diff options
| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 02:14:28 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 02:14:28 -0700 |
| commit | 4813ca0585b9e8b768962e5bcc8dfe85fd545f5b (patch) | |
| tree | a70cdcd523885e3e506893af915062b6d3658744 /24797-h | |
Diffstat (limited to '24797-h')
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/24797-h.htm | 20533 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig001.png | bin | 0 -> 27640 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig002.png | bin | 0 -> 45453 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig003.png | bin | 0 -> 38813 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig004.png | bin | 0 -> 47445 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig005.png | bin | 0 -> 59825 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig006.png | bin | 0 -> 46462 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig007.png | bin | 0 -> 66361 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig008.png | bin | 0 -> 55546 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig009.png | bin | 0 -> 48667 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig010.png | bin | 0 -> 14724 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig011.png | bin | 0 -> 34053 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig012.png | bin | 0 -> 16603 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig013.png | bin | 0 -> 19999 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig014.png | bin | 0 -> 34624 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig015.png | bin | 0 -> 54736 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig016.png | bin | 0 -> 63060 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig017.png | bin | 0 -> 78607 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig018.png | bin | 0 -> 41842 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig019.png | bin | 0 -> 87547 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig020.png | bin | 0 -> 81390 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig021.png | bin | 0 -> 28859 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig022.png | bin | 0 -> 17699 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig023.png | bin | 0 -> 124080 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig024.png | bin | 0 -> 85139 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig025.png | bin | 0 -> 90020 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig026.png | bin | 0 -> 57174 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig027.png | bin | 0 -> 94588 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig028.png | bin | 0 -> 60169 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig029.png | bin | 0 -> 68377 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig030.png | bin | 0 -> 19144 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig031.png | bin | 0 -> 57182 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig032.png | bin | 0 -> 88287 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig033.png | bin | 0 -> 24775 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig034.png | bin | 0 -> 134069 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig035.png | bin | 0 -> 49864 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig036.png | bin | 0 -> 49578 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig037.png | bin | 0 -> 69186 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig038.png | bin | 0 -> 23965 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig039.png | bin | 0 -> 29469 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig040.png | bin | 0 -> 29116 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig041.png | bin | 0 -> 22755 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig042.png | bin | 0 -> 50734 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig043.png | bin | 0 -> 147599 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig044.png | bin | 0 -> 48587 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig045.png | bin | 0 -> 66344 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig046.png | bin | 0 -> 107004 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig047.png | bin | 0 -> 116731 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig048.png | bin | 0 -> 94360 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig049.png | bin | 0 -> 74428 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig050.png | bin | 0 -> 1805 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig051.png | bin | 0 -> 53218 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig052.png | bin | 0 -> 25643 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig053.png | bin | 0 -> 41377 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig054.png | bin | 0 -> 34710 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig055.png | bin | 0 -> 52766 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig056.png | bin | 0 -> 53150 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig057.png | bin | 0 -> 50618 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig058.png | bin | 0 -> 82665 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig059.png | bin | 0 -> 104516 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig060.png | bin | 0 -> 73801 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig061.png | bin | 0 -> 80128 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig062.png | bin | 0 -> 93017 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig063.png | bin | 0 -> 96952 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig064.png | bin | 0 -> 176519 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig065.png | bin | 0 -> 48882 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig066.png | bin | 0 -> 21983 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig067.png | bin | 0 -> 25499 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig068.png | bin | 0 -> 44335 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig069.png | bin | 0 -> 54547 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig070.png | bin | 0 -> 33616 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig071.png | bin | 0 -> 94370 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig072.png | bin | 0 -> 96295 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig073.png | bin | 0 -> 27288 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig074.png | bin | 0 -> 142358 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig075.png | bin | 0 -> 123917 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig076.png | bin | 0 -> 26856 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig077.png | bin | 0 -> 20463 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig078.png | bin | 0 -> 54703 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig079.png | bin | 0 -> 51103 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig080.png | bin | 0 -> 13026 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig081.png | bin | 0 -> 63902 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig082.png | bin | 0 -> 44931 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig083.png | bin | 0 -> 60455 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig084.png | bin | 0 -> 33808 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig085.png | bin | 0 -> 91622 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig086.png | bin | 0 -> 61443 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig087.png | bin | 0 -> 19147 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig088.png | bin | 0 -> 66120 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 24797-h/images/fig089.png | bin | 0 -> 34216 bytes |
90 files changed, 20533 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/24797-h/24797-h.htm b/24797-h/24797-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8db3e1a --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/24797-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,20533 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of A History of Sea Power, by William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott</title> + <style type="text/css"> + <!-- + body { background: white; color: black; + margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; } + h1 { text-align: center; margin-top: 4em; } + h1.pg { text-align: center; margin-top: 0em; } + h2 { text-align: center; margin-top: 2em; } + h3 { text-align: center; margin-top: 0em; } + p.indent { text-indent: 1em; text-align: justify; } + p.footnote { text-align: justify; font-size: smaller; } + p.center { text-align: center; } + p.sm_center { text-align: center; font-size: smaller; } + p.author { text-align: center; font-size: larger; + margin: 2em; } + p.bquote { margin-left: 2em; } + p.subtitle { text-align: center; font-size: larger; } + p.bigtitle { text-align: center; font-size: x-large; + margin-top: 4em; } + p.list { text-indent: -1em; margin-left: 1em; + margin-top: 0em; margin-bottom: 0em; + text-align: justify; } + p.index { text-indent: -1em; margin-left: 1em; + margin-top: 0em; margin-bottom: 0em; + text-align: justify; font-size: smaller; } + p.list_sc { text-indent: -1em; margin-left: 1em; + margin-top: 0em; margin-bottom: 0em; + text-align: justify; font-variant: small-caps; } + table.data { border-collapse: collapse; + margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; } + table.image { margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; + font-size: smaller; } + td { padding-left: 3px; padding-right: 3px; } + td.left { text-align: left; } + td.center { text-align: center; } + td.btmctr { text-align: center; vertical-align: bottom; } + td.right { text-align: right; } + td.right_br { text-align: right; border-right: solid black thin; } + td.right_brb { text-align: right; border-right: solid black thin; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.right_bb { text-align: right; border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.top { vertical-align: top; } + td.center_bb { text-align: center; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.center_br { text-align: center; + border-right: solid black thin; } + td.center_btrb { text-align: center; + border-top: solid black thin; + border-right: solid black thin; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.center_btb { text-align: center; + border-top: solid black thin; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.center_brb { text-align: center; + border-right: solid black thin; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.center_bb { text-align: center; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.left_bb { border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.left_br { border-right: solid black thin; } + td.left_brb { border-right: solid black thin; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.left_btb { border-top: solid black thin; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.left_btrb { border-top: solid black thin; + border-right: solid black thin; + border-bottom: solid black thin; } + td.indent { text-indent: 1em; text-align: justify; } + span.sc { font-variant: small-caps; } + span.page { position: absolute; left: 92%; right: auto; + text-align: right; text-indent: 0em; + color: gray; background: white; + font-size: 9px; font-weight: normal; } + + hr.full { width: 100%; + margin-top: 3em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + height: 4px; + border-width: 4px 0 0 0; /* remove all borders except the top one */ + border-style: solid; + border-color: #000000; + clear: both; } + a:link {color:#0000ff; + text-decoration:none; } + link {color:#0000ff; + text-decoration:none; } + a:visited {color:#0000ff; + text-decoration:none; } + a:hover {color:#ff0000; + text-decoration: underline; } + pre {font-size: 85%; } + --> + </style> +</head> +<body> +<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, A History of Sea Power, by William Oliver +Stevens and Allan Westcott</h1> +<pre> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre> +<p>Title: A History of Sea Power</p> +<p>Author: William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott</p> +<p>Release Date: March 10, 2008 [eBook #24797]</p> +<p>Language: English</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF SEA POWER***</p> +<p> </p> +<h3>E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall</h3> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full"> + +<h1>A HISTORY OF SEA POWER</h1> + +<p class="sm_center">BY</p> + +<p class="author">WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS</p> + +<p class="sm_center">AND</p> + +<p class="author">ALLAN WESTCOTT</p> + +<p class="sm_center"> +PROFESSORS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY +</p> + +<p class="sm_center" style="margin: 3em;"> +WITH MAPS, DIAGRAMS,<br>AND ILLUSTRATIONS +</p> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p class="center"> +NEW YORK<br> +GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY +</p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<h2><a name="page_v"><span class="page">Page v</span></a> +PREFACE</h2> + +<p class="indent"> +This volume has been called into being by the absence of any brief +work covering the evolution and influence of sea power from the +beginnings to the present time. In a survey at once so comprehensive +and so short, only the high points of naval history can be touched. +Yet it is the hope of the authors that they have not, for that +reason, slighted the significance of the story. Naval history is +more than a sequence of battles. Sea power has always been a vital +force in the rise and fall of nations and in the evolution of +civilization. It is this significance, this larger, related point +of view, which the authors have tried to make clear in recounting +the story of the sea. In regard to naval principles, also, this +general survey should reveal those unchanging truths of warfare +which have been demonstrated from Salamis to Jutland. The tendency +of our modern era of mechanical development has been to forget the +value of history. It is true that the 16" gun is a great advance +over the 32-pounder of Trafalgar, but it is equally true that the +naval officer of to-day must still sit at the feet of Nelson. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The authors would acknowledge their indebtedness to Professor F. +Wells Williams of Yale, and to the Classical Departments of Harvard +and the University of Chicago for valuable aid in bibliography. +Thanks are due also to Commander C. C. Gill, U. S. N., Captain T. G. +Frothingam, U. S. N. R., Dr. C. Alphonso Smith, and to colleagues of +the Department of English at the Naval Academy for helpful criticism. +As to the "References" at the conclusion of each chapter, it <a +name="page_vi"><span class="page">Page vi</span></a> should be said +that they are merely references, not bibliographies. The titles +are recommended to the reader who may wish to study a period in +greater detail, and who would prefer a short list to a complete +bibliography. +</p> + +<p class="bquote"> +<span class="sc">William Oliver Stevens</span><br> +<span class="sc">Allan Westcott</span> +</p> + +<p> +United States Naval Academy,<br> + <i>June</i>, 1920. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_vii"><span class="page">Page vii</span></a> +CONTENTS</h2> + +<table> + <tr><td class="right"><span class="sc">chapter</span></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">I </td> + <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_15"><span class="sc">The + Beginnings of Navies</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">II </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Athens as a Sea + Power:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td> </td><td style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td>1. <a href="#page_27"><span class="sc">The Persian + War</span></a></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td>2. <a href="#page_39"><span class="sc">The Peloponnesian + War</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">III </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The Sea Power of + Rome:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td>1. <a href="#page_49"><span class="sc">The Punic + Wars</span></a></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td>2. <a href="#page_61"><span class="sc">The Imperial + Navy</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">IV </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The Navies of the Middle + Ages:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_71"><span class="sc">The Eastern + Empire</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">V </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The Navies of the Middle + Ages</span> [<i>Continued</i>]</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_87"><span class="sc">Venice and the + Turk</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">VI </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Opening the Ocean + Routes:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td>1. <a href="#page_110"><span class="sc">Portugal and the New + Route to India</span></a></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td>2. <a href="#page_121"><span class="sc">Spain and the New + World</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">VII </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Sea Power in the + North:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_130"><span class="sc">Holland's Struggle for + Independence</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">VIII </td> + <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_145"><span class="sc">England and + the Armada</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">IX </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Rise of English Sea + Power:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_168"><span class="sc">Wars with the + Dutch</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">X </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Rise of English Sea + Power</span> [<i>continued</i>]:</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_193"><span class="sc">Wars with France to the + French Revolution</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XI </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Napoleonic Wars:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_222"><span class="sc">The First of June and + Camperdown</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XII </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Napoleonic Wars</span> + [<i>Continued</i>]:</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_238"><span class="sc">The Rise of + Nelson</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XIII </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Napoleonic Wars</span> + [<i>Concluded</i>]:</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_261"><span class="sc">Trafalgar and + After</span></a><a name="page_viii"><span class="page">Page + viii</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XIV </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Revolution in Naval + Warfare:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_286"><span class="sc">Hampton Roads and + Lissa</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XV </td> + <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_312"><span class="sc">Rivalry for + World Power</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XVI </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The World War:</span></td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_345"><span class="sc">The First + Year</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XVII </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The World War</span> + [<i>Continued</i>]:</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_386"><span class="sc">The Battle of + Jutland</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XVIII </td> + <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The World War</span> + [<i>Concluded</i>]:</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td><a href="#page_419"><span class="sc">Commerce + Warfare</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right">XIX </td> + <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_441"><span class="sc"> + Conclusion</span></a></td></tr> + + <tr><td class="right"> </td> + <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_451"><span class="sc"> + Index</span></a></td></tr> + +</table> + +<h2><a name="page_ix"><span class="page">Page ix</span></a> +MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_16">Egyptian Ship</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_18">Scene of Ancient Sea Power</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_21">Greek War Galley</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_22">Greek Merchant Ship</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_29">Route of Xerxes' Fleet to Battle of Salamis</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_30">Scene of Preliminary Naval Operations, Campaign + of Salamis</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_34">The Battle of Salamis, 480 B. C.</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_40">The Athenian Empire at its Height—About + 450 B. C.</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_41">Scene of Phormio's Campaign</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_42">Battle of the Corinthian Gulf, 429 B. C.</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_50">Scene of the Punic Wars</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_54">Roman Formation at Ecnomus</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_55">Carthaginian Tactics at the Battle of Ecnomus, + 256 B. C.</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_58">Points of Interest in the First Punic War</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_65">Scene of Battle of Actium, 31 B. C.</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_73">The Saracen Empire at its Height, About 715 A. + D.</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_75">Europe's Eastern Frontier</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_77">Constantinople and Vicinity</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_88">Theater of Operations, Venice and the Turk</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_93">16th Century Galley</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_106">Battle of Lepanto, October 7, 1571</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_111">Cross-Staff</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_113">The Known and Unknown World in 1450</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_114">Portuguese Voyages and Possessions</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_124">Flagship of Columbus</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_126">Chart of A. D. 1589</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_136">The Netherlands in the 16th Century</a> + <a name="page_x"><span class="page">Page x</span></a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_147">Galleon</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_159">Cruise of the Spanish Armada</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_160">Original "Eagle" Formation of the Armada</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_161">The Course of the Armada up the Channel</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_171">Scene of the Principal Naval Actions of the 17th + Century Between England and Holland and England and France</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_174">The Battle of Portland, February 18, 1653</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_186">The Thames Estuary</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_194">Three-Decked Ship of the Line, 18th Century</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_205">The West Indies</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_208">Scene of the Yorktown Campaign</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_209">Battle of the Virginia Capes, September 5, + 1781</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_214">Battle of the Saints' Passage, April 12, + 1782</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_231">Battle of the First of June, 1794</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_235">Battle of Camperdown, October 11, 1797</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_242">Battle of Cape St. Vincent, February 14, 1797</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_244">The Nile Campaign, May-August, 1798</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_249">Coast Map—From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth + of the Nile</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_250">Battle of the Nile</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_256">Battle of Copenhagen</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_264">Position of British and Enemy Ships, March, + 1805</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_268">Nelson's Pursuit of Villeneuve</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_271">Nelson's Victory</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_274">Battle of Trafalgar, October 21, 1805</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_278">Trafalgar, About 12:30</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_288">Early Ironclads</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_294">Bushnell's Turtle</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_295">Fulton's Nautilus</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_301">Battle of Lissa, July 20, 1866</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_307">Battle of the Yalu, September 17, 1894</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_316">Approaches to Manila</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_318">Battle of Manila, May 1, 1898</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_322">West Indies—Movements in Santiago + Campaign</a> + <a name="page_xi"><span class="page">Page xi</span></a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_326">Battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_328">Theater of Operations, Russo-Japanese War</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_333">Harbor of Port Arthur</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_336">Rojdestvensky's Cruise, October 18, 1904-May 27, + 1905</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_340">Battle of Tsushima, May 27, 1905</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_352">Heligoland Bight Action</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_354">Heligoland Bight Action, Final Phase, + 12:30-1:40</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_361">Battle of Coronel, November 1, 1914</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_362">Admiral Von Spee's Movements</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_364">Battle of Falkland Islands, December 8, + 1914</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_368">The Cruise of the Emden, September 1-November + 9, 1914</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_371">Theater of Operations, in the North Sea</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_372">Dogger Bank Action, January 24, 1915</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_376">The Approaches to Constantinople</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_380">Dardanelles Defenses</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_388">Cruising Formation of the British Battle + Fleet</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_389">Beatty's Cruising Formation</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_390">Type of German Battle Cruiser: The + Derflinger</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_393">Type of British Battle Cruiser: The Lion</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_395">Battle of Jutland: First Phase</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_399">Type of British Battleship: The Iron Duke</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_400">Battle of Jutland: Second and Third Phases</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_402">Type of German Battleship: the Koenig</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_423">Effects of the Blockade of Germany</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_425">German Barred Zones</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_428">Ocean-Going Types of German Submarines</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_433">Ostend-Zeebrugge Area</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_435">Zeebrugge Harbor with German Defenses and British + Blockships</a></p> + +<p class="list_sc"> +<a href="#page_436">British, Allied and Neutral Merchant Ships + Destroyed by German Raiders, Submarines and Mines</a></p> + +<p class="bigtitle"> +<a name="page_13"><span class="page">Page 13</span></a> +A HISTORY OF SEA POWER</p> + +<h2><a name="page_15"><span class="page">Page 15</span></a> +CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p class="subtitle">THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Civilization and sea power arose from the Mediterranean, and the +progress of recent archeological research has shown that civilizations +and empires had been reared in the Mediterranean on sea power long +before the dawn of history. Since the records of Egypt are far +better preserved than those of any other nation of antiquity, and +the discovery of the Rosetta stone has made it possible to read +them, we know most about the beginnings of civilization in Egypt. +We know, for instance, that an Egyptian king some 2000 years before +Christ possessed a fleet of 400 fighting ships. But it appears +now that long before this time the island of Crete was a great +naval and commercial power, that in the earliest dynasties of Egypt +Cretan fleets were carrying on a commerce with the Nile valley. +Indeed, the Cretans may have taught the Egyptians something of the +art of building sea-going ships for trade and war.[1] At all events, +Crete may be regarded as the first great sea power of history, an +island empire like Great Britain to-day, extending its influence +from Sicily to Palestine and dominating the eastern Mediterranean +for many centuries. From recent excavations of the ancient capital +we get an interesting light on the old Greek legends of the Minotaur +and <a name="page_16"><span class="page">Page 16</span></a> the +Labyrinth, going back to the time when the island kingdom levied +tribute, human as well as monetary, on its subject cities throughout +the Ægean. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: It is interesting to note that the earliest empires, +Assyria and Egypt, were not naval powers, because they arose in rich +river valleys abundantly capable of sustaining their inhabitants. +They did not need to command the sea.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On this sea power Crete reared an astonishingly advanced civilization. +Until recent times, for instance, the Phœnicians had been credited +with the invention of the alphabet. We know now that 1000 years +before the Phœnicians began to write the Cretans had evolved a +system of written characters—as yet undeciphered—and a +decimal system for numbers. A correspondingly high stage of excellence +had been reached in engineering, architecture, and the fine arts, +and even in decay Crete left to Greece the tradition of mastery +in laws and government. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 578px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig001.png" width="578" height="248" alt="Fig. 1"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right">From Torr, <i>Ancient Ships</i>.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">EGYPTIAN SHIP</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The power of Crete was already in its decline centuries before the +Trojan War, but during a thousand years it had spread its own and +Egyptian culture over the shores of the Ægean. The destruction +of the island empire in about 1400 B.C. apparently was due to some +great disaster that destroyed her fleet and left her open to invasion +by a conquering race—probably the Greeks—who ravaged +her cities by sword and fire. On account of her commanding position +in the Mediterranean, Crete might again have risen to sea power +but for the endless civil wars that marked her subsequent history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The successor to Crete as mistress of the sea was Phœnicia. The +Phœnicians, oddly enough, were a Semitic people, a <a +name="page_17"><span class="page">Page 17</span></a> nomadic race +with no traditions of the sea whatever. When, however, they migrated +to the coast and settled, they found themselves in a narrow strip +of coast between a range of mountains and the sea. The city of Tyre +itself was erected on an island. Consequently these descendants of +herdsmen were compelled to find their livelihood upon the sea—as +were the Venetians and the Dutch in later ages—and for several +hundred years they maintained their control of the ocean highways. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Phœnicians were not literary, scientific, or artistic; they +were commercial. Everything they did was with an eye to business. +They explored the Mediterranean and beyond for the sake of tapping +new sources of wealth, they planted colonies for the sake of having +trading posts on their routes, and they developed fighting ships for +the sake of preserving their trade monopolies. Moreover, Phœnicia +lay at the end of the Asiatic caravan routes. Hence Phœnician ships +received the wealth of the Nile valley and Mesopotamia and distributed +it along the shores of the Mediterranean. Phœnician ships also +uncovered the wealth of Spain and the North African coast, and, +venturing into the Atlantic, drew metals from the British Isles. +According to Herodotus, a Phœnician squadron circumnavigated +Africa at the beginning of the seventh century before Christ, +completing the voyage in three years. We should know far more now of +the extent of the explorations made by these master mariners of +antiquity were it not for the fact that they kept their trade routes +secret as far as possible in order to preserve their trade monopoly. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In developing and organizing these trade routes the Phœnicians +planted colonies on the islands of the Mediterranean,—Sicily, +Sardinia, Corsica, and Malta. They held both shores of the Straits +of Gibraltar, and on the Atlantic shores of Spain established posts +at Cadiz and Tarshish, the latter commonly supposed to have been +situated just north of Cadiz at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River. +Cadiz was their distributing point for the metals of northern Spain +and the British Isles. The most famous colony was Carthage, situated +<a name="page_18"><span class="page">Page 18</span></a> near the +present city of Tunis. Carthage was founded during the first half +of the ninth century before Christ, and on the decay of the parent +state became in turn mistress of the western Mediterranean, holding +sway until crushed by Rome in the Punic Wars. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the methods of the Phœnicians and their colonists in +establishing trade with primitive peoples, we get an interesting +picture from Herodotus,[1] who describes how the Carthaginians +conducted business with barbarous tribes on the northern coast of +Africa. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">History</span>, translated by Geo. +Rawlinson, vol. III, p. 144.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 599px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig002.png" width="599" height="313" alt="Fig. 2"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +"When they (the Carthaginian traders) arrive, forthwith they unload +their wares, and having disposed them in orderly fashion on the +beach, leave them, and returning aboard their ships, raise a great +smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, came dawn to the shore, +and laying out to view so much gold as they think the wares to be +worth, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come +ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it up and +go their way; but if it does not seem sufficient they go aboard +their ships once more and wait patiently. Then the others approach +and add to the gold till the Carthaginians are satisfied. Neither +party deals unfairly with the other; for the Carthaginians <a +name="page_19"><span class="page">Page 19</span></a> never touch +the gold till it comes up to the estimated value of their goods, +nor do the natives ever carry off the goads till the gold has been +taken away." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In addition to the enormous profits of the carrying trade the +Phœnicians had a practical monopoly of the famous "Tyrian dyes," +which were in great demand throughout the known world. These dyes were +obtained from two kinds of shellfish together with an alkali prepared +from seaweed. Phœnicians were also pioneers in the art of making +glass. It is not hard to understand, therefore, how Phœnicia grew +so extraordinarily rich as to rouse the envy of neighboring rulers, +and to maintain themselves the traders of Tyre and Sidon had to +develop fighting fleets as well as trading fleets. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Early in Egyptian history the distinction was made between the +"round" ships of commerce and the "long" ships of war. The round +ship, as the name suggests, was built for cargo capacity rather +than for speed. It depended on sail, with the oars as auxiliaries. +The long ship was designed for speed, depending on oars and using +sail only as auxiliary. And while the round ship was of deep draft +and rode to anchor, the shallow flat-bottomed long ships were drawn +up on shore. The Phœnicians took the Egyptian and Cretan models +and improved them. They lowered the bows of the fighting ships, +added to the blunt ram a beak near the water's edge, and strung +the shields of the fighting men along the bulwarks to protect the +rowers. To increase the driving force and the speed, they added a +second and then a third bank of oars, thus producing the "bireme" and +the "trireme." These were the types they handed down to the Greeks, +and in fact there was little advance made beyond the Phœnician +war galley during all the subsequent centuries of the Age of the Oar. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +About the beginning of the seventh century before Christ the +Phœnicians had reached the summit of their power on the seas. +Their extraordinary wealth tempted the king of Assyria, in 725 B.C., +to cross the mountain barrier with a great army. He had no difficulty +in overrunning the country, but the inhabitants fled to their colonies. +The great city of <a name="page_20"><span class="page">Page +20</span></a> Tyre, being on an island, defied the invader, and finally +the Assyrian king gave up and withdrew to his own country. Having +realized at great cost that he could not subdue the Phœnicians +without a navy, he set about finding one. By means of bribes and threats +he managed to seduce three Phœnician cities to his side. These +furnished him sixty ships officered by Phœnicians, but manned by +Assyrian crews. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With this fleet an attack was made on Tyre, but such was the contempt +felt by the Tyrians for their enemy that they held only twelve ships +for defense. These twelve went out against the sixty, utterly routed +them, and took 500 prisoners. For five years longer the Assyrian king +maintained a siege of Tyre from the mainland, attempting to keep the +city from its source of fresh water, but as the Tyrians had free +command of the sea, they had no difficulty in getting supplies of all +kinds from their colonies. At the end of five years the Assyrians again +returned home, defeated by the Phœnician control of the sea. +When, twenty years later, Phœnicia was subjugated by Assyria, +it was due to the lack of union among the scattered cities and +colonies of the great sea empire. Widely separated, governed by their +own princes, the individual colonies had too little sense of loyalty +for the mother country. Each had its own fleets and its own interests; +in consequence an Assyrian fleet was able to destroy the Phœnician +fleets in detail. From this point till the rise of Athens as a sea +power, the fleets of Phœnicia still controlled the sea, but they +served the plans of conquest of alien rulers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a dependency of Persia, Phœnicia enabled Cambyses to conquer +Egypt. However, when the Phœnician fleet was ordered to subjugate +Carthage, already a strong power in the west, the Phœnicians refused +on the ground of the kinship between Carthage and Phœnicia. And +the help of Phœnicia was so essential to the Persian monarch that +he countermanded the order. Indeed the relation of Phœnicia to +Persia amounted to something more nearly like that of an ally than +a conquered province, for it was to the interests of Persia to +keep the Phœnicians happy and loyal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When, in 498 B.C., the Greeks of Asia and the neighboring <a +name="page_21"><span class="page">Page 21</span></a> islands revolted, +it was due chiefly to the loyalty of the Phœnicians that the Persian +empire was saved. Thereafter, the Persian yoke was fastened on the +Asiatic Greeks, and any prospect of a Greek civilization developing +on the eastern shore of the Ægean was destroyed. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 567px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig003.png" width="567" height="365" alt="Fig. 3"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right">From Torr, <i>Ancient Ships</i>.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">GREEK WAR GALLEY</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +But on the western shore lay flourishing Greek cities still independent +of Persian rule. Moreover, the coastal towns like Corinth and Athens +were developing considerable power on the sea, and it was evident +that unless European Greece were subdued it would stand as a barrier +between Persia and the western Mediterranean. Darius perceived the +situation and prepared to destroy these Greek states before they +should become too formidable. The story of this effort, ending at +Salamis and Platea, and breaking for all time the power of Persia, +belongs in the subsequent chapter that narrates the rise and fall +of Athens as a sea power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this point, it is worth pausing to consider in detail the war +galley which the Phœnicians had developed and which they handed +down to the Greeks at this turning point in the world's history. +The bireme and the trireme were adopted <a name="page_22"><span +class="page">Page 22</span></a> by the Greeks, apparently without +alteration, save that at Salamis the Greek galleys were said to have +been more strongly built and to have presented a lower freeboard +than those of the Phœnicians. A hundred years later, about 330 +B.C., the Greeks developed the four-banked ship, and Alexander of +Macedon is said to have maintained on the Euphrates a squadron of +seven-banked ships. In the following century the Macedonians had +ships of sixteen banks of oars, and this was probably the limit +for sea-going ships in antiquity. These multiple banked ships must +have been most unhandy, for a reversal of policy set in till about +the beginning of the Christian era the Romans had gone back to +two-banked ships. In medieval times war galleys reverted to a single +row of oars on each side, but required four or five men to every +oar. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 634px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig004.png" width="634" height="426" alt="Fig. 4"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right">From Torr, <i>Ancient Ships</i>.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">GREEK MERCHANT SHIP</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +At the time of the Persian war the trireme was the standard type of +warship, as it had been for the hundred years before, and continued to +be during the hundred years <a name="page_23"><span class="page">Page +23</span></a> that followed. In fact, the name trireme was used +loosely for all ships of war whether they had two banks of oars +or three. But the fleets that fought in the Persian war and in +the Peloponnesian war were composed of three-banked ships, and +fortunately we have in the records of the Athenian dockyards accurate +information as to structural detail. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Athenian trireme was about 150 feet in length with a beam of 20 +feet. The beam was therefore only 2/15 of the length. (A merchant +ship of the same period was about 180 feet long with a beam of 1/4 +its length.) The trireme was fitted with one mast and square sail, +the latter being used only when the wind was fair, as auxiliary +to the oars, especially when it needed to retire from battle. In +fact, the phrase "hoist the sail" came to be used colloquially +like our "turn tail" as a term for running away. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The triremes carried two sails, usually made of linen, a larger +one used in cruising and a smaller one for emergency in battle. +Before action it was customary to stow the larger sail on shore, +and the mast itself was lowered to prevent its snapping under the +shock of ramming. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The forward part of the trireme was constructed with a view to +effectiveness in ramming. Massive catheads projected far enough to +rip away the upper works of an enemy, while the bronze beak at the +waterline drove into her hull. This beak, or ram, was constructed +of a core of timber heavily sheathed with bronze, presenting three +teeth. Although the ram was the prime weapon of the ship, it often +became so badly wrenched in collision as to start the whole forward +part of the vessel leaking. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The rowers were seated on benches fitted into a rectangular structure +inside the hull. These benches were so compactly adjusted that +the naval architects allowed only two feet of freeboard for every +bank of oars. Thus the Roman quinquiremes of the Punic wars stood +only about ten feet above water. The covering of this rectangular +structure formed a sort of hurricane deck, standing about three +feet above the gangway that ran around the ship at about the level +of the bulwarks. This gangway and upper deck formed the platform <a +name="page_24"><span class="page">Page 24</span></a> for the fighting +men in battle. Sometimes the open space between the hurricane deck +and the gangway was fenced in with shields or screens to protect the +rowers of the uppermost bank of oars from the arrows and javelins +of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The complement of a trireme amounted to about 200 men. The captain, +or "trierarch," commanded implicit obedience. Under him were a +sailing master, various petty officers, sailors, soldiers or marines, +and oarsmen. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The trireme expanded in later centuries to the quinquereme: upper +works were added and a second mast, but in essentials it was the +same type of war vessel that dominated the Mediterranean for three +thousand years—an oar driven craft that attempted to disable +its enemy by ramming or breaking away the oars. After contact the +fighting was of a hand to hand character such as prevailed in battles +on land. These characteristics were as true of the galley of Lepanto +(1571 A.D.) as of the trireme of Salamis (480 B.C.). Of the three +cardinal virtues of the fighting ship, mobility, seaworthiness, +and ability to keep the sea, or cruising radius, the oar-driven +type possessed only the first. It was fast, it could hold position +accurately, it could spin about almost on its own axis, but it was +so frail that it had to run for shelter before a moderate wind +and sea. In consequence naval operations were limited to the summer +months. As to its cargo capacity, it was so small that it was unable +to carry provisions to sustain its own crew for more than a few +days. As a rule the trireme was beached at night, with the crew +sleeping on shore, and as far as possible the meals were cooked +and eaten on shore. In the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), +for example, the Spartans fell upon the Athenians when their ships +were drawn up on the beach and the crews were cooking their dinner. +Moreover, the factors of speed and distance were both limited by +the physical fatigue of the oarsmen. In the language of to-day, +therefore, the oar-driven man-of-war had a small "cruising radius." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This dependence on the land and this sensitiveness to weather are +important facts in ancient naval history. It is fair to say that +storms did far more to destroy fleets and naval <a name="page_25"><span +class="page">Page 25</span></a> expeditions than battles during +the entire age of the oar. The opposite extreme was reached in +Nelson's day. His lumbering ships of the line made wretched speed +and straggling formations, but they were able to weather a hurricane +and to keep the sea for an indefinite length of time. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a final word on the beginnings of navies, emphasis should be +laid on the enormous importance of these early mariners, such as +the Cretans and the Phœnicians, as builders of civilization. The +venturesome explorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port +not only opened up a new source of wealth but also established a +reciprocal relation that quickened civilization at both ends of +his route. The cargo ships that left the Nile delta distributed the +arts of Egypt as well as its wheat, and the richest civilization of +the ancient world, that of Greece, rose on foundation stones brought +from Egypt, Assyria, and Phœnicia. It may be said of Phœnicia +herself that she built-up her advanced culture on ideas borrowed almost +wholly from her customers. But control of the seas for trade involved +control of the seas for war, and behind the merchantman stood the +trireme. It is significant and appropriate that a Phœnician coin +that has come down to us bears the relief of a ship of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In contrast with these early sea explorers and sea fighters stand +the peoples of China and India. Having reached a high state of +culture at an early period, they nevertheless, sought no contact +with the world outside and became stagnant for thousands of years. +Indeed, among the Hindus the crossing of the sea was a crime to be +expiated only by the most agonizing penance. Hence these peoples +of Asia, the most numerous in the world, exercised no influence +on the development of civilization compared with a mere handful +of people in Crete or the island city of Tyre. And for the same +reason China and India ceased to progress and became for centuries +mere backwaters of history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is worth noting also that the Mediterranean, leading westwards +from the early developed nations of Asia Minor and Egypt, opened +a westward course to the advance of discovery and colonization, +and this trend continued as the Pillars of <a name="page_26"><span +class="page">Page 26</span></a> Hercules led to the Atlantic and +eventually to the new world. For every nation that bordered the +Mediterranean illimitable highways opened out for expansion, provided +it possessed the stamina and the skill to win them. And in those days +they were practically the only highways. Frail as the early ships +were and great as were the perils they had to face, communications +by water were far centuries faster and safer than communications +by land. Hence civilization followed the path of the sea. Even in +these early beginnings it is easy to see that sea-borne commerce +leads to the founding of colonies and the formation of an empire +whose parts are linked together by trade routes, and finally, that +the preservation of such an empire depends an the naval control +of sea. This was as true of Crete and Phœnicia as it was later +true of Venice, Holland, and England. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Sea Kings of Crete</span>, J. Baikie, 1910.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Phœnicia</span>, Story of the Nations Series, + George Rawlinson, 1895.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Sailing Ship</span>, E. Keble Chatterton, 1909.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Ships and Their Ways of Other Days</span>, E. Keble + Chatterton, 1913.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Ancient Ships</span>, Cecil Torr, 1894.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Archeologie Navale</span>, Auguste Jal, 1840.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Prehistoric Naval Architecture of the North of + Europe</span>, G. H. Buhmer, in Report of the U. S. National Museum, + 1893. This article contains a complete bibliography on the subject + of ancient ships.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Sea Power and Freedom</span> (chap. 2), Gerard Fiennes, + 1918. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_27"><span class="page">Page 27</span></a> +CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p class="subtitle">ATHENS AS A SEA POWER</p> + +<p class="center">1. THE PERSIAN WAR</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In determining to crush the independence of the Greek cities of +the west, Darius was influenced not only by the desire to destroy +a dangerous rival on the sea and an obstacle to further advances +by the Persian empire, but also to tighten his hold on the Greek +colonies of Asia Minor. Helped by the Phœnician fleet and the +treachery of the Lesbians and Samians, he had succeeded in putting +down a formidable rebellion in 500 B.C. In this rebellion the Asiatic +Greeks had received help from their Athenian brethren on the other +side of the Ægean; indeed just so long as Greek independence +flourished anywhere there would always be the threat of revolt +in the Greek colonies of Persia. Darius perceived rightly that +the prestige and the future power of his empire depended on his +conquering Greece. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In 492 he dispatched Mardonius with an army of invasion to subdue +Attica and Eretria, and at the same time sent forth a great fleet +to conquer the independent island communities of the Ægean. +Mardonius succeeded in overcoming the tribes of Thrace and Macedonia, +but the fleet, after taking the island of Thasus, was struck by a +storm that wrecked three hundred triremes with a loss of 20,000 +lives. As the broken remnants of the fleet returned to Asia, leaving +Mardonius with no sea communications, and harassed by increasing +opposition, he was compelled to retreat also. In 490 Darius sent out +another army under Mardonius, this time embarking it on a fleet of +600 triremes which succeeded in arriving safely at the coast of Attica +in the bay of Marathon. While the army was <a name="page_28"><span +class="page">Page 28</span></a> disembarking it was attacked by +Miltiades and utterly defeated. The second expedition, therefore, +came to nothing. But Marathon can hardly be called a decisive battle +because it merely postponed the invasion; it affected in no way +the communications of the Persians and it did not weaken seriously +their military resources. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The great savior of Greece at this crisis was the Athenian, +Themistocles. He foresaw the renewed efforts of the Persian king +to destroy Greece, and realized also that the most vital point in +the coming conflict would be the control of the sea. Accordingly +he urged upon the Athenians the necessity of building a powerful +fleet. In this policy he was aided by one of those futile wars +so characteristic of Greek history, a war between Athens and the +island of Ægina. In order to overcome the Æginetans, +who had a large fleet, the Athenians were compelled to build a +larger one, and by the time this purpose was accomplished rumors +came that the Persian king was getting ready another invasion of +Greece. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Campaign of Salamis</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The third attempt was undertaken ten years after the second, in +the year 480, under Xerxes, the successor to Darius. This time the +very immensity of the forces employed was to overcome all opposition +and all misfortunes. An army, variously estimated at from one to +five million men, crossed the Hellespont on a bridge of boats to +invade the peninsula from the north, while a fleet of 1200 triremes +was assembled to insure the command of the sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Against the unlimited resources of the Persian empire and the unity +of plan represented by Xerxes and his generals, the Greeks had +little to offer. They possessed the two advantages of the defensive, +knowledge of the terrain and interior lines,[1] but their resources +were small and their spirit divided. <a name="page_29"><span +class="page">Page 29</span></a> Greece in those days was, as was +later said of Italy, "merely a geographical expression." The various +cities were mutually jealous and hostile, and it took a great common +danger to bring them even into a semblance of coöperation. +Even during this desperate crisis the cities of western Greece, +counting themselves reasonably safe from invasion, declined to +send a ship or a man for the common cause. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: "'Interior Lines' conveys the meaning that from a +central position one can assemble more rapidly on either of two +opposite fronts than the enemy can, and therefore utilize force +more effectively." NAVAL STRATEGY, A. T. Mahan, p. 32.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 601px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig005.png" width="601" height="432" alt="Fig. 5"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">ROUTE OF XERXES' FLEET TO BATTLE OF + SALAMIS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The Persian army advanced without opposition as far as the pass +of Thermopylæ, which guarded the only road into the rest +of Greece. Twelve days after the army had started on its march +the great fleet crossed the Ægean to establish contact with +the army and bring supplies. The army was checked by the valor of +Leonidas, and the Persian fleet was intercepted by a Greek fleet +which stood guard over the channel leading to the Gulf of Lamia, +thus protecting the sea flank of Leonidas. The Persian fleet, after +crossing the open sea safely, made its base at Sepias preparatory +to the attack on the Greek fleet. The latter numbered only about +<a name="page_30"><span class="page">Page 30</span></a> 380 vessels +to some 1200 of their enemy and the prospects for the Persian cause +looked bright indeed. But as the very number of the Persian ships made +it impossible to beach all of them for the night a large proportion +of them were anchored, lying in eight lines, prows toward the sea. +At dawn a northeast gale fell upon them, and, according to the +Greek accounts, wrecked 400 triremes, together with an uncounted +number of transports. Meanwhile the Greek ships had taken refuge +under the lee of the island of Eubœa, and the news of the +Persian disaster was signaled to them by the watchers on the heights. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 446px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig006.png" width="446" height="372" alt="Fig. 6"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF PRELIMINARY NAVAL OPERATIONS, + CAMPAIGN OF SALAMIS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +As soon as the weather moderated the Greeks returned to their position +in the straits near Artemisium, and during the next three days the +two fleets fought stubbornly but without advantage to either side. +During the second day a southerly gale caught a flying squadron +of some 200 triremes, that had been dispatched round the island of +Eubœa to catch the Greeks in the rear, and not one of the Persian +ships survived. The Greek rear guard squadron of fifty brought +the welcome news to the main fleet and served as a much needed <a +name="page_31"><span class="page">Page 31</span></a> reënforcement. +Although the Persian armada had lost about half its force in three +days by storms, the odds were still so heavily against the Greeks +that they found themselves in constant peril of having their flanks +turned in this open sea fighting. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the afternoon of the third day the pass of Thermopyæ was +forced, thanks to the treachery of a Greek and the contemptible +policy of the Spartan government which steadily refused the plea +of Leonidas for reënforcements. With Thermopyæ taken +there was no further reason for the Greek fleet to try to hold the +straits north of Eubœa, and during the night it retired +unobserved. The following day the Persian fleet advanced and brought +to the army the supplies which it sorely needed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With the fall of Thermopyæ and the contact established between +his army and his fleet, Xerxes found his route open for the invasion +of Attica. Since there was no possibility of opposing him on land, +the population of the province was removed and Athens left to its +fate. Themistocles, who was in command of the Athenian division of +the Greek fleet, now urged the assembling of the fleet at Salamis, +partly to cover the withdrawal of the Athenians and partly to assist +in the defense of the Isthmus of Corinth, which was to be the next +stand of the Greeks. The advice was adopted and the fleet assembled +off the town of Salamis. Athenian refugees had crowded into the town +and from the heights above they watched the smoke of their burning +city. Their own future and the future of Athenian civilization hung +on the long lines of triremes drawn up on the shore. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A glance at the map of the region of Salamis shows the advantages +offered by the position for the defensive. The fighting off Artemisium +had shown the peril of attacking a greatly superior force in the open +because of the danger of being outflanked. In the narrow straits +between Salamis and the mainland the Greek line of battle would +rest its flanks on the opposite shores. But it is one thing to +choose a position and another to get the enemy to accept battle in +that position. If the Persians ignored the Greek fleet and moved +<a name="page_32"><span class="page">Page 32</span></a> to the +Isthmus, the Greeks would be caught in an awkward predicament. To +regain touch with the Greek army, the fleet would be then compelled +to come out of the straits and fight at a disadvantage in the open. +There was only one chance of defeating the Persian fleet and that +was to make it fight in the narrow waters of the strait where numbers +would not count so heavily. Everything depended on bringing this +to pass. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nor could the Greeks wait indefinitely for the Persians. Already +the incorrigible jealousies of rival cities had almost reached the +point of disintegrating the fleet. Although the commander in chief +was the Spartan general Eurybiades, the whole Spartan contingent +was on the point of deserting in a body to its own coasts. The +situation was saved by Themistocles. Having wrung from his allies +a reluctant consent to stop at Salamis temporarily to cover the +withdrawal of the Athenian populace, the story is that he secretly +dispatched a messenger to Xerxes to say that if he would attack +at once he could crush the entire naval forces of the Greeks at a +blow, but if he delayed the Greeks would scatter. Acting on this +advice, Xerxes landed troops on the island of Psyttaleia, dispatched +a squadron to block the western outlet of Salamis Straits, and +proceeded to move the main body of his fleet to attack the Greeks +by way of the eastern channel. The preparations were made during +the night and were not completed till dawn of the day of battle, +September 20, 480 B.C. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The debates in the allied fleet came to an end with the appearance +of the Persians. The shrewd plan of Themistocles had succeeded. +The Greeks would have to fight with their backs to the wall, but +they would fight with better chance of success than under any other +circumstances. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Greek force consisted of about 380 vessels. Of these, Athens +contributed 180, Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnesus were +represented by 89 and the remainder were made up of squadrons from +the island states. Some of these island contingents contained a +type of ship different from the triremes, the penteconter. This +was a galley with only one bank of <a name="page_33"><span +class="page">Page 33</span></a> oars, but these were long sweeps, +each manned by five oarsmen. The penteconter was an early prototype +of the galley of the Christian era. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Persians had been reduced by this time to about 600 ships, +although there had been numerous reënforcements since the +disaster at Cape Sepias. The fleet was "Persian" only in name, +for, except for bands of Persian archers on some of the ships, it +was composed of elements levied from each of the subject nations +that followed the sea. Indeed Persia is a curious example in history +of a nation with a purely artificial sea power, for its navy was +composed of aliens entirely. Thus the squadron that was sent to +blockade the western end of the straits was Egyptian, the right +wing of the fleet as it advanced to the attack was composed of +Phœnicians, and the center and left was made up of Cyprians, +Cilicians, Samothracians, and Ionians, the latter only recently in +rebellion against Persia and at that time welcoming help from Athens +in a cause in which Athens herself was now involved. Apparently +there was no compunction felt on this account, for the Ionians +distinguished themselves by gallant fighting against their Greek +brethren. Nevertheless, it is not hard to imagine difficulties +involved in the task of making a unit of such an assortment of +peoples. The fleet was commanded by a Persian, Prince Ariabignes, +brother of Xerxes. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At daybreak the Persian triremes drew up in three lines on each +side of the island of Psyttaleia and advanced into the straits. +But the narrowing waters of the channel made it necessary to reduce +the front and bear to the left. Consequently all formation was +lost, and the Persian triremes poured into the narrows "in a +stream,"—to quote the phrase of the tragedian Æschylus, +who fought on an Athenian trireme in this battle and describes it +in one of his plays. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Facing the invader was a smaller array of ships but a better ordered +line of battle. On the Greek left was the Athenian division opposing +the advancing triremes of Phœnicia; on the right was the Spartan +division facing the Greeks of Asia Minor. The two fleets rushed toward +each other, but just before contact the Persians found themselves +embarrassed <a name="page_34"><span class="page">Page 34</span></a> +by their very number of ships. As may be seen by the map, they had +an awkward turn to make in entering the narrows. At this point, +just opposite the peninsula of Salamis, the straits are only about +2000 yards wide, making it impossible for more than 80 or 90 triremes +to advance abreast. As a result the Phœnician wing of the line +was extended considerably in advance of the rest, forced ahead +by the pressure of ships behind. Although, as a matter of fact, +the Spartan wing also was somewhat in advance of the rest of the +Greek line, the first shock of battle came between the Phœnicians +and the Athenians. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 637px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig007.png" width="637" height="416" alt="Fig. 7"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right">After Grundy, <i>The Great Persian + War.</i></td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, 480 B. C.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center"> + <table><tr><td class="left"><ol> + <li>The Original Position</li> + <li>The Advance</li> + <li>The Contact</li> + </ol></td></tr></table> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +This initial advantage offered by an exposed wing was immediately +seized upon. While the Athenians bore the frontal attack, the +Æginetans on their right fell upon the Phœnicians' flank. +This double attack on the Persian right wing eventually proved +the turning point of the battle. The Phœnicians, however, had the +reputation of being the foremost sea <a name="page_35"><span +class="page">Page 35</span></a> fighters in the world, and they +bore themselves well. Similarly the Asiatic Greeks proved themselves +foemen worthy of their brethren from the Peloponnesus, and the +fight was maintained with great ferocity all along the line. The +inhabitants of Athens who had been removed to Salamis blackened +the shores on one side of the Strait, as anxious watchers of the +tremendous spectacle. Opposite them on the slope of Mt. Ægaleos +sat Xerxes himself, surrounded by his staff, a less anxious spectator +but no less interested in the outcome. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +About seven o'clock a fresh westerly wind arose, as it does at +this day in that region, and as it did some years later during a +battle won by an Athenian admiral in the Gulf of Corinth.[1] This +wind blows every morning with considerable violence for about two +hours; and in this battle it must have tended to make the bows of +the Persian ships pay off—thus exposing their sides to the +Greek rams—and drift back upon the galleys that were crowding +forward from the rear in the attempt to get into the battle. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: The Battle of the Corinthian Gulf: v. p. 43] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Greeks pressed their advantage, using their rams to sink an +adversary or disable her by cutting away her oars. Where the +mêlée was too close for such tactics they tried to +take their enemy by boarding. On every Greek trireme was a specially +organized boarding party consisting of 36 men—18 marines, 14 +heavily armed soldiers, and four bowmen; and the Greeks seem to +have been superior to their enemy at close quarters. On the Persian +side the superiority lay in their archers and javelin throwers. +Toward the end of the battle, for instance, a Samothracian trireme +performed a remarkable feat. Having been disabled by an Æginetan +ship, the Samothracian cleared the decks of her assailant with +arrows and javelins and took possession. Although the invaders +seem to have fought with the greatest courage and determination, +the disadvantage of confusion at the outset of the battle, augmented +by the head wind, told decisively against them. They were unable +to take advantage of their superiority in ships on account of the +narrowness of the channel, <a name="page_36"><span class="page">Page +36</span></a> and indeed found that the very multitude of their +ships only added to their difficulties. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The retreat began with the flower of the Persian fleet, the +Phœnician division. Caught at the opening of the battle with +the Athenians in front and the Æginetans on the left flank, +they were never able to extricate themselves, although they fought +stubbornly. The foremost ships, many in a disabled condition, began +to retreat; others backed water to make way for them; the rearmost +finding it impossible to reach the battle at all, withdrew out of the +straits; and soon the retreat became general. As the Phœnicians +withdrew, the Athenians and the Æginetans fell upon the center +of the Persian line, and the rout became general with the Greeks in +full pursuit. The latter pressed their enemy as far as the island of +Psyttaleia, thus cutting off the Persian force on the island from +their communications. Whereupon Aristides, the Athenian, led a +force in boats from Salamis to the island and put to death every +man of the Persian garrison. The Persian ships fled to their base +at Phaleron, while the Greeks returned to their base at Salamis. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The battle of Salamis was won, but at the moment neither side realized +its decisive character. The Greeks had lost 40 ships; the Persians +had lost over 200 sunk, and an indeterminate number captured. +Nevertheless, the latter could probably have mustered a considerable +force for another attack—which the Greeks expected—if their +morale had not been so badly shaken. Their commander, Ariabignes, was +among the killed, and there was no one else capable of reorganizing +the shattered forces. Xerxes, fearing for the safety of his bridge +over the Hellespont, gave orders for his ships to retire thither to +protect it, and the very night after the battle found the remains +of the Persian fleet in full flight across the Ægean. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The news reached the Greeks at noon of the following day and they +set out in pursuit, but having gone as far as Andros without coming +up with the enemy, they paused for a council of war. The Athenians +urged the policy of going on and destroying the bridge over the +Hellespont, but they were <a name="page_37"><span class="page">Page +37</span></a> voted down by their allies, who preferred to leave +well enough alone. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is customary to speak of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis +as due to their superior physique and fighting qualities. This +superiority may be claimed for the Greek soldiers at Marathon and +Platæ, where the Persian army was actually Persian. The Asiatic +soldier, forced into service and flogged into battle, was indeed +no match for the virile and warlike Greek. But at Salamis it was +literally a case of Greek meeting Greek, except in the case of +the Phœnicians—who had the reputation of being the finest +seafighters in the world—and it is not easy to see how the +battle was won by sheer physical prowess. There is no evidence to +show any lack of either courage or fighting ability on the Persian +side. The decisive feature of the battle was the fatal exposure +of the Phœnician wing at the very outset. However, it is worth +noting that the invaders had been maneuvering all night and were +tired—especially the oarsmen—when called upon to enter +battle against an enemy that was fresh. In that respect there was +undoubtedly some advantage to the Greeks, but it can hardly have +been of prime importance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The immediate results of the victory at Salamis were soon apparent. +The all-conquering Persian army suddenly found itself in a critical +situation. Cut off from its supplies by sea, it had to retreat or +starve, for the country which it occupied was incapable of furnishing +supplies for a host so enormous. Xerxes left an army of occupation +in Thessaly consisting of 300,000 men under Mardonius, but the +rest were ordered to get back to Persia as best they could. A +panic-stricken rout to the Hellespont began, and for the next +forty-five days a great host, that had never been even opposed in +battle, went to pieces under famine, disease, and the guerilla warfare +of the inhabitants of the country it traversed, and it was only a +broken and demoralized remnant of the great army that survived to +see the Hellespont. This great military disaster was due entirely +to the fact that Salamis had deprived Xerxes of the command of +the sea. Indeed, if the advice of Themistodes had been taken and +the Greek fleet had proceeded to the <a name="page_38"><span +class="page">Page 38</span></a> Hellespont and held the position, +not even a remnant of the retreating army would have survived. It +happened that the bridge had been carried away by storms and the +army had to be ferried over by the ships of the beaten and demoralized +Persian fleet, an operation which would have been impossible in +the face of the victorious Greeks. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Xerxes still held to the idea of conquering Greece; but the chance +was gone. Mardonius, it is true, remained in Thessaly with an army, +but it was no longer an army of millions. The Greeks assembled an +army of about 100,000 men and in the battle of Platæa the +following year utterly defeated it. On the same day the Greeks +destroyed what was left of the Persian fleet in the battle of Mycale, +on the coast of Asia Minor. This, strictly speaking, was not a +naval battle at all, for the Persians had drawn their ships up on +shore and built a stockade around them. The Greeks landed their +crews, took the stockade by storm and burnt the ships. These later +victories were the direct consequences of the earlier victory of +Salamis. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Another phase of the Persian plan of conquering the Greeks must not +be overlooked. Xerxes had stirred up Carthage to undertake a naval +and military expedition against the Greeks of Sicily, in order that +all the independent Greek states might be crushed simultaneously. +Again the weather came to the rescue, for the greater part of the +Carthaginian fleet was wrecked by storms. The survivors of the +expedition laid siege to the city of Himera, but were eventually +driven back to their ships in rout with the loss of their general. +Thus the Greek civilization of Sicily was saved at the same time +as that of Athens. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +East and west, therefore, the grandiose plan of the Persian despot +fell in ruin, and with it fell the prestige and the power of the +empire. The Ionians revolted and joined Athens as allies, and the +control of the Ægean passed from Persia to Athens. With this +loss of sea power began the decline of Persia as a world power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The significance of this astounding defeat of the greatest military and +naval power of the time lies in the fact that <a name="page_39"><span +class="page">Page 39</span></a> European, or more particularly +Greek, civilization was spared to develop its own individuality. +Had Xerxes succeeded, the paralyzing régime of an Asiatic +despotism would have stifled the genius of the Greek people. +Self-government would never have had its beginnings in Greece, and a +subjugated Athens would never have produced the "Age of Pericles." +In the two generations following Salamis, Athens made a greater +original contribution to literature, philosophy, science, and art +than any other nation in any two centuries of its existence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the fact that this priceless heritage was left to later ages +the world is indebted chiefly to the Greeks who fought at Salamis. +The night before that battle the cause of Greece seemed doomed +beyond hope. The day after, the invaders began a retreat that ended +forever their hopes of conquest. This amazing change of fortune was +due to the fact that the success of the Persian invasion depended +on the control of the sea. Hence the Greeks, though unable to muster +an army large enough to meet the Persian host on land, defeated +it disastrously by winning a victory on the sea. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +2. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After Salamis, Athens rose to a commanding position among the Greek +states. Her period of supremacy was brief, lasting less than 75 +years, but while it endured it rested on her triremes. In the middle +of the fifth century she had 100,000 men in her navy, practically +as many as Great Britain in her fleet before 1914. Although the +period of Athenian supremacy was short-lived, it is interesting +because it produced a great naval genius, Phormio, and because +it wrecked itself as Persian sea power had done, in an attempt at +foreign conquest. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Scarcely had the Persian invasion come to an end when bickering broke +out among the various Greek states, much of it directed against Athens. +She had small difficulty, however, in maintaining her ascendancy in +northern Greece on account of her superiority on the sea, and it +was during the half century after Salamis that Athens arose to her +splendid <a name="page_40"><span class="page">Page 40</span></a> +climax as the intellectual and artistic center of the world. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 602px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig008.png" width="602" height="429" alt="Fig. 8"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right">After Shepherd's <i>Historical + Atlas.</i></td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT—ABOUT + 450 B.C.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +In 431 began the Peloponnesian War. Its immediate cause was the +help given by Athens to Corcyra (Corfu) in a war against Corinth. +Corinth called on Sparta for help, and in consequence northern and +southern Greece were locked in a mortal struggle. The Athenians +had a naval base at Naupaktis on the Gulf of Corinth, and in 429, +two years after war broke out, the Athenian Phormio found himself +supplied with only twenty triremes with which to maintain control +of that important waterway. At the same time Sparta was setting in +motion a large land and water expedition with the object of sweeping +Athenian influence from all of western Greece and of obtaining +control of the Gulf of Corinth. A fleet from Corinth was to join +another at Leukas, one of the Ionian Islands, and then proceed to +operate on the northern coast of the gulf while an army invaded +the province. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 604px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig009.png" width="604" height="281" alt="Fig. 9"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF PHORMIO'S CAMPAIGNS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +As it happened, the army moved off without waiting for <a +name="page_41"><span class="page">Page 41</span></a> the +coöperation of the fleet and eventually went to pieces in an +ineffectual siege of an inland city. When the fleet started out +from Corinth it numbered 47 triremes. As this was more than twice +the number possessed by Phormio, the Corinthian admiral evidently +counted on being secure from attack. Accordingly he used some of his +triremes as transports and started on his journey without taking +the precaution to train his oarsmen or practice maneuvers. But +as he skirted along the southern coast he was surprised to see +the Athenian ships moving in a parallel course as if on the alert +for an opportunity to attack. When the Corinthian ships bore up +from Patræ to cross to the Ætolian shore, the Athenian +column steered directly toward them. At this threat the Corinthian +fleet turned away and put in at Rhium, a point near the narrowest +part of the strait, in order to make the crossing under cover of +night. The Corinthian admiral made the same fatal mistake committed +by the commander of the Spanish Armada 2000 years later in a similar +undertaking, that of trying to avoid an enemy on the sea rather than +fight him before carrying out an invasion of the enemy's coast. +This ignominious conduct on the part of the Corinthian admiral was +partly due to the fact that he was encumbered with his transports, +but chiefly to the fact that he knew that in fighting qualities +his <a name="page_42"><span class="page">Page 42</span></a> men +were no match for the Athenians. The latter had no peers on the +sea at that time. Since Salamis they had progressed far in naval +science and efficiency and were filled with the confidence that +comes from knowledge and experience. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 385px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig010.png" width="385" height="384" alt="Fig. 10"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF, 429 B. + C.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Corinthian Formation and Circling Tactics + of Phormio.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +All night Phormio watched his enemy and at dawn surprised him in +mid-crossing. On seeing Phormio advance to the attack, the Corinthian +drew up his squadron in a defensive position, ranging his vessels +in concentric circles, bows outward, like the spokes of a wheel. +In the center of this formation he placed his transports, together +with five of his largest triremes to assist at any threatened spot. +The formation suggests a leader of infantry rather than an admiral; +moreover, it revealed a fatal readiness to give up the offensive +to an enemy force less than half his own. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At any rate there was no lack of decision on the part of Phormio. He +advanced rapidly in line ahead formation, closed in near the enemy's +prows as if he intended to strike at any moment and circled round +the line. The Corinthian <a name="page_43"><span class="page">Page +43</span></a> triremes, having no headway and manned by inexperienced +rowers, began crowding back on one another as they tried to keep +in position for the expected attack. Then the same early morning +wind that had embarrassed the Persian ships at Salamis sprang up +and added to the confusion of fouling ships and clashing oar blades. +Choosing his opening, Phormio flew the signal for attack and rammed +one of the flagships of the Corinthian fleet. The Athenians fell +upon their enemy and almost at the first blow routed the entire +Corinthian force. In addition to those triremes that were sunk +outright, twelve remained as prizes with their full complement +of crews, and the rest scattered in flight. Phormio returned in +triumph to Naupaktis with the loss of scarcely a man. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +So humiliating a defeat had to be avenged, and Sparta organized +a new expedition. This time a fleet of 77 triremes was collected. +Meanwhile Phormio had sent to Athens the news of his victory together +with an urgent plea for reënforcements. Unfortunately the great +Pericles was dying and the government had fallen into weak and +unscrupulous hands. Consequently while 20 triremes were ordered to +the support of Phormio, political intrigue succeeded in diverting +this squadron to carry out a futile expedition to Crete, and Phormio +was left to contest the control of the gulf against a fleet of 77 +with nothing more than his original twenty. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is interesting to observe what strategy Phormio adopted in this +difficult situation. In the campaign of Salamis, Themistocles chose +the narrow waters of the strait as the safest position for a fleet +outnumbered by the enemy, because of the protection offered to the +flanks by the opposite shores. But Phormio, commanding a fleet about +one-fourth that of his adversary, chose the open sea. Apparently +his decision was based on the fact that the superiority of the +Athenian ship lay in its greater speed and skill in maneuvering. +Unable to cope with his adversary in full force, he might by his +superior mobility beat him in detail. Accordingly, he boldly took +the open sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For about a week the two fleets lay within sight of each <a +name="page_44"><span class="page">Page 44</span></a> other, with +Phormio trying to draw his enemy out of the narrows into open water +and his adversary attempting to crowd him into a corner against +the share. Finally the Peloponnesian, realizing that Phormio would +have to defend his base, and hoping to force him to fight at a +disadvantage, moved upon Naupaktis. As this port was undefended, +Phormio was compelled to return thither. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Peloponnesian fleet advanced in line of four abreast with the +Spartan admiral and the twenty Spartan triremes—the best in +the fleet—in the lead. At the signal from the admiral the +column swung "left into line" and bore down in line abreast upon the +Athenians who were ranging along the shore in line ahead. The object +of the maneuver was to cut the Athenians off from the port and crowd +them upon the shore. The latter, however, developed such a burst of +speed that eleven of the twenty succeeded in reaching Naupaktis; +the remaining nine drove ashore and their crews escaped. Apparently +the victory of the Spartan was as complete as it was easy. But while +the rest of the fleet busied itself with the deserted Athenian +triremes on the share, the Spartan squadron continued in the pursuit +of the eleven Athenian ships that were heading for Naupaktis. Ten +of the eleven reached port and drew up in a position of defense. +The eleventh, less speedy than the rest, was being overhauled by +the Spartan flagship which was pushing the pursuit far in advance +of the rest of the squadron. The captain of the Athenian ship, seeing +this situation, determined on a bold stroke. Instead of pushing on +into the harbor he pulled round a merchant ship that lay anchored +at the mouth, and rammed his pursuer amidships, disabling her at +a blow. The Spartan admiral promptly killed himself and the rest +of the ship's company were too panic stricken to resist. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this disaster the rest of the Spartan squadron hesitated, dropped +oars or ran into shallow water. Seeing his opportunity, Phormio +dashed out of the harbor with his ten triremes and fell upon the +Spartans. In spite of the ridiculous disparity of forces, this +handful of Athenian ships pressed their attack so gallantly that +they destroyed the Spartan <a name="page_45"><span class="page">Page +45</span></a> advance wing and then, catching the rest of the fleet +in disorder, routed the main body as well. By nightfall Phormio +had rescued eight of the nine Athenian triremes that had fallen +into the hands of the enemy and sent the scattered remnants of the +Peloponnesian fleet in full flight towards Corinth. This battle +of Naupaktis remains one of the most brilliant naval victories in +history, a victory won against overwhelming odds by quick decision +and superb audacity. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Only a half century separates Salamis from the battle of the Corinthian +Gulf and the battle of Naupaktis, but during that period there had +been a great advance in naval science. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As far as naval tactics are concerned, Salamis was merely a fight +between two mobs of ships, except that when opportunity offered, +a vessel used her ram. Otherwise the only difference from land +fighting was the fact that the combatants stood on floating platforms. +But in the Peloponnesian war we see not only the birth of naval +tactics but a very high development, especially as revealed in +these two victories of Phormio. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With the development of a naval science rose also a naval profession. +At Salamis Themistocles was a politician and Eurybiades was a soldier; +it happened that they were made fleet commanders for the emergency. +Phormio was a naval officer by profession, and he won by genius +combined with superior efficiency in the personnel under his command. +In his courage, resourcefulness, in the spirit he inspired, and +the high pitch of skill he developed among his officers and men, +he is an ideal type for every later age. Little is known of his +life and character beyond the story of these two exploits, but +they are sufficient to give him the name of the first great admiral +of history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +His exploits illustrate, too, at the very outset of naval history, +the vital truth that the man counts more than the machine. In these +later days, when the tendency is to measure naval power merely +by counting dreadnoughts, and to settle all hypothetical combats +by the proportion of strength at a given point on the game board, +it is well to remember that the most overwhelming victories have +been won by the skill <a name="page_46"><span class="page">Page +46</span></a> and audacity of a great leader, which overcame odds +that would be reckoned by the experts as insuperable. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Peloponnesian war dragged on with varying fortunes for ten +years. The Athenians were regularly successful on the sea and +unsuccessful on land. They seem to have laid an unwise dependence +on their navy for a state situated on the mainland with land +communications open to the enemy. They attempted to make an island +of their state by withdrawing into the city of Athens the entire +population of Attica, leaving open to the invader the rest of the +province. The repeated ravaging of Attica by Peloponnesian armies +weakened both the resources and the morale of the Athenians, and +the crowding of the inhabitants into the city resulted in frightful +mortality from the plague. At the same time the naval expeditions +sent out to harry the coast of the Peloponnesus accomplished nothing +of real advantage. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In 421 a truce was agreed upon between Athens and Sparta, which +was to last fifty years. Both sides were sorely weakened by the +protracted struggle and neither had gained any real advantage over +the other. Without waiting to recuperate from the losses of the +war, Athens embarked in 415 on an ambitious plan of conquering +Syracuse, and gaining all of Sicily as an Athenian colony. In the +event of success Athens would have a western outpost for the eventual +control of the Mediterranean, as she already had an eastern outpost +in Ionia, which gave her control of the Ægean. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the light of the event it is customary to refer to this expedition +as the climax of folly, and yet it is clear that if the commander +in chief had not wasted time in interminable delays the Athenians +might easily have won their objective. At first the Syracusans felt +hopeless because of the large army and fleet dispatched against +them, and the great naval prestige of their enemy, but as delay +succeeded delay, assistance arrived from Corinth and Sparta, and +the besieged citizens took heart. The siege dragged on for the +greater part of two years, with the offensive gradually slipping +from the Athenians to the Syracusans, till finally the invaders +found their troops besieged on shore and their ships bottled up in +<a name="page_47"><span class="page">Page 47</span></a> the harbor +by a line of galleys anchored across the entrance. The Syracusans +knew that they were no match for the Athenians on the open sea, but +with a fleet crowded into a harbor with no room for maneuvering, +the problem was not essentially different from that of fighting +on land. They built a fleet of ships with specially strengthened +bows for ramming and erected catapults for throwing heavy stones +on the decks of the enemy. Meanwhile, the Athenian ships had +deteriorated from lack of opportunity to refit and their crews +had been heavily reduced by disease. In a pitched battle between +the two fleets in the harbor, the Athenians were worsted. Shortly +after as the Athenians were attempting to break through the barrier +and escape, they were again attacked by the Syracusans. There was +no room for maneuvering; the Athenian ships were jammed together +in a mass in which all advantage of numbers was lost. Moreover, +against the deadly rain of huge stones the Athenians had no defense +whatever. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The result was an overwhelming victory for the Syracusans. Out +of 110 triremes the Athenians lost fifty. The besieging army went +to pieces in attempting a retreat across the island, and the whole +expedition came to a tragic end. This defeat of the Athenian fleet +in the harbor of Syracuse was the ruin of Athens. When the news +reached Greece, many of her dependencies revolted, the Peloponnesian +war had broken out anew, and she had no strength left to hold her +own. The deathblow was given when a Spartan admiral destroyed all +that was left of the Athenian navy at Ægospotami in the year +405. Thereafter Athens was merely a conquered province, permitted +to keep a fleet of only twelve ships, and watched by a garrison +of Spartan soldiers in the citadel. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The downfall of Athenian sea power at Syracuse may be compared +with the downfall of Persian sea power at Salamis. Just as the +latter prevented the spread of an Asiatic form of civilization +in Europe and gave Greek civilization a chance to develop, so the +former put an end to the extension of a strong Hellenic power in +Italy and left opportunity for the rise of the civilization of +Rome. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_48"><span class="page">Page 48</span></a> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of Greece</span>, Ernst Curtius, 1874.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of Greece</span>, George Grote, 1856.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Great Persian War</span>, G. B. Grundy, 1901.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Persian Wars</span>, Herodotus, ed. +and transl. by Geo. Rawlinson, 1862.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Peloponnesian War</span>, Thucydides, +ed. and transl. by Jowett.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_49"><span class="page">Page 49</span></a> +CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE SEA POWER OF ROME +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1. THE PUNIC WARS +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When peoples have migrated in the past, they have frequently changed +their habits to conform to new topographical surroundings. We have +seen that the Phœnicians, originally a nomadic people, became a +seafaring race because of the conditions of the country they settled +in; and on the other hand, at a later period, the Vikings who overran +Normandy or Britain forsook the sea and became farmers. The popular +idea that a race follows the sea because of an "instinct in the blood +of the race" has little to stand on. When, however, the colonists from +Phœnicia settled Carthage and founded an empire, they continued +the traditions of their ancestors and built up their power on a +foundation of ships. This was due to the conditions—topographical +and geographical—which surrounded them, and which were much +like those of the mother country. Carthage possessed the finest +harbor on the coast of Africa, situated in the middle of the +Mediterranean, where all the trade routes crossed. To counteract +these attractions of the sea there was nothing but the arid and +mountainous character of the interior. It was inevitable, therefore, +that the Carthaginians, like their ancestors, should build an empire +of the sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As early as the sixth century B.C. Carthage had established her +power so securely in the western Mediterranean as to be able to +set down definite limits beyond which Rome agreed not to go. Thus +the opening sentence of a treaty between the two nations in 509 +B. C. ran as follows: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and +their allies there shall be peace and alliance upon the <a +name="page_50"><span class="page">Page 50</span></a> conditions +that neither the Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the +Fair Promontory[1] unless compelled by bad weather or an enemy; +and in case they are forced beyond it they shall not be allowed +to take or purchase anything except what is barely necessary for +refitting their vessels or for sacrifice, and they shall depart +within five days."[2] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: A cape on the African coast about due north from +Carthage.] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">General History</span>, Polybius, +Bk. III, chap. 3.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A second and a third treaty emphasized even mare strongly the +Carthaginian dictatorship over the Mediterranean. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 375px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig011.png" width="375" height="403" alt="Fig. 11"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +It was inevitable, therefore, that as Rome expanded her interests +should come in collision with those of Carthage. The immediate +causes of the Punic wars are of no consequence for our purpose; +the two powers had rival interests in Sicily, and the clash of +these brought on the war in the year 264 B.C. There followed a +mortal struggle between Rome and Carthage that extended through +three distinct wars and a period of aver a hundred years. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When the two nations faced each other in arms, Carthage <a +name="page_51"><span class="page">Page 51</span></a> had the advantage +of prestige and the greatest navy in the world. Her weaknesses lay +in the strife of political factions and the mercenary character +of her forces. Her officers were usually Carthaginians, but it was +considered beneath the dignity of a Carthaginian to be a private. +The rank and file, therefore, were either hired or pressed into +service from the subject provinces. In the case of Xanthippus, +who defeated Regulus in the first Punic war, even the commanding +officer was a Spartan mercenary. These troops would do well so +long as campaigns promised plunder but would became disaffected +if things went wrong. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Romans, on the other hand, had only a small navy and no naval +experience; their strength lay in their legionaries. And in further +contrast with their enemy they had none but Romans in their forces, +or allies who were proud of fighting on the side of Rome. Consequently +they fought in the spirit of intense patriotism which could stand +the moral strain of defeat and even disaster. On land there was +no better fighter than the Roman soldier. At sea, however, all +the advantage lay with the Carthaginian, and it soon became clear +that if the Romans were to succeed they would have to learn to +fight on water. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the first three years Carthaginian fleets raided the coasts of +Sicily and Italy with impunity. Finally, in desperation, Rome set +about the creation of a fleet, and the story is that a Carthaginian +quinquereme that had been wrecked an the coast was taken as a model, +and while the ships were building, rowers were trained in rowing +machines set up an shore. The first contact with the enemy was not +encouraging. The new fleet, which was constructed in two months, +consisted of 100 quinqueremes and 30 triremes. Seventeen of these +while on a trial cruise were blockaded in the harbor of Messina +by twenty Carthaginian ships, and the Roman commander was obliged +to surrender after his crews had landed and escaped. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The next encounter was a different story. The Romans, realizing their +ignorance of naval tactics and their superiority in land fighting, +determined to make the next naval battle as nearly as possible like +an engagement of infantry. Accordingly <a name="page_52"><span +class="page">Page 52</span></a> the ships were fitted with boarding +gangways with a huge hooked spike at the end, like the beak of a +crow, which gave them their name, "corvi" or "crows."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: The following is the description in Polybius of what +they were like and how they were worked. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"They [the Romans] erected on the prow of every vessel a round pillar +of wood, of about twelve feet in height, and of three palms breadth +in diameter, with a pulley at the top. To this pillar was fitted a +kind of stage, eighteen feet in length and four feet broad, which +was made ladder-wise, of strong timbers laid across, and cramped +together with iron: the pillar being received into an oblong square, +which was opened for that purpose, at the distance of six feet +within the end of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways +was a parapet, which reached just above the knee. At the farthest +end of this stage or ladder was a bar of iron, whose shape was +somewhat like a pestle; but it was sharpened at the bottom, or +lower point; and on the top of it was a ring. The whole appearance +of this machine very much resembled those that are used in grinding +corn. To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, by which, with +the help of the pulley that was at the top of the pillar, they +hoisted up the machines, and, as the vessels of the enemy came near, +let them fall upon them, sometimes on their prow, and sometimes +on their sides, as occasion best served. As the machine fell, it +struck into the decks of the enemy, and held them fast. In this +situation, if the two vessels happened to lie side by side, the +Romans leaped on board from all parts of their ships at once. But +in case that they were joined only by the prow, they then entered +two and two along the machine; the two foremost extending their +bucklers right before them to ward off the strokes that were aimed +against them in front; while those that followed rested the boss +of their bucklers upon the top of the parapet on either side, and +thus covered both their flanks." GENERAL HISTORY, Book 1.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Armed with this new device, the Consul Duilius took the Roman fleet +to sea to meet an advancing Carthaginian fleet and encountered it +off the port of Mylæ (260 B.C.). The Carthaginians had such +contempt for their enemy that they advanced in irregular order, +permitting thirty of their ships to begin the battle unsupported +by the rest of the fleet. One after the other the Carthaginian +quinqueremes were grappled and stormed, for once the great <i>corvus</i> +crashed down on a deck all the arts of seamanship were useless. +Before the day was over the Carthaginians had lost 14 ships sunk +and 31 captured, a total of half their fleet, and the rest had +fled in disorder towards Carthage. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The unexpected had happened, as it so frequently does in history. +The amateurs had beaten the professionals, not by trying to achieve +the same efficiency but by inventing something new that would make +that efficiency useless. Thus, as <a name="page_53"><span +class="page">Page 53</span></a> we nave seen, the Syracusans, who +were no match for the Athenians in the open sea, destroyed the sea +power of Athens by bottling up her fleet in a harbor and bombarding +it with catapults. It is an instance such as we shall see recurring +throughout naval history, in which the power of a great fleet is +largely or completely neutralized by a new or device in the hands +of the nation with the smaller navy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The significance of Mylæ lay in the fact that a new naval +power had arisen, that henceforth Rome must be reckoned with on +the sea. The victory served to encourage the Romans to enlarge +their navy, and with it to press the war into the enemy's territory. +Soon after Mylæ they gained possession of the greater part +of Sicily, and in the year 256 they dispatched a fleet to carry +the offensive into Africa. This Roman fleet of 330 ships met, just +off Ecnomus, on the southern coast of Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet +of 350, and a great battle took place, interesting for the grand +scale on which it was fought and the tactics employed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Romans, an seeing their enemy, assumed a formation hitherto +unknown in tactics at sea. Their first and second squadrons formed +the sides of an acute-angled triangle; the third squadron formed +the base of the triangle, towing the transports, and the fourth +squadron brought up the rear, covering the transports. The whole +formed a compact wedge, pushing forward like a great spear head +to pierce the enemy's line. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Admirable as this formation was, the Carthaginians were no less +skillful in their tactics for destroying it. Instead of keeping +an unbroken line to receive the attack, they stationed their left +wing at same distance from the center so as to overlap the Roman +right, and their right wing in column ahead, so as to overlap the +Roman left. As the Romans advanced, the Carthaginian center purposely +gave way, drawing the advance wings of their enemy away from the +transports and the two squadrons in the rear. Then they faced about +and attacked. Meanwhile the two Carthaginian squadrons on the flanks +swung round the Roman wedge, the left wing engaging the Roman third +squadron, which was hampered by the transports,<a name="page_54"><span +class="page">Page 54</span></a> and driving it toward the shore. At +the same time the Carthaginian right wing attacked the fourth, or +reserve, squadron from the rear and drove it into the open sea. Thus +the battle went on in three distinct engagements, each separated by +considerable distance from the others. The outcome is thus narrated +by Polybius: +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 458px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig012.png" width="458" height="415" alt="Fig. 12"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +"Because in each of these divisions the strength of the combatants +was nearly equal, the success was also for some time equal. But +in the progress of the action the affair was brought at last to +a decision: a different one, perhaps, from what might reasonably +have been expected in such circumstances. For the Roman squadron +that had begun the engagement gained so full a victory, that Amilcar +[the Carthaginian commander] was forced to fly, and the consul +Manlius brought away the vessels that were taken. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The other consul, having now perceived the danger in which the +triarii[1] and the transports were involved, hastened to their +assistance with the second squadron, which was still entire. The +triarii, having received these succors, when they were<a +name="page_55"><span class="page">Page 55</span></a> Just upon +the point of yielding, again resumed their courage, and renewed +the fight with vigor: so that the enemy, being surrounded on every +side in a manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at once +both in the front and rear were at last constrained to steer away +to sea. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: The rear guard, or fourth squadron.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"About this time Manlius also, returning from the engagement, observed +that the ships of the third squadron were forced in close to the +shore, and there blocked up by the left division of the Carthaginian +fleet. He joined his forces, therefore, with those of the other +consul, who had now placed the transports and triarii in security, +and hastened to assist these vessels, which were so invested by the +enemy that they seemed to suffer a kind of siege. And, indeed, they +must have all been long before destroyed if the Carthaginians, through +apprehension of the <i>corvi</i>, had not still kept themselves at +distance, and declined a close engagement. But the consuls, having +now advanced together, surround the enemy, and take fifty of their +ships with all the men. The rest, being few in number, steered +close along the shore, and saved themselves by flight. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 456px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig013.png" width="456" height="333" alt="Fig. 13"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS, +256 B.C.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +"Such were the circumstances of this engagement; in which the victory +at last was wholly on the side of the Romans. Twenty-four of their +ships were sunk in the action, and more than thirty of the +Carthaginians. No vessel of the Romans <a name="page_56"><span +class="page">Page 56</span></a> fell into the hands of the enemy; +but sixty-four of the Carthaginians were taken with their men."[2] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Polybius's <span class="sc">General History</span>, +Book I, Chap. 2.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The battle of Ecnomus had no such decisive effect on history as +the battle of Salamis, but it was on a far greater scale and it +reveals an enormous advance in tactics. Three hundred thousand +men, rowers and warriors, were engaged, and nearly 700 ships. Up +to the battle of Actium, two centuries later, Ecnomus remained +the greatest naval action in history. Moreover, the tactics of the +rival fleets show a high degree of discipline and efficiency. The +Carthaginian plan of dividing their enemy's force and defeating it +by a concentrated attack on his transport division, was skillfully +carried out and came perilously near succeeding. Had the first +and second squadrons of the Carthaginians been able to carry out +their part of the plan and "contain" the corresponding advance +squadrons of the Romans, the result would have been an overwhelming +victory for Carthage, involving not only the destruction of the +Roman fleet but also the capture of the Roman army of invasion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This victory left open the way for the advance into Africa. The +Romans had landed and marched almost to the gates of Carthage when +the army was destroyed by the skill of a Spartan, Xanthippus, and +Regulus, the Consul in command, was captured. This astonishing +catastrophe inflicted on the Roman legionaries was due to the use +of elephants, and offers a curious parallel to the effect of the +<i>corvi</i> on the Carthaginian sailors. Such was the terror inspired +by these animals that the Roman soldier would not stand before them +until a year or two later, in Sicily, the Consul Cecilius showed +how they could not only be repulsed but turned back on their own +army by the use of javelins and arrows. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nothing daunted by the loss of their army, Rome dispatched a fleet +of 350 ships to Africa to carry off the remnants of the defeated +army that were besieged in the city of Aspis. They were met by +a hastily organized Carthaginian fleet off the promontory of +Hermæa in a brief action in which <a name="page_57"><span +class="page">Page 57</span></a> the Romans were overwhelmingly +victorious. The latter took 114 vessels with their crews. The Roman +expedition continued on its course to Africa, rescued the besieged +troops and turned back in high feather toward Sicily. The Consuls +in command had been warned by the pilots not to attempt to skirt +the southern coast of Sicily at that season of the year, but the +warning was disregarded. Suddenly, as the fleet was approaching the +shore it was overwhelmed by a great gale, and out of 464 vessels +only eighty survived. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Frightful as this loss was in ships and men, Rome proceeded at +once to build another fleet, to the number of 250, which, with +characteristic energy, was made ready for service in three months. +This force also, after an ineffectual raid on the African coast, +fell victim to a storm on the way home with the loss of 150 ships. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Unwilling to relinquish the mastery of the sea that had been won +by an uninterrupted series of victories, Rome sent another fleet +to attack a Carthaginian force lying in the harbor of Drepanum. +As the Romans approached, the Carthaginians went out to meet them, +and so maneuvered as to force them to fight with an enemy in front +and the rocks and shoals of the coast in their rear. The Roman ships +were never able to extricate themselves from this predicament, +and the greater part were either taken or wrecked on the coast. +The Consul in command managed to escape with about thirty of his +vessels, but 93 were taken with their crews. This is the single +instance of a pitched battle between Roman and Carthaginian fleets +in which the victory went to Carthage, a victory due entirely to +better seamanship. The immediate result of this success was the +destruction of the Roman squadron lying in the port of Lilybæum +which was assisting the troops in the siege of that town. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Still another Roman fleet that had the temerity to anchor in an +exposed position was destroyed by a storm. "For so complete was +the destruction," writes Polybius, "that scarcely a single plank +remained entire." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Stunned by these disasters, the government at Rome gave up the idea +of contesting any further the command of the <a name="page_58"><span +class="page">Page 58</span></a> sea. The citizens, how ever, were not +willing to submit, and displayed a magnificent spirit of patriotism +in this the darkest period of the war. Individuals of means, or +groups of individuals, pledged each a quinquereme, fully equipped, +for a new fleet, asking reimbursement from the government only in +case of victory. By these private efforts a force of 200 quinqueremes +was constructed. At this time, as at the very beginning, the model +for the Roman ships was a prize taken from the enemy. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 560px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig014.png" width="560" height="401" alt="Fig. 14"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC + WAR</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile the Carthaginians, confident that the Romans were finally +driven from the sea, had allowed their own fleet to disintegrate. +Accordingly when the astonishing news reached them that the Romans +were again abroad they were compelled to fill their ships with +raw levies of troops and inexperienced rowers and sailors. And, +since the Carthaginian troops who were besieging the city of Eryx +in Sicily were in need of supplies, a large number of transports +were sent with the fleet. The Carthaginian commander planned to +make a landing unobserved, leave his transports, exchange his raw +crews for some of the veterans before Eryx and then give battle +to the Roman fleet. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_59"><span class="page">Page 59</span></a> This program +failed because of the initiative of the Roman Consul commanding +the new fleet. Having got word of the coming of the Carthaginians +and divining their plan, he braved an unfavorable wind and a rough +sea for the sake of forcing an action before they could establish +contact with their army. Accordingly he sought out his enemy and +met him (in the year 241 B.C.) off the island of Ægusa, near +Lilybæum. Almost at the first onset the Romans won an +overwhelming victory, capturing seventy and sinking fifty of the +Carthaginian force. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This final desperate effort of Rome was decisive. The Carthaginians +had no navy left, and their armies in Sicily were cut off from +all communications with their base. Accordingly ambassadors went +to Rome to sue for peace, and the great struggle that had lasted +without intermission for twenty-four years and reduced both parties +to the point of exhaustion, ended with a triumph for Rome through +a victory on the sea. By the treaty of peace Carthage was obliged +to pay a heavy indemnity and yield all claim to Sicily. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whatever historical moral may be drawn from the story of the first +Punic war, the fact remains that a nation of landsmen met the greatest +maritime power in the world and defeated it on its own element. In +every naval battle save one the Romans were victors. It is true, +however, that in the single defeat off Drepanum and in the dreadful +disasters inflicted by storms, Rome lost through lack of knowledge +of wind and sea. No great naval genius stands above the rest, to +whom the final success can be attributed. Rome won simply through +the better fighting qualities of her rank and file and the stamina +of her citizens. To quote the phrase of a British writer,[1] Rome +showed the superior "fitness to win." +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Fred Jane, <span class="sc">Heresies of Sea Power</span>, +<i>passim</i>.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Second Punic War</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the first Punic war the prize was an island, Sicily. Naturally, +therefore, the fighting was primarily naval. The second Punic war +(218-202 B.C.) was essentially a war on land. <a name="page_60"><span +class="page">Page 60</span></a> Carthage, driven from Sicily, turned +to Spain and made the southern part of the peninsula her province. +Using this as his base, Hannibal marched overland, crossed the +Alps, and invaded Italy from the north. Had he followed up his +unbroken series of victories by marching on the capital instead +of going into winter quarters at Capua, it is possible that Rome +might have been destroyed and all subsequent history radically +changed. The Romans had no general who could measure up to the genius +of Hannibal, but their spirit was unbroken even by the slaughter of +Cannæ, and their allies remained loyal. Moreover, Carthage, +thanks to factional quarrels and personal jealousies, was deaf to +all the requests sent by Hannibal for reënforcements when +he needed them most. In the end, Scipio, after having driven the +Carthaginians out of Spain, dislodged Hannibal from Italy by carrying +an invasion into Africa. At the battle of Zama the Romans defeated +Hannibal and won the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is difficult to see any significant use of sea power in this +second Punic war. Neither side seemed to realize what might be +done in cutting the communications of the other, and both sides +seemed to be able to use the sea at will. Of course due allowance +must be made for the limitations of naval activity. The quinquereme +was too frail to attempt a blockade or to patrol the sea lanes in +all seasons. Nevertheless both sides used the sea for the transport +of troops and the conveying of intelligence, and neither side made +any determined effort to establish a real control of the sea.[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: For a distinguished opinion to the contrary, v. Mahan, +<span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon History</span>, 14 +ff. In this view, however, Mahan is not supported by Mommsen (vol. +II, p. 100). See also Jane, <span class="sc">Heresies of Sea +Power</span>, 60 ff.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Third Punic War</i> (149-146 B.C.) +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The third Punic war has no naval interest. Rome, not satisfied with +defeating her rival in the two previous wars, took a convenient +pretext to invade Carthage and destroy every vestige of the city. +With this the great maritime empire came to an end, and Rome became +supreme in the Mediterranean. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_61"><span class="page">Page 61</span></a> +2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY; THE CAMPAIGN OF ACTIUM +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the fall of Carthage no rival appeared to contest the sovereignty +of Rome upon the sea. The next great naval battle was waged between +two rival factions of Rome herself at the time when the republic +had fallen and the empire was about to be reared on its ruins. This +was the battle of Actium, one of the most decisive in the world's +history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The rivalry between Antony and Octavius as to who should control +the destinies of Rome was the immediate cause of the conflict. +In the parceling out of spoil from the civil wars following the +murder of Cæsar, Octavius had taken the West, Lepidus the +African provinces, and Antony the East. Octavius soon ousted Lepidus +and then turned to settle the issue of mastery with Antony. In +this he had motives of revenge as well as ambition. Antony had +robbed him of his inheritance from Cæsar, and divorced his +wife, the sister of Octavius, in favor of Cleopatra, with whom he +had become completely infatuated. In this quarrel the people of +Rome were inclined to support Octavius, because of their indignation +over a reported declaration made by Antony to the effect that he +intended to make Alexandria rather than Rome the capital of the +empire and rule East and West from the Nile rather than the Tiber. +Both sides began preparations for the conflict. Antony possessed +the bulk of the Roman navy and the Roman legions of the eastern +provinces. To his fleet he added squadrons of Egyptian and +Phœnician vessels of war, and to his army he brought large +bodies of troops from the subject provinces of the East. In addition +he spent great sums of money by means of his agents in Rome to arouse +disaffection against Octavius. At the outset he acted with energy and +caused his antagonist the gravest anxiety. It was clear also that +Antony intended to take the offensive. He established winter quarters +at Patras, on the Gulf of Corinth, during the winter of 32-31 B.C., +billeting his army in various towns on the west coast of Greece, +and keeping it supplied by grain ships from Alexandria. His fleet +he anchored in the Ambracian Gulf, a <a name="page_62"><span +class="page">Page 62</span></a> landlocked bay, thirty miles wide, +lying north of the Gulf of Corinth; it is known to-day as the Gulf +of Arta. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Octavius, however, was equally determined not to yield the offensive +to his adversary, and boldly collected ships and troops for a movement +in force against Antony's position. His troops were also Roman +legionaries, experienced in war, but his fleet was considerably +less in numbers and the individual ships much smaller than the +quinqueremes and octiremes of Antony. The ships of Octavius were +mostly biremes and triremes. These disadvantages, however, were +offset by the fact that his admiral, Agrippa, was an experienced +sea-fighter, having won a victory near Mylæ during the civil +wars, and by the other fact that the crews under him, recruited +from the Dalmatian coast, were hardy, seafaring men. These were +called Liburni, and the type of ship they used was known as the +<i>Liburna</i>. This was a two-banked galley, but the term was +already becoming current for any light man of war, irrespective +of the number of banks of oars. In contrast with these Liburni, +who divided their days between fishing and piracy and knew all +the tricks of fighting at sea, the crews of Antony's great fleet +were in many cases landsmen who had been suddenly impressed into +service. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As soon as Antony had moved his force to western Greece he seemed +paralyzed by indecision and made no move to avail himself of his +advantageous position to strike. He had plenty of money, while +his adversary was at his wit's end to find even credit. He had +the admiration of his soldiers, who had followed him through many +a campaign to victory, while Octavius had no popularity with his +troops, most of whom were reluctant to fight against their old +comrades in arms. And finally, Antony had a preponderating fleet +with which he could command the sea and compel his opponent to +fight on the defensive in Italian territory. All these advantages +he allowed to slip away. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the winter of 32-31 one-third of Antony's crews perished +from lack of proper supplies and the gaps were filled by slaves, +mule-drivers, and plowmen—any one whom his captains could seize +and impress from the surrounding country. <a name="page_63"><span +class="page">Page 63</span></a> The following spring Agrippa made a +feint to the south by capturing Methone at the southern tip of the +Peloponnesus, thus threatening the wheat squadrons from Egypt on +which Antony depended. Next came the news that Octavius had landed +an army in Epirus and was marching south. Then Antony realized that +his adversary was aiming to destroy the fleet in the Ambracian +Gulf and hastened thither. He arrived with a squadron ahead of his +troops, at almost the same instant as Octavius, and if Octavius +had had the courage to attack the tired and disorganized crews of +Antony's squadron, Antony would have been lost. But by dressing +his crews in the armor of legionaries and drawing up his ships in +a position for fighting, with oars suspended, he "bluffed" his +enemy into thinking that he had the support of his troops. When +the latter arrived Antony established a great camp on Cape Actium, +which closes the southern side of the Gulf, and fortified the entrance +on that side. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thereafter for months the two forces faced each other on opposite +sides of the Gulf, neither side risking more than insignificant +skirmishes. During this time Octavius had free use of the sea for +his supplies, while the heavier fleet of Antony lay idle in harbor. +Nevertheless, Octavius did not dare to risk all on a land battle, and +conducted his campaign in a characteristically timid and vacillating +manner which should have made it easy for Antony to take the aggressive +and win. But the famous lieutenant of Julius Cæsar was no +longer the man who used to win the devotion of his soldiers by +his courage and audacity. He was broken by debauchery and torn +this way and that by two violently hostile parties in his own camp. +One party, called the Roman, wanted him to come to an understanding +with Octavius, or beat him in battle, and go to Rome as the restorer +of the republic. The other party, the Egyptian, was Cleopatra and +her following. Cleopatra was interested in holding Antony to Egypt, +to consolidate through him a strong Egyptian empire, and she was +not at all interested in the restoration of Roman liberties. In +Antony's desire to please Cleopatra and his attempt to deceive +his Roman friends into thinking that he was working for their <a +name="page_64"><span class="page">Page 64</span></a> aims, may be +seen the explanation of the utter lack of strategy or consistent +plan in his entire campaign against Octavius. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the beginning of July Antony apparently proposed a naval battle. +Instantly the suspicions of the Roman party were awakened. They +cried out that Antony was evidently going back to Egypt without +having won the decisive battle against Octavius on land, which +would really break the enemy's power, and without paying any heed +to the political problems at Rome. Such a furor was raised between +the two parties that Antony abandoned his plan and made a feint +toward the land battle in Epirus that the Romans wanted. Meanwhile +two of his adherents, one a Roman, the other a king from Asia Minor, +exasperated by the insolence of Cleopatra, deserted to Octavius. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +August came and went without action or change in the situation. +Meanwhile as Antony's camp had been placed in a pestilential spot +for midsummer heat, he suffered great losses from disease. By this +time Cleopatra was interested in nothing but a return to Egypt. +Accordingly she persuaded Antony to order a naval battle without +asking anybody's advice, and he set the date August 29 for the +sally of his fleet. The Romans were amazed and protested, but in +vain. Preparations went on in such a way as to make it clear to the +observing that what Antony was planning was not so much a battle +as a return to Egypt. Vessels which he did not need outside for +battle he ordered burned, although such ships would usually be kept +as reserves to make up losses in fighting. Moreover, he astonished +the captains by ordering them to take out into action the big sails +which were always left ashore before a battle. Nor did his explanation +that they would be needed in pursuit satisfy them. It appeared also +that he was employing trusted slaves at night to load the Egyptian +galleys with all of Cleopatra's treasure. Two more Roman leaders, +satisfied as to Antony's real intention, deserted to Octavius and +informed him of Antony's plans. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile a heavy storm had made it impossible to attempt the action +on August 29 or several days after. On the 2d of September (31 +B.C.) the sea became smooth again. Octavius <a name="page_65"><span +class="page">Page 65</span></a> and Agrippa drew out their fleet +into open water, about three-quarters of a mile from the mouth of +the gulf, forming line in three divisions. They waited till nearly +noon before Antony's fleet began to make its expected appearance to +offer battle. This also was formed in three divisions corresponding +to those of their enemy. The Egyptian division of sixty ships under +Cleopatra took up a safe position in the rear of the center. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 505px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig015.png" width="483" height="505" alt="Fig. 15"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B.C.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +There was a striking contrast in the types of ships in the opposing +ranks. The galleys of Octavius were low in the water, and nimble in +their handling; those of Antony were bulky and high, with five to +ten banks of oars, and their natural unhandiness was made worse by +a device intended to protect them against ramming. This consisted +of a kind of boom of heavy timbers rigged out on all sides of the +hull. In addition to the higher sides these ships supported towers +and citadels <a name="page_66"><span class="page">Page 66</span></a> +built upon their decks, equipped with every form of the artillery +of that day, especially catapults capable of hurling heavy stones +upon the enemy's deck. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Against such formidable floating castles, the light ships of Agrippa +and Octavius could adopt only skirmishing tactics. They rushed in +where they could shear away the oar blades of an enemy without +getting caught by the great grappling irons swung out from his +decks. They kept clear of the heavy stones from the catapults through +superior speed and ability to maneuver quickly, but they were unable +to strike their ponderous adversaries any vital blow. On the other +hand the great hulks of Antony were unable to close with them, +and though the air was filled with a storm of arrows, stones and +javelins, neither side was able to strike decisively at the other. +As at Salamis the opposite shores were lined with the opposing +armies, and every small success was hailed by shouts from a hundred +thousand throats on the one side and long drawn murmurs of dismay +from an equal host on the other. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In these waters a north wind springs up every afternoon—a +fact that Antony and Cleopatra had counted on—and as soon +as the breeze shifted the royal galley of Cleopatra spread its +crimson sail and, followed by the entire Egyptian division, sailed +through the lines and headed south. Antony immediately left his +flagship, boarded a quinquereme and followed. This contemptible +desertion of the commander in chief was not generally known in +his fleet; as for the disappearance of the Egyptian squadron, it +was doubtless regarded as a good riddance. The battle, therefore, +went on as stubbornly as ever. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Late in the afternoon Agrippa, despairing of harming his enemy +by ordinary tactics, achieved considerable success by the use of +javelins wrapped in burning tow, and fire rafts that were set drifting +upon the clumsy hulks which could not get out of their way. By this +means a number of Antony's ships were destroyed, but the contest +remained indecisive. At sunset Antony's fleet retired in some disorder +to their anchorage <a name="page_67"><span class="page">Page +67</span></a> in the gulf. Octavius attempted no pursuit but kept +the sea all night, fearing a surprise attack or an attempted flight +from the gulf. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile a flying wing of Octavius's fleet had been sent in pursuit +of Antony and Cleopatra, who escaped only after a rear guard action +had been fought in which two of Cleopatra's ships were captured. +The fugitives put ashore at Cape Tænarus, to enable Antony +to send a message to his general, Canidius, ordering him to take +his army through Macedonia into Asia. Then the flight was resumed +to Alexandria. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the morning of the 3d Octavius sent a message to the enemy's +camp announcing the fact of Antony's desertion and calling on the +fleet and army to surrender. The Roman soldiers were unwilling to +believe that their commander had been guilty of desertion, and +were confident that he had been summoned away on important business +connected with the campaign. Their general, however, did not dare +convey to them Antony's orders because they would betray the truth +and provoke mutiny. Consequently he did nothing. Certain Roman +senators and eastern princes saw the light and quietly went over +to the camp of Octavius. Several days of inaction followed, during +which the desertions continued and the rumor of Antony's flight +found increasing belief. On the seventh day, Canidius, who found +himself in a hopeless dilemma, also went over to Octavius. This +desertion by the commander settled the rest of the force. A few +scattered into Macedonia, but the great bulk of the army and all +that was left of the fleet surrendered. Nineteen legions and more +than ten thousand cavalry thus came over to Octavius and took service +under him. This was the real victory of Actium. In the words of +the Italian historian Ferrero, "it was a victory gained without +fighting, and Antony was defeated in this supreme struggle, not +by the valor of his adversary or by his own defective strategy +or tactics, but by the hopeless inconsistency of his double-faced +policy, which, while professing to be republican and Roman, was +actually Egyptian and monarchical." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_68"><span class="page">Page 68</span></a> The story +of the naval battle of Actium is a baffling problem to reconstruct +on account of the wide divergence in the accounts. For instance, +the actual number of ships engaged is a matter of choice between +the extremes of 200 to 500 on a side. And the consequences were so +important to Octavius and to Rome that the accounts were naturally +adorned afterwards with the most glowing colors. Every poet who lived +by the bounty of Augustus in later years naturally felt inspired to +pay tribute to it in verse. But the actual naval battle seems to +have been of an indecisive character. For that matter, even after +the wholesale surrender of Antony's Roman army and fleet, neither +Anthony nor Octavius realized the importance of what had happened. +Antony had recovered from worse disasters before, and felt secure +in Alexandria. Octavius at first followed up his advantage with +timid and uncertain steps. Only after the way was made easy by the +hasty submission of the Asiatic princes and the wave of popularity +and enthusiasm that was raised in Rome by the news of the victory, +did Octavius press the issue to Egypt itself. There the war came +to an end with the suicide of both Antony and Cleopatra. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As in the case of the indecisive naval battle off the capes of +the Chesapeake, which led directly to the surrender of Cornwallis, +an action indecisive in character may be most decisive in results. +Actium may not have been a pronounced naval victory but it had +tremendous consequences. As at Salamis, East and West met for the +supremacy of the western world, and the East was beaten back. It +is not likely that the Egyptian or the Syrian would have dominated +the genius of the western world for any length of time, but the +defeat of Octavius would have meant a hybrid empire which would +have fallen to pieces like the empire of Alexander, leaving western +Europe split into a number of petty states. On the other hand, +Octavius was enabled to build on the consequences of Actium the +great outlines of the Roman empire, the influence of which on the +civilized world to-day is still incalculable. When he left Rome to +fight Antony, the government was bankrupt and the people torn with +faction. When he returned <a name="page_69"><span class="page">Page +69</span></a> he brought the vast treasure of Egypt and found a people +united to support him. Actium, therefore, is properly taken as the +significant date for the beginning of the Roman empire. Octavius +took the name of his grand-uncle Cæsar, the title of Augustus, +and as "Imperator" became the first of the Roman emperors. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The relation of the battle of Actium to this portentous change +in the fortunes of Octavius was formally recognized by him on the +scene where it took place. Nicopolis, the City of Victory, was +founded upon the site of his camp, with the beaks of the captured +ships as trophies adorning its forum. The little temple of Apollo on +the point of Actium he rebuilt on an imposing scale and instituted +there in honor of his victory the "Actian games," which were held +thereafter for two hundred years. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the battle of Actium and the establishment of a powerful +Roman empire without a rival in the world, there follows a long +period in which the Mediterranean, and indeed all the waterways +known to the civilized nations, belonged without challenge to the +galleys of Rome. Naval stations were established to assist in the +one activity left to ships of war, the pursuit of pirates, but +otherwise there was little or nothing to do. And during this long +period, indeed, down to the Middle Ages, practically nothing is +known of the development in naval types until the emergence of the +low, one- or two-banked galley of the wars between the Christian +and the Mohammedan. The first definite description we have of warships +after the period of Actium comes at the end of the ninth century. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +There was some futile naval fighting against the Vandals in the days +when Rome was crumbling. Finally, by a curious freak of history, +Genseric the Vandal took a fleet out from Carthage against Rome, +and swept the Mediterranean. In the year 455, some six centuries +after Rome had wreaked her vengeance on Carthage, this Vandal fleet +anchored unopposed in the Tiber and landed an army that sacked the +imperial <a name="page_70"><span class="page">Page 70</span></a> +city, which had been for so long a period mistress of the world, +and had given her name to a great civilization. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the four centuries in which the <i>Pax Romana</i> rested +upon the world, it is easy to conceive of the enormous importance +to history and civilization of having sea and river, the known +world over, an undisputed highway for the fleets of Rome. Along +these routes, even more than along the military roads, traveled +the institutions, the arts, the language, the literature, the laws, +of one of the greatest civilizations in history. And ruthless as +was the destruction of Vandal and Goth in the city itself and in +the peninsula, they could not destroy the heritage that had been +spread from Britain to the Black Sea and from the Elbe to the upper +waters of the Nile. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of Rome</span>, Theodor Mommsen, tr. by + W. P. Dickson, 1867.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">General History</span>, Polybius, transl. by + Hampton, 1823.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Romans Under the Empire</span>, + Chas. Merivale (vol. III.), 1866.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Greatness and Decline of Rome</span>, G. + Ferrero, tr. by A. E. Zemmern, 1909.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Études sur l'Histoire Militaire et Maritime + des Grecs et des Romains</span>, Paul Serre, 1888.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Fleets of the First Punic War</span>, W. W. Tarn, + in <i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>, 1907.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Heresies of Sea Power</span> (pp. 40-71), Fred + Jane, 1906.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power on History</span> (pp. 15 + ff.), A. T. Mahan, 1889.</p> + +<p class="list"> +For a complete bibliography of Roman sea power, v. + <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power on the Roman + Republic</span> (Doctoral Dissertation), F. W. Clark, 1915.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_71"><span class="page">Page 71</span></a> +CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES: THE EASTERN EMPIRE +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The thousand years following the collapse of the Roman empire, a +period generally referred to as the Middle Ages, are characterized +by a series of barbarian invasions. Angles, Saxons, Goths, Visigoths, +Huns, Vandals, Vikings, Slavs, Arabs, and Turks poured over the +broken barriers of the empire and threatened to extinguish the last +spark of western and Christian civilization. Out of this welter +of invasions and the anarchy of petty kingdoms arose finally the +powerful nations that perpetuated the inheritance from Athens, +Rome, and Jerusalem, and developed on this foundation the newer +institutions of political and intellectual freedom that have made +western civilization mistress of the world. For this triumph of +West over East, of Christianity over barbarism, we have to thank +partly the courage and genius of great warriors and statesmen who +arose here and there, like Alfred of England and Martel of France, +but chiefly the Eastern Empire, with its capital at Constantinople, +which stood through this entire epoch as the one great bulwark against +which the invasions dashed in vain. In this story of defense, the +Christian fleets won more than one Salamis, as we shall see in +the course of this chapter. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the year 328 A.D. the Emperor Constantine the Great moved his +capital to Byzantium and named it "New Rome." In honor of its founder, +however, the name was changed soon to "Constantinople," which it +has retained ever since. It may seem strange that after so many +glorious centuries Rome should have been deprived of the honor +of being the center of the great empire which bore its own name, +but in the fourth <a name="page_72"><span class="page">Page +72</span></a> century the city itself had no real significance. +All power rested in the person of the Emperor himself, and wherever +he went became for the time being the capital for all practical +purposes. At this time the empire was already on the defensive and +the danger lay in the east. Constantine needed a capital nearer +the scene of future campaigns, nearer his weakest frontier, the +Danube, and nearer the center of the empire. Byzantium not only +served these purposes but also possessed natural advantages of a +very high order. It was situated where Europe and Asia meet, it +commanded the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, +and it was a natural citadel. Whoever captured the city must needs +be powerful by land and sea. Under the emperor's direction the new +capital was greatly enlarged and protected by a system of massive +walls. Behind these walls the city stood fast for over a thousand +years against wave after wave of barbarian invasion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the wars with the Persians, the Vandals, and the Huns nothing +need be said here, for they do not involve the operations of fleets. +The city was safe so long as no enemy appeared with the power to +hold the sea. That power appeared in the seventh century when the +Arabs, or "Saracens," as they were called in Europe, swept westward +and northward in the first great Mohammedan invasion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Most migrations are to be explained by the pressure of enemies, +or the lack of food and pasturage in the countries left behind, +or the discovery of better living conditions in the neighboring +countries. But the impulse behind the two tremendous assaults of +Islam upon Europe seems to have been religious fanaticism of a +character and extent unmatched in history. The founder of the Faith, +Mohammed, taught from 622 to 632. He succeeded in imbuing his followers +with the passion of winning the world to the knowledge of Allah +and Mohammed his prophet. The unbeliever was to be offered the +alternatives of conversion or death, and the believer who fell in +the holy wars would be instantly transported to Paradise. Men who +actually believe that they will be sent to a blissful immortality +after death are the most terrible soldiers <a name="page_73"><span +class="page">Page 73</span></a> to face, for they would as readily +die as live. In fact Cromwell's "Ironsides" of a later day owed +their invincibility to very much the same spirit. At all events, by +the time of Mohammed's death all Arabia had been converted to his +faith and, fired with zeal, turned to conquer the world. Hitherto +the tribes of Arabia were scattered and disorganized, and Arabia +as a country meant nothing to the outside world. Now under the +leadership of the Prophet it had become a driving force of tremendous +power. Mohammedan armies swept over Syria into Persia. In 637, +only five years after Mohammed's death, Jerusalem surrendered, +and shortly afterwards Egypt was conquered. Early in the eighth +century the Arabs ruled from the Indus on the east, and the Caucasus +on the north, to the shores of the Atlantic on the west. Their +empire curved westward along the coast of northern Africa, through +Spain, like one of their own scimitars, threatening all Christendom. +Indeed, the Arab invasion stands unparalleled in history for its +rapidity and extent. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 642px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig016.png" width="642" height="324" alt="Fig. 16"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE SARACEN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, ABOUT + 715 A.D.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The one great obstacle in the way was the Christian, or Roman, +empire with its center at Constantinople. Muaviah, the Emir of +Syria, was the first to perceive that nothing could be done against +the empire until the Arabs had wrested from it the command of the +sea. Accordingly he set about building <a name="page_74"><span +class="page">Page 74</span></a> a great naval armament. In 649 +this fleet made an attack on Cyprus but was defeated. The following +year, however, it took an important island, Aradus, off the coast +of Syria, once a stronghold of the Phœnicians, and sacked it with +savage barbarity. An expedition sent from Constantinople to recover +Alexandria was met by this fleet and routed. This first naval victory +over the Christians gave the Saracens unbounded confidence in their +ability to fight on the sea. They sailed into the Ægean, took +Rhodes, plundered Cos, and returned loaded with booty. Muaviah, +elated with these successes, planned a great combined land and +water expedition against the Christian capital. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this point it is worth pausing to consider what the fighting +ship of this period was like. As we have seen in the preceding +chapter the Roman navy sank into complete decay. At the end of the +fourth century there was practically no imperial navy in existence. +The conquest of the Vandals by Belisarius in the sixth century +involved the creation of a fleet, but when that task was over the +navy again disappeared until the appearance of the Arabs compelled +the building of a new imperial fleet. The small provincial squadrons +then used to patrol the coasts were by no means adequate to meet +the crisis. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The warships of this period were called "dromons," a term that +persists even in the time of the Turkish invasion eight centuries +later. The word means "fast sailers" or "racers." The dromon was +not the low galley of the later Middle Ages but a two-banked ship, +probably quite as large as the Roman quinquereme, carrying a complement +of about 300 men. Amidships was built a heavy castle or redoubt of +timbers, pierced with loopholes for archery. On the forecastle +rose a kind of turret, possibly revolving, from which, after Greek +fire was invented, the tubes or primitive cannon projected the +substance on the decks of the enemy. The dromon had two masts, lateen +rigged, and between thirty and forty oars to a side. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +There were two classes of dromons, graded according to size, and a +third class of ship known as the "pamphylian," which was apparently +of a cruiser type, less cumbered with <a name="page_75"><span +class="page">Page 75</span></a> superstructure. In addition there +were small scout and dispatch boats of various shapes and sizes. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Both Christian and Saracen fought with these kinds of warships. +Apparently the Arabs simply copied the vessels they found already +in use by their enemies, and added no new device of their own. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 627px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig017.png" width="627" height="624" alt="Fig. 17"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">EUROPE'S EASTERN FRONTIER</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +In 655 Muaviah started his great double invasion against Constantinople. +He sent his fleet into the Ægean, while he himself with an +army tried to force the passes of the Taurus mountains. Before the +Arab fleet had gone far it met the Christian fleet, commanded by +the Emperor himself, off the town of Phaselis on the southwestern +coast of Asia Minor. A great battle followed. The Christian emperor, +Constantine II, distinguished himself by personal courage throughout +the action, but the day went sorely against the Christians. At +last the flagship was captured and he himself survived only by +leaping into a vessel that came to his rescue while his men <a +name="page_76"><span class="page">Page 76</span></a> fought to +cover his escape. It was a terrible defeat, for 20,000 Christians +had been killed and the remnants of their fleet were in full retreat. +But the Saracens had bought their victory at such a price that they +were themselves in no condition to profit by it, and the naval +expedition went no further. Meanwhile Muaviah had not succeeded +in forcing the Taurus with his army, so that the grand assault +came to nothing after all. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following year the murder of the Caliph brought on a civil +war among the Saracens, in consequence of which Muaviah arranged +a truce with Constantine. The latter was thus enabled to turn his +attention to the beating back of the Slavs in the east and the +recovery of imperial possessions in the west, notably the city +and province of Carthage. During the last of these campaigns he +was killed by a slave. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The death of this energetic and able ruler seemed to Muaviah the +opportunity to begin fresh operations against the Christian empire. +Three great armies invaded the territory of the Cross. One plundered +Syracuse, another seized and fortified a post that threatened the +existence of Carthage, a third pushed to the shores of the Sea of +Marmora. These were, however, only preliminary to the grand assault +on the capital itself. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In 673 a great Arab armada forced the Hellespont and captured Cyzicus. +With this as a base, the fleet landed an army on the northern shore +of the Sea of Marmora. By these means Constantinople was invested +by land and sea. But the great walls proved impregnable against +the attacks of the army, and the Christian fleet, sheltered in +the Golden Horn, was able to sally out from time to time and make +successful raids on detachments of the Saracen ships. This state +of affairs continued for six months, after which Muaviah retired +with his army to Cyzicus, leaving a strong naval guard to hold +the straits. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The next spring Muaviah again landed his army on the European side and +besieged the city for several months. The second year's operations were +no more successful than the <a name="page_77"><span class="page">Page +77</span></a> first, and again the Arab force retired to Cyzicus +for the winter. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Arab commander was determined to stick it out until he had +forced the surrender of the city by sheer exhaustion, but his plan +had a fatal error. During the winter months the land blockade was +abandoned, with the result that supplies for the next year's siege +were readily collected for the beleaguered city. Emperor and citizens +alike rose to the emergency with a spirit of devotion that burned +brighter with every year of the siege. Meanwhile the Christians +of the outlying provinces of Syria and Africa were also fighting +stubbornly and with considerable success against the enemy. The +year 676 passed without any material change in the situation. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 415px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig018.png" width="415" height="352" alt="Fig. 18"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +During the siege a Syrian architect named Callinicus is said to +have come to Constantinople with a preparation of his own invention, +"Greek fire," which he offered the Emperor for use against the Saracen. +This, according to one historian, "was a semi-liquid substance, +composed of sulphur, pitch, dissolved niter, and petroleum boiled +together and mixed with certain less important and more obscure +substances.... When ejected it caught the woodwork which it fell +and set it so thoroughly on fire that there was no possibility +of extinguishing the conflagration. It could only be put out, it +is said, by pouring vinegar, wine, or sand upon it."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Art of War</span>, Oman, p. 546.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Constantine IV, the Emperor, was quick to see the possibilities +of the innovation and equipped his dromons with projecting brass +tubes for squirting the substance upon the enemy's ships. These +are sometimes referred to as "siphons," but it is not clear just +how they were operated. One writer[2] is of <a name="page_78"><span +class="page">Page 78</span></a> the opinion that something of the +secret of gunpowder had been obtained from the East and that the +substance was actually projected by a charge of gunpowder; in short, +that these "siphons" were primitive cannon. In addition to these +tubes other means were prepared for throwing the fire. Earthenware +jars containing it were to be flung by hand or arbalist, and darts +and arrows were wrapped with tow soaked in the substance. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">The Byzantine Empire</span>, Foord, +p. 139.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Christian fleet was no match for the Saracen in numbers, but +Constantine pinned his faith on the new invention. Accordingly, +during the fourth year of the siege, 677, he boldly led his fleet +to the attack. We have no details of this battle beyond the fact +that the Greek fire struck such terror by its destructive effect that +the Saracens were utterly defeated. This unexpected blow completed +the growing demoralization of the besiegers. The army returned to +the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and the survivors of the fleet +turned homewards. Constantine followed up his victory with splendid +energy. He landed troops on the Asiatic shore, pursued the retreating +Arabs and drove the shattered remnant of their army back into Syria. +The fleet was overtaken by a storm in the Ægean and suffered +heavily. Before the ships could reassemble, the Christians were +upon them and almost nothing was left of the great Saracen armada. +Thus the second great assault on Constantinople was shattered by +the most staggering disaster that had ever befallen the cause of +Islam. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Christian empire once more stood supreme, and that supremacy +was attested by the terms of peace which the defeated Muaviah was +glad to accept. There was to be a truce of thirty years, during +which the Christian emperor was to receive an annual tribute of +3000 pounds of gold, fifty Arab horses and fifty slaves. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is unfortunate that there was no Herodotus to tell the details +of this victory, for it was tremendously important to European +civilization. Western Europe was then a welter of barbarism and +anarchy, and if Constantinople had fallen, in all probability the +last vestige of Roman civilization would have been destroyed. Moreover, +the battle is of special <a name="page_79"><span class="page">Page +79</span></a> interest from a tactical point of view because it was +won by a new device, Greek fire, which was the most destructive +naval weapon up to the time when gunpowder and artillery took its +place. Indeed this substance may be said to have saved Christian +civilization for several centuries, for the secret of its composition +was carefully preserved at Constantinople and the Arabs never recovered +from their fear of it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The victory did not, however, mark the crisis of the struggle. +In the half century that followed, Constantinople suffered from +weak or imbecile emperors while the Caliphate gained ground under +able rulers and generals. In the first fifteen years of the eighth +century the Saracens reached the climax of their power. Under a +great general, Muza, they conquered Spain and spread into southern +France. It was he who conceived the grandiose plan of conquering +Christendom by a simultaneous attack from the west and from the +east, converging at the city of Rome. One army was to advance from +Asia Minor and take Constantinople; another was to cross the Pyrenees +and overrun the territory of the Franks. Had the enterprise been +started at the time proposed there could have been little opposition +in the west, for the Franks were then busy fighting each other, +but luckily Muza fell into disgrace with the Caliph at this time +and his great project was undertaken by less able hands and on +a piecemeal plan. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The eastern line of invasion was undertaken first in the year 717. +A fleet of warships and transports to the number of 1800 sailed +to the Hellespont, carrying about 80,000 troops, while a great +army collected at Tarsus and marched overland toward the same +destination. Meanwhile two more fleets were being prepared in the +ports of Africa and Egypt, and a third army was being collected +to reënforce the first expedition. This army was to be under +the personal command of the Caliph himself. The third attack on +the Christian capital was intended to be the supreme effort. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Fortunately, the ruler of Constantinople at this hour of peril +was a man of ability and energy, Leo III; but the empire had sunk +so low as a result of the misrule of his predecessors that his +authority scarcely extended beyond the shores <a name="page_80"><span +class="page">Page 80</span></a> of the Sea of Marmora, and his +resources were at a low ebb. The navy on which so much depended +was brought to a high point of efficiency, but it was so inferior +in numbers to the Saracen armada that he dared not attempt even +a defense of the Dardanelles. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the Arabs all went well at first. Unopposed they transported a +part of their army to the European shore, moved toward Constantinople +and invested it by land and sea. One detachment was sent to cover +Adrianople, which was occupied by a Christian garrison; the rest +of the force concentrated on the capital itself. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile the Christian fleet lay anchored in the shelter of the +Golden Horn, protected by a boom of chains and logs. As the Saracen +ships came up to occupy the straits above the city they fell into +confusion in trying to stem the rapid current. Seeing his opportunity, +the emperor ordered the boom opened, and leading the way in his +flagship, he fell upon the huddle of Saracen vessels in the channel. +The latter could make little resistance, and before the main body of +the fleet could work up to the rescue, the Christians had destroyed +twenty and taken a number of prizes back to the Horn. Again Greek +fire had proved its deadly efficacy. Elated with this success, +Leo ordered the boom opened wide and, lying in battle order at +the mouth of the Horn, he challenged the Arab fleet to attack. But +such was the terror inspired by Greek fire that the Grand Vizier, +in spite of his enormous superiority in numbers, declined to close. +Instead he withdrew his dromons out of the Bosphorus and thereafter +followed the less risky policy of a blockade. This initial success +of the Christian fleet had the important effect of leaving open +the sea route to the Black Sea, through which supplies could still +reach the beleaguered city. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Arabs then sat down to wear out the defenders by a protracted +siege on land and sea. In the spring of 718 the new army and the two +new fleets arrived on the scene. One of the latter succeeded, probably +by night, in passing through the Bosphorus and closing the last inlet +to the city. The situation for the defenders became desperate. Many +<a name="page_81"><span class="page">Page 81</span></a> of the +men serving on these new fleets, however, were Christians. These +took every opportunity to desert, and gave important information to +the emperor as to the disposition of the Arab ships. Acting on +this knowledge, Leo took his fleet out from the shelter of the +boom and moved up the straits against the African and Egyptian +squadrons that were blockading the northern exit. The deserters +guided him to where these squadrons lay, at anchor and unprepared +for action. What followed was a massacre rather than a battle. The +Christian members of the crews deserted wholesale and turned upon +their Moslem officers. Ship after ship was rammed by the Christian +dromons or set on fire by the terrible substance which every Arab +regarded with superstitious dread. Some were driven ashore, others +captured, many more sunk or burnt to the water's edge. Of a total +of nearly 800 vessels practically nothing was left. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Leo followed up this spectacular naval victory by transporting +a force from the garrison of the city to the opposite shore of +the Bosphorus, attacking the army encamped there and driving it +in rout. Meanwhile the Bulgarian chieftain had responded to Leo's +appeal and, relieving the siege of Adrianople, beat back the Saracen +army at that point with great slaughter. The fugitives of that army +served to throw into panic the troops encamped round the walls +of Constantinople, already demoralized by disease, the death of +their leaders, and the annihilation of the African and Egyptian +fleets in the Bosphorus. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The great retreat began. The Arab soldiers started back through +Asia Minor, but only 30,000 out of the original force of 180,000 +lived to reach Tarsus. The fleet set sail for the Ægean, +and as in the similar retreat of a half century before, the Arabs +were overwhelmed by a storm with terrible losses. The Christian +ships picked off many survivors, and the Christians of the islands +destroyed others that sought shelter in any port. It is said that +out of the original armada of 1800 vessels only five returned to +Syria! Thus the third and supreme effort of the Saracen ended in +one of the greatest military disasters in history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_82"><span class="page">Page 82</span></a> The service +of the Christian fleet in the salvation of the empire at this time +is thus summarized by a historian: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The fleet won most of the credit for the fine defense; it invariably +fought with admirable readiness and discipline, and was handled in +the most masterful manner. It checked the establishment of a naval +blockade at the very outset, and broke it when it was temporarily +formed in 718; it enabled the army to operate at will on either +shore of the Bosphorus, and it followed up the retreating Saracens +and completed the ruin of the great armament."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Byzantine Empire</span>, Foard, +p. 170.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The winning stroke in this campaign was the tremendous naval victory +at the mouth of the Bosphorus, and this, even more emphatically +than Constantine's victory in 677, deserves to be called another +Salamis. Not only did it save the Christian empire but it checked +the Caliphate at the summit of its power and started it on its +decline. Not for thirty years afterwards was the Saracen able to +put any considerable fleet upon the sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was ten years after the Arab defeat at Constantinople that the +armies of the west began the other part of Muza's project—the +conquest of the Franks. By this time the Frankish power was united +and able to present a powerful defense. In six bitterly contested +battles between Tours and Poitiers in 732 Charles Martel defeated +the Arabs in a campaign that may well be called the Marathon, or +better, the Platæa, of the Middle Ages, for it completed +the work done by the imperial navy at Constantinople. From this +time forward the power of the Saracen began to ebb by land and +sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As it ebbed, the new cities of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice began to +capture the trade and hold the control of the sea that once had +been Saracen, until the Christian control was so well established +as to make possible the Crusades. Later, as we shall see, a second +invasion of Mohammedans, the Turks, ably assisted by the descendants +of the Arabs who conquered Spain, once more threatened to control +the Mediterranean for the cause of Islam. But the Persian Gulf +and the Indian Ocean, which fell into the hands of the Arabs as +soon as they took to <a name="page_83"><span class="page">Page +83</span></a> the water, remained in Arab hands down to the times +of the Portuguese. In those waters, because they were cut off from +the Mediterranean, the Saracen had no competitor. As early as the +eighth century Ceylon was an Arab trading base, and when the Portuguese +explorers arrived at the end of the 15th century they found the +Arabs still dominating the water routes of India and Asia, holding +as they had held for seven centuries a monopoly of the commerce +of the east. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the Mediterranean during the struggle between Christian and +Saracen a recent English writer makes the following suggestive comment: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The function of the Mediterranean has thus undergone a change. +In early times it had been a barrier; later, under the Phœnicians, +it became a highway, and to the Greeks a defense. We find that the +Romans made it a basis for sea power and subdued all the lands +on its margin. With the weakening of Rome came a weakening of sea +power. The Barbary states and Spain became Saracen only because +the naval power of the eastern empire was not strong enough to hold +the whole sea, but neither was the Saracen able to gain supreme +control. Thus the conditions were the same as in the earlier days +of the conflict between Rome and Carthage: the Mediterranean became +a moat separating the rivals, though first one and then the other +had somewhat more control. The islands became alternately Saracen +and Christian. Crete and Sicily were held for centuries before +they were regained by a Christian power."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Geography and World Power</span>, +Fairgrieve, p. 125.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The victory of 718 saved Constantinople from any further peril +from the Arabs, but it was again in grave peril, two centuries +later, when a sudden invasion of Russians in great force threatened +to accomplish at a stroke what the Saracens had failed to do in three +great expeditions. The King of Kiev, one of the race of Vikings +that had fought their way into southern Russia, collected a huge +number of ships, variously estimated from one to ten thousand, +and suddenly appeared <a name="page_84"><span class="page">Page +84</span></a> in the Bosphorus. Probably there were not more than +1500 of these vessels all told and they must have been small compared +with the Christian dromons; nevertheless they presented an appalling +danger at that moment. The Christian fleet was watching Crete, the +army was in the east winning back territory from the Arabs, and +Constantinople lay almost defenseless. The great walls could be +depended an to hold off a barbarian army, but a fleet was needed +to hold the waterways; otherwise the city was doomed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Horn lay a few antiquated dromons and a few others still on +the stocks. To Theophanes the Patrician was given this nucleus of +a squadron with which to beat back the Russians. Desperate and even +hopeless as the situation appeared, he went to work with the greatest +energy, patching up the old ships, and hurrying the completion of +the new. Meanwhile the invaders sent raiding parties ashore that +harried the unprotected country districts with every refinement +of cruelty. In order to make each ship count as much as possible +as an offensive unit, Theaphanes made an innovation by fitting out +Greek fire tubes on the broadsides as well as in the bows. This +may be noted as the first appearance of the broadside armament +idea, which had to wait six hundred years more before it became +finally established. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When the new ships had been completed and the old ones made serviceable, +Theophanes had exactly fifteen men of war. With this handful of +vessels, some hardly fit to take the sea, he set out from the Horn +and boldly attacked the Russian fleet that blocked the entrance to +the strait. Never was there a more forlorn hope. Certainly neither +the citizens on the walls nor the men on the ships had any expectation +of a return. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +What followed would be incredible were it not a matter of history. +These fifteen ships were immediately swallowed up by the huge fleet +of the enemy, but under the superb leadership of Theophanes each +one fought with the fury of desperation. They had one hope, the +weapon that had twice before saved the city, Greek fire. The Russians +swarmed alongside only to find their ships taking fire with a flame +that water would not quench. Contempt of their feeble enemy changed +soon <a name="page_85"><span class="page">Page 85</span></a> to +a wild terror. There was but one impulse, to get out of reach of +the Christians, and the ships struggled to escape. Soon the whole +Russian fleet was in wild flight with the gallant fifteen in hot +pursuit. Some of these could make but slow headway because of their +unseaworthiness, but when all was over the Russians are said to have +lost two-thirds of their entire force. The invaders who had been +left on shore were then swept into the sea by reënforcements +that had arrived at Constantinople, and not a vestige was left +of the Russian invasion. Once more Greek fire and the Christian +navy had saved the empire; and for sheer audacity, crowned with a +victory of such magnitude, the feat of Theophanes stands unrivaled +in history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From the tenth century on, Constantinople began to find her rivalries +in the west. The coronation of Charlemagne in 800 had marked the +final separation of the eastern and the western empire. As noted +above, the passing of the Saracens gave opportunity for the growth +of commercial city-states like Genoa, Pisa and Venice, and their +interests clashed not only with one another but also with those +of Constantinople. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The climax came in 1204 when Venice succeeded in diverting the +Fourth Crusade to an expedition of vengeance for herself, first +against the city of Zara and then against Constantinople. This +time the Eastern Empire had no fleet ready for defense and the +Venetian galleys filled the waters under the city walls. Many of +these galleys were fitted with a kind of flying bridge, a long +yard that extended from the mast to the top of the wall and stout +enough to bear a file of men that scrambled by this means to the +parapets. After many bloody repulses the city was finally captured, +and there followed a sack that for utter barbarity outdid anything +ever perpetrated by Arab or Turk. Thus the city that for nearly a +thousand years had saved Christian civilization was, by a hideous +irony of fate, taken and sacked by a Crusading army. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When the second Mohammedan invasion threatened Europe, Constantinople, +weak on land and impotent by sea, and deserted by the Christian +nations of the west, was unable to <a name="page_86"><span +class="page">Page 86</span></a> put up a strong resistance. At +last, in 1453, it was captured by the Turks, and became thereafter +the capital of the Moslem power. Great as this catastrophe was, +it cannot compare with what would have happened if the city had +fallen to the Saracen, the Hun, or the Russian during the dark +centuries when the nations of the west were scarcely in embryo. +In the 15th century they were strong enough to take up the sword +that Constantinople had dropped and draw the line beyond which +the Turk was not permitted to go. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although it has been the fashion since Gibbon to sneer at the Eastern +Empire, it must be remembered with respect as the last treasure +house of the inheritance bequeathed by Rome and Greece during the +dark centuries of barbarian and Saracen. Even in its ruin it sent its +fugitives westward with the manuscripts of a language and literature +then little known, the Greek, and thereby added greatly to the +growing impetus of the Renaissance. It is significant also that +during its thousand years of life, as long as it kept its hold on +the sea it stood firm. When it yielded that, its empire dwindled +to a mere city fortress whose doom was assured long before it fell. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Cambridge Medieval History</span>, Vol. II., 1913.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The History of the Saracens</span>, E. Gibbon & S. + Ockley.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman + Empire</span>, Edward Gibbon, ed. by J. B. Bury.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Byzantine Empire</span>, E. A. Foord, 1911.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Military and Religious Life in the Middle Ages</span>, + Paul Lacroix, 1874.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Later Roman Empire</span>, J. B. Bury, + 1889.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Eastern Roman Empire</span>, J. B. + Bury, 1912.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_87"><span class="page">Page 87</span></a> +CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES [<i>Continued</i>]: VENICE AND THE +TURK +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The city-state of Venice owed its origin to the very same barbarian +invasions that wrecked the old established cities of the Italian +peninsula. Fugitives from these towns in northern Italy and the +outlying country districts fled to the islets and lagoons for shelter +from the Hun, the Goth, and the Lombard. As the sea was the Venetians' +barrier from the invader, so also it had to be their source of +livelihood, and step by step through the centuries they built up +their commerce until they practically controlled the Mediterranean, +for trade or for war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As early as 991 a Doge of Venice made a treaty with the Saracens +inaugurating a policy held thereafter by Venice till the time of +Lepanto; namely, to trade with Mohammedans rather than fight them. +The supreme passion of Venice was to make money, as it had been of +ancient Phœnicia, and to this was subordinated every consideration +of race, nationality, and religion. The first important step was +the conquest of the Dalmatian pirates at the beginning of the 11th +century. This meant the Venetian control of the Adriatic. When the +Crusades began, the sea routes to the Holy Land were in the hands +of the Venetians; indeed it was this fact that made the Crusades +possible. As the carrying and convoying agent of the Crusaders, +Venice developed greatly in wealth and power. With direct access to +the Brenner Pass, she became a rich distributing center for Eastern +goods to northern Europe. In all important Levantine cities there +was a Venetian quarter, Venetians had special trading privileges, +and many seaports and islands came directly under Venetian rule. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 827px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig019.png" width="827" height="531" alt="Fig. 19"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center"> +<a name="page_88"><span class="page">Page 88</span></a> +THEATER OF OPERATIONS, VENICE AND THE TURK</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +This rapid expansion naturally roused the jealousy of others. In +1171 Venice fought an unsuccessful war with Constantinople, and +yet continued to grow in wealth and power. In 1204, as we have +seen, Venice avenged herself by diverting the Fourth Crusade to +the siege and sack of her eastern rival. As the reward of that +nefarious exploit Venice received the greater part of the eastern +empire, and became the dominating power in the Mediterranean. During +the 13th and 14th centuries, however, she was compelled to fight +with her rebellious colonies and her new rivals, Genoa and Padua. +The wars with Genoa very nearly proved fatal to Venice, but just +when matters seemed most desperate she was saved by a naval victory +against a Genoese fleet in her own waters. In consequence of these +wars between Venice and Genoa both were heavy losers in wealth and +lives; Genoa never recovered from her defeat, but her rival showed +amazing powers of recuperation. She extended her territory in Italy +to include the important cities of Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, and +Verona, and in 1488 acquired the island of Cyprus in the Levant. At +this time the <a name="page_89"><span class="page">Page 89</span></a> +Venetian state owned 3300 ships, manned by 36,000 men, and stood +at the height of her power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Already, however, a new enemy had appeared who threatened not only +Venice but all Europe. This was the Ottoman Turk. The Turks were +not like the Arabs, members of the Indo-European family, but a +race from the eastern borders of the Caspian Sea, a branch of the +Mongolian stock. As these peoples moved south and west they came in +contact with Mohammedanism and became ardent converts. Eventually +they swept over Asia Minor, crossed the Dardanelles, took Adrianople, +and pushed into Serbia. Thus, when Constantinople fell in 1453 it +had been for some time a mere island of Christianity surrounded by +Moslems. Indeed it was only the civil wars among the Turks themselves +that held them back so long from the brilliant career of conquest +that characterized the 15th and early 16th centuries, for these +later followers of Mohammed had all the fanaticism of the Saracens. +Before the fall of Constantinople and the transfer of the Turkish +seat of government to that city, a corps of infantry was organized +that became the terror of the Christian world—the Janissaries. +By a grim irony of the Sultan, who created this body of troops, these +men were exclusively of Christian parentage, taken as children either +in the form of a human tribute levied on the Christian population +of Constantinople, or as captives in the various expeditions in +Christian territory. The Janissaries were brought up wholly to a +military life, they were not permitted to marry, and their lives +were devoted to fighting for the Crescent. For a long time they +were invincible in the open field. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first half of the 16th century saw the Turks in Persia, in the +east, and at the gates of Vienna in the west. For a time they got +a foothold in Italy by seizing Otranto. They had conquered Egypt +and Syria, penetrated Persia, and in Arabia gained the support of +the Arabs for the Turkish sultan as the successor to the Caliphs. +Constantinople, therefore, became not only the political capital for +the Turkish empire but the religious center of the whole Moslem world. +Moreover, <a name="page_90"><span class="page">Page 90</span></a> the +Arab states on the southern borders of the Mediterranean acknowledged +the suzerainty of the Turkish ruler. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This fact was of great importance, for it enabled the Turks to +become masters of the inland sea. In 1492 the greater part of the +Moors—the descendants of the Arab conquerors of Spain—were +expelled from the Peninsula by the conquest of Granada. This event +was hailed with joy throughout Christendom, but it had an unexpected +and terrible consequence. Flung back into northern Africa, and filled +with hatred because of the persecution they had endured, these Moors +embarked on a career of piracy directed against Christians. In +making common cause with the Turks they supplied the fleets that +the Turkish power needed to carry out its schemes of conquest. +Apparently the Turks had never taken to salt water as the Arabs +had done, but in these Moorish pirates they found fighters on the +sea well worthy to stand comparison with their peerless fighters +on land, the Janissaries. Between 1492 and 1580, the date of Ali's +death, there was a period in which the Moorish corsairs were supreme. +It produced three great leaders, each of whom in turn became the +terror of the sea: Kheyr ed Din, known as Barbarossa, Dragut, and +Ali. It is a curious fact that the first and third were of Christian +parentage. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +So long as the Turk invaded Christian territory by land alone, +the Venetians were unconcerned. They made what treaties they could +for continuing their trade with communities that had fallen into +the conquerors' hands. But when the Turk began to spread out by +sea it was inevitable that he must clash with the Venetian, and so +there was much fighting. Yet even after a successful naval campaign +the emissary of Venice was obliged to come before the Sultan, cap +in hand, to beg trading privileges in Turkish territory. Everything +in Venetian policy was subordinated to the maintenance of sufficient +friendly relations with the Turk to assure a commercial monopoly in +the Levant. Although the Moslem peril grew more and more menacing, +Venice remained unwilling to join in any united action for the +common good of Europe. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of course Venice was not alone in this policy. In 1534 <a +name="page_91"><span class="page">Page 91</span></a> Francis the +First, for example, in order to humiliate his rival, Charles V, +secretly sent word to Barbarossa of the plans being made against +him. Indeed France showed no interest in combating the Turk even +at the time when he was at the summit of his power. But Venice, as +the dominating naval power, had the means of checking the Turkish +invasion if she had chosen to do so. Instead she permitted the +control of the Mediterranean to slip from her into the hands of +the Moslems with scarcely a blow. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The leading part in the resistance to the Moslem sea power was +taken by Spain under Charles V. He had, as admiral of the navy, +Andrea Doria, the Genoese, the ablest seaman on the Christian side. +Early in his career he had captured a notorious corsair; later +in the service of Spain, he defeated the Turks at Patras (at the +entrance to the Gulf of Corinth), and again at the Dardanelles. +These successes threatened Turkish supremacy on the Mediterranean, +and Sultan Soliman "the Magnificent," the ruler under whom the +Turkish empire reached its zenith, summoned the Algerian corsair +Barbarossa and gave him supreme command over all the fleets under +the Moslem banner. At this time, 1533, Barbarossa was seventy-seven +years old, but he had lost none of his fire or ability. On the +occasion of being presented to the Sultan, he uttered a saying +that might stand as the text for all the writings of Mahan: "Sire, +he who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following year Barbarossa set out from Constantinople with +a powerful fleet and proceeded to ravage the coast of Italy. He +sacked Reggio, burnt and massacred elsewhere on the coast without +opposition, cast anchor at the mouth of the Tiber and if he had +chosen could have sacked Rome and taken the Pope captive. He then +returned to Constantinople with 11,000 Christian captives. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Charles V was roused by this display of corsair power and barbarity +to collect a force that should put an end to such raids. Barbarossa +had recently added Tunis to his personal domains, and the great +expedition of ships and soldiers which the emperor assembled was +directed against that city. Despite <a name="page_92"><span +class="page">Page 92</span></a> the warning given by the King of +France, Barbarossa was unable to oppose the Christian host with +a force sufficiently strong to defend the city. The Christians +captured it and the chieftain escaped only by a flight along the +desert to the port of Bona where he had a few galleys in reserve. +With these he made his way to Algiers before Andrea Doria could +come up with him. The Christians celebrated the capture of Tunis by +a massacre of some 30,000 inhabitants and returned home, thanking +God that at last Barbarossa was done for. Indeed, with the loss +of his fleet and his newly acquired province it seemed as if the +great pirate was not likely to give much trouble, but the Christians +had made the mistake of leaving the work only half done. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In 1537, two years after the fall of Tunis, the Sultan declared war +on Venice. The Turkish fleet, although led by the Sultan Soliman +himself, was defeated by the Venetians off Corfu. Doria, in the +service of Charles V, caught and burned ten richly laden Turkish +merchant ships and then defeated a Turkish squadron. The prestige +of the Crescent on the sea was badly weakened by these events, +but suddenly Barbarossa appeared and raided the islands of the +Archipelago and the coasts of the Adriatic with a savagery and +sweep unmatched by anything in his long career. He arrived in the +Golden Horn laden with booty, and delivered to his master, the +Sultan, 18,000 captives. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This exploit changed the complexion of affairs. During the winter +of 1537-1538 the naval yards of Constantinople were busy with the +preparations for a new fleet which should take the offensive against +the Venetians and the Christians generally. In the spring Barbarossa +got out into the Archipelago and, raiding at will, swept up another +batch of prisoners to serve as galley slaves for the new ships. +Meanwhile the Mediterranean states nerved themselves for a final +effort. Venice contributed 81 galleys, the Pope sent 36, and Spain, +30. Later the Emperor sent 50 transports with 10,000 soldiers, and +49 galleys, together with a number of large sailing ships. Venice +also added 14 sailing ships of war, or "nefs," and Doria 22; these +formed a special squadron. The Venetian <a name="page_93"><span +class="page">Page 93</span></a> nefs were headed by Condalmiero in +his flagship the <i>Galleon of Venice</i>, the most formidable +warship in the Mediterranean, and the precursor of a revolution +in naval architecture and naval tactics. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 837px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig020.png" width="837" height="509" alt="Fig. 20"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">16TH CENTURY GALLEY</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the sailing ship was coming more and more into favor because +of the discoveries across the Atlantic, the galley was the man +of war of this period. The dromons of the Eastern empire, with +their stout build and two banks of oars, had given way to a long, +narrow vessel with a single bank of oars which had been developed +by men who lived on the shores of the sheltered lagoons of the +Adriatic. The prime characteristic of this type was its mobility. +For the pirate whose business it was to lie in wait and dash out +on a merchantman, this quality of mobility—independence of +wind and speed of movement—was of chief importance. Similarly, +in order to combat the pirate it was necessary to possess the same +characteristic. Of course, as in all the days of rowed ships, this +freedom of movement was limited by the physical exhaustion of the +rowers. In the ships of Greek and Roman days these men had some +protection from the <a name="page_94"><span class="page">Page +94</span></a> weapons of the enemy and from the weather, but in +the 16th century galley, whether Turkish or Christian, they were +chained naked to their benches day and night, with practically +nothing to shelter them from the weather or from the weapons of +an enemy. So frightful were the hardships of the life that the +rowers were almost always captives, or felons who worked out their +sentences on the rowers' bench. An important difference between +the galley of this period and the earlier types of rowed ship is +the fact that in the galley there was but one row of oars on a +side, but these oars were very long and manned by four or five men +apiece. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A typical galley was about 180 feet over all with a beam of 19 +feet and a depth of hold of about 7-1/2 feet. A single deck sloped +from about the water line to a structure that ran fore and aft +amidships, about six feet wide, which served as a gangway between +forecastle and poop and gave access to the hold. The forecastle +carried the main battery of guns, and was closed in below so as to +provide quarters for the fighting men. The poop had a deck house +and a smaller battery; this deck also was closed in, furnishing +quarters for the officers. There were two or three masts, lateen +rigged, adorned in peace or war with the greatest profusion of +banners and streamers. Indeed huge sums of money were expended on +the mere ornament of these war galleys, particularly in the elaborate +carvings that adorned the stern and prow. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the conflict of Christian and Moslem, when Constantinople was +the capital of Christendom, Greek fire on two critical occasions +routed the Saracens. This substance was never understood in western +Europe, and for centuries the secret was carefully preserved in +the eastern capital. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, +it was used by the Moslem against the Christian, but the discovery +of gunpowder soon made the earlier substance obsolete. In the 16th +century cannon had already reached considerable dimensions, but in +a naval battle between galleys these weapons were not used after +the first volley or so. The tactics were little different from +those of the day of the trireme, consisting <a name="page_95"><span +class="page">Page 95</span></a> simply of ramming, and fighting +at close quarters with arquebus, bows, pike, and sword. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Twenty feet from the bows of every galley projected her metal beak, +and all her guns pointed forward; hence in the naval tactics of +the period everything turned on a head-on attack. The battle line, +therefore, was line abreast. For the same reasons a commander had +to fear an attack on his flank, and he maneuvered usually to get +at least one flank protected by the shore. The battle line in the +days of the galley could be dressed as accurately as a file of +soldiers, but the fighting was settled in a close mêlée +in which all formation was lost from the moment of collision between +the two fleets. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Campaign of Prevesa</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Such were the men of war and the tactics common to Christian and +corsair during the 16th century. While the Christians were slowly +collecting their armada, Barbarossa, with a force of 122 galleys, +set out to catch his enemy in detail if he could. Pirate as he +was, the old ruffian had a clear strategic grasp of what he might +do with a force that was inferior to the fleet collecting against +him. The Christians were to mobilize at Corfu. The Papal squadron +had collected in the Gulf of Arta, and Barbarossa made for it. By +sheer luck just before he arrived it had moved to the rendezvous. +If he had followed it up immediately, he might have crushed both +the Papal and Venetian contingents, because Doria and the Spanish +fleet had not yet arrived; but apparently he felt uncertain as to +just how far off these reënforcements were and therefore did +not attempt the stroke. Instead, he took up a defensive position +in the Gulf of Arta, exactly where Antony had collected his fleet +before the battle of Actium. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In September (1538) the Christian fleet under Doria left Corfu and +crossed to the Gulf. Barbarossa had drawn up his force in battle +array inside the entrance, under the guns of the Turkish fortress +at Prevesa. Since this entrance is obstructed by a bar with too +little water for Doria's heavier ships, he lay outside. Thus the two +fleets faced each other, <a name="page_96"><span class="page">Page +96</span></a> each waiting for the other to make the next move. For +the first time in their careers the greatest admiral on the Christian +side was face to face with the greatest on the Moslem side. Both +were old men, Doria over seventy and Barbarossa eighty-two. The +stage was set for another decisive battle on the scene of Actium. +The town of Prevesa stood on the site of Octavius's camp, and again +East and West faced each other for the mastery of the sea. With +the vastly greater strength of the Christian fleet, and the known +skill of its leader, everything pointed to an overwhelming victory +for the Cross. What followed is one of the most amazing stories +in history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Having the interior lines and the smooth anchorage, Barbarossa +had only to watch his enemy go to pieces in the open roadstead +in trying to maintain a blockade. His officers, however, scorned +such a policy, and, being appointees of the Sultan and far from +subordinate in spirit to their chief, they were finally able to +force his hand and compel him to offer battle to the Christians +by leaving the security of the gulf and the fortress and going +out into the open, exactly where Doria wanted him. Accordingly +on the 27th of September, the Turkish fleet sailed out to offer +battle. It happened that Doria had gone ten miles away to Sessola +for anchorage, and the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> lay becalmed right +in the path of the advancing fleet. Condalmiero sent word for help, +and Doria ordered him to begin fighting, assuring him that he would +soon be reënforced. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Turkish galleys, advancing in a crescent formation, soon enveloped +the lonely ship. Her captain ordered his crew to lie down on her +deck while he alone stood, in full armor, a target to the host of +Moslems who pushed forward in their galleys anxious for the honor +of capturing this great ship. Condalmiero ordered his gunners to +hold their fire until the enemy were within arquebus range. Then +the broadsides of the galleon blazed and the surrounding galleys +crumpled and sank. A single shot weighing 120 pounds sank a galley +with practically all on board. The signal to retreat was given +and speedily obeyed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thereafter there were to be no more rushing tactics. Barbarossa +<a name="page_97"><span class="page">Page 97</span></a> organized +his galleys in squadrons of twenty, which advanced, one after the +other, delivered their fire, and retired. All the rest of the day, +from about noon till sunset, this strange conflict between the single +galleon and the Turkish fleet went on. The ship was cumbered with her +fallen spars; she had lost thirteen men killed and forty wounded. +The losses would have been far greater but for the extraordinarily +thick sides of the galleon. After sundown the Turkish fleet appeared +to be drawing up in line for the last assault. On the <i>Galleon +of Venice</i> there was no thought of surrender; the ammunition +was almost spent and the men were exhausted with their tremendous +efforts, but they stood at their posts determined to defend their +ship to the last man. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Then, to their astonishment Barbarossa drew off, sending some of +his galleys to pursue and cut off certain isolated Christian units, +but leaving the field to the Venetian galleon. Meanwhile, during all +that long, hot afternoon the great fleet of Andrea Doria, instead +of pressing forward to the relief of the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> +and crushing Barbarossa with its great superiority in numbers, +was going through strange parade maneuvers about ten miles away. +Doria's explanation was that he was trying to decoy Barbarossa +out into deeper water where the guns of the nefs could be used, +but there is no other conclusion to be reached than that Doria +did not want to fight. Fortune that day offered him everything +for an overwhelming victory, one that might have ranked with the +decisive actions of the world's history, and he threw it away under +circumstances peculiarly disgraceful and humiliating. Never did +commander in chief so richly deserve to be shot on his own deck. +The following day as a fair wind blew for Corfu, Doria spread sail +and retired from the gulf, while Barbarossa, roaring with laughter, +called on his men to witness the cowardice of this Christian admiral. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The victory lay with Barbarossa. With a greatly inferior force he +had challenged Doria and attacked. Doria had not only declined the +challenge but fled back to Corfu. No wonder the Sultan ordered the +cities of his domain to be illuminated. Barbarossa's prizes included +two galleys and five nefs, <a name="page_98"><span class="page">Page +98</span></a> but he, too, had failed in an inexplicable fashion +in drawing off from the assault on the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> +at the end of the day's fighting. It is with her, with the gallant +Condalmiero and his men, that all the honor of the day belongs. +Nothing in the adventurous 16th century surpasses their splendid, +disciplined valor on this occasion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The astonishing powers of resistance and the deadly effect of the +broadsides of the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> displayed in a long +and successful fight against an entire fleet of galleys should +have had the effect of making a revolution in naval architecture +fifty years before that change actually occurred. But men of war +of those days were built after the models of Venetian architects, +and the latter clung doggedly to the galley. They overlooked the +great defensive and offensive powers of the galleon displayed in +this story and saw only the fact that she was becalmed and unable +to move. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Doria's failure left conditions in the Mediterranean as bad as +ever. Barbarossa died at the age of ninety, but one of the last +acts of his life was to ransom a follower of his, Dragut, Pasha +of Tripoli, who had served under him at Prevesa and, having been +captured two years later, served four years as a galley slave on +the ship of Gian Andrea Doria, the grandnephew and heir of Andrea +Doria. Dragut soon assumed the leadership laid down by Barbarossa, +his master, fighting first the elder Doria and then his namesake +with great skill and audacity. For years the Knights of Malta had +been a thorn in the side of the Moslems who roamed the sea, and +in 1565 a gigantic effort was made by the Sultan, together with +his tributaries from the Barbary states, to wipe out this naval +stronghold. The siege that followed was distinguished by the most +reckless courage and the most desperate fighting on both sides. It +extended from May 18 to September 8, costing the Christians 8000 +and the Moslems 30,000 lives. In the midst of the siege Dragut +himself was slain, and the conduct of the siege fell into less +capable hands. Finally the Turks withdrew. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The death of Soliman the Magnificent, in 1566, brought to the head +of the Turkish state a ruler known by the significant <a +name="page_99"><span class="page">Page 99</span></a> name, Selim +the Drunkard. Weak and debauched as he was, nevertheless he aspired +to add to the Turkish dominions as his father had done. Accordingly, +he informed Venice that she must evacuate Cyprus. Previous to this +time Venice had succeeded, by means of heavy bribes to the Sultan's +ministers, in keeping her hold on this important island, but this +policy only tempted further arrogance on the part of the Turk. +Further, the time was propitious for such a stroke because Venice +was impoverished by bad harvests and the loss of her naval arsenal +by fire, Spain was occupied in troubles with the Moors, and France, +torn with civil war, wanted to keep peace with the Sultan at any +price. During the terrible siege of Malta Venice had remained neutral; +now that the danger came home to her she cried for help, and not +unnaturally there were those who sneered at her in this crisis +and bade her save herself. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Pope, however, had long been anxious to organize a league of +Christian peoples to win back the Mediterranean to the Cross and draw +a line beyond which the Crescent should never pass. In this plight +of Venice he saw an opportunity, because hitherto the persistent +neutrality or the unwillingness of the Venetians to fight the Turk to +the finish had been one of the chief obstacles to concerted action. +He therefore pledged his own resources to Venice and attempted +to collect allies by the appeal to the Cross. The results were +discouraging, but a force of Spanish, Papal, and Venetian galleys +was finally collected and after endless delays dispatched to the +scene in the summer of 1570. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile the Turks had been pressing their attack on Cyprus and +were besieging the city of Nicosia. If the Christians had been +moved by any united spirit they could have relieved Nicosia and +struck a heavy blow at the Turkish fleet, which lay unready and +stripped of its men in the harbor. But Gian Doria, who inherited +from his great uncle his great dislike of Venetians, and who probably +had secret instructions from his master, Philip II, to help as +little as possible, succeeded in blocking any vigorous move on +the part of the other commanders. Finally, after a heated quarrel, +he sailed <a name="page_100"><span class="page">Page 100</span></a> +back to Sicily with his entire fleet, and the rest followed. The +allies had gone no nearer Cyprus than the port of Suda in Crete. +The whole expedition, therefore, came to nothing. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In September Nicosia fell to the Turk, who then turned to the conquest +of Famagusta, the last stronghold of the Venetians on the island. +Bragadino, the commander of the besieged forces, fought against +desperate odds with a courage and skill worthy of the best traditions +of his native city, hoping to repulse the Turks until help could +arrive. But Doria's defection in 1570 decided the fate of the city +the following year. After fifty-five days of siege, with no resources +left, Bragadino was compelled, on August 4, 1571, to accept an offer +of surrender on honorable terms. The Turkish commander, enraged +at the loss of 50,000 men, which Bragadino's stubborn defense had +cost, no sooner had the Venetians in his power than he massacred +officers and men and flayed their commander alive. This news did +not reach the Christians, however, until their second expedition +was almost at grips with the Turks at Lepanto. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Campaign of Lepanto</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Undismayed by the failure of his first attempt, Pope Pius had +immediately gone to work to reorganize his Holy League. He had +to overcome the mutual hatred and mistrust that lay between Spain +and Venice, aggravated by the recent conduct of Doria, but neither +the Pope nor Venice could do without the help of Spain. There was +much bickering between the envoys in the Papal chambers, and it +was not till February, 1571, that the terms of the new enterprise +were agreed upon. By this contract no one of the powers represented +was to make a separate peace with the Porte. The costs were divided +into six parts, of which Spain undertook three, Venice, two, and +the Pope, one. Don Juan, the illegitimate brother of Philip II, was +to be commander in chief. Although only twenty-four, this prince +had won a military reputation in suppressing the Moorish rebellion +in Spain, and, having been recognized by Philip as a half brother, +he had a princely rank that would <a name="page_101"><span +class="page">Page 101</span></a> subordinate the claims of all the +rival admirals. Finally, the rendezvous was appointed at Messina. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The aged Venetian admiral, Veniero, had been compelled by the situation +in the east to divide his force into two parts, one at Crete, and +the other under himself at Corfu. By the time he received orders +to proceed to the rendezvous, he learned that Ali, the corsair +king of Algiers, known better by his nickname of "Uluch" Ali, was +operating at the mouth of the Adriatic with a large force. To reach +Messina with his divided fleet, Veniero ran the risk of being caught +by Ali and destroyed in detail, but the situation was so critical +that he took the risk and succeeded in slipping past the corsair +undiscovered. In permitting this escape, and in fact in allowing +all the other units of the Christian fleet to assemble at Messina, +Ali missed a golden opportunity to destroy the whole force before +it ever collected. Instead, he continued his ravages on the coasts +of the Adriatic, bent only on plunder. He carried his raids almost +to the lagoons of Venice itself, and indeed might have attacked +the city had he not been hampered by a shortage of men. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the Turks were having their own way, unopposed, and the +situation was growing daily more critical, the Christian fleet was +slow in assembling. For a whole month Veniero waited in Messina +for the arrival of Don Juan and the Spanish squadrons. Philip, +apparently, used one pretext after another to delay the prince, +and once on his way Don Juan had to tarry at every stage of the +journey to witness ceremonial fêtes held in his honor. Philip +acted in good faith as far as his preparations went, but he wanted +to save his galleys for use against the Moors of the Barbary coast, +which was nearer the ports of Spain, and was indifferent to the +outcome of the quarrel between Venice and the Porte. Undoubtedly +Doria and the other Spanish officers were fully informed of their +royal master's desires in this expedition as in the one of the +year before. They were to avoid battle if they could. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On August 25 Don Juan arrived at Messina and was joyously received +by the city and the fleet. Nevertheless, it <a name="page_102"><span +class="page">Page 102</span></a> was the 12th of September before +the decision was finally reached to seek out the Turkish fleet and +offer battle. Fortunately Don Juan was a high-spirited youth who +shared none of his brother's half-heartedness; he went to work to +organize the discordant elements under his command into as much of +a unit as he could, and to imbue them with the idea of aggressive +action. In this spirit he was seconded by thousands of young nobles +and soldiers of fortune from Spain and Italy, who had flocked to his +standard like the knight errants of the age of chivalry, burning +to distinguish themselves against the infidel. Among these, oddly +enough, was a young Spaniard, Cervantes, who was destined in later +years to laugh chivalry out of Europe by his immortal "Don Quixote." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In order to knit together the three elements, Spanish, Venetian, +and Papal, Don Juan so distributed their forces that no single +squadron could claim to belong to any one nation. As the Venetian +galleys lacked men, he put aboard them Spanish and Italian infantry. +Before leaving Messina, he had given every commander written +instructions as to his cruising station and his place in the battle +line. The fighting formation was to consist of three squadrons of +the line and one of reserve. The left wing was to be commanded +by the Venetian Barbarigo; the center, by Don Juan himself, in +the flagship <i>Real</i>, with Colonna, the Papal commander on +his right and Veniero, the Venetian commander, on his left, in +their respective flagships. The right wing was intrusted to Doria, +and the reserve, amounting to about thirty galleys, was under the +Spaniard, Santa Cruz. In front of each squadron of the line two +Venetian galleasses were to take station in order to break up the +formation of the Turkish advance. The total fighting force consisted +of 202 galleys, six galleasses, and 28,000 infantrymen besides +sailors and oarsmen. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Venetian galleasses deserve special mention because they attracted +considerable attention by the part they subsequently played in the +action. Sometimes the word was applied to any specially large galley, +but these represented something different from anything in either +Christian or Turkish <a name="page_103"><span class="page">Page +103</span></a> fleets. They were an attempt to reach a combination +of galleon and galley, possessing the bulk, strength, and heavy +armament of the former, together with the oar propulsion of the +latter to render them independent of the wind. But like most, if +not all, compromise types, the galleass was short-lived. It was +clumsy and slow, being neither one thing nor the other. Most of the +time on the cruise these galleasses had to be towed in order to +keep up with the rest of the fleet. It is interesting to note that, +despite the example of the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> at Prevesa, +there was not a single galleon in the whole force. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On September 16 the start from Messina was made. The fleet crossed +to the opposite shore of the Adriatic, creeping along the coast and +in the lee of the islands after the manner of oar driven vessels +that were unable to face a fresh breeze or a moderate sea. Delayed +by unfavorable winds, it was not till October 6 that it arrived +at the group of rocky islets lying just north of the opening of +the Gulf of Corinth, or Lepanto[1] where the Turkish fleet was +known to be mobilized. Meanwhile trouble had broken out among the +Christians. Serious fighting had taken place between Venetians and +Spaniards, and Veniero, without referring the case to Don Juan, +had hanged a Spanish soldier who had been impudent to him, thus +enraging the commander in chief. In a word, the various elements +were nearly at the point of fighting each other before the object +of their crusade was even sighted. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Lepanto is the modern name of Naupaktis, the naval +base of Athens in the gulf. It had been a Venetian stronghold, +but fell to the Turks in 1499. The name Lepanto is given to both +the town and the gulf.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At dawn of the 7th the lookout on the <i>Real</i> sighted the van +of the Turkish fleet coming out to the attack, and this news had a +salutary effect. Don Juan called a council of war, silenced those +like Doria who still counseled avoiding battle, and then in a swift +sailing vessel went through the fleet exhorting officers and men +to do their utmost. The sacrament was then administered to all, +the galley slaves freed from their chains, and the standard of +the Holy League, the figure of the Crucified Savior, was raised +to the truck of the flagship. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_104"><span class="page">Page 104</span></a> As the +Christians streamed down from the straits to meet their enemy, +they faced a serious peril. The Turks were advancing in full array +aided by a wind at their backs; the same wind naturally was against +the Christians, who had to toil at their oars with great labor +to make headway. If the wind held there was every prospect that +the Turks would be able to fall upon their enemy before Don Juan +could form his line of battle. Fortunately, toward noon the wind +shifted so as to help the Christians and retard the Turks. This +shift just enabled most of the squadrons to fall into their appointed +stations before the collision. Two of the galleasses, however, +were not able to reach their posts in advance of the right wing +before the mêlée began, and the right wing itself, +though it had ample time to take position, kept on its course to the +south, leaving the rest of the fleet behind. To Turk and Christian +alike this move on the part of Doria meant treachery, for which +Doria's previous conduct gave ample color, but there was no time +to draw back or reorganize the line. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Turkish force, numbering 222 galleys, swept on to the attack, +also in three divisions, stretched out in a wide crescent. The +commander in chief, Ali Pasha, led the center, his right was commanded +by Sirocco, the Viceroy of Egypt, and his left by "Uluch" Ali. This +arrangement should have brought Ali, the greatest of the Moslem +seafighters of his day, face to face with Doria, the most celebrated +admiral in Christendom. The two opposing lines swung together with a +furious plying of oars and a tumult of shouting. The four galleasses +stationed well in front of the Christian battle line opened an +effective fire at close quarters on the foremost Turkish galleys +as they swept past. In trying to avoid the heavy artillery of these +floating fortresses, the Turks fell into confusion, losing their +battle array almost at the very moment of contact, and masking +the fire of many of their ships. This was an important service +to the credit of the galleasses, but as they were too unwieldy to +maneuver readily they seem to have taken no further part in the +action. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first contact took place about noon between Barbarigo's and +Sirocco's squadrons. The Venetian had planned to rest <a +name="page_105"><span class="page">Page 105</span></a> his left +flank so close to the shore as to prevent the Turks from enveloping +it, but Sirocco, who knew the depth of water better, was able to +pour a stream of galleys between the end of Barbarigo's line and +the coast so that the Christians at this point found themselves +attacked in front and rear. For a while it looked as if the Turks +would win, but the Christians fought with the courage of despair. +There was no semblance of line left; only a mêlée of +ships laid so close to each other as to form almost a continuous +platform over which the fighting raged hand to hand. Both the leaders +fell. Barbarigo was mortally wounded, and Sirocco was killed when +his flagship was stormed. The loss of the Egyptian flagship and +commander seemed to decide the struggle at this point. The Christian +slaves, freed from the rowers' benches, were supplied with arms +and joined in the fighting with the fury of vengeance on their +masters. A backward movement set in among the Turkish ships; then +many headed for the shore to escape. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile, shortly after the Christian left had been engaged the +two centers crashed together. Such was the force of the impact +that the beak of Ali Pasha's galley drove as far as the fourth +rowing bench of the <i>Real</i>. Instantly a fury of battle burst +forth around the opposing flagships. Attack and counter attack +between Spanish infantry and Turkish Janissaries swayed back and +forth across from one galley to another amid a terrific uproar. +Once the <i>Real</i> was nearly taken, but Colonna jammed the bows +of his galley alongside and saved the situation by a counter attack. +On the other side of the flagship Veniero was also at one time in +grave peril but was saved by the timely assistance of his comrades. +Though wounded in the leg, this veteran of seventy fought throughout +the action as stoutly as the youngest soldier. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The prompt action of Colonna turned the tide in the center, for +after clearing the Turks from the deck of the <i>Real</i>, the +Christians, now reënforced, made a supreme effort that swept +the length of Ali Pasha's galley and left the Turkish commander in +chief among the slain. In fighting of this character no quarter +was given; of the 400 men on the Turkish <a name="page_106"><span +class="page">Page 106</span></a> flagship not one was spared. Don +Juan immediately hoisted the banner of the League to the masthead +of the captured ship. This sign of victory broke the spirit of +the Turks and nerved the Christians to redoubled efforts. As on +the left wing so in the center the offensive now passed to the +allies. Thus after two hours' fighting the Turks were already beaten +on left and center, though fighting still went on hotly in tangled +and scattered groups of ships. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 443px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig021.png" width="443" height="512" alt="Fig. 21"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF LEPANTO, OCT. 7. 1571</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Formation of the two fleets just before + contact, about 11 a. m.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +On the Christian right, however, the situation was different. Doria +had from the beginning left the right center "in the air" by sailing +away to the south. He explained this singular conduct afterwards by +saying that he noticed Ali moving seaward as if to try an enveloping +movement round the Christians' southern flank, and therefore moved +to head <a name="page_107"><span class="page">Page 107</span></a> +him off. However plausible this may be, the explanation did not +satisfy Doria's captains, who obeyed his signals with indignant +rage. At all events Ali had a considerably larger force than Doria, +and after the latter had drawn away so far as to create a wide +gap between his own squadron and the center, Ali suddenly swung +his galleys about in line and fell upon the exposed flank, leaving +Doria too far away to interfere. The Algerian singled out a detached +group of about fifteen galleys, among which was the flagship of +the Knights of Malta. No Christian flag was so hated as the banner +of this Order, and the Turks fell upon these ships with shouts +of triumph. One after another was taken and it began to look as +if Ali would soon roll up the entire flank and pluck victory from +defeat. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But Santa Cruz, who was still laboring through the straits when +the battle began, was now in a position to help. After an hour's +fighting with all the advantage on Ali's side, Santa Cruz arrived +with his reserve squadron and turned the scale. By this time, too, +Doria managed to reach the scene with a part of his squadron. Thus +Ali found himself outnumbered and in danger of capture. Signaling +retreat, he collected a number of his galleys and, boldly steering +through the field of battle, escaped to lay at the feet of the +Sultan the captured flag of the Knights of Malta. Some thirty-five +others of his force made their way safely back to Lepanto. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The fighting did not end till evening. By that time the Christians +had taken 117 galleys and 20 galliots, and sunk or burnt some fifty +other ships of various sorts. Ten thousand Turks were captured and +many thousands of Christian slaves rescued. The Christians lost +7500 men; the Turks, about 30,000. It was an overwhelming victory. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As far as the tactics go, Lepanto was, like Salamis, an infantry +battle on floating platforms. It was fought and won by the picked +infantrymen of Spain and Italy; the day of seamanship had not yet +arrived. For the conduct of the most distinguished admiral on the +Christian side, Gian Andrea Doria, little justification can be +found. Even if we accept his excuse at its face value, the event +proved his folly. <a name="page_108"><span class="page">Page +108</span></a> It is strange that in this, the supreme victory +of the Cross over the Crescent on the sea, a Doria should have +tarnished his reputation so foully, even as his great-uncle Andrea +had tarnished his in the battle of Prevesa. It seems as if in both, as +Genoese, the hatred of Venice extinguished every other consideration +of loyalty to Christendom. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +What were the consequences of Lepanto, and in what sense can it +be called a decisive battle? The question at first seems baffling. +Overwhelming as was the defeat of the Turks, Ali had another fleet +ready the next spring and was soon ravaging the seas again. Twice +there came an opportunity for the two fleets to meet for another +battle, but Ali declined the challenge. After Lepanto he seemed +unwilling, without a great superiority, to risk another close action +and contented himself with a "fleet in being." In this new attitude +toward the Christians lies the hint to the answer. The significance +of Lepanto lies in its moral effect. Never before had the Turkish +fleet been so decisively beaten in a pitched battle. The fame of +Lepanto rang through Europe and broke the legend of Turkish +invincibility on the sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The material results, it must be admitted, were worse than nothing +at the time. In 1573 Don Juan was amazed and infuriated to learn +that Venice, contrary to the terms of the Holy League, had secretly +arranged a separate peace with the Sultan. The terms she accepted +were those of a beaten combatant. Venice agreed to the loss of +Cyprus, paid an indemnity of 300,000 ducats, trebled her tribute +for the use of Zante as a trading post, and restored to the Turk +all captures made on the Albanian and Dalmatian coast. Apparently +the Venetian had to have his trade at any price, including honor. +At this news Don Juan tore down the standard of the allies and +raised the flag of Castile and Aragon. In two years and after a +brilliant victory, the eternal Holy League, which was pledged to +last forever, fell in pieces. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As for Venice, her ignoble policy brought her little benefit. She +steadily declined thereafter as a commercial and naval power. Her +old markets were in the grip of the Turk, and the new discoveries of +ocean routes to the east—beyond the <a name="page_109"><span +class="page">Page 109</span></a> reach of the Moslem,—diverted +the course of trade away from the Mediterranean, which became, +more and more, a mere backwater of the world's commerce. In fact, +it was not until the cutting of the Suez Canal that the inland +sea regained its old time importance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the long unsuccessful struggle of Christian against the Turk +Venice must bear the chief blame, for she had the means and the +opportunity to conquer if she had chosen the better part. And yet +the story of this chapter shows also that the rest of Christendom +was not blameless. If Christians in the much extolled Age of Faith +had shown as much unity of spirit as the Infidels, the rule of the +Turk would not have paralyzed Greece, the Balkans, the islands +of the Ægean, and the coasts of Asia Minor for nearly five +centuries. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">La Guerre de Chypre et la Bataille de + Lépante</span>, J. P. Jurien de la Gravière, 1888.</p> + +<p class="list"> +By the same author, <span class="sc">Doria et Barberousse</span>, + 1886.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Reign of Philip the Second</span> (vol. + III.), W. H. Prescott, 1858.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean</span>, E. Hamilton + Currey. This contains a full bibliography.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Navy of Venice</span>, Alethea Wiel, 1910.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Eastern Question</span> (chap. V.), J. A. R. + Marriott, 1917.<p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Barbary Corsairs</span>, Story of the Nations Series, + Lane-Poole, 1890.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span> (Introduction), J. S. + Corbett, 1898.</p> + + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Geography and World Power</span>, James Fairgrieve, + 1917.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_110"><span class="page">Page 110</span></a> +CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +OPENING THE OCEAN ROUTES +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1. PORTUGAL AND THE NEW ROUTE TO INDIA +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From the days of the Phœnicians to the close of the 15th century, +all trade between Europe and Asia crossed the land barrier east of +the Mediterranean. Delivered by Mohammedan vessels at the head of +the Persian Gulf or the ports of the Red Sea, merchandise followed +thence the caravan routes across Arabia or Egypt to the Mediterranean, +quadrupling in value in the transit. Intercourse between East and +West, active under the Romans, was again stimulated by the crusades +and by Venetian traders, until in the 14th and the 15th centuries +the dyes, spices, perfumes, cottons, muslins, silks, and jewels +of the Orient were in demand throughout the western world. This +assurance of a ready market and large profits, combined with the +capture of Constantinople by the Turks (1453), their piratical +attacks in the Mediterranean which continued unchecked until Lepanto, +and their final barring of all trade routes through the Levant, +revived among nations of western Europe the old legends of all-water +routes to Asia, either around Africa or directly westward across +the unknown sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With the opening of ocean routes and the discovery of America, +a rivalry in world trade and colonial expansion set in which has +continued increasingly down to the present time, forming a dominant +element in the foreign policies of maritime nations and a primary +motive for the possession and use of navies. The development of +overseas trade, involving the factors of merchant shipping, navies, +and control of the seas, is thus an integral part of the history +of sea power. The great voyages of discovery are also not to be +disregarded, <a name="page_111"><span class="page">Page 111</span></a> +supplying as they did the basis for colonial claims, and illustrating +at the same time the progress of nautical science and geographical +knowledge. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 533px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig022.png" width="533" height="344" alt="Fig. 22"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">CROSS-STAFF</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The art of navigation, though still crude, had by the 15th century +so advanced that the sailor was no longer compelled to skirt the +shore, with only rare ventures across open stretches of sea. The +use of the compass, originating in China, had been learned from the +Arabs by the crusaders, and is first mentioned in Europe towards +the close of the 12th century. An Italian in England, describing a +visit to the philosopher Roger Bacon in 1258, writes as follows: +"Among other things he showed me an ugly black stone called a magnet +... upon which, if a needle be rubbed and afterward fastened to +a straw so that it shall float upon the water, the needle will +instantly turn toward the pole-star; though the night be never so +dark, yet shall the mariner be able by the help of this needle to +steer his course aright. But no master-mariner," he adds, "dares +to use it lest he should fall under the imputation of being a +magician."[1] By the end of the 13th century <a name="page_112"><span +class="page">Page 112</span></a> the compass was coming into general +use; and when Columbus sailed he had an instrument divided as in +later times into 360 degrees and 32 points, as well as a quadrant, +sea-astrolabe, and other nautical devices. The astrolabe, an instrument +for determining latitude by measuring the altitude of the sun or +other heavenly body, was suspended from the finger by a ring and +held upright at noon till the shadow of the sun passed the sights. +The cross-staff, more frequently used for the same purpose by sailors +of the time, was a simpler affair less affected by the ship's roll; +it was held with the lower end of the cross-piece level with the +horizon and the upper adjusted to a point on a line between the +eye of the observer and the sun at the zenith. By these various +means the sailor could steer a fixed course and determine latitude. +He had, however, as yet no trustworthy means of reckoning longitude +and no accurate gauge of distance traveled. The log-line was not +invented until the 17th century, and accurate chronometers for +determining longitude did not come into use until still later. A +common practice of navigators, adopted by Columbus, was to steer +first north or south along the coast and then due west on the parallel +thought to lead to the destination sought. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Dante's tutor Brunetto Latini, quoted in <span +class="sc">The Discovery of America</span>, Fiske, Vol. I, p. 314.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 798px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig023.png" width="798" height="501" alt="Fig. 23"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WORLD IN 1450, SHOWING +THE VOYAGES OF COLUMBUS, VASCO DE GAMA, MAGELLAN, AND DRAKE</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +With the revival of classical learning in the Renaissance, geographical +theories also became less wildly imaginative than in the medieval +period, the charts of which, though beautifully colored and highly +decorated with fauna and flora, show no such accurate knowledge +even of the old world as do those of the great geographer Ptolemy, +who lived a thousand years before. Ptolemy (200 A.D.), in company +with the majority of learned men since Aristotle, had declared +the earth to be round and had even estimated its circumference +with substantial accuracy, though he had misled later students +by picturing the Indian Ocean as completely surrounded by Africa, +which he conceived to extend indefinitely southward and join Asia +on the southeast, leaving no sea-route open from the Atlantic. There +was another body of opinion of long standing, however, which outlined +Africa much as it actually is. Friar Roger Bacon, whose interest +in the compass has already been mentioned, collected statements of +classical <a name="page_113"></a><a name="page_114"><span class="page"> +Page 114</span></a> authorities and other evidence to show that +Asia could be reached by sailing directly westward, and that the +distance was not great; and this material was published in Paris +in a popular <i>Imago Mundi</i> of 1410. In general, the best +geographical knowledge of the period, though it underestimated the +distance from Europe westward to Asia and was completely ignorant +of the vast continents lying between, gave support to the theories +which the voyages of Diaz, Vasco da Gama, and Columbus magnificently +proved true. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When the best sailors of the time were Italians, and when astronomical +and other scientific knowledge of use in navigation was largely +monopolized by Arabs and Jews, it seems strange that the isolated +and hitherto insignificant country of Portugal should have taken, +and for a century or more maintained primacy in the great epoch +of geographical discovery. The fact is explained, not so much by +her proximity to the African coast and the outlying islands in the +Atlantic, as by the energetic and well-directed patronage which +Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460) extended to voyages of +exploration and to the development of every branch of nautical +art. The third son of John the Great of Portugal, and a nephew on +his mother's side of Henry IV of England, the prince in 1415 led +an armada to the capture of Ceuta from the Moors, and thereafter, +as governor of the conquered territory and of the southern province +of Portugal, settled at Saigres near Cape St. Vincent. On this +promontory, almost at the western verge of the known world, Henry +founded a city, Villa do Iffante, erected an observatory on the +cliff, and gathered round him the best sailors, geographers and +astronomers of his age. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 967px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig024.png" width="967" height="504" alt="Fig. 24"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">PORTUGUESE VOYAGES AND POSSESSIONS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Under this intelligent stimulus, Portuguese navigators within a +century rounded the Cape of Good Hope, opened the sea route to +the Indies, discovered Brazil, circumnavigated the globe, and made +Portugal the richest nation in Europe, with a great colonial empire +and claims to dominion over half the seas of the world. Portuguese +ships carried her flag from Labrador (which reveals its discoverers +in its name) and Nova Zembla to the Malay Archipelago and Japan. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_115"><span class="page">Page 115</span></a> +<a name="page_116"><span class="page">Page 116</span></a> It is +characteristic of the crusading spirit of the age that Prince Henry's +first ventures down the African coast were in pursuance of a vague +plan to ascend one of the African rivers and unite with the legendary +Christian monarch Prester John (Presbyter or Bishop John, whose realm +was then supposed to be located in Abyssinia) in a campaign against +the Turk. But crusading zeal changed to dreams of wealth when his +ships returned from the Senegal coast between 1440 and 1445 with +elephants' tusks, gold, and negro slaves. The Gold Coast was already +reached; the fabled dangers of equatorial waters—serpent +rocks, whirlpools, liquid sun's rays and boiling rivers—were +soon proved unreal; and before 1480 the coast well beyond the Congo +was known. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The continental limits of Africa to southward, long clearly surmised, +were verified by the voyage of Bartolomeo Diaz, in 1487. Diaz rounded +the cape, sailed northward some 200 miles, and then, troubled by food +shortage and heavy weather, turned backward. But he had blazed the +trail. The cape he called <i>Tormentoso</i> (tempestuous) was renamed +by his sovereign, João II, Cape <i>Bon Esperanto</i>—the +Cape of Goad Hope. The Florentine professor Politian wrote to +congratulate the king upon opening to Christianity "new lands, +new seas, new worlds, dragged from secular darkness into the light +of day." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was not until ten years later that Vasco da Gama set out to +complete the work of Diaz and establish contact between east and +west. The contour of the African coast was now so well understood +and the art of navigation so advanced that Vasco could steer a +direct course across the open sea from the Cape Verde Islands to +the southern extremity of Africa, a distance of 3770 miles (more +than a thousand miles greater than that of Columbus' voyage from +the Canaries to the Bahamas), which he covered in one hundred days. +After touching at Mozambique, he caught the steady monsoon winds +for Calicut, on the western coast of the peninsula of India, then +a great <i>entrepôt</i> where Mohammedan and Chinese fleets +met each year to exchange wares. Thwarted here by the intrigues of +Mohammedan traders, who were quick to realize <a name="page_117"><span +class="page">Page 117</span></a> the danger threatening their commercial +monopoly, he moved on to Cannanore, a port further north along the +coast, took cargo, and set sail for home, reaching the Azores in +August of 1499, with 55 of his original complement of 148 men. +They came back, in the picturesque words of the Admiral, "With +the pumps in their hands and the Virgin Mary in their mouths," +completing a total voyage of 13,000 miles. The profits are said +to have been sixty-fold. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The ease with which in the next two decades Portugal extended and +consolidated her conquest of eastern trade is readily accounted +for. She was dependent indeed solely upon sea communications, over +a distance so great as to make the task seem almost impossible. +But the craft of the east were frail in construction and built for +commerce rather than for warfare. The Chinese junks that came to +India are described as immense in size, with large cabins for the +officers and their families, vegetable gardens growing on board, +and crews of as many as a thousand men; but they had sails of matted +reed that could not be lowered, and their timbers were loosely +fastened together with pegs and withes. The Arab ships, according +to Marco Polo, were also built without the use of nails. Like the +Portuguese themselves, the Arab or Mohammedan merchants belonged +to a race of alien invaders, little liked by the native princes +who retained petty sovereignties along the coast. But the real +secret of Portuguese success lay in the fact that their rivals were +traders rather than fighters, who had enjoyed a peaceful monopoly for +centuries, and who could expect little aid from their own countries +harassed by the Turk. The Portuguese on the other hand inherited +the traditions of Mediterranean seamanship and warfare, and, above +all, were engaged in a great national enterprise, led by the best +men in the land, with enthusiastic government support. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After Vasco's return, fleets were sent out each year, to open the +Indian ports by either force or diplomacy, destroy Moslem merchant +vessels, and establish factories and garrisons. In 1505 Francisco de +Almeida set sail with the largest fleet as yet fitted out (sixteen ships +and sixteen caravels), an <a name="page_118"><span class="page">Page +118</span></a> appointment as Viceroy of Cochin, Cannanore, and +Quilon, and supreme authority from the Cape to the Malay Peninsula. +Almeida in the next four years defeated the Mohammedan traders, +who with the aid of Egypt had by this time organized to protect +themselves, in a series of naval engagements, culminating on February +3, 1509, in the decisive battle of Diu. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mir Hussain, Admiral of the Gran Soldan of Egypt and commander in +chief of the Mohammedan fleet in this battle, anchored his main +force of more than a hundred ships in the mouth of the channel +between the island of Diu and the mainland, designing to fall back +before the Portuguese attack towards the island, where he could +secure the aid of shore batteries and a swarm of 300 or more foists +and other small craft in the harbor. Almeida had only 19 ships +and 1300 men, but against his vigorous attack the flimsy vessels +of the east were of little value. The battle was fought at close +quarters in the old Mediterranean style, with saber, cutlass, and +culverin; ramming, grappling, and boarding. Before nightfall Almeida +had won. This victory ensured Portugal's commercial control in +the eastern seas. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Alfonso d'Albuquerque, greatest of the Portuguese conquistadores, +succeeded Almeida in 1509. Establishing headquarters in a central +position at Goa, he sent a fleet eastward to Malacca, where he set +up a fort and factory, and later fitted out expeditions against +Ormuz and Aden, the two strongholds protecting respectively the +entrances to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The attack on Aden +failed, but Ormuz fell in 1515. Albuquerque died in the same year +and was buried in his capital at Goa. His successor opened trade and +founded factories in Ceylon. In 1526 a trading post was established +at Hugli, near the mouth of the Ganges. Ormuz became a center for the +Persian trade, Malacca for trade with Java, Sumatra, and the Spice +Islands. A Portuguese envoy, Fernam de Andrada, reached Canton in +1517—in the first European ship to enter Chinese waters—and +Pekin three years later. Another adventurer named Mendez Pinto spent +years in China and in 1548 established a factory near Yokohama, +Japan. Brazil, where a squadron under Cabral had touched <a +name="page_119"><span class="page">Page 119</span></a> as early +as 1502, was by 1550 a prosperous colony, and in later centuries +a chief source of wealth. Mozambique, Mombassa, and Malindi, on +the southeastern coast of Africa, were taken and fortified as +intermediate bases to protect the route to Asia. The muslins of +Bengal, the calicoes of Calicut, the spices from the islands, the +pepper of Malabar, the teas and silks of China and Japan, now found +their way by direct ocean passage to the Lisbon quays. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A few strips along the African coast, tenuously held by sufferance +of the great powers, and bits of territory at Goa, Daman, and Diu +in India, are the twentieth century remnants of Portugal's colonial +empire. The greater part of it fell away between 1580 and 1640, when +Portugal was under Spanish rule. But her own system of colonial +administration, or rather exploitation, was if possible worse than +Spain's. Her scanty resources of man power were exhausted in colonial +warfare. The expulsion of Protestants and Jews deprived her of +elements in her population that might have known how to utilize +wealth from the colonies to build up home trade and industries. +Her situation was too distant from the European markets; and the +raw materials landed at Lisbon were transshipped in Dutch bottoms +for Amsterdam and Antwerp, which became the true centers of +manufacturing and exchange. Cervantes, in 1607, could still speak +of Lisbon as the greatest city in Europe,[1] but her greatness was +already decaying; and her fate was sealed when Philip of Spain +closed her ports to Dutch shipping, and Dutch ships themselves +set sail for the east. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Persiles and Sigismuda</span>, III, i.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But the period of Portugal's maritime ascendancy cannot be left +without recording, even if in barest outline, the circumnavigation +of the globe by Fernão da Magalhães, or Magellan, who, +though he made this last voyage of his under the Spanish flag, was +Portuguese by birth and had proved his courage and iron resolution +under Almeida and Albuquerque in Portugal's eastern campaigns. +Seeking a westward passage to the Spice Islands, the five vessels +of 75 to 100 tons composing his squadron cleared the mouth of the +Guadalquivir <a name="page_120"><span class="page">Page 120</span></a> +on September 20, 1519. They established winter quarters in the last +of March at Port St. Julian on the coast of Patagonia. Here, on +Easter Sunday, three of his Spanish captains mutinied. Magellan +promptly threw a boat's crew armed with cutlasses aboard one of +the mutinous ships, killed the leader, and overcame the unruly +element in the crew. The two other ships he forced to surrender +within 24 hours. One of the guilty captains was beheaded and the +other marooned on the coast when the expedition left in September. +Five weeks were now spent in the labyrinths of the strait which has +since borne the leader's name. "When the capitayne Magalianes," +so runs the contemporary English translation of the story of the +voyage, "was past the strayght and sawe the way open to the other +mayne sea, he was so gladde thereof that for joy the teares fell +from his eyes." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +He had sworn he would go on if he had to eat the leather from the +ships' yards. With three vessels—one had been shipwrecked in +the preceding winter and the other deserted in the straits—they +set out across the vast unknown expanse of the Pacific. "In three +monethes and xx dayes they sailed foure thousande leagues in one +goulfe by the sayde sea called Pacificum.... And havying in this +tyme consumed all their bysket and other vyttayles, they fell into +such necessitie that they were in forced to eate the pouder that +remayned thereof being now full of woormes.... Theyre freshe water +was also putryfyed and become yellow. They dyd eate skynnes and +pieces of lether which were foulded about certeyne great ropes +of the shyps." On March 6, 1521, they reached the Ladrones, and +ten days later, the Philippines, even these islands having never +before been visited by Europeans. Here the leader was killed in a +conflict with the natives. One ship was now abandoned, and another +was later captured by the Portuguese. Of the five ships that had +left Spain with 280 men, a single vessel, "with tackle worn and +weather-beaten yards," and 18 gaunt survivors reached home. "It +has not," writes the historian John Fiske of this voyage, "the +unique historic position of the first voyage of Columbus, which +brought together two streams of human life that had been <a +name="page_121"><span class="page">Page 121</span></a> disjoined +since the glacial period. But as an achievement in ocean navigation +that voyage of Columbus sinks into insignificance beside it.... When +we consider the frailness of the ships, the immeasurable extent of +the unknown, the mutinies that were prevented or quelled, and the +hardships that were endured, we can have no hesitation in speaking +of Magellan as the prince of navigators."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Discovery of America</span>, Vol. +II, p. 210.] +</p> + +<p class="center">2. SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is generally taken for granted that the great movement of the +Renaissance, which spread through western Europe in the 15th and +the 16th centuries, quickening men's interest in the world about +them rather than the world to come, and inspiring them with an +eagerness and a confident belief in their own power to explore +its hidden secrets, was among the forces which brought about the +great geographical discoveries of the period. Its influence in +this direction is evident enough in England and elsewhere later on; +but, judging by the difficulties of Columbus in securing support, +it was not in his time potent with those in control of government +policy and government funds. The Italian navigator John Cabot and +his son Sebastian made their voyages from England in 1498 and 1500 +with very feeble support from Henry VII, though it was upon their +discoveries that England later based her American claims. Even in +Spain there seems to have been little eagerness to emulate the +methods by which her neighbor Portugal had so rapidly risen to +wealth and power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But the influence of revived classical information on geographical +matters was keenly felt; and the idea of a direct westerly passage +to India was suggested, not only by Portugal's monopoly of the Cape +route, but by classical authority, generally accepted by the best +geographers of the time. The <i>Imago Mundi</i> of 1410, already +mentioned, embodying Roger Bacon's arguments that the Atlantic washed +the shores of Asia and that the voyage thither was not long, was a +book <a name="page_122"><span class="page">Page 122</span></a> +carefully studied by Columbus. Paul Toscanelli, a Florentine physicist +and astronomer, adopting and developing this theory, sent in 1474 to +Alfonso V of Portugal a map of the world in which he demonstrated +the possibilities of the western route. The distance round the earth +at the equator he estimated almost exactly to be 24,780 statute miles, +and in the latitude of Lisbon 19,500 miles; but he so exaggerated +the extent of Europe and Asia as to reduce the distance between +them by an Atlantic voyage to about 6500 miles, putting the east +coast of China in about the longitude of Oregon. This distance he +still further shortened by locating Cipango (Japan) far to the +eastward of Asia, in about the latitude of the Canary Islands and +distant from them only 3250 miles. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With all these opinions Columbus was familiar, for the list of his +library and the annotations still preserved in his own handwriting, +show that he was not an ignorant sailor, nor yet a wild visionary, +but prepared by closest study for the task to which he gave his +later years. His earlier career, on the other hand, had supplied +him with abundant practical knowledge. Born in Genoa, a mother +city of great seamen, probably in the year 1436, he had received +a fair education in Latin, geography, astronomy, drafting, and +other subjects useful to the master-mariner of those days. He had +sailed the Mediterranean, and prior to his great adventure, had +been as far north as Iceland, and on many voyages down the African +coast. Following his brother Bartholomew, who was a map-maker in +the Portuguese service, he came about 1470 to Lisbon, even then a +center of geographical knowledge and maritime activity. Probably +as early as this time the idea of a western voyage was in his mind. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Skepticism may account for Portugal's failure to listen to his +proposals; and her interest was already centered in the route around +Africa under her exclusive control. The tale of his years of search +for assistance is well known. Indeed, while the fame of Columbus +rests rightly enough upon his discovery of a new world, of whose +existence he had never dreamed and which he never admitted in his +lifetime, his greatness is best shown by his faith in his vision, +and the <a name="page_123"><span class="page">Page 123</span></a> +steadfast energy and fortitude with which he pushed towards its +practical accomplishment, during years of vain supplication, and +amid the trials of the voyage itself. He had actually left Granada, +when Isabella of Spain at last agreed to support his venture. In +the contract later drawn up he drove a good bargain, contingent +always upon success; he was to be admiral and viceroy of islands +and continents discovered and their surrounding waters, with control +of trading privileges and a tenth part of the wealth of all kinds +derived. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With the explorations of Columbus on his first and his three later +voyages (in 1496, 1498, and 1502) we are less concerned than with +the first voyage itself as an illustration of the problems and +dangers faced by the navigator of the time, and with the effect of +the discovery of the new world upon Spain's rise as a sea power. +The three caravels in which he sailed were typical craft of the +period. The <i>Santa Maria</i>, the largest, was like the other +two, a single-decked, lateen-rigged, three-masted vessel, with a +length of about 90 feet, beam of about 20 feet, and a maximum speed +of perhaps 6-1/2 knots. She was of 100 tons burden and carried 52 +men. The <i>Pinta</i> was somewhat smaller. The <i>Niña</i> +(Baby) was a tiny, half-decked vessel of 40 tons. Heavily timbered +and seaworthy enough, the three caravels were short provisioned +and manned in part from the rakings of the Palos jail. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Leaving Palos August 3, 1492, Columbus went first to the Canaries, +and thence turned his prow directly westward, believing that he +was on the parallel that touched the northern end of Japan. By +a reckoning even more optimistic than Toscanelli's, he estimated +the distance thither to be only 2500 miles. Thence he would sail +to Quinsay (Hang Chow), the ancient capital of China, and deliver +the letter he carried to the Khan of Cathay. The northeast trade +winds bore them steadily westward, raising in the minds of the +already fear-stricken sailors the certainty that against these +head winds they could never beat back. At last they entered the +vast expanse of the Sargasso Sea, six times as large as France, +where they lay for a week almost becalmed, amid tangled masses of +floating seaweeds. To add to their perplexities, they had passed +the line <a name="page_124"><span class="page">Page 124</span></a> of +no variation, and the needle now swung to the left of the pole-star +instead of the right. On the last day of the outward voyage they were +2300 miles to the westward according to the information Columbus +shared with his officers and men; according to his secret log they +were 2700 miles from the Canaries, and well beyond the paint where he +had expected to strike the islands of the Asiatic coast. The mutinous +and panic-stricken spirit of his subordinates, the uncertainty of +Columbus himself, turned to rejoicing when at 2:00 A.M. of Friday, +October 12, a sailor on the <i>Pinta</i> sighted the little island +of the Bahamas, which, since the time of the Vikings, was the first +land sighted by white men in the new world. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 829px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig025.png" width="829" height="658" alt="Fig. 25"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">FLAGSHIP OF COLUMBUS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The three vessels cruised southward, in the belief, expressed by +the name Indian which they gave the natives, that they were in the +archipelago east of Asia. Skirting the northern coast of Cuba and +Hayti, they sought for traces of gold, and <a name="page_125"><span +class="page">Page 125</span></a> information as to the way to the +mainland. The <i>Santa Maria</i> was wrecked on Christmas Day; the +<i>Pinta</i> became separated; Columbus returned in the little +<i>Ninã</i>, putting in first at the Tagus, and reaching +Palos on March 15, 1493. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though his voyage gave no immediate prospect of immense profits, +yet it was the general belief that he had reached Asia, and by a +route three times as short as that by the Cape of Good Hope. The +Spanish court celebrated his return with rejoicing. Appealing to +the Pope, at this time the Spaniard Rodrigo Bargia, King Ferdinand +lost no time in securing holy sanction for his gains. A Papal bull +of May 3, 1493, conferred upon Spain title to all lands discovered +or yet to be discovered in the western ocean. Another on the day +following divided the claims of Spain and Portugal by a line running +north and south "100 leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde +Islands" (an obscure statement in view of the fact that the Cape +Verdes lie considerably to the westward of the other group), and +granted to Spain a monopoly of commerce in the waters "west and +south" (again an obscure phrase) of this line, so that no other +nation could trade without license from the power in control. This +was the extraordinary Papal decree dividing the waters of the world. +Small wander that the French king, Francis I, remarked that he +refused to recognize the title of the claimants till they could +produce the will of Father Adam, making them universal heirs; or +that Elizabeth, when a century later England became interested +in world trade, disputed a division contrary not only to common +sense and treaties but to "the law of nations." The Papal decree, +intended merely to settle the differences of the two Catholic states, +gave rise to endless disputes and preposterous claims. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The treaty of Tordesillas (1494) between Spain and Portugal fixed +the line of demarcation more definitely, 370 miles west of the +Cape Verde Islands, giving Portugal the Brazilian coast, and by +an additional clause it made illegitimate trade a crime punishable +by death. Another agreement in 1529 extended the line around to +the Eastern Hemisphere, 17 degrees east of the Moluccas, which, if +Spain had abided by it, <a name="page_126"><span class="page">Page +126</span></a> would have excluded her from the Philippines. After +Portugal fell under Spanish rule in 1580, Spain could claim dominion +over all the southern seas. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 646px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig026.png" width="646" height="385" alt="Fig. 26"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">CHART OF A.D. 1589</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Showing Papal line of Demarcation</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The enthusiasm and confident expectation with which Spain set out +to exploit the discoveries of Columbus's first voyage changed to +disappointment when subsequent explorations revealed lands of +continental dimensions to be sure, but populated by ignorant savages, +with no thoroughfare to the ancient civilization and wealth of +the East, and no promise of a solid, lucrative commerce such as +Portugal had gained. Mines were opened in the West Indies, but it +was not until the conquest of Mexico by Cortez (1519-1521) laid open +the accumulated wealth of seven centuries that Spain had definite +assurance of the treasure which was to pour out of America in a +steadily increasing stream. The first two vessels laden with Mexican +treasure returned in 1523. Ten years later the exploration and +conquest of Peru by Pizarro trebled the influx of silver and gold. +The silver mines of Europe were abandoned. The Emperor Charles, as +Francis I said, could <a name="page_127"><span class="page">Page +127</span></a> fight his European campaigns on the wealth of the +Indies alone. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But between Spain and her "sinews of war" lay 3000 miles of ocean. +To hold the colonies themselves, to guard the plate fleets against +French, Dutch, and English raiders, to protect her own coastline +and maintain communications with her possessions in Italy and the +Low Countries, to wage war against the Turk in the Mediterranean, +Spain felt the need of a navy. Indeed, in view of these varied +motives for maritime strength, it is surprising that Spain depended +so largely on impressed merchant vessels, and had made only the +beginnings of a royal navy at the time of the Grand Armada.[1] +Not primarily a nation of traders or sailors, she had, by grudging +assistance to the greatest of sea explorers, fallen into a rich +colonial empire, to secure and make the most of which called for +sea power. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: "For the kings of England have for many years been at +the charge to build and furnish a navy of powerful ships for their +own defense, and for the wars only; whereas the French, the Spaniards, +the Portugals, and the Hollanders (till of late) have had no proper +fleet belonging to their princes or state." Sir Walter Raleigh, +<span class="sc">A Discourse of the Invention of Ships.</span>] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is possible, however, to lay undue stress on the factor just +mentioned in accounting for both the rise and the decay of Spain. +Her ascendancy in Europe in the 16th century was due chiefly to +the immense territories united with her under Charles the Fifth +(1500-1558), who inherited Spain, Burgundy, and the Low Countries, +and added Austria with her German and Italian provinces by his +accession to the imperial throne. Under Charles's powerful leadership +Spain became the greatest nation in Europe; but at the same time her +resources in men and wealth were exhausted in the almost constant +warfare of his long reign. The treasures of America flowed through +the land like water, in the expressive figure of a German historian, +"not fertilizing it but laying it waste, and leaving sharper dearth +behind."[2] The revenues of the plate fleet were pledged to German +or Genoese bankers even before they reached the country, and were +expended in the purchase of foreign luxuries or in waging imperial +wars, <a name="page_128"><span class="page">Page 128</span></a> +rather than in the encouragement of home agriculture, trade, and +industry. While the vast possessions of church and nobility escaped +taxation, the people were burdened with levies on the movement +and sale of commodities and on the common necessities of life. +Prohibition of imports to keep gold in the country was ineffectual, +for without the supplies brought in by Dutch merchantmen Spain would +have starved, and Philip II often had to connive in violations +of his own restrictions. Prohibition of exports to keep prices +down was an equally Quixotic measure, the chief effect of which +was to kill trade. Spain could not supply the needs of her own +colonies, and in fact illustrates the truth that a nation cannot, +in the end, profit greatly by colonies unless it develops industries +to utilize their raw materials and supply their demands. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">Das Zeitalter der Fugger</span>, Vol. +II, p. 150.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For some time before the Armada Spain was on the downward path, +as a result of the conditions mentioned. On the other hand, while +the Armada relieved England of a terrible danger and dashed Spain's +hope of domination in the north, it was not of itself a fatal blow. +The war still continued, with other Spanish expeditions organized on +a grand scale, and ended in 1604, so far as England was concerned, +with that country's renunciation of trade to the Indies and aid +to the Dutch. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But even if Spain's rise and decline were not primarily a result +of sea power, still, taking the term to include the extension of +shipping and maritime trade as well as the employment of naval +forces in strictly military operations, there are lessons to be +drawn from the use or neglect of sea power by both sides in Spain's +long drawn-out struggle with Holland and England. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>General</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Expansion of Europe</span>, a History of the + Foundations of the Modern World, by Prof. W. C. Abbot, 1918.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Story of Geographical Discovery</span>, J. + Jacobs, 1913.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Ships and Their Ways of Other Days</span>, E. Keble + Chatterton, 1906. + <a name="page_129"><span class="page">Page 129</span></a></p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Dawn of Navigation</span>, Thomas G. Ford, U. + S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. XXXIII., 1-3.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Dawn of Modern Geography</span>, 2 vols., C. + Raymond Beazley, 1904.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Portugal</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Prince Henry the Navigator</span>, C. Raymond + Beazley, 1895.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Vasco da Gama and his Successors</span>, 1460-1580, + K. G. Jayne, 1910.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Rise of Portuguese Power in India</span>, R. S. + Whiteway, 1910.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Cambridge Modern History</span>, Vol. I., Ch. I.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of the Indian Navy</span>, Lieut. C. R. Low, + 1877.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Spain</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Discovery of America</span>, John Fiske, 1893.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Spain in America</span>, E. G. Bourne, American + Nation Series, 1909.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Spain</span>, Martin Hume, Cam. Modern Hist. Series, + 1898.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_130"><span class="page">Page 130</span></a> +CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +SEA POWER IN THE NORTH: HOLLAND'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first sea-farers in the storm-swept waters of the north, at +least in historic times, were the Teutonic tribes along the North +Sea and the Baltic. On land the Teutons held the Rhine and the +Danube against the legions of Rome, spread later southward and +westward, and founded modern European states out of the wreckage +of the Roman Empire. On the sea, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes in the +5th century began plundering the coasts of what is now England, +and, after driving the Celts into mountain fastnesses, established +themselves in permanent control. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Vikings</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These Teutonic voyagers were followed toward the close of the 8th +century by their Scandinavian kindred to the northward, the +Vikings—superb fighting men and daring sea-rovers who harried +the coasts of western Europe for the next 200 years. There were no +navies to stop them. "These sea dragons," exclaimed Charlemagne, +"will tear my kingdom asunder!" In England no king before Alfred +had a navy; and Alfred was compelled to organize a strong sea force +to bring the invaders to terms. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Elsewhere the Vikings met little opposition. Wherever they found +lands that attracted them, they conquered and settled dawn. Thus +Normandy came into being. They swept up the rivers, burning and looting +where they pleased, from the Elbe to the Rhone. They carried their +raids as far south as Sicily and the Mediterranean coast of Africa, +and <a name="page_131"><span class="page">Page 131</span></a> as far +north and west as Iceland, Greenland, and the American continent. +In the east, by establishing a Viking colony at Nishni Novgorod, +they laid the foundations of the Russian empire, and their leader, +Rus, gave it his name. Following river courses, others penetrated +inland as far as Constantinople, where, being bought off by the +emperor, they took service as imperial guards. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Their extraordinary voyages were made in boats that resemble so +closely Greek and Roman models—even Phœnician, for that +matter—as to suggest that the Vikings learned their ship-building +from Mediterranean traders who forced their way into the Baltic +in very early times. For example, the Viking method of making a +rib in three parts is identical with the method of the Greeks and +Romans. The chief points of difference are that Viking ships were +sharp at both ends—like a canoe, were round-bottomed instead +of flat, and had one steering oar instead of two. The typical Viking +ship was only about 75 feet in length; but a royal vessel—the +<i>Dragon</i> of the chief—sometimes attained a length of +300 feet, with sixty pairs of oars. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +If the Vikings had had national organization under one head, they +might well have laid the rest of Europe under tribute. In the 11th +century, Cnut, a descendant of the Vikings, ruled in person over +England, Denmark, and Norway. But their ocean folk-wanderings seem +to have ended as suddenly as they began, and the effects were social +rather than political. Where they settled, they brought a strain +of the hardiest racial stock in Europe to blend with that of the +conquered peoples. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Hanseatic League</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the Middle Ages, peaceful trading gradually gained the upper +hand over piracy and conquest. From the Italian cities the wares of +the south and the Orient came over the passes of the Alps and down +the German rivers, where trading cities grew up to act as carriers +of merchandise and civilization among the nations of the north. The +merchant guilds of <a name="page_132"><span class="page">Page +132</span></a> these cities, banded together in the Hanseatic League, +for at least three centuries dominated the northern seas. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Perhaps the most extensive commercial combination ever formed for +the control of sea trade, the Hanseatic League began with a treaty +between Lübeck and Hamburg in 1174, and at the height of its +power in the 14th and 15th centuries it included from 60 to 80 +cities, of which Lübeck, Cologne, Brunswick, and Danzig were +among the chief. The league cleared northern waters of pirates, and +used embargo and naval power to subdue rivals and promote trade. +It established factories or trading stations from Nishni Novgorod +to Bergen, London, and Bruges. From Russia it took cargoes of fats, +tallows, wax, and wares brought into Russian markets from the east; +from Scandinavia, iron and copper; from England, hides and wool; from +Germany, fish, grain, beer, and manufactured goods of all kinds. The +British pound sterling (Österling) and pound avoirdupois, in +fact the whole British system of weights and coinage, are legacies +from the German merchants who once had their headquarters in the +Steelyard, London. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the early 15th century the league attempted to shut Dutch ships +from the Baltic trade by restricting their cargoes to wares produced +in their own country, and by coercing Denmark into granting the +league special privileges on the route through the Sound. This +policy, culminating in the destruction of the Dutch grain fleet +in 1437, led to a naval struggle which extended over four years +and ended in a truce by which the Dutch secured the freedom of the +Baltic. It was a typical naval war for sea control and commercial +advantage, in which the Dutch as a rule seem to have got the better, +and in which the legend first made its appearance of a Dutch admiral +sweeping the seas with a broom nailed to his mast. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From this time the power of the Hansa declined. This was partly +because the free cities came more and more under the rule of German +princes with no interest in, or knowledge of, commerce; partly +because of rivalry arising from the union of the Scandinavian states +(1397) and the growth of <a name="page_133"><span class="page">Page +133</span></a> England, France, and the Low Countries to national +strength and commercial independence; and partly also because of +the decline of German fisheries when the herring suddenly shifted +from the Baltic to the North Sea. Underlying these varied causes, +however, and significant of the far-reaching effect of changing +trade-routes upon the progress and prosperity of nations, was the +fact that, when the Mediterranean trade route was closed by the +Turks, and also the route through Russia by Ivan III, the German +cities were side-tracked. Antwerp and Amsterdam were not only more +centrally located for the distribution of trade, but also much +nearer for Atlantic traffic—an advantage which Germany has +ever since keenly envied. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Long before the rise of the Low Countries as a maritime power, +Ghent and Bruges had enjoyed an early preëminence owing to +their development of cloth manufacture, and the latter city as a +terminus for the galleys of Venice and Genoa. After the silting +up of the port of Bruges (1432), Antwerp grew in importance, and +in the 16th century became the chief market and money center of +Europe. Its inhabitants numbered about 100,000, with a floating +population of upwards of 50,000 more. It contained the counting-houses +of the great bankers of Europe—the Fuggers of Germany, the +Pazzi of Florence, the Dorias of Genoa. Five thousand merchants +were registered on the Bourse, as many as 500 ships often left +the city in a single day, and two or three thousand more might be +seen anchored in the Scheldt or lying along the quays.[1] Amsterdam +by 1560 was second to Antwerp with a population of 40,000, and +forged ahead after the sack of Antwerp by Spanish soldiers in 1576 +and the Dutch blockade of the Scheldt during the struggle with +Spain. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Blok, <span class="sc">History of the People of the +Netherlands</span>, Part II, Ch. XII.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This early prosperity of the Netherland cities may be attributed +less to aggressive maritime activity than to their flourishing +industries, their natural advantages as trading centers at the +mouths of the Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse, and the privileges of +self-government enjoyed by the middle classes under the House of +Burgundy and even under Charles the <a name="page_134"><span +class="page">Page 134</span></a> Fifth. Charles taxed them +heavily—his revenues from the Low Countries in reality far +exceeded the treasure he drew from America; but he was a Fleming +born, spoke their language, and accorded them a large measure of +political and religious freedom. The grievances which after his +death led to the Dutch War of Independence, are almost personified +in the son who succeeded him in 1555—Philip II, a Spaniard +born and bred, who spoke no Flemish and left Brussels for the last +time in 1573, dour, treacherous, distrustful, fanatical in religion; +a tragic character, who, no doubt with great injustice to the Spanish, +has somehow come to represent the character of Spain in his time. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Dutch Struggle for Freedom</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The causes of the long war in the Netherlands, which began in 1566 +and ended with their independence 43 years later, is best explained +in terms of general principles rather than specific grievances. +"A conflict in which the principle of Catholicism with unlimited +royal autocracy as Spain recognized it, was opposed to toleration +in the realm of religion, with a national government according +to ancient principles and based on ancient privileges,"—so +the Dutch historian Blok sums up the issues at stake. The Prince +of Orange, just before he was cut down by an assassin, asserted +in his famous <i>Defense</i> three fundamental principles: freedom +to worship God; withdrawal of foreigners; and restoration of the +charters, privileges, and liberties of the land. The Dutch fought +for political, religious, and also for economic independence. England +gave aid, not so much for religious motives as because she saw +that her political safety and commercial prosperity hinged on the +weakening of Spain. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Resembling our American Revolution in the character of the struggle +as well as the issues at stake—though it was far more bloody +and desperate—the Dutch War of Independence was fought mainly +within the country itself, with the population divided, and the +Spanish depending on land forces to maintain their rule; but, as in +the American war, control of <a name="page_135"><span class="page">Page +135</span></a> the sea was a vital factor. For munitions, supplies, +gold, for the transport of the troops themselves, Spain had to depend +primarily on the sea. It is true one could continue on Spanish +territory from Genoa, which was Spain's watergate into Italy, across +the Mont Cenis Pass, and through Savoy, Burgundy, Lorraine, and +Luxembourg to Brussels, and it was by this route that Parma's splendid +army of 10,000 "Blackbeards" came in 1577. But this was an arduous +three months' march for troops and still more difficult for supplies. +To cross France was as a rule impossible; when Don Juan of Austria +went to Flanders for the brief period of leadership ended by his +death of camp fever in 1578, he passed through French territory +disguised as a Moorish slave. By the sea route, upon which Spain +was after all largely dependent, and the complete control of which +would have made her task infinitely easier, she was constantly +exposed to Huguenot, Dutch, and English privateers. These gentry +cared little whether or not their country was actually at war with +Spain, but took their letters of marque, if they carried them, +from any prince or ruler who would serve their turn. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With this opportunity to strike at Spanish communications, it will +appear strange that the Dutch should not have immediately seized +their advantage and made it decisive. One curious difficulty lay +in the fact that throughout the war Dutch shipping actually carried +the bulk of Spanish trade and drew from it immense profits. Even +at the close of the century, while the war was still continuing, +nine-tenths of Spain's foreign trade and five-sixths of her home +trade was in foreign—and most of it in Dutch—hands. +Hence any form of sea warfare was sure to injure Dutch trade. The +Revolution, moreover, began slowly and feebly, with no well-thought-out +plan of campaign, and could not at once fit out fully organized +forces to cope with those of Spain. The Dutch early took to commerce +warfare, but it was at first semi-piratical, and involved the +destruction of ships of their own countrymen. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Sea Beggars—<i>Zee Geuzen</i> or <i>Gueux der +Mer</i>—made their appearance shortly after the outbreak of +rebellion. <a name="page_136"><span class="page">Page 136</span></a> +<a name="page_137"><span class="page">Page 137</span></a> "<i>Vyve +les geus par mer et par terre,</i>" wrote the patriot Count van +Brederode as early as 1566. The term "beggar" is said to have +arisen from a contemptuous remark by a Spanish courtier to +Margaret of Parma, when the Dutch nobles presented their grievances +in Brussels. Willingly accepting the name, the patriots applied it +to their forces both by land and by sea. Letters of marque were +first issued by Louis of Nassau, brother of William of Orange, +and in 1569 there were 18 ships engaged, increased in the next +year to 84. The bloody and licentious De la Marek, who wore his +hair and beard unshorn till he had avenged the execution of his +relative, Egmont, was a typical leader of still more wild and reckless +crews. It was no uncommon practice to go over the rail of a merchant +ship with pike and ax and kill every Spaniard on board. In 1569 +William of Orange appointed the Seigneur de Lumbres as admiral of +the beggar fleet, and issued strict instructions to him to secure +better order, avoid attacks on vessels of friendly and neutral +states, enforce the articles of war, and carry a preacher on each +ship. The booty was to be divided one-third to the Prince for the +maintenance of the war, one-third to the captains to supply their +vessels, and one-third to the crews, one-tenth of this last share +going to the admiral in general command. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 534px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig027.png" width="534" height="797" alt="Fig. 27"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 16TH CENTURY</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The events of commerce warfare, though they often involve desperate +adventures and hard fighting, are not individually impressive, and +the effectiveness of this warfare is best measured by collective +results. On one occasion, when a fleet of transports fell into the +hands of patriot forces off Flushing in 1572, not only were 1000 +troops taken, but also 500,000 crowns of gold and a rich cargo, +the proceeds of which, it is stated, were sufficient to carry on the +whole war for a period of two years. Again it was fear of pirates +(Huguenot in this case) that in December of 1568 drove a squadron +of Spanish transports into Plymouth, England, with 450,000 ducats +($960,000) aboard for the pay of Spanish troops. Elizabeth seized +the money (on the ground that it was still the property of the +Genoese bankers who had lent it and that she might as well borrow +it as Philip), and minted <a name="page_138"><span class="page">Page +138</span></a> it into English coin at a profit of £3000. But +Alva at Antwerp, with no money at all, was forced to the obnoxious +"Hundreds" tax—requiring a payment of one per cent on all +possessions, five per cent on all real estate transfers, and 10 +per cent every time a piece of merchandise was sold—a typical +tax after the Spanish recipe, which, though not finally enforced +to its full extent, aroused every Netherlander as a fatal blow at +national prosperity. To return to the general effect of commerce +destruction, it is estimated that Spain thus lost annually 3,000,000 +ducats ($6,400,000), a sum which of course meant vastly more then +than now. When the Duke of Alva retired from command in 1578, the +pay of Spanish troops was 6,500,000 ducats in arrears. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Among the exploits of organized naval forces, the earliest was the +capture of Brill, by which, according to Motley, "the foundations +of the Dutch republic were laid." Driven out of England by Elizabeth, +who upon the representations of the Spanish ambassador ordered her +subjects not to supply the Beggars with "meat, bread or beer," +a fleet of 25 vessels and 300 or 400 men left Dover towards the +end of March, 1572, with the project of seizing a base on their +own coast. On the afternoon of April 1, they appeared off the town +of Brill, located on an island at the mouth of the Meuse. The +magistrates and most of the inhabitants fled; and the Beggars battered +down the gates, occupied the town, and put to death 13 monks and +priests. When Spanish forces attempted to recapture the city, the +defenders opened sluice gates to cut off the northern approach, +and at the same time set fire to the boats which had carried the +Spanish to the island. The Spanish, terrorized by both fire and +water, waded through mud and slime to the northern shore. During +the same week Flushing was taken, and before the end of June the +Dutch were masters of nearly the entire Zealand coast. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the north the Spanish at first found an able naval leader in +Admiral Bossu, himself a Hollander, who for a time kept the coast +clear of Beggars. In October, 1573, however, 30 of his ships were +beaten in the Zuyder Zee by 25 under Dirkzoon, who captured five of +the Spanish vessels and scattered the rest <a name="page_139"><span +class="page">Page 139</span></a> with the exception of the flagship. +The latter, a 32-gun ship terrifyingly named the <i>Inquisition</i> +and much stronger than any of the others on either side, held out +from three o'clock in the afternoon until the next morning. Three +patriot vessels closed in on her, attacking with the vicious weapons +of the period—pitch, boiling oil, and molten lead. By morning +the four combatants had drifted ashore in a tangled mass. When Bossu +at last surrendered, 300 men, out of 382 in his ship's complement, +were dead or disabled. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though not yet able to stand up against Spanish infantry, the Dutch +in naval battles were usually successful. In the Scheldt, January +29, 1574, 75 Spanish vessels were attacked by 64 Dutch under Admiral +Boisot. After a single broadside, the two fleets grappled, and in +a two-hour fight at close quarters eight of the Spanish ships were +captured, seven destroyed, and 1200 Spaniards killed. The Spanish +commander, Julian Romero, escaped through a port-hole, is said to +have remarked afterwards, "I told you I was a land fighter and no +sailor; give me a hundred fleets and I would fare no better." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In September following, Admiral Boisot brought some of his victorious +ships and sailors to the relief of Leyden, whose inhabitants and +garrison had been reduced by siege to the very last extremities. +The campaign that followed was typical of this amphibious war. +Boisot's force, with those already an the scene, numbered about +2500, equipped with some 200 shallow-draft boats and row-barges +mounting an average of ten guns each. Among them was the curious +<i>Ark of Delft</i>, with shot-proof bulwarks and paddle-wheels +turned by a crank. As a result of ruthless flooding of the country, +ten of the fifteen miles between Leyden and the outer dyke were +easily passed; but five miles from the city ran the Landscheidung +or inner dyke, which was above water, and beyond this an intricate +system of canals and flooded polders, with forts and villages held +by a Spanish force four times as strong. The most savage fighting +on decks, dykes, and bridges marked every step forward; the Dutch in +their native element attacking with cutlass, boathook and harpoon, +while the superior military discipline of the Spanish could not +<a name="page_140"><span class="page">Page 140</span></a> come +in play. But at least 20 inches of water were necessary to float +the Dutch vessels, and it was not until October 3 that a spring +tide and a heavy northwest gale made it possible to reach the city +walls. In storm and darkness, terrified by the rising waters, the +Spanish fled. The relief of the city marked a turning-point in +the history of the revolt. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the six terrible years of Alva's rule in the Netherlands +(1567-1573) the Dutch sea forces contributed heavily toward the +maintenance of the war, assured control of the Holland and Zealand +coasts, and more than once, as at Brill and Leyden, proved the +salvation of the patriot cause. Holland and Zealand, the storm-centers +of rebellion, were not again so devastated, though the war dragged +on for many years, maintained by the indomitable spirit of William +of Orange until his assassination in 1584, and afterward by the +military skill of Maurice of Nassau and the aid of foreign powers. +The seven provinces north of the Scheldt, separating from the Catholic +states of the south, prospered in trade and industry as they shook +themselves free from the stifling rule of Spain. By a twelve-year +truce, finally ratified in 1609, they became "free states over +which Spain makes no pretensions," though their independence was +not fully recognized until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The +war, while it ruined Antwerp, increased the prosperity of Holland +and Zealand, which for at least twenty years before the truce were +busily extending their trade to every part of the world. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Growth of Dutch Commerce</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The story of this expansion of commerce is a striking record. The +grain and timber of the Baltic, the wines of France and Spain, the +salt of the Cape Verde Islands, the costly wares of the east, came +to the ports of the Meuse and Zuyder Zee. In 1590 the first Dutch +traders entered the Mediterranean, securing, eight years later, the +permission of the Sultan to engage in Constantinople trade. In 1594 +their ships reached the Gold Coast, and a year later four vessels +visited Madagascar, Goa, Java, and the Moluccas or Spice Islands. +<a name="page_141"><span class="page">Page 141</span></a> A rich +Zealand merchant had a factory at Archangel and a regular trade +into the White Sea. Seeking a reward of 25,000 florins offered +by the States for the discovery of a northeast passage, Jacob van +Heimskirck sailed into the Arctic and wintered in Nova Zembla; +Henry Hudson, in quest of a route northwestward, explored the river +and the bay that bear his name and died in the Polar Seas. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Statistics, while not very trustworthy and not enlightening unless +compared with those for other nations, may give some idea of the +preponderance of Dutch shipping. At the time of the truce she is +said to have had 16,300 ships, about 10,000 of which were small +vessels in the coasting trade. Of the larger, 3000 were in the +Baltic trade, 2000 in the Spanish, 600 sailed to Italy, and the +remainder to the Mediterranean, South America, the Far East, and +Archangel. The significance of these figures may be made clearer by +citing Colbert's estimate that at a later period (1664) there were +20,000 ships in general European carrying trade, 16,000 of which +were Dutch. Throughout the 17th century Dutch commerce continued to +prosper, and did not reach its zenith until early in the century +following. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the closing years of the 16th century several private companies +were founded in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Zealand to engage in eastern +trade. These were combined in 1602 into the United East Indies +Company, which sent large fleets to the Orient each year, easily +ousted the Portuguese from their bases on the coast and islands, +and soon established almost a monopoly, leaving to England only a +small share of trade with Persia and northwest India. The relative +resources invested by English and Dutch in Eastern ventures is +suggested by the fact that the British East Indies Company founded +in 1600 had a capital of £80,000, while the Dutch Company +had £316,000. By 1620 the shares of the Dutch company had +increased to three times their original value, and they paid average +dividends of 18 per cent for the next 200 years. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this Dutch conquest of eastern trade, like that of the Portuguese +a century earlier, we have an illustration of what <a +name="page_142"><span class="page">Page 142</span></a> has since +been a guiding principle in the history of sea power—a national +policy of commercial expansion sturdily backed by foreign policy and +whenever necessary by naval force. The element of national policy +is evident in the fact that Holland—and England until the +accession of James I in 1603—preferred war rather than acceptance +of Spanish pretensions to exclusive rights in the southern seas. +The Dutch, like the Portuguese, saw clearly the need of political +control. They made strongholds of their trading bases, and gave +their companies power to oust competitors by force. As a concession +to Spanish pride, the commerce clause in the Truce of 1609 was +made intentionally unintelligible—but the Dutch interpreted +it to suit themselves. As for the element of force, every squadron +that sailed to the east was a semi-military expedition. The Dutch +seaman was sailor, fighter, and trader combined. The merchant was +truly, in the phrase of the age, a "merchant adventurer," lucky +indeed and enriched if, after facing the perils of navigation in +strange waters, the possible hostility of native rulers, and the +still greater danger from European rivals, half his ships returned. +The last statement is no hyperbole; of 9 ships sent to the East +from Amsterdam in 1598, four came back, and just half of the 22 +sent out from the entire Netherlands. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From time to time, either to maintain the blockade of the Scheldt +and assist in operations on the Flanders coast, or to protect their +trade and strike a direct blow at Spain, the Dutch fitted out purely +naval expeditions. One of the most effective, from the standpoint +of actual fighting, was that led by van Heimskirck, already famous +for Arctic exploration and exploits in the Far East. In 1607 he +took 21 converted merchantmen and 4 transports to the Spanish coast +to protect Dutch vessels from the east and the Mediterranean. +Encountering off Gibraltar an enemy force of 11 large galleons +and as many galleys under Alvarez d'Avila, a veteran of Lepanto, +he destroyed half the Spanish force and drove the rest into port, +killing about 2000 Spanish and coming out of the fight with the +loss of only 100 men. Heimskirck concentrated upon the galleons and +came to close action after <a name="page_143"><span class="page">Page +143</span></a> the fashion which seems to have been characteristic +of the Dutch in naval engagements throughout the war. "Hold your +fire till you hear the crash," he cried, as he drove his prow into +the enemy flagship; and the battle was won after a struggle yard-arm +to yard-arm. Bath admirals were killed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Portugal, broken by the Spanish yoke, could offer little resistance +in the Far East. In 1606 a Dutch fleet of 12 ships under Matelieff +de Jonge laid siege to Malacca, and gave up the attempt only after +destroying 10 galleons sent to relieve the town. Matelieff then +sailed to the neighboring islands, and established the authority +of the company at Bantam, Amboyna, Ternate, and other centers of +trade. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Other fleets earlier and later promoted the interests of the company +by the same means. English traders, with scanty government encouragement +from the Stuart kings, were not as yet dangerous rivals. A conflict +occurred with them in 1611 off Surat; and at Amboyna in 1623 the +Dutch seized the English Company's men, tortured ten of them, and +broke up the English base. For more than a century Holland remained +supreme in the east; she has retained her colonial empire down to +the 20th century; and she did not surrender her commercial primacy +until exhausted by the combined attacks of England and France. +Less successful than England in the development of colonies, she +has stood out as the greatest of trading nations. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Vikings</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Viking Age</span>, H. F. Du Chaillu, 1889. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Hansa</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Hansa Towns</span>, H. Zimmerman, 1889.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of Commerce</span>, Clive Day, 1913 + (bibliography).</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Civilization During the Middle Ages</span>, George + Burton Adams, 1918.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Cambridge Modern History</span>, Vols. I and II.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Dutch Sea Power</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic</span> (still the + best source in English for political and naval history of the period). +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<a name="page_144"><span class="page">Page 144</span></a> +<span class="sc">History of the People of the Netherlands</span>, P. + J. Blok, trans. Ruth Putnam, 1898-1912.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">History of Commerce in Europe</span>, W. H. Gibbins, + 1917.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Sea Beggars</span>, Dingman Versteg, 1901.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Some Exploits of the Old Dutch Navy</span>, Lieut. H. + H. Frost, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1919. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_145"><span class="page">Page 145</span></a> +CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +By reason of England's insularity, it is an easy matter to find +instances from even her early history of the salutary or fatal +influence of sea power. Romans, Saxons, Danes swept down upon England +from the sea. By building a fleet, King Alfred, said to have been +the true father of the British navy, kept back the Danes. It was +the dispersion of the English fleet by reason of the lateness of +the season that enabled William the Conqueror, in the small open +vessels interestingly pictured in the Bayeux tapestry, to win a +footing on the English shore. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But during the next three centuries, with little shipping and little +trade save that carried on by the Hansa, with no enemy that dangerously +threatened her by sea, England had neither the motives nor the +national strength and unity to develop naval power. She claimed, +it is true, dominion over the narrow waters between her and her +possessions in France, and also over the "four seas" surrounding +her; and as early as 1201 an ordinance was passed requiring vessels +in these waters to lower sails ("vail the bonnet") and also to +"lie by the lee" when so ordered by King's ships. But though these +claims were revived in the 17th century against the Dutch, and +though the requirement that foreign vessels strike their topsails +to the British flag remained in the Admiralty Instructions until +after Trafalgar, they were at this time enforced chiefly to rid the +seas of pirates—the common enemies of nations. During this +period there were a few "king's ships," the sovereign's personal +property, forming a nucleus around which a naval force of fishing +and merchant vessels could be assembled in time of war. The Cinque +Ports, originally Dover, Sandwich, Hastings, Romney and Hythe, long +enjoyed certain trading <a name="page_146"><span class="page">Page +146</span></a> privileges in return for the agreement that when +the king passed overseas they would "rigge up fiftie and seven +ships" (according to a charter of Edward I) with 20 armed soldiers +each, and maintain them for 15 days. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +An attack in 1217 by such a fleet, under the Governor of Dover +Castle, affords perhaps the earliest instance of maneuvering for +the weather-gage. The English came down from the windward and, as +they scrambled aboard the enemy, threw quicklime into the Frenchmen's +eyes. At Sluis, in 1340, to take another instance of early English +naval warfare, Edward III defeated a large French fleet and a number +of hired Genoese galleys lashed side by side in the little river +Eede in Flanders. Edward came in with a fair wind and tide and fell +upon the enemy as they lay aground at the stem and unmanageable. +This victory gave control of the Channel for the transport of troops +in the following campaign. But like most early naval combats, it +was practically a land battle over decks, and, although sanguinary +enough, it is from a naval stand paint interesting chiefly for +such novelties as a scouting force of knights on horseback along +the shore. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The beginnings of a permanent and strong naval establishment, as +distinct from merchant vessels owned by the king or in his service, +must be dated, however, from the Tudors and the period of national +rehabilitation following the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and +the War of the Roses (1455-1485). One reason for this was that +the employment of artillery on shipboard and the introduction of +port-holes made it increasingly difficult to convert merchant craft +into dependable men-of-war. Henry VIII took a keen interest in +his navy, devoted the revenues of forfeited church property to +its expansion, established the first Navy Board (1546), and is +even credited with the adoption of sailing vessels as the major +units of his fleet. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>From Oar to Sail</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The use of heavy ordnance, already mentioned, as well as the increasing +size and efficiency of sail-craft that came with <a +name="page_147"><span class="page">Page 147</span></a> the spread +of ocean commerce and navigation, naturally pointed the way to this +transition in warfare from oar to sail. The galley was at best +a frail affair, cumbered with oars, benches and rowers, unable to +carry heavy guns or withstand their fire. Once sailing vessels had +attained reasonable maneuvering qualities, their superior strength +and size, reduced number of non-combatant personnel, and increased +seaworthiness and cruising radius gave them a tremendous superiority. +That the change should have begun in the north rather than in the +Mediterranean, where naval and military science had reached its +highest development, must be attributed not only to the rougher +weather conditions of the northern seas, and the difficulty of +obtaining slaves as rowers, but also to the fact that the southern +nations were more completely shackled by the traditions of galley +warfare. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 532px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig028.png" width="532" height="398" alt="Fig. 28"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">GALLEON</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Yet for the new type it was the splendid trading vessels of Venice that +supplied the design. For the Antwerp and London <a name="page_148"><span +class="page">Page 148</span></a> trade, and in protection against +the increasing danger from pirates, the Venetians had developed a +compromise between the war-galley and the round-ship of commerce, +a type with three masts and propelled at least primarily by sails, +with a length about three times its beam and thus shorter and more +seaworthy than the galley, but longer, lower and swifter than the +clumsy round-ship. To this new type the names <i>galleass</i> and +<i>galleon</i> were bath given, but in English and later usage +<i>galleass</i> came to be applied to war vessels combining oar +and sail, and <i>galleon</i> to either war or trading vessels of +medium size and length and propelled by sail alone. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Spanish found the galleon useful in the Atlantic carrying trade, +but, as shown at Lepanto, they retained the galley in warfare; +whereas Henry VIII of England was probably the first definitely +to favor sail for his men-of-war. An English navy list of 1545 +shows four clumsy old-fashioned "great-ships" of upwards of 1000 +tons, but second to these a dozen newer vessels of distinctly galleon +lines, lower than the great-ships, flush-decked, and sail-driven. +Though in engagements with French galleys during the campaign of +1545 these were handicapped by calm weather, they seem to have +held their own both in battle and in naval opinion. Of the royal +ships at the opening of Elizabeth's reign (1558), there were 11 +large sailing vessels of 200 tans and upwards, and 10 smaller ones, +but only two galleys, and these "of no continuance and not worth +repair."[1] In comment on these figures, it should be added that +there were half a hundred large ships available from the merchant +service, and also that pinnaces and other small craft still combined +oar and sail. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Corbett, +Vol. I, p. 133.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In England the superiority of sail propulsion was soon definitely +recognized, and discussion later centered on the relative merits of +the medium-sized galleon and the big "great-ship." The characteristics +of each are well set forth in a contemporary naval treatise by Sir +William Monson: the former with "flush deck fore and aft, sunk +and low in the water; the other lofty and high-charged, with a +half-deck, forecastle, and copperidge-heads [athwortship bulkheads +where light guns were <a name="page_149"><span class="page">Page +149</span></a> mounted to command the space between decks]." The +advantages of the first were that she was speedy and "a fast ship +by the wind" so as to avoid boarding by the enemy, and could run in +close and fire effective broadsides between wind and water without +being touched; whereas the big ship was more terrifying, more +commodious, stronger, and could carry more and heavier guns. Monson, +like many a later expert, suspended judgment regarding the two types; +but Sir Walter Raleigh came out strongly for the smaller design. +"The greatest ships," he writes, "are the least serviceable...., +less nimble, less maniable; 'Grande navi grande fatiga,' saith the +Spaniard. A ship of 600 tons will carry as good ordnance as a ship +of 1200 tons; and though the greater have double her number, the +lesser will turn her broadsides twice before the greater can wind +once." And elsewhere: "The high charging of ships makes them extreme +leeward, makes them sink deep in the water, makes them labor, and +makes them overset. Men may not expect the ease of many cabins +and safety at once in sea-service."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Works</span>, Oxford ed. 1829, Vol. +VIII, p. 338.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These statements were made after the Armada; but the trend of English +naval construction away from unwieldy ships such as used by the +Spanish in the Armada, is clearly seen in vessels dating from +1570-1580—the <i>Foresight, Bull,</i> and <i>Tiger</i> (rebuilt +from galleasses), the <i>Swiftsure, Dreadnought, Revenge,</i> and +others of names renowned in naval annals. These were all of about +the dimensions of the <i>Revenge,</i> which was of 440 tons, 92 +feet over all, 32 feet beam, and 15 feet from deck to keel. That +is to say, their length was not more than three times their beam, +and their beam was about twice their depth in the hold—the +characteristic proportions of the galleon type. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The progressiveness of English ship construction is highly significant, +for to it may be attributed in large measure the Armada victory. +Spain had made no such advances; in fact, until the decade of the +Armada, she hardly had such a thing as a royal navy. The superiority +of the English ships was generally recognized. An English naval +writer in 1570 declared <a name="page_150"><span class="page">Page +150</span></a> the ships of his nation so fine "none of any other +region may seem comparable to them"; and a Spaniard some years +later testified that his people regarded "one English ship worth +four of theirs." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though not larger than frigates of Nelson's time, these ships were +crowded with an even heavier armament, comprising guns of all sizes +and of picturesque but bewildering nomenclature. According to +Corbett,[1] the ordnance may be divided into four main classes +based on caliber, the first two of the "long gun" and the other +two of the carronade or mortar type. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Vol. +I, p. 384.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I. Cannon proper, from 16 to 28 caliber, of 8.5-inch bore and 12 +feet in length, firing 65-pound shot. The demi-cannon, which was +the largest gun carried on ships of the time, was 6.5 inches by +9 feet and fired 30-pound shot. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +II. Culverins, 28 to 34 caliber long guns, 5 inches by 12 feet, +firing 17-pound shot. Demi-culverins were 9-pounders. Slings, bases, +sakers, port-pieces, and fowlers belonged to this class. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +III. Perriers, from 6 to 8 caliber, firing stone-balls, shells, +fire-balls, etc. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +IV. Mortars, of 1.5 caliber, including petards and murderers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The "great ordnance," or cannon, were muzzle-loading. The secondary +armament, mounted in tops, cageworks, bulkheads, etc., were +breech-loading; but these smaller pieces fell out of favor as time +went on owing to reliance on long-range fire and rareness of boarding +actions. Down to the middle of the 19th century there was no great +improvement in ordnance, save in the way of better powder and boring. +Even in Elizabeth's day the heaviest cannon had a range of three +miles. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These advances in ship design and armament were accompanied by +some changes in naval administration. In 1546 the Navy Board was +created, which continued to handle matters of what may be termed +civil administration until its functions were taken over by the +Board of Admiralty in the reorganization of 1832. The chief members +of the Navy Board, the <a name="page_151"><span class="page">Page +151</span></a> Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor of Ships, Surveyor +of Ordnance, and Clerk of Ships, were in Elizabethan times usually +experienced in sea affairs. To John Hawkins, Treasurer from 1578 to +1595, belongs chief credit for the excellent condition of ships in +his day. The Lord High Admiral, a member of the nobility, exercised at +least nominal command of the fleet in peace and war. For vice admiral +under him a man of practical experience was ordinarily chosen. On +shipboard, the only "gentleman" officers were the captains; the +rest—masters, master's mates, pilots, carpenters, boatswains, +coxswains, and gunners—were, to quote a contemporary description, +"mechanick men that had been bred up from swabbers." But owing +to the small proportion of soldiers on board, the English ships +were not like those of Spain, which were organized like a camp, +with the soldier element supreme and the sailors "slaves to the +rest." +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Political Situation</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The steps taken to build up the navy in the decade or more preceding +the Armada were well justified by the political and religious strife +in western Europe and the dangers which on all sides threatened the +English realm. France, the Netherlands, and Scotland were torn by +religious warfare. In England the party with open or secret Catholic +sympathies was large, amounting to perhaps half the population, +the strength of whose loyalty to Elizabeth it was difficult to +gage. Since 1568 Elizabeth had held captive Mary Queen of Scots, +driven out of her own country by the Presbyterian hierarchy, and +a Catholic with hereditary claims to the English throne. Before +her death, Philip of Spain had conspired with her to assassinate +the heretic Elizabeth; after Mary's execution in 1587 he became +heir to her claims and entered the more willingly upon the task +of conquering England and restoring it to the faith. For years, +in fact, there had been a state of undeclared hostility between +England and Spain, and acts which, with sovereigns less cautious +and astute than both Elizabeth and Philip, would have meant war. +In 1585 Elizabeth formed an alliance <a name="page_152"><span +class="page">Page 152</span></a> with the Netherlands, and sent +her favorite, Leicester, there as governor-general, and Sir Philip +Sidney as Governor of Flushing, which with two other "cautionary +towns" she took as pledges of Dutch loyalty. The motives for this +action are well stated in a paper drawn up by the English Privy +Council in 1584, presenting a situation interesting in its analogy +to that which faced the United States when it entered the World +War: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The conclusion of the whole was this: Although her Majesty should +thereby enter into the war presently, yet were she better to do +it now, while she may make the same out of her realm, having the +help of the people of Holland, and before the King of Spain shall +have consummated his conquest of those countries, whereby he shall +be so provoked by pride, solicited by the Pope, and tempted by +the Queen's own subjects, and shall be so strong by sea; and so +free from all other actions and quarrels—yea, shall be so +formidable to all the rest of Christendom, as that her Majesty +shall no wise be able, with her own power, nor with the aid of +any other, neither by land nor sea, to withstand his attempts, +but shall be forced to give place to his insatiable malice, which +is most terrible to be thought of, but miserable to suffer." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These were the compelling reasons for England's entry into the +war. The aid to Holland and the execution of Mary, on the other +hand, were sufficient to explain Philip's attempted invasion. The +grievance of Spain owing to the incursions of Hawkins and Drake +into her American possessions, and England's desire to break Spain's +commercial monopoly, were at the time relatively subordinate, though +from a naval standpoint the voyages are interesting in themselves +and important in the history of sea control and sea trade. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Hawkins and Drake</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +John Hawkins was a well-to-do ship-owner of Plymouth, and as already +stated, Treasurer of the Royal Navy, with a contract for the upkeep +of ships. His first venture to the Spanish Main was in 1562, when he +kidnapped 300 negroes on <a name="page_153"><span class="page">Page +153</span></a> the Portuguese coast of Africa and exchanged them +at Hispanola (Haiti), for West Indian products, chartering two +additional vessels to take his cargo home. Though he might have +been put to death if caught by either Portugal or Spain, his profits +were so handsome by the double exchange that he tried it again in +1565, this time taking his "choice negroes at £160 each" to +Terra Firme, or the Spanish Main, including the coasts of Venezuela, +Colombia, and the Isthmus. When the Spanish authorities, warned +by their home government, made some show of resistance, Hawkins +threatened bombardment, landed his men, and did business by force, +the inhabitants conniving in a contraband trade very profitable +to them. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On his third voyage he had six vessels, two of which, the <i>Jesus +of Lubeck</i> and the <i>Minion</i>, were Queen's ships hired out +for the voyage. The skipper of one of the smaller vessels, the +<i>Judith</i>, was Francis Drake, a relative and protégé +of the Hawkins family, and then a youth of twenty-two. On September +16, 1567, after a series of encounters stormier than ever in the +Spanish settlements, the squadron homeward bound was driven by +bad weather into the port of Mexico City in San Juan de Ulua Bay. +Here, having a decided superiority over the vessels in the harbor, +Hawkins secured the privilege of mooring and refitting his ships +inside the island that formed a natural breakwater, and mounted +guns on the island itself. To his surprise next morning, he beheld +in the offing 13 ships of Spain led by an armed galleon and having +on board the newly appointed Mexican viceroy. Hawkins, though his +guns commanded the entrance, took hostages and made some sort of +agreement by which the Spanish ships were allowed to come in and +moor alongside. But the situation was too tense to carry off without +an explosion. Three days later the English were suddenly attacked +on sea and shore. They at once leaped into their ships and cut +their cables, but though they hammered the Spanish severely in the +fight that followed, only two English vessels, the <i>Minion</i> +and the <i>Judith</i>, escaped, the <i>Minion</i> so overcrowded +that Hawkins had to drop 100 of his crew on the Mexican coast. +Drake made straight for Plymouth, nursing a bitter grievance at +the alleged breach of <a name="page_154"><span class="page">Page +154</span></a> faith, and vowing vengeance on the whole Spanish +race. "The case," as Drake's biographer, Thomas Fuller, says, "was +clear in sea-divinity, and few are such infidels as not to believe +doctrines which make for their own profit."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Holy State</span>, Bk. II, Ch. +XXII.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the next three years, following the example of many a French +Huguenot privateersman before him, and forsaking trade for semi-private +reprisal (in that epoch a few degrees short of piracy), he made +three voyages to the Spanish Indies. On the third, in 1572, he +raided Nombre de Dios with fire and sword. Then, leaguing himself +with the mixed-breed natives or cameroons, he waylaid a guarded +mule-train bearing treasure across the Isthmus, securing 15 tons of +silver which he buried, and as much gold as his men could stagger +away under. It was on this foray that he first saw the Pacific +from a height of the Cordilleras, and resolved to steer an English +squadron into this hitherto unmolested Spanish sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The tale of Drake's voyage into the Pacific and circumnavigation +of the globe is a piratical epic, the episodes of which, however, +find some justification in the state of virtual though undeclared +hostilities between England and Spain, in the Queen's secret sanction, +and in Spain's own policy of ruthless spoliation in America. Starting +at the close of 1577 with five small vessels, the squadron was reduced +by shipwreck and desertion until only the flagship remained when Drake +at last, on September 6 of the next year, achieved his midwinter +passage of the Straits of Magellan and bore down, "like a visitation +of God" as a Spaniard said, upon the weakly defended ports of the +west coast. After ballasting his ship with silver from the rich +Potosi mines, and rifling even the churches, he hastened onward in +pursuit of a richly laden galleon nicknamed <i>Cacafuego</i>—a +name discreetly translated <i>Spitfire</i>, but which, to repeat a +joke that greatly amused Drake's men at the time, it was proposed +to change to <i>Spitsilver</i>, for when overtaken and captured the +vessel yielded 26 tons of silver, 13 chests of pieces of eight, +and gold and jewels sufficient to swell the booty to half a million +pounds sterling. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For 20 years the voyage across the northern Pacific had been <a +name="page_155"><span class="page">Page 155</span></a> familiar to +the Spanish, who had studied winds and currents, laid down routes, +and made regular crossings. Having picked up charts and China pilots, +and left the whole coast in panic fear, Drake sailed far to the +northward, overhauled his ship in a bay above San Francisco, then +struck across the Pacific, and at last rounded Good Hope and put +into Plymouth in September of the third year. It suited Elizabeth's +policy to countenance the voyage. She put the major part of the +treasure into the Tower, took some trinkets herself, knighted Drake +aboard the <i>Golden Hind</i>, and when the Spanish ambassador +talked war she told him, in a quiet tone of voice, that she would +throw him into a dungeon. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This red-bearded, short and thickset Devon skipper, bold of speech +as of action, was now the most renowned sailor of England, with a +name that inspired terror on every coast of Spain. It was inevitable, +therefore, that when Elizabeth resolved upon open reprisals in +1585, Drake should be chosen to lead another, and this time fully +authorized, raid on the Spanish Indies. Here he sacked the cities +of San Domingo and Carthagena, and, though he narrowly missed the +plate fleet, brought home sufficient spoils for the individuals +who backed the venture. In the year 1587 with 23 ships and orders +permitting him to operate freely on Spain's home coasts, he first +boldly entered Cadiz, in almost complete disregard of the puny +galleys guarding the harbor, and destroyed some 37 vessels and +their cargoes. Despite the horrified protests of his Vice Admiral +Borough (an officer "of the old school" to be found in every epoch) +at these violations of traditional methods, he then took up a position +off Saigres where he could harry coastwise commerce, picked up the +East Indiaman <i>San Felipe</i> with a cargo worth a million pounds +in modern money, and even appeared off Lisbon to defy the Spanish +Admiral Santa Cruz. Thus he "singed the King of Spain's beard," and +set, in the words of a recent biographer, "what to this day may +serve as the finest example of how a small, well-handled fleet, +acting on a nicely timed offensive, may paralyze the mobilization +of an overwhelming force."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Corbett, +Vol. II, p. 108.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_156"><span class="page">Page 156</span></a> +<i>The Grand Armada</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the time of this Cadiz expedition Spanish preparations for the +invasion of England were already well under way, Philip being now +convinced that by a blow at England all his aims might be +secured—the subjugation of the Netherlands, the safety of +Spanish America, the overthrow of Protestantism, possibly even +his accession to the English throne. As the secret instructions +to Medina Sidonia more modestly stated, it was at least believed +that by a vigorous offensive and occupation of English territory +England could be forced to cease her opposition to Spain. For this +purpose every province of the empire was pressed for funds. Pope +Sixtus VI contributed a million gold crowns, which he shrewdly +made payable only when troops actually landed on English soil. +Church and nobility were squeezed as never before. The Cortes on +the eve of the voyage voted 8,000,000 ducats, secured by a tax on +wine, meat, and oil, the common necessities of life, which was +not lifted for more than two hundred years. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To gain control of the Channel long enough to throw 40,000 troops +ashore at Margate, and thereafter to meet and conquer the army of +defense—such was the highly difficult objective, to assure +the success of which Philip had been led to hope for a wholesale +defection of English Catholics to the Spanish cause. Twenty thousand +troops were to sail with the Armada; Alexander Farnese, Duke of +Parma, was to add 17,000 veterans from Flanders and assume supreme +command. With the Spanish infantry once landed, under the best +general in Europe, it was not beyond reason that England might become +a province of Spain. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +What Philip did not see clearly, what indeed could scarcely be +foreseen from past experience, was that no movement of troops should +be undertaken without first definitely accounting for the enemy +fleet. The Spanish had not even an open base to sail to. With English +vessels thronging the northern ports of the Channel, with 90 Dutch +ships blockading the Scheldt and the shallows of the Flanders coast, +it would be necessary to clear the Channel by a naval victory, and +maintain <a name="page_157"><span class="page">Page 157</span></a> +control until it was assured by victory on land. The leader first +selected, Santa Cruz—a veteran of Lepanto—at least put +naval considerations uppermost and laid plans on a grand scale, +calling for 150 major ships and 100,000 men, 30,000 of them sailors. +But with his death in 1587 the campaign was again thought of primarily +from the army standpoint. The ships were conceived as so many +transports, whose duty at most was to hold the English fleet at +bay. Parma was to be supreme. To succeed Santa Cruz as naval leader, +and in order, it is said, that the gray-haired autocrat Philip +might still control from his cell in the Escorial, the Duke of +Medina Sidonia was chosen—an amiable gentleman of high rank, +but consciously ignorant of naval warfare, uncertain of purpose, +and despondent almost from the start. Medina had an experienced +Vice Admiral in Diego Flores de Valdes, whose professional advice +he usually followed, and he had able squadron commanders in Recalde, +Pedro de Valdes, Oquendo, and others; but such a commander-in-chief, +unless a very genius in self-effacement, was enough to ruin a far +more auspicious campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Delayed by the uncertain political situation in France, even more +than by Drake's exploits off Cadiz, the Armada was at last, in +May of 1588, ready to depart. The success of the Catholic party +under the leadership of the Duke of Guise gave assurance of support +rather than hostility on the French flank. There were altogether +some 130 ships, the best of which were 10 war galleons of Portugal +and 10 of the "Indian Guard" of Spain. These were supported by +the Biscayan, Andalusian, Guipuscoan, and Levantine squadrons of +about 10 armed merchantmen each, four splendid Neapolitan galleasses +that gave a good account of themselves in action, and four galleys +that were driven upon the French coast by storms and took no part +in the battle—making a total (without the galleys) of about +64 fighting ships. Then there were 35 or more pinnaces and small +craft, and 23 <i>urcas</i> or storeships of little or no fighting +value. The backbone of the force was the 60 galleons, large, top-lofty +vessels, all but 20 of them from the merchant service, with towering +poops and <a name="page_158"><span class="page">Page 158</span></a> +forecastles that made them terrible to look upon but hard to handle. +On board were 8,000 sailors and 19,000 troops. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Dispersed by a storm on their departure from Lisbon, the fleet +again assembled at Corunna, their victuals already rotten, and +their water foul and short. Medina Sidonia even now counseled +abandonment; but religious faith, the fatalistic pride of Spain, +and Philip's dogged fixity of purpose drove them on. Putting out +of Corunna on July 22, and again buffeted by Biscay gales, they +were sighted off the Lizard at daybreak of July 30, and a pinnace +scudded into Plymouth with the alarm. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 448px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig029.png" width="448" height="764" alt="Fig. 29"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +For England the moment of supreme crisis had come, Elizabeth's +policy of paying for nothing that she might expect her subjects +to contribute had left the royal navy short of what the situation +called for, and the government seems also, even throughout the +campaign, to have tied the admirals to the coast and kept them from +distant adventures by limited supplies of munitions and food. But +in the imminent danger, the nobility, both Catholic and Protestant, +and every coastwise city, responded to the call for ships and men. +Their loyalty was fatal to Philip's plan. The royal fleet of 25 +ships and a dozen pinnaces was reënforced until the total +craft of all descriptions numbered 197, not more than 140 of which, +however, may be said to have had a real share in the campaign. For +a month or more a hundred sail had been mobilized at Plymouth, +of which 69 were greatships and galleons. These were smaller in +average tonnage than the Spanish ships, but more heavily armed, and +manned by 10,000 capable seamen. Lord Henry Seymour, with Palmer +and Sir William Winter under him, watched Parma at the Strait of +Dover, with 20 ships and an equal number of galleys, barks and +pinnaces. The Lord High Admiral, Thomas Howard of Effingham, a +nobleman of 50 with some naval experience and of a family that had +long held the office, commanded the western squadron, with Drake +as Vice Admiral and John Hawkins as Rear Admiral. The <i>Ark</i> +(800 tons), <i>Revenge</i> (500), and <i>Victory</i> (800) were +their respective flagships. Martin Frobisher in the big 1100-ton +<i>Triumph</i>, Lord Sheffield in the <i>White Bear</i> (1000), and +Thomas Fenner in the <i>Nonpareil</i> (500) were included with the +Admirals <a name="page_159"><span class="page">Page 159</span></a> +<a name="page_160"><span class="page">Page 160</span></a> in +Howard's inner council of war. "Howard," says Thomas Fuller, +"was no deep-seaman, but he had skill enough to know those who +had more skill than himself and to follow their instructions." As +far as as possible for a commoner, Drake exercised command. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 659px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig030.png" width="659" height="403" alt="Fig. 30"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">From Pigafetta's <i>Discorso sopro + l'Ordinanza dell' Armata Catholico</i> (Corbett's <i>Drake</i>, + Vol. II, p. 213</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA, + PROBABLY ADOPTED WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS AND SHOWING THE INFLUENCE + OF GALLEY WARFARE</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +On the morning of the 31st the Armada swept slowly past Plymouth +in what has been described as a broad crescent, but which, from a +contemporary Italian description, seems to have been the "eagle" +formation familiar to galley warfare, in line abreast with wide +extended wings bent slightly forward, the main strength in center +and guards in van and rear. Howard was just completing the arduous +task of warping his ships out of the harbor. Had Medina attacked at +once, as some of his subordinates advised, he might have compelled +Howard to close action and won by superior numbers. But his orders +suggested the advisability of avoiding battle till he had joined +with Parma; and for the Duke this was enough. As the Armada continued +its course, Howard fell in astern and to <a name="page_161"><span +class="page">Page 161</span></a> windward, inflicting serious injuries +to two ships of the enemy rear. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 817px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig031.png" width="817" height="389" alt="Fig. 31"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">From Hale's <i>Story of the Great + Armada.</i></td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +A week of desultory running battle ensued as the fleets moved slowly +through the Channel; the English fighting "loose and large," and +seeking to pick off stragglers, still fearful of a general action, +but taking advantage of Channel flaws to close with the enemy and +sheer as swiftly away; the Spanish on the defensive but able to +avoid disaster by better concerted action and fleet control. Only +two Spanish ships were actually lost, one of them Pedro de Valdes' +flagship <i>Neustra Señora del Rosario</i>, which had been +injured in collision and surrendered to Drake without a struggle +on the night of August 1, the other the big <i>San Salvador</i> +of the Guipuscoan squadron, the whole after part of which had been +torn up by an explosion after the fighting on the first day. But +the Spanish inferiority had been clearly demonstrated and they had +suffered far more in morale than in material injuries when on Sunday, +August 7, they dropped anchor in Calais roads. The English, on their +part, though flushed with confidence, had seen their weakness in +organized tactics, and now divided their fleet into four squadrons, +with the flag officers and Frobisher in command. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It betrays the fatuity of the Spanish leader, if not of the whole +plan of campaign, that when thus practically driven to <a +name="page_162"><span class="page">Page 162</span></a> refuge in +a neutral port, Medina Sidonia thought his share of the task +accomplished, and wrote urgent appeals to Parma to join or send +aid, though the great general had not enough flat-boats and barges +to float his army had he been so foolhardy as to embark, or the +Dutch so benevolent as to let him go. But the English, now +reënforced by Seymour's squadron, gave the Duke little time +to ponder his next move. At midnight eight fire hulks, "spurting +flames and their ordnance exploding," were borne by wind and tide +full upon the crowded Spanish fleet. Fearful of <i>maquinas de +minas</i> such as had wrought destruction a year before at the +siege of Antwerp, the Spanish made no effort to grapple the peril +but slipped or cut cables and in complete confusion beat off shore. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At dawn the Spanish galleons, attempting with a veering wind from +the southward and westward to form in order off Gravelines, were set +upon in the closest approach to a general engagement that occurred +in the campaign. While Howard and several of his ships were busy +effecting the capture of a beached galleass, Drake led the attack +in the <i>Revenge</i>, seeking to force the enemy to leeward and +throw the whole body upon the shallows of the Flanders coast. With +splendid discipline, the Spanish weather ships, the flagship <i>San +Martin</i> among them, fought valiantly to cover the retreat. But +it was an unequal struggle, the heavier and more rapid fire of the +English doing fearful execution on decks crowded with men-at-arms. +Such artillery combat was hitherto unheard of. Though warned of the +new northern methods, the Spanish were obsessed by tradition; they +were prepared for grappling and boarding, and could they have closed, +their numbers and discipline would have told. Both sides suffered +from short ammunition; but the Armada, with no fresh supplies, was +undoubtedly in the worse case. "They fighting with their great +ordnance," writes Medina Sidonia, "and we with harquebus fire and +musketry, the distance being very small." Six-inch guns against +bows and muskets tells the tale. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A slackening of the English pursuit at nightfall after eight hours' +fighting, and an off-shore slant of wind at daybreak, prevented complete +disaster. One large galleon sank and two <a name="page_163"><span +class="page">Page 163</span></a> more stranded and were captured +by the Dutch. These losses were not indeed fatal, but the remaining +ships staggering away to leeward were little more than blood-drenched +wrecks. Fifteen hundred had been killed and wounded in the day's +action, and eleven ships and some eight thousand men sacrificed thus +far in the campaign. The English, on the other hand, had suffered +no serious ship injuries and the loss of not above 100 men. In the +council held next day beyond the Straits of Dover, only a few of +the Spanish leaders had stomach for further fighting; the rest +preferred to brave the perils of a return around the Orkneys rather +than face again these defenders of the narrow seas. Before a fair +wind they stood northward, Drake still at their heels, though by +reason of short supplies he left them at the Firth of Forth. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In October, fifty ships, with 10,000 starved and fever-stricken +men, trailed into the Biscay ports of Spain. Torn by September +gales, the rest of the Armada had been sunk or stranded on the rough +coasts of Scotland and Ireland. "The wreckers of the Orkneys and the +Faroes, the clansmen of the Scottish isles, the kernes of Donegal +and Galway, all had their part in the work of murder and robbery. +Eight thousand Spaniards perished between the Giant's Causeway and +the Blaskets. On a strand near Sligo an English captain numbered +eleven hundred corpses which had been cast up by the sea."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">History of the English People</span>, +Green, Vol. II, p. 448.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Flavit Deus, et dissipati sunt"—"The Lord sent His wind, and +scattered them." So ran the motto on the English medal of victory. +But storms completed the destruction of a fleet already thoroughly +defeated. Religious faith, courage, and discipline had availed +little against superior ships, weapons, leadership, and nautical +skill. "Till the King of Spain had war with us," an Englishman +remarked, "he never knew what war by sea meant."[2] It might be +said more accurately that the battle gave a new meaning to war +by sea. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Monson, <span class="sc">Naval Tracts</span>, +Purchas, Vol. III, p. 121.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From the standpoint of naval progress, the campaign demonstrated +definitely the ascendancy of sail and artillery. For the old galley +tactics a new system now had to be developed. Since <a +name="page_164"><span class="page">Page 164</span></a> between +sailing vessels head-on conflict was practically eliminated, and +since guns mounted to fire ahead and astern were of little value +save in flight or pursuit, the arrangement of guns in broadside +soon became universal, and fleets fought in column, or "line ahead," +usually close-hauled on the same or opposite tacks. While these were +lessons for the next generation, there is more permanent value in +the truth, again illustrated, that fortune favors the belligerent +quicker to forsake outworn methods and to develop skill in the use +of new weapons. The Spanish defeat illustrates also the necessity +of expert planning and guidance of a naval campaign, with naval +counsels and requirements duly regarded; and the fatal effect of +failure to concentrate attention on the enemy fleet. It is doubtful, +however, whether it would have been better, as Drake urged, and as +was actually attempted in the month before the Armada's arrival, if +the English had shifted the war to the coast of Spain. The objections +arise chiefly from the difficulties, in that age, of maintaining +a large naval force far from its base, all of which the Spanish +encountered in their northward cruise. It is noteworthy that, even +after the brief Channel operations, an epidemic caused heavy mortality +in the English fleet. Finally, the Armada is a classic example +of the value of naval defense to an insular nation. In the often +quoted words of Raleigh, "To entertain the enemy with their own +beef in their bellies, before they eat of our Kentish capons, I +take it to be the wisest way, to do which his Majesty after God +will employ his good ships at sea." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Upon Spain, already tottering from inherent weakness, the Armada +defeat had the effect of casting down her pride and confidence +as leader of the Catholic world. Though it was not until three +centuries later that she lost her last colonies, her hold on her +vast empire was at once shaken by this blow at her sea control. +While she maintained large fleets until after the Napoleonic Wars, +she was never again truly formidable as a naval power. But the victory +lifted England more than it crushed Spain, inspiring an intenser +patriotism, an eagerness for colonial and commercial adventure, an +exaltation of spirit <a name="page_165"><span class="page">Page +165</span></a> manifested in the men of genius who crowned the +Elizabethan age. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Last Years of the War</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The war was not ended; and though Philip was restrained by the +rise of Protestant power in France under Henry of Navarre, he was +still able to gather his sea forces on almost as grand a scale. In +the latter stages of the war the naval expeditions on both sides +were either, like the Armada, for the purpose of landing armies on +foreign soil, or raids on enemy ports, colonies and commerce. Thus +Drake in 1589 set out with a force of 18,000 men, which attacked +Corunna, moved thence upon Lisbon, and lost a third or more of +its number in a fruitless campaign on land. Both Drake and the +aged Hawkins, now his vice admiral, died in the winter of 1595-96 +during a last and this time ineffective foray upon the Spanish +Main. Drake was buried off Puerto Bello, where legend has it his +spirit still awaits England's call— +</p> + +<p class="bquote"> + "Take my drum to England, hang et by the shore,<br> +Strike et when your powder's running low.<br> + If the Dons sight Devon, I'll leave the port of Heaven,<br> +An' drum them up the Channel as we drummed them long ago."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake's Drum</span>, Sir Henry Newbolt.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +We are still far from the period when sea control was thought of +as important in itself, apart from land operations, or when fleets +were kept in permanent readiness to take the sea. It is owing to +this latter fact that we hear of large flotillas dispatched by +each side even in the same year, yet not meeting in naval action. +Thus in June of 1596 the Essex expedition, with 17 English and +18 Dutch men-of-war and numerous auxiliaries, seized Cadiz and +burned shipping to the value of 11,000,000 ducats. There was no +naval opposition, though Philip in October of the same year had +ready a hundred ships and 16,000 men, which were dispersed with +the loss of a quarter of their strength in a gale off Finisterre. +Storms also <a name="page_166"><span class="page">Page 166</span></a> +scattered Philip's fleet in the next year; in 1598, Spanish transports +landed 5,000 men at Calais; and England's fears were renewed in +the year after that by news of over 100 vessels fitting out for +the Channel, which, however, merely protected the plate fleet by +a cruise to the Azores. As late as 1601, Spain landed 3500 troops +in Ireland. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But if these major operations seem to have missed contact, there +were many lively actions on a minor scale, the well-armed trading +vessels of the north easily beating off the galley squadrons guarding +Gibraltar and the routes past Spain. Among these lesser encounters, the +famous "Last Fight of the Revenge," which occurred during operations +of a small English squadron off the Azores in 1591, well illustrates +the fighting spirit of the Elizabethan Englishman and the ineptitude +which since the Armada seems to have marked the Spaniard at sea. +In Drake's old flagship, attacked by 15 ships and surrounded by +a Spanish fleet of 50 sail, a bellicose old sea-warrior named Sir +Richard Grenville held out from nightfall until eleven the next +day, and surrendered only after he had sunk three of the enemy, +when his powder was gone, half his crew dead, the rest disabled, +and his ship a sinking wreck. "Here die I, Richard Grenville," so +we are given his last words, "with a joyful and a quiet mind, for +that I have ended my life as a good soldier ought to do, who has +fought for his country and his queen, his honor and his religion." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The naval activities mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraphs +had no decisive effect upon the war, which ended, for England at +least, with the death of Elizabeth in 1603 and the accession of James +Stuart of Scotland to the English throne. James at once adopted a +policy of <i>rapprochement</i> with Spain, which while it guaranteed +peace during the 22 years of his reign, was by its renunciation of +trade with the Indies, aid to the Dutch, and leadership of Protestant +Europe, a sorry sequel to the victory of fifteen years before. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Armada nevertheless marks the decadence of Spanish sea power. +With the next century begins a new epoch in naval warfare, an age +of sail and artillery, in which Dutch, <a name="page_167"><span +class="page">Page 167</span></a> English, and later French fleets +contested for the sea mastery deemed essential to colonial empire +and commercial prosperity. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Sir Julian Corbett, + 2 vols., 1898.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Successors of Drake</span>, Sir Julian Corbett, + 1900.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Story of the Great Armada</span>, J. R. Hale, no + date.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Armada Papers</span>, Sir John Knox Laughtun, 2 vols., + Navy Records Society, 1894.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">La Armada Invencible</span>, Captain Fernandez Duro, + 1884.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">A History of the Administration of the Royal + Navy</span>, 1509-1660, by M. Oppenheim, 1896.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">A History of the Royal Navy</span>, William Laird + Clowes, Vol. 1., 1897.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Growth of English Commerce and Industry</span>, + W. Cunningham, 1907.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Development of Tactics in the Tudor Navy</span>, + Capt. G. Goldingham, United Service Magazine, June, 1918.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_168"><span class="page">Page 168</span></a> +CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER: WARS WITH THE DUTCH. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Dutch Wars of the 17th century the British navy may be said +to have caught its stride in the march that made Britannia the +unrivaled mistress of the seas. The defeat of the Armada was caused +by other things besides the skill of the English, and the steady +decline of Spain from that point was not due to that battle or to +any energetic naval campaign undertaken by the English thereafter. +In fact, save for the Cadiz expedition of 1596, in which the Dutch +coöperated, England had a rather barren record after the Armada +campaign down to the middle of the 17th century. During that period +the Dutch seized the control of the seas for trade and war. They +appropriated what was left of the Levantine trade in the Mediterranean, +and contested the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies and the +Spanish in the West. Indeed the Dutch were at this time freely +acknowledged to be the greatest sea-faring people of Europe.[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: "Dutch exports reached a figure in the 17th century, +which was not attained by the English until 1740. Even the Dutch +fisheries, which employed over 2000 boats, were said to be more +valuable than the manufactures of France and England combined." +<span class="sc">A History of Commerce</span>, Clive Day, p. 194.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When the Commonwealth came into power in England the new government +turned its attention to the navy, which had languished under the +Stuarts. A great reform was accomplished in the bettering of the +living conditions for the seamen. Their pay was increased, their +share of prize money enlarged, and their food improved. At the +same time, during the years 1648-51, the number of ships of the +fleet was practically doubled, and the new vessels were the product +of the <a name="page_169"><span class="page">Page 169</span></a> +highest skill in design and honest work in construction. The turmoil +between Roundhead and Royalist had naturally disorganized the officer +personnel of the fleet. Prince Rupert, nephew of Charles I, had taken +a squadron of seven Royalist ships to sea, hoping to organize, at +the Scilly Islands or at Kinsdale in Ireland, bases for piratical +raids on the commerce of England, and it was necessary to bring +him up short. Moreover, Ireland was still rebellious, Barbados, +the only British possession in the West Indies, was held for the +King, and Virginia also was Royalist. To establish the rule of the +Commonwealth Cromwell needed an efficient fleet and an energetic +admiral. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the latter he turned to a man who had won a military reputation +in the Civil War second only to that of the great Oliver himself, +Robert Blake, colonel of militia. Blake was chosen as one of three +"generals at sea" in 1649. As far as is known he had never before +set foot on a man of war; he was a scholarly man, who had spent ten +years at Oxford, where he had cherished the ambition of becoming +a professor of Greek. At the time of his appointment he was fifty +years old, and his entire naval career was comprised in the seven +or eight remaining years of his life, and yet he so bore himself +in those years as to win a reputation that stands second only to +that of Nelson among the sea-fighters of the English race. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Blake made short work of Rupert's cruising and destroyed the Royalist +pretensions to Jersey and the Scillies. One of his rewards for +the excellent service rendered was a position in the Council of +State, in which capacity he did much toward the bettering of the +condition of the sailors, which was one of the striking reforms +of the Commonwealth. His test, however, came in the first Dutch +War, in which he was pitted against Martin Tromp, then the leading +naval figure of Europe. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the wars with Spain, English and Dutch had been allies, but +the shift of circumstances brought the two Protestant nations into +a series of fierce conflicts lasting throughout the latter half of +the 17th century. The outcome of these was that England won the +scepter of the sea which she has ever since held. The main cause +of the war was the rivalry of the two <a name="page_170"><span +class="page">Page 170</span></a> nations on the sea. There were +various other specific reasons for bad feeling on both sides, as +for instance a massacre by the Dutch of English traders at Amboyna +in the East Indies, during the reign of James I, which still rankled +because it had never been avenged. The English on their side insisted +on a salute to their men of war from every ship that passed through +the Channel, and claimed the rights to a tribute, of all herrings +taken within 30 miles off the English coast. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Cromwell formulated the English demands in the Navigation Act of +1651. The chief of these required that none but English ships should +bring cargoes to England, save vessels of the country whence the +cargoes came. This was frankly a direct blow at the Dutch carrying +trade, one to which the Dutch could not yield without a struggle. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For this struggle the Netherlanders were ill prepared. The Dutch +Republic was a federation of seven sovereign states, lacking a strong +executive and torn by rival factions. Moreover, her geographical +position was most vulnerable. Pressed by enemies on her land frontiers, +she was compelled to maintain an army of 57,000 men in addition to +her navy. As the resources of the country were wholly inadequate +to support the population, her very life depended on the sea. For +the Holland of the 17th century, as for the England of the 20th, the +fleets of merchantmen were the life blood of the nation. Unfortunately +for the Dutch, this life blood had to course either through the +Channel or else round the north of Scotland. Either way was open +to attacks by the British, who held the interior position. Further, +the shallows of the coasts and bays made necessary a flat bottomed +ship of war, lighter built than the English and less weatherly +in deep water. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In contrast the British had a unity of government under the iron +hand of Cromwell, they had the enormous advantage of position, +they were self-sustaining, and their ships were larger, stouter +and better in every respect than those of their enemies. Hence, +although the Dutch entered the conflict with the naval prestige +on their side, it is clear that the odds were decidedly against +them. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_171"><span class="page">Page 171</span></a> +<i>The First Dutch War</i> +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 516px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig032.png" width="516" height="423" alt="Fig. 32"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF + THE 17TH CENTURY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND + FRANCE</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The fighting did not wait for a declaration of war. Blake met Tromp, +who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen, off Dover on May 19, +1652. On coming up with him Blake fired guns demanding the required +salute. Tromp replied with a broadside. Blake attacked with his +flagship, well ahead of his own line, and fought for five hours with +Tromp's flagship and several others. The English were outnumbered +about three to one, and Blake might have been annihilated had not +the English admiral, Bourne, brought his squadron out from Dover +at the sound of the firing and fallen upon Tromp's flank. As the +Dutch Admiral's main business was to get his convoy home, he fell +back slowly toward the coast of France, <a name="page_172"><span +class="page">Page 172</span></a> both sides maintaining a cannonade +until they lost each other in the darkness. Apparently there was +little attempt at formation after the first onset; it was close +quarters fighting, and only the wild gunnery of the day saved both +fleets from enormous losses. As it was, Blake's flagship was very +severely hammered. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Following this action, Tromp reappeared with 100 ships, but failed +to keep Blake from attacking and ruining the Dutch herring fisheries +for that year. This mistake temporarily cost Tromp his command. +He was superseded by DeWith, an able man and brave, but no match +for Blake. On September 28, 1652, Blake met him off the "Kentish +Knock" shoal at the mouth of the Thames. In order to keep the weather +gage, which would enable him to attack at close quarters, Blake +took the risk of grounding on the shoal. His own ship and a few +others did ground for a time, but they served as a guide to the +rest. In the ensuing action Blake succeeded in putting the Dutch +between two fires and inflicting a severe defeat. Only darkness +saved the Dutch from utter destruction. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The effect of this victory was to give the English Council of State +a false impression of security. In vain Blake urged the upkeep of +the fleet. Two months later, November 30, 1652, Tromp, now restored +to command, suddenly appeared in the Channel with 80 ships and a +convoy behind him. Blake had only 45 and these only partly manned, +but he was no man to refuse a challenge and boldly sailed out to +meet him. It is said that during the desperate struggle—the +"battle of Dungeness"—Blake's flagship, supported by two +others, fought for some time with twenty of the Dutch. As Blake had +the weather gage and retained it, he was able to draw off finally +and save his fleet from destruction. All the ships were badly knocked +about and two fell into the hands of the enemy. Blake came back so +depressed by his defeat that he offered to resign his command, +but the Council of State would not hear of such a thing, handsomely +admitted their responsibility for the weakness of the fleet, and set +at work to refit. Meanwhile for the next three months the Channel +was in Tromp's hands. <a name="page_173"><span class="page">Page +173</span></a> This is the period when the legend describes him +as hoisting a broom to his masthead. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +By the middle of February the English had reorganized their fleet +and Blake took the sea with another famous Roundhead soldier, Monk, +as one of his divisional commanders. At this time Tromp lay off +Land's End waiting for the Dutch merchant fleet which he expected +to convoy to Holland. On the 18th the two forces sighted each other +about 15 miles off Portland. Then followed the "Three Days' Battle," +or the battle of Portland, one of the most stubbornly contested +fights in the war and its turning point. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In order to be sure to catch Tromp, Blake had extended his force +of 70 or 80 ships in a cross Channel position. Under cover of a +fog Tromp suddenly appeared and caught the English fleet divided. +Less than half were collected under the immediate command of Blake, +only about ten were in the actual vicinity of his flagship, and +the rest were to eastward, especially Monk's division which he +had carelessly permitted to drift to leeward four or five miles. +As the wind was from the west and very light, Monk's position made +it impossible for him to support his chief for some time. Tromp saw +his opportunity to concentrate on the part of the English fleet +nearest him, the handful of ships with Blake. The latter had the +choice of either bearing up to make a junction with Monk and the +others before accepting battle or of grappling with Tromp at once, +trusting to his admirals to arrive in time to win a victory. It +was characteristic of Blake that he chose the bolder course. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The fighting began early in the afternoon and was close and furious +from the outset. Again Blake's ship was compelled to engage several +Dutch, including Tromp's flagship. De Ruyter, the brilliant lieutenant +of Tromp, attempted to cut Blake off from his supports on the north, +and Evertsen steered between Blake and Penn's squadron on the south. +(See diagram 1.) Blake's dozen ships might well have been surrounded +and taken if his admirals had not known their business. Penn tacked +right through Evertsen's squadron to come to the side of Blake, and +Lawson foiled de Ruyter by bearing away till he <a name="page_174"><span +class="page">Page 174</span></a> had enough southing to tack in the +wake of Penn and fall upon Tromp's rear (diagram 2). Evertsen then +attempted to get between Monk and the rest of the fleet and two hours +after the fight in the center began Monk also was engaged. When the +lee vessels of the "red" or center squadron came on the scene about +four o'clock, they threatened to weather the <a name="page_175"><span +class="page">Page 175</span></a> Dutch and put them between two +fires. To avoid this and to protect his convoy, Tromp tacked his +whole fleet together—an exceedingly difficult maneuver under +the circumstances—and drew off to windward. Darkness stopped +the fighting for that day. All night the two fleets sailed eastward +watching each other's lights, and hastily patching up damages. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 558px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig033.png" width="558" height="658" alt="Fig. 33"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Based on diagram of Mahan's in Clowes, + <i>The Royal Navy</i>, Vol. II, p. 180-1.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEB. 18, 1653</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Morning discovered them off the Isle of Wight, with the English +on the north side of the Channel. As Tromp's chief business was to +save his convoy and as the English force was now united, he took +a defensive position. He formed his own ships in a long crescent, +with the outward curve toward his enemy, and in the lee of this +line he placed his convoy. The wind was so light that the English +were unable to attack until late. The fighting, though energetic, +had not proved decisive when darkness fell. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following day, the 20th, brought a fresh wind that enabled +the English to overhaul the Dutch, who could not move faster than +the heavily laden merchantmen, and force a close action. Blake +tried to cut off Tromp from the north so as to block his road home. +Vice Admiral Penn, leading the van, broke through the Dutch battle +line and fell upon the convoy, but Blake was unable to reach far +enough to head off his adversary before he rounded Cape Gris Nez +under cover of darkness and found anchorage in Calais roads. That +night, favored by the tide and thick weather, Tromp succeeded in +carrying off the greater part of his convoy unobserved. Nevertheless +he had left in Blake's hand some fifty merchantmen and a number +of men of war variously estimated from five to eighteen. At the +same time the English had suffered heavily in men and ships. On +Blake's flagship alone it is said that 100 men had been killed +and Blake and his second in command, Deane, were both wounded, the +former seriously. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The result of this three days' action was to encourage the English +to press the war with energy and take the offensive to the enemy's +own coast. English crews had shown that they could fight with a +spirit fully equal to that of the Dutch, and English ships and weight +of broadside, as de Ruyter frankly declared to his government, were +decidedly superior. The <a name="page_176"><span class="page">Page +176</span></a> fact that the shallow waters of the Dutch coast +made necessary a lighter draft man of war than that of the English +proved a serious handicap to the Dutch in all their conflicts with +the British. Both fleets were so badly shot up by this prolonged +battle that there was a lull in operations until May. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In that month Tromp suddenly arrived off Dover and bombarded the +defenses. The English quickly took the sea to hunt him down. As +Blake was still incapacitated by his wound, the command was given +to Monk. The latter, with a fleet of over a hundred ships, brought +Tromp to action on June 2 (1653) in what is known as the "Battle +of the Gabbard" after a shoal near the mouth of the Thames, where +the action began. Tromp was this time not burdened with a convoy +but his fleet was smaller in numbers than Monk's and, as he well +knew, inferior in other elements of force. Accordingly, he adapted +defensive tactics of a sort that was copied afterwards by the French +as a fixed policy. He accepted battle to leeward, drawing off in a +slanting line from his enemy with the idea of catching the English +van as it advanced to the attack unsupported by the rest of the +fleet, and crippling it so severely that the attack would not be +pressed. As it turned out, a shift of the wind gave him the chance +to fall heavily upon the English van, but a second shift gave back +the weather gage to the English and the two fleets became fiercely +engaged at close quarters. Blake, hearing the guns, left his sick +bed and with his own available force of 18 ships sailed out to join +battle. The sight of this fresh squadron flying Blake's flag, turned +the fortune of battle decisively. The Dutch escaped destruction +only by finding safety in the shallows of the Flemish coast, where +the English ships could not follow. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After this defeat the Dutch were almost at the end of their resources +and sued far peace, but Cromwell's ruthless demands amounted to +a practical loss of independence, which even a bankrupt nation +could not accept. Accordingly, every nerve was strained to build +a fleet that might yet beat the English. The latter, for their +part, were equally determined not to lose the fruits of their hard +won victories. Since Blake's active <a name="page_177"><span +class="page">Page 177</span></a> share in the battle of the Gabbard +aggravated his wound so severely that he was carried ashore more +nearly dead than alive, Monk retained actual command. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Monk attempted to maintain a close blockade of the Dutch coast +and to prevent a junction between Tromp's main fleet at Flushing +and a force of thirty ships at Amsterdam. In this, however, he was +outgeneraled by Tromp, who succeeded in taking the sea with the +greatest of all Dutch fleets, 120 men of war. The English and the +Dutch speedily clashed in the last, and perhaps the most furiously +contested, battle of the war, the "Battle of Scheveningen." The +action began at six in the morning of July 30, 1653. Tromp had the +weather gage, but Monk, instead of awaiting his onslaught, tacked +towards him and actually cut through the Dutch line. Tromp countered +by tacking also, in order to keep his windward position, and this +maneuver was repeated three times by Tromp and Monk, and the two +great fleets sailed in great zigzag courses down the Dutch coast a +distance of forty miles, with bitter fighting going on at close +range between the two lines. Early in the action the renowned Tromp +was killed, but his flag was kept flying and there was no flinching +on the part of his admirals. About one o'clock a shift of the wind +gave the weather gage to the English. Some of the Dutch captains +then showed the white feather and tried to escape. This compelled +the retirement of DeWith, who had succeeded to the command, and +who, as he retreated, fired on his own fugitives as well as on +the English. As usual in those battles with the Dutch, the English +had been forced to pay a high price for their victory. Their fleet +was so shattered that they were obliged to lift the blockade and +return home to refit. But for the Dutch it was the last effort. +Again they sued for peace. Cromwell drove a hard bargain; he insisted +on every claim England had ever made against the Netherlands before +the war, but on this occasion he agreed to leave Holland her +independence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus in less than two years the First Dutch War came to an end. In the +words of Mr. Hannay,[1] the English historian, <a name="page_178"><span +class="page">Page 178</span></a> its "importance as an epoch in +the history of the English Navy can hardly be exaggerated. Though +short, for it lasted barely twenty-two months, it was singularly +fierce and full of battles. Yet its interest is not derived mainly +from the mere amount of fighting but from the character of it. This +was the first of our naval wars conducted by steady, continuous, +coherent campaigns. Hitherto our operations on the sea had been +of the nature of adventures by single ships and small squadrons, +with here and there a great expedition sent out to capture some +particular port or island." +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">A Short History of the Royal Navy</span>, +Vol. I, p. 217.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As to the intensity of the fighting, it is worth noting that in this +short period six great battles took place between fleets numbering +as a rule from 70 to 120 ships on a side. By comparison it may be +remarked that at Trafalgar the total British force numbered 27 +ships of the line and the Allies, 33. Nor were the men of war of +Blake and Tromp the small types of an earlier day. In 1652 the +ship of the line had become the unit of the fleet as truly as it +was in 1805. It is true that Blake's ships were not the equal of +Nelson's huge "first rates," because the "two-decker" was then +the most powerful type. The first three-decker in the English navy +was launched in the year of Blake's death, 1657. The fact remains, +however, that these fleet actions of the Dutch Wars took place +on a scale unmatched by any of the far better known engagements +of the 18th or early 19th century. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A curious naval weapon survived from the day when Howard drove +Medina Sidonia from Calais roads, the fireship, or "brander." This +was used by both English and Dutch. Its usefulness, of course, was +confined to the side that held the windward position, and even +an opponent to leeward could usually, if he kept his head, send +out boats to grapple and tow the brander out of harm's way. In the +battle of Scheveningen, however, Dutch fireships cost the English +two fine ships, together with a Dutch prize, and very nearly destroyed +the old flagship of Blake, the <i>Triumph</i>. She was saved only +by the extraordinary exertions of her captain, who received mortal +injury from the flames he fought so courageously. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_179"><span class="page">Page 179</span></a> This +First Dutch War is interesting in what it reveals of the advance +in tactics. Tromp well deserves his title as the "Father of Naval +Tactics," and he undoubtedly taught Blake and Monk a good deal by +the rough schooling of battle, but they proved apt pupils. From +even the brief summary of these great battles just given, it is +evident that Dutch and English did not fight each other in helter +skelter fashion. In fact, there is revealed a great advance in +coördination over the work of the English in the campaign +of the Armada. These fleets worked as units. This does not mean +that they were not divided into squadrons. A force of 100 ships +of the line required division and subdivision, and considerable +freedom of movement was left to division and squadron commanders +under the general direction of the commander in chief, but they +were all working consciously together. Just as at Trafalgar Nelson +formed his fleet in two lines (originally planned as three) and +allowed his second in command a free hand in carrying out the task +assigned him, so Tromp and Blake operated their fleets in +squadrons—Tromp usually had five—and expected of their +subordinates responsibility and initiative. All this is in striking +contrast with the practice that paralyzed tactics in the latter +17th and 18th centuries, which sacrificed everything to a rigid +line of battle in column ahead, and required every movement to +emanate from the commander in chief. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although details about the great battles of the First Dutch War +are scanty, there is enough recorded to show that both sides used +the line ahead as the normal battle line. It is equally clear, +however, that they repeatedly broke through each other's lines +and aimed at concentration, or destroying in detail. These two +related principles, which had to be rediscovered toward the end of +the 18th century, were practiced by Tromp, de Ruyter, and Blake. +Their work has not the advantage of being as near our day as the +easy, one-sided victories over the demoralized French navy in the +Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, but the day may come when the +British will regard the age of Blake as the naval epoch of which +they have the most reason to be proud. Then England met <a +name="page_180"><span class="page">Page 180</span></a> the greatest +seamen of the day led by one of the greatest admirals of history +and won a bitterly fought contest by virtue of better ships and +the spirit of Cromwell's "Ironsides." +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Porto Farina and Santa Cruz</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nor did the age of Blake end with the First Dutch War. As soon +as the admiral was able to go aboard ship, Cromwell sent him with +a squadron into the Mediterranean to enforce respect for the +Commonwealth from the Italian governments and the Barbary states. +He conducted his mission with eminent success. Although the Barbary +pirates did not course the sea in great fleets as in the palmy +days of Barbarossa, they were still a source of peril to Christian +traders. Blake was received civilly by the Dey of Algiers but +negotiations did not result satisfactorily. At Tunis he was openly +flouted. The Pasha drew up his nine cruisers inside Porto Farina +and defied the English admiral to do his worst. Blake left for a +few days to gain the effect of surprise and replenish provisions. +On April 4, 1655, he suddenly reappeared and stood in to the attack. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The harbor of Porto Farina was regarded as impregnable. The entrance +was narrow and the shores lined with castles and batteries. As Blake +foresaw, the wind that took him in would roll the battle smoke upon +the enemy. In a short time he had silenced the fire of the forts +and then sent boarding parties against the Tunisian ships, which +were speedily taken and burnt. Then he took his squadron out again, +having destroyed the entire Tunisian navy, shattered the forts, and +suffered only a trifling loss. This exploit resounded throughout +the Mediterranean. Algiers was quick to follow Tunis in yielding +to Blake's demands. It is characteristic of this officer that he +should have made the attack on Tunis entirely without orders from +Cromwell, and it is equally characteristic of the latter that he +was heartily pleased with the initiative of his admiral in carrying +out the spirit rather than the letter of his instructions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile Cromwell had been wavering between a war <a +name="page_181"><span class="page">Page 181</span></a> against +France or Spain. The need of a capture of money perhaps influenced +him to turn against Spain, for this country still drew from her +western colonies a tribute of gold and silver, which naturally +would fall a prey to the power that controlled the sea. One month +after Blake's exploit at Tunis, another English naval expedition set +out to the West Indies to take Santo Domingo. Although Jamaica was +seized and thereafter became an English possession, the expedition +as a whole was a disgraceful failure, and the leaders, Penn and +Venables, were promptly clapped by Cromwell into the Tower on their +return. This stroke against Spain amounted to a declaration of +war, and on Blake's return to England he was ordered to blockade +Cadiz. One detachment of the plate fleet fell into the hands of his +blockading ships and the silver ingots were dispatched to London. +Blake continued his blockade in an open roadstead for six months, +through autumn and winter, an unheard of thing in those days and +exceedingly difficult. Blake was himself ill, his ships were not +the copper-bottomed ones of a hundred years later, and there was +not, as in later days, an English base at Gibraltar. But he never +relaxed his vigilance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In April (1657) he learned that another large plate fleet had arrived +at Santa Cruz, Teneriffe. Immediately he sailed thither to take or +destroy it. If Porto Farina had been regarded as safe from naval +attack, Santa Cruz was far more so. A deep harbor, with a narrow, +funnel entrance, and backed by mountains, it is liable to dead +calms or squally bursts of wind from the land. In addition to its +natural defenses it was heavily fortified. Blake, however, reckoned +on coming in with a flowing tide and a sea breeze that, as at Porto +Farina, would blow his smoke upon the defenses. He rightly guessed +that if he sailed close enough under the castles at the harbor +entrance their guns could not be sufficiently depressed to hit +his ships, and as he saw the galleons and their escorts lined up +along the shore he perceived also that they were masking the fire +of their own shore batteries. For the most difficult part of his +undertaking, the exit from the harbor, <a name="page_182"><span +class="page">Page 182</span></a> he trusted to the ebbing tide +with the chance of a shift in the wind in his favor. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Early on the morning of April 20th (1657) he sailed in. As he had +judged, the fire of the forts did little damage. By eight o'clock +the English ships were all at their appointed stations and fighting. +During the entire day Blake continued his work of destruction till +it was complete, and at dusk drifted out on the ebb. Some writers +mention a favoring land breeze that helped to extricate the English, +but according to Blake's own words, "the wind blew right into the +bay." In spite of this head wind the ships that were crippled were +warped or towed out and not one was lost. The English suffered +in the entire action only 50 killed and 120 wounded, and repairs +were so easily made that Blake returned to his blockading station +at once. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This was the greatest of Blake's feats as it also was his last. +All who heard of it—friend or enemy—pronounced it as +without parallel in the history of ships. A few months later Blake +was given leave to return home. He had long been a sick man, but +his name alone was worth a fleet and Cromwell had not been able +to spare him. As it happened, he did not live long enough to see +England again. Cromwell, who knew the worth of his faithful admiral, +gave him a funeral of royal dignity and interment in Westminster +Abbey. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Blake never showed, perhaps, great strategic insight—Tromp +and de Ruyter were his superiors there, as was also Nelson—but +he, more than any other, won for England her mastery of the sea, +and no other can boast his record of great victories. These he +won partly by skill and forethought but chiefly by intrepidity. We +can do no better than leave his fame in the words of the Royalist +historian, Clarendon—a political enemy—who says: "He +quickly made himself signal there (on the sea) and was the first +man who declined the old track ... and disproved those rules that +had long been in practice, to keep his ships and men out of danger, +which had been held in former times a point of great ability and +circumspection, as if the principal requisite in the captain of +a ship had been to come home safe again. He was the first <a +name="page_183"><span class="page">Page 183</span></a> man who +brought ships to contemn castles on shore, which had been thought +ever very formidable.... He was the first that infused that proportion +of courage into the seamen by making them see what mighty things +they could do if they were resolved, and taught them to fight in +fire as well as on water. And though he hath been very well imitated +and followed, he was the first that drew the copy of naval courage +and bold resolute achievement." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The chaos that followed the death of the Protector resulted in Monk's +bringing over the exiled Stuart king—Charles II. Thereafter +Round Head and Royalist served together in the British navy. An +important effect of the Restoration was organization of a means of +training the future officers of the fleet. The Navy as a profession +may be said to date from this time, in contrast with the practice of +using merchant skippers and army officers, which had prevailed to +so great a degree hitherto. Under the new system "young gentlemen" +were sent to sea as "King's Letter Boys"—midshipmen—to +learn the ways of the navy and to grow up in it as a preparation +for command. This was an excellent reform but it resulted in making +the navy the property of a social caste from that day to this, +and it made promotion, for a century and more, largely subject to +family influence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Another effect of the Restoration was to break down the fighting +efficiency of the fleet as it had been in the days of Blake. The +veterans of the First Dutch War fought with their old time courage +and discipline, but the newer elements did not show the same devotion +and initiative. The effect on the material was still worse, for +the fleet became a prey to the cynical dishonesty that Charles +II inspired in every department of his government. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Second Dutch War</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Five years after Charles II became king, England was involved in +another war with the Netherlands. There was still bad feeling between +the two peoples, and trading companies in the far east or west kept up +a guerilla warfare which <a name="page_184"><span class="page">Page +184</span></a> flooded both governments with complaints. The chief +cause seems to have been the desire of the English Guinea Company +to get rid of their Dutch competitors who persistently undersold +them in the slave markets of the West Indies. Before there was any +declaration of war an English squadron was sent out to attack the +Dutch company's settlement on the West African coast. After this +it crossed the Atlantic and took New Amsterdam, which thereafter +became New York. The Dutch retaliated by sending out one of their +squadrons to retake their African post and threaten the Atlantic +colonies. In March, 1665, war was declared. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this conflict the relative strengths of the two navies were about +the same as in the previous war. The Dutch had made improvements +in their ships, but they still suffered from the lack of unity +in organization and spirit. The first engagement was the battle +of Lowestoft, on June 3, 1665. The English fleet was under the +personal command of the Duke of York, later James II; the Dutch +were led by de Ruyter. The two forces numbered from 80 to 100 ships +each, and strung out as they were, must have extended over nearly +ten miles of sea. The Duke of York formed his fleet in the pattern +that he set by his own "Fighting Instructions," which governed the +tactics of all navies thereafter for a hundred years, namely, the +entire force drawn up in single line. This line bore down abreast +toward the enemy until it reached gunshot, then swung into line +ahead and sailed on a course parallel to that of the enemy. De +Ruyter arranged his fleet accordingly, and the two long lines passed +each other on opposite tacks three times, cannonading furiously +at close range. This meant that the force was distributed evenly +along the enemy's line and as against an evenly matched force these +tactics could result, as a rule, only in mere inconclusive artillery +duels which each side would claim as victories. In the battle of +Lowestoft, however, several of the captains in the Dutch center +flinched at the third passing and bore up to leeward, leaving a +wide gap in de Ruyter's line. The English broke through at this +point and hammered the weakened Dutch line in the center with a +superior force. This was the decisive <a name="page_185"><span +class="page">Page 185</span></a> point in the battle and de Ruyter +was forced to retreat. The Dutch would have suffered even greater +loss than they did had it not been for the masterly fashion in which +Cornelius Tromp—son of the famous Martin Tromp—covered +the retreat. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The defeat of the Dutch was due to the bad conduct of the captains +in the center, four of whom were shot by order of de Ruyter and +others dismissed from the service. It is interesting to note that +while the first half of the battle was fought on the formal lines +that were soon to be the cast iron rule of conduct for the British +navy, and led to nothing conclusive; the second half was characterized +by the breaking of the enemy's line, in the older style of Blake, +and led to a pronounced victory. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this time Louis XIV had pledged himself to give aid to the +Netherlands in case of attack by a third Power. But when the Dutch +and his own ministers called on him to make good his promise he +offered more promises and no fulfillment. The rumor of an approaching +French squadron which was to make junction with de Ruyter, who had +now been placed in command of the Dutch fleet, caused the English +government to make the grave mistake of detaching Prince Rupert +with 20 ships to look for the mythical French force. This division +left Monk, who was again in command of the fleet, with only 57 +ships. Hearing that de Ruyter was anchored on the Flanders coast, +Monk went out to find him. De Ruyter left his anchorage to meet the +English, and on June 1, 1666, the two forces met in mid-Channel, +between Dunkirk and the Downs. As the Dutch force heavily outnumbered +him—nearly two to one—Monk might have been expected to +avoid fighting, but he acted in the spirit of Blake. Having the +windward position he decided that he could strike the advanced +division under Tromp and maul it severely before the rest of the +Dutch could succor it. Accordingly he boldly headed for the enemy's +van. When Monk attacked he had only about 35 ships in hand, for the +rest were straggling behind too far to help. Thus began the famous +"Four Days' Battle," characterized by Mahan as "the most remarkable, +in <a name="page_186"><span class="page">Page 186</span></a> some +of its aspects that has ever been fought upon the ocean."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Influence of Sea Power upon +History</span>, p. 125.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The fighting was close and furious and in its unparalleled duration +numbers were bound to tell. On the third day Monk retreated to +the Thames, but on being joined by Rupert's squadron immediately +sallied forth to do battle again. On this day, June 4, the Dutch +succeeded in cutting through his formation and putting him between +two fires. Indeed Monk escaped destruction only by breaking through +his ring of enemies and finding refuge in the Thames. The Dutch had +won a great victory, for the English had lost some twenty ships +and 5000 in killed and wounded. But Monk was right in feeling a +sense of pride in the fight that he had made against great odds. +The losses that he had inflicted were out of all proportion to the +relative strength of the two forces. Unfortunately the new spirit +that was coming into the navy of the Restoration was evidenced by +the fact that a number of English captains, finding the action too +hot for them, deserted their commander in chief. On the Dutch side +de Ruyter's handling of his fleet was complicated by the conduct +of Cornelius Tromp. This officer believed that he, not de Ruyter, +should have been made commander of the Dutch fleet and in this +action as in the next, acted with no regard for his chief's orders. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a consequence of the Four Days' Battle, Dutchmen again controlled +the Channel and closed the mouth of the Thames to trade. The English +strained every nerve to create a fleet that should put an end to +this humiliating and disastrous situation. The preparations were +carried out with such speed that on July 22 (1666), Monk and Rupert +anchored off the end of the Gunfleet shoal with a fleet of about +80 ships of the line and frigates. On the 25th the English sighted +de Ruyter, with a fleet slightly larger in numbers, in the broad +part of the Thames estuary. Monk, forming his fleet in the long +line ahead, sailed to the attack. The action that followed is called +the "Battle of St. James's Day" or the "Gunfleet." +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 600px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig034.png" width="600" height="522" alt="Fig. 34"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE THAMES ESTUARY</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Whether or not Monk was influenced by his princely colleague <a +name="page_187"><span class="page">Page 187</span></a> it is impossible +to say, but the tactics of this engagement do not suggest the Monk +of earlier battles. He followed the "Fighting Instructions" and +in spite of them won a victory, but it might have been far more +decisive. The English bore down in line abreast, then formed line +ahead on reaching gunshot, the van, center, and rear, engaging +respectively the Dutch van, center, and rear. In these line ahead +attacks the rear usually straggled. Tromp, commanding the Dutch +rear, saw his chance to attack Smith, commanding the English rear, +before his squadron was in proper formation. Smith retreated, and +Tromp, eager to win a victory all by himself, abandoned the rest of +the Dutch fleet and pursued Smith. Thus the action broke into two +widely separated parts. The <a name="page_188"><span class="page">Page +188</span></a> English van and center succeeded in forcing the +corresponding Dutch divisions to retreat, and if Monk had turned +to the help of Smith he might have taken or destroyed all of the +39 ships in Tromp's division. Instead, he and Rupert went careering +on in pursuit of the enemy directly ahead of them. Eventually de +Ruyter's ships found refuge in shallow water and then Monk turned +to catch Tromp. But the latter proved too clever for his adversaries +and slipped between them to an anchorage alongside of de Ruyter. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the victory was not nearly so decisive as it should have +been with the opportunity offered, nevertheless it served the need +of the hour. De Ruyter was no longer able to blockade the Thames and +the Straits of Dover. And Monk, following up his success, carried +the war to the enemy's coast, where he burned a merchant fleet +of 160 vessels in the roadstead of the island of Terschelling, +and destroyed one of the towns. Early in 1666 active operations +on both sides dwindled down, and Charles, anxious to use naval +appropriations for other purposes, allowed the fleet to fall into +a condition of unreadiness for service. One of the least scandals in +this corrupt age was the unwillingness or inability of the officials +to pay the seamen their wages. In consequence large numbers of +English prisoners in Holland actually preferred taking service +in the Dutch navy rather than accepting exchange, on the ground +that the Dutch government paid its men while their own did not. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Early in June, 1667, de Ruyter took advantage of the condition of +the English fleet by inflicting perhaps the greatest humiliation on +England that she has ever suffered. Entering the Thames unopposed, +he was prevented from attacking London only by unfavorable wind and +tide. He then turned his attention to the dockyards of Chatham and +burnt or captured seven great ships of the line, besides numerous +smaller craft, carried off the naval stores at Sheerness, and then +for the next six weeks kept a blockade on the Thames and the eastern +and southern coasts of England. This mortifying situation continued +until the signing of the "Peace of Breda" concluded the war. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_189"><span class="page">Page 189</span></a> +<i>The Third Dutch War</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Less than five years later Charles again made war on the Netherlands. +For this there was not the shadow of excuse, but Louis XIV saw +fit to attack the Dutch, and Charles was ever his willing vassal. +The English began hostilities without any declaration of war by +a piratical attack on a Dutch convoy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this juncture Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Attacked +on her land frontiers by France, then the dominating military power, +and on her sea frontiers by England, the strongest naval power, she +seemed to have small chance to survive. But her people responded +with a heroism worthy of her splendid history. They opened their +dykes to check the armies of invasion and strained every nerve to +equip a fleet large enough to cope with the combined navies of +France and England. In this Third Dutch War four great naval battles +were fought: that of Solebay, May 28, 1672, the two engagements +off Schooneveldt, May 28 and June 4, 1673, and that of the Texel, +August 11, 1673. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In all of these the honors go to the Dutch and their great admiral, +de Ruyter. Since these actions did not restore the Netherlands to +their old-time position or check the ascendancy of England, they +need not be discussed individually here. The outstanding feature +of the whole story is the surpassing skill and courage of de Ruyter +in the face of overwhelming odds. In this war he showed the full +stature of his genius as never before, and won his title as the +greatest seaman of the 17th century. After his death one must wait +till the day of Suffren and Nelson to find men worthy to rank with +him. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this campaign de Ruyter showed his powers not only as a tactician +but as a strategist. In the words of Mahan, the Dutch "made a strategic +use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based +their sea operations. To this they were forced by the desperate +odds under which they were fighting; but they did not use their +shoals as a mere shelter,—the <a name="page_190"><span +class="page">Page 190</span></a> warfare they waged was the +defensive-offensive. When the wind was fair for the allies to attack, +de Ruyter kept under cover of his islands, or at least on ground +where the enemy dared not follow; but when the wind served so that +he might attack in his own way he turned and fell upon them."[1] +That is, instead of accepting the tame rôle of a "fleet in +being" and hiding in a safe harbor, de Ruyter took and held the +sea, always on the aggressive, always alert to catch his enemy +in a position of divided forces or exposed flank and strike hard. +His master, Martin Tromp, is regarded as the father of the line +ahead formation for battle, but he undoubtedly taught de Ruyter +its limitations as well as its advantages, and there is no trace +of the stupid formalism of the Duke of York's regulations in de +Ruyter's brilliant work. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon +History</span>, p. 144.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this time he had no worthy opponent. As Monk was dead, the Duke of +York had again assumed active command with Rupert as his lieutenant. +Although the Duke was honestly devoted to the navy he was dull-witted, +and in spite of the advantage of numbers and the dogged courage of +officers and men which so often in English history has made up for +stupid leadership, he was wholly unable to cope with de Ruyter's +genius. As for the French navy, their ships were superb, the best +in Europe, but their officers had no experience and apparently +small desire for close fighting. At all events, despite the odds +against him, de Ruyter defeated the allies in all four battles, +prevented their landing an army of invasion, and broke up their +attempt to blockade the coast. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The war was unpopular in England and as it met with ill success +it became more so. After the battle of the Texel, in 1673, active +operations died down to practically nothing, and at the beginning +of the year England made peace. By this time Holland had managed to +find other allies on the Continent—Spain and certain German +states—and while she had to continue her struggle against Louis +XIV by land she was relieved of the menace of her great enemy on the +sea. Fifteen years later, by a curious freak of history, a Dutch +<a name="page_191"><span class="page">Page 191</span></a> prince +became King William III of England, and the two old enemies became +united in alliance. But the Netherlands had exhausted themselves +by their protracted struggle. They had saved their independence, +but after the close of the 17th century they ceased to be a world +power of any consequence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The persistent enmity of the French king for the Dutch gained nothing +for France but everything for England. Unwittingly he poured out his +resources in money and men to the end that England should become +the great colonial and maritime rival of France. As a part of her +spoils England had gained New York and New Jersey, thus linking her +northern and southern American colonies, and she had taken St. Helena +as a base for her East Indies merchantmen. She had tightened her +hold in India, and by repeatedly chastising the Barbary pirates had +won immunity for her traders in the Mediterranean. At the beginning +of the Second Dutch War Monk had said with brutal frankness, "What +matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade +which the Dutch have." This, the richest prize of all, fell from +the hands of the Dutch into those of the English. During the long +drawn war which went on after the English peace of 1674, while +Holland with her allies fought against Louis XIV, the great bulk +of the Dutch carrying trade passed from the Dutch to the English +flag. The close of the 17th century, therefore, found England fairly +started on her career as an ocean empire, unified by sea power. Her +navy, despite the vices it had caught from the Stuart régime, +had become firmly established as a permanent institution with a +definite organization. By this time every party recognized its +essential importance to England's future. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nevertheless, whatever satisfaction may be felt by men of English +speech in this rapid growth of England's power and prestige as +a result of the three wars with the Dutch, one cannot avoid the +other side of the picture. A people small in numbers but great +in energy and genius was hounded to the point of extinction by +the greed of its powerful neighbors. <a name="page_192"><span +class="page">Page 192</span></a> Peace-loving, asking merely to +be let alone, the only crime of the Dutch was to excite the envy +of the English and the French. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +See next chapter, <a href="#page_221">page 221</a>. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_193"><span class="page">Page 193</span></a> +CHAPTER X</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER [<i>Continued</i>]. WARS WITH FRANCE TO +THE FRENCH REVOLUTION +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The effect of the expulsion of James II from the throne of England +coupled with the accession of the Dutch prince, William of Orange, +was to make England change sides and take the leadership in the +coalition opposed to Louis XIV. From this time on, for over 125 +years, England was involved in a series of wars with France. They +began with the threat of Louis to dominate Europe and ended with +the similar threat on the part of Napoleon. In all this conflict +the sea power of England was a factor of paramount importance. Even +when the fighting was continental rather than naval, the ability +of Great Britain to cut France off from her overseas possessions +resulted in the transfer of enormous tracts of territory to the +British Empire. During the 18th century, the territorial extent +of the expire grew by leaps and bounds, with the single important +loss of the American colonies. And even this brought no positive +advantage to France for it did not weaken her adversary's grip +on the sea. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The War of the League of Augsburg</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The accession of William III was the signal for England's entry +into the war of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) against France, +and the effort of the French king to put James II back again upon +the English throne. By this time the French navy had been so greatly +strengthened that at the outset it outnumbered the combined fleets +of the English and the Dutch. It boasted the only notable admiral of +this period, <a name="page_194"><span class="page">Page 194</span></a> +Tourville, but it missed every opportunity to do something decisive. +It failed to keep William from landing in England with an army; +it failed also to keep the English from landing and supplying an +army in Ireland, where they raised the siege of Londonderry and won +the decisive victory of the Boyne. On the other hand the British +navy was handled with equal irresolution and blindness in strategy. +It accomplished what it did in keeping communications open with +Ireland through the mistakes of the French, and its leaders seemed +to be equally unaware of the importance of winning definitely the +control of the sea. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 549px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig035.png" width="549" height="379" alt="Fig. 35"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THREE-DECKED SHIP OF THE LINE, 18TH CENTURY</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +If the naval strategy on both sides was feeble the tactics were +equally so. The contrast between the fighting of Blake, Monk, Tromp +and de Ruyter and that of the admirals of this period is striking. +For example, on May 1, 1689, the English admiral Herbert and the +French admiral Châteaurenault fought an indecisive action +in Bantry Bay, Ireland. After considerable powder had been shot +away without the loss of a ship on either side, the French went +back to protect their <a name="page_195"><span class="page">Page +195</span></a> transports in the bay; Herbert also withdrew, and +was made Earl of Torrington for his "victory." This same officer +commanding a Dutch and English fleet encountered the French under +Tourville off Beachy Head on the south coast of England (July 10, +1690). It is true that Tourville's force was stronger, but Torrington +acted with no enterprise and was thoroughly beaten. At the same +time the French admiral showed lack of push in following up his +victory, which might have been crushing. By this time the line +ahead order of fighting had become a fetich on both sides. The +most noted naval battle of this war is that of La Hogue (May 29, +1692), which has been celebrated as a great British victory. In +this action an allied fleet of 99 were opposed to a French fleet +of 44 under Tourville. Tourville offered battle under such odds +only because he had imperative orders from his king to fight the +enemy. During the action the French did not lose a single ship, but +in the four days' retreat the vessels became separated in trying +to find shelter and fifteen were destroyed or taken. This was a +severe blow to the the French navy but by no means decisive. The +subsequent inactivity of the fleet was due to the demands of the +war on land. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As the war became more and more a continental affair, Louis was +compelled to utilize all his resources for his military campaigns. +For this reason the splendid fleet with which he had begun the +war gradually disappeared from the sea. Some of these men of war +were lent to great privateersmen like Jean Bart and Du Guay Trouin, +who took out powerful squadrons of from five to ten ships of the +line, strong enough to overcome the naval escorts of a British +convoy, and ravaged English commerce. In this matter of protecting +shipping the naval strategy was as vacillating and blind as in +everything else. Nevertheless no mere commerce destroying will +serve to win the control of the sea, and despite the losses in +trade and the low ebb to which English naval efficiency had sunk, +the British flag still dominated the ocean routes while the greater +part of the French fleet rotted in port. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this war of the League of Augsburg, Louis XIV was fighting +practically all Europe, and the strain was too great <a +name="page_196"><span class="page">Page 196</span></a> for a nation +already weakened by a long series of wars. By the terms of peace +which he found himself obliged to accept, he lost nearly everything +that he had gained by conquest during his long reign. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Wars of the Spanish and the Austrian Succession</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After a brief interval of peace war blazed out again over the question +whether a French Bourbon should be king of Spain,—the War of +the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. England's aim in this war was +to acquire some of the Spanish colonies in America and to prevent +any loss of trading privileges hitherto enjoyed by the English +and the Dutch. But as it turned out nothing of importance was +accomplished in the western hemisphere except by the terms of peace. +The French and Spanish attempted no major operations by sea. But +the English navy captured Minorca, with its important harbor of +Port Mahon, and Rooke, with more initiative than he had ever shown +before in his career, took Gibraltar (August 4, 1704). These two +prizes made Great Britain for the first time a Mediterranean power, +and the fact that she held the gateway to the inland sea was of +great importance in subsequent naval history. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In addition to these captures the terms of peace (the Treaty of +Utrecht) yielded to England from the French Newfoundland, the Hudson +Bay territory, and Nova Scotia. All that the French had left on the +eastern coast of Canada was Cape Breton Island, with Louisburg, +which was the key to the St. Lawrence. As for commercial privileges, +England had gained from the Portuguese, who had been allies in +the war, a practical monopoly of their carrying trade; and from +France she had taken the entire monopoly of the slave trade to +the Spanish American colonies which had been formerly granted by +Spain to France. Holland got nothing out of the war as affecting +her interests at sea,—not even a trading post. Her alliance +with Great Britain had become as some one has called it, that of +"the giant and the dwarf." At the conclusion of the War of the +Spanish Succession, to quote the words <a name="page_197"><span +class="page">Page 197</span></a> of Mahan, "England was <i>the</i> +sea power; there was no second." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this war as in the preceding, French privateersmen made great +inroads on British commerce, and some of these privateering operations +were conducted on a grand scale. For example, Du Guay Trouin took +a squadron of six ships of the line and two frigates, together +with 2000 troops, across the Atlantic and attacked Rio Janeiro. +He had little difficulty in forcing its submission and extorting +a ransom of $400,000. The activities of the privateers led to a +clause in the treaty of peace requiring the French to destroy the +fortifications of the port of Dunkirk, which was notorious as the +nest of these corsairs. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748, was another of the +dynastic quarrels of this age, with France and Spain arrayed against +England. It has no naval interest for our purposes here. The peace +of 1748, however, leaving things exactly as they were when the war +began, settled none of the existing grudge between Great Britain +and France. Eight years later, hostilities began again in the Seven +Years' War, 1756-1763, in which Great Britain entered on the side +of Prussia against a great coalition of Continental powers headed +by France. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Seven Years' War</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The naval interest of this war is centered in the year 1759, when +France, having lost Louisburg on account of England's control of +the sea, decided to concentrate naval and military forces on an +invasion of England. Before the plans for this projected thrust +were completed, Quebec also had fallen to the British. The attempted +invasion of 1759 is not so well known as that of Napoleon in 1805, +but it furnished the pattern that Napoleon copied and had a better +chance of success than his. In brief, a small squadron under the +famous privateer Thurot was to threaten the Scotch and Irish coasts, +acting as a diversion to draw off the British fleet. Meanwhile +the squadron at Toulon was to dodge the British off that port, +pass the Straits and join Conflans, who had the main French <a +name="page_198"><span class="page">Page 198</span></a> fleet at +Brest. The united forces were then to cover the crossing of the +troops in transports and flatboats to the English coast. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This plan was smashed by Admiral Hawke in one of the most daring +feats in British naval annals. Thurot got away but did not divert +any of the main force guarding the Channel. The Toulon fleet also +eluded the English for a time but went to pieces outside the Straits +largely on account of mismanagement on the part of its commander. +The remnants were either captured or driven to shelter in neutral +ports by the English squadron under Boscawen. On November 9, a +heavy gale and the necessities of the fleet compelled Hawke to lift +his blockade of Brest and take shelter in Torbay, after leaving +four frigates to watch the port. On the 14th, Conflans, discovering +that his enemy was gone, came out, with the absurd idea of covering +the transportation of the French army before Hawke should appear +again. That very day Hawke returned to renew the blockade, and +learning that Conflans had been seen heading southeast, decided +rightly that the French admiral was bound for Quiberon Bay to make +an easy capture of a small British squadron there under Duff before +beginning the transportation of the invading army. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For five days pursuer and pursued drifted in calms. On the 19th +a stiff westerly gale enabled Hawke to overtake Conflans, who was +obliged to shorten sail for fear of arriving at his destination in +the darkness. The morning of the 20th found the fleets in sight +of each other but scattered. All the forenoon the rival admirals +made efforts to gather their units for battle. A frigate leading +the British pursuit fired signal guns to warn Duff of the enemy's +presence, and the latter, cutting his cables, was barely able to +get out in time to escape the French fleet and join Hawke. Conflans +then decided that the English were too strong for him, and abandoning +his idea of offering battle, signaled a general retreat and led +the way into Quiberon Bay. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Hawke instantly ordered pursuit. The importance of this signal can +be realized only by taking into account the tremendous gale blowing +and the exceedingly dangerous character <a name="page_199"><span +class="page">Page 199</span></a> of the approach to Quiberon Bay, +lined as it was with sunken rocks. Hawke had little knowledge of +the channels but he reasoned that where a French ship could go +an English one could follow, and the perils of the entry could +not outweigh in his mind the importance of crushing the navy of +France then and there. The small British superiority of numbers +which Conflans feared was greatly aggravated by the conditions +of his flight. The slower ships in his rear were crushed by the +British in superior force and the English coming alongside the +French on their lee side were able to use their heaviest batteries +while the French, heeled over by the gale, had to keep their lowest +tier of ports closed for fear of being sunk. One of their ships tried +the experiment of opening this broadside and promptly foundered. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Darkness fell on a scene of wild confusion. Two of the British +vessels were lost on a reef, but daylight revealed the fact that +the French had scattered in all directions. Only five of their +ships had been destroyed and one taken, but the organization and +the morale were completely shattered. The idea of invasion thus +came to a sudden end in Quiberon Bay. The daring and initiative +of Hawke in defying weather and rocks in his pursuit of Conflans +is the admirable and significant fact of this story, for the actual +fighting amounted to little. It is the sort of thing that marked +the spirit of the Dutch Wars and of Blake at Santa Cruz, and is +strikingly different from the tame and stupid work of other admirals, +English or French, in his own day. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Seven Years' War ended in terms of the deepest humiliation for +France—a "Carthaginian peace." She was compelled to renounce +to England all of Canada with the islands of the St. Lawrence, the +Ohio valley and the entire area east of the Mississippi except +New Orleans. Spain, which had entered the war on the side of France +in 1761, gave up Florida in exchange for Havana, captured by the +English, and in the West Indies several of the Lesser Antilles +came under the British flag. It is hardly necessary to point out +that the loss of these overseas possessions on such a tremendous +scale was <a name="page_200"><span class="page">Page 200</span></a> +due to the ability of the British navy to cut the communications +between them and the mother country. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Naval administration in England at this time was corrupt, and the +admirals, with the notable exception of Hawke, were lacking in +enterprise; they were still slaves to the "Fighting Instructions." +But in all these respects the French were far worse, and the British +government never lost sight of the immense importance of sea power. +Its strategy was sound. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The War of American Independence</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The peace of 1763 was so humiliating that every patriotic Frenchman +longed for the opportunity of revenge. This offered itself in the +revolt of the American colonies against the North Ministry in 1775. +From the outset French neutrality as regards the American rebels +was most benevolent; nothing could be more pleasing to France than +to see her old enemy involved in difficulties with the richest and +most populous of her colonies. For the first two or three years +France gave aid surreptitiously, but after the capture of Burgoyne +in 1777, she decided to enter the war openly and draw in allies +as well. She succeeded in enlisting Spain in 1779 and Holland the +year following. The entrance of the latter was of small military +value, perhaps, but at all events France so manipulated the rebellion +in the colonies as to bring on another great European war. In this +conflict for the first time she had no enemies to fight on the +Continent; hence she was free to throw her full force upon the +sea, attacking British possessions in every quarter of the world. +The War of the American Revolution became therefore a maritime war, +the first since the conflicts with the Dutch in the 17th century. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +While Paul Jones was in Paris waiting for his promised command, +he forwarded to the Minister of Marine a plan for a rapid descent +in force on the American coast. If his plan had been followed and +properly executed the war might have been ended in America at one +blow. But this project died in the procrastination and red tape of +the Ministry of Marine, and a subsequent proposal for an attack on +Liverpool <a name="page_201"><span class="page">Page 201</span></a> +dwindled into the mere commerce-destroying cruise which is memorable +only for Jones's unparalleled fight with the <i>Serapis</i>. Eventually +the navy of France was thrown into the balance to offset that of +Great Britain, and it is largely to this fact that the United States +owes its independence; men and munitions came freely from overseas +and on one momentous occasion, the Battle of the Virginia Capes, +the French navy performed its part decisively in action. But on +a score of other occasions it failed pitiably on account of the +lack of a comprehensive strategic plan and the want of energy and +experience on the part of the commanding officers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is true that the French navy had made progress since the Seven +Years' War. In 1778, it possessed 80 good line of battle ships. +To this force, a year later, Spain was able to contribute nearly +sixty. But England began the war with 150. Thus even if the French +and Spanish personnel had been as well trained and as energetic +as the British they would have had a superior force to contend +with, particularly as the allied fleet was divided between the +ports of Spain and France, and under dual command. But in efficiency +the French and Spanish navies were vastly inferior to the British. +Spanish efficiency may be dismissed at the outset as worthless. For +the French officer the chief requisite was nobility of birth. The +aristocracy of England furnished the officers for its service also, +but in the French navy, considerations of social grade outweighed +those of naval rank, a condition that never obtained in the British. +In consequence, discipline—the principle of subordination +animated by the spirit of team work—was conspicuously wanting +in the French fleets. Individual captains were more concerned about +their own prerogatives than about the success of the whole. This +condition is illustrated by the conduct of the captains under Suffren +in the Bay of Bengal, where the genius of the commander was always +frustrated by the wilfulness of his subordinates. Finally in the +matter of tactics the French were brought up on a fatally wrong +theory, that of acting on the defensive, of avoiding decisive action, +of saving a fleet rather than risking it for the sake of victory. +Hence, though they were <a name="page_202"><span class="page">Page +202</span></a> skilled in maneuvering, and ahead of the British in +signaling, though their ships were as fine as any in the world, +this fatal error of principle prevented their taking advantage of +great opportunities and sent them to certain defeat in the end. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus it is clear that the sea power of France and Spain was not +formidable if the English had taken the proper course of strategy. +This should have been to bottle up French and Spanish fleets in +their own ports from Brest to Cadiz. Such a policy would have left +enough ships to attend to the necessities of the army in America +and the pursuit of French and American privateers, and accomplished +the primary duty of preventing the arrival of French squadrons and +French troops on the scene of war. Here the British government +made its fatal mistake. Instead of concentrating on the coast of +France and Spain, it tried to defend every outlying post where +the flag might be threatened. Thus the superior English fleet was +scattered all over the world, from Calcutta to Jamaica, while the +French fleets came and went at will, sending troops and supplies +to America and challenging the British control of the sea. Had the +French navy been more efficient and energetic in its leadership +France might have made her ancient enemy pay far more dearly for +her strategic blunder. As it was, England lost her colonies in +America. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Instead of the swift stroke on the American coast which Paul Jones +had contemplated, a French fleet under d'Estaing arrived in the +Delaware about five months after France had entered the war and +after inexcusable delays on the way. In spite of the loss of precious +time he had an opportunity to beat an inferior force under Howe +at New York and seize that important British base, but his +characteristic timidity kept him from doing anything there. From +the American coast he went to the West Indies, where he bungled +every opportunity of doing his duty. He allowed St. Lucia to fall +into British hands and failed to capture Grenada. Turning north again, +he made a futile attempt to retake Savannah, which had fallen to the +English. Then at the end of 1779, at about the darkest hour of the +American cause, he returned to France, leaving the colonists in the +lurch. D'Estaing was by <a name="page_203"><span class="page">Page +203</span></a> training an infantry officer, and his appointment to +such an important naval command is eloquent of the effect of court +influence in demoralizing the navy. "S'il avait été +aussi marin que brave," was the generous remark of Suffren on this +man. It is true that on shore, where he was at home, d'Estaing was +personally fearless, but as commander of a fleet, where he was +conscious of inexperience, he showed timidity that should have +brought him to court martial. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In March, 1780, the French fleet in the West Indies was put under +the command of de Guichen, a far abler man than d'Estaing, but +similarly indoctrinated with the policy of staying on the defensive. +His rival on the station was Rodney, a British officer of the old +school, weakened by years and illness, but destined to make a name +for himself by his great victory two years later. In many respects +Rodney was a conservative, and in respect to an appetite for prize +money he belonged to the 16th century, but his example went a long +way to cure the British navy of the paralysis of the Fighting +Instructions and bring back the close, decisive fighting methods +of Blake and de Ruyter. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this same year in which Rodney took command of the West Indies +station, a Scotch gentleman named Clerk published a pamphlet on +naval tactics which attracted much attention. It is a striking +commentary on the lack of interest in the theory of the profession +that no British naval officer had ever written on the subject. This +civilian, who had no military training or experience, worked out +an analysis of the Fighting Instructions and came to the conclusion +that the whole conception of naval tactics therein contained was +wrong, that decisive actions could be fought only by concentrating +superior forces on inferior. One can imagine the derision heaped +on the landlubber who presumed to teach admirals their business, +but there was no dodging the force of his point. Of course the +mathematical precision of his paper victories depended on the enemy's +being passive while the attack was carried out, but fundamentally he +was right. The history of the past hundred years showed the futility +of an unbroken line ahead, with van, center, and rear attempting <a +name="page_204"><span class="page">Page 204</span></a> to engage +the corresponding divisions of the enemy. Decisive victories could +be won only by close, concentrated fighting. It may be true, as +the British naval officers asserted, that they were not influenced +by Clerk's ideas, but the year in which his book appeared marks +the beginning of the practice of his theory in naval warfare. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the time of the American Revolution the West Indies represented +a debatable ground where British interests clashed with those of +her enemies, France, Spain, and Holland. It was very rich in trade +importance; in fact, about one fourth of all British commerce was +concerned with the Caribbean. Moreover, it contained the rival +bases for operations on the American coast. Hence it became the +chief theater of naval activity. Rodney's business was to make the +area definitely British in control, to protect British possessions +and trade and to capture as much as possible of enemy possessions +and trade. On arriving at his station in the spring of 1780, he +sought de Guichen. The latter had shown small enterprise, having +missed one opportunity to capture British transports and another +to prevent the junction of Rodney's fleet with that of Parker who +was awaiting him. Even when the junction was effected, the British +total amounted to only 20 ships of the line to de Guichen's 22, +and the French admiral might still have offered battle. Instead +he followed the French strategy of his day, by lying at anchor +at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting for the British to sail away +and give him an opportunity to capture an island without having +to fight for it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Rodney promptly sought him out and set a watch of frigates off +the port. When de Guichen came out on April 15 (1780) to attend +to the convoying of troops, Rodney was immediately in pursuit, +and on the 17th the two fleets were in contact. Early that morning +the British admiral signaled his plan "to attack the enemy's rear," +because de Guichen's ships were strung out in extended order with +a wide gap between rear and center. De Guichen, seeing his danger, +wore together and closed the gap. This done, he again turned northward +and the two fleets sailed on parallel courses but out of gunshot. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 799px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig036.png" width="799" height="490" alt="Fig. 36"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE WEST INDIES + <a name="page_205"><span class="page">Page 205</span></a></td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_206"><span class="page">Page 206</span></a> About +eleven 0' clock, some four hours after his first signal, Rodney +again signaled his intention to engage the enemy, and shortly before +twelve he sent up the order, "for every ship to bear down and steer +for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeable to the 21st article +of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Rodney had intended to +concentrate his ships against their <i>actual</i> opposites at the +time,—the rear of the French line, which was still considerably +drawn out; but the captain of the leading ship interpreted the +order to mean the <i>numerical</i> opposites in the enemy's line, +after the style of fighting provided for by the Instructions from +time immemorial. Rodney's first signal informing the fleet that he +intended to attack the enemy's rear meant nothing to his captain +at this time. Accordingly he sailed away to engage the first ship +in the French van, followed by the vessels immediately astern of +him, and thus wrecked the plan of his commander in chief. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nothing could illustrate better the hold of the traditional style +of fighting on the minds of naval officers than this blunder, though +it is only fair to add that there was some excuse in the ambiguity +Of the order. Rodney was infuriated and expressed himself with +corresponding bitterness. He always regarded this battle as the one +on which his fame should rest because of what it might have been +if his subordinates had given him proper support. The interesting +point lies in the fact that he designed to throw his whole force +on an inferior part of the enemy's force—the principle of +concentration. In a later and much more famous battle, as we shall +see, Rodney departed still further from the traditional tactics +by "breaking the line," his own as well as that of the French, +and won a great victory. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile there occurred another operation not so creditable. Rodney +had spent a large part of his life dodging creditors, and it was +due to the generous loan of a French gentleman in Paris that he +did not drag out the years of this war in the Bastille for debt. +When Holland entered the war he saw an opportunity to make a fortune +by seizing the island of St. Eustatius, which had been the chief +depot in the West <a name="page_207"><span class="page">Page +207</span></a> Indies for smuggling contraband into America. To this +purpose he subordinated every other consideration. The island was +an easy prize, but the quarrels and lawsuits over the distribution +of the booty broke him down and sent him back to England at just +the time when he was most needed in American waters, leaving Hood +in acting command. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In March, 1781, de Grasse sailed from Brest with a fleet of 26 +ships of the line and a large convoy. Five of his battleships were +detached for service in the East, under Suffren, of whom we shall +hear more later. The rest proceeded to the Caribbean. On arriving +at Martinique de Grasse had an excellent opportunity to beat Hood, +who had an inferior force; but like his predecessors, d'Estaing and +de Guichen, he was content to follow a defensive policy, excusing +himself on the ground of not exposing his convoy. While at Cape +Haitien he received messages from Rochambeau and Washington urging +his coöperation with the campaign in America. To his credit +be it said that on this occasion he acted promptly and skillfully, +and the results were of great moment. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this time the British had subdued Georgia and South Carolina, +and Cornwallis was attempting to carry the conquest through North +Carolina. In order to keep in touch with his source of supplies +the sea, however, he was compelled to fall back to Wilmington. +From there, under orders from General Clinton, he marched north +to Yorktown, Virginia, where he was joined by a small force of +infantry. Washington and Rochambeau had agreed on the necessity +of getting the coöperation of the West Indies fleet in an +offensive directed either at Clinton in New York or at Cornwallis +at Yorktown. Rochambeau preferred the latter alternative, because +it involved fewer difficulties, and the message to de Grasse was +accompanied by a private memorandum from him to the effect that he +preferred the Chesapeake as the scene of operations. Accordingly +de Grasse sent the messenger frigate back with word of his intention +to go to Chesapeake Bay. He then made skillful arrangements for +the transport of all available troops, and set sail with every +ship <a name="page_208"><span class="page">Page 208</span></a> he +could muster, steering by the less frequented Old Bahama Channel +in order to screen his movement. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 517px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig037.png" width="517" height="392" alt="Fig. 37"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +On August 30 (1781) de Grasse anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just inside +the Chesapeake Capes, with 28 ships of the line. The two British +guard frigates were found stupidly at anchor inside the bay; one +was taken and the other chased up the York river. De Grasse then +landed the troops he had brought with him, and these made a welcome +reënforcement to Lafayette, who was then opposing Cornwallis. +At the same time Washington was marching south to join Lafayette, +and word had been sent to the commander of a small French squadron +at Newport to make junction with de Grasse, bringing the siege +artillery necessary to the operations before Yorktown. Thus the +available farces were converging on Cornwallis in superior strength, +and his only route for supplies and reënforcements lay by sea. +All depended on whether <a name="page_209"><span class="page">Page +209</span></a> the British could succeed in forcing the entrance +to Chesapeake Bay. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Hood, with 14 ships of the line, had followed on the trail of de +Grasse, and as it happened looked into Chesapeake Bay just three +days before the French admiral arrived. Finding no sign of the +French, Hood sailed on to New York and joined Admiral Graves, who +being senior, took command of the combined squadrons. As it was +an open secret at that time that the allied operations would be +directed at Cornwallis, Graves immediately sailed for the Capes, +hoping on the way to intercept the Newport squadron which was known +to be bound far the same destination. On reaching the Capes, September +5, he found de Grasse guarding the entrance to the bay with 24 ships +of the line, the remaining four having been detailed to block the +mouths of the James and York rivers. To oppose this force Graves +had only 19 ships of the line, but he did not hesitate to offer +battle. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In de Grasse's mind there were two things to accomplish: first, +to hold the bay, and secondly, to keep the British occupied far +enough at sea to allow the Newport squadron to slip in. Of course +he could have made sure of both objects and a great deal more by +defeating the British fleet in a decisive action, but that was not +the French naval doctrine. The entrance to the Chesapeake is ten +miles wide but the main channel lies between the southern promontory +and a shoal called the Middle Ground three miles north of it. The +British stood for the channel during the morning and the French, +taking advantage of the ebbing tide at noon, cleared the bay, forming +line of battle as they went. As they had to make several tacks to +clear Cape Henry, the ships issued in straggling order, offering +an opportunity for attack which Graves did not appreciate. Instead +he went about, heading east an a course parallel to that of de +Grasse, and holding the windward position. When the two lines were +nearly opposite each other the British admiral ware down to attack. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 607px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig038.png" width="607" height="433" alt="Fig. 38"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, SEPT. 5, + 1781</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">(After diagram in Mahan's <i>Major Operations + in the War of American Independence,</i> p. 180.)</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Graves's method followed the orthodox tradition exactly, and with +the unvarying result. As the attacking fleet bore down in line ahead +at an angle, the van of course came into <a name="page_210"><span +class="page">Page 210</span></a> action first, unsupported for some +time by the rest. As the signal for close action was repeated, +this angle was made sharper, and in attempting to close up the line +several ships got bunched in such a way as to mask their fire. +Meanwhile the rear, the seven ships under Hood, still trailing +along in line ahead, never got into the action at all. Graves had +signaled for "close action," but Hood chose to believe that the +order for line ahead still held until the signal was repeated, +whereupon he bore down. As the French turned away at the same time, +to keep their distance, Hood contributed nothing to the fighting +of the day. At sunset the battle ended. The British had lost 90 +killed and 246 wounded; the French, a total of 200. Several of the +British ships were badly damaged, one of which was in a sinking +condition and had to be burned. The two fleets continued on an +easterly course about three miles apart, and for five days more +the two maneuvered without fighting. Graves was too much injured +<a name="page_211"><span class="page">Page 211</span></a> by the +first day's encounter to attack again and de Grasse was content +to let him alone. Graves still had an opportunity to cut back and +enter the bay, taking a position from which it would have been hard +to dislodge him and effecting the main object of the expedition +by holding the mouth of the Chesapeake. But this apparently did not +occur to him. De Grasse, who had imperiled Washington's campaign +by cruising so far from the entrance, finally returned on the 11th, +and found that the Newport squadron had arrived safely the day +before. When Graves saw that the French fleet was now increased +to 36 line-of-battle ships, he gave up hope of winning the bay +and returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis to his fate. A little +over a month later, October 19, the latter surrendered, and with +his sword passed the last hope of subduing the American revolution. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This battle of the Capes, or Lynnhaven, has never until recent +times been given its true historical perspective, largely because +in itself it was a rather tame affair. But as the historian Reich[1] +observes, "battles, like men, are important not for their dramatic +splendor but for their efficiency and consequences.... The battle +off Cape Henry had ultimate effects infinitely more important than +Waterloo." Certainly there never was a more striking example of +the "influence of sea power" on a campaign. Just at the crisis of +the American Revolution the French navy, by denying to the British +their communications by sea, struck the decisive blow of the war. +This was the French <i>revanche</i> for the humiliation of 1763. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Foundations of Modern Europe</span>, +p. 24.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The British failure in this action was due to a dull commander +in chief carrying out a blundering attack based on the Fighting +Instructions. Blame must fall also on his second in command, Hood, +who, though a brilliant officer, certainly failed to support his +chief properly when there was an obvious thing to do. Perhaps if +the personal relations between the two had been more cordial Hood +would have taken the initiative. But in those days the initiative +of a subordinate was not encouraged, and Hood chose to stand on +his dignity. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the war was practically settled by the fall of <a +name="page_212"><span class="page">Page 212</span></a> Yorktown, +it required another year or so to die out. In this final year a +famous naval battle was fought which went far toward establishing +British predominance in the West Indies, and which revealed something +radically different in naval tactics from the practice of the time. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the spring of 1782, Rodney was back in command of the West Indian +station, succeeding Hood, who continued to serve as commander of a +division. The British base was Gros Islet Bay in Santa Lucia. De Grasse +was at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting to transport troops to Santo +Domingo, where other troops and ships were collected. There, joining +with a force of Spaniards from Cuba, he was to conduct a campaign +against Jamaica. It was Rodney's business to break up this plan. +During a period of preparation on both sides, reënforcements +joined the rival fleets, that of the British amounting to enough to +give Rodney a marked superiority in numbers. Moreover his ships +were heavier, as he had five 3-deckers to the French one, and about +200 more guns. The superiority of speed, as well, lay with Rodney +because more of his ships had copper sheathing. A still further +advantage lay in the fact that he was not burdened with the problem +of protecting convoys and transports as was de Grasse. Thus, in the +event of conflict, the advantages lay heavily with the British. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the morning of April 8, the English sentry frigate off Fort +Royal noted that the French were coming out, and hastened with +the news to Rodney at Santa Lucia. The latter put to sea at once. +He judged rightly that de Grasse would steer for Santo Domingo, in +order to get rid of his transports at their destination as soon +as possible, and on the morning of the 9th he sighted the French +off the west coast of the island of Dominica. On the approach of +the English fleet, de Grasse signaled his transports to run to +the northwest, while he took his fleet on a course for the channel +between the islands of Dominica and Guadeloupe. As the British would +be sure to pursue the fleet, this move would enable the convoy to +escape. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The channel toward which de Grasse turned his fleet is <a +name="page_213"><span class="page">Page 213</span></a> known as +the Saints' Passage from a little group of islands, "les isles des +Saintes," lying to the north of it. In the course of the pursuit, +Hood, with the British van division of nine ships, had got ahead of +the rest and offered a tempting opening for attack in superior force. +If de Grasse had grasped his opportunity he might have inflicted a +crushing blow on Rodney and upset the balance of superiority. But +the lack of aggressiveness in the French doctrine was again fatal +to French success. De Grasse merely sent his second in command to +conduct a skirmish at long range—and thus threw his chance +away. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The light winds and baffling calms kept both fleets idle for a day. +On the 11th de Grasse tried to work his fleet through the channel +on short tacks. Just as he had almost accomplished his purpose he +discovered several of his vessels still so far to westward as to +be in danger of capture. In order to rescue these he gave up the +fruits of laborious beating against the head wind and returned. +The following morning, April 12 (1782), discovered the two fleets +to the west of the strait and so near that the French could no +longer evade battle. The French came down on the port tack and the +British stood toward them, with their admiral's signal flying to +"engage to leeward." When the two lines converged to close range, +the leading British ship shifted her course slightly so as to run +parallel with that of the French, and the two fleets sailed past each +other firing broadsides. So far the battle had followed traditional +line-ahead pattern. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Just as the leading ship of the British came abreast of the rearmost +of the French, the wind suddenly veered to the southward, checking +the speed of the French ships and swinging their bows over toward +the English line. At best a line of battle in the sailing ship +days was an uneven straggling formation, and the effect of this +flaw of wind, dead ahead, was to break up the French line into +irregular groups separated by wide gaps. One of these opened up +ahead as Rodney's flagship, the <i>Formidable</i>, forged past +the French line. His fleet captain, Douglas, saw the opportunity +and pleaded with Rodney to cut through the gap. "No," he replied, +<a name="page_214"><span class="page">Page 214</span></a> "I will +not break my line." Douglas insisted. A moment later, as the +<i>Formidable</i> came abreast of the opening, the opportunity proved +too tempting and Rodney gave his consent. His battle signal, "engage +the enemy to leeward," was still flying, but the <i>Formidable</i> +luffed up and swung through the French line followed by five others. +The ship immediately ahead of the <i>Formidable</i> also cut through +a gap, and the sixth astern of the flagship went through as well, +followed by the entire British rear. As each vessel pierced the +broken line she delivered a terrible fire with both broadsides at +close range. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 603px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig039.png" width="603" height="537" alt="Fig. 39"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, APRIL 12, + 1782</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">After diagram in Mahan's <i>Influence of Sea + Power Upon History</i>, p. 486.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The result of this maneuver was that the British fleet found <a +name="page_215"><span class="page">Page 215</span></a> itself to +windward of the French in three groups, while the French ships were +scattered to leeward and trying to escape before the wind, leaving +three dismasted hulks between the lines. An isolated group of six +ships in the center, including de Grasse's <i>Ville de Paris</i>, +offered a target for attack, but the wind was light and Rodney +indolent in pursuit. Of these, one small vessel was overhauled +and the French flagship was taken after a heroic defense, that +lasted until sunset, against overwhelming odds. De Grasse's efforts +to reform his fleet after his line was broken had met with failure, +for the van fled to the southwest and the rear to the northwest, +apparently making little effort to succor their commander in chief +or retrieve the fortunes of the day. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Rodney received a peerage for this day's work but he certainly +did not make the most of his victory. Apparently content with the +five prizes he had taken, together with the person of de Grasse, +he allowed the bulk of the French fleet to escape when he had it in +his power to capture practically all. On this point his subordinate, +Hood, expressed himself with great emphasis: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Why he (Rodney) should bring the fleet to because the <i>Ville de +Paris</i> was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under +easy sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy, in the +night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled him +to have taken almost every ship the next day.... Had I had the +honor of commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the 12th, I may, +without much imputation of vanity, say the flag of England should +now have graced the sterns of <i>upwards</i> of twenty sail of +the enemy's ships of the line."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Quoted by Mahan, <span class="sc">The Royal Navy</span> +(Clowes), Vol. III, p. 535.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Sir Charles Douglas, who had been responsible for Rodney's breaking +the line, warmly agreed with Hood's opinion on this point. Nevertheless, +although the victory was not half of what it might have been in younger +hands, it proved decisive enough to shatter the naval organization +of the French in the West Indies. It stopped the projected campaign +<a name="page_216"><span class="page">Page 216</span></a> against +Jamaica and served to write better terms for England in the peace +treaty of January 20, 1783. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Tactically this battle has become famous for the maneuver of "breaking +the line," contrary to the express stipulations of the Fighting +Instructions. Certainly the move was not premeditated. Rodney may +well be said to have been pushed into making it, and two of his +captains made the same move on their own initiative. Indeed it +is quite likely that, after the event, too much has been made of +this as a piece of deliberate tactics, for the sudden shift of +wind had paid off the bows of the French ships so that they were +probably heading athwart the course of the British line, and the +British move was obviously the only thing to do. But the lesson of +the battle was clear,—the decisive effect of close fighting and +concentrated fire. In the words of Hannay, "It marked the beginning +of that fierce and headlong yet well calculated style of sea fighting +which led to Trafalgar and made England undisputed mistress of the +sea."[1] It marked, therefore, the end of the Fighting Instructions, +which had deadened the spirit as well as the tactics of the British +navy for over a hundred years. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Rodney (<span class="sc">English Men of Action +Series</span>), p. 213.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The tactical value of "breaking the line" is well summarized by +Mahan in the following passage: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The effect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle, depends +upon several conditions. The essential idea is to divide the opposing +force by penetrating through an interval found, or made, in it, and +then to concentrate upon that one of the fractions which can be +least easily helped by the other. In a column of ships this will +usually be the rear. The compactness of the order attacked, the +number of the ships cut off, the length of time during which they +can be isolated and outnumbered, will all affect the results. A very +great factor in the issue will be the moral effect, the confusion +introduced into a line thus broken. Ships coming up toward the break +are stopped, the rear doubles up, while the ships ahead continue +their course. Such a moment is critical, and calls for instant action; +but the men are rare who in an unforeseen emergency can see, and at +once take the right course, especially <a name="page_217"><span +class="page">Page 217</span></a> if, being subordinates, they incur +responsibility. In such a scene of confusion the English, without +presumption, hoped to profit by their better seamanship; for it +is not only 'courage and devotion,' but skill, which then tells. +All these effects of 'breaking the line' received illustration +in Rodney's great battle in 1782."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Influence of Sea Power upon +History</span>, pp. 380-381.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Before we leave the War of American Independence mention should +be made of Commodore Suffren who, as we have seen, left de Grasse +with five ships of the line to conduct a campaign in the Indian +Ocean in the spring of 1781. His purpose was to shake the British +hold on India, which had been fastened by the genius of Clive in +the Seven Years' War. But the task given to Suffren was exceedingly +difficult. His squadron was inadequate—for instance, he had +only two frigates for scout and messenger duty—and he had +no port that he could use as a base in Indian waters. To conduct +any campaign at all he was compelled to live off his enemy and +capture a base. These were risky prospects for naval operations +several thousand miles from home, and for the faintest hope of +success required an energy and initiative which had never before +appeared in a French naval commander. In addition to these handicaps +of circumstance Suffren soon discovered that he had to deal with +incorrigible slackness and insubordination in his captains. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In spite of everything, however, Suffren achieved an amazing degree of +success. He succeeded in living off the prizes taken from the British, +and he took from them the port of Trincomalee for a base. He fought +five battles off the coast of India against the British Vice Admiral +Hughes, in only one of which was the latter the assailant, and in all +of which Suffren bore off the honors. He was constantly hampered, +however, by the inefficiency and insubordination of his captains. On +four or five occasions, including an engagement at the Cape Verde +Islands on his way to India, it was only this misconduct that saved +the British from the crushing attack that <a name="page_218"><span +class="page">Page 218</span></a> Suffren had planned. Unfortunately +for him his victories were barren of result, for the terms of peace +gave nothing in India to the French which they had not possessed +before. As Trincomalee had belonged to the Dutch before the British +captured it, this port was turned back to Holland. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nevertheless Suffren deserves to be remembered both for what he +actually accomplished under grave difficulties and what he might +have done had he been served by loyal and efficient subordinates. +Among all the commanders of this war he stands preeminent for naval +genius, and this eminence is all the more extraordinary when one +realizes that his resourcefulness, tenacity, aggressiveness, his +contempt of the formal, parade tactics of his day, were notoriously +absent in the rest of the French service. Such was the admiration +felt for him by his adversaries that after the end of the war, +when the French squadron arrived at Cape Town on its way home and +found the British squadron anchored there, all the British officers, +from Hughes down, went aboard the French flagship to tender their +homage.[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: "If ever a man lived who justified Napoleon's maxim +that war is an affair not of men but of a man, it was he. It was +by his personal merit that his squadron came to the very verge +of winning a triumphant success. That he failed was due to the +fact that the French Navy... was honeycombed by the intellectual +and moral vices which were bringing France to the great +Revolution—corruption, self-seeking, acrid class insolence, +and skinless, morbid vanity."—<span class="sc">The Royal +Navy</span>, David Hannay, II, 287.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the War of American Independence was unsuccessfully fought +by Great Britain and she was compelled to recognize the independence +of her rebellious colonies, she lost comparatively little else by the +terms of peace. As we have seen, her hold in India was unchanged. +The stubborn defense of Gibraltar throughout the war, aided by +occasional timely relief by a British fleet, saved that stronghold +for the English flag. To Spain England was forced to surrender +Florida and Minorca. France got back all the West Indian islands +she had lost, with the exception of Tobago, but gained nothing +besides. The war therefore did not restore to France her colonial +empire of former days or make any change in the relative overseas +strength of the two nations. Despite the <a name="page_219"><span +class="page">Page 219</span></a> blunders of the war no rival sea +power challenged that of Great Britain at the conclusion of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile, just before the war and during its early years, an English +naval officer was laying the foundation for an enormous expansion +of the British empire in the east. This was James Cook, a man who +owed his commission in the navy and his subsequent fame to nothing +in family or political influence, but to sheer genius. Of humble +birth, he passed from the merchant service into the navy and rose +by his extraordinary abilities to the rank of master. Later he +was commissioned lieutenant and finally attained the rank of post +captain.[1] Such rank was hardly adequate recognition of his great +powers, but it was unusually high for a man who was not born a +"gentleman." +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Full captain's rank, held only by a captain in command +of a vessel of at least 20 guns.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the end of the Seven Years' War he distinguished himself, by +his work in surveying and sounding an the coasts of Labrador and +Newfoundland, as a man of science. In consequence, he was detailed +to undertake expeditions for observing the transit of Venus and +for discovering the southern continent which was supposed to exist +in the neighborhood of the Antarctic circle. In the course of this +work Cook practically established the geography of the southern half +of the globe as we know it to-day. And by his skill and study of +the subject he conquered the great enemy of exploring expeditions, +scurvy. Thirty years before, another British naval officer, Anson, +had taken a squadron into the Pacific and lost about three-fourths +of his men from this disease. When the war of the American Revolution +broke out, Cook was abroad on one of his expeditions, but the French +and American governments issued orders to their captains not to +molest him on account of his great service to the cause of scientific +knowledge. Unfortunately he was killed by savages at the Sandwich +Islands in 1779. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The bearing of his work on the British empire lies chiefly in his +careful survey of the east coast of Australia, which he laid claim +to in the name of King George, and the circumnavigation <a +name="page_220"><span class="page">Page 220</span></a> of New Zealand, +which later gave title to the British claim on those islands. Thus, +while the American colonies in the west were winning their independence, +another territory in the east, far more extensive, was being brought +under British sway, destined in another century to become important +dominions of the empire. The Dutch had a claim of priority in discovery +through the early voyages of Tasman, but they attempted no colonization +and Dutch sea power was too weak to make good a technical claim in +the face of England's navy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Finally, when the results of a century of wars between France and +England are summarized, we find that France had lost all her great +domain in America except a few small islands in the West Indies. +In brief, it is due to British control of the sea during the 18th +century that practically all of the continent north of the Rio +Grande is English in speech, laws, and tradition. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This control of the sea exercised by England was not the gift of +fortune. It was a prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in +peace and hard fighting in war. France had the opportunity to wrest +from England the control of the sea as England had won it from +Holland, for France at the close of the 17th century dominated +Europe. In population and in wealth she was superior to her rival. +But the arrogance of her king kept her embroiled in futile wars on +the Continent, with little energy left for the major issue, the +conquest of the sea. Finally, when the war of American Independence +left her a free hand to concentrate on her navy as against that of +England, France lost through the fatal weakness of policy which +corrupted all her officers with the single brilliant exception of +Suffren. The French naval officer avoided battle on principle, +and when he could not avoid it he accepted the defensive. To the +credit of the English officer be it said that, as a rule, he sought +the enemy and took the aggressive; he had the "fighting spirit." +This difference between French and British commanders had as much +to do with the ultimate triumph of England on the sea as anything +else. It retrieved many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer +hard hitting. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The history of the French navy points a moral applicable <a +name="page_221"><span class="page">Page 221</span></a> to any service +and any time. When a navy encourages the idea that ships must not +be risked, that a decisive battle must be avoided because of what +might happen in case of defeat, it is headed for the same fate +that overwhelmed the French. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon History</span>, A. T. + Mahan, 1890.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">A Short History of the Royal Navy</span>, David + Hannay, 1909.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Royal Navy</span> (vols. II, III), W. L. Clowes + et al., 1903.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Admiral Blake</span>, English Men of Action Series, + David Hannay, 1909.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Rodney</span>, English Men of Action Series, David + Hannay, 1891.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Monk</span>, English Men of Action Series, Julian + Corbett, 1907.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">England in the Seven Years' War</span>, J. S. + Corbett, 1907.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Graves Papers</span>, F. E. Chadwick, 1916.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Studies in Naval History, Biographies</span>, J. + K. Laughton, 1887.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">From Howard to Nelson</span>, ed. by J. K. Laughton, + 1899.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Major Operations in the War of American + Independence</span>, A. T. Mahan, 1913.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Sea Kings of Britain</span>, Geoffrey Callender, 1915.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_222"><span class="page">Page 222</span></a> +CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE FIRST OF JUNE AND CAMPERDOWN +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Ten years after the War of American Independence, British sea power +was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with France. +This time it was with a France whose navy, demoralized by revolution, +was less able to dispute sea control, but whose armies, organized +into an aggressive, empire-building force by the genius of Napoleon, +threatened to dominate Europe, shaking the old monarchies with +dangerous radical doctrines, and bringing all Continental nations +into the conflict either as enemies or as allies. The dismissal +of the French envoy from England immediately after the execution +of Louis XVI (Jan. 21, 1793) led the French Republic a week later +to a declaration of war, which continued with but a single +intermission—from October, 1801, to May, 1803—through +the next 22 years. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The magnitude of events on land in this period, during which French +armies fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew kingdoms, and +remade the map of Europe, obscures the importance of the warfare +on the sea. Yet it was Great Britain by virtue of her navy and +insular position that remained Napoleon's least vulnerable and +most obstinate opponent, forcing him to ever renewed and exhausting +campaigns, reviving continental opposition, and supporting it with +subsidies made possible by control of sea trade. In Napoleon's own +words the effect of this pressure is well summarized: "To live without +ships, without trade, without colonies, is to live as no Frenchman +can consent to do." The Egyptian campaign, conceived as a thrust at +British sources of wealth in the East, and defeated at the Nile; +the organization of the <a name="page_223"><span class="page">Page +223</span></a> northern neutrals against England, overthrown at +Copenhagen; the direct invasion of the British Isles, repeatedly +planned and thwarted at St. Vincent, Camperdown, and Trafalgar; +the final and most nearly successful effort to ruin England by +closing her continental markets and thus, in Napoleon's phrase, +"defeating the sea by the land"—these were the successive +measures by which he sought to shake the grip of sea power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following narrative of these events is in three divisions: +the first dealing with the earlier engagements of the First of +June and Camperdown, fought by squadrons based on home ports; the +second with the war in the Mediterranean and the rise of Nelson as +seen in the campaigns of St. Vincent, the Nile, and Copenhagen; +the third with the Trafalgar campaign and the commercial struggle +to which the naval side of the war was later confined. The career +of Nelson is given an emphasis justified by his primacy among naval +leaders and the value of his example for later times. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The effect of land events in obscuring the naval side of the war, +already mentioned, is explained not merely by their magnitude, but +by the fact that, though Great Britain was more than once brought +to the verge of ruin, this was a consequence not of the enemy's power +on the sea, but of his victories on land. Furthermore, the slow +process which ended in the downfall of Napoleon and the reduction of +France to her old frontiers was accomplished, not so conspicuously +by the economic pressure of sea power, as by the efforts of armies +on battlefields from Russia to Spain. On the sea British supremacy +was more firmly established, and the capacities of France and her +allies were far less, than in preceding conflicts of the century. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The French Navy Demoralized</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The explanation of this weakness of the French navy involves an +interesting but somewhat perplexing study of the influences which make +for naval growth or decay. That its ineffectiveness was due largely +to an inferior national <a name="page_224"><span class="page">Page +224</span></a> instinct or genius for sea warfare, as compared +with England, is discredited by the fact that the disparity was +less obvious in previous wars; for, as Lord Clowes has insisted, +England won no decisive naval victory against superior forces from +the second Dutch War to the time of Nelson. The familiar theory +that democracy ruined the French navy will be accepted nowadays +only with some qualifications, especially when it is remembered +that French troops equally affected by the downfall of caste rule +were steadily defeating the armies of monarchical powers. It is true, +however, that navies, as compared with armies, are more complicated +and more easily disorganized machines, and that it would have taxed +even Napoleonic genius to reorganize the French navy after the +neglect, mutiny, and wholesale sweeping out of trained personnel +to which it was subjected in the first furies of revolution. Whatever +the merits of the officers of the old régime, selected as +they were wholly from the aristocracy and dominated by the defensive +policy of the French service, three-fourths of them were driven out +by 1791, and replaced by officers from the merchant service, from +subordinate ratings, and from the crews. Suspicion of aristocracy +was accompanied in the navy by a more fatal suspicion of skill. In +January, 1794, the regiments of marine infantry and artillery, as +well as the corps of seamen-gunners, were abolished on the ground +that no body of men should have "the exclusive privilege of fighting +the enemy at sea," and their places were filled by battalions of +the national guard. Figures show that as a result, French gunnery +was far less efficient than in the preceding war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The strong forces that restored discipline in the army had more +difficulty in reaching the navy; and Napoleon's gift for discovering +ability and lifting it to command was marked by its absence in his +choice of leaders for the fleets. Usually he fell back on pessimistic +veterans of the old régime like Brueys, Missiessy, and +Villeneuve. An exception, Allemand, showed by his cruise out of +Rochefort in 1805 what youth, energy, and daring could accomplish +even with inferior means. Considering the importance of leadership +as a factor in success, we may well believe that, had a French +Nelson, or even <a name="page_225"><span class="page">Page +225</span></a> a Suffren, been discovered in this epoch, history +would tell a different tale. If further reasons for the decadence +of the navy are needed, they may be found in the extreme difficulty +of securing naval stores and timber from the Baltic, and in the +fact that, though France had nearly three times the population of +the British Isles, her wealth, man-power, and genius were absorbed +in the war on land. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Aside from repulsion at the violence of the French revolution and +fear of its contagion, England had a concrete motive for war in +the French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands and the Scheldt, +the possession of which by an ambitious maritime nation England has +always regarded as a menace to her safety and commercial prosperity. +"This government," declared the British Ministry in December, 1792, +"will never view with indifference that France shall make herself, +directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries or general +arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In prosecuting the war, Great Britain fought chiefly with her main +weapon, the navy, leaving the land war to her allies. A contemporary +critic remarked that she "worked with her navy and played with her +army"; though the latter did useful service in colonial conquests +and in Egypt, the two expeditionary forces to the Low Countries in +1793 and 1799 were ill-managed and ineffective. The tasks of the +fleet were to guard the British Isles from raids and invasion, +to protect British commerce in all parts of the world, and, on +the offensive, to seize enemy colonies, cut off enemy trade, and +coöperate in the Mediterranean with allied armies. To accomplish +these aims, which called for a wide dispersion of forces, the British +naval superiority over France was barely adequate. According to +the contemporary naval historian James, the strength of the two +fleets at the outbreak of war was as follows: +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center_bb"> </td> + <td class="center_bb">Ships of<br>the line</td> + <td class="center_bb" style="vertical-align: bottom;">Guns</td> + <td class="center_bb">Aggregate<br>broadsides</td></tr> +<tr><td>British</td><td class="center">115</td> + <td class="center">8,718</td><td class="center">88,957</td></tr> +<tr><td>French</td><td class="center">76</td> + <td class="center">6,002</td><td class="center">73,057</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_226"><span class="page">Page 226</span></a> Of her +main fighting units, the ships-of-the-line, England could put into +commission about 85, which as soon as possible were distributed +in three main spheres of operation: in the Mediterranean and its +western approaches, from 20 to 25; in the West Indies, from 10 to +12; in home waters, from the North Sea to Cape Finisterre, from +20 to 25, with a reserve of some 25 more in the home bases on the +Channel. Though this distribution was naturally altered from time +to time to meet changes in the situation, it gives at least an +idea of the general disposition of the British forces throughout +the war. France, with no suitable bases in the Channel, divided +her fleet between the two main arsenals at Brest and Toulon, with +minor squadrons at Rochefort and, during the Spanish alliance, +in the ports of Spain. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Distant Operations</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the West Indies and other distant waters, France could offer +but little effective resistance, and operations there may hence +be dismissed briefly, but with emphasis on the benefit which naval +control conferred upon British trade, the main guaranty of England's +financial stability and power to keep up the war. Fully one-fifth +of this trade was with the West Indies. Consequently, both to swell +the volume of British commerce and protect it from privateering, +the seizure of the French West Indian colonies—"filching the +sugar islands," as Sheridan called it—was a very justifiable +war measure, in spite of the scattering of forces involved. Hayti +was lost to France as a result of the negro uprising under Toussaint +l'Ouverture. Practically all the French Antilles changed hands +twice in 1794, the failure of the British to hold them arising from +a combination of yellow fever, inadequate forces of occupation, +and lax blockade methods on the French coast, which permitted heavy +reënforcements to leave France. General Abercromby, with 17,000 +men, finally took all but Guadaloupe in the next year. As Holland, +Spain, and other nations came under French control, England seized +their colonies likewise—the Dutch settlements at the Cape of +Good Hope and Ceylon in 1795; the Moluccas and other Dutch islands +in the East Indies <a name="page_227"><span class="page">Page +227</span></a> in 1796; Trinidad (Spanish) in 1797; Curaçao +(Dutch) in 1800; and the Swedish and Danish West Indies in 1801. By +the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 all these except Trinidad and Ceylon +were given back, and had to be retaken in the later period of the +war, Guadaloupe remaining a privateers' nest until its final capture +in 1810. Though French trade was ruined, it was impossible to stamp +out privateering, which grew with the growth of British commerce +which it preyed upon, and the extent of which is indicated by the +estimate that in 1807 there were from 200 to 300 privateers on +the coasts of Cuba and Hayti alone. As for the captured islands, +Great Britain in 1815 retained only Malta, Heligoland, and the +Ionian Islands in European waters; Cape Colony, Mauritius, and +Ceylon on the route to the East; and in the Caribbean, Demerara +on the coast, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and Tobago—some of them +of little intrinsic value, but all useful outposts for an empire +of the seas. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Channel and Bay of Biscay, the first year of war passed +quietly. Lord Howe, commanding the British Channel fleet, had behind +him a long, fine record as a disciplinarian and tactician; he had +fought with Hawke at Quiberon Bay, protected New York and Rhode +Island against d'Estaing in 1778, and later thrown relief into +Gibraltar in the face of superior force. Now 68 years of age, he +inclined to cautious, old-school methods, such as indeed marked +activities on both land and sea at this time, before Napoleon had +injected a new desperateness into war. Both before and after the +"Glorious First of June" the watch on the French coast was merely +nominal; small detachments were kept off Brest, but the main fleet +rested in Portsmouth throughout the winter and took only occasional +cruises during the remainder of the year. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Battle of the First of June</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though there had been no real blockade, the interruption of her +commerce, the closure of her land frontiers, and the bad harvest +of 1793, combined to bring France in the spring following to the +verge of famine, and forced her to risk her <a name="page_228"><span +class="page">Page 228</span></a> fleet in an effort to import supplies +from overseas. On April 11 an immense flotilla of 120 grain vessels +sailed from the Chesapeake under the escort of two ships-of-the-line, +which were to be strengthened by the entire Brest fleet at a rendezvous +300 miles west of Belleisle. Foodstuffs having already been declared +subject to seizure by both belligerents, Howe was out on May 2 +to intercept the convoy. A big British merchant fleet also put +to sea with him, to protect which he had to detach 8 of his 34 +ships, but with orders to 6 of these that they should rejoin his +force on the 20th off Ushant. Looking into Brest on the 19th, Howe +found the French battle fleet already at sea. Not waiting for the +detachment, and thus losing its help in the battle that was to +follow, he at once turned westward and began sweeping with his +entire fleet the waters in which the convoy was expected to appear. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The French with 26 ships-of-the-line—and thus precisely equal +to Howe in numbers—had left Brest two days before. The crews +were largely landsmen; of the flag officers and captains, not one +had been above the grade of lieutenant three years before, and +nine of them had been merchant skippers with no naval experience +whatever. On board were two delegates of the National Convention, +whose double duties seem to have been to watch the officers and +help them command. To take the place of experience there was +revolutionary fervor, evidenced in the change of ship-names to +such resounding appellations as <i>La Montagne, Patriote, Vengeur +du Peuple, Tyrannicide</i>, and <i>Revolutionnaire</i>. There was +also more confidence than was ever felt again by French sailors +during the war. "Intentionally disregarding subtle evolutions," +said the delegate Jean Bon Saint Andree, "perhaps our sailors will +think it more appropriate and effective to resort to the boarding +tactics in which the French were always victorious, and thus astonish +the world by new prodigies of valor." "If they had added to their +courage a little training," said the same commissioner after the +battle, "the day might have been ours." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The commander in chief, Villaret de Joyeuse, who had won his lieutenancy +and the esteem of Suffren in the American war, <a name="page_229"><span +class="page">Page 229</span></a> was no such scorner of wary tactics. +Thus when the two fleets, more by accident than calculation on +either side, came in contact on the morning of May 28, 1794, about +400 miles west of Ushant, it would have been quite possible for +him to have closed with the British, who were 10 miles to leeward +in a fresh southerly wind. But his orders were not to fight unless +it were essential to protect the convoy, and since this was thought +to be close at hand, he first drew away to the eastward, with the +British in pursuit. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The chase continued during the remainder of this day and the day +following, with partial engagements and complicated maneuvering, +the net result of which was that in the end Howe, in spite of the +superior sailing qualities of the French ships, had kept in touch +with them, driven his own vessels through their line to a windward +position, and forced the withdrawal of four units, with the loss of +but one of his own. Two days of thick weather followed, during which +both fleets stood to the northwest in the same relative positions, +the French, very fortunately indeed, securing a reënforcement +of four fresh ships from detachments earlier at sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Now 26 French to 25 British, the two fleets on the morning of the +final engagement were moving to westward on the still southerly wind, +in two long, roughly parallel lines. Confident of the individual +superiority of his ships, the British admiral had no wish for further +maneuvering, in which his own captains had shown themselves none +too reliable and the enemy commander not unskilled. Possibly also +he feared the confusion of a complicated plan, for it was notorious +(as may be verified by looking over his correspondence) that Howe +had the greatest difficulty in making himself intelligible with +tongue or pen. His orders were therefore to bear up together toward +the enemy and attack ship to ship, without effort at concentration, +and with but one noteworthy departure from the time-honored tactics +in which he had been schooled. This was that the battle should be +close and decisive. The instructions were that each ship should +if possible break through the line astern of her chosen opponent, +raking the ships on each side as she <a name="page_230"><span +class="page">Page 230</span></a> went through, and continue the +action to leeward, in position to cut off retreat. "I don't want +the ships to be bilge to bilge," said Howe to the officers of his +flagship, the <i>Queen Charlotte</i>, "but if you can lock the +yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be the quicker decided." +The approach was leisurely, nearly in line abreast, on a course +slightly diagonal to that of the enemy. At 10 A. M. the <i>Queen +Charlotte</i>, in the center of the British line, shoved past just +under the stern of Villaret's flagship, the <i>Montagne</i>, raking +her with a terrible broadside which is said to have struck down +300 of her men. As was likely to result from the plan of attack, +the ships in the van of the attacking force were more closely and +promptly engaged than those of the rear; only six ships actually +broke through, but there was hot fighting all along the line. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Famous among the struggles in the mêlée was the epic +three-hour combat of the <i>Brunswick</i>, next astern of Howe, and +the <i>Vengeur</i>, both 74's. With the British vessel's anchors +hooked in her opponent's port forechannels, the two drifted away +to leeward, the <i>Brunswick</i> by virtue of flexible rammers +alone able to use her lower deck guns, which were given alternately +extreme elevation and depression and sent shot tearing through the +<i>Vengeur's</i> deck and hull; whereas the <i>Vengeur</i>, with +a superior fire of carronades and musketry, swept the enemy's upper +deck. When the antagonists wrenched apart, the <i>Brunswick</i> had +lost 158 of her complement of 600 men. The <i>Vengeur</i> was slowly +sinking and went down at 6 P. M., with a loss of 250 killed and +wounded and 100 more drowned. "As we drew away," wrote a survivor, +"we heard some of our comrades still offering prayers for the welfare +of their country; the last cries of these unfortunates were, 'Vive +la République!' They died uttering them." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Out of the confusion, an hour after the battle had begun, Villaret +was able to form a column of 16 ships to leeward, and though ten of +his vessels lay helpless between the lines, three drifted or were +towed down to him and escaped. Howe has been sharply criticized +for letting these cripples get away; but the battered condition +of his fleet and his own complete physical exhaustion led him to +rest content with six prizes aside from the sunken <i>Vengeur</i>. +The criticism has also been made that <a name="page_231"><span +class="page">Page 231</span></a> he should have further exerted +himself to secure a junction with the detachment on convoy duty, +which on May 19 was returning and not far away. If he had at that +time held his 32 ships between Brest and Rochefort, with scouts +well distributed to westward, he would have been much more certain +to intercept both Villaret's fleet and the convoy, which would have +approached in company, and both of which, with the British searching +in a body at sea, stood a good chance of escape. Howe's hope, no +doubt, was to meet the convoy unguarded. The latter, protected by +fog, actually crossed on May 30 the waters fought over on the 29th, +and twelve days later safely reached the French coast. Robespierre +had told Villaret that if the convoy were captured he should answer +for it with his life. Hence the French admiral declared years later +that the loss of his battleships troubled him relatively little. +"While Howe amused himself refitting them, I saved the convoy, +and I saved my head." +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 607px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig040.png" width="607" height="391" alt="Fig. 40"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1794</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Based on diagram in Mahan's <i>Influence of + Sea Power upon the French Revolution,</i> Vol. I, p. 136.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Though the escape of the convoy enabled the French to <a +name="page_232"><span class="page">Page 232</span></a> boast a +"strategic victory," the First of June in reality established British +prestige and proved a crushing blow to French morale. A British +defeat, on the other hand, might have brought serious consequences, +for within a year's time the Allied armies, including the British +under the Duke of York, were driven out of Holland, the Batavian +Republic was established in league with France (February, 1795), +and both Spain and Prussia backed out of the war. Austria remained +England's only active ally. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the remainder of 1794 and the year following only minor or +indecisive encounters occurred in the northern theater of war, lack +of funds and naval supplies hampering the recovery of the French +fleet from the injuries inflicted by Howe. Ill health forcing the +latter's retirement from sea duty, he was succeeded in the Channel by +Lord Bridport, who continued his predecessor's easy-going methods +until the advent of Jervis in 1798, instituted a more rigorous +régime. It was not yet recognized that the wear and tear on +ships and crews during sea duty was less serious than the injurious +effect of long stays in port upon sea spirit and morale. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>French Projects of Invasion</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With their fleets passive, the French resorted vigorously to commerce +warfare, and at the same time kept England constantly perturbed by +rumors, grandiose plans, and actual undertakings of invasion. That +these earlier efforts failed was due as much to ill luck and bad +management as to the work of Bridport's fleet. Intended, moreover, +primarily as diversions to keep England occupied at home and sicken +her of the war, they did not altogether fail of their aim. Some +of these projects verged on the ludicrous, as that of corraling +a band of the criminals and royalist outlaws that infested France +and dropping them on the English coast for a wild campaign of murder +and pillage. Fifteen hundred of these <i>Chouans</i> were actually +landed at Fishguard in February of 1798, but promptly surrendered, and +France had to give good English prisoners in <a name="page_233"><span +class="page">Page 233</span></a> exchange for them on the threat +that they would be turned loose again on French soil. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Much more serious was General Hoche's expedition to Ireland of +the winter before. Though Hoche wished to use for the purpose the +army of over 100,000 with which he had subdued revolt in the +Vendée, the Government was willing to venture a force of +only 15,000, which set sail from Brest, December 15, 1796, in 17 +ships-of-the-line, together with a large number of smaller war-vessels +and transports. Heavy weather and bad leadership, helped along +by British frigates with false signals, scattered the fleet on +the first night out. It never again got together; and though a +squadron with 6,000 soldiers on board was actually for a week or +more in the destination, Bantry Bay, not a man was landed, and +by the middle of January nearly all of the flotilla was back in +France. The British squadron under Colport, which had been on the +French coast at the time of the departure, had in the meanwhile +been obliged to make port for supplies. Bridport with the main +fleet left Portsmouth, 250 miles from the scene of operations, four +days after news of the French departure. During the whole affair +neither he nor Colport took a single prize. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Even so small a force cöoperating with rebellion in Ireland +might have proved a serious annoyance, though not a grave danger. +Invasion on a grand scale, which Napoleon's victorious campaign in +Italy and the peace with Austria (preliminaries at Loeben, April, +1797) now made possible, was effectually forestalled by two decisive +victories at sea. Bonaparte, who was to lead the invasion, did not +minimize its difficulties. "To make a descent upon England without +being master of the sea," he wrote at this time, "is the boldest +and most difficult operation ever attempted." Yet the flotilla of +small craft necessary was collected, army forces were designated, +and in February of 1798 Bonaparte was at Dunkirk. All this served +no doubt to screen the Egyptian preparations, which amid profound +secrecy were already under way. The Egyptian campaign was an indirect +blow at England; but the direct blow would certainly have been +struck had not the naval engagements of Cape St. Vincent (February, +1797) and <a name="page_234"><span class="page">Page 234</span></a> +Camperdown (October, 1797) settled the question of mastery of the +sea by removing the naval support of Spain and Holland on the right +and left wings. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Battle of Camperdown</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Admiral Duncan's victory of Camperdown, here taken first as part +of the events in northern waters, is noteworthy in that it was +achieved not only against ever-dangerous opponents, but with a +squadron which during the preceding May and June had been in the +very midst of the most serious mutiny in the history of the British +navy. In Bridport's fleet at Portsmouth this was not so much a +mutiny as a well organized strike, the sailors it is true taking +full control of the ships, and forcing the Admiralty and Parliament +to grant their well justified demands for better treatment and better +pay. Possibly a secret sympathy with their grievances explains the +apparent helplessness of the officers. The men on their part went +about the business quietly, and even rated some of their former +officers as midshipmen, in special token of esteem. At the Nore, +however, and in Duncan's squadron at Yarmouth, the mutiny was marked +by bloodshed and taint of disloyalty, little surprising in view of +the disaffected Irish, ex-criminals, impressed merchant sailors, +and other unruly elements in the crews. In the end 18 men were +put to death and many others sentenced. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Duncan faced the trouble with the courage but not the mingling of +fair treatment and sharp justice which marked its suppression by +that great master of discipline, Jervis, in the fleet off Spain. +On his own ship and another, Duncan drew up the loyal marines under +arms, spoke to the sailors, and won their allegiance, picking one +troublesome spirit up bodily and shaking him over the side. But +the rest of the squadron suddenly sailed off two days later to +join the mutineers at the Nore, where all the ships were then in +the hands of the crews. With his two faithful ships, Duncan made +for the Texel, swearing that if the Dutch came out he would go +down with colors flying. Fortunately he was rejoined before that +event by the rest of his squadron, the mutinous ships having been +<a name="page_235"><span class="page">Page 235</span></a> either +retaken by the officers or voluntarily surrendered by the men. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 605px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig041.png" width="605" height="394" alt="Fig. 41"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN, OCTOBER 11, 1797, + ABOUT 12:30 P.M.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">British, 16 of the line; Dutch, 15 of the + line.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The whole affair, among the ships in Thames mouth, was over in a +month's time, from mid-May to mid-June, so quickly that the enemy had +little chance to seize the advantage. The Dutch, driven willy-nilly +into alliance with France and not too eager to embark upon desperate +adventures in the new cause, were nevertheless not restrained from +action by any kind feeling for England, who had seized their ships +and colonies and ruined their trade. When at last, during a brief +withdrawal of Duncan, their fleet under Admiral de Winter attempted +a cruise, it was in a run-down condition. Aside from small units, +it consisted of 15 ships (4 of 74 guns, 5 of 68, 2 of 64, and 4 +under 60), against Duncan's stronger force of 16 (7 of 74, 7 of 64 +and 2 of 50). The Dutch ships were flat-bottomed and light-draft for +navigation in their shallow coastal waters, and generally inferior +to British vessels of similar rating, even though the latter were +left-overs from the Channel Fleet. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the morning of the Battle of Camperdown, October 11, <a +name="page_236"><span class="page">Page 236</span></a> 1797, the +Dutch were streaming along their coast on a northwest wind bent +on return into the Texel. Pressing forward in pursuit, Duncan when +in striking distance determined to prevent the enemy's escape into +shallow water by breaking through their line and attacking to leeward. +The signal to this effect, however, was soon changed to "Close +action," and only the two leading ships eventually broke through. +The two British divisions—for they were still in cruising +formation and strung out by the pursuit—came down before the +wind. Onslow, the second in command, in the <i>Monarch</i>, struck +the line first at 12:30 and engaged the Dutch <i>Jupiter</i>, fourth +from the rear. Eighteen minutes later Duncan in the <i>Venerable</i> +closed similarly to leeward of the <i>Staten Generaal</i>, and +afterward the <i>Vrijheid</i>, in the Dutch van. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The two leaders were soon supported—though there was straggling +on both sides; and the battle that ensued was the bloodiest and +fiercest of this period of the war. The British lost 825 out of a +total of 8221 officers and men,[1] more than half the loss occurring +in the first four ships in action. The British ships were also +severely injured by the gruelling broadsides during the onset, +but finally took 11 prizes, all of them injured beyond repair. +Though less carefully thought out and executed, the plan of the +attack closely resembles that of Nelson at Trafalgar. The head-on +approach seems not to have involved fatal risks against even such +redoubtable opponents as the Dutch, and it insured decisive results. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: As compared with this loss of 10%, the casualties +in Nelson's three chief battles were as follows: Nile, 896 out of +7401, or 12.1%; Copenhagen, 941 out of 6892, or 13.75%; Trafalgar, +1690 out of 17,256, or 9.73%.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Duncan's otherwise undistinguished career, and the somewhat unstudied +methods of his one victory, may explain why he has not attained the +fame which the energy displayed and results achieved would seem +to deserve. "He was a valiant officer," writes his contemporary +Jervis, "little versed in subtleties of tactics, by which he would +have been quickly confused. When he saw the enemy, he ran down upon +them, without thinking of a fixed order of battle. To conquer, he +counted <a name="page_237"><span class="page">Page 237</span></a> +on the bold example he gave his captains, and the event completely +justified his hopes." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whatever its tactical merits, the battle had the important strategic +effect of putting the Dutch out of the war. The remnants of their fleet +were destroyed in harbor during an otherwise profitless expedition +into Holland led by the Duke of York in 1799. By this time, when +naval requirements and expanding trade had exhausted England's +supply of seamen, and forced her to relax her navigation laws, +it is estimated that no less than 20,000 Dutch sailors had left +their own idle ships and were serving on British traders and +men-of-war.[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: For references, see end of Chapter XIII, +<a href="#page_285">page 285</a>.] +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_238"><span class="page">Page 238</span></a> +CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE NAPOLEONIC WARS [<i>Continued</i>]: THE RISE OF NELSON +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Mediterranean, where the protection of commerce, the fate +of Italy and all southern Europe, and the exposed interests of +France gave abundant motives for the presence of a British fleet, +the course of naval events may be sufficiently indicated by following +the work of Nelson, who came thither in 1793 in command of the +<i>Agamemnon</i> (64) and remained until the withdrawal of the +fleet at the close of 1796. Already marked within the service, +in the words of his senior, Hood, as "an officer to be consulted +on questions relative to naval tactics," Nelson was no doubt also +marked as possessed of an uncomfortable activity and independence +of mind. Singled out nevertheless for responsible detached service, +he took a prominent part in the occupation of Corsica, where at +the siege of Calvi he lost the sight of his right eye, and later +commanded a small squadron supporting the left flank of the Austrian +army on the Riviera. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In these latter operations, during 1795 and 1796, Nelson felt that +much more might have been done. The Corniche coast route into Italy, +the only one at first open to the French, was exposed at many points +to fire from ships at sea, and much of the French army supplies as +well as their heavy artillery had to be transported in boats along +the coast. "The British fleet could have prevented the invasion +of Italy," wrote Nelson five years later, "if our friend Hotham +[who had succeeded Hood as commander in chief in the Mediterranean] +had kept his fleet on that coast."[1] Hotham felt, perhaps rightly, +that the necessity of watching the French ships at Toulon made this +impossible. <a name="page_239"><span class="page">Page 239</span></a> +But had the Toulon fleet been destroyed or effectually crippled at +either of the two opportunities which offered in 1795, no such +need would have existed; the British fleet would have dominated +the Mediterranean, and exercised a controlling influence on the +wavering sympathies of the Italian states and Spain. At the first +of these opportunities, on the 13th and 14th of March, Hotham said +they had done well enough in capturing two French ships-of-the-line. +"Now," remarked Nelson, whose aggressive pursuit had led to the +capture, "had we taken 10 sail and allowed the 11th to escape, +when it had been possible to have got at her, I should not have +called it well done." And again of the second encounter: "To say how +much we wanted Lord Hood on the 13th of July, is to say, 'Will you +have all the French fleet, or no action?'" History, and especially +naval history, is full of might-have-beens. Aggressive action +establishing naval predominance might have prevented Napoleon's +brilliant invasion and conquest of Italy; Spain would then have +steered clear of the French alliance; and the Egyptian campaign +would have been impossible. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Dispatches</span>, June 6, 1800.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The succession of Sir John Jervis to the Mediterranean command +in November, 1795, instituted at once a new order of things, in +which inspiring leadership, strict discipline, and closest attention +to the health of crews, up-keep vessels, and every detail of ship +and fleet organization soon brought the naval forces under him +to what has been judged the highest efficiency attained by any +fleet during the war. Jervis had able subordinates—Nelson, +Collingwood and Troubridge, to carry the list no further; but he +may claim a kind of paternal share in molding the military character +of these men. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Between Jervis and Nelson in particular there existed ever the +warmest mutual confidence and admiration. Yet the contrast between +them well illustrates the difference between all-round professional +and administrative ability, possessed in high degree by the older +leader, and supreme fighting genius, which, in spite of mental and +moral qualities far inferior, has rightly won Nelson a more lasting +fame. As a member of parliament before the war, as First Lord of the +Admiralty from 1801 to 1803, and indeed in his sea commands, Jervis +displayed a <a name="page_240"><span class="page">Page 240</span></a> +breadth of judgment, a knowledge of the world, a mastery of details of +administration, to which Nelson could not pretend. In the organization +of the Toulon and the Brest blockades, and in the suppression of +mutiny in 1797, Jervis better than Nelson illustrates conventional +ideals of military discipline. When appointed to the Channel command +in 1799 he at once adopted the system of keeping the bulk of the +fleet constantly on the enemy coast "well within Ushant with an +easterly wind." Captains were to be on deck when ships came about +at whatever hour. In port there were no night boats and no night +leave for officers. To one officer who ventured a protest Jervis +wrote that he "ought not to delay one day his intention to retire." +"May the discipline of the Mediterranean never be introduced in the +Channel," was a toast on Jervis's appointment to the latter squadron. +"May his next glass of wine choke the wretch," was the wish of an +indignant officer's wife. Jervis may have been a martinet, but +it was he, more than any other officer, who instilled into the +British navy the spirit of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Mediterranean, however, he arrived too late. There, as in +the Atlantic, the French Directory after the experiments of 1794 +and 1795 had now abandoned the idea of risking their battleships; +and while these still served effectively in port as a fleet in +being, their crews were turned to commerce warfare or transport +flotilla work for the army. Bonaparte's ragged heroes were driving +the Austrians out of Italy. Sardinia made peace in May of 1796. +Spain closed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French +Republic in August, putting a fleet of 50 of the line (at least +on paper) on Jervis's communications and making further tenure +of the Mediterranean a dangerous business. By October, 26 Spanish +ships had joined the 12 French then at Toulon. Even so, Jervis with +his force of 22 might have hazarded action, if his subordinate Mann, +with a detached squadron of 7 of these, had not fled to England. +Assigning to Nelson the task of evacuating Corsica and later Elba, +Jervis now took station outside the straits, where on February 13, +1797, Nelson rejoined his chief, whose strength still consisted +of 15 of the line. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_241"><span class="page">Page 241</span></a> +<i>The Battle of Cape St. Vincent</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Spanish fleet, now 27, was at this time returning to Cadiz, +as a first step toward a grand naval concentration in the north. A +stiff Levanter having thrown the Spanish far beyond their destination, +they were returning eastward when on February 14, 1797, the two +fleets came in contact within sight of Cape St. Vincent. In view +of the existing political situation, and the known inefficiency of +the Spanish in sea fighting, Jervis decided to attack. "A victory," +he is said to have remarked, "is very essential to England at this +hour." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a fresh westerly wind blew away the morning fog, the Spanish +were fully revealed to southward, running before the wind, badly +scattered, with 7 ships far in advance and thus to leeward of the +rest. After some preliminary pursuit, the British formed in a single +column (Troubridge in the <i>Culloden</i> first, the flagship +<i>Victory</i> seventh, and Nelson in the <i>Captain</i> third +from the rear), and took a southerly course which would carry them +between the two enemy groups. As soon as they found themselves +thus separated, the Spanish weather division hauled their wind, +opened fire, and ran to northward along the weather side of the +British line; while the lee division at first also turned northward +and made some effort to unite with the rest of their company by +breaking through the enemy formation, but were thrown back by a +heavy broadside from the <i>Victory</i>. Having accomplished his +first purpose, Jervis had already, at about noon, hoisted the signal +to "tack in succession," which meant that each ship should continue +her course to the point where the <i>Culloden</i> came about and +then follow her in pursuit of the enemy weather division. This +critical and much discussed maneuver appears entirely justified. +The British by tacking in succession kept their column still between +the parts of the enemy, its rear covering the enemy lee division, +and the whole formation still in perfect order and control, as it +would not have been had the ships tacked simultaneously. Again, if +the attack had been made on the small group to leeward, the Spanish +weather division could easily have run <a name="page_242"><span +class="page">Page 242</span></a><a name="page_243"></a> down into +the action and thus brought their full strength to bear. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 531px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig042.png" width="531" height="802" alt="Fig. 42"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14, + 1797</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BRITISH: 15 ships, 1232 guns. SPANISH: + 27 ships, 2286 guns.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +But against an enemy so superior in numbers more was needed to keep +the situation in hand. Shortly before one o'clock, when several +British vessels had already filled away on the new course, Nelson +from his position well back in the column saw that the leading +ships of the main enemy division were swinging off to eastward +as if to escape around the British rear. Eager to get into the +fighting, of which his present course gave little promise, and +without waiting for orders, he wore out of the column, passed between +the two ships next astern, and threw himself directly upon the three +big three-deckers, including the flagship <i>Santisima Trindad</i> +(130 guns), which headed the enemy line. Before the fighting was +over, his ship was badly battered, "her foretopmast and wheel shot +away, and not a sail, shroud or rope left";[1] but the <i>Culloden</i> +and other van ships soon came up, and also Collingwood in the +<i>Excellent</i> from the rear, after orders from Jervis for which +Nelson had not waited. Out of the mêlée the British +emerged with four prizes, Nelson himself having boarded the <i>San +Nicolas</i> (80), cleared her decks, and with reënforcements +from his own ship passed across her to receive the surrender of +the <i>San Josef</i> (112). The swords of the vanquished Spanish, +Nelson says, "I gave to William Fearney, one of my bargemen, who +placed them with the greatest <i>sangfroid</i> under his arm." +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Nelson's <span class="sc">Dispatches</span>, Vol. II, +p. 345.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For Nelson's initiative (which is the word for such actions when +they end well) Jervis had only the warmest praise, and when his +fleet captain, Calder, ventured a comment on the breach of orders, +Jervis gave the tart answer, "Ay, and if ever you offend in the +same way I promise you a forgiveness beforehand." Jervis was made +Earl St. Vincent, and Nelson, who never hid his light under a bushel, +shared at least in popular acclaim. It was not indeed a sweeping +victory, and there is little doubt that had the British admiral +so chosen, he might have done much more. But enough had been +accomplished to discourage Spanish naval activities in the French +cause for a long time to come. They were hopelessly outclassed; but +in <a name="page_244"><span class="page">Page 244</span></a> their +favor it should be borne in mind that their ships were miserably +manned, the crews consisting of ignorant peasants of whom it is +reported that they said prayers before going aloft, and with whom +their best admiral, Mazzaredo, had refused to sail. Moreover, they +were fighting half-heartedly, lacking the inspiration of a great +national cause, without which victories are rarely won. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The defeat of the Spanish, as Jervis had foreseen, was timely. +Mantua had just capitulated; British efforts to secure an honorable +peace had failed; consols were at 51, and specie payments stopped +by the Bank of England; Austria was on the verge of separate +negotiations, the preliminaries of which were signed at Loeben on +April 18; France, in the words of Bonaparte, could now "turn all +her forces against England and oblige her to a prompt peace."[1] +The news of St. Vincent was thus a ray of light on a very dark +horizon. Its strategic value, along with the Battle of Camperdown, +has already been made clear. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Correspondence</span>, III, 346.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The British fleet, after refitting at Lisbon, took up a blockade +of the Spanish at Cadiz which continued through the next two years. +Discontent and mutiny, which threatened with each fresh ship from +home, was guarded against by strict discipline, careful attention to +health and diet, and by minor enterprises which served as diversions, +such as the bombardment of Cadiz and the unsuccessful attack on Santa +Cruz in the Canary Islands, July 24-25, 1797, in which Nelson lost +his right arm. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 813px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig043.png" width="813" height="430" alt="Fig. 43"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST 1798</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Battle of the Nile</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nelson's return to the Cadiz blockade in May, 1798, after months +of suffering in England, was coincident with the gathering of a +fresh storm cloud in the Mediterranean, though the direction in +which it threatened was still completely concealed. While Sicily, +Greece, Portugal and even Ireland were mentioned by the British +Admiralty as possible French objectives, Egypt was apparently not +thought of. Yet its strategic position between three continents +remained as important as <a name="page_245"></a><a name="page_246"> +<span class="page">Page 246</span></a> in centuries past, +controlling the trade of the Levant and threatening India by land +or sea. "The time is not far distant," Bonaparte had already +written, "when we shall feel that truly to destroy England we must +take possession of Egypt." In point of fact the strength of England +rested not merely on the wealth of the Indies, but on her merchant +fleets, naval control, home products and manufactures, in short her +whole industrial and commercial development, too strong to be +struck down by a blow in this remote field. Still, if the continued +absence of a British fleet from the Mediterranean could be counted +on, the Egyptian campaign was the most effective move against her +that offered at the time. It was well that the British Admiralty +rose to the danger. Jervis, though he pointed out the risks involved, +was directed to send Nelson with an advance squadron of 3 ships, +later strengthened to 14, to watch the concentration of land and +naval forces at Toulon. "The appearance of a British fleet in the +Mediterranean," wrote the First Lord, Spencer, in urging the move, +"is a condition on which the fate of Europe may be stated to depend." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Before a strong northwest wind the French armada on May 19 left +Toulon—13 of the line, 13 smaller vessels, and a fleet of +transports which when joined by contingents from Genoa, Corsica, +and Civita Vecchia brought the total to 400 sail, crowded with over +30,000 troops. Of the fighting fleet there is the usual tale of +ships carelessly fitted out, one-third short-handed, and supplied +with but two months' food—a tale which simply points the +truth that the winning of naval campaigns begins months or years +before. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The gale from which the French found shelter under Sardinia and +Corsica fell later with full force on Nelson to the westward of +the islands. His flagship the <i>Vanguard</i> lost her foremast +and remaining topmasts, while at the same time his four frigates, +so essential in the search that followed, were scattered and failed +to rejoin. Having by extraordinary exertions refitted in Sardinia +in the short space of four days, he was soon again off Toulon, but +did not learn of the enemy's departure until May 31, and even then +he got no clue as to <a name="page_247"><span class="page">Page +247</span></a> where they had gone. Here he was joined on June 7 +by the promised reënforcements, bringing his squadron to 13 +74's and the <i>Leander</i> of 50 guns. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The ensuing search continued for two months, until August 1, the +date of the Battle of the Nile. During this period, Nelson appears +to best advantage; in the words of David Hannay, he was an "embodied +flame of resolution, with none of the vulgar bluster that was to +appear later." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Moving slowly southward, the French flotilla had spent ten days in +the occupation of Malta—the surrender of which was chiefly +due to French influence among the Knights of St. John who held +the island—and departed on June 19 for their destination, +following a circuitous route along the south side of Crete and +thence to the African coast 70 miles west of Alexandria. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Learning off Cape Passaro on the 22d of the enemy's departure from +Malta, Nelson made direct for Alexandria under fair wind and press +of sail. He reached the port two days ahead of Bonaparte, and finding +it empty, at once set out to retrace his course, his impetuous +energy betraying him into what was undoubtedly a hasty move. The +two fleets had been but 60 miles apart on the night of the 25th. +Had they met, though Bonaparte had done his utmost by organization +and drill to prepare for such an emergency, a French disaster would +have been almost inevitable, and Napoleon, in the amusingly partisan +words of Nelson's biographer Southey, "would have escaped those +later crimes that have incarnadined his soul." Nelson had planned +in case of such an encounter to detach three of his ships to attack +the transports. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The trying month that now intervened, spent by the British fleet +in a vain search along the northern coast of the Mediterranean, +a brief stop at Syracuse for water and supplies, and return, was +not wholly wasted, for during this time the commander in chief +was in frequent consultation with his captains, securing their +hearty support, and familiarizing them with his plans for action +in whatever circumstances a meeting might occur. An interesting +reference to this practice of Nelson's appears in a later +characterization of him written by the <a name="page_248"><span +class="page">Page 248</span></a> French Admiral Décres to +Napoleon. "His boastfulness," so the comment runs, "is only equalled +by his ineptitude, but he has the saving quality of making no pretense +to any other virtues than boldness and good nature, so that he is +accessible to the counsels of those under him." As to who dominated +these conferences and who profited by them we may form our own +opinion. It was by such means that Nelson fostered a spirit of +full coöperation and mutual confidence between himself and +his subordinates which justified his affectionate phrase, "a band +of brothers." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The result was seen at the Nile. If rapid action lost the chance +of battle a month before, it did much to insure victory when the +opportunity came, and it was made possible by each captain's full +grasp of what was to be done. "Time is everything," to quote a +familiar phrase of Nelson; "five minutes may spell the difference +between victory and defeat." It was two in the afternoon when the +British, after looking into Alexandria, first sighted the French +fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, and it was just sundown when the +leading ship <i>Goliath</i> rounded the <i>Guerrier's</i> bows. The +battle was fought in darkness. In the face of a fleet protected by +shoals and shore batteries, with no trustworthy charts or pilots, +with ships still widely separated by their varying speeds, a less +thoroughly drilled force under a less ardent leader would have +felt the necessity of delaying action until the following day. +Nelson never hesitated. His ships went into action in the order +in which they reached the scene. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion +which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the repeated letters +from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor, +in spite of repeated soundings which showed this course possible, +the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of despondent inertia still +lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. +Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was +known that their range did not cover the head of the French line. The +frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely warning +were at anchor in the bay. Numerous water <a name="page_249"><span +class="page">Page 249</span></a> parties were on shore and with +them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables from one vessel +to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had been vaguely +planned. At a hurried council it was proposed to put to sea, but +this was given up for the sufficient reason that there was no time. +The French were cleared for action only on the out-board side. Their +admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a fear reasonable +enough if his ships had been sailing before the wind at sea; but +at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective and the wind +blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van would be far +more dangerous, since support could less easily be brought up from +the rear. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 560px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig044.png" width="560" height="321" alt="Fig. 44"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">COAST MAP</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth of the + Nile</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +It was on the head of the line that the attack came. Nelson had +given the one signal that "his intention was to attack the van +and center as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before +developed." This plan called for doubling, two ships to the enemy's +one. With a fair wind from the north-northwest Captain Foley in the +<i>Goliath</i> at 6 p.m. reached the <i>Guerrier</i>, the headmost of +the thirteen ships in the enemy line. Either by instant initiative, +or more likely in accordance with previous plans in view of such an +opportunity, he took his ship inside the line, his anchor dragging +slightly so as to bring him up on the quarter of the second enemy +vessel, the <i>Conquérant</i>. The <i>Zealous</i>, following +closely, anchored on the <a name="page_250"><span class="page">Page +250</span></a> bows of the <i>Guerrier</i>; the <i>Orion</i> engaged +inside the fifth ship; the <i>Theseus</i> inside the third; and +the <i>Audacious</i>, passing between the first two of the enemy, +brought up on the <i>Conquérant's</i> bow. With these five +engaged inside, Nelson in the <i>Vanguard</i> and the two ships +following him engaged respectively outside the third, fourth and +fifth of the enemy. Thus the concentration on the van was eight +to five. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +About a half hour later the <i>Bellerophon</i> and the <i>Majestic</i> +attacked respectively the big flagship <i>Orient</i> (110) in the +center and the <i>Tonnant</i> (80) next astern, and against these +superior antagonists suffered severely, losing in killed and wounded +390 men divided about equally between them, which was nearly half the +total loss of 896 and greater than the total at Cape St. Vincent. +Both later drifted almost helpless down the line. The <i>Culloden</i> +under Troubridge, a favorite of both Jervis and Nelson, had +unfortunately grounded and stuck fast on Aboukir shoal; but the +<i>Swiftsure</i> and the <i>Alexander</i> came up two hours after +the battle had begun as a support to the ships in the centre, the +<i>Swiftsure</i> engaging the <i>Orient</i>, and the <i>Alexander</i> +the <i>Franklin</i> next ahead, while the smaller <i>Leander</i> +skillfully chose a position where she could rake the two. By this +time all five of the French van had surrendered; the <i>Orient</i> +was in flames and blew up about 10 o'clock with the loss of all but +70 men. Admiral Brueys, thrice wounded, died before the explosion. +Of the four ships in the rear, only two, the <i>Guillaume Tell</i> +under Admiral Villeneuve and the <i>Généreux</i>, +were able to cut their cables next morning and get away. Nelson +asserted that, had he not been incapacitated by a severe scalp +wound in the action, even these would not have escaped. Of the +rest, two were burned and nine captured. Among important naval +victories, aside from such one-sided slaughters as those of our +own Spanish war, it remains the most overwhelming in history. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 491px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig045.png" width="491" height="737" alt="Fig. 45"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE NILE</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The effect was immediate throughout Europe, attesting dearly the +contemporary importance attached to sea control. "It was this battle," +writes Admiral de la Gravière, "which for two years delivered +over the Mediterranean to the British and called thither the squadrons +of Russia, which shut up our <a name="page_251"></a><a name="page_252"> +<span class="page">Page 252</span></a> army in the midst of a +hostile people and led the Porte to declare against us, which put +India beyond our reach and thrust France to the brink of ruin, for +it rekindled the hardly extinct war with Austria and brought Suvaroff +and the Austro-Russians to our very frontiers."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span>, II, 129.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The whole campaign affords an instance of an overseas expedition +daringly undertaken in the face of a hostile fleet (though it should +be remembered that the British were not in the Mediterranean when +it was planned), reaching its destination by extraordinary good +luck, and its possibilities then completely negatived by the +reëstablishment of enemy naval control. The efforts of the +French army to extricate itself northward through Palestine were +later thwarted partly by the squadron under Commodore Sidney Smith, +which captured the siege guns sent to Acre by sea and aided the +Turks in the defense of the fortress. In October of 1799 Bonaparte +escaped to France in a frigate. French fleets afterwards made various +futile efforts to succor the forces left in Egypt, which finally +surrendered to an army under Abercromby, just too late to strengthen +the British in the peace negotiations of October, 1801. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nelson's subsequent activities in command of naval forces in Italian +waters need not detain us. Physically and nervously weakened from +the effects of his wound and arduous campaign, he fell under the +influence of Lady Hamilton and the wretched court of Naples, lent +naval assistance to schemes of doubtful advantage to his country, +and in June of 1800 incurred the displeasure of the Admiralty by +direct disobedience of orders to send support to Minorca. He returned +to England at the close of 1800 with the glory of his victory somewhat +tarnished, and with blemishes on his private character which +unfortunately, as will be seen, affected also his professional +reputation. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Copenhagen Campaign</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Under the rapid scene-shifting of Napoleon, the political stage +had by this time undergone another complete change from <a +name="page_253"><span class="page">Page 253</span></a> that which +followed the battle of the Nile. Partly at least as a consequence +of that battle, the so-called Second Coalition had been formed by +Great Britain, Russia, and Austria, the armies of the two latter +powers, as already stated, carrying the war again to the French +frontiers. It required only the presence of Bonaparte, in supreme +control after the <i>coup d'état</i> of the Eighteenth +<i>Brumaire</i> (9 Nov., 1799), to turn the tide, rehabilitate the +internal administration of France, and by the victories of Marengo +in June and Hohenlinden in December of 1800 to force Austria once +more to a separate peace. Paul I of Russia had already fallen out +with his allies and withdrawn his armies and his great general, +Suvaroff, a year before. Now, taken with a romantic admiration +for Napoleon, and angry when the British, after retaking Malta, +refused to turn it over to him as Grand Master of the Knights of +St. John, he was easily manipulated by Napoleon into active support +of the latter's next move against England. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This was the Armed Neutrality of 1800, the object of which, from +the French standpoint, was to close to England the markets of the +North, and combine against her the naval forces of the Baltic. +Under French and Russian pressure, and in spite of the fact that +all these northern nations stood to suffer in one way or another +from rupture of trade relations with England, the coalition was +accomplished in December, 1800; Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark +pledging themselves to resist infringements of neutral rights, +whether by extension of contraband lists, seizure of enemy goods +under neutral flag, search of vessels guaranteed innocent by their +naval escort, or by other methods familiar then as in later times. +These were measures which England, aiming both to ruin the trade +of France and to cut off her naval supplies, felt bound to insist +upon as the belligerent privileges of sea power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To overcome this new danger called for a mixture of force and diplomacy, +which England supplied by sending to Denmark an envoy with a 48-hour +ultimatum, and along with him 20 ships-of-the-line, which according +to Nelson were "the best negotiators in Europe." The commander +in chief of this <a name="page_254"><span class="page">Page +254</span></a> squadron was Sir Hyde Parker, a hesitant and mediocre +leader who could be trusted to do nothing (if that were necessary), +and Nelson was made second in command. Influence, seniority, a clean +record, and what-not, often lead to such choices, bad enough at +any time but indefensible in time of war. Fortunately for England, +when the reply of the Danish court showed that force was required, +the two admirals virtually changed places with less friction than +might have been expected, and Nelson "Lifted and carried on his +shoulders the dead weight of his superior,"[1] throughout the ensuing +campaign. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Mahan, <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon +French Revolution and Empire</span>, II, 52.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When the envoy on March 23 returned to the fleet, then anchored in +the Cattegat, he brought an alarming tale of Danish preparations, +and an air of gloom pervaded the flagship when Nelson came aboard +for a council of war. Copenhagen, it will be recalled, is situated +on the eastern coast of Zealand, on the waterway called the Sound +leading southward from the Cattegat to the Baltic. Directly in +front of the city, a long shoal named the Middle Ground separates +the Sound into two navigable channels, the one nearer Copenhagen +known as the King's Deep (<i>Kongedyb</i>). The defenses of the +Danish capital, so the envoy reported, were planned against attack +from the northward. At this end of the line the formidable Trekroner +Battery (68 guns), together with two ships-of-the-line and some +smaller vessels, defended the narrow entrance to the harbor; while +protecting the city to the southward, along the flats at the edge +of the King's Deep, was drawn up an array of about 37 craft ranging +from ships-of-the-line to mere scows, mounting a total of 628 guns, +and supported at some distance by batteries on land. Filled with +patriotic ardor, half the male population of the city had volunteered +to support the forces manning these batteries afloat and ashore. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nelson's plan for meeting these obstacles, as well as his view of +the whole situation, as presented at the council, was embodied in +a memorandum dated the following day, which well illustrates his +grasp of a general strategic problem. The <a name="page_255"><span +class="page">Page 255</span></a> Government's instructions, as well +as Parker's preference, were apparently to wait in the Cattegat +until the combined enemy forces should choose to come out and fight. +Instead, the second in command advocated immediate action. "Not a +moment," he wrote, "should be lost in attacking the enemy; they will +every day and hour be stronger." The best course, in his opinion, +would be to take the whole fleet at once into the Baltic against +Russia, as a "home stroke," which if successful would bring down +the coalition like a house of cards. If the Danes must first be +dealt with, he proposed, instead of a direct attack, which would be +"taking the bull by the horns," an attack from the rear. In order +to do so, the fleet could get beyond the city either by passing +through the Great Belt south of Zealand, or directly through the +Sound. Another resultant advantage, in case the five Swedish sail of +the line or the 14 Russian ships at Revel should take the offensive, +would be that of central position, between the enemy divisions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Supposing us through the Belt," the letter concludes, "with the +wind northwesterly, would it not be possible to either go with +the fleet or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one +Bomb and two Fireships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron +at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, +and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The +measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion that the boldest +measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous +assertion of her force, directed with judgment." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Here was a striking plan of aggressive warfare, aimed at the heart of +the coalition. The proposal to leave part of the fleet at Copenhagen +was indeed a dangerous compromise, involving divided forces and +threatened communications, but was perhaps justified by the known +inefficiency of the Russians and the fact that the Danes were actually +fought and defeated with a force no greater than the plan provided. +In the end the more conservative course was adopted of settling with +Denmark first. Keeping well to the eastern shore, the fleet on March +30 passed into the Sound without injury <a name="page_256"><span +class="page">Page 256</span></a> from the fire of the Kronenburg +forts at its entrance, and anchored that evening near Copenhagen. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Three days later, on April 2, 1801, the attack was made as planned, +from the southward end of the Middle Ground. Nelson in the +<i>Elephant</i> commanded the fighting squadron, which consisted +of seven 74's, three 64's and two of 50 guns, with 18 bomb vessels, +sloops, and fireships. The rest of the ships, under Parker, were +anchored at the other end of the shoal and 5 miles north of the +city; it seems they were to have coöperated, but the south wind +which Nelson needed made attack impossible for them. Against the +Danish total of 696 guns on the ships and Trekroner fortification, +Nelson's squadron had 1014, but three of his main units grounded +during the approach and were of little service. There was no effort +at concentration, the British when in position engaging the whole +southern part of the Danish line. "Here," in the words of Nelson's later +description, "was no maneuvering; it was downright fighting"—a +hotly contested action against ships and shore batteries lasting +from 10 a. m., when the <i>Elephant</i> led into position on the +bow of Commodore Fischer's flagship <i>Dannebroge</i>, until about +one. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the midst of the engagement, as Nelson restlessly paced the +quarterdeck, he caught sight of the signal "Leave off action" flown +from Sir Hyde's flagship. Instead of transmitting the signal to the +vessels under him, Nelson kept his own for "Close action" hoisted. +Colonel Stewart, who was on board at the time, continues the story +as follows: "He also observed, I believe to Captain Foley, 'You +know, Foley, I have only one eye—I have a right to be blind +sometimes'; and then with an archness peculiar to his character, +putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not +see the signal.'" It was obeyed, however, by the light vessels under +Captain Riou attacking the Trekroner battery, which were suffering +severely, and which could also more easily effect a retreat. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 495px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig046.png" width="495" height="752" alt="Fig. 46"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, APRIL 2, 1801</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Shortly afterward the Danish fire began to slacken and several of +the floating batteries surrendered, though before they could be +taken they were frequently remanned by fresh <a name="page_257"></a> +<a name="page_258"><span class="page">Page 258</span></a> forces +from the shore. Enough had been accomplished; and to end a difficult +situation—if not to extricate himself from it—Nelson +sent the following summons addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen, +the Danes": "Lord Nelson has orders to spare Denmark when no longer +resisting; if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord +Nelson will be obliged to set fire to the floating batteries he has +taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who have +defended them." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A truce followed, during which Nelson removed his ships. Next day +he went ashore to open negotiations, while at the same time he +brought bomb vessels into position to bombard the city. The cessation +of hostilities was the more readily agreed to by the Danes owing +to the fact that on the night before the battle they had received +news, which they still kept concealed from the British, of the +assassination of the Czar Paul. His successor, they knew, would be +forced to adopt a policy more favorable to the true interests of +Russian trade. The league in fact was on the verge of collapse. A +fourteen weeks' armistice was signed with Denmark. On April 12 the +fleet moved into the Baltic, and on May 5, Nelson having succeeded +Parker in command, it went on to Revel, whence the Russian squadron +had escaped through the ice to Kronstadt ten days before. On June +17 a convention was signed with Russia and later accepted by the +other northern states, by which Great Britain conceded that neutrals +might engage in trade from one enemy port to another, with the +important exception of <i>colonial</i> ports, and that naval stores +should not be contraband; whereas Russia agreed that enemy goods +under certain conditions might be seized in neutral ships, and +that vessels under naval escort might be searched by ships-of-war. +In the meantime, Nelson, realizing that active operations were +over with, resigned his command. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the opinion of the French naval critic Gravière, the +campaign thus ended constitutes in the eyes of seamen Nelson's +best title to fame—"<i>son plus beau titre gloire.</i>"[1] +Certainly it called forth the most varied talents—grasp of +the political and <a name="page_259"><span class="page">Page +259</span></a> strategical situation; tact and force of personality +in dealing with an inert commander in chief; energy in overcoming +not only military obstacles but the doubts and scruples of fellow +officers; aggressiveness in battle; and skill in negotiations. In +view of the Czar's murder—of which the British Government +would seem to have had an inkling beforehand—it may be thought +that less strenuous methods would have served. On the contrary, +however, hundreds of British merchant vessels had been seized in +northern ports, trade had been stopped, and the nation was threatened +with a dangerous increment to her foes. Furthermore, after a brief +interval of peace, Great Britain had to face ten years more of +desperate warfare, during which nothing served her better than +that at Copenhagen the northern neutrals had had a sharp taste +of British naval power. Force was needed. That it was employed +economically is shown by the fact that, when a renewal of peace +between France and Russia in 1807 again threatened a northern +confederation, Nelson's accomplishment with 12 ships was duplicated, +but this time with 25 of the line, 40 frigates, 27,000 troops, +the bombardment of Copenhagen, and a regular land campaign. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span>, Vol. II, +p. 43.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Upon Nelson's return to England, popular clamor practically forced +his appointment to command the Channel defense flotilla against +the French armies which were now once more concentrated on the +northern coast. This service lasted for only a brief period until +the signing of peace preliminaries in October, 1801. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the eight years of hostilities thus ended Great Britain, it +is true, had been fighting largely on the defensive, but on a line +of defense carried to the enemy's sea frontiers and comparable to +siege lines about a city or fortress, which, when once established, +thrust upon the enemy the problem of breaking through. The efforts +of France to pierce this barrier, exerted in various directions +and by various means, were, as we have seen, defeated by naval +engagements, which insured to England the control of the sea. During +this period, France lost altogether 55 ships-of-the-line, Holland 18, +Spain 10, and Denmark 2, a total of 85, of which at least 50 were +captured <a name="page_260"><span class="page">Page 260</span></a> +by the enemy. Great Britain lost 20, but only 5 by capture. The +British battle fleet at the close of hostilities had increased +to 189 capital ships; that of France had shrunk to 45. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For purposes of commerce warfare the French navy had suffered the +withdrawal of many of its smaller fighting vessels and large numbers +of its best seamen, attracted into privateering by the better promise +of profit and adventure. As a result of this warfare, about 3500 +British merchantmen were destroyed, an average of 500 a year, +representing an annual loss of 2-1/2 per cent of all the ships of +British register. But in the meantime the French merchant marine +and commerce had been literally swept off the seas. In 1799 the +Directory admitted there was "not a single merchant ship on the seas +carrying the French flag." French imports from Asia, Africa, and +America in 1800 amounted to only $300,000, and exports to $56,000, +whereas England's total export and import trade had nearly doubled, +from 44-1/2 million pounds sterling in 1792 to nearly 78 million in +1800. It is true that, owing to the exigencies of war, the amount of +British shipping employed in this trade actually fell off slightly, +and that of neutrals increased from 13 to 34%. But the profits +went chiefly to British merchants. England had become the great +storehouse and carrier for the Continent, "Commerce," in the phrase +engraved on the elder Pitt's monument, "being united with and made +to flourish by war."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Figures on naval losses from Gravière, <span +class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span>, Vol. II, ch. VII, and on commerce, +from Mahan, <span class="sc">French Revolution and Empire</span>, +Vol. II, ch. XVII.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +See end of Chapter XIII, <a href="#page_285">page 285</a>. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_261"><span class="page">Page 261</span></a> +CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE NAPOLEONIC WAR [<i>Concluded</i>]: TRAFALGAR AND AFTER +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The peace finally ratified at Amiens in March, 1802, failed to +accomplish any of the purposes for which England had entered the +war. France not only maintained her frontiers on the Scheldt and +the Rhine, but still exercised a predominant influence in Holland +and western Italy, and excluded British trade from territories +under her control. Until French troops were withdrawn from Holland, +as called for by the treaty, England refused to evacuate Malta. +Bonaparte, who wished further breathing space to build up the French +navy, tried vainly to postpone hostilities by threatening to invade +England and exclude her from all continental markets. "It will be +England," he declared, "that forces us to conquer Europe." The +war reopened in May of 1803. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With no immediate danger on the Continent and with all the resources +of a regenerated France at his command, Bonaparte now undertook the +project of a descent upon England on such a scale as never before. +Hazardous as he always realized the operation to be—it was a +thousand to one chance, he told the British envoys, that he and +his army would end at the bottom of the sea—he was definitely +committed to it by his own threats and by the expectation of France +that he would now annihilate her hereditary foe. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Napoleon's Plan of Invasion</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +An army of 130,000 men, with 400 guns and 20 days' supplies, was +to embark from four ports close to Boulogne as a center, and cross +the 36 miles of Channel to a favorable <a name="page_262"><span +class="page">Page 262</span></a> stretch of coast between Dover and +Hastings, distant from London some 70 miles. The transport flotilla, +as finally planned, was to consist of 2000 or more small flat-bottomed +sailing vessels with auxiliary oar propulsion-<i>chaloupes</i> and +<i>bateaux canonnières</i>, from 60 to 80 feet over all, +not over 8 feet in draft, with from two to four guns and a capacity +for 100 to 150 men. Large open boats (<i>péniches</i>) were +also to be used, and all available coast craft for transport of +horses and supplies. Shipyards from the Scheldt to the Gironde were +soon busy building the special flotilla, and as fast as they were +finished they skirted the shores to the points of concentration under +protection of coast batteries. Extensive harbor and defense works +were undertaken at Boulogne and neighboring ports, and the 120 miles +from the Scheldt to the Somme was soon bristling with artillery, +in General Marmont's phrase, "a coast of iron and bronze." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The impression was spread abroad that the crossing was to be effected +by stealth, in calm, fog, or the darkness of a long winter night, +without the protection of a fleet. Almost from the first, however, +Bonaparte seems to have had no such intention. The armament of the +flotilla itself proved of slight value, and he was resolved to +take no uncalled-for risks, on an unfamiliar element, with 100,000 +men. An essential condition, which greatly complicated the whole +undertaking, became the concentration of naval forces in the Channel +sufficient to secure temporary control. "Let us be masters of the +Strait for 6 hours," Napoleon wrote to Latouche-Treville in command +of the Toulon fleet, "and we shall be masters of the world." In +less rhetorical moments he extended the necessary period to from +two to fifteen days. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Up to the spring of 1804 neither army nor flotilla was fully ready, +and thereafter the crossing was always definitely conditioned upon a +naval concentration. But the whole plan called for swift execution. +As time lapsed, difficulties multiplied. Harbors silted up, transports +were wrecked by storms, British defense measures on land and sea grew +more formidable, the Continental situation became more threatening. +The Boulogne army thus became more and more—what Napoleon <a +name="page_263"><span class="page">Page 263</span></a> perhaps +falsely declared later it had always been—an army concentrated +against Austria. To get a fleet into the Channel without a battle +was almost impossible, and once in, its position would be dangerous +in the extreme. Towards the end, in the opinion of the French student +Colonel Desbrière, Napoleon's chief motive in pressing for +fleet coöperation was the belief that it would lead to a decisive +naval action which, though a defeat, would shift from his own head +the odium of failure. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whether this theory is fully accepted or not, the fact remains that +the only sure way of conquering England was by a naval contest. +Her first and main defense was the British fleet, which, spread out +to the limits of safety to watch French ships wherever harbored, +guarded not only against a concentration in the Channel, but against +incursions into other fields. The immediate defense of the coasts was +intrusted to flotillas of armed boats, over 700 in all, distributed +along the coast from Leith south-about to Glasgow, with 100 on the +coast of Ireland. Naval men looked upon these as of slight value, +a concession, according to Earl St. Vincent, to "the old women +in and out" (of both sexes) at home. The distribution of the main +battle squadrons varied, but in March, 1805, at the opening of the +Trafalgar campaign they were stationed as follows: Boulogne and the +Dutch forces were watched by Admiral Keith with 11 of the line and +150 smaller units scattered from the Texel to the Channel Islands. +The 21 French ships under Ganteaume at Brest, the strategic center, +were closely blockaded by Cornwallis, whose force, by Admiralty +orders, was not to fall below 18 of the line. A small squadron had +been watching Missiessy's 5 ships at Rochefort and upon his escape +in January had followed him to the West Indies. The 5 French and 10 +Spanish at Ferrol and the 6 or more ready for sea at Cadiz were held +in check by forces barely adequate. In the Gulf of Lyons Nelson with +13 ships had since May, 1803, stood outside the distant but dangerous +station of Toulon. Owing to the remoteness from bases, a close and +constant blockade was here impossible; <a name="page_264"></a><a +name="page_265"><span class="page">Page 265</span></a> moreover, +it was the policy to let the enemy get out in the hope of bringing +him to action at sea. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 497px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig047.png" width="497" height="738" alt="Fig. 47"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, + 1805</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +To effect a concentration in the Channel in the face of these obstacles +was the final aim of all Napoleon's varied naval combinations of 1804 +and 1805—combinations which impress one with the truth of +Gravière's criticism that the Emperor lacked "<i>le sentiment +exact des difficultes de la marine</i>," and especially, one should +perhaps add, <i>de la marine française</i>. The first plan, the +simplest and, therefore, most promising, was that Latouche Treville +with the Toulon fleet should evade Nelson and, after releasing ships +on the way, enter the Channel with 16 of the line, while Cornwallis +was kept occupied by Ganteaume. This was upset by the death of +Latouche, France's ablest and most energetic admiral, in August +of 1804, and by the accession, two months later, of Spain and the +Spanish navy to the French cause. After many misgivings Napoleon +chose Villeneuve to succeed at Toulon. Skilled in his profession, +honest, and devoted, he was fatally lacking in self-confidence +and energy to conquer difficulties. "It is sad," wrote an officer +in the fleet, "to see that force which under Latouche was full of +activity, now without faith in either their leader or themselves." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The final plan, though still subject to modifications, was for +a concentration on a larger scale in the West Indies. Villeneuve +was to go thither, picking up the Cadiz ships on the way, join +the Rochefort squadron if it were still there, and wait 40 days +for the Brest fleet. Upon its arrival the entire force of 40 ships +was to move swiftly back to the Channel. It was assumed that the +British squadrons, in alarm for the colonies, would in the meantime +be scattered in pursuit. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Pursuit of Villeneuve</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Villeneuve put to sea in a rising gale on January 17, 1805, but +was soon back in port with damaged ships, the only effect being +to send Nelson clear to Egypt in search of him. A successful start +was made on March 30. Refusing to wait for 5 Spanish vessels at +Carthagena, Villeneuve with 11 sail reached Cadiz on April 9, picked +up one French vessel and two Spanish <a name="page_266"><span +class="page">Page 266</span></a> under Admiral Gravina, and leaving +4 more to follow was off safely on the same night for the West +Indies. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From Gibraltar to the Admiralty in London, Villeneuve's appearance +in the Atlantic created a profound stir. His departure from Cadiz +was known, but not whither he had gone. The five ships on the Cadiz +blockade fell back at once to the Channel. A fast frigate from +Gibraltar carried the warning to Calder off Ferrol and to the Brest +blockade, whence it reached London on April 25. A convoy for Malta +and Sicily with 6000 troops under Gen. Craig—a pledge which +Russia called for before sending her own forces to southern +Italy—was already a week on its way and might fall an easy +victim. In consequence of an upheaval at the Admiralty, Lord Barham, +a former naval officer now nearly 80 years of age, had just begun his +memorable 9 months' administration as First Lord of the Admiralty +and director of the naval war. Immediately a whole series of orders +went out to the fleets to insure the safety of the troop ships, +the maintenance of the Ferrol blockade, an eventual strengthening +of forces outside the Channel, and the safety of the Antilles in +case Villeneuve had gone there. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Where was Nelson? His scout frigates by bad judgment had lost Villeneuve +on the night of March 31 east of Minorca, with no clue to his future +course. Nelson took station between Sardinia and the African coast, +resolved not to move till he "knew something positive." In the +absence of information, the safety of Naples, Sicily, and Egypt +was perhaps not merely an obsession on his part, but a proper +professional concern; but it is strange that no inkling should +have reached him from the Admiralty or elsewhere that a western +movement from Toulon was the only one Napoleon now had in mind. +It was April 18 before he received further news of the enemy, and +not until May 5 was he able to get up to and through the Straits +against steady head winds; even then he could not, as he said, +"run to the West Indies without something beyond mere surmise." +Definite reports from Cadiz that the enemy had gone thither reached +him through an Admiral Campbell in the Portuguese service, and were +confirmed by the fact that they had been seen nowhere to northward. +On <a name="page_267"><span class="page">Page 267</span></a> the +12th, leaving the <i>Royal Sovereign</i> (100) to strengthen the +escort of Craig's convoy, which had now appeared, he set out westward +with 10 ships in pursuit of the enemy's 18. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +He reached Barbados on June 4, only 21 days after Villeneuve's +arrival at Martinique. The latter had found that the Rochefort +squadron—as a result of faulty transmission of Napoleon's +innumerable orders—was already back in Europe, and that the Brest +squadron had not come. In fact, held tight in the grip of Cornwallis, +it was destined never to leave port. But a reënforcement of +2 ships had reached Villeneuve with orders to wait 35 days longer +and in the meantime to harry the British colonies. Disgruntled and +despondent, he had scarcely got troops aboard and started north +on this mission when he learned that Nelson was hot on his trail. +The troops were hastily thrown into frigates to protect the French +colonies. Without other provision for their safety, and in disregard +of orders, Villeneuve at once turned back for Europe, hoping the +Emperor's schemes would still be set forward by his joining the +ships at Ferrol. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nelson followed four days later, on June 13, steering for his old +post in the Mediterranean, but at the same time despatching the +fast brig <i>Curieux</i> to England with news of the French fleet's +return. This vessel by great good fortune sighted Villeneuve in +mid-ocean, inferred from his northerly position that he was bound +for Ferrol, and reached Portsmouth on July 8. Barham at the Admiralty +got the news the next morning, angry that he had not been routed out +of bed on the arrival of the captain the night before. By 9 o'clock +the same morning, orders were off to Calder on the Ferrol station +in time so that on the 22d of July he encountered the enemy, still +plowing slowly eastward, some 300 miles west of Cape Finisterre. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a result of admirable communication work and swift administrative +action the critic of Nelson at Cape St. Vincent now had a chance +to rob the latter of his last victory and end the campaign then +and there. His forces were adequate. Though he had only 14 ships +to 20, his four three-deckers, according to the estimates of the +time, were each worth <a name="page_268"></a><a name="page_269"><span +class="page">Page 269</span></a> two of the enemy 74's, and on +the other hand, the 6 Spanish ships with Villeneuve could hardly be +counted for more than three. In the ensuing action, fought in foggy +weather, two of the Spanish were captured and one of Calder's +three-deckers was so injured that it had to be detached. The two +fleets remained in contact for three days following, but neither +took the aggressive. In a subsequent court martial Calder was +reprimanded for "not having done his utmost to renew the said +engagement and destroy every ship of the enemy." +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 765px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig048.png" width="765" height="463" alt="Fig. 48"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE, + MARCH-SEPTEMBER, 1805</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +On July 27 the Allied fleet staggered into Vigo, and a week later, +after dropping three ships and 1200 sick men, it moved around to +Corunna and Ferrol. Instead of being shaken down and strengthened +by the long cruise, it was, according to the commander's plaintive +letters, in worse plight than when it left Toulon. Nevertheless, +ten days later he was ready to leave port, with 29 units, 14 of them +raw vessels from Ferrol, and 11 of them Spanish. If, as Napoleon +said, France was not going to give up having a navy, something +might still be done. His orders to Villeneuve were to proceed to +Brest and thence to Boulogne. "I count," he ended, "on your zeal +in my service, your love of your country, and your hatred of that +nation which has oppressed us for 40 generations, and which a little +preseverance on your part will now cause to rëenter forever +the ranks of petty powers."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Orders of 26 July, Desbrière, <span +class="sc">Projets</span>, Vol. V, p. 672.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Such were Villeneuve's instructions, the wisdom or sincerity of +which it was scarcely his privilege to question (though it may +be ours). In passing judgment on his failure to execute them it +should be remembered that two months later, to avoid the personal +disgrace of being superseded, he took his fleet out to more certain +disaster than that which it now faced in striking northward from +Corunna. "<i>Un poltron du tête et non de la cœur</i>"[2] +the French Admiral was handicapped throughout by a paralyzing sense +of the things he could not do. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Gravière II, 136.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +If he had sailer northward he would have found the British fleet +divided. Nelson, it is true, after returning to Cadiz had <a +name="page_270"><span class="page">Page 270</span></a> fallen back +from Gibraltar to the Channel, where he left his eleven ships with +the Brest squadron in remarkable condition after more than two +years at sea. Calder had also joined, bringing Cornwallis' total +strength to 39. These stood between the 21 French at Brest and +the 29 at Ferrol. But on August 16 Cornwallis divided his forces, +keeping 18 (including 10 three-deckers) and sending Calder back to +the Spanish coast with the rest. Napoleon called this a disgraceful +blunder (<i>insigne bêtise</i>), and Mahan adds, "This censure +was just." Sir Julian Corbeh says it was a "master stroke... in all +the campaign there is no movement—not even Nelson's chase of +Villeneuve—that breathes more deeply the true spirit of war." +According to Napoleon, Villeneuve might have "played prisoners' +base with Calder's squadron and fallen upon Cornwallis, or with +his 30 of the line have beaten Calder's 20 and obtained a decisive +superiority." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +So perhaps a Napoleonic admiral. Villeneuve left Ferrol on August +13 and sailed northwest on a heavy northeast wind till the 15th. +Then, his fixed purpose merely strengthened by false news from a +Danish merchantman of 25 British in the vicinity, he turned before +the wind for Cadiz. As soon as he was safely inside, the British +blockaders again closed around the port. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Battle of Trafalgar</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After twenty-five days in England, Nelson took command off Cadiz +on September 28, eager for a final blow that would free England for +aggressive war. There was talk of using bomb vessels, Congreve's +rockets, and Francis's (Robert Fulton's) torpedoes to destroy the +enemy in harbor, but it soon became known that Villeneuve would +be forced to put to sea. On October 9, Nelson issued the famous +Memorandum, or battle plan, embodying what he called "the Nelson +touch," and received by his captains with an enthusiasm which the +inspiration of the famous leader no doubt partly explains. This +plan, which had been formulating itself in Nelson's mind as far +back as the pursuit of the French fleet to the West Indies, may +be regarded as the product of his ripest experience and <a +name="page_271"><span class="page">Page 271</span></a> genius; +the praise is perhaps not extravagant that "it seems to gather up +and coördinate every tactical principle that has ever proved +effective."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Corbett. <span class="sc">The Campaign of Trafalgar</span>, +p. 349.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 597px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig049.png" width="597" height="482" alt="Fig. 49"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">NELSON'S VICTORY</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Built in 1765. 2162 tons.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Though the full text of the Memorandum will repay careful study, +its leading principles may be sufficiently indicated by summary. +Assuming 40 British ships to 46 of the enemy (the proportions though +not the numbers of the actual engagement), it provides first that +"the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the +fleet in two lines of 16 ships each, with an advanced squadron of +8 of the fastest sailing two-decked ships." This made for speed +and ease in maneuvering, and was based on the expressed belief +that so many units could not be formed and controlled in the +old-fashioned single line without fatal loss of time. The ships +<a name="page_272"><span class="page">Page 272</span></a> would +now come into action practically in cruising formation, which was +commonly in two columns. The only noteworthy change contemplated +was that the flagships of the first and second in command should +shift from first to third place in their respective columns, and +even this change was not carried out. Perhaps because the total +force was smaller than anticipated, the advance squadron was merged +with the two main divisions on the night before the battle, and +need not be further regarded. Collingwood, the second in command, +was given freedom of initiative by the provision that "after my +intentions are made known to him he will have entire direction +of his line." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The plan next provides, first for attack from to leeward, and second +for attack from to windward. In either case, Collingwood's division +was to bring a superior force to bear on 12 ships of the enemy rear, +while Nelson would "cut two, three or four ships ahead of their +center so far as to ensure getting at their commander in chief." +"Something must be left to chance... but I look with confidence +to a victory before the van of the enemy can succor their rear." +And further, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship +alongside that of an enemy." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the attack from the windward a very rough diagram is given, thus: +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 547px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig050.png" width="547" height="72" alt="Fig. 50"> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +But aside from this diagram, the lines of which are not precisely +straight or parallel in the original, and which can hardly be reconciled +with the instructions in the text, there is no clear indication that +the attack from the windward (as in the actual battle) was to be +delivered in line abreast. What the text says is: "The divisions +of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the +enemy's center. The signal will most probably then be given for +the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even +steering sails, in <a name="page_273"><span class="page">Page +273</span></a> order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's +line and to cut through." Thus, if we assume a convergent approach +in column, there was to be no slow deployment of the rear or leeward +division into line abreast to make the attack of all its ships +simultaneous; rather, in the words of a captain describing what +really happened, they were simply to "scramble into action" at +best speed. Nor is there any suggestion of a preliminary shift +from line ahead in the case of Nelson's division. Though endless +controversy has raged over the point, the prescribed approach seems +to have been followed fairly closely in the battle. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The concentration upon the rear was not new; in fact, it had become +almost conventional, and was fully anticipated by the enemy. More +originality lay in the manner of "containing" the center and van. +For this purpose, in the first place, the approach was to be at +utmost speed, not under "battle canvas" but with all sail spread. +In the second place, the advance of Nelson's division in column, +led by the flagship, left its precise objective not fully disclosed +to the enemy until the last moment, and open to change as advantage +offered. It could and did threaten the van, and was finally directed +upon the center when Villeneuve's presence there was revealed. +Finally, the very serious danger of enemy concentration upon the head +of the column was mitigated not only by the speed of the approach, +but by the concentration there of three heavy three-deckers. The +plan in general had in view a particular enemy, superior in numbers +but weak in gunnery, slow in maneuver, and likely to avoid decisive +action. It aimed primarily at rapidity of movement, but combined +also the merits of concentration, simplicity, flexibility, and +surprise. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this discussion of the scheme of the battle, around which interest +chiefly centers, the actual events of the engagement have been +in some measure anticipated, and may now be told more briefly. +Driven to desperation by the goadings of Napoleon and the news +that Admiral Rosily was approaching to supersede him, Villeneuve +at last resolved to put to sea. "The intention of His Majesty," +so the Minister of Marine had written, "is to seek in the ranks, +wherever they may be found, <a name="page_274"><span class="page">Page +274</span></a> officers best suited for superior command, requiring +above all a noble ambition, love of glory, decision of character, and +unbounded courage. His Majesty wishes to destroy that circumspection +which is the reproach of the navy; that defensive system which +paralyzes our fleet and doubles the enemy's. He counts the loss +of vessels nothing if lost with honor; he does not wish his fleet +blockaded by an enemy inferior in strength; and if that is the +situation at Cadiz he advises and orders you to attack." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Allied fleet worked out of Cadiz on the 19th of October and +on the 20th tacked southward under squally westerly winds. On the +21st, the day of the battle, the wind was still from the west, light +and flawy, with a heavy swell and signs of approaching storm. At dawn +the two fleets were visible to each other, Villeneuve about 9 miles +northeast and to leeward of the British and standing southward from +Cape Trafalgar. The French Admiral had formed his main battle line +of 21 ships, French and Spanish intermingled, with the <i>Santisima +Trinidad</i> (128) in the center and his flagship <i>Bucentaure</i> +next; the remaining 12 under the Spanish Admiral Gravina constituted +a separate squadron stationed to windward to counter an enemy +concentration, which was especially expected upon the rear. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As the British advance already appeared to threaten this end of +their line, the Allied fleet wore together about 9 o'clock, thus +reversing their order, shifting their course northward, and opening +Cadiz as a refuge. The maneuver, not completed until an hour later, +left their line bowed in at the center, with a number of ships slightly +to leeward, while Gravina's squadron mingled with and prolonged +the rear in the new order. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 560px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig051.png" width="560" height="744" alt="Fig. 51"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCT. 21, 1805</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Position of ships about noon, when <i>Royal + Sovereign</i> opened fire.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">(From plan by Capt. T. H. Tizard, R.N., + British Admiralty Report, 1913.)</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The change, though it aroused Nelson's fear lest his quarry should +escape, facilitated his attack as planned, by exposing the enemy rear +to Collingwood's division. As rapidly as the light airs permitted, +the two British columns bore down, Nelson in the <i>Victory</i> +(100) leading the windward division of 12 ships, closely followed +by the heavy <i>Neptune</i> and <i>Téméraire</i>, +while Collingwood in the freshly coppered and refitted <i>Royal +Sovereign</i> set a sharp pace for the 15 sail to leeward. Of the +<a name="page_275"><span class="page">Page 275</span></a><a +name="page_276"><span class="page">Page 276</span></a> forty +ships Nelson had once counted on, some had not come from England, +and a half dozen others were inside the straits for water. While the +enemy were changing course, Collingwood had signaled his division +to shift into a line of bearing, an order which, though rendered +almost ineffective by his failure to slow down, served to throw the +column off slightly and bring it more nearly parallel to the enemy +rear. (See plan.) Both commanders clung to the lead and pushed ahead +as if racing into the fray, thus effectually preventing deployment +and leaving trailers far behind. Nelson went so far as to try to +jockey his old friend out of first place by ordering the <i>Mars</i> +to pass him, but Collingwood set his studding sails and kept his +lead. Possibly it was then he made the remark that he wished Nelson +would make no more signals, as they all knew what they had to do, +rather than after Nelson's famous final message: "England expects +that every man will do his duty." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nelson, uncertain of Villeneuve's place in the line and anxious to +prevent escape northward, steered for a gap ahead of the <i>Santisima +Trinidad</i>, as if to threaten the van. But at 12:00 noon, as +the first shots were fired at the <i>Royal Sovereign</i>, flags +were broken from all ships, and Villeneuve's location revealed. +Swinging to southward under heavy fire, the <i>Victory</i> passed +under the stern of the <i>Bucentaure</i> and then crashed into +the <i>Redoutable</i>, which had pushed close up to the flagship. +The relative effectiveness of the gunnery in the two fleets is +suggested by the fact that the <i>Victory</i> while coming in under +the enemy's concentrated fire had only 50 killed and wounded, whereas +the raking broadside she finally poured into the <i>Bucentaure's</i> +stern is said to have swept down 400 men. Almost simultaneously with +the leader, the <i>Téméraire</i> and <i>Neptune</i> +plunged into the line, the former closing with the <i>Bucentaure</i> +and the latter with the <i>Santisima Trinidad</i> ahead. Other +ships soon thrust into the terrific artillery combat which centered +around the leaders in a confused mingling of friend and foe. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At about 12:10, nearly half an hour before the <i>Victory</i> penetrated +the Allied line, the <i>Royal Sovereign</i> brought up on the leeward +side of the <i>Santa Ana</i>, flagship of the Spanish <a +name="page_277"><span class="page">Page 277</span></a> Admiral Alava, +after raking both her and the <i>Fougueux</i> astern. The <i>Santa +Ana</i> was thirteenth in the actual line, but, as Collingwood +knew, there were 16, counting those to leeward, among the ships he +had thus cut off for his division to subdue. As a combined effect +of the light breeze and the manner of attack, it was an hour or +more before the action was made general by the advent of British +ships in the rear. All these suffered as they closed, but far less +than those near the head of the line. Of the total British casualties +fully a third fell upon the four leading ships—<i>Victory, +Téméraire, Royal Sovereign</i> and <i>Belleisle</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Not until about three o'clock were the shattered but victorious +British in the center threatened by the return of the ten ships in +the Allied van. Culpably slow, however hindered by lack of wind, +several of these joined stragglers from Gravina's division to leeward; +the <i>Intrépide</i>, under her brave skipper Infernet, +set an example all might well have followed by steering straight +for the <i>Bucentaure</i>, and surrendered only to overwhelming +odds; five others under Rear Admiral Dumanoir skirted to windward +and escaped with the loss of one of their number, cut off by two +British late-comers, <i>Spartiate</i> and <i>Minotaur</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Partial firing continued until 4:30, when a victory having been +reported to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Nelson, he died of +his wound." So reads the <i>Victory's</i> log. The flagship had +been in deadly grapple with the <i>Redoutable</i>, whose complement, +like that of many another French and Spanish ship in the action, +showed that the decadence of their navies was not due to lack of +fighting spirit in the rank and file. Nelson was mortally wounded +by a musket shot from the mizzen-top soon after the ships closed. +In his hour of supreme achievement death came not ungraciously, +giving final assurance of the glory which no man ever faced death +more eagerly to win. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the Allied fleet, four fled with Dumanoir, but were later engaged +and captured by a British squadron near Corunna. Eleven badly battered +survivors escaped into Cadiz. Of the 18 captured, 11 were wrecked or +destroyed in the gales <a name="page_278"><span class="page">Page +278</span></a> that swept the coast for several days after the +battle; three were recaptured or turned back to their crews by the +prize-masters, and only four eventually reached Gibraltar. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 417px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig052.png" width="417" height="663" alt="Fig. 52"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">From plan attached to report of Capt. Prigny, + Villeneuve's Chief of Staff (Deshrière, <i>Trafalgar</i>, + App. p. 128.)</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The Trafalgar victory did not indeed reduce France to terms, and it +thus illustrates the limitations of naval power <a name="page_279"><span +class="page">Page 279</span></a> against an enemy not primarily +dependent upon the sea. But it freed England from further threat +of invasion, clinched her naval predominance, and opened to her +the prospect of taking a more aggressive part in the land war. Even +this prospect was soon temporarily thrust into the background. On the +very day of Trafalgar Napoleon's bulletins announced the surrender +of 60,000 Austrians at Ulm, and the Battle of Austerlitz a month +later crushed the Third Coalition. The small British contingents in +Germany and southern Italy hastened back to their transports. It +was only later, when France was approaching exhaustion, that British +forces in the Spanish peninsula and elsewhere took a conspicuous +part in the Continental war. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Continental System</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +England's real offensive strength lay not in her armies but in her +grip on Europe's intercourse with the rest of the world. And on +the other hand, the only blow that Napoleon could still strike at +his chief enemy was to shut her from the markets of Europe—to +"defeat the sea by the land." This was the aim of his Continental +System. It meant a test of endurance—whether he could force +France and the rest of Europe to undergo the tremendous strain of +commercial isolation for a sufficient period to reduce England +to ruin. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Continental System came into being with Napoleon's famous Berlin +Decree of November, 1806, which, declaring a "paper" blockade of the +British Isles, put all trade with England under the ban. Under this +decree and later supplementary measures, goods of British origin, +whatever their subsequent ownership, were confiscated or destroyed +wherever French agents could lay hands on them; and neutral vessels +were seized and condemned for entering British ports, accepting +British convoy, or even submitting to British search. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +England's chief retaliatory measure was the Orders in Council of +November, 1807. Her object in these orders and later modifications +was not to cut off trade with the Continent, but to control it to +her own profit and the injury of the enemy—in short, "no +trade except through England." The orders <a name="page_280"><span +class="page">Page 280</span></a> aimed to compel the aid of neutrals +by excluding neutral ships from the Continent unless they should +first enter British ports, pay British dues, and (as would be an +inevitable consequence) give covert assistance in carrying on British +trade. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Continental System reached its greatest efficiency during the +apogée of Napoleon's power in 1809 and 1810. To check forbidden +traffic, which continued on an enormous scale, he annexed Holland +to his empire, and threw a triple cordon of French troops along +Germany's sea frontier. As a result, in the critical year of 1811 +goods piled up in British warehouses, factories closed, bankruptcies +doubled, and her financial system tottered.[1] But to bar the tide +of commerce at every port from Trieste to Riga was like trying +to stem the sea. At each leak in the barrier, sugar, coffee, and +British manufactures poured in, and were paid for at triple or +tenfold prices, not in exports, but in coin. Malta, the Channel +Islands, and Heligoland (seized by England from Denmark in 1807) +became centers of smuggling. The beginning of the end came when +the Czar, tired of French dictation and a policy ruinous to his +country, opened his ports, first to colonial products (December, +1810), and a year later to all British wares. Six hundred vessels, +brought under British convoy into the Baltic, docked at Libau, +and caravans of wagons filled the roads leading east and south. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: In spite of this crisis, British trade showed progressive +increase in each half decade from 1800 to 1815, and did not fall off +again until the five years after the war. The figures (in millions +of pounds sterling) follow: 1801-05, 61 million; 1806-10, 67 million; +1811-15, 74 million; 1816-20, 60 million.—Day, <span +class="sc">History of Commerce</span>, p. 355.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In June of 1812 Napoleon gathered his "army of twenty nations" for +the fatal Russian campaign. Now that they had served their purpose, +England on June 23 revoked her Orders in Council. The Continental +System had failed. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The War of 1812</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the same month, on June 18, the United States declared war on +Great Britain. Up to 1807 her commerce and shipping, in the words +of President Monroe, had "flourished beyond <a name="page_281"><span +class="page">Page 281</span></a> example," as shown by the single +fact that her re-export trade (in West Indies products) was greater +in that year than ever again until 1915.[1] Later they had suffered +from the coercion of both belligerents, and from her own futile +countermeasures of embargo and non-intercourse. Her final declaration +came tardily, if not indeed unwisely as a matter of practical policy, +however abundantly justified by England's commercial restrictions +and her seizure of American as well as British seamen on American +ships. An additional motive, which had decisive weight with the +dominant western faction in Congress, was the hope of gaining Canada +or at least extending the northern frontier. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: United States exports rose from a value of 56 million +dollars in 1803 to 108 million in 1807; then fell to 22 million in +1808, and after rising to about 50 million before the war, went +down to 6 million in 1814.—<i>Ibid.</i>, p 480.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A subordinate episode in the world conflict, the War of 1812 cannot +be neglected in naval annals. The tiny American navy retrieved +the failures of American land forces, and shook the British navy +out of a notorious slackness in gunnery and discipline engendered +by its easy victories against France and Spain. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In size the British Navy in 1812 was more formidable than at any +earlier period of the general war. Transport work with expeditionary +forces, blockade and patrol in European waters, and commerce protection +from the China Sea to the Baltic had in September, 1812, increased +the fleet to 686 vessels in active service, including 120 of the +line and 145 frigates. There were 75 in all on American stations, +against the total American Navy of 16, of which the best were the +fine 44-gun frigates <i>Constitution, President</i> and <i>United +States</i>. In the face of such odds, and especially as England's +European preoccupations relaxed, the result was inevitable. After +the first year of war, while a swarm of privateers and smaller war +vessels still took heavy toll of British commerce, the frigates +were blockaded in American ports and American commerce was destroyed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But before the blockade closed down, four frigate actions had been +fought, three of them American victories. In each <a +name="page_282"><span class="page">Page 282</span></a> instance, as +will be seen from the accompanying table, the advantage in weight +of broadside was with the victor. The American frigates were in fact +triumphs of American shipbuilding, finer in lines, more strongly +timbered, and more heavily gunned than British ships of their class. +But that good gunnery and seamanship figured in the results is +borne out by the fact that of the eight sloop actions fought during +the war, with a closer approach to equality of strength, seven +were American victories. The British carronades that had pounded +French ships at close range proved useless against opponents that +knew how to choose and hold their distance and could shoot straight +with long 24'S. +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center_btrb">Ship[1]</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Commander</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Wt. of broadside</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Crew</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Casualties</td> + <td class="center_btb">Place and date</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Constitution[2]</td> + <td class="left_brb">Hull</td> + <td class="center_brb">54</td> + <td class="center_brb">684</td> + <td class="center_brb">456</td> + <td class="center_brb">14</td> + <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">750 miles east of Boston, + Aug. 19, 1812.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Guerrière (Brit.)</td> + <td class="left_brb">Dacres</td> + <td class="center_brb">49</td> + <td class="center_brb">556</td> + <td class="center_brb">272</td> + <td class="center_brb">79</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">United States[2]</td> + <td class="left_brb">Decatur</td> + <td class="center_brb">54</td> + <td class="center_brb">786</td> + <td class="center_brb">478</td> + <td class="center_brb">12</td> + <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">Off Canary Islands, Oct. 25. + 1812.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Macedonian (Brit.)</td> + <td class="left_brb">Carden</td> + <td class="center_brb">49</td> + <td class="center_brb">547</td> + <td class="center_brb">301</td> + <td class="center_brb">104</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Constitution[2]</td> + <td class="left_brb">Bainbridge</td> + <td class="center_brb">52</td> + <td class="center_brb">654</td> + <td class="center_brb">475</td> + <td class="center_brb">34</td> + <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">Near Bahia, Dec. 29, 1812.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Java (Brit.)</td> + <td class="left_brb">Lambert</td> + <td class="center_brb">49</td> + <td class="center_brb">576</td> + <td class="center_brb">426</td> + <td class="center_brb">150</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Chesapeake</td> + <td class="left_brb">Broke</td> + <td class="center_brb">50</td> + <td class="center_brb">542</td> + <td class="center_brb">379</td> + <td class="center_brb">148</td> + <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">Off Boston, June 1, 1813.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Shannon (Brit.)[2]</td> + <td class="left_brb">Broke</td> + <td class="center_brb">52</td> + <td class="center_brb">550</td> + <td class="center_brb">330</td> + <td class="center_brb">83</td> +</table> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: The figures are from Roosevelt's <span class="sc">Naval +War of 1812</span>, in which 7% is deducted for the short weight +of American shot. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Victorious.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It seems," said a writer in the London <i>Times</i>, "that the +Americans have some superior mode of firing." But when Broke with +his crack crew in the <i>Shannon</i> beat the <i>Chesapeake</i> +fresh out of port, he demonstrated, as had the Americans in other +actions, that the superiority was primarily a matter of training +and skill. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the Great Lakes America's naval efforts should have <a +name="page_283"><span class="page">Page 283</span></a> centered, +for here was her main objective and here she was on equal terms. +Both sides were tremendously hampered in communications with their +main sources of supply. But with an approach from the sea to Montreal, +the British faced no more serious obstacle in the rapids of the St. +Lawrence above than did the Americans on the long route up the +Mohawk, over portages into Oneida Lake, and thence down the Oswego +to Ontario, or else from eastern Pennsylvania over the mountains to +Lake Erie. The wilderness waterways on both sides soon saw the +strange spectacle of immense anchors, cables, cannon, and ship +tackle of all kinds, as well as armies of sailors, shipwrights, +and riggers, making their way to the new rival bases at Sackett's +Harbor and Kingston, both near the foot of Lake Ontario. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the whole lake and river frontier, Ontario was of the most vital +importance. A decisive American victory here, including the capture +of Kingston, would cut enemy communications and settle the control +of all western Canada. Kingston as an objective had the advantage +over Montreal that it was beyond the direct reach of the British +navy. The British, fully realizing the situation, made every effort +to build up their naval forces on this lake, and gave Commodore Yeo, +who was in command, strict orders to avoid action unless certain +of success. On the other hand, the American commander, Chauncey, +though an energetic organizer, made the mistake of assuming that his +mission was also defensive. Hence when one fleet was strengthened by +a new ship it went out and chased the other off the lake, but there +was little fighting, both sides engaging in a grand shipbuilding +rivalry and playing for a sure thing. Naval control remained unsettled +and shifting throughout the war. It was fortunate, indeed, says +the British historian, James, that the war ended when it did, or +there would not have been room on the lake to maneuver the two +fleets. The <i>St. Lawrence</i>, a 112-gun three-decker completed +at Kingston in 1814, was at the time the largest man-of-war in +the world. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Possibly a growing lukewarmness about the war, manifested on both sides, +prevented more aggressive action. But it did <a name="page_284"><span +class="page">Page 284</span></a> not prevent two brilliant American +victories in the lesser theaters of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. +Perry's achievement on Lake Erie in building a superior flotilla +in the face of all manner of obstacles was even greater than that +of the victory itself. The result of the latter, won on September +10, 1813, is summed up in his despatch: "We have met the enemy and +they are ours—2 ships, 2 brigs, 1 schooner, and 1 sloop." +It assured the safety of the northwestern frontier. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On Lake Champlain Macdonough's successful defense just a year later +held up an invasion which, though it would not have been pushed +very strenuously in any case, might have made our position less +favorable for the peace negotiations then already under way. In +this action, as in the one on Lake Erie, the total strength of each +of the opposing flotillas, measured in weight of broadsides (1192 +pounds for the British against 1194 far the Americans), was about +that of a single ship-of-the-line. But the number of units employed +raised all the problems of a squadron engagement. Macdonough's +shrewd choice of position in Plattsburg Bay, imposing upon the +enemy a difficult approach under a raking fire, and his excellent +handling of his ships in action, justify his selection as the ablest +American naval leader developed by the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the outbreak of the American War, France and England had been +engaged in a death grapple in which the rights of neutrals were +trampled under foot. Napoleon, by his paper blockade and confiscations +on any pretext, had been a more glaring offender. But America's +quarrel was after all not with France, who needed American trade, +but with England, a commercial rival, who could back her restrictions +by naval power. Once France was out of the war, the United States +found it easy to come to terms with England, whose commerce was +suffering severely from American privateers.[1] At the close of the +war the questions at issue when it began had <a name="page_285"><span +class="page">Page 285</span></a> dropped into abeyance, and were +not mentioned in the treaty terms. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: According to figures cited in Mahan's <span class="sc">War +of 1812</span>, (Vol. II, p. 224), 22 American naval vessels took +165 British prizes, and 526 privateers took 1344 prizes. In the +absence of adequate motives on either side for prolonging the war, +these losses, though not more severe than those inflicted by French +cruisers, were decisive factors for peace.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The view taken of the aggressions of sea power in the Napoleonic +Wars will depend largely on the view taken regarding the justice of +the cause in which it fought. It saved the Continent from military +conquest. It preserved the European balance of power, a balance +which statesmen of that age deemed essential to the safety of Europe +and the best interests of America and the rest of the world. On +the other hand, but for the sacrifices of England's land allies, +the Continental System would have forced her to make peace, though +still undefeated at sea. Even if her territorial accessions were +slight, England came out of the war undisputed "mistress of the +seas" as she had never been before, and for nearly a century to come +was without a dangerous rival in naval power and world commerce. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For general history of the period see: <span class="sc">Histories +of the British Navy</span> by Clowes (Vols. V, VI, 1900) and Hannay +(1909), Mahan's <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon the +French Revolution and Empire</span> (1892) and <span class="sc">War +of 1812</span> (1905), Chevalier's <span class="sc">Histoire de la Marine +Française sous la Première République</span> +(1886), Gravière's <span class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span> +(1885), Callender's <span class="sc">Sea Kings of Britain</span> +(Vol. III, 1911), and Maltzahn's <span class="sc">Naval Warfare</span> +(tr. Miller, 1908). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Among biographies: Mahan's and Laughton's lives of Nelson, Anson's +<span class="sc">Life of Jervis</span> (1913), Clark Russell's +<span class="sc">Life of Collingwood</span> (1892), and briefer +sketches in <span class="sc">From Howard to Nelson</span>, ed. +Laughton (1899). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the Trafalgar campaign see: +</p> + +<p class="list"> +British Admiralty blue-book on <span class="sc">The Tactics of +Trafalgar</span> (with bibliography, 1913), Corbett's <span +class="sc">Campaign of Trafalgar</span> (1910), Col. Desbrière's +<span class="sc">Projets et Tentatives de Débarquement aux Iles +Britanniques</span> (1902) and <span class="sc">Campagne Maritime +de Trafalgar</span> (1907). +</p> + +<p class="list"> +See also Col. C. E. Callwell's <span class="sc">Military Operations +and Maritime Preponderance</span> (1913), and Professor Clive Day's +<span class="sc">History of Commerce</span> (revised edition, 1911, +with bibliography). +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_286"><span class="page">Page 286</span></a> +CHAPTER XIV</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE: HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the 19th century, from 1815 to 1898, naval power, though +always an important factor in international relations, played in +general a passive rôle. The wars which marked the unification +of Germany and Italy and the thrusting back of Turkey from the +Balkans were fought chiefly on land. The navy of England, though +never more constantly busy in protecting her far-flung empire, was +not challenged to a genuine contest for mastery of the seas. In the +Greek struggle for independence there were two naval engagements of +some consequence—Chios (1822), where the Greeks with fireships +destroyed a Turkish squadron and gained temporary control of the +Ægean, and Navarino (1827), in which a Turkish force consisting +principally of frigates was wiped out by a fleet of the western +powers. But both of these actions were one-sided, and showed nothing +new in types or tactics. In the American Civil War control of the +sea was important and even decisive, but was overwhelmingly in the +hands of the North. Hence the chief naval interest of the period +lies not so much in the fighting as in the revolutionary changes +in ships, weapons, and tactics—changes which parallel the +extraordinary scientific progress of the century; and the engagements +may be studied now, as they were studied then, as testing and +illustrating the new methods and materials of naval war. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Changes in Ships and Weapons</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Down to the middle of the 19th century there had been only a slow and +slight development in ships and weapons for a <a name="page_287"><span +class="page">Page 287</span></a> period of nearly 300 years. A sailor +of the Armada would soon have felt at home in a three-decker of +1815. But he would have been helpless as a child in the fire-driven +iron monsters that fought at Hampton Roads. The shift from sail to +steam, from oak to iron, from shot to shell, and from muzzle-loading +smoothbore to breech-loading rifle began about 1850; and progress +thereafter was so swift that an up-to-date ship of each succeeding +decade was capable of defeating a whole squadron of ten years before. +Success came to depend on the adaptability and mechanical skill of +personnel, as well as their courage and discipline, and also upon +the progressive spirit of constructors and naval experts, faced +with the most difficult problems, the wrong solution of which would +mean the waste of millions of dollars and possible defeat in war. +Every change had to overcome the spirit of conservatism inherent in +military organizations, where seniority rules, errors are sanctified +by age, and every innovation upsets cherished routine. Thus in the +contract for Ericsson's <i>Monitor</i> it was stipulated that she +should have masts, spars, and sails! +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first successful steamboat for commerce was, as is well known, +Robert Fulton's flat-bottomed side-wheeler <i>Clermont</i>, which +in August, 1807, made the 150 miles from New York to Albany in 32 +hours. During the war of 1812 Fulton designed for coast defense +a heavily timbered, double-ender floating battery, with a single +paddle-wheel located inside amidships. On her trial trip in 1815 +this first steam man-of-war, the U. S. S. <i>Fulton</i>, carried +26 guns and made over 6 knots, but she was then laid up and was +destroyed a few years later by fire. Ericsson's successful application +of the screw propeller in 1837 made steam propulsion more feasible +for battleships by clearing the decks and eliminating the clumsy +and exposed side-wheels. The first American screw warship was the +U. S. S. <i>Princeton</i>, of 1843, but every ship in the American +Navy at the outbreak of the Civil War had at least auxiliary sail +rig. Though by 1850 England had 30 vessels with auxiliary steam, the +<i>Devastation</i> of 1869 was the first in the British service to +use steam exclusively. Long after this time old "floating museums" +with sail rig and smoothbores were retained <a name="page_288"><span +class="page">Page 288</span></a> in most navies for motives of +economy, and even the first ships of the American "White Squadron" +were encumbered with sails and spars. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 551px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig053.png" width="551" height="473" alt="Fig. 53"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">EARLY IRONCLADS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Progress in ordnance began about 1822, when explosive shells, hitherto +used only in mortars, were first adopted for ordinary cannon with +horizontal fire. At the time of the Crimean War shells were the +usual ammunition for lower tier guns, and at Sinope in 1853 their +smashing effect against wooden hulls was demonstrated when a Russian +squadron destroyed some Turkish vessels which fired only solid +shot. The great professional cry of the time, we are told, became +"For God's sake, keep out the shell."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Custance, <span class="sc">The Ship of the Line in +Battle</span>, p. 9.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In 1851 Minié rifles supplanted in the British army the old +<a name="page_289"><span class="page">Page 289</span></a> smoothbore +musket or "Brown Bess," with which at ranges above 200 yards it was +difficult to hit a target 11 feet square. This change led quickly +to the rifling of heavy ordnance as well. The first Armstrong rifles +of 1858—named after their inventor, Sir William Armstrong, +head of the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich—included guns up +to 7-inch diameter of bore. The American navy, however, depended +chiefly on smoothbores throughout the Civil War. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Breech-loading, which had been used centuries earlier, came in +again with these first rifles, but after 1865 the British navy +went back to muzzle-loading and stuck to it persistently for the +next 15 years. By that time the breech-loading mechanism had been +simplified, and its adoption became necessary to secure greater length +of gun barrel, increased rapidity of fire, and better protection for +gun-crews. About 1880 quick-fire guns of from 3 to 6 inches, firing +12 or 15 shots a minute, were mounted in secondary batteries. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As already suggested, the necessity for armor arose from the smashing +and splintering effect of shell against wooden targets and the +penetrating power of rifled guns. To attack Russian forts in the +Crimea, the French navy in 1855 built three steam-driven floating +batteries, the <i>Tonnant, Lave</i>, and <i>Dévastation</i>, +each protected by 4.3-inch plates and mounting 8 56-lb. guns. In +the reduction of the Kinburn batteries, in October of the same +year, these boats suffered little, but were helped out by an +overwhelming fire from wooden ships, 630 guns against 81 in the +forts. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The French armored ship <i>Gloire</i> of 1859 caused England serious +worry about her naval supremacy, and led at once to H. M. S. +<i>Warrior</i>, like the <i>Gloire</i>, full rigged with auxiliary +steam. The <i>Warrior's</i> 4.5-inch armor, extending from 6 feet +below the waterline to 16 feet above and covering about 42 per +cent of the visible target, was proof against the weapons of the +time. At this initial stage in armored construction, naval experts +turned with intense interest to watch the work of ironclads against +ships and forts in the American Civil War. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_290"><span class="page">Page 290</span></a> +<i>The American Civil War</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The naval activities of this war are too manifold to follow in +detail. For four years the Union navy was kept constantly occupied +with the tasks of blockading over 3000 miles of coast-line, running +down enemy commerce destroyers, cooperating with the army in the +capture of coast strongholds, and opening the Mississippi and other +waterways leading into the heart of the Confederacy. To make the +blockade effective and cut off the South from the rest of the world, +the Federal Government unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of +"continuous voyage," seizing and condemning neutral ships even when +bound from England to Bermuda or the Bahamas, if their cargo was +ultimately destined for Southern ports. The doctrine was declared +inapplicable when the last leg of the journey was by land,[1] doubtless +because there was little danger of heavy traffic across the Mexican +frontier. Blockade runners continued to pour goods into the South +until the fall of Fort Fisher in 1865; but as the blockade became +more stringent, it crippled the finances of the Confederacy, shut +out foodstuffs and munitions, and shortened, if it did not even +have a decisive effect in winning the war. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Peterhoff Case, 1866 (5 Wall, 28).] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To meet these measures the South was at first practically without +naval resources, and had to turn at once to new methods of war. +Its first move was to convert the steam frigate <i>Merrimac</i>, +captured half-burned with the Norfolk Navy Yard, into an ironclad +ram. A casemate of 4 inches of iron over 22 inches of wood, sloping +35 degrees from the vertical, was extended over 178 feet, or about +two-thirds of her hull. Beyond this structure the decks were awash. +The <i>Merrimac</i> had an armament of 6 smoothbores and 4 rifles, +two of the latter being pivot-guns at bow and stern, and a 1500-lb. +cast-iron beak or ram. With her heavy load of guns and armor she +drew 22 feet aft and could work up a speed of barely 5 knots. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Faced with this danger, the North hurriedly adopted Ericsson's plan +for the <i>Monitor</i>,[2] which was contracted for on October 4, 1861, +and launched after 100 days. Old marlin-spike <a name="page_291"><span +class="page">Page 291</span></a> seamen pooh-poohed this "cheesebox +on a raft." As a naval officer said, it might properly be worshiped +by its designer, for it was an image of nothing in the heavens +above, or the earth beneath, or the waters under the earth. It +consisted of a revolving turret with 8-inch armor and two 11-inch +smoothbore guns, set on a raft-like structure 142 feet in length by +41-1/2 feet in beam, projecting at bow, stern, and sides beyond a +flat-bottomed lower hull. Though unseaworthy, the <i>Monitor</i> +maneuvered quickly and drew only 10-1/2 feet. She was first ordered +to the Gulf, but on March 6 this destination was suddenly changed +to the Chesapeake. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: So called by Ericsson because it would "admonish" +the South, and also suggest to England "doubts as to the propriety +of completing four steel-clad ships at three and one-half millions +apiece."] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The South in fact won the race in construction and got its ship +first into action by a margin of just half a day. At noon on March +8, with the iron-workers still driving her last rivets, the +<i>Merrimac</i> steamed out of Norfolk and advanced ponderously +upon the three sail and two steam vessels then anchored in Hampton +Roads. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Northern navy there had been much skepticism about the ironclad +and no concerted plan to meet her attack. Under a rain of fire from +the Union ships, and from share fortifications too distant to be +effective, the <i>Merrimac</i> rammed and sank the sloop-of-war +<i>Cumberland</i>, and then, after driving the frigate <i>Congress</i> +aground, riddled her with shells. Towards nightfall the Confederate +vessel moved dawn stream, to continue the slaughter next day. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +About 12 o'clock that night, after two days of terrible buffeting +on the voyage down the coast, the little <i>Monitor</i> anchored on +the scene lighted up by the burning wreck of the <i>Congress</i>. +The first battle of ironclads began next morning at 8:30 and continued +with slight intermission till noon. It ended in a triumph, not for +either ship, but for armor over guns. The <i>Monitor</i> fired +41 solid shot, 20 of which struck home, but merely cracked some +of the <i>Merrimac's</i> outer plates. The <i>Monitor</i> was hit +22 times by enemy shells. Neither craft was seriously harmed and +not a man was killed on either side, though several were stunned or +otherwise injured. Lieut. <a name="page_292"><span class="page">Page +292</span></a> Worden, in command of the <i>Monitor</i>, was nearly +blinded by a shell that smashed in the pilot house, a square iron +structure then located not above the turret but on the forward +deck. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The drawn battle was hailed as a Northern victory. Imagination +had been drawing dire pictures of what the <i>Merrimac</i> might +do. At a Cabinet meeting in Washington Sunday morning, March 9, +Secretary of War Stanton declared: "The <i>Merrimac</i> will change +the course of the war; she will destroy <i>seriatim</i> every naval +vessel; she will lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution. +I have no doubt that the enemy is at this minute on the way to +Washington, and that we shall have a shell from one of her guns in +the White House before we leave this room." The menace was somewhat +exaggerated. With her submerged decks, feeble engines, and general +awkwardness, the <i>Merrimac</i> could scarcely navigate in Hampton +Roads. In the first day's fighting her beak was wrenched off and +a leak started, two guns were put out of action, and her funnel +and all other top-hamper were riddled. As was shown by Farragut in +Mobile Bay, and again by Tegetthoff at Lissa, even wooden vessels, +if in superior numbers, might do something against an ironclad in +an aggressive mêlée. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Both the antagonists at Hampton Roads ended their careers before +the close of 1862; the <i>Merrimac</i> was burned by her crew at +the evacuation of Norfolk, and the <i>Monitor</i> was sunk under +tow in a gale off Hatteras. But turret ships, monitors, and armored +gunboats soon multiplied in the Union navy and did effective service +against the defenses of Southern harbors and rivers. Under Farragut's +energetic leadership, vessels both armored and unarmored passed with +relatively slight injury the forts below New Orleans, at Vicksburg, +and at the entrance to Mobile Bay. Even granting that the shore +artillery was out of date and not very expertly served, it is well +to realize that similar conditions may conceivably recur, and that +the superiority of forts over ships is qualified by conditions +of equipment and personnel. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Actually to destroy or capture shore batteries by naval force is +another matter. As Ericsson said, "A single shot will sink <a +name="page_293"><span class="page">Page 293</span></a> a ship, +while 100 rounds cannot silence a fort."[1] Attacks of this kind +against Fort McAllister and Charleston failed. At Charleston, April +7, 1863, the ironclads faced a cross-fire from several forts, 47 +smoothbores and 17 rifles against 29 smoothbores and 4 rifles in +the ships, and in waters full of obstructions and mines. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Wilson, <span class="sc">Ironclads in action</span>, +Vol. I, p. 91.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The capture of Fort Fisher, commanding the main entrance to Wilmington, +North Carolina, was accomplished in January, 1865, by the combined +efforts of the army and navy. The fort, situated on a narrow neck +of land between the Cape Fear River and the sea, had 20 guns on +its land face and 24 on its sea face, 15 of them rifled. Against +it were brought 5 ironclads with 18 guns, backed up by over 200 +guns in the rest of the fleet. After a storm of shot and shell +for three successive days, rising at times to "drum-fire," the +barrage was lifted at a signal and troops and sailors dashed forward +from their positions on shore. Even after this preparation the +capture cost 1000 men. As at Kinhurn in the Crimean War, the +effectiveness of the naval forces was due less to protective armor +than to volume of fire. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Submarines and Torpedoes</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the defense of Southern harbors, mines and torpedoes for the +first time came into general use, and the submarine scored its +first victim. Experiments with these devices had been going on +for centuries, but were first brought close to practical success +by David Bushnell, a Connecticut Yankee of the American Revolution. +His tiny submarine, resembling a mud-turtle standing on its tail, +embodied many features of modern underwater boats, including a +primitive conning tower, screw propulsion (by foot power), a vertical +screw to drive the craft down, and a detachable magazine with 150 +pounds of gunpowder. The <i>Turtle</i> paddled around and even +under British men-of-war off New York and New London, but could +not drive a spike through their copper bottoms to attach its mine. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Robert Fulton, probably the greatest genius in nautical invention, +<a name="page_294"><span class="page">Page 294</span></a> carried +the development of bath mines and submarines much further. His +<i>Nautilus</i>, so-called because its collapsible sail resembled +that of the familiar chambered nautilus, was surprisingly ahead of +its time; it had a fish-like shape, screw propulsion (by a two-man +hand winch), horizontal diving rudder, compressed air tank, water +tank filled or emptied by a pump, and a torpedo[1] consisting of +a detachable case of gunpowder. A lanyard ran from the torpedo +through an eye in a spike, to be driven in the enemy hull, and +thence to the submarine, which as it moved away brought the torpedo +up taut against the spike and caused its explosion. Fulton interested +Napoleon in his project, submerged frequently for an hour or more, +and blew up a hulk in Brest harbor. But the greybeards in the French +navy frowned on these novel methods, declaring them "immoral" and +"contrary to the laws of war." +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: This name, coined by Fulton, was from the <i>torpedo +electricus</i>, or cramp fish, which kills its victim by electric +shock.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 550px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig054.png" width="550" height="226" alt="Fig. 54"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BUSHNELL'S TURTLE</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Later the British Government entered into negotiations with the +inventor, and in October, 1804, used his mines in an unsuccessful +attack an the French flotilla of invasion at Boulogne. Only one +pinnace was sunk. Fulton still maintained that he could "sweep +all military marines off the ocean."[2] But Trafalgar ended his +chances. As the old Admiral Earl St. <a name="page_295"><span +class="page">Page 295</span></a> Vincent remarked, "Pitt [the Prime +Minister] would be the greatest fool that ever existed to encourage +a mode of war which they who command the sea do not want and which +if successful would deprive them of it." So Fulton took £15,000 +and dropped his schemes. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Letter to Pitt, Jan. 6, 1806.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 549px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig055.png" width="549" height="498" alt="Fig. 55"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">FULTON'S NAUTILUS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Much cruder than the <i>Nautilus</i>, owing to their hurried +construction, were the Confederate "Davids" of the Civil War. One +of these launches, which ran only semi-submerged, drove a spar +torpedo against the U. S. S. <i>New Ironsides</i> off Charleston, but +it exploded on the rebound, too far away. The C. S. S. <i>Hunley</i> +was a real submarine, and went down readily, but on five occasions +it failed to emerge properly, and drowned in these experiments +about 35 men. In August, 1864, running on the surface, it sank by +torpedo the U. S. Corvette <i>Housatonic</i> <a name="page_296"><span +class="page">Page 296</span></a> off Charleston, but went down +in the suction of the larger vessel, carrying to death its last +heroic crew. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +By the end of the century, chiefly owing to the genius and patient +efforts of two American inventors, John P. Holland and Simon Lake, +the submarine was passing from the experimental to the practical +stage. Its possibilities were increased by the Whitehead torpedo +(named after its inventor, a British engineer established in Fiume, +Austria), which came out in 1868 and was soon adopted in European +navies. With gyroscopic stabilizing devices and a "warmer" for the +compressed air of its engine, the torpedo attained before 1900 +a speed of 28 knots and a possible range of 1000 yards. Its first +victim was the Chilean warship <i>Blanco</i>, sunk in 1891 at 50 +yards after two misses. Thornycroft in England first achieved speed +for small vessels, and in 1873 began turning out torpedo boats. +Destroyers came in twenty years later, and by the end of the century +were making over 30 knots. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Long before this time the lessons of the Civil War had hastened the +adoption of armor, the new ships ranging from high-sided vessels +with guns in broadside, as in the past, to low freeboard craft +influenced by the <i>Monitor</i> design, with a few large guns +protected by revolving turrets or fixed barbettes, and with better +provision for all-around fire. Ordnance improved in penetrating +power, until the old wrought-iron armor had to be 20 inches thick +and confined to waterline and batteries. Steel "facing" and the +later plates of Krupp or Harveyized steel made it possible again +to lighten and spread out the armor, and during the last decade +of the century it steadily increased its ascendancy over the gun. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Battle of Lissa</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The adoption of armor meant sacrifice of armament, and a departure +from Farragut's well-tried maxim, "The best protection against the +enemy's fire is a well-sustained fire from your own guns." Thus +the British <i>Dreadnought</i> of 1872 gave 35% of its displacement +to armor and only 5% to armament. Invulnerability was secured at the +expense of offensive power. <a name="page_297"><span class="page">Page +297</span></a> That aggressive tactics and weapons retained all +their old value in warfare was to receive timely illustration in +the Battle of Lissa, fought in the year after the American war. The +engagement illustrated also another of Farragut's pungent maxims +to the effect that iron in the ships is less important than "iron in +the men"—a saying especially true when, as with the Austrians +at Lissa, the iron is in the chief in command. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In 1866 Italy and Prussia attacked Austria in concert, Italy having +secured from Bismarck a pledge of Venetia in the event of victory. +Though beaten at Custozza on June 24, the Italians did their part +by keeping busy an Austrian army of 80,000. Moltke crushed the +northern forces of the enemy at Sadowa on July 3, and within three +weeks had reached the environs of Vienna and practically won the +war. Lissa was fought on July 20, just 6 days before the armistice. +This general political and military situation should be borne in +mind as throwing some light on the peculiar Italian strategy in +the Lissa campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Struggling Italy, her unification under the House of Piedmont as yet +only partly achieved, had shown both foresight and energy in building +up a fleet. Her available force on the day of Lissa consisted of 12 +armored ships and 16 wooden steam vessels of same fighting value. +The ironclads included 7 armored frigates, the best of which were the +two "kings," <i>Re d'Italia</i> and <i>Re di Portogallo</i>, built +the year before in New York (rather badly, it is said), each armed +with about 30 heavy rifles. Then there was the new single-turret +ram <i>Affondatore</i>, or "Sinker," with two 300-pounder 10-inch +rifles, which came in from England only the day before the battle. +Some of the small protected corvettes and gunboats were of much less +value, the <i>Palestro</i>, for instance, which suffered severely +in the fight, having a thin sheet of armor over only two-fifths of +her exposed hull. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Austrian fleet had the benefit of some war experience against +Denmark in the North Sea two years before, but it was far inferior +and less up-to-date, its armored ships consisting of 7 screw frigates +armed chiefly with smoothbores. Of the <a name="page_298"><span +class="page">Page 298</span></a> wooden ships, there were 7 screw +frigates and corvettes, 9 gunboats and schooners, and 3 little +side-wheelers—a total of 19. The following table indicates +the relative strength: +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="left_btrb" rowspan="2"> </td> + <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Armored</td> + <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Wooden</td> + <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Small craft</td> + <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Total</td> + <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Rifles</td> + <td class="center_btb" rowspan="2">Total w't of metal</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center_brb">No.</td> + <td class="center_brb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_brb">No.</td> + <td class="center_brb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_brb">No.</td> + <td class="center_brb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_brb">No.</td> + <td class="center_brb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_brb">No.</td> + <td class="center_brb">Weight</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Austria</td> + <td class="center_br">7</td> + <td class="center_br">176</td> + <td class="center_br">7</td> + <td class="center_br">304</td> + <td class="center_br">12</td> + <td class="center_br">52</td> + <td class="center_br">22</td> + <td class="center_br">532</td> + <td class="center_br">121</td> + <td class="center_br">7,130</td> + <td class="center">23,538</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Italy</td> + <td class="center_brb">12</td> + <td class="center_brb">243</td> + <td class="center_brb">11</td> + <td class="center_brb">382</td> + <td class="center_brb">5</td> + <td class="center_brb">16</td> + <td class="center_brb">28</td> + <td class="center_brb">641</td> + <td class="center_brb">276</td> + <td class="center_brb">28,700</td> + <td class="center_bb">53,236</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus in general terms the Italians were nearly twice as strong +in main units, could fire twice as heavy a weight of metal from +all their guns, and four times as heavy from their rifles. Even +without the <i>Affondatore</i>, their advantage was practically +as great as this from the beginning of the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With such a preponderance, it would seem as if Persano, the Italian +commander in chief, could easily have executed his savage-sounding +orders to "sweep the enemy from the Adriatic, and to attack and +blockade them wherever found." He was dilatory, however, in assembling +his fleet, negligent in practice and gun drill, and passive in his +whole policy to a degree absolutely ruinous to morale. War was +declared June 20, and had long been foreseen; yet it was June 25 +before he moved the bulk of his fleet from Taranto to Ancona in +the Adriatic. Here on the 27th they were challenged by 13 Austrian +ships, which lay off the port cleared for action for two hours, while +Persano made no real move to fight. It is said that the Italian +defeat at Custozza three days before had taken the heart out of +him. On July 8 he put to sea for a brief three days' cruise and +went through some maneuvers and signaling but no firing, though +many of the guns were newly mounted and had never been tried by +their crews. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this time Napoleon III of France had already undertaken mediation +between the hostile powers. In spite of the orders of June 8, quoted +above, which seem sufficiently definite, <a name="page_299"><span +class="page">Page 299</span></a> and urgent orders to the same +effect later, Persano was unwilling to take the offensive, and +kept complaining of lack of clear instructions as to what he should +do. He was later convicted of cowardice and negligence; but the +campaign he finally undertook against Lissa was dangerous enough, +and it seems possible that some secret political maneuvering was +partly responsible for his earlier delay.[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: In July Persano wrote to the Deputy Boggio: "Leave the +care of my reputation to me; I would rather be wrongly dishonored +than rightly condemned. Patience will bring peace; I shall be called +a traitor, but nevertheless Italy will have her fleet intact, and +that of Austria will be rendered useless." Quoted in Bernotti, +<span class="sc">Il Potere Marittimo Nella Grande Guerra</span>, +p. 177.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is significant at least that the final proposal to make a descent +upon the fortified island of Lissa came not from Persana but from +the Minister of Marine. On July 15 the latter took up the project +with the fleet chief of staff, d'Amico, and with Rear Admiral Vacca, +but not until later with Persano. All agreed that the prospect +of a truce allowed no time for a movement against Venice or the +Austrian base at Pola, but that they should strike a swift stroke +elsewhere. Lissa commanded the Dalmatian coast, was essential to +naval control in the Adriatic, and was coveted by Italy then as +in later times. It would be better than trying to crush the enemy +fleet at the risk of her own if she could enter the peace conference +with possession of Lissa a <i>fait accompli</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Undertaken in the face of an undefeated enemy fleet, this move has +been justly condemned by naval strategists. But with a less alert +opponent the coup might have succeeded. Tegetthoff, the Austrian +commander, was not yet 41 years of age, but had been in active +naval service since he was 18, and had led a squadron bravely in +a fight with the Danes two years before off Heligoland. He had +his heterogeneous array of fighting craft assembled at Pola at +the outbreak of war. "Give me everything you have," he told the +Admiralty when they asked him what ships he wanted; "I'll find +some use for them." His crews were partly men of Slav and Italian +stock from the Adriatic coast, including 600 from Venice; there +is no reason for supposing them better than those of Persano. The +influence <a name="page_300"><span class="page">Page 300</span></a> +of their leader, however, inspired them with loyalty and fighting +spirit, and their defiance of the Italians at Ancona on June 27 +increased their confidence. When successive cable messages from +Lissa satisfied him that the Italian fleet was not attempting a +diversion but was actually committed to an attack on the island, +Tegetthoff set out thither on July 19 with his entire fighting +force. His order of sailing was the order of battle. "Every captain +knew the admiral's intention as well as the admiral himself did; +every officer knew what had to be done, and every man had some +idea of it, and above all knew that he had to fight."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Laughton, <span class="sc">Studies in Naval History</span>, +Tegetthoff, p. 164.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the meantime the Italian drive on Lissa had gone ahead slowly. +The island batteries were on commanding heights and manned by marines +and artillerymen resolved to fight to the last ditch. During the +second day's bombardment the <i>Affondatore</i> appeared, and also +some additional troops needed to complete the landing force. Two-thirds +of the guns on shore were silenced that day, and if the landing +operations had been pushed, the island captured, and the fleet +taken into the protected harbor of St. Giorgio, Tegetthoff would +have had a harder problem to solve. But as the mist blew away with +a southerly wind at 10 o'clock on the next day, July 20, the weary +garrison on the heights of the island gave cheer after cheer as +they saw the Austrian squadron plunging through the head seas at +full speed from the northeastward, while the Italian ships hurriedly +drew together north of the island to meet the blow. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Austrians advanced in three successive divisions, ironclads, +wooden frigates, and finally the smaller vessels, each in a wedge-shaped +formation (shown by the diagram), with the apex toward the enemy. +The object was to drive through the Italian line if possible near +the van and bring on a close scrimmage in which all ships could +take part, ramming tactics could be employed, and the enemy would +profit less by their superiority in armor and guns. Like Nelson's at +Trafalgar, Tegetthoff's formation was one not likely to be imitated, +but it was <a name="page_301"><span class="page">Page 301</span></a> +at least simple and well understood, and against a passive resistance +it gave the results planned. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 551px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig056.png" width="551" height="521" alt="Fig. 56"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +"<i>Ecco i pescatori!</i>" (Here come the fishermen), cried Persana, +with a scorn he was far from actually feeling. The Italians were +in fact caught at a disadvantage. One of their best ships, the +<i>Formidabile</i>, had been put <i>hors de combat</i> by the batteries +on the day before. Another, coming in late from the west end of the +island, took no part in the action. The wooden ships, owing to the +cowardice of their commander, Albini, also kept out of the fight, +though Persano signaled desperately to them to enter the engagement +and "surround the enemy rear." With his remaining ironclads Persano +formed three divisions <a name="page_302"><span class="page">Page +302</span></a> of three ships each and swung across the enemy's +bows in line ahead. Just at the critical moment, and for no very +explicable motive, he shifted his flag from the <i>Re d'Italia</i> +in the center to the <i>Affondatore</i>, which was steaming alone +on the starboard side of the line. The change was not noted by all +his ships, and thus caused confusion of orders. The delay involved +also left a wider gap between van and center, and through this the +Austrians plunged, Tegetthoff in his flagship <i>Erzherzog Ferdinand +Max</i> leading the way. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Here orderly formation ended, and only the more striking episodes +stand out in a desperate close combat, during which the black ships +of Austria and the gray of Italy rammed or fired into each other +amid a smother of smoke and spray. The Austrian left flank and rear +held up the Italian van; the Austrian ironclads engaged the Italian +center; and the wooden ships of the Austrian middle division, led by +the 92-gun <i>Kaiser</i>, smashed into the Italian rear. Of all the +Austrian ships, the big <i>Kaiser</i>, a relic of other days, saw +the hardest fighting. Twice she avoided the <i>Affondatore's</i> +ram, and she was struck by one of her 300-pound projectiles. Then +the <i>Re di Portogallo</i> bore down, but Petz, the <i>Kaiser's</i> +captain, rang for full speed ahead and steered for the ironclad, +striking a glancing blow and scraping past her, while both ships +poured in a heavy fire. The <i>Kaiser</i> soon afterward drew out +of the action, her foremast and funnel down, and a bad blaze burning +amidships. Altogether she fired 850 rounds in the action, or about +one-fifth of the total fired by the Austrians, and she received +80 hits, again one-fifth of the total. Of the 38 Austrians killed +and 138 wounded in the battle, she lost respectively 24 and 75. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The <i>Kaiser's</i> combat, though more severe, was typical of what +was going on elsewhere. The Italian gunboat <i>Palestro</i> was forced +to withdraw to fight a fire that threatened her magazines. The <i>Re +d'Italia</i>, which was at first supposed by the Austrians to be +Persano's flagship, was a center of attack and had her steering gear +disabled. As she could go only straight ahead or astern, the Austrian +flagship seized the chance and rammed her squarely amidships at full +speed, <a name="page_303"><span class="page">Page 303</span></a> +crashing through her armor and opening an immense hole. The Italian +gunboat heeled over to starboard, then back again, and in a few +seconds went down, with a loss of 381 men. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This spectacular incident practically decided the battle. After an +hour's fighting the two squadrons drew apart about noon, the Austrians +finally entering St. Giorgio harbor and the Italians withdrawing +to westward. During the retreat the fire on the <i>Palestro</i> +reached her ammunition and she blew up with a loss of 231 of her +crew. Except in the two vessels destroyed, the Italian losses were +slight—8 killed and 40 wounded. But the armored ships were +badly battered, and less than a month later the <i>Affondatore</i> +sank in a squall in Ancona harbor, partly, it was thought, owing +to injuries received at Lissa. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For a long time after this fight, an exaggerated view was held +regarding the value of ramming, line abreast formation, and bow +fire. Weapons condition tactics, and these tactics of Tegetthoff +were suited to the means he had to work with. But they were not +those which should have been adopted by his opponents; nor would +they have been successful had the Italians brought their broadsides +to bear on a parallel course and avoided a mêlée. +What the whole campaign best illustrates—and the lesson has +permanent interest—is how a passive and defensive policy, +forced upon the Italian fleet by the incompetence of its admiral +or otherwise, led to its demoralization and ultimate destruction. +After a long period of inactivity, Persano weakened his force against +shore defenses before he had disposed of the enemy fleet, and was +then taken at a disadvantage. His passive strategy was reflected in +his tactics. He engaged with only a part of his force, and without +a definite plan; "A storm of signals swept over his squadron" as +it went into action. What really decided the battle was not the +difference in ships, crews, or weapons, but the difference in +aggressiveness and ability of the two admirals in command. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_304"><span class="page">Page 304</span></a> +<i>The Battle of the Yalu</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Twenty-eight years elapsed after Lissa before the next significant +naval action, the Battle of the Yalu, between fleets of China and +Japan. Yet the two engagements may well be taken together, since +at the Yalu types and tactics were still transitional, and the +initial situation at Lissa was duplicated—line abreast against +line ahead. The result, however, was reversed, for the Japanese +in line ahead took the initiative, used their superior speed to +conduct the battle on their own terms, and won the day. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Trouble arose in the Far East over the dissolution of the decrepit +monarchy of Korea, upon which both Japan and China cast covetous +eyes. As nominal suzerain, China in the spring of 1894 sent 2000 +troops to Korea to suppress an insurrection, without observing +certain treaty stipulations which required her to notify Japan. The +latter nation despatched 5000 men to Chemulpo in June. Hostilities +broke out on July 25, when four fast Japanese cruisers, including +the <i>Naniwa Kan</i> under the future Admiral Togo, fell upon the +Chinese cruiser <i>Tsi-yuen</i> and two smaller vessels, captured +the latter and battered the cruiser badly before she got away, and +then to complete the day's work sank a Chinese troop transport, +saving only the European officers on board. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After this affair the Chinese Admiral Ting, a former cavalry officer +but with some naval experience, favored taking the offensive, since +control of the sea by China would at once decide the war. But the +Chinese Foreign Council gave him orders not to cruise east of a +line from Shantung to the mouth of the Yalu. Reverses on land soon +forced him to give all his time to troop transportation, and this +occupied both navies throughout the summer. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On September 16, the day before the Battle of the Yalu, the Chinese +battleships escorted transports with 5000 troops to the mouth of +the Yalu, and on the following morning they were anchored quietly +outside the river. "For weeks," writes an American naval officer who +was in command of one of the Chinese battleships, "we had anticipated +an engagement, and <a name="page_305"><span class="page">Page +305</span></a> had had daily exercise at general quarters, etc., +and little remained to be done.... The fleet went into action as +well prepared as it was humanly possible for it to be with the same +officers and men, handicapped as they were by official corruption +and treachery ashore."[1] As the midday meal was in preparation, +columns of black smoke appeared to southwestward. The squadron at +once weighed anchor, cleared for action, and put on forced draft, +while "dark-skinned men, with queues tightly coiled around their +heads, and with arms bare to the elbow, clustered along the decks +in groups at the guns, waiting to kill or be killed." Out of the +smoke soon emerged 12 enemy cruisers which, with information of +the Chinese movements, had entered the Gulf intent on battle. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Commander P. N. McGiffin, <span class="sc">The Battle +of the Yalu</span>, <i>Century Magazine</i>, August, 1895, pp. +585-604.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The forces about to engage included the best ships of both nations. +There were 12 on each side, excluding 4 Chinese torpedo boats, and +10 actually in each battle line. The main strength of the Chinese +was concentrated in two second-class battleships, the <i>Ting-yuen</i> +and the <i>Chen-yuen</i>, Stettin-built in 1882, each of 7430 tons, +with 14-inch armor over half its length, four 12-inch Krupp guns in +two barbettes, and 6-inch rifles at bow and stern. The two barbettes +were <i>en echelon</i> (the starboard just ahead of the port), in +such a way that while all four guns could fire dead ahead only two +could bear on the port quarter or the starboard bow. These ships +were designed for fighting head-on; and hence to use them to best +advantage Admiral Ting formed his squadron in line abreast, with the +<i>Ting-yuen</i> and <i>Chen-yuen</i> in the center. The rest of the +line were a "scratch lot" of much smaller vessels—two armored +cruisers (<i>Lai-yuen</i> and <i>King-yuen</i>) with 8 to 9-inch +armored belts; three protected cruisers (<i>Tsi-yuen, Chi-yuen</i>, +and <i>Kwang-ping</i>) with 2 to 4-inch armored decks; on the left +flank the old corvette <i>Kwang-chia</i>; and opposite her two +other "lame ducks" of only 1300 tons, the <i>Chao-yung</i> and +<i>Yang-wei</i>. Ting had properly strengthened his center, but had +left his flanks fatally weak. On board the flagship <i>Ting-yuen</i> +was Major von Hannekin, China's military adviser, and an ex-petty +<a name="page_306"><span class="page">Page 306</span></a> officer +of the British navy named Nichols. Philo N. McGiffin, a graduate of +the United States Naval Academy, commanded the <i>Chen-yuen</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Japanese advanced in column, or line ahead, in two divisions. +The first, or "flying squadron," was led by Rear Admiral Tsuboi in +the <i>Yoshino</i>, and consisted of four fast protected cruisers. +Four similar ships, headed by Vice Admiral Ito in the <i>Matsushima</i>, +formed the chief units of the main squadron, followed by the older +and slower ironclads, <i>Fuso</i> and <i>Hiyei</i>. The little +gunboat <i>Akagi</i> and the converted steamer <i>Saikio Maru</i> +had orders not to engage, but nevertheless pushed in on the left +of the line. Aside from their two battleships, the Chinese had +nothing to compare with these eight new and well-armed cruisers, +the slowest of which could make 17-1/2 knots. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In armament the Japanese also had a marked advantage, as the following +table, from Wilsan's <i>Ironclads in Action</i>, will show: +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="left_btrb" rowspan="2"> </td> + <td class="center_btrb"><span class="sc">Ships</span></td> + <td class="center_btrb" colspan="3"><span class="sc"> + Guns</span></td> + <td class="center_btb" colspan="2"><span class="sc">Shots + in 10 Minutes</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class="center_brb">Number</td> + <td class="center_brb">6-inch</td> + <td class="center_brb">Large quick fire</td> + <td class="center_brb">Small q. f. and machine</td> + <td class="center_brb">Number</td> + <td class="center_bb">Weight of metal</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">China</td> + <td class="center_br">12</td> + <td class="center_br">40</td> + <td class="center_br">2</td> + <td class="center_br">130</td> + <td class="center_br">33</td> + <td class="center">4,885</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Japan</td> + <td class="center_brb">10</td> + <td class="center_brb">34</td> + <td class="center_brb">66</td> + <td class="center_brb">154</td> + <td class="center_brb">185</td> + <td class="center_bb">11,706</td> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The smaller quick-fire and machine guns proved of slight value +on either side, but the large Japanese quick-firers searched all +unprotected parts of the enemy ships with a terrific storm of shells. +After the experience of July 25, the Chinese had discarded much +of their woodwork and top hamper, including boats, thin steel +gun-shields, rails, needless rigging, etc., and used coal and sand +bags an the upper decks; but the unarmored ships nevertheless suffered +severely. From the table it is evident that the Japanese could +pour in six times as great a volume of fire. The Chinese had a +slight advantage in <a name="page_307"><span class="page">Page +307</span></a> heavier guns, and their marksmanship, it is claimed, +was equally accurate (possibly 10% hits on each side), but their +ammunition was defective and consisted mostly of non-bursting +projectiles. They had only 15 rounds of shell for each gun. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the approach the Japanese steered at first for the enemy +center, thus concealing their precise objective, and then swung to +port, with the aim of attacking on the weaker side of the Chinese +battleships (owing to their barbette arrangement) and on the weaker +flank of the line. In the meantime the Chinese steamed forward at +about 6 knots and turned somewhat to keep head-on, thus forcing the +Japanese to file across their bows. At 12.20 p.m. the <i>Chen-yuen</i> +and <i>Ting-yuen</i> opened at 5800 yards on Tsuboi's squadron, +which held its fire until at 3000 yards or closer it swung around +the Chinese right wing. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The main squadron followed. Admiral Ito has been criticized for thus +drawing his line across the enemy's advance, instead of attacking +their left flank. But he was previously committed to the movement, +and executed it rapidly and for the most part at long range. Had +the Chinese pressed forward at best speed, Lissa might have been +repeated. As it was, they cut off only the <i>Hiyei</i>. To avoid +ramming, this old ironclad plunged boldly between the <i>Chen-yuen</i> +and <i>Ting-yuen</i>. She was hit 22 times and had 56 killed and +wounded, but managed to pull through. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Before this time the <i>Chao-yung</i> and <i>Yang-wei</i> on the +right flank of the Chinese line had crumpled under a heavy cross-fire +from the flying squadron. These ships had wooden cabins on deck +outboard, and the whole superstructure soon became roaring masses +of flames. Both dropped out of line and burned to the water's edge. +The two ships on the opposite flank had seized an early opportunity +to withdraw astern of the line, and were now off for Port Arthur +under full steam, "followed," writes McGiffin, "by a string of +Chinese anathemas from our men at the guns." +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 555px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig057.png" width="555" height="767" alt="Fig. 57"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPT. 17, 1894</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The Japanese van turned to port and was thus for some +<a name="page_308"><span class="page">Page 308</span></a><a +name="page_309"><span class="page">Page 309</span></a> time out +of action. The main division turned to starboard and circled the +Chinese rear. Of the 6 Chinese ships left in the line, the four +smaller seem now to have moved on to southward, while both Japanese +divisions concentrated on the two battleships <i>Chen-yuen</i> +and <i>Ting-yuen</i>. These did their best to keep head to the +enemy, and stood up doggedly, returning slowly the fire of the +circling cruisers. Tsuboi soon turned away to engage the lighter +vessels. Finally, at 3.26, as the <i>Matsushima</i> closed to about +2000 yards, the <i>Chen-yuen</i> hit her fairly with a last remaining +12-inch shell. This one blow put Ito's flagship out of action, +exploding some ammunition, killing or wounding 50 or more men, and +starting a dangerous fire. The Japanese hauled off, while according +to Chinese accounts the battleships actually followed, but at 4.30 +came again under a severe fire. About 5.30, when the Chinese were +practically out of ammunition, Ito finally withdrew and recalled +his van. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the other Chinese ships, the <i>Chi-yuen</i> made a desperate +attempt to approach the Japanese van and went down at 3.30 with screws +racing in the air. The <i>King-yuen</i>, already on fire, was shot to +pieces and sunk an hour later by the <i>Yoshino's</i> quick-firers. +As the sun went down, the <i>Lai-yuen</i> and <i>Kwang-ping</i>, +with two ships from the river mouth, fell in behind the battleships +and staggered off towards Port Arthur, unpursued. The losses on the +two armored ships had been relatively slight—56 killed and +wounded. The Japanese lost altogether 90 killed and 204 wounded, +chiefly on the <i>Matsushima</i> and <i>Hiyei</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though China saved her best ships from the battle, her fighting +spirit was done for. The battleships were later destroyed by Japanese +torpedo operations after the fall of Wei-hai-wei. Her crews had on +the whole fought bravely, handicapped as they were by their poor +materials and lack of skill. For instance, when McGiffin called +for volunteers to extinguish a fire on the <i>Chen-yuen's</i> +forecastle, swept by enemy shells, "men responded heartily and +went to what seemed to them certain death." It was at this time +that the commander himself, leading the party, was knocked over +by a <a name="page_310"><span class="page">Page 310</span></a> +shell explosion and then barely escaped the blast of one of his +own 12-inch guns by rolling through an open hatch and falling 8 +feet to a pile of débris below. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the way of lessons, aside from the obvious ones as to the value +of training and expert leadership and the necessity of eliminating +inflammables in ship construction, the battle revealed on the one +hand the great resisting qualities of the armored ship, and on +the other hand the offensive value of superior gunfire. Admiral +Mahan said at the time that "The rapid fire gun has just now fairly +established its position as the greatest offensive weapon in naval +warfare."[1] Another authority has noted that, both at Lissa and +the Yalu, "The winning fleet was worked in divisions, as was the +British fleet in the Dutch wars and at Trafalgar, and the Japanese +fleet afterwards at Tsushima." Remarking that experiments with +this method were made by the British Channel Fleet in 1904, the +writer continues: "The conception grew out of a study of Nelson's +Memorandum. Its essence was to make the fleet flexible in the hands +of the admiral, and to enable any part to be moved by the shortest +line to the position where it was most required."[2] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Lessons from the Yalu Fight</span>, +<i>Century Magazine</i>, August, 1895, p. 630.] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Custance, <span class="sc">The Ship of the Line in +Battle</span>, p. 103.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) which closed the war, +Japan won Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Pescadores +Islands and Formosa, and China's withdrawal from Korea. But just as +she was about to lay hands on these generous fruits of victory, +they were snatched out of her grasp by the European powers, which +began exploiting China for themselves. Japan had to acquiesce and +bide her time, using her war indemnity and foreign loans to build +up her fleet. The Yalu thus not only marks the rise of Japan as +a formidable force in international affairs, but brings us to a +period of intensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far +East and elsewhere which gave added significance to naval power +and led to the war of 1914. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_311"><span class="page">Page 311</span></a> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Aside from those already cited see:</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Robert Fulton, Engineer and Artist</span>, H. W. + Dickinson, 1913.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Story of the Guns</span>, J. E. Tennant, + 1864.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The British Navy</span>, Sir Thomas Brassey, + 1884.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Clowes' History of the Royal Navy</span>, Vol. + VII (p. 20, bibliography).</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Naval Development of the 19th Century</span>, + N. Barnaby, 1904.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Torpedo in Peace and War</span>, F. T. + Jane, 1898.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Submarine Warfare</span>, H. C. Fyfe, 1902.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Submarine in War and Peace</span>, Simon + Lake, 1918.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Four Modern Naval Campaigns</span>, Lissa, W. L. + Clowes, 1902.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Austro-Italian Naval War</span>, Journal of + the United Service Institution, Vol. XI, pp. 104ff.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_312"><span class="page">Page 312</span></a> +CHAPTER XV</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Even more significant in its relation to sea power than the revolution +in armaments during the 19th century was the extraordinary growth +of ocean commerce. The total value of the world's import and export +trade in 1800 amounted in round numbers to 1-1/2 billion dollars, +in 1850 to 4 billion, and in 1900 to nearly 24 billion. In other +words, during a period in which the population of the world was not +more than tripled, its international exchange of commodities was +increased 16-fold. This growth was of course made possible largely +by progress in manufacturing, increased use of steam navigation, +and vastly greater output of coal and iron.[1] At the end of the +Napoleonic wars England was the only great commercial and industrial +state. At the close of the century, though with her colonies she +still controlled one-fourth of the world's foreign trade, she faced +aggressive rivals in the field. The United States after her Civil +War, and Germany after her unification and the Franco-Prussian +War, had achieved an immense industrial development, opening up +resources in coal and iron that made them formidable competitors. +Germany in particular, a late comer in the colonial field, felt +that her future lay upon the seas, as a means of securing access on +favorable terms to world markets and raw materials. Other nations +also realized that their continued growth and prosperity would depend +upon commercial expansion. This might be accomplished in a measure +by cheaper production and superior business organization, but could +be greatly aided by political means—by colonial activity, +by securing control <a name="page_313"><span class="page">Page +313</span></a> or special privileges in unexploited areas and backward +states, by building up a merchant fleet under the national flag. +Obviously, since the seas join the continents and form the great +highways of trade, this commercial and political expansion would +give increased importance to naval power. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Coal production increased during the century from +11.6 million tons to 610 million, and pig iron from half a million +tons to 37 million. Figures from Day, <span class="sc">History +of Commerce</span>, Ch. XXVIII.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Admiral Mahan, an acute political observer as well as strategist, +summed up the international situation in 1895 and again in 1897 as +"an equilibrium on the [European] Continent, and, in connection +with the calm thus resulting, an immense colonizing movement in +which all the great powers were concerned."[1] Later, in 1911, he +noted that colonial rivalries had again been superseded by rivalries +within Europe, but pointed out that the European tension was itself +largely the product of activities and ambitions in more distant +spheres. In fact the international developments of recent times, +whether in the form of colonial enterprises, armament competition, +or actual warfare, find a common origin in economic and commercial +interests. Commerce and quick communications have drawn the world +into closer unity, yet by a kind of paradox have increased the +possibilities of conflict. Both by their common origin and by their +far-reaching consequences, it is thus possible to connect the story +of naval events from the Spanish-American to the World War, and to +gather them up under the general title, "rivalry for world power." +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To this rivalry the United States could hardly hope or desire to +remain always a passive spectator, yet, aside from trying to stabilize +the western hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine, she cherished down +to the year 1898 a policy of isolation from world affairs. During +the first half of the 19th century, it is true, her interests were +directed outward by a flourishing merchant marine. In 1860 the +American merchant fleet of 2,500,000 tons was second only to Great +Britain's and nearly equal to that of all other nations combined. +But its decay had already begun, and continued rapidly. <a +name="page_314"><span class="page">Page 314</span></a> The change +from wood to iron construction enabled England to build cheaper +ships; and American shipping suffered also from lack of government +patronage, diversion of capital into mare profitable projects of +Western development, and loss of a third of its tonnage by destruction +or shift to foreign register during the Civil War. At the outbreak +of that war 72 per cent of American exports were carried in American +bottoms; only 9 per cent in 1913. Thus the United States had reached +the unsatisfactory condition of a nation with a large and rapidly +growing foreign commerce and an almost non-existent merchant marine. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Naval Strategy</span>, p. 104.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This was the situation when the nation was thrust suddenly and +half unwillingly into the main stream of international events by +the Spanish-American War. Though this war made the United States +a world power, commercial or political aggrandizement played no +part in her entry into the struggle. It arose solely from the +intolerable conditions created by Spanish misrule in Cuba, and +intensified by armed rebellion since 1895. Whatever slight hope or +justification for non-intervention remained was destroyed by the +blowing up of the <i>U. S. S. Maine</i> in Havana harbor, February +15, 1898, with the loss of 260 of her complement of 354 officers +and men. Thereafter the United States pushed her preparations for +war; but the resolution of Congress, April 19, 1898, authorizing +the President to begin hostilities expressly stated that the United +States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba, +and after its pacification would "leave the government and control +of the island to its people." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was at once recognized that the conflict would be primarily +naval, and would be won by the nation that secured control of the +sea. The paper strength of the two navies left little to choose, +and led even competent critics like Admiral Colomb in England to +prophesy a stalemate—a "desultory war." Against five new +American battleships, the <i>Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon</i> +and <i>Texas</i>, the first four of 10,000 tons, and the armored +cruisers <i>Brooklyn</i> and <i>New York</i> of 9000 and 8000 tans, +Spain could oppose the battleship <i>Pelayo</i>, a little better +than the <i>Texas</i> and five armored cruisers, the <a +name="page_315"><span class="page">Page 315</span></a> <i>Carlos +V, Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo</i>, and <i>Vizcaya</i>, +each of about 7000 tons, and the somewhat larger and very able former +Italian cruiser <i>Cristobal Colon</i>. Figures and statistics, +however, give no idea of the actual weakness of the Spanish navy, +handicapped by shiftless naval administration, by dependence on +foreign sources of supply, and by the incompetence and lack of +training of personnel. Of the squadron that came to Cuba under +Admiral Cervera, the <i>Colon</i> lacked two 10-inch guns for her +barbettes, and the <i>Vizcaya</i> was so foul under water that with +a trial speed of 18-1/2 knots she never made above 13—Cervera +called her a "buoy." There was no settled plan of campaign; to +Cervera's requests for instructions came the ministerial reply +that "in these moments of international crisis no definite plans +can be formulated."[1] The despairing letters of the Spanish Admiral +and his subordinates reveal how feeble was the reed upon which +Spain had to depend for the preservation of her colonial empire. +The four cruisers and two destroyers that sailed from the Cape +Verde Islands on April 29 were Spain's total force available. The +<i>Pelayo</i> and the <i>Carlos V</i>, not yet ready, were the +only ships of value left behind. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Bermejo to Cervera, April 4, 1898.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the American naval list, in addition to the main units already +mentioned, there were six monitors of heavy armament but indifferent +fighting value, a considerable force of small cruisers, four converted +liners for scouts, and a large number of gunboats, converted yachts, +etc., which proved useful in the Cuban blockade. Of these forces +the majority were assembled in the Atlantic theater of war. The +<i>Oregon</i> was on the West Coast, and made her famous voyage of +14,700 miles around Cape Horn in 79 days, at an average speed of +11.6 knots, leaving Puget Sound on March 6 and touching at Barbados +in the West Indies an May 18, just as the Spanish fleet was steaming +across the Caribbean. The cruise effectively demonstrated the danger +of a divided navy and the need of an Isthmian canal. Under Commodore +Dewey in the Far East were two gunboats and four small cruisers, +the <a name="page_316"><span class="page">Page 316</span></a> best +of them the fast and heavily armed flagship <i>Olympia</i>, of +5800 tons. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Battle of Manila Bay</i> +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 541px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig058.png" width="541" height="369" alt="Fig. 58"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">APPROACHES TO MANILA</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +With this latter force the first blow of the war was struck on May +1 in Manila Bay. Dewey, largely through the influence of Assistant +Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, had been appointed to the eastern +command the autumn before. On reaching his station in January, he +took his squadron to Hong Kong to be close to the scene of possible +hostilities. On February 25 he received a despatch from Roosevelt, +then Acting Secretary: "Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration +of war Spain, your duty will be to see that Spanish squadron does +not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the +Philippine Islands." On April 25 came the inspiring order: "Proceed +at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly +against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use +utmost endeavor." The <a name="page_317"><span class="page">Page +317</span></a> Commodore had already purchased a collier and a supply +ship for use in addition to the revenue cutter <i>McCulloch</i>, +overhauled his vessels and given them a war coat of slate-gray, and +made plans for a base at Mirs Bay, 30 miles distant in Chinese +waters, where he would be less troubled by neutrality rules in +time of war. On April 22 the <i>Baltimore</i> arrived from San +Francisco with much-needed ammunition. On the 27th Consul Williams +joined with latest news of preparations at Manila, and that afternoon +the squadron put to sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the morning of the 30th it was off Luzon, and two ships scouted +Subig Bay, which the enemy had left only 24 hours before. At 12 that +night Dewey took his squadron in column through the entrance to Manila +Bay, just as he had steamed past the forts on the Mississippi with +Farragut 35 years before. Only three shots were fired by the guns +on shore. The thoroughness of Dewey's preparations, the rapidity +of his movements up to this point, and his daring passage through a +channel which he had reason to believe strongly defended by mines +and shore batteries are the just titles of his fame. The entrance to +Manila is indeed 10 miles wide and divided into separate channels by +the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile. The less frequented +channel chosen was, as Dewey rightly judged, too deep for mining +except by experts. Yet the Spanish had news of his approach the +day before; they had 17 guns, including 6 modern rifles, on the +islands guarding the entrance; they had plenty of gunboats that +might have been fitted out as torpedo launches for night attack. +It does not detract from the American officer's accomplishment +that he drew no false picture of the obstacles with which he had +to deal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At daybreak next morning, having covered slowly the 24 miles from +the mouth of the bay up to Manila, the American ships advanced past +the city to attack the Spanish flotilla drawn up under the Cavite +batteries 6 miles beyond. Here was what an American officer described +as "a collection of old tubs scarcely fit to be called men-of-war." +The most serviceable was Admiral Montojo's flagship <i>Reina +Cristina</i>, an unarmored cruiser of 3500 tons; the remaining half +dozen were <a name="page_318"><span class="page">Page +318</span></a><a name="page_319"><span class="page">Page 319</span></a> +older ships of both wood and iron, some of them not able to get +under way. They mounted 31 guns above 4-inch to the Americans' 53. +More serious in prospect, though not in reality, was the danger +from shore batteries and mines. The United States vessels approached +in column, led by the <i>Olympia</i>, which opened fire at 5.40. +In the words of Admiral Dewey's report, "The squadron maintained +a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5000 to 2000 +yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to that +of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally +ineffective. Three runs were made from the eastward and three from +the westward, so that both broadsides were brought to bear." One +torpedo launch which dashed out was sunk and another driven ashore. +The <i>Cristina</i> moved out as if to ram, but staggered back +under the <i>Olympia's</i> concentrated fire. At 7.35, owing to a +mistaken report that only 15 rounds of ammunition were left for the +5-inch guns, the American squadron retired temporarily, but renewed +action at 11.16 and ended it an hour later, when the batteries were +silenced and "every enemy ship sunk, burned or deserted." +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 493px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig059.png" width="493" height="737" alt="Fig. 59"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +As reported by Admiral Montojo, the Spanish lost 381 men. The American +ships were hit only 15 times and had 7 men slightly injured. Volume +and accuracy of gunfire won the day. Somewhat extravagant language +has been used in describing the battle, which, whatever the perils +that might naturally have been expected, was a most one-sided affair. +But it is less easy to overpraise Admiral Dewey's energetic and +aggressive handling of the entire campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Manila thereafter lay helpless under the guns of the squadron, +and upon the arrival and landing of troops surrendered on August +13, after a merely formal defense. In the interim, Spain sent out +a relief force under Admiral Camara consisting of the <i>Pelaya, +Carlos V</i> and other smaller units, before encountering which +Dewey planned to leave Manila and await the arrival of two monitors +then on their way from San Francisco. After getting through the +Suez Canal, Camara was brought back (July 8) by an American threat +against the coast of Spain. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_320"><span class="page">Page 320</span></a> Soon +after the battle a number of foreign warships congregated at Manila, +including 5 German ships under Admiral von Diedrichs, a force superior +to Dewey's, and apparently bent on learning by persistent contravention +all the rules of a blockaded port. The message finally sent to the +German Admiral is reticently described by Dewey himself, but is +said to have been to the effect that, if the German admiral wanted +a fight, "he could have it right now." On the day of the surrender +of Manila the British and the Japanese ships in the harbor took +a position between the American and the German squadrons. This +was just after the seizure of Kiao-chau, at a time when Germany +was vigorously pushing out for "a place in the sun." But for the +American commander's quiet yet firm stand, with British support, +the United States might have encountered more serious complications +in taking over 127,000 square miles of archipelago in the eastern +world, with important trade interests, a lively insurrection, and +a population of 7 million. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Santiago Campaign</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Atlantic, where it was the American policy not to carry +their offensive beyond Spain's West Indies possessions, events +moved more slowly. Rear Admiral Sicard, in command of the North +Atlantic squadron based on Key West, was retired in March for physical +disability and succeeded by William T. Sampson, who stepped up +naturally from senior captain in the squadron and was already +distinguished for executive ability and knowledge of ordnance. Sampson's +first proposal was, in the event of hostilities, a bombardment of +Havana, a plan approved by all his captains and showing a confidence +inspired perhaps by coastal operations in the Civil War; but this +was properly vetoed by the Department on the ground that no ships +should be risked against shore defenses until they had struck at +the enemy's naval force and secured control of the sea. An earlier +memorandum from Secretary Long, outlining plans for a blockade of +Cuba, had been based <a name="page_321"><span class="page">Page +321</span></a> on suggestions from Rear Admiral (then Captain) +Mahan,[1] and his strategic insight may have guided this decision. +On April 22, Sampson, now acting rear admiral, placed his force +off Havana and established a close blockade over 100 miles on the +northern coast. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Goode, <span class="sc">With Sampson Through the +War</span>, p. 19.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The problem for American strategy was now Cervera's "fleet in +being,"—inferior in force but a menace until destroyed or +put out of action—which, as before stated, left the Cape +Verde Islands on April 29, for a destination unknown. A bombardment +of cities on the American coast or a raid on the North Atlantic +trade routes was within the realm of possibilities. Difficulties +of coaling and an inveterate tendency to leave the initiative to +the enemy decided the Spanish against such a project. But its bare +possibility set the whole east coast in a panic, which has been +much ridiculed, but which arose naturally enough from a complete +lack of instruction in naval matters and from lack of a sensible +control of the press. The result was an unfortunate division of +the fleet. A so-called Flying squadron under Commodore Schley, +consisting of the <i>Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas,</i> and 3 +small cruisers, was held at Hampton Roads; whereas, if not thus +employed, these ships might have blockaded the south side of Cuba +from the beginning of the war. A northern patrol squadron, of vessels +not of much use for this or any other purpose, was also organized +to guard the coast from Hampton Roads north. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On May 4, with Cervera still at large, Sampson lifted his guard of +Havana—unwisely in the opinion of Mahan—and took his +best ships, the <i>New York, Indiana, Iowa,</i> and two monitors, +to reconnoiter San Juan, Porto Rico, where it was thought the missing +fleet might first appear. Just as he was bombarding San Juan, on +the morning of May 12, the Navy Department received a cable from +Martinique announcing Cervera's arrival there. Havana and Cienfuegos +(on the south side of Cuba and connected with Havana by rail) were +considered the only two ports where the Spanish fleet could be +of value to the forces on the island; and from these two <a +name="page_322"><span class="page">Page 322</span></a> ports both +American squadrons were at this time a thousand miles away. Schley +hastened southward, left Key West on the 19th, and was off Cienfuegos +by daylight on the 21st. It was fairly quick work; but had the +Spanish fleet moved thither at its usual speed of 6 knots from +its last stopping-place, it would have got there first by at least +12 hours. The Spanish admiral, finding no coal at Martinique, had +left a crippled destroyer there and moved on to the Dutch island of +Curaçao, where on the 14th and 15th he secured with difficulty +about 500 tons of fuel. Thence, in all anxiety, he made straight for +the nearest possible refuge, Santiago, where he put in at daybreak +on the 19th and was soon receiving congratulations on the completion +of a successful cruise. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 842px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig060.png" width="842" height="515" alt="Fig. 60"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">WEST INDIES</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Movements in the Santiago campaign.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +By the next day Sampson, having hurried back from San Juan and +coaled, was again in force off Havana. There he received news of +Cervera's arrival in Santiago. Since Havana could not be uncovered, +he sent instructions to Schley—at first discretionary, and then, +as the reports were confirmed, more imperative—to blockade the +eastern port. Though the commander of the Flying Squadron received +the latter orders on the 23d, he had seen smoke in Cienfuegos harbor +and still believed he had Cervera cornered there. Accordingly he +delayed until evening of the next day. Then, after reaching Santiago, +he cabled on the 27th that he was returning to Key West to coal, +though he had a collier with him and stringent orders to the contrary; +and it was not until the 29th that he actually established the +Santiago Blockade. Sampson, his superior in command (though not +his senior in the captains' list), later declared his conduct at +this time "reprehensible"[1]—possibly too harsh a term, for +the circumstances tried judgment and leadership in the extreme. +Cervera found Santiago destitute of facilities for refitting. Yet +the fact <a name="page_323"><span class="page">Page 323</span></a><a +name="page_324"><span class="page">Page 324</span></a> remains that +he had 10 days in which to coal and get away. "We cannot," writes +Admiral Mahan, "expect ever again to have an enemy so inept as +Spain showed herself to be."[1*] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Letter to Secretary, July 10, 1898, <span +class="sc">Sampson-Schley Documents</span>, p. 136: "Had the commodore +left his station at that time he probably would have been +court-martialed, so plain was his duty.... This reprehensible conduct +I cannot separate from his subsequent conduct, and for this reason +I ask you to do him ample justice on this occasion." A court of +inquiry later decided that Commodore Schley's service up to June +1 was characterized by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of +enterprise."] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1*: <span class="sc">Lessons of the War with Spain</span>, +p. 157.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The "bottling up" of Cervera cleared the situation, and the navy +could now concentrate on a task still difficult but well defined. +Sampson brought his force to Santiago on June 1, and assumed immediate +command. A close blockade was instituted such as against adequate +torpedo and mine defenses would have been highly dangerous even +at that day. Three picket launches were placed about a mile off +shore, three small vessels a mile further out, and beyond these +the 5 or 6 major units, under steam and headed toward the entrance +in a carefully planned disposition to meet any attempt at escape. +At night a battleship stood in and played its searchlight directly +on the mouth of the channel. The latter was six miles in length, +with difficult turns, and at the narrowest point only 300 feet +wide. Lieut. Hobson's gallant effort on June 3 to sink the collier +<i>Merrimac</i> across the channel had made its navigation even more +difficult, though the vessel did not lie athwart-stream. Mine barriers +and batteries on the high hills at the harbor mouth prevented forcing +the channel, but the guns were mostly of ancient type and failed to +keep the ships at a distance. On the other hand, bombardments from +the latter did little more than to afford useful target practice. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The despatch of troops to Santiago was at once decided upon, and +the subsequent campaign, if it could be fully studied, would afford +interesting lessons in combined operations. On June 22, 16,000 men +under General Shafter landed at Daiquiri, 15 miles east of Santiago, +in 52 boats provided by the fleet, though the War Department had +previously stated that the general would "land his own troops."[2] +"It was done in a scramble," writes Col. Roosevelt; and there was +great difficulty in getting the skippers of army transports to bring +their vessels within reasonable distance of the shore. Since the sole +object of the campaign was to get at and destroy the enemy fleet, the +navy fully expected and understood that the <a name="page_325"><span +class="page">Page 325</span></a> army would make its first aim to +advance along the coast and capture the batteries at the entrance, +so that the mines could be lifted and the harbor forced. Army +authorities declare this would have involved division of forces +on both sides of the channel and impossibilities of transportation +due to lack of roads. But these difficulties applied also in a +measure to the defenders, and might perhaps have been surmounted +by full use of naval aid. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Goode, <span class="sc">With Sampson Through the +War</span>, p. 182.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Instead, the army set out with some confidence to capture the city +itself. El Caney and San Juan Hill were seized on July 2 after +a bloody struggle in which the Spanish stuck to their defenses +heroically and inflicted 1600 casualties. By their own figures the +Spanish on this day had only 1700 men engaged, though there were +36,500 Spanish troops in the province and 12,000 near at hand. In +considerable discouragement, Shafter now spoke of withdrawal, and +urged Sampson "immediately to force the entrance"[1]—in spite +of the fact that the main purpose in sending troops had been to avoid +this very measure. In view of threatening foreign complications and +the impossibility of replacing battleships, it was imperative not +to risk them against mines. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 190.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Food conditions were serious in Santiago, but Cervera was absolutely +determined not to assume responsibility for taking his fleet out to +what he regarded as certain slaughter. A night sortie, with ships +issuing one by one out of an intricate channel into the glare of +searchlights, he declared more difficult than one by day. Fortunately +for the Americans, in view of the situation ashore, the decision was +taken out of his hands, and Governor General Blanco from Havana +peremptorily ordered him to put to sea. The time of his exit, Sunday +morning, July 3, was luckily chosen, for Sampson, in the <i>New +York</i>, was 10 miles to eastward on his way to a conference with +Shafter, and the <i>Massachusetts</i> was at Guantanamo for coal. +The flagship <i>Maria Teresa</i> led out at 9.35, followed 10 minutes +later by the <i>Vizcaya</i>, and then by the <i>Colon, Oquendo</i>, +and the destroyers <i>Furor</i> and <i>Pluton</i>, each turning +westward at top speed. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 604px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig061.png" width="604" height="346" alt="Fig. 61"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898 +<a name="page_326"><span class="page">Page 326</span></a></td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Simultaneously the big blockaders crowded toward them and opened +a heavy fire, while stokers shoveled desperately below to get up +steam. To the surprise of other vessels, Schley's ship, the +<i>Brooklyn</i>, after heading towards the entrance, swung round, +not with the enemy, but to starboard, just sliding past the +<i>Texas'</i> bow. This much discussed maneuver Schley afterward +explained as made to avoid blanketing the fire of the rest of the +squadron. The <i>Oregon</i>, which throughout the blockade had +kept plenty of steam, "rushed past the <i>Iowa</i>," in the words +of Captain Robley Evans, "like an express train," in a cloud of +smoke lighted by vicious flashes from her guns. In ten minutes +the <i>Maria Teresa</i> turned for shore, hit by 30 projectiles, +her decks, encumbered with woodwork, bursting into masses of flame. +The concentration upon her at the beginning had shifted to the +<i>Oquendo</i> in the rear, which ran ashore with guns silenced +5 minutes after the leader. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Shortly before 11, the <i>Vizcaya</i>, with a torpedo ready in one +of her bow tubes, turned towards the <i>Brooklyn</i>, which had kept +in the lead of the American ships. A shell hitting squarely in the +<i>Vizcaya's</i> bow caused a heavy explosion and she sheered away, +the guns of the <i>Brooklyn, Oregon</i>, and <a name="page_327"><span +class="page">Page 327</span></a> <i>Iowa</i> bearing on her as she +ran towards the beach. The <i>Colon</i>, with a trial speed of 20 +knots, and 6 miles ahead of the <i>Brooklyn</i> and <i>Oregon</i>, +appeared to stand a good chance of getting finally away. The <i>New +York</i>, rushing back toward the battle, was still well astern. But +the <i>Colon's</i> speed, which had averaged 13.7 knots, slackened +as her fire-room force played out; and shortly after 1 p.m. she +ran shoreward, opened her Kingston valves, and went down after +surrender. She had been hit only 6 times. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the first stage of the fight the little yacht <i>Gloucester</i>, +under Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, had dashed pluckily upon +the two destroyers, which were also under fire from the secondary +batteries of the big ships. The <i>Furor</i> was sunk and the +<i>Plutón</i> driven ashore. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +There is hardly a record in naval history of such complete destruction. +Of 2300 Spaniards, 1800 were rescued as prisoners from the burning +wrecks or from the Cuban guerillas on shore, 350 met their death, +and the rest escaped towards Santiago. The American loss consisted +of one man killed and one wounded on the <i>Brooklyn</i>. This ship, +which owing to its leading position had been the chief enemy target, +received 20 hits from shells or fragments, and the other vessels +altogether about as many more. An examination of the half-sunken +and fire-scarred Spanish hulks showed 42 hits out of 1300 rounds +from the American main batteries, or 3.2 per cent, and 73 from +secondary batteries. Probably these figures should be doubled to +give the actual number, but even so they revealed the need of +improvement in gunnery. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Sampson was right when he stated earlier in the campaign that the +destruction of the Spanish fleet would end the war. Santiago surrendered +a fortnight later without further fighting. An expeditionary force under +General Miles made an easy conquest of Puerto Rico. On August 12, a +protocol of peace was signed, by the terms of which the United States +took over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (upon payment of 20 +million dollars), and Cuba became independent under American protection. +The war greatly strengthened the position of the United States in +the Caribbean, and gave <a name="page_328"><span class="page">Page +328</span></a> her new interests and responsibilities in the Pacific. +In the possession of distant dependencies the nation found a new +motive for increased naval protection and for more active concern +in international affairs. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +2. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the time when the United States acquired the Philippines, the +Far East was a storm center of international disturbance. Russia, +with the support of Germany and France, had, as already noted, +combined to prevent Japan from fully exploiting her victory over +China. The latter country, however, had every appearance of a melon +ripe for cutting; and under guise of security for loans, indemnity +for injuries, railroad and treaty-port concessions, and special +spheres of influence, each European nation endeavored to mark out +its prospective share. Russia, in return for protecting China against +Japan, gained a short-cut for her Siberian Railway across Northern +Manchuria, with rail and mining concessions in that province and +prospects of getting hold of both Port Arthur and Kiao-chau. But, at +an opportune moment for Germany, two German missionaries were murdered +in 1897 by Chinese bandits. Germany at once seized Kiao-chau, and in +March, 1898, extorted a 99-year lease of the port, with exclusive +development privileges throughout the peninsula of Shantung. "The +German Michael," as Kaiser Wilhelm said at a banquet on the departure +of his fleet to the East, had "firmly planted his shield upon Chinese +soil"; and "the gospel of His Majesty's hallowed person," as Admiral +Prince Heinrich asserted in reply, "was to be preached to every one +who will hear it and also to those who do not wish to hear." "Our +establishment on the coast of China," writes ex-Chancellor van +Bülow, "was in direct and immediate connection with the progress +of the fleet, and a first step into the field of world politics... +giving us <i>a place in the sun</i> in Eastern Asia."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: From London <i>Spectator</i>, Dec. 26, 1897, quoted +in Morse, <span class="sc">International Relations of the Chinese +Empire</span>, Vol. III, p. 108.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 541px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig062.png" width="546" height="541" alt="Fig. 62"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus forestalled at Kiao-chau, Russia at once pushed <a +name="page_329"><span class="page">Page 329</span></a> through a +25-year lease of Port Arthur, and proceeded to strengthen it as +a fortified port and naval base. England, though preoccupied with +the Boer War, took Wei-hai-wai as a precautionary measure, "for as +long a time as Port Arthur shall remain a possession of Russia."[1] +France secured a new base in southern China on Kwang-chau Bay, and +Italy tried likewise but failed. Aroused by the foreign menace, the +feeling of the Chinese masses burst forth in the summer of 1900 in the +massacres and uprisings known as the Boxer Rebellion. In the combined +expedition to relieve the legations at <a name="page_330"><span +class="page">Page 330</span></a> Peking Japanese troops displayed +superior deftness, discipline, and endurance, and gained confidence +in their ability to cope with the armies of European powers. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <i>Ibid.</i>, III, 118.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the period following, Germany in Shantung and Russia in Manchuria +pursued steadily their policy of exploitation. Against it, the +American Secretary of State John Hay advanced the policy of the +<i>Open Door</i>, "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative +entity... and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and +impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."[1] To this +the powers gave merely lip-service, realizing that her fixed policy +of isolation would restrain the United States from either diplomatic +combinations or force. "The open hand," wrote Hay in discouragement, +"will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinese as the +raised club,"[2] nor was it so efficacious in dealing with other +nations concerned. Japan, however, had strained every energy to +build up her army and navy for a conflict that seemed inevitable, +and was ready to back her opposition to European advances by force +if need be. In 1902 she protected herself against a combination of +foes by defensive alliance with England. She demanded that Russia +take her troops out of Manchuria and recognize Japanese predominance +in Korea. Russia hoped to forestall hostilities until she could +further strengthen her army and fleet in the East, but when the +transfer of ships reached the danger point, Japan declared war, +February 8, 1904, and struck viciously that same night. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Note to the European Powers</span>, +July 3, 1900.] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Thayer, <span class="sc">Life of Hay</span>, II, 369.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As in the Spanish-American War, control of the sea was vital, since +Japan must depend upon it to move her troops to the continental +theater of war. Nor could she hold her army passive while awaiting +the issue of a struggle for sea control. Delay would put a greater +relative strain on her finances, and give Russia, handicapped by +long communications over the single-track Siberian Railway, a better +chance to mass in the East her troops and supplies. Japan's plan was +therefore to strike hard for naval advantage, but to begin at once, +in any <a name="page_331"><span class="page">Page 331</span></a> +event, the movement of troops overseas. At the outbreak of war her +fleet of 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers, with light cruiser +and destroyer flotillas, was assembled at Sasebo near the Straits +of Tsushima, thoroughly organized for fighting and imbued with +the spirit of war. Japan had an appreciable naval superiority, +but was handicapped by the task of protecting her transports and +by the necessity—which she felt keenly—of avoiding +losses in battle which would leave her helpless upon the possible +advent of Russia's Baltic reserves. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Russia's main naval strength in the East consisted of 7 battleships +and 3 armored cruisers, presenting a combined broadside of 100 +guns against Japan's 124. The support of the Black Sea fleet was +denied by the attitude of England, which would prevent violation +of the agreement restricting it from passing the Dardanelles. The +Baltic fleet, however, was an important though distant reserve +force, a detachment from which was actually in the Red Sea on its +way east at the outbreak of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Just as clearly as it was Japan's policy to force the fighting on +land, so it should have been Russia's to prevent Japan's movement +of troops by aggressive action at sea. This called for concentration +of force and concentration of purpose. But neither was evident in +the Russian plan of campaign, which betrayed confusion of thought +and a traditional leaning toward the defensive—acceptance on +the one hand of what has been called "fortress fleet" doctrine, +that fleets exist to protect bases and can serve this purpose by +being shut up in them; and on the other hand of exaggerated "fleet +in being" theory, that the mere presence of the Russian fleet, though +inactive, would prevent Japan's use of the sea. Thus in October, +1903, Witjeft, chief of the Port Arthur naval staff, declared that +a landing of Japanese troops either in the Liao-tung or the Korean +Gulf was "impossible so long as our fleet is not destroyed." Just as +Russia's total force was divided between east and west, so her +eastern force was divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with +the Japanese in central position between. Three armored cruisers +were in <a name="page_332"><span class="page">Page 332</span></a> +the northern port, and 7 battleships in the other; and all Russia's +efforts after war broke out were vainly directed toward remedying +this faulty disposition before it began. The whole Russian fleet in +the East, moreover, was, it is said, badly demoralized and unready +for war, owing chiefly to bureaucratic corruption and to the fact +that not merely its strategical direction but its actual command +was vested in the Viceroy, Alexieff, with headquarters on shore. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Operations Around Port Arthur</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On January 3, 1904, Japan presented practically an ultimatum; on +February 6 broke off diplomatic relations; on February 8 declared +war; and on the same night—just as the Czar was discussing +with his council what should be done—she delivered her first +blow. By extraordinary laxity, though the diplomatic rupture was +known, the Port Arthur squadron remained in the outer anchorage, +"with all lights burning, without torpedo nets out, and without any +guard vessels."[1] Ten Japanese destroyers attacked at close quarters, +fired 18 torpedoes, and put the battleship <i>Tsarevitch</i> and two +cruisers out of action for two months. It was only poor torpedo work, +apparently, that saved the whole fleet from destruction. A Russian +light cruiser left isolated at Chemulpa was destroyed the next day. +The transportation of troops to Korea and Southern Manchuria was +at once begun. Though not locked in by close blockade, and not +seriously injured by the frequent Japanese raids, bombardments, +and efforts to block the harbor entrance, the Port Arthur squadron +made no move to interfere. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Semenoff, <span class="sc">Rasplata</span>, p. 45.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Both fleets suffered from mines. Vice Admiral Makaroff, Russia's +foremost naval leader, who took command at Port Arthur in March, +went down with the <i>Petropavlosk</i> on April 13, when his ship +struck a mine laid by the Japanese. On May 14, on the other hand, +the Russian mine-layer <i>Amur</i> slipped out in a fog, spread +her mines in the usual path of Japanese vessels off the port, and +thus on the same day sank <a name="page_333"><span class="page">Page +333</span></a> two of their best ships, the <i>Hatsuse</i> and +<i>Yashima</i>. Mining, mine-sweeping, an uneventful Russian sortie +an June 23, progress of Japanese land forces down the peninsula +and close investment of Port Arthur—this was the course of +events down to the final effort of the Russian squadron on August +10. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 602px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig063.png" width="602" height="463" alt="Fig. 63"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +By this time Japanese siege guns were actually reaching ships in +the harbor. Action of any kind, especially if it involved some +injury to the enemy navy, was better than staying to be shot to +pieces from the shore. Yet Makaroff's successor, Witjeft, painfully +and consciously unequal to his responsibilities, still opposed +an exit, and left port only upon imperative orders from above. +Scarcely was the fleet an hour outside when Togo appeared on the +scene. The forces in the Battle of August 10 consisted of 6 Russian +battleships and 4 cruisers, against 6 Japanese armored vessels and +9 cruisers; the combined large-caliber broadsides of the armored +<a name="page_334"><span class="page">Page 334</span></a> ships +being 73 to 52, and of the cruisers 55 to 21, in favor of Togo's +squadron. In spite of this superiority in armament, and of fully +a knot in speed, Togo hesitated to close to decisive range. Five +hours or more of complicated maneuvering ensued, during which both +squadrons kept at "long bowls," now passing each other, now defiling +across van or rear, without marked advantage for either side. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At last, at 5.40 p.m., the Japanese got in a lucky blow. Two 12-inch +shells struck the flagship <i>Tsarevitch</i>, killing Admiral Witjeft, +jamming the helm to starboard, and thus serving to throw the whole +Russian line into confusion. Togo now closed to 3000 yards, but +growing darkness enabled his quarry to escape. The battle in fact +was less one-sided than the later engagement at Tsushima. On both +sides the percentage of hits was low, about 1% for the Russians +and 6 or 7% for their opponents. Togo's flagship <i>Mikasa</i> was +hit 30 times and lost 125 men; the total Japanese loss was about +half that of the enemy—236 to 478. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Much might still have been gained, in view of the future coming of +the Baltic fleet, had the Russians still persisted in pressing onward +for Vladivostok; but owing to loss of their leader and ignorance of the +general plan, they scattered. The cruiser <i>Novik</i> was caught and +sunk, another cruiser was interned at Shanghai, a third at Saigon, +and the <i>Tsarevitch</i> at Kiao-chau. The rest, including 5 of the +6 battleships, fled back into the Port Arthur death-trap. Largely in +order to complete their destruction, the Japanese sacrificed 60,000 +men in desperate assaults on the fortress, which surrendered January +2, 1905. As at Santiago, the necessity of saving battleships, less +easily replaced, led the Japanese to the cheaper expenditure of +men. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On news of the Port Arthur sortie, the Vladivostok squadron, which +hitherto had made only a few more or less futile raids on Japanese +shipping, advanced toward Tsushima Straits, and met there at dawn +of August 14 a slightly superior force of 4 cruisers under Kamimura. +The better shooting of the Japanese soon drove the slowest Russian +ship, the <i>Rurik</i>, out of line; the other two, after a plucky +fight, <a name="page_335"><span class="page">Page 335</span></a> +managed to get away, with hulls and funnels riddled by enemy shells. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The complete annulment of Russia's eastern fleet in this first +stage of hostilities had enabled Japan to profit fully by her easier +communications to the scene of war. Its final destruction with the +fall of Port Arthur gave assurance of victory. The decisive battle +of Mukden was fought in March, 1905. Close to their bases, trained +to the last degree, inspired by success, the Japanese navy could +now face with confidence the approach of Russia's last fleet. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Rojdestvensky's Cruise</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After a series of accidents and delays, the Baltic fleet under +Admiral Rojdestvensky—8 battleships, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, +and numerous auxiliaries—left Libau Oct. 18, 1904, on its +18,000-mile cruise. Off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, the ships +fired into English trawlers under the impression that they were +enemy torpedo craft, and thus nearly stirred England to war. Off +Tangier some of the lighter vessels separated to pass by way of +Suez, and a third division from Russia followed a little later +by the same route. Hamburg-American colliers helped Rojdestvensky +solve his logistical problem on the long voyage round Africa, and +German authorities stretched neutrality rules upon his arrival in +Wahlfish Bay, for the engrossment of Russia in eastern adventures +was cheerfully encouraged by the neighbor on her southern frontier. +France also did her best to be of service to the fleet of her ally, +though she had "paired off" with England to remain neutral in the +war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With the reunion of the Russian divisions at Nossi Bé, +Madagascar, January 9, 1905, came news of the fall of Port Arthur. +The home government now concluded to despatch the fag-ends of its +navy, though Rojdestvensky would have preferred to push ahead without +waiting for such "superfluous encumbrances" to join. Ships, as his +staff officer Semenoff afterward wrote, were needed, but not "old +flatirons and <a name="page_336"><span class="page">Page 336</span></a> +galoshes"; guns, but not "holes surrounded by iron."[1] After a +tedious 10 weeks' delay in tropical waters, the fleet moved on +to French Indo-China, where, after another month of waiting, the +last division under Nebogatoff finally joined—a slow old +battleship, 3 coast defense ironclads, and a cruiser. Upon these, +Rojdestvensky's officers vented their vocabulary of invective, in +which "war junk" and "auto-sinkers" were favorite terms. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Rasplata</span>, p. 426.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Having already accomplished almost the impossible, the armada of +50 units on May 14 set forth on the last stage of its extraordinary +cruise. Of three possible routes to Vladivostok—through the +Tsugaru Strait between Nippon and Yezo, through the Strait of La +Perouse north of Yezo, or through the Straits of Tsushima—the +first was ruled out as too difficult of navigation; the second, +because it would involve coaling off the coast of Japan. Tsushima +remained. To avoid torpedo attack, the Russian admiral planned to +pass the straits by day, and fully expected battle. But the hope +lingered in his mind that fog or heavy weather might enable him to +pass unscathed. He had been informed that owing to traffic conditions +on the Siberian railway, he could get nothing at Vladivostok in the +way of supplies. Hence, as a compromise measure which weakened +fighting efficiency, he took along 3 auxiliary steamers, a repair +ship, 2 tugs, and 2 hospital ships, the rest of the train on May +25 entering Shanghai; and he so filled the bunkers and piled even +the decks with fuel, according to Nebogatoff's later testimony, +that they went into action burdened with coal for 3,000 miles.[2] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Mahan, <span class="sc">Naval Strategy</span>, p. 412.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 814px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig064.png" width="814" height="557" alt="Fig. 64"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCT. 18, 1904-MAY 27, + 1905</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The main Russian fighting force entered the battle in three divisions +of 4 ships each: (1) the <i>Suvaroff</i> (flagship), <i>Alexander +III, Borodino</i> and <i>Orel</i>, each a new battleship of about +13,600 tons; (2) the <i>Ossliabya</i>, a slightly smaller battleship, +and three armored cruisers; (3) Nebogatoff's division as given above, +with the exception of the cruiser. Then there was a squadron of +4 smaller cruisers, 4 other cruisers as scouts, and 9 destroyers. +The Japanese engaged in two main divisions of 6 ships each (4 +battleships and 8 armored cruisers), backed <a name="page_337"><span +class="page">Page 337</span></a> <a name="page_338"><span +class="page">Page 338</span></a> by four light cruiser divisions of +4 ships each. The Russian line had the advantage in heavy ordnance, +as will appear from the following table, but this was more than +compensated for by the enemy's superiority in 8-inch guns and +quick-firers, which covered the Russians with an overwhelming rain +of shells. Of guns in broadside, the Japanese ships-of-the-line +had 127 to 98; and the cruisers 89 to 43. +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center_btrb" rowspan="2"> </td> + <td class="center_btrb" rowspan="2">Ships</td> + <td class="center_btrb" colspan="4"><span class="sc"> + Main Batteries</span></td> + <td class="center_btb" colspan="2">Q.F.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center_brb">12″</td> + <td class="center_brb">10″</td> + <td class="center_brb">9″</td> + <td class="center_brb">8″</td> + <td class="center_brb">6″</td> + <td class="center_bb">4″</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Japan</td> + <td class="center_br">12</td> + <td class="center_br">16</td> + <td class="center_br">1</td> + <td class="center_br"> </td> + <td class="center_br">30</td> + <td class="center_br">160</td> + <td class="center"> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Russia</td> + <td class="center_br">12</td> + <td class="center_br">26</td> + <td class="center_br">15</td> + <td class="center_br">4</td> + <td class="center_br">3</td> + <td class="center_br">90</td> + <td class="center">20</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +On the basis of these figures, and the 50% superiority of the Japanese +in speed, the issue could hardly be in doubt. Admiral Togo, moreover, +had commanded his fleet in peace and war for 8 years, and had veteran +subordinates on whom he could depend to lead their divisions +independently yet in coordination with the general plan. Constant +training and target practice had brought his crews to a high degree +of skill. The Japanese shells were also superior, with fuses that +detonated their charges on the slightest contact with an explosive +force like that of mines. Between the enemy and their base, the +Japanese could wait quietly in home waters, while the Russian fleet +was worn out by its eight months' cruise. At best, the latter was +a heterogeneous assemblage of new ships hastily completed and old +ships indifferently put in repair, which since Nebogatoff joined +had had but one opportunity for maneuvers and had operated as a +unit for only 13 days. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the night of May 26-27, as the Russian ships approached Tsushima +through mist and darkness, half the officers and men were at their +posts, while the rest slept beside the guns. Fragments of wireless +messages—"Last night" ... "nothing" ... "eleven lights" ... "but +not in line"—revealed <a name="page_339"><span class="page">Page +339</span></a> enemy patrols in the waters beyond. Semenoff on the +<i>Suvaroff</i> describes vividly "the tall, somewhat bent figure +of the Admiral on the side of the bridge, the wrinkled face of +the man at the wheel stooping over the compass, the guns' crews +chilled at their posts." In the brightly lighted engine-rooms, "life +and movement was visible on all sides; men were nimbly running +up and down ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and buzzing of +voices; orders were being transmitted loudly; but, on looking more +intently, the tension and anxiety—that same peculiar frame of +mind so noticeable on deck—could also be observed."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Battle of Tsushima</span>, p. +28.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Battle of Tsushima</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At dawn (4.45) the Japanese scout <i>Sinano Maru</i>, which for +an hour or more had been following in the darkness, made them out +clearly and communicated the intelligence at once to Togo in his +base at Masampho Bay, on the Korean side of the straits, and to +the cruiser divisions off the Tsushima Islands. This was apparently +the first definite news that Togo had received for several days, +and the fact suggests that his scouting arrangements were not above +criticism, for it took fast steaming to get to the straits by noon. +Cruiser divisions were soon circling towards the Russians through +the mist and darting as swiftly away, first the 5th and 6th under +Takeomi and Togo (son of the admiral), then the 3d under Dewa, all +reporting the movements of the enemy fleet and shepherding it till +the final action began. Troubled by their activity, Rojdestvensky +made several shifts of formation, first placing his 1st and 2d +divisions in one long column ahead of the 3d, then at 11.20 throwing +the 1st division again to starboard, while the cruisers protected +the auxiliaries which were steaming between the lines in the rear. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This was the disposition when, shortly after one o'clock, the Japanese +main divisions appeared to northward about 7 miles distant, steaming +on a westerly course across the enemy's bows. Since morning Togo +had covered a distance of 90 miles. From <a name="page_340"><span +class="page">Page 340</span></a> his signal yards fluttered the +stirring message: "The fate of the empire depends upon to-day's +battle. Let every man do his utmost." Ordering all his cruisers +to circle to the Russian rear, and striking himself for their left +flank, which at the moment was the weaker, Togo first turned southward +as if to pass on opposite courses, and then at about two o'clock +led his two divisions around to east-northeast, so as to "cross +the T" upon the head of the enemy line. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 610px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig065.png" width="610" height="487" alt="Fig. 65"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905</td></tr> +</table> + +<table style="width: 100%;"> +<tr><td colspan="6"><i>Japanese</i></td></tr> +<tr><td rowspan="7" style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td colspan="2">I Division (Togo)</td> + <td rowspan="7" style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td colspan="2">II Division (Kamimura)</td></tr> +<tr><td rowspan="6" style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td>Mikasa, B.S.</td> + <td rowspan="6" style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td>Idzumo</td></tr> +<tr><td>Shikishima, B.S.</td><td>Iwate</td></tr> +<tr><td>Asahi, B.S.</td><td>Adzumo</td></tr> +<tr><td>Fuji, B.S.</td><td>Asama</td></tr> +<tr><td>Nisshin, A.C.</td><td>Tokiwa</td></tr> +<tr><td>Kasuga</td><td>Yakumo</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="6"> </td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="6"><i>Russians</i></td></tr> +<tr><td rowspan="5" style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td colspan="2">I Division</td> + <td rowspan="2" style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td colspan="2">II Division</td></tr> +<tr><td rowspan="4" style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td>Suvaroff</td> + <td style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td>Ossliabya (flag)</td></tr> +<tr><td>Alexander III</td><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td>Borodino</td> + <td style="width: 1em;"> </td> + <td colspan="2">III Division</td></tr> +<tr><td>Orel</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_341"><span class="page">Page 341</span></a> Just +as Togo's flagship <i>Mikasa</i> straightened on her new course, +nearly north of the <i>Suvaroff</i>, and 6400 yards distant, the +<i>Suvaroff</i> opened fire. It has been suggested that at this +critical moment the Russian admiral should have closed with the +enemy, or, leading his ships on a northwesterly course, laid his +starboard broadsides on the knuckle formed by the Japanese turn. +But the position of the enemy cruisers and destroyers, and worry +over his transports, guided his movements. Moreover, he had not +yet completed an awkwardly executed maneuver to get his ships back +into single column with the 1st division ahead. The <i>Ossliabya</i> +and other ships of the 2d division were thrown into confusion, and +forced to slow down and even stop engines. Under these difficulties, +the <i>Suvaroff</i> sheered more to eastward. As they completed their +turn the Japanese secured a "capping" position and could concentrate +on the leading ships of both the 1st and the 2d Russian divisions, +4 ships on the <i>Suvaroff</i> and 7 on the <i>Ossliabya</i>. Under +this terrible fire the <i>Ossliabya</i> went down, the first modern +battleship (in the narrow sense of the word) ever sunk by gunfire, +and the <i>Suvaroff</i> a few moments later fell out of line, torn +by shells, her forward funnel down, and steering gear jammed. "She +was so battered," wrote a Japanese observer, "that scarcely any +one would have taken her for a ship." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With an advantage in speed of 15 knots to 9, the Japanese drew +ahead. The <i>Alexander</i>, followed by other Russian ships in +much confusion, about three o'clock made an effort to pass northward +across the enemy rear, but they were countered by the Japanese first +division turning west together and the 2d division in succession at +3.10. The first and decisive phase of the action thus ended. Both +fleets eventually resumed easterly and then southerly courses, +for considerable periods completely lost to each other in smoke +and haze. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Plunging through heavy seas from the southwest, the Japanese cruisers +had in the meantime punished the Russian rear less severely than +might have been expected. Two transports went down in flames, two +cruisers were badly damaged, and the high-sided ex-German liner +<i>Ural</i> was punctured with shells. On the other hand, Dewa's +flagship <i>Kasagi</i> was driven to port <a name="page_342"><span +class="page">Page 342</span></a> with a bad hole under water, and +Toga's old ship <i>Naniwa Kan</i> had to cease action for repairs. +Hits and losses in fact were considerable in both the main and the +cruiser divisions of the Japanese, their total casualties numbering +465. Late in the afternoon the Russian destroyer <i>Buiny</i> came +up to the wreck of the <i>Suvaroff</i>, and lurched alongside long +enough for Rojdestvensky, wounded and almost unconscious, to be +practically thrown on board. He was captured with the destroyer +next day. In spite of her injuries, the <i>Suvaroff</i> held off +a swarm of cruisers and destroyers until at last torpedoed at 7.20 +p. m. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Russian battleships had meanwhile described a large circle to +southward, and at 5 p. m. were again steaming north, accompanied +by some of their cruisers and train. Attacked once more between 6 +and 7 o'clock, and almost incapable of defense, the <i>Alexander +III</i> and <i>Borodino</i> went down, making 4 ships lost out of +the 5 new vessels that had formed the backbone of Rojdestvensky's +forces. In the gathering darkness. Nebogatoff collected the survivors +and staggered northward. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of slight value in the day engagement, 21 Japanese destroyers, +with about 40 torpedo boats which had sheltered under Tsushima +Island, now darted after the fleeing foe. In the fog and heavy +weather they were almost as great a menace to each other as to the +enemy. Russian ships without searchlights escaped harm. Of three +or perhaps four Russian vessels struck, all but the <i>Navarin</i> +stayed afloat until the next day. Admiral Custance estimates 8 hits, +or 9% of the torpedoes fired. There were at least 6 collisions +among the flotillas, and 4 boats destroyed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the morning of the 28th the remains of the Russian fleet were +scattered over the sea. Nebagatoff with 4 battleships and 2 cruisers +surrendered at 10.30. Of the 37 ships all told that entered Tsushima +Straits, only the following escaped: the cruisers <i>Oleg, Aurora</i>, +and <i>Jemschug</i> reached Manila on June 3; a tug and a supply +ship entered Shanghai, and another transport with plenty of coal +went clear to Madagascar; only the fast cruiser <i>Almaz</i> and +two destroyers made Vladivostok. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Among the lessons to be drawn from Tsushima, one of the <a +name="page_343"><span class="page">Page 343</span></a> clearest is +the weakening effect of divided purpose. With all honor to Admiral +Rojdestvensky for his courage and persistence during his cruise, +it is evident that at the end he allowed the supply problem to +interfere with his preparations for battle, and that he fought +"with one eye on Vladivostok." It is evident also that only by a +long period of training and operating as a unit can a collection +of ships and men be welded into an effective fighting force. Torpedo +results throughout the war, whether due to faulty materials or +unskilled employment, were not such as to increase the reliance upon +this weapon. The gun retained its supremacy; and the demonstrated +advantage conferred by speed and heavy armament in long range fighting +was reflected in the "all-big-gun" <i>Dreadnought</i> of 1906 and +the battle cruisers of 1908. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Immediately after the Russian navy had been swept out of existence, +President Roosevelt offered to mediate, and received favorable replies +from the warring nations. By the treaty signed at Portsmouth, New +Hampshire, on September 5, 1905, Russia withdrew from Manchuria +in favor of China, recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea +(annexed by Japan in 1910), and surrendered to Japan her privileges +in Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. In lieu of indemnity, +Japan after a long deadlock was induced by pressure on the part +of England and the United States to accept that portion of the +island of Saghalien south of the parallel of 50°. Thus the war +thwarted Russia's policy of aggressive imperialism in the East, +and established Japan firmly on the mainland at China's front door. +At the same time, by the military débâcle of Russia, +it dangerously disturbed the balance of power in Europe, upon which +the safety of that continent had long been made precariously to +depend. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Spanish-American War</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Notes on the Spanish American War</span> (a series + of publications issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. + Navy Department, 1900).</p> + +<p class="list"> +<a name="page_344"><span class="page">Page 344</span></a> +<span class="sc">Sampson-Schley Official Communications to the U. S. + Senate</span>, Gov't Printing Office, 1899.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Downfall of Spain</span>, H. W. Wilson, 1900.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">With Sampson Through the War</span>, W. A. M. Goode, + 1899.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">A History of the Spanish-American War</span>, R. H. + Tetherington, 1900.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Russo-Japanese War</i> +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">International Relations of the Chinese Empire</span>, + 3 vols., H. B. Morse, 1918.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Battle of Tsushima</span> (1906), +<span class="sc">Rasplata</span> (1910), Captain Vladimir Semenoff.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Japanese Official History</span>, translated in U. S. +Naval Institute Proceedings, July-August, September-October, 1914.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Ship of the Line in Battle</span>, Admiral +Reginald Custance, 1912.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War</span>, +Captain N. Klado, 1905.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Official British History of the Russo-Japanese +War</span>, 3 vols., 1910.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The American Merchant Marine</span>, Debaters' +Handbook Series, N. Y., 1916 (with bibliography).</p> + +<h2><a name="page_345"><span class="page">Page 345</span></a> +CHAPTER XVI</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE WORLD WAR: THE FIRST YEAR (1914-1915) +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Russo-Japanese war greatly weakened Russia's position in Europe, +and left the Dual Alliance of France and Russia overweighted by the +military strength of the Teutonic Empires, Germany and Austria, +whether or not Italy should adhere to the Triple Alliance with +these nations. To Great Britain, such a disturbance of the European +balance was ever a matter of grave concern, and an abandonment +of her policy of isolation was in this instance virtually forced +upon her by Germany's rivalry in her own special sphere of commerce +and sea power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The disturbing effect of Germany's naval growth during the two +decades prior to 1914 affords in fact an excellent illustration +of the influence of naval strength in peace as well as in war. +Under Bismarck Germany had pushed vigorously though tardily into +the colonial field, securing vast areas of rather doubtful value +in East and West Africa, and the Bismarck Archipelago, Marshall +Islands, and part of New Guinea in the Pacific. With the accession +of William II in 1888 and the dropping of the pilot, Bismarck, +two years later, she embarked definitely upon her quest for world +power. The young Kaiser read eagerly Mahan's <i>Influence of Sea +Power Upon History</i> (1890), distributed it among the ships of +his still embryonic navy, and fed his ambition on the doctrines +of this epoch-making work. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Naval development found further stimulus and justification in the +rapid economic growth of Germany. In 1912 her industrial production +attained a value of three billion dollars, as compared with slightly +over four billion for England and seven billion for the United +States. Since 1893 her merchant marine had tripled in size and taken +second place to that of England with a total of over five million +tons. During the same <a name="page_346"><span class="page">Page +346</span></a> period she surpassed France and the United States +in volume of foreign commerce, and in this respect also reached a +position second to Great Britain, with a more rapid rate of increase. +An emigration of 220,000 a year in the early eighties was cut down +to 22,000 in 1900.[1] To assure markets for her manufactures, and +continued growth in population and industry, Germany felt that +she must strive to extend her political power. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Figures from Priest, <span class="sc">Germany Since +1840</span>, p. 150 ff.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though Germany's commercial expansion met slight opposition even +in areas under British control, it undoubtedly justified measures +of political and naval protection; and it was this motive that was +advanced in the preface to the German Naval Bill of 1900, which +declared that, "To protect her sea trade and colonies ... Germany +must have a fleet so strong that a war, even with the greatest naval +power, would involve such risks as to jeopardize the position of that +power."[2] Furthermore, Germany's quest for colonies and points of +vantage such as Kiao-chau, her scheme for a Berlin-Bagdad railroad +with domination of the territories on the route, had parallel in +the activities of other nations. Unfortunately, however, Germany's +ambitions grew even more rapidly than her commerce, until her true +aim appeared to be destruction of rivals and domination of the +world. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: Hurd and Castle, <span class="sc">German Sea Power</span>, +Appendix II.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The seizure of Kiao-chau in 1897-98 coincided with the appointment +of Admiral von Tirpitz as Imperial Minister of Marine. Under his +administration, the Naval Bill of 1900, passed in a heat of anglophobia +aroused by the Boer War, doubled the program of 1898, and contained +ingenious provisions by which the Reichstag was bound to steady +increases covering a long period of years, and by which the Navy +Department was empowered to replace worthless old craft, after 20 +or 25 years' service, with new ships of the largest size. As the +armament race grew keener, this act was amended in the direction +of further increases, but its program was never cut down. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +International crises and realignments marked the growing tension of +these years. In 1905 England extended for ten <a name="page_347"><span +class="page">Page 347</span></a> years her understanding with Japan. By +the <i>Entente Cordiale</i> with France in 1904 and a later settlement +of outstanding difficulties with Russia, she also practically changed +the Dual Alliance into a Triple Entente, though without positively +binding herself to assistance in war. To the agreement of 1904 by +which England and France assured each other a free hand in Egypt and +Morocco, respectively, the Kaiser raised strenuous objections, and +forced the resignation of the anglophile French Foreign Minister, +Delcassé; but at the Algeciras Convention of 1906, assembled +to settle the Morocco question, Germany and Austria stood virtually +alone. Even the American delegates, sent by President Roosevelt at +the Kaiser's invitation, voted generally with the Western Powers. +When Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909, the Kaiser +shook the mailed fist to better effect than at Algeciras, with the +result that Russia had to accept this extension of Austro-German +influence in the Balkan sphere. Still again two years later, when +the German cruiser <i>Panther</i> made moves to establish a base +at Agadir on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Europe approached the +verge of war; but Germany found the financial situation against +her, backed down, and eventually took a strip of land on the Congo +in liquidation of her Morocco claims. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For all her resolute saber-rattling in these years, Germany found +herself checkmated in almost every move. The Monroe Doctrine, for +which the United States showed willingness to fight in the Venezuela +affair of 1902, balked her schemes in the New World. In the Far +East she faced Japan; in Africa, British sea power. A "<i>Drang +nach Osten</i>," through the Balkans and Turkey toward Asia Minor, +offered on the whole the best promise; and it was in this quarter +that Austria's violent demands upon Serbia aroused Russia and +precipitated the World War. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Great Britain's foreign agreements, already noted, had as a primary +aim the concentration of her fleet in home waters. Naval predominance +in the Far East she turned over to Japan; in the western Atlantic, +to the United States (at least by acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine +and surrender of treaty <a name="page_348"><span class="page">Page +348</span></a> rights to share in the construction of the Panama +Canal); and in the Mediterranean, to France, though England still +kept a strong cruiser force in this field. The old policy of showing +the flag all over the world was abandoned, 160 old ships were sent +to the scrap heap as unable "either to fight or to run away," and +88% of the fleet was concentrated at home, so quietly that it "was +found out only by accident by Admiral Mahan."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Admiral Fisher, <span class="sc">Memories</span>, p. +185.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These and other changes were carried out under the energetic +régime of Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910. +The British <i>Dreadnought</i> of 1906, completed in 10 months, and +the battle cruisers of 1908—<i>Indefatigable, Invincible</i> +and <i>Indomitable</i>—came as an unpleasant surprise to +Germany, necessitating construction of similar types and enlargement +of the Kiel Canal. Reforms in naval gunnery urged by Admiral Sir +Percy Scott were taken up, and plans were made for new bases in the +Humber, in the Forth at Rosyth, and in the Orkneys, necessitated by +the shift of front from the Channel to the North Sea. But against the +technical skill, painstaking organization, and definitely aggressive +purpose of Germany, even more radical measures were needed to put +the tradition-ridden British navy in readiness for war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Naval preparedness was vital, for the conflict was fundamentally, +like the Napoleonic Wars, a struggle between land power predominant +on the Continent and naval power supreme on the seas. As compared +with France in the earlier struggle, Germany was more dependent +on foreign commerce, and in a long war would feel more keenly the +pressure of blockade. On the other hand, while the naval preponderance +of England and her allies was probably greater than 100 years before, +England had to throw larger armies into the field and more of her +shipping into naval service, and found her commerce not augmented +but cut down. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Indeed, Germany was not without advantage in the naval war. As she +fully expected, her direct sea trade was soon shut off, and her +shipping was driven to cover or destroyed. But Germany was perhaps +80% self-supporting, was well supplied <a name="page_349"><span +class="page">Page 349</span></a> with minerals and munitions, and +could count on trade through neutral states on her frontiers. Her +shallow, well-protected North Sea coast-line gave her immunity +from naval attack and opportunity to choose the moment in which +to throw her utmost strength into a sortie. So long as her fleet +remained intact, it controlled the Baltic by virtue of an interior +line through the Kiel Canal, thus providing a strangle hold on +Russia and free access to northern neutrals. Only by dangerous +division of forces, or by leaving the road to England and the Atlantic +open, could the British fleet enter the Baltic Sea. England it is +true had a superior navy (perhaps less superior than was commonly +thought), and a position of singular advantage between Germany and +the overseas world. But for her the maintenance of naval superiority +was absolutely essential. An effective interference with her sea +communications would quickly put her out of the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The importance (for Germany as well as for England) of preserving +their main fighting fleets, may explain the wariness with which +they were employed. Instead of risking them desperately, both sides +turned to commerce warfare—the Western Powers resorting to +blockade and the Germans to submarines. Each of these forms of +warfare played a highly important part in the war, and the submarine +campaign in particular, calling for new methods and new instruments, +seems almost to have monopolized the naval genius and energies of +the two groups of belligerents. It may be noted, however, that but +for the cover given by the High Seas Fleet, the submarine campaign +could hardly have been undertaken; and but for the Grand Fleet, it +would have been unnecessary. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The naval strength of the various belligerents in July, 1914, appears +in the table on the following page.[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: From table prepared by U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence, +July 1, 1916.] +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center_btrb"> </td> + <td class="center_btrb">Great Britain</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Ger- many</td> + <td class="center_btrb">U.S. (1916)</td> + <td class="center_btrb">France</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Japan</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Russia</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Italy</td> + <td class="center_btb">Austria</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Dreadnoughts</td> + <td class="center_brb">20</td> + <td class="center_brb">13</td> + <td class="center_brb">12</td> + <td class="center_brb">4</td> + <td class="center_brb">2</td> + <td class="center_brb">..</td> + <td class="center_brb">3</td> + <td class="center_bb">3</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Pre-dreadn'ts</td> + <td class="center_brb">40</td> + <td class="center_brb">20</td> + <td class="center_brb">21</td> + <td class="center_brb">18</td> + <td class="center_brb">13</td> + <td class="center_brb">7</td> + <td class="center_brb">8</td> + <td class="center_bb">6</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Battle Cruisers</td> + <td class="center_brb">9</td> + <td class="center_brb">4</td> + <td class="center_brb">..</td> + <td class="center_brb">..</td> + <td class="center_brb">2</td> + <td class="center_brb">..</td> + <td class="center_brb">..</td> + <td class="center_bb">..</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Armored Cr's</td> + <td class="center_brb">34</td> + <td class="center_brb">9</td> + <td class="center_brb">10</td> + <td class="center_brb">20</td> + <td class="center_brb">13</td> + <td class="center_brb">6</td> + <td class="center_brb">9</td> + <td class="center_bb">2</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Cruisers</td> + <td class="center_brb">74</td> + <td class="center_brb">41</td> + <td class="center_brb">14</td> + <td class="center_brb">9</td> + <td class="center_brb">13</td> + <td class="center_brb">9</td> + <td class="center_brb">6</td> + <td class="center_bb">5</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Destroyers</td> + <td class="center_brb">167</td> + <td class="center_brb">130</td> + <td class="center_brb">54</td> + <td class="center_brb">84</td> + <td class="center_brb">50</td> + <td class="center_brb">91</td> + <td class="center_brb">36</td> + <td class="center_bb">18</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Submarines</td> + <td class="center_brb">78</td> + <td class="center_brb">30</td> + <td class="center_brb">44</td> + <td class="center_brb">64</td> + <td class="center_brb">13</td> + <td class="center_brb">30</td> + <td class="center_brb">19</td> + <td class="center_bb">6</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Owing to new construction, these figures underwent rapid change. +Thus England added 4 dreadnoughts (2 built for Turkey) in August, +1914; the battle cruiser <i>Tiger</i> in November; the dreadnought +<i>Canada</i> and 5 <i>Queen Elizabeths</i> in 1915; and 5 <i>Royal +Sovereigns</i> in 1915-1916. In comparisons, full account is not +always taken of the naval support of England's <a name="page_350"><span +class="page">Page 350</span></a> allies; it is true, however, that +the necessity of protecting coasts, troop convoys, and commerce +prevented her from throwing her full strength into the North Sea. +Her capital ships were in two main divisions—the 1st or Grand +Fleet in the Orkneys, and the 2d fleet, consisting at first of 16 +pre-dreadnoughts, in the Channel. Admiral Jellico[1] gives the +strength of the Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, on +August 4, 1914, as follows: +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Grand Fleet</span>, p. 31.] +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center_btrb"> </td> + <td class="center_btrb">Dread- noughts</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Pre- Dread- noughts</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Battle cruisers</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Light cruisers</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Destroyers</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Airships</td> + <td class="center_btb">Cruisers</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">British</td> + <td class="center_br">20</td> + <td class="center_br">8</td> + <td class="center_br">4</td> + <td class="center_br">12</td> + <td class="center_br">42</td> + <td class="center_br">..</td> + <td class="center">0</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">German</td> + <td class="center_brb">13</td> + <td class="center_brb">16</td> + <td class="center_brb">3</td> + <td class="center_brb">15</td> + <td class="center_brb">88</td> + <td class="center_brb">1</td> + <td class="center_bb">2</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Of submarines, according to the same authority, England had 17 of +the D and E classes fit for distant operations, and 37 fit only for +coast defense, while Germany had 28 U boats, all but two or three of +which were able to cruise overseas. The British admiral's account of +the inferiority of the British navy in submarines, aircraft, mines, +destroyers, director firing (installed in only 8 ships in 1914), +armor-piercing shells, and <a name="page_351"><span class="page">Page +351</span></a> protection of bases, seems to justify the caution +of British operations, but is a severe indictment of the manner +in which money appropriated for the navy was used. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To open a war with England by surprise naval attack was no doubt +an element in German plans; but in 1914 this was negatived by the +forewarning of events on the Continent, by Germany's persistent delusion +that England would stay neutral, and by the timely mobilization of +the British fleet. This had been announced the winter before as +a practical exercise, was carried out according to schedule from +July 16 to July 23 (the date of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia), +and was then extended until July 29, at which date the Grand Fleet +sailed for Scapa Flow. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At midnight of August 4 the British ultimatum to Germany expired +and hostilities began. During the same night the Grand Fleet swept +the northern exit of the North Sea to prevent the escape of enemy +raiders, only one of which, the <i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i>, +actually reached the Atlantic in this first stage of the war. On a +similar sweep further south, the Harwich light cruiser and destroyer +force under Commodore Tyrwhitt sank by gunfire the mine layer +<i>Königin Luise</i>, which a trawler had reported "throwing +things overboard"; but the next morning, August 6, the cruiser +<i>Amphion</i>, returning near the same position, was destroyed by +two mines laid by her victim of the day before. On the same date +five cables were cut leading from Germany overseas. From August +10 to 23 all British forces were busy covering the transit of the +first troops sent to the Continent. Such, in brief summary, and +omitting more distant activities for the present, were the opening +naval events of the war. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Heligoland Bight Action</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the morning of August 28 occurred a lively action in Heligoland +Bight, which cost Germany 3 light cruisers and a destroyer, and +seemed to promise further aggressive action off the German shores. +The British plan called for a destroyer and light cruiser sweep +southward to a point about 12 miles <a name="page_352"><span +class="page">Page 352</span></a> west of Heligoland, and thence +westward, with submarines disposed off Heligoland as decoys, the +object being to cut off German destroyers and patrols. Commodore +Tyrwhitt's force which was to execute the raid consisted of the +1st and 3rd flotillas of 16 destroyers each, led by the new light +cruiser <i>Arethusa</i>, flagship (28.5 knots, two 6", six 4" guns), +and the <i>Fearless</i> (25-4 knots, ten 4" guns). These were to be +supported about 50 miles to westward by two battle cruisers from +the Humber. This supporting force was at the last moment joined +by three battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty and 6 cruisers under +Commodore Goodenough from the Grand Fleet; but news of the accession +never reached Commodore Keyes of the British submarines, who was +hence puzzled later by the appearance of Goodenough's cruisers +on the scene. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 457px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig066.png" width="457" height="313" alt="Fig. 66"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, AUG. 28, 1914</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The Germans, it appears, had got wind of the enemy plan, and arranged +a somewhat similar counter-stroke. As Commodore Tyrwhitt's flotillas +swept southward, they engaged and chased 10 German destroyers straight +down upon Heligoland. Here the <i>Arethusa</i> and the <i>Fearless</i> +were sharply engaged with two German light cruisers, the <i>Stettin</i>, +and the <i>Frauenlob</i> (ten 4.1" guns each), until actually in sight +of the island. Both sides suffered, the <i>Frauenlob</i> withdrawing +to <a name="page_353"><span class="page">Page 353</span></a> +Wilhelmshaven with 50 casualties, and the <i>Arethusa</i> having +her speed cut down and nearly every gun put temporarily out of +commission. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whipping around to westward, the flotillas caught the German destroyer +<i>V 187</i>, which at 9.10, after an obstinate resistance, was reduced +to a complete wreck enveloped in smoke and steam. As British destroyers +picked up survivors, they were driven off by the <i>Stettin</i>; +but two boats with British crews and German prisoners were rescued +later by the British submarine <i>E 4</i>, which had been lurking +nearby. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Extraordinary confusion now developed from the fact that Commodore +Keyes in his submarine flotilla leader <i>Lurcher</i> sighted through +the mist two of Goodenough's cruisers (which had chased a destroyer +eastward), and reported them as enemies. The call was picked up +by Goodenough himself, who brought his remaining four ships to +Keyes' assistance; but when these appeared, Keyes thought that +he had to deal with four enemies more! Tyrwhitt was also drawn +backward by the alarm. Luckily the situation was cleared up without +serious consequences. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +German cruisers, darting out of the Ems and the Jade, were now entering +the fray. At 10.55 the <i>Fearless</i> and the <i>Arethusa</i> with +their flotillas were attacked by the <i>Stralsund</i>, which under a +heavy fire made off toward Heligoland. Then at 11.15 the <i>Stettin</i> +engaged once more, and five minutes later the <i>Mainz</i>. Just +as this last ship was being finished up by destroyer attack, and +the <i>Stettin</i> and two fresh cruisers, <i>Köln</i> and +<i>Ariadne</i>, were rushing to her assistance, Beatty's five battle +cruisers appeared to westward and rose swiftly out of the haze. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Admiral Beatty's opportune dash into action at this time, from +his position 40 miles away, was in response to an urgent call from +Tyrwhitt at 11.15, coupled with the fact that, as the Admiral states +in his report, "The flotillas had advanced only 2 miles since 8 +a.m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases." "Our high +speed," the report continues, "made submarine attack difficult, +and the smoothness of the <a name="page_354"><span class="page">Page +354</span></a> sea made their detection fairly easy. I considered +that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie except by a +battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided +our stroke was sufficiently rapid." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The <i>Stettin</i> broke backward just in the nick of time. The +<i>Köln</i> flagship of the German commodore, was soon staggering +off in a blaze, and was later sunk with her total complement of +380 officers and men. The <i>Ariadne</i>, steaming at high speed +across the bows of the British flagship <i>Lion</i>, was put out +of action by two well-placed salvos. At 1.10 the <i>Lion</i> gave +the general signal "Retire." +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 555px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig067.png" width="555" height="349" alt="Fig. 67"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, + 12:30-1:40</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">From 20 to 40 miles slightly S. of W. + from Heligoland.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Though the German cruisers had fought hard and with remarkable +accuracy of fire, their movements had been tardy and not well concerted. +The British losses amounted altogether to only 33 killed and 40 +wounded; while the enemy lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners +over 1000 men. Very satisfactory, from the British standpoint, was +the effect of the victory upon their own and upon enemy morale. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Encouragement of this kind was desirable, for German submarines <a +name="page_355"><span class="page">Page 355</span></a> and mines +were already beginning to take their toll. Off the Forth on September +5, a single torpedo sank the light cruiser <i>Pathfinder</i> with +nearly all hands. This loss was avenged when a week later the <i>E +9</i>, under Lieut. Commander Max Harton, struck down the German +cruiser <i>Hela</i> within 6 miles of Heligoland. But on September +22, at 6.30 a.m., a single old-type German craft, the <i>U 9</i>, +dealt a staggering blow. With a total of 6 torpedoes Commander +Weddigen sank first the <i>Aboukir</i>, and then in quick succession +the <i>Hogue</i> and the <i>Cressy</i>, both dead in the water at +the work of rescue. The loss of these rather antiquated vessels +was less serious than that of over 1400 trained officers and men. +A shock to British traditions came with the new order that ships +must abandon injured consorts and make all speed away. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, which at the outbreak of +war were totally unprotected against submarines and thought to +be beyond their reach, the Grand Fleet felt less secure than when +cruising on the open sea. Safer refuges were sought temporarily +on the west coast of Scotland and at Lough Swilly in the north +of Ireland, but even off this latter base on October 27, the big +dreadnought <i>Audacious</i> was sunk by mines laid by the German +auxiliary cruiser <i>Berlin</i>. In view of the impending Turkish +crisis, the loss was not admitted by the Admiralty, though since +pictures of the sinking ship had actually been taken by passengers +on the White Star liner <i>Olympic</i>, it could not long remain +concealed. Mines and submarines had seemingly put the British navy +on the defensive, even if consolation could be drawn from the fact +that troops and supplies were crossing safely to France, the enemy +had been held up at the Marne, the German surface fleet was passive, +and the blockade was closing down. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Escape of the "Göben" and the "Breslau"</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In distant waters Germany at the outbreak of the war had only ten +cruisers—<i>Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Nürnberg</i>, +and <i>Leipzig</i> in the Pacific, <i>Königsberg</i> on the east +coast of Africa, <i>Karlsruhe</i> and <i>Dresden</i> in the West +Indies, and <a name="page_356"><span class="page">Page 356</span></a> +<i>Göben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> in the Mediterranean. Within +six months' time, these, together with a few auxiliary cruisers +fitted out abroad, were either destroyed or forced to intern in +neutral ports. Modern wireless communication, difficulties of coaling +and supply, and the overwhelming naval strength of the Allies made +the task of surface raiders far more difficult than in previous +wars. They were nevertheless skillfully handled, and, operating in +the wide ocean areas, created a troublesome problem for the Western +Powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The battle cruiser <i>Göben</i> and the light cruiser +<i>Breslau</i> alone, operating under Admiral Souchon in Mediterranean +waters, accomplished ultimate results which would have easily justified +the sacrifice of ten times the number of ships lost by Germany in +distant seas. To hunt down these two vessels, and at the same time +contain the Austrian Navy, the Entente had in the Mediterranean +not only the bulk of the French fleet but also 3 battle cruisers, +4 armored cruisers, and 4 light cruisers of Great Britain. Early +on August 4, as he was about to bombard the French bases of Bona +and Philippeville in Algiers, Admiral Souchon received wireless +orders to make for the Dardanelles. Germany and England were then on +the very verge of war. Knowing the British ships to be concentrated +near Malta, and actually passing the <i>Indomitable</i> and the +<i>Invincible</i> in sullen silence as he turned eastward, the +German commander decided to put in at Messina, Sicily. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the end of the 24 hours granted in this port, the prospects +for the German ships appeared so desperate that the officers, it +is said, made their final testaments before again putting to sea. +Slipping eastward through the Straits of Messina at twilight of +the 6th, they were sighted by the British scout <i>Gloucester</i>, +which stuck close at their heels all that night and until 4.40 p.m. +the next day. Then, under orders to turn back, and after boldly +engaging the <i>Breslau</i> to check the flight, Captain Kelly of +the <i>Gloucester</i> gave up the pursuit as the enemy rounded +the Morea and entered the Greek Archipelago. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The escape thus apparently so easy was the outcome of lack of +coördination between French and British, slow and poor <a +name="page_357"><span class="page">Page 357</span></a> information +from the British Admiralty, and questionable disposition of the +British forces on the basis of information actually at hand. Prior +to hostilities, it was perhaps unavoidable that the British commander, +Admiral Milne, should be ignorant of French plans; but even on August +5 and 6 he still kept all his battle cruisers west and north of +Sicily to protect the French troop transports, though by this time +he might have felt assured that the French fleet was at sea. At +the time of the escape Admiral Troubridge with 4 armored cruisers +and a destroyer force barred the Adriatic; though he caught the +<i>Gloucester's</i> calls, he was justified in not moving far from +his station without orders, in view of his inferior strength and +speed. Not until August 10 did British forces enter the Ægean; +and at 5 p.m. that day the two German ships steamed uninvited up +the Dardanelles. Since the Turkish situation was still somewhat +dubious, Admiral Souchon had been ordered to delay his entrance; but +on the 10th, hearing British wireless signals steadily approaching +his position in the Greek islands, he took the decision into his +own hands. Germany had "captured Turkey," as an Allied diplomat +remarked upon seeing the ships in the Golden Horn. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this affair the British, it is true, had many +preoccupations—the hostile Austrian fleet, the doubtful neutrality +of Italy, the French troop movement; the safety of Egypt and Suez. +Yet the Admiralty were well aware that the German Ambassador von +Wangenheim was dominant in Turkish councils and that the Turkish army +was mobilized under German officers. It seems strange, therefore, +that an escape into Constantinople was, in the words of the British +Official History, "the only one that had not entered into our +calculations." The whole affair illustrates the immense value political +information may have in guiding naval strategy. The German ships, +though ostensibly "sold" to the Turks, retained their German personnel. +Admiral Souchon assumed command of the Turkish Navy, and by an +attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea later succeeded in +precipitating Turkey's entrance into the war, with its long train +of evil consequences for the Western Powers. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_358"><span class="page">Page 358</span></a> +<i>Coronel and the Falkland Islands</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Pacific the German cruisers were at first widely scattered, +the <i>Emden</i> at Kiao-chau, the <i>Leipzig</i> on the west coast +of Mexico, the <i>Nürnberg</i> at San Francisco, and the armored +cruisers <i>Gneisenau</i> and <i>Scharnhorst</i> under Admiral von +Spee in the Caroline Islands. The two ships at the latter point, +after being joined by the <i>Nürnberg</i>, set out on a leisurely +cruise for South America, where, in view of Japan's entry into +the war, the German Admiral may have felt that he would secure a +clearer field of operations and, with the aid of German-Americans, +better facilities for supplies. After wrecking on their way the +British wireless and cable station at Fanning Island, and looking +into Samoa for stray British cruisers, the trio of ships were joined +at Easter Island on October 14 by the <i>Leipzig</i> and also by +the <i>Dresden</i>, which had fled thither from the West Indies. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The concentration thus resulting seems of doubtful wisdom, for, +scattered over the trade routes, the cruisers would have brought +about greater enemy dispersion and greater injury to commerce; and, +as the later course of the war was to show, the loss of merchant +tonnage was even more serious for the Entente than loss of fighting +ships. It seems evident, however, that Admiral van Spee was not +attracted by the tame task of commerce destroying, but wished to +try his gunnery, highly developed in the calm waters of the Far +East, against enemy men-of-war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In its present strength and position, the German "fleet in being" +constituted a serious menace, for to assemble an adequate force +against it on either side of Cape Horn would mean to leave the +other side dangerously exposed. It was with a keen realization of +this dilemma that Admiral Cradock in the British armored cruiser +<i>Good Hope</i> left the Falklands on October 22 to join the +<i>Monmouth, Glasgow</i>, and auxiliary cruiser <i>Otranto</i> in +a sweep along the west coast. The old battleship <i>Canopus</i>, +with 12-inch guns, but only 12 knots cruising speed, was properly +judged too slow to keep with the squadron. It is difficult to say +whether the failure to send <a name="page_359"><span class="page">Page +359</span></a> Cradock reënforcements at this time from either +the Atlantic or the Pacific was justified by the preoccupations in +those fields. Needless to say, there was no hesitation, <i>after</i> +Coronel, in hurrying ships to the scene. On November 1, when the +Admiralty Board was reorganized with Admiral Fisher in his old +place as First Sea Lord, orders at once went out sending the +<i>Defense</i> to Cradock and enjoining him not to fight without +the <i>Canopus</i>. But these orders he never received. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The composition of the two squadrons now approaching each other +off the Chilean coast was as follows: +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center_btrb">Name</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Type</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Displace-<br>ment</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Belt armor</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_btb">Speed</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Scharnhorst</td> + <td class="left_br">Armored cruiser</td> + <td class="center_br">11,600</td> + <td class="left_br">6-inch</td> + <td class="left_br">8-8.2″, 6-6″</td> + <td>23.5</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Gneisenau</td> + <td class="left_br">Armored cruiser</td> + <td class="center_br">11,600</td> + <td class="left_br">6-inch</td> + <td class="left_br">8-8.2″, 6-6″</td> + <td>23.5</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Leipzig</td> + <td class="left_br">Protected cruiser</td> + <td class="center_br">3,250</td> + <td class="left_br">none</td> + <td class="left_br">10-4″</td> + <td>23</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Nürnberg</td> + <td class="left_br">Light cruiser</td> + <td class="center_br">3,450</td> + <td class="left_br">none</td> + <td class="left_br">10-4″</td> + <td>24</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Dresden</td> + <td class="left_brb">Light cruiser</td> + <td class="center_brb">3,600</td> + <td class="left_brb">none</td> + <td class="left_brb">10-4″</td> + <td class="left_bb">24</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Good Hope</td> + <td class="left_br">Armored cruiser</td> + <td class="center_br">14,000</td> + <td class="left_br">6-inch</td> + <td class="left_br"> + 2-9.2″, 16-6″, 14-3″</td> + <td>24</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Monmouth</td> + <td class="left_br">Armored cruiser</td> + <td class="center_br">9,800</td> + <td class="left_br">4-inch</td> + <td class="left_br">14-6″, 8-3″</td> + <td>24</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Glasgow</td> + <td class="left_brb">Light cruiser</td> + <td class="center_brb">4,800</td> + <td class="left_brb">none</td> + <td class="left_brb">2-6″, 10-4″</td> + <td class="left_bb">26.5</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Canopus (not engaged)</td> + <td class="left_brb">Coast defense</td> + <td class="center_brb">12,950</td> + <td class="left_brb">6-inch</td> + <td class="left_brb">4-35 cal. 12″, 12-6″</td> + <td class="left_bb">16.5</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Without the <i>Canopus</i>, the British had perhaps a slight advantage +in squadron speed, but only the two 9.2-inch guns of the <i>Good +Hope</i> could match the sixteen 8.2-inch guns of the Germans. Each +side had information of the other's strength; but on the afternoon +of November 1, the date of the Battle of Coronel, each supposed +that only one enemy cruiser was in the immediate vicinity. Hence +there was mutual surprise when the two squadrons, spread widely +on opposite courses, came in contact at 4.40 p. m. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +While concentrating and forming his squadron, Admiral Cradock must +have pondered whether he should fight or retreat. The <i>Canopus</i> +he knew was laboring northward 250 miles away. It was highly doubtful +whether he could bring the enemy into action later with his slow +battleship in line. His orders were to "search and protect trade." +"Safety," we <a name="page_360"><span class="page">Page 360</span></a> +are told, "was a word he hardly knew." But his best justification +lay in the enemy's menace to commerce and in the comment of Nelson +upon a similar situation, "By the time the enemy has beat our fleet +soundly, they will do us no more harm that year." It was perhaps with +this thought that Admiral Cradock signaled to the <i>Canopus</i>, +"I am going to fight the enemy now." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At about 6 p.m. the two columns were 18,000 yards distant on southerly +converging courses. The British, to westward and slightly ahead, tried +to force the action before sunset, when they would be silhouetted +against the afterglow. Their speed at this time, however, seems to +have been held up by the auxiliary cruiser <i>Otranto</i>, which +later retreated southwestward, and their efforts to close were +thwarted by the enemy's turning slightly away. Admiral von Spee +in fact secured every advantage of position, between the British +and the neutral coast, on the side away from the sun, and on such +a course that the heavy seas from east of south struck the British +ships on their engaged bows, showering the batteries with spray +and rendering useless the lower deck guns. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At 7 o'clock the German ships opened fire at 11,260 yards. The third +salvo from the <i>Scharnhorst</i> disabled the <i>Good Hope's</i> +forward 9.2-inch gun. The <i>Monmouth's</i> forecastle was soon +on fire. It seems probable indeed that most of the injury to the +British was inflicted by accurate shooting in this first stage of +the action. On account of the gathering darkness, Admiral von Spee +allowed the range to be closed to about 5500 yards, guiding his aim +at first by the blaze on the Monmouth, and then for a time ceasing +fire. Shortly before 8 o'clock a huge column of flame shooting up +between the stacks of the <i>Good Hope</i> marked her end. The +<i>Monmouth</i> sheered away to westward and then northward with a +heavy list that prevented the use of her port guns. An hour later, +at 9.25, with her flag still flying defiantly, she was sunk by the +<i>Nürnberg</i> at point blank range. The <i>Glasgow</i>, +which had fought throughout the action, but had suffered little from +the fire of the German light cruisers, escaped in the darkness. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 485px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig068.png" width="485" height="748" alt="Fig. 68"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right">From <i>Official British Naval History</i>, + Vol. I.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOV. 1, 1914</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +"It is difficult," writes an American officer, "to find fault <a +name="page_361"><span class="page">Page 361</span></a><a +name="page_362"><span class="page">Page 362</span></a> with the +tactics of Admiral van Spee; he appears to have maneuvered so as +to secure the advantage of light, wind, and sea, and to have suited +himself as regards the range."[1] The <i>Scharnhorst</i> was hit +twice, the <i>Gneisenau</i> four times, and the German casualties +were only two men wounded. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Commander C. C. Gill, <span class="sc">Naval Power +in the War</span>, p. 51.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 419px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig069.png" width="419" height="508" alt="Fig. 69"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +This stinging blow and the resultant danger aroused the new Board +of Admiralty to energetic moves. Entering the Atlantic, the German +squadron might scatter upon the trade routes or support the rebellion +in South Africa. Again, it might double westward or northward in the +Pacific, or pass in groups of three, as permitted by American rules, +through the Panama Canal into the West Indies. Concerted measures <a +name="page_363"><span class="page">Page 363</span></a> were taken +against these possibilities. Despite the weakening of the Grand +Fleet, the battle cruisers <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i> +under Admiral Sturdee, former Chief of Admiralty Staff, sailed on +November 11 for the Falkland Islands. Their destination was kept +a close secret, for had the slightest inkling of their mission +reached German ears it would at once have been communicated to von +Spee. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the battle, the German admiral moved slowly southward, coaling +from chartered vessels and prizes; and it was not until December +1 that he rounded the Horn. Even now, had he moved directly upon +the Falklands, he would have encountered only the <i>Canopus</i>, +but he again delayed several days to take coal from a prize. On +December 7 the British battle cruisers and other ships picked up +in passage arrived at the island base and at once began to coal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Their coming was not a moment too soon. At 7.30 the next morning, +while coaling was still in progress and fires were drawn in the +<i>Bristol</i>, the signal station on the neck of land south of +the harbor reported two strange vessels, which proved to be the +<i>Gneisenau</i> and the <i>Nürnberg</i>, approaching from +the southward. As they eased down to demolish the wireless station, +the <i>Canopus</i> opened on them at about 11,000 yards by indirect +fire. The two ships swerved off, and at 9.40, perceiving the dense +clouds of smoke over the harbor and what appeared to be tripod +masts, they fell back on their main force. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Hull down, and with about 15 miles' start, the Germans, had they +scattered at this time might, most of them at least, have escaped, +as they certainly would have if their approach had been made more +cautiously and at a later period in the day. The British ships +were now out, with the fast <i>Glasgow</i> well in the lead. In +the chase that followed, Admiral van Spee checked speed somewhat +to keep his squadron together. Though Admiral Sturdee for a time +did the same, he was able at 12.50 to open on the rear ship +<i>Leipzig</i> at 16,000 yards. At 1.20 the German light cruisers +scattered to southwestward, followed by the <i>Cornwall, Kent</i>, +and <i>Glasgow</i>. The 26-knot <i>Bristol</i>, had she been able to +work up steam in time, would <a name="page_364"><span class="page">Page +364</span></a> have been invaluable in this pursuit; she was sent +instead to destroy three enemy colliers or transports reported +off the islands. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Between the larger ships the action continued at long range, for +the superior speed of the battle cruisers enabled Admiral Sturdee +to choose his distance, and his proper concern was to demolish the +enemy with his own ships unscathed. At 2.05 he turned 8 points +to starboard to clear the smoke blown down from the northwest and +reduce the range, which had increased to 16,000 yards. Admiral +von Spee also turned southward, and the stern chase was renewed +without firing until 2.45. At this point both sides turned to port, +the Germans now slightly in the rear and working in to 12,500 yards +to use their 5.9-inch guns. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At 3.15 the British came completely about to avoid the smoke, and +the Germans also turned, a little later, as if to cross their bows. +(See diagram.) The <i>Gneisenau</i> and <i>Scharnhorst</i>, though +fighting gamely, were now beaten ships, the latter with upper works +a "shambles of torn and twisted iron," and holes in her sides through +which could be seen the red glow of flames. She turned on her beam-ends +at 4.17 and sank with every man an board. At 6 o'clock, after a +fight of extraordinary persistence, the <i>Gneisenau</i> opened +her sea-cocks and went down. All her 8-inch ammunition had been +expended, and 600 of her 850 men were disabled or killed. Some +200 were saved. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Against ships with 12-inch guns and four times their weight of +broadside the <i>Gneisenau</i> and <i>Scharnhorst</i> made a creditable +record of over 20 hits. The British, however, suffered no casualties or +material injury. While Admiral Sturdee's tactics are thus justified, +the prolongation of the battle left him no time to join in the light +cruiser chase, and even opened the possibility, in the rain squalls +of the late afternoon, that one of the armored cruisers might get +away. In spite of a calm sea and excellent visibility during most +of the action, the gunnery of the battle cruisers appears to have +been less accurate at long range than in the later engagement off +the Dogger Bank. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 559px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig070.png" width="559" height="608" alt="Fig. 70"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right">From <i>Official British Naval History</i>, + Vol. I.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, DEC. 8, + 1914</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center"> + <table class="data" style="text-align: left;"> + <tr><td class="center" colspan="4"><i>British Squadron</i></td></tr> + <tr><td class="center"><i>Name</i></td> + <td class="center"><i>Type</i></td> + <td class="center"><i>Guns</i></td> + <td class="center"><i>Speed</i></td></tr> + <tr><td>Invincible</td> + <td>Battle Cruiser</td> + <td>8–12″, 16–4″</td> + <td>26.5</td></tr> + <tr><td>Inflexible</td> + <td>Battle Cruiser</td> + <td>8–12″, 16–4″</td> + <td>26.5</td></tr> + <tr><td>Carnarvon</td> + <td>Armored Cruiser</td> + <td>4–7.5″, 6–6″</td> + <td>23.0</td></tr> + <tr><td>Cornwall</td> + <td>Armored Cruiser</td> + <td>14–6″</td> + <td>23.5</td></tr> + <tr><td>Kent</td> + <td>Armored Cruiser</td> + <td>14–6″</td> + <td>23.0</td></tr> + <tr><td>Bristol</td> + <td>Scout Cruiser</td> + <td>2–6″, 10–4″</td> + <td>26.5</td></tr> + <tr><td>Glasgow</td> + <td>Scout Cruiser</td> + <td>2–6″, 10–4″</td> + <td>26.5</td></tr> + <tr><td>Canopus</td> + <td>Coast Defense</td> + <td>4–12″, 12–6″</td> + <td>16.5</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="4"> </td></tr> + <tr><td class="center" colspan="4"><i>German Squadron</i></td></tr> + <tr><td>Scharnhorst</td> + <td>Armored Cruiser</td> + <td>8–8.2″, 6–6″</td> + <td>23.5</td></tr> + <tr><td>Gneisenau</td> + <td>Armored Cruiser</td> + <td>8–8.2″, 6–6″</td> + <td>23.5</td></tr> + <tr><td>Leipzig</td> + <td>Protected Cruiser</td> + <td>10–4″</td> + <td>23.0</td></tr> + <tr><td>Nürnberg</td> + <td>Scout Cruiser</td> + <td>10–4″</td> + <td>24.0</td> + <tr><td>Dresden</td> + <td>Scout Cruiser</td> + <td>10–4″</td> + <td>24.0</td></tr> + </table> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Following similar tactics, the <i>Glasgow</i> and <i>Cornwall</i> +overtook <a name="page_365"><span class="page">Page 365</span></a><a +name="page_366"><span class="page">Page 366</span></a> +and finally silenced the <i>Leipzig</i> at 7 p.m., four hours after +the <i>Glasgow</i> had first opened fire. Defiant to the last, like +the <i>Monmouth</i> at Coronel, and with her ammunition gone, she +sank at 9.25, carrying down all but 18 of her officers and crew. +The <i>Kent</i>, stoking all her woodwork to increase steam, attained +at 5 o'clock a position 12,000 yards from the <i>Nürnberg</i>, +when the latter opened fire. At this late hour a long range action +was out of the question. As the <i>Nürnberg</i> slowed down +with two of her boilers burst, the <i>Kent</i> closed to 3000 yards +and at 7.30 finished off her smaller opponent. The <i>Dresden</i>, +making well above her schedule speed of 24 knots, had disappeared +to southwestward early in the afternoon. Her escape entailed a +long search, until, on March 14, 1915, she was destroyed by the +<i>Kent</i> and <i>Glasgow</i> off Juan Fernandez, where she had +taken refuge for repairs. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Cruise of the "Emden"</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Among the German cruisers other than those of Admiral van Spee's +squadron, the exploits of the <i>Emden</i> are best known, and +reminiscent of the <i>Alabama's</i> famous cruise in the American +Civil War. It may be noted, however, as indicative of changed +conditions, that the <i>Emden's</i> depredations covered only two +months instead of two years. A 3600 ton ship with a speed of 25 +knots, the <i>Emden</i> left Kiao-chau on August 6, met von Spee's +cruisers in the Ladrones on the 12th, and on September 10 appeared +most unexpectedly on the west side of the Bay of Bengal. Here she +sank five British merchantmen, all following the customary route +with lights aglow. On the 18th she was off the Rangoon River, and 6 +days later across the bay at Madras, where she set ablaze two tanks +of the Burma Oil Company with half a million gallons of kerosene. +From September 26 to 29 she was at the junction of trade routes west +of Ceylon, and again, after an overhaul in the Chagos Archipelago to +southward, spent October 16-19 in the same profitable field. Like +most raiders, she planned to operate in one locality not more than +three or four days, and then, avoiding all vessels on her course, +strike <a name="page_367"><span class="page">Page 367</span></a> +suddenly elsewhere. During this period, British, Japanese, French, +and Russian cruisers—the Germans assert there were 19 at +one time—followed her trail. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The most daring adventure of Captain von Müller, the <i>Emden's</i> +skipper, was now carried out in the harbor of Penang, on the west +side of the Malay Peninsula. With an additional false funnel to +imitate British county-class cruisers, the <i>Emden</i> at daybreak +of October 28 passed the picket-boat off the harbor unchallenged, +destroyed the Russian cruiser <i>Jemtchug</i> by gunfire and two +torpedoes, and, after sinking the French destroyer <i>Mousquet</i> +outside, got safely away. The Russian commander was afterward condemned +for letting his ship lie at anchor with open lights, with only an +anchor watch, and with strangers at liberty to visit her. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Steaming southward, the raider made her next and last appearance on +the morning of November 9 off the British cable and wireless station +on the Cocos Islands. As she approached, word was promptly cabled to +London, Adelaide, and Singapore, and—more profitably—was +wirelessed to an Australian troop convoy then only 45 miles away. +The <i>Emden</i> caught the message, but nevertheless sent a party +ashore, and was standing outside when the armored cruiser <i>Sydney</i> +came charging up. Against the <i>Emden's</i> ten 4.1-inch guns, +the <i>Sydney</i> had eight 6-inch guns, and she was at least 4 +knots faster. Outranged and outdone in speed, the German ship was +soon driven ashore in a sinking condition, with a funnel down and +steering gear disabled. During her two months' activity thus ended, +the <i>Emden</i> had made 21 captures, destroying ships and cargoes +to the value of over $10,000,000. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The other German cruisers were also short-lived. The +<i>Karlsrühe</i>, after arming the liner <i>Kronprinz Wilhelm</i> +off the Bahamas (August 6) and narrowly escaping the <i>Suffolk</i> +and the <i>Bristol</i> by superior speed, operated with great success +on the South American trade routes. Her disappearance—long a +mystery to the Allies—was due to an internal explosion, just +as she was about to crown her exploits by a raid on the island of +Barbados. The <i>Königsberg</i>, on the east coast of Africa, +surprised and sank the British light cruiser <i>Pegasus</i> <a +name="page_368"><span class="page">Page 368</span></a><a +name="page_369"><span class="page">Page 369</span></a> while the +latter lay at Mombasa, Zanzibar, making repairs. She was later +bottled up in the Rufigi River (October 30) and finally destroyed +there (July 11, 1915) by indirect fire from monitors, "spotted" +by airplanes. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 767px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig071.png" width="767" height="508" alt="Fig. 71"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPT. 1-NOV. 9, + 1914</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the auxiliary cruisers, the <i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i> +was sunk by the <i>Highflyer</i> (August 26), and the <i>Cap +Trafalgar</i> went down after a hard fight with the <i>Carmania</i> +(September 14). The <i>Prinz Eitel Friedrich</i>, which had entered +the Atlantic with von Spee, interned at Newport News, Virginia, +in March, 1915, and was followed thither a month later by the +<i>Kronprinz Wilhelm</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The results of this surface warfare upon commerce amounted to 69 +merchant vessels, totaling 280,000 tons. With more strict concentration +upon commerce destruction, and further preparations for using German +liners as auxiliaries, the campaign might have been prolonged and made +somewhat more effective. But for the same purpose the superiority +of the submarine was soon demonstrated. To take the later surface +raiders: the <i>Wolf</i> sank or captured 20 ships in 15 months +at sea; the <i>Seeadler</i>, 23 in 7 months; the <i>Möwe</i> +15 in 2 months. But many a submarine in one month made a better +record than these. The opening of Germany's submarine campaign, to +be treated later, was formally announced by her blockade proclamation +of February 4, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Dogger Bank Action</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The strategic value of the battle cruiser, as a means of throwing +strength quickly into distant fields, was brought out in the campaign +against von Spee. As an outcome of German raids on the east coast of +England, its tactical qualities, against units of equal strength, +were soon put to a sharper trial. Aside from mere +<i>Schrecklichkeit</i>—a desire to carry the terrors of war +to English soil—these raids had the legitimate military objects +of helping distant cruisers by holding British ships in home waters, +of delaying troop movements to France, and of creating a popular +clamor that might force a dislocation or division of the Grand +Fleet. The first incursion, on November <a name="page_370"><span +class="page">Page 370</span></a> 3, inflicted trifling damage; the +second, on December 16, was marked by the bombardment of Scarborough, +Hartlepool, and Whitby, in which 99 civilians were killed and 500 +wounded. The third, on January 24 following, brought on the Dogger +Bank action, the first encounter between battle cruisers, and one +of the two capital ship actions of the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At dawn on this date, the <i>Derfflinger, Seydlitz</i> (flagship +of Admiral von Hipper), <i>Moltke</i>, and armored cruiser +<i>Blücher</i>, with 4 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas, +were moving westward about midway in the North Sea on a line between +Heligoland and the scene of their former raids. Five battle cruisers +under Admiral Beatty were at the same time approaching a rendezvous +with the Harwich Force for one of their periodical sweeps in the +southern area. The Harwich Force first came in contact with the +enemy about 7 a.m. Fortunately for the Germans, they had already +been warned of Beatty's approach by one of their light cruisers, +and had just turned back at high speed when the British battle +cruisers made them out to southeastward 14 miles away. The forces +opposed were as follows: +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center_btrb">British</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Displace-<br>ment</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Armor</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Best recent speed[*]</td> + <td class="center_btrb">German</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Displace-<br>ment</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Armor</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td> + <td class="center_btb">Best recent speed</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Lion</td> + <td class="center_br">26,350</td> + <td class="center_br">9″</td> + <td class="left_br">8 13.5″</td> + <td class="center_br">31.7</td> + <td class="left_br">Derfflinger</td> + <td class="center_br">26,180</td> + <td class="center_br">13″</td> + <td class="center_br">8 12″</td> + <td class="center">30</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Tiger</td> + <td class="center_br">28,500</td> + <td class="center_br">9″</td> + <td class="left_br">8 13.5″</td> + <td class="center_br">32</td> + <td class="left_br">Seydlitz</td> + <td class="center_br">24,610</td> + <td class="center_br">11″</td> + <td class="center_br">10 11″</td> + <td class="center">29</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Princess Royal</td> + <td class="center_br">28,500</td> + <td class="center_br">9″</td> + <td class="left_br">8 13.5″</td> + <td class="center_br">31.7</td> + <td class="left_br">Moltke</td> + <td class="center_br">22,640</td> + <td class="center_br">11″</td> + <td class="center_br">10 11″</td> + <td class="center">28.4</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">New Zealand</td> + <td class="center_br">18,800</td> + <td class="center_br">8″</td> + <td class="left_br">8 12″</td> + <td class="center_br">29</td> + <td class="left_br">Blücher</td> + <td class="center_br">15,550</td> + <td class="center_br">6″</td> + <td class="center_br">12 8.2″</td> + <td class="center">25.4</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">Indomitable</td> + <td class="center_brb">17,250</td> + <td class="center_brb">7″</td> + <td class="left_brb">8 12″</td> + <td class="center_brb">28.7</td> + <td class="left_brb"> </td> + <td class="center_brb"> </td> + <td class="center_brb"> </td> + <td class="center_brb"> </td> + <td class="center_bb"> </td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote *: Jane's <span class="sc">Fighting Ships</span>, 1914.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 637px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig072.png" width="637" height="496" alt="Fig. 72"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Settling at once to a stern chase, the British ships increased +speed to 28.5 knots; while the Germans, handicapped by the slower +<i>Blücher</i>, were held down to 25. At 8.52 the <i>Lion</i> +was within 20,000 yards of the <i>Blücher</i>, and, after +deliberate ranging shots, scored her first hit at 9.09. As the +range further decreased, the <i>Tiger</i> opened on the rear ship, +and the <i>Lion</i> shifted to the third in line at 18,000 yards. +The enemy returned <a name="page_371"><span class="page">Page +371</span></a><a name="page_372"><span class="page">Page +372</span></a> the fire at 9.14. Thus the action continued, both +squadrons in lines of bearing, and Beatty's ships engaged as a +rule with their opposites in the enemy order. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 549px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig073.png" width="549" height="358" alt="Fig. 73"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">DOGGER BANK ACTION, JAN. 24, 1915</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +At 9.45 the German armored cruiser had suffered severely, and ships +ahead also showed the effects of the heavier enemy fire. Under +cover of a thick smoke screen from destroyers on their starboard +bow, and a subsequent destroyer attack, the Germans now shifted +course away from the enemy and the rear ships hauled out on the +port quarter of their leader to increase the range. The British +cruisers, according to Admiral Beatty's report, "were ordered to +form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed." +An hour later the <i>Blücher</i> staggered away to northward. +Badly crippled, she was assigned by Beatty to the <i>Indomitable</i>, +and was sunk at 12.37. At 10.54 submarines were reported on the +British starboard bows. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Just after 11 the flagship <i>Lion</i>, having received two hits +under water which burst a feed tank and thus put the port engine out +of commission, turned northward out of the line. Though the injury +was spoken of as the result of a "chance <a name="page_373"><span +class="page">Page 373</span></a> shot," the <i>Lion</i> had been hit +15 times. About an hour later Admiral Beatty hoisted his flag in +the <i>Princess Royal</i>, but during the remainder of the battle +Rear Admiral Moore in the <i>Tiger</i> had command. Judging from +the fact that the <i>Tiger</i> was hit only 8 times in the entire +action and the <i>Princess Royal</i> and the <i>New Zealand</i> +not at all, there seems to have been little effort at this time +to press the attack. The British lost touch at 11.50, and turned +back at noon. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the lively discussion aroused by the battle, the question was +raised why the <i>Blücher</i> was included in the German line. +Any encounter that developed on such an excursion was almost certain +to be with superior forces, against which the armored cruiser would +be of slight value. In a retreat, the "lame duck" would slow down +the whole squadron, or else must be left behind. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the first hour of the battle, the British gained about three +knots, and brought the range to 17,500 yards. The range after 9.45 +is not given, but was certainly not lowered in a corresponding +degree. This may have been due to increased speed on the part of +the German leaders, or to the interference of German destroyers, +which now figured for the first time as important factors in day +action. Two of these attacks were delivered, one at 9.40 and another +about an hour later, and though repulsed by British flotillas, +they both caused interference with the British course and fire. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The injury to the <i>Lion</i>, in the words of Admiral Beatty, +"undoubtedly deprived us of a greater victory." The British wireless +caught calls from Hipper to the High Seas Fleet, which (though this +seems strange at the time of a battle cruiser sortie) is declared +by the Germans to have been beyond reach at Kiel.[1] Worried by the +danger to the <i>Lion</i> in case of retreat before superior forces, +and in the belief that he was being led into submarine traps and mine +fields, Admiral Moore gave up the chase. The distance to Heligoland +was still at least 70 miles; the German ships were badly injured; the +course since 9.45 had been more to the northward; the Grand Fleet +was rapidly approaching the scene. The <a name="page_374"><span +class="page">Page 374</span></a> element of caution, seen again +in the Jutland battle 15 months later, seems to have prevented +pressing the engagement to more decisive results. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Capt. Persius, <i>Naval and Military Record</i>, Dec. +10, 1919.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The conditions of flight and pursuit obtaining at the Dogger Bank +emphasized the importance of speed and long range fire. Owing to +the fact that they had twice the angle of elevation (30 degrees), +the German 11-inch and 12-inch guns were not outranged by the British +13.5-inch guns; and at 17,000 yards their projectiles had no greater +angle of fall. The chief superiority of the larger ordnance therefore +lay in their heavier bursting charges and greater striking energy, +12,800 foot-tons to 8,900 foot-tons. According to a German report, +the first salvo that hit the <i>Seydlitz</i> knocked out both +after-turrets and annihilated their crews; and the ship was saved +only by flooding the magazines.[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Admiral van Scheer, quoted in <i>Naval and Military +Record</i>, London, March 24, 1920.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Dardanelles Campaign</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Throughout the war a difference of opinion existed in Allied councils +as to whether it was better to concentrate all efforts in the western +sphere of operations, or to assail the Central Powers in the Near +East as well, where the accession of Turkey (and later of Bulgaria) +threatened to put the resources of all southeastern Europe under +Teutonic control, and even opened a gateway into Asia. Such a division +of effort was suggested not only by the necessity of protecting the +Suez Canal, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, but by the difficulty of breaking +the stalemate on the western front, and by the opportunity that +would be offered of utilizing Allied control of sea communications. +Furthermore, the Allies had a margin of predreadnoughts and cruisers +ready for action and of no obvious value elsewhere. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On November 3, 1914, three days after Turkey entered the war, an +Allied naval force that had been watching off the Dardanelles engaged +the outer forts in a 10-minute bombardment, of no significance save +perhaps as a warning to <a name="page_375"><span class="page">Page +375</span></a> the Turks of trouble later on. In the same month the +First Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, proposed +an attack on the Straits as "an ideal method of defending Egypt"; +but it was not seriously considered until, on January 2, Russia +sent an urgent appeal for a diversion to relieve her forces in the +Caucasus. Lord Kitchener, the British Minister of War, answered +favorably, but, feeling that he had no troops to spare, turned the +solution over to the Navy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From the first the decision was influenced by political considerations. +Russia needed assurance of Allied solidarity—and it is significant +that in February Lord Grey announced that England no longer opposed +Russia's ambition to control Constantinople. Nine-tenths of Russia's +exports were blocked by the closing of the Straits; their reopening +would afford not only access to her vast stores of foodstuffs, +but an entry—infinitely more convenient than Vladivostok or +Archangel—for munitions and essential supplies. The Balkan +States were wavering. In Turkey there was a strong neutral or pro-Ally +sentiment. Victory would give an enormous material advantage, help +Russia in the impending German drive on her southwestern frontier, +and bolster Allied prestige throughout the eastern world. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Faced with the problem, the Admiralty sent an inquiry to Admiral +Carden, in command on the scene, as to the practicability of forcing +the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone, assuming that old ships +would be employed, and "that the importance of the results would +justify severe loss." He replied on January 5: "I do not think the +Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended +operations with a large number of ships." In answer to further +inquiries, accompanied by not altogether warranted assurance from +the First Lord that "High authorities here concur in your opinion," +Admiral Carden outlined four successive operations: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(a) The destruction of defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defenses up to +and including Cephez Point battery N8. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 796px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig074.png" width="796" height="482" alt="Fig. 74"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE + <a name="page_376"><span class="page">Page 376</span></a> + </td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_377"><span class="page">Page 377</span></a> (c) +Destruction of defenses of the Narrows. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(d) Sweeping of a dear channel through the mine-field and advance +through the Narrows; followed by a reduction of the forts further +up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This plan was presented at a meeting of the British War Council on +January 13. It may be noted at this point that the War Council, though +composed of 7 members of the Cabinet, was at this time dominated by +a triumvirate—the Premier (Mr. Asquith), the Minister of +War (General Kitchener), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. +Churchill); and in this triumvirate, despite the fact that England's +strength was primarily naval, the head of the War Office played a +leading rôle. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher) and one or +two other military experts attended the Council meetings, but they +were not members, and their function, at least as they saw it, was +"to open their mouths when told to." Staff organizations existed also +at both the War Office and the Admiralty, at the latter consisting +of the First Lord, First Sea Lord and three other officers not +on the Admiralty Board. The working of this improvised and not +altogether ideal machinery for the supreme task of conducting the +war is interestingly revealed in the report[1] of the commission +subsequently, appointed to investigate the Dardanelles Campaign. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: British <span class="sc">Annual Register</span>, 1918, +Appendix, pp. 24 ff., from which quotations here are taken.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Mr. Churchill," according to this report, "appears to have advocated +the attack by ships alone before the War Council on a certain amount +of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion." Encouraged by his +sanguine and aggressive spirit, the Council decided that "the Admiralty +should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and +take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective." +In view of the fact that the operation as then conceived was to be +purely naval, the word "take" suggests an initial misconception +of what the navy could do. The support for the decision, especially +from the naval experts, was chiefly on the assumption that if Admiral +Carden's first operation were unpromising, the whole plan might +be dropped. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_378"><span class="page">Page 378</span></a> Admiral +Fisher's misgivings as to the wisdom of the enterprise soon increased, +owing primarily to his desire to employ the full naval strength in +the home field. He did not believe that "cutting off the enemy's +big toe in the East was better than stabbing him to the heart." +He had begun the construction of 612 new vessels ranging from +"hush-hush" ships of 33 knots and 20-inch guns to 200 motor-boats, +and he wished to strike for access to the Baltic, with a threat of +invasion on Germany's Baltic coast. The validity of his objections +to the Dardanelles plan appears to depend on the practicability +of this alternative, which was not attempted later in the war. +The First Lord and the First Sea Lord presented their difference +of opinion to the Premier, but it appears that there was no ill +feeling; Admiral Fisher later writes that "Churchill had courage +and imagination—he was a war man." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At a Council meeting on January 28, when the decision was made +definite, Admiral Fisher was not asked for an opinion and expressed +none. (The Investigation Commission declare that the naval experts +should have been asked, and should have expressed their views whether +asked or not.) But there was a dramatic moment when, after rising as +if to leave the Council, he was quickly followed by Lord Kitchener, +who pointed out that all the others were in favor of the plan, and +induced him once more to take his seat. After the decision, Mr. +Churchill testifies, "I never looked back. We had left the region +of discussion and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The +matter had now passed into the domain of action." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To turn to the scene of operations, there were now assembled at +the Dardanelles 10 British and 4 French predreadnoughts, together +with the new battleship <i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, the battle cruiser +<i>Inflexible</i>, and many cruisers and torpedo craft. On February +19, 1915, again on February 25-26, and on March 1-7, this force +bombarded the outer forts at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr and the +batteries 10 miles further up at Cephez Point. These were in part +silenced and demolished by landing parties. Bad weather, however, +interfered with operations, and there was also some shortage of +ammunition. <a name="page_379"><span class="page">Page 379</span></a> +The batteries, and especially the mobile artillery of the Turks, +still greatly hampered the work of mine sweeping, which at terrible +hazards was carried on at night within the Straits. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the meantime the Government, to quote General Callwell, the +Director of Military Operations, had "drifted into a big military +attack." But the despatch from England of the 29th Division, which +was to join the forces available in Egypt, was delayed; owing to +Lord Kitchener's concern about the western situation, from Feb. +22 to March 16—an unfortunate loss of time. By March 17, +however, the troops from Egypt and most of the French contingent +were assembled at the island of Lemnos, and General Sir Ian Hamilton +had arrived to take command. His instructions included the statement +that "employment of military forces on any large scale at this +juncture is only contemplated in the event of the fleet failing to +get through after every effort has been exhausted. Having entered +on the project of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of +abandoning the scheme." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On March 11 the First Lord sent to Admiral Carden a despatch asking +whether the time had not arrived when "you will have to press hard +for a decision," and adding: "Every well-conceived action for forcing +a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive +our support." The Admiral replied concurring, but expressing the +opinion that "in order to insure my communication line immediately +fleet enters Sea of Marmora, military operations should be opened +at once." On March 16 he resigned owing to ill health, and his +second in command, Admiral de Robeck, succeeded, with the feeling +that he had orders to force the Straits. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The attack of March 18 was the crucial and, as it proved, the final +action of the purely naval campaign. At this time the mines had been +swept as far up as Cephez Point, and a clear channel opened for +some distance beyond. During the morning the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> +and 5 other ships bombarded the Narrows forts at 14,000 yards. +Then at 12.22 the French predreadnoughts <i>Suffren, Gaulois, +Charlemagne</i>, and <i>Bouvet</i> approached to about 9000 yards +and by 1.25 had for the time being silenced the batteries of the +Narrows. Six British <a name="page_380"><span class="page">Page +380</span></a> battleships now advanced (2.36) to relieve the French. +In the maneuvering and withdrawal, the <i>Biouvet</i> was sunk by a +drifting mine[1] with a loss of over 600 men, and the <i>Gaulois</i> +was hit twice under water and had to be beached on an island <a +name="page_381"><span class="page">Page 381</span></a> outside the +Straits. About 4 o'clock the <i>Irresistible</i> also ran foul +of a mine and was run ashore on the Asiatic side, where most of +her men were taken off under fire. The <i>Ocean</i>, after going to +her assistance, struck a mine and went down about 6 o'clock. Not +more than 40 per cent. of the injuries sustained in the action +were attributable to gunfire, the rest to mines sent adrift from +the Narrows. Of the 16 capital ships engaged, three were sunk, +one had to be beached, and some of the others were hardly ready +for continuing the action next day. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: It is stated that an ingenious device caused these +mines to sink after a certain time and come back on an under-current +that flows <i>up</i> the Dardanelles, and then rise at the Narrows +for recovery. This may have enabled the Turks to keep up their +presumably limited supply of mines; but how well the automatic control +worked is not known.] +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 551px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig075.png" width="551" height="631" alt="Fig. 75"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">DARDANELLES DEFENSES</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +There is some military support for the opinion that if, on the +18th or at some more suitable time, the fleet had acted in the +spirit of Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!" and, +protected by dummy ships, bumpers, or whatever other devices naval +ingenuity could devise, had steamed up to and through the Narrows +in column, it would not have suffered much more severely than during +the complicated maneuvering below. Of such an attack General von +der Goltz, in command of the Turkish army, said that, "Although +he thought it was almost impossible to force the Dardanelles, if +the English thought it an important move in the general war, they +could by sacrificing ten ships force the entrance, and do it very +fast, and be up in Marmora within 10 hours from the time they forced +it."[l] Admiral Fisher estimated that the loss would be 12 ships. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Repeated by Baron van Wangenheim to Ambassador Morgenthau, +prior to the attack of March 18, <span class="sc">Ambassador +Morgenthau's Story</span>, <i>World's Work</i>, September, 1918. See +also Col. F. N. Maude, Royal Engineers, <i>Contemporary Review</i>, +June, 1915.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After such deductions, there would be no great surplus to deal +with the <i>Göben</i>, which would fight desperately, and +with the defenses of Constantinople. Indeed, such losses would seem +absolutely prohibitive, if viewed only from the narrow standpoint +of the force engaged, and without taking into fullest account the +limited value of the older ships and the fact that the Government +was fully committed to a prosecution of the campaign. It is of +course easy to see that victory purchased by the loss of 10 +predreadnoughts and 10,000 men would be cheap, as compared with the +sacrifice of over 100,000 <a name="page_382"><span class="page">Page +382</span></a> men killed and wounded and 10,000 invalided in the +later campaign on land. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +General Callwell has pointed out that the naval commanders were +properly worried about what would happen after they got through +the Straits, if the Sublime Porte should not promptly "throw up +the sponge." "The communications would have remained closed to +colliers and small craft by movable armament, if not also by mines. +Forcing the pass would in fact have resembled bursting through a +swing door. Sailors and soldiers alike have an instinctive horror +of a trap, and they are in the habit of looking behind them as +well as before them."[1] But according to Ambassador Morgenthau, +who was probably in a better position than any one else to form +an opinion, "The whole Ottoman State on the 18th day of March, +1915, was on the brink of dissolution." The Turkish Government +was divided into factions and restive under German domination, and +there was thus an excellent prospect that it would have capitulated +under the guns of the Allied fleet. If not, then there might have +been nothing left for the latter but to try to get back the way +it came. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Nineteenth Century and After</span>, +March, 1919, p. 486.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Feeling in Constantinople during the month from February 19th to +March 19th has already been suggested; it was nervous in the extreme. +Neither Turks nor Germans felt assured that the Dardanelles could +withstand British naval power. Plans were made for a general exit +to Asia Minor, and there was a conviction that in a few days Allied +ships would be in the Golden Horn. At the forts, if we may believe +evidence not as yet definitely disproved, affairs were still more +desperate. The guns, though manned largely by Germans, were not of +the latest type, and for a month had been engaged in almost daily +bombardment. Ammunition was running short. "Fort Hamadié, +the most powerful defense on the Asiatic side, had just 17 +armor-piercing projectiles left, while at Killid-ul-Bahr, the main +defense on the European side, there were precisely 10."[2] To this +evidence may be added the statement of <a name="page_383"><span +class="page">Page 383</span></a> Enver Pasha: "If the English had +only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles +they could have got to Constantinople, but their delay enabled us +to fortify the peninsula, and in 6 weeks' time we had taken down +there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns." +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">Ambassador Morgenthau's Story</span>, +<i>World's Work</i>, September, 1918, p. 433, corroborating the +statement of the correspondent G. A. Schreiner, in <span class="sc">From +Berlin to Bagdad</span>.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +If Mr. Churchill was chiefly responsible for undertaking the campaign, +he was not responsible for the delay after March 18. "It never +occurred to me," he states, "that we should not go on." Admiral +de Robeck in his first despatches appeared to share this view. On +March 26, however, he telegraphed: "The check on March 18 is not, +in my opinion, decisive, but on March 22 I met General Hamilton and +heard his views, and I now think that, to obtain important results +and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation +will be essential." This despatch, Mr. Churchill says, "involved a +complete change of plan and was a vital decision. I regretted it +very much. I believed then, as I believe now, that we were separated +by very little from complete success." He proposed that the Admiral +should be directed to renew the attack; but the First Sea Lord did +not agree, nor did Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, nor Admiral Sir Henry +Jackson. So it was decided to wait for the army, and some satire +has been directed at Mr. Churchill and those other "acknowledged +experts in the technicalities of amphibious warfare," Mr. Balfour +and Mr. Asquith, who were inclined to share his views. The verdict +of the Dardanelles Commission was that, "Had the attack been renewed +within a day or two there is no reason to suppose that the proportion +of casualties would have been less; and, if so, even had the second +attack succeeded, a very weak force would have been left for subsequent +naval operations." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Once decided upon, it was highly essential that the combined operation +should begin without further delay. But it was now found that the +army transports had been loaded, so to speak, up-side-down, with +guns and munitions buried under tents and supplies. Sending them +back to Alexandria for reloading involved a six weeks' delay, though +Lord Kitchener wired, "I think you had better know at once that I +regard <a name="page_384"><span class="page">Page 384</span></a> +such postponement as far too long." The landing on the tip of the +Gallipoli Peninsula, which was nearest the forts in the Straits +and said to be the only feasible place, actually began on April +25, and was achieved under the guns of the fleet, and by almost +unexampled feats of heroism by boats' crews and the first parties +on shore. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Henceforth the navy played a subordinate though not insignificant +part in the campaign. "By our navy we went there and were kept +there," writes Mr. John Masefield in <i>Gallipoli</i>, "and by +our navy we came away. During the nine months of our hold on the +peninsula over 300,000 men were brought by the navy from places +three, four, or even six thousand miles away. During the operations +some half of these were removed by our navy, as sick and wounded, +to ports from 800 to 3000 miles away. Every day, for 11 months, +ships of our navy moved up and down the Gallipoli coast bombarding +the Turk positions. Every day during the operations our navy kept +our armies in food, drink and supplies. Every day, in all that +time, if weather permitted, ships of our navy cruised in the Narrows +and off Constantinople, and the seaplanes of our navy raided and +scouted within the Turk lines." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On May 12 the predreadnought <i>Goliath</i> was torpedoed by a Turkish +destroyer; and on May 25-26 the German submarine <i>U 23</i>, which +had made the long voyage by way of Gibraltar, sank the <i>Triumph</i> +and the <i>Majestic</i>. It was upon a forewarning of this attack +that Admiral Fisher, according to his own statement, resigned as +a protest against the retention of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> and +other capital units in this unpromising field. British and French +submarines, on the other hand, worked their way into the Sea of +Marmora, entered the harbor of Constantinople, and inflicted heavy +losses, including two Turkish battleships, 8 transports, and 197 +supply vessels. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +So almost unprecedented were the problems of a naval attack on the +Dardanelles that it appears rash to condemn either the initiation +or the conduct of an operation that ended in failure when seemingly +on the verge of success. Clearly, the campaign was handicapped +by lack of unanimous support and whole-hearted faith on the part +of authorities at home. It was <a name="page_385"><span +class="page">Page 385</span></a> not thoroughly thought out at +the start, and was subjected to trying delays. No advantage was +ever taken of the invaluable factor of surprise. Even so, it was +not wholly barren of results. It undoubtedly relieved Russia, kept +Bulgaria neutral for at least five months, and immobilized 300,000 +Turks, according to Lord Kitchener's estimate, for nine months' +time. Nevertheless, the final failure was a tremendous blow to +Allied prestige. Upon the withdrawal, in January of 1916, some +of the troops were transferred to Salonika; and it is noteworthy +that in Macedonia, as at Gallipoli, the army was dependent on the +navy for the transport of troops, munitions, and in fact virtually +everything needed in the campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Aside from the Dardanelles failure, the naval situation at the end +of 1915 was such as to give assurance to the Western Powers. They +had converted potential control of the sea into actual control, save +in limited areas on the enemies' sea frontiers. Germany had lost +her cruisers and her colonies, and her shipping had been destroyed +or driven from the seas. Though losses from submarines averaged +150,000 tons a month in 1915, they had not yet caused genuine alarm. +The German fleet was still a menace, but, in spite of attrition +warfare, the Grand Fleet was decidedly stronger than in 1914. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">British Official Naval History</span>, Sir Julian + Corbett, London, 1920.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Grand Fleet</span>, Admiral Jellicoe, London, + 1918.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The British Navy in Battle</span>, Arthur H. + Pollen, London, 1919.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">My Memoirs</span>, Admiral van Tirpitz, 1919.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The German High Seas Fleet in the World War</span>, + Vice Admiral van Scheer, 1920.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, War Notes</span>, + 1914-1918.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Les Enseignements Maritimes de la Guerre + Anti-Germanique</span>, Admiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Il Potere Marittimo Nella Grande Guerra</span>, + Captain Romeo Bernotti, Leghorn, 1920.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Naval Power in the War</span>, Commander C. C. Gill, + New York, 1918.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_386"><span class="page">Page 386</span></a> +CHAPTER XVII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE WORLD WAR [<i>Continued</i>]: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +There was only one action between the British Grand Fleet and the +German High Seas Fleet in the World War, the battle of Jutland. +This was indecisive, but even in a history with the limits of this +book it deserves a chapter of its own. In the magnitude of the +forces engaged, a magnitude less in numbers of ships—great as +that was—than in the enormous destructive power concentrated +in those ships, it was by far the greatest naval battle in history. +Moreover, this was the one fleet battle fought with the weapons +of to-day. Any discussion of modern tactics, therefore, must be +based for some time to come on an analysis of Jutland. Finally, the +indecisiveness of the action has resulted in a controversy among +naval critics that is likely to continue indefinitely. Meanwhile +the debatable points are rich in interest and suggestion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In earlier wars the nation with a more powerful fleet blockaded +the ports of the enemy. In this war the sea mine, the submarine, +the aircraft and the long-range gun of coast defenses made the +old-fashioned close blockade impossible. Such blockade as could +be maintained under modern conditions had to be "distant." The +British made a base in the Orkneys, Scapa Flow, which had central +position with relation to a possible sortie of the German fleet +toward either the North Atlantic or the Channel. The intervening +space of North Sea was patrolled by a scouting force of light vessels +of various sorts and periodical sweeps by the Grand Fleet. On May +30, 1916, the Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, set out from +its base at Scapa Flow for one of these patrolling cruises. On the +same day Vice Admiral Beatty left his base <a name="page_387"><span +class="page">Page 387</span></a> at Rosyth (in the Firth of Forth) +with his advance force of battle cruisers and battleships, under +orders to join Jellicoe at sea. On the following day the High Seas +Fleet took the sea and the two great forces came together in battle. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is not certain why the German fleet should have been cruising +at this time. Having declined to offer battle in the summer of +1914, on account of the British superiority of force, the High +Command could hardly have contemplated attacking in 1916 when the +odds were much heavier. From statements published by German officers +since the war, the objects seem to have been, first, to prevent a +suspected attempt to force an entrance into the Baltic; secondly, +to fall upon Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron, during its frequent +patrolling cruises, when it was detached from the main force; and, +thirdly, to destroy the British trading fleets which were conducting +an important volume of commerce from the ports of Norway with England +and Russia. It is not easy to see, however, why the High Seas Fleet +should be sent out on a mere commerce destroying raid. The Germans +had been out twice before, since April 1st of that year, and probably +it was considered good policy to send the fleet to sea every now +and then for the moral effect. The people could not relish the idea +of their navy being condemned to inaction in their own harbors, +and there was bad feeling over the fact that the government had +just yielded to President Wilson's protest on ruthless submarine +warfare. A victory over Beatty's battle cruisers, or some other +detached unit of the British fleet, would have been very opportune +in bracing German morale. At the same time Admiral von Scheer had +probably reckoned on being able to avoid battle with the Grand +Fleet by means of a swift retreat under cover of smoke screens +and torpedo attacks. Certainly the odds were too heavy to permit +of any other policy on his part. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The First Phase</i> +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 561px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig076.png" width="561" height="452" alt="Fig. 76"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE + FLEET</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">(After diagram by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, + U.S.N., <i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov., + 1919.</i>)</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center"> + <table class="data" style="text-align: left;"> + <tr><td>Forces:</td></tr> + <tr><td class="right">24</td><td>Dreadnought Battleships</td></tr> + <tr><td class="right">3</td><td>Battle Cruisers</td></tr> + <tr><td class="right">12</td><td>Light Cruisers</td></tr> + <tr><td class="right">8</td><td>Armored Cruisers</td></tr> + <tr><td class="right">51</td><td>Destroyers</td></tr> + <tr><td colspan="2">Note: One destroyer accompanied each armored + cruiser.</td></tr> + </table> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +At 2 p. m. of the 31st of May, 1916, the British main fleet, under +Admiral Jellicoe, was in Latitude 57° 57' N., Longitude 3° +45' E. (off the coast of Norway), holding a south-easterly <a +name="page_388"><span class="page">Page 388</span></a> course. +It consisted of 24 battleships formed in a line of six divisions +screened by destroyers and light cruisers, as indicated in the +accompanying diagram. Sixteen miles ahead of the battle fleet was +the First Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Arbuthnot and the +Second Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Heath; these consisted +of four armored cruisers each. They were spread out at intervals +of six miles, with the <i>Hampshire</i> six miles astern of the +<i>Minotaur</i> to serve as link ship for signals to and from the +main fleet. Four miles ahead was the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron +of three ships under Rear Admiral Hood. These were steaming in +column, <a name="page_389"><span class="page">Page 389</span></a> +screened by four destroyers and two light cruisers (<i>Chester</i> +and <i>Canterbury</i>). The diagram on p. 388 shows the complete +formation of the Battle Fleet and Cruiser Squadrons, under Admiral +Jellicoe's personal command. It is interesting as an example of +the extreme complexity of fleet formation under modern conditions, +especially when it is realized that the whole fleet was proceeding +on its base course by zigzagging. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 553px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig077.png" width="553" height="437" alt="Fig. 77"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION, 2 P. M.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">(After diagrams by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. + Frost, U.S.N., <i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov., + 1919.</i>)</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Seventy-seven miles to the southward Vice Admiral Beatty, commanding +the scouting force, was heading on a northeasterly course. His force +was spread out in scouting formation. The First Battle Cruiser +Squadron of four ships, headed by the flagship <i>Lion</i>, was +flanked three miles to the eastward by the Second Battle Cruiser +Squadron of two ships, and five miles to the north by the Fifth +Battle Squadron, consisting of four of the finest battleships in +the fleet, 25-knot <a name="page_390"><span class="page">Page +390</span></a> <i>Queen Elizabeths</i>, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. +Each of these squadrons had its screen of destroyers and light +cruisers. Eight miles to the south the First, Second, and Third Light +Cruiser Squadrons were spread out in line at five-mile intervals. +The formation is made clear by the accompanying diagram. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the same hour, 2 p. m., Vice Admiral Hipper, with the German +scouting force, was heading north about 15 to 20 miles to the southeast +of Beatty. Hipper commanded the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, +consisting of the <i>Lützow</i> (flag), <i>Derflinger, Seydlitz, +Moltke</i>, and <i>Van der Tann</i>, accompanied by a screening +force of four or five light cruisers and about 15 destroyers. Fifty +miles south of this advance force was the main body of the High +Seas Fleet under Vice Admiral von Scheer. It consisted of three +battle squadrons arranged apparently in one long column of 22 ships +escorted by a screen of 62 destroyers, eight or ten light cruisers, +and the one remaining armored cruiser in the German navy, the +<i>Roon</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus the stage was set and the characters disposed for the great +naval drama of that day. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 765px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig078.png" width="765" height="509" alt="Fig. 78"> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +At 2.20 the light cruiser <i>Galatea</i> (v. diagram), which lay +farthest to the east of Beatty's force, reported two German light +cruisers engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Beatty thereupon +changed course toward Horn Reef Lightship in order to cut them +off from their base, his light cruisers of the first and third +divisions spreading out as a screen to the eastward. It would be +interesting to know why, at this point, he did not draw in his +battleships and thus concentrate his force, for when he did establish +contact with the Germans, Evan-Thomas's squadron was too far away +for effective support. Ten minutes later Hipper got word of British +light cruisers and destroyers sighted to the westward and, changing +course to northwest, he headed for them at high speed. At 2.45 +Beatty sent out a seaplane from the <i>Engadine</i> to ascertain +the enemy's position. This is the first instance in naval history of +a fleet scouting by means of aircraft. The airplane came close enough +to the enemy to draw the fire of four light <a name="page_391"><span +class="page">Page 391</span></a><a name="page_392"><span +class="page">Page 392</span></a> cruisers, and returning reported +their position. Meanwhile the <i>Galatea</i> had reported heavy +smoke "as from a fleet." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the first report from the <i>Galatea</i>, which had been intercepted +on the flagship, <i>Iron Duke</i>, Jellicoe ordered full speed, and +despatched ahead the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Hood, +to cut off the escape of the Germans to the Skagerrak, as Beatty +was then heading to cut them off from their bases to the south. +Admiral Scheer, also, on getting report of the English cruisers, +quickened the speed of his main fleet. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At 3.30 Beatty and Hipper discovered each other's battle cruiser +forces. Hipper turned about and headed on a southerly course to lead +the British toward the advancing main fleet. Beatty also turned, +forming his battle cruisers on a line of bearing to clear the smoke, +and the two forces approached each other on converging courses as +indicated in the diagram. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this point it is worth while to compare the two battle cruiser +forces:[1] +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="center" colspan="4">BRITISH</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td class="center" colspan="4">GERMAN</td></tr> +<tr><td class="btmctr">Name</td> + <td class="btmctr">Armor</td> + <td class="btmctr">Displace-<br>ment</td> + <td class="btmctr">Guns</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td class="btmctr">Name</td> + <td class="btmctr">Armor</td> + <td class="btmctr">Displace-<br>ment</td> + <td class="btmctr">Guns</td></tr> +<tr><td>Queen Mary</td> + <td class="center">9″</td> + <td class="center">26,350</td> + <td>8 13.5″</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td>Lützow</td> + <td class="center">13″</td> + <td class="center">26,180</td> + <td class="right">8 12″</td></tr> +<tr><td>Lion</td> + <td class="center">9″</td> + <td class="center">26,350</td> + <td>8 13.5″</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td>Derfflinger</td> + <td class="center">13″</td> + <td class="center">26,180</td> + <td class="right">8 12″</td></tr> +<tr><td>Tiger</td> + <td class="center">9″</td> + <td class="center">28,500</td> + <td>8 13.5″</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td>Seydlitz</td> + <td class="center">11″</td> + <td class="center">24,610</td> + <td class="right">10 11″</td></tr> +<tr><td>Princess Royal</td> + <td class="center">9″</td> + <td class="center">28,350</td> + <td>8 13.5″</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td>Moltke</td> + <td class="center">11″</td> + <td class="center">22,640</td> + <td class="right">10 11″</td></tr> +<tr><td>Indefatigable</td> + <td class="center">8″</td> + <td class="center">18,800</td> + <td>8 12″</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td>VonderTann</td> + <td class="center">10″</td> + <td class="center">19,100</td> + <td class="right">11″</td></tr> +<tr><td>New Zealand</td> + <td class="center">8″</td> + <td class="center_bb">18,800</td> + <td>8 12″</td> + <td style="width: 2em;"> </td> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + <td class="left_bb"> </td> + <td> </td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2"> </td> + <td class="center">145,150</td> + <td colspan="4"> </td> + <td class="center">118,710</td> + <td> </td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Table from Lieut. Comdr. H. H. Frost, U. S. N., <i>U. +S. Naval Institute Proceedings</i>, Nov., 1919, p. 850.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A glance shows the superiority of the British in guns and the German +superiority in armor. The British had six ships to the German five, +and if the four new battleships of Evan-Thomas's division could +be effectively brought into action, the British superiority in +force would be reckoned as considerably more than two to one. These +battleships had 13" armor, eight 15" guns each, and a speed of 25 +knots. They were the most powerful ships afloat. +<a name="page_393"><span class="page">Page 393</span></a> +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 757px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig079.png" width="757" height="479" alt="Fig. 79"> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +In speed, Beatty had a marked advantage. He could make 29 knots with all +six of his cruisers and 32 knots with his four <a name="page_394"><span +class="page">Page 394</span></a> best,—<i>Queen Mary, Tiger, +Lion</i>, and <i>Princess Royal</i>. Hipper's squadron could make +but 28 knots, though the <i>Lützow</i> and <i>Derfflinger</i> +were probably capable of 30. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At 3.48 British and German battle cruisers opened fire. According +to Beatty's report the range at this moment was 18,500 yards. Beatty +then turned to starboard, assuming a course nearly parallel to that +of Hipper. Almost immediately, three minutes after the first salvo, +the <i>Lion</i>, the <i>Tiger</i>, and the <i>Princess Royal</i> were +hit by shells. In these opening minutes the fire of the Germans +seems to have been fast and astonishingly accurate. The <i>Lion</i> +was hit repeatedly, and at four o'clock the roof of one of her +turrets was blown off. It is said that the presence of mind and +heroic self-sacrifice of an officer saved the ship from the fate +that subsequently overwhelmed two of her consorts. By this time +the range had decreased to 16,000 yards (British reckoning) and +Beatty shifted his course more to the south to confuse the enemy's +fire control. Apparently this move did not succeed in its purpose +for at 4.06 a salvo struck the <i>Indefatigable</i> on a line with +her after turret, and exploded a magazine. As she staggered out of +column and began sinking, another salvo smashed into her forward +decks and she rolled over and sank like a stone. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +About this time the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action, but +it was not able to do effective service. The range was extreme, +about 20,000 yards, and being some distance astern of the battle +cruisers, on account of its inferior speed, it had to contend with +the battle smoke of the squadron ahead as well as the gradually +thickening atmospheric conditions. In addition the Germans frequently +laid smoke screens and zigzagged. Evan-Thomas's division never saw +more than two enemy ships at a time. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The shift of course taken by Beatty at four o'clock, accompanied +possibly by a corresponding shift of Hipper, opened the range so +far in a few minutes that fire slackened on both sides. Beatty +then swung to port in order to close to effective range. At 4.15 +twelve of his destroyers, acting on the general order to attack +when conditions were favorable, dashed out toward the German line. +At the same instant German destroyers, <a name="page_395"><span +class="page">Page 395</span></a> to the number of fifteen accompanied +by the light cruiser <i>Regensburg</i>, advanced toward the British +line, both forces maneuvering to get on the bows of the opposing +battle cruisers. For this purpose the British flotilla was better +placed because their battle cruisers were well ahead of the Germans. +The German destroyers, therefore, concentrated their efforts on the +battleship division, which turned away to avoid the torpedoes. In +numbers the advantage lay with the Germans, and a fiercely contested +action took place between the lines conducted with superb gallantry +on both sides. The Germans succeeded in breaking up the British +attack at a cost of two destroyers. Two of the British destroyers +also were rendered unmanageable and sank later when the High Seas +Fleet arrived on the scene. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 403px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig080.png" width="403" height="459" alt="Fig. 80"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF JUTLAND, FIRST PHASE</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Action Between Battle Cruiser + Forces.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_396"><span class="page">Page 396</span></a> Meanwhile, +at 4.26, just before the destroyers clashed, a salvo struck the +<i>Queen Mary</i>, blew up a magazine, and she disappeared with +practically all on board. Thus the second of Beatty's battle cruisers +was sent to the bottom with tragic suddenness. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At 4.38, Commodore Goodenough, commanding the Second Light Cruiser +Squadron, who was scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported +that the German battle fleet was in sight steering north, and gave +its position. Beatty at once called in his destroyers and turned +his ships in succession, sixteen points to starboard, ordering +Evan-Thomas to turn similarly. Thus the capital ships turned right +about on the opposite course, the battleships following the cruisers +as before, and all heading for the main fleet which was then about +fifty miles away to the north. Commodore Goodenough at this point +used his initiative in commendable fashion. Without orders he kept +on to the south to establish contact with the German battle fleet +and hung on its flanks near enough to report its position to the +commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire, but handled his +frail ships so skillfully as to escape serious loss. At the same +time the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect +in the British system of communication made his reports of bearing +seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a +difficulty for the commander in chief, who, fifty miles away, was +trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Second Phase</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The northward run of the British advance force and the German advance +force, followed by their main fleet, was uneventful. The situation +was at this stage exactly reversed. Beatty was endeavoring to lead +the German forces into the guns of the Grand Fleet, while ostensibly +he was attempting to escape from a superior force, much as Hipper +had been doing with relation to Scheer during the first phase. +Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers continued to engage the +five German battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards, assisted +<a name="page_397"><span class="page">Page 397</span></a> by the +two leading ships of Evan-Thomas's Battle Squadron. The other two +battleships engaged the head of the advancing German battle fleet +at the extreme range of 19,000 yards as often as they could make +out their enemy. The visibility grew worse and apparently neither +side scored on the other. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As the British main fleet was reported somewhat to the east of +Beatty's position, he bore toward that quarter; and Hipper, to avoid +being "T-d" by his enemy, turned to the eastward correspondingly. The +mistiness increased to such a degree that shortly after five o'clock +Beatty lost sight of the enemy's battle cruisers and ceased fire for +half an hour. Between 5.40 and six o'clock, however, conditions were +better and firing was opened again by the British ships, apparently +with good effect. Meanwhile clashes had already taken place between +the light cruiser <i>Chester</i>, attached to the Third Battle +Squadron of the main fleet, and the light cruisers of the enemy, +which were far in advance of their battle cruisers. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Third Phase</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +We have already noted that as soon as Jellicoe learned of the presence +of the enemy he ordered Hood, with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, +to cut off the German retreat to the Skagerrak and to support Beatty. +Hood's course had taken him well to the east of where the action was +in progress. At 5.40 he saw the flashes of guns far to the northwest, +and immediately changed course in that direction. Fifteen minutes +later he was able to open fire on German light cruisers, with his +four destroyers darting ahead to attack with torpedoes. These light +cruisers, which had just driven off the <i>Chester</i> with heavy +losses, discharged torpedoes at Hood's battle cruisers and turned +away. The latter shifted helm to avoid them and narrowly missed being +hit. One torpedo indeed passed under the <i>Invincible</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this point another group of four German light cruisers appeared +and Hood's destroyers advanced to attack them. The fire of the +cruisers damaged two destroyers though not before one of them, the +<i>Shark</i>, had torpedoed the German <a name="page_398"><span +class="page">Page 398</span></a> cruiser <i>Rostock</i>. The +<i>Shark</i> herself was in turn torpedoed and sunk by a German +destroyer. At about the same time action had begun between the +ships of the armored cruiser squadron under Arbuthnot and another +squadron of German light cruisers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A moment later (at 5.56) Beatty sighted the leaders of the Grand +Fleet and knew that contact with his support was established. At +once he changed course to about due east and put on full speed +in order to head off the German line, and by taking position to +the eastward, allow the battle fleet to form line astern of his +battle cruisers. Such an overwhelming force was now concentrated +on the German light cruisers that they turned back. Of their number +the <i>Wiesbaden</i> had been disabled by a concentration of fire +and the <i>Rostock</i> torpedoed. Hipper then made a turn of 180° +with his battle cruisers in order to get back to the support of +the battleships which he had left far to the rear. Then he turned +round again, and continued to lead the German advance. All this +time he seems to have had no suspicion that the Grand Fleet was +in the neighborhood. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 767px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig081.png" width="767" height="505" alt="Fig. 81"> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +As Beatty dashed across the front of the approaching battle fleet +he sighted Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron ahead of him and +signaled him to take station ahead. Accordingly Hood countermarched +and led Beatty's line in the <i>Invincible</i>. Evan-Thomas was +by this time so far in the rear of the speedier battle cruisers +that he was unable to follow with Beatty, and in order to avoid +confusion with the oncoming battle fleet he turned left 90° in +order to form astern of the Sixth Battle Division, by this move, +however, leaving Beatty's cruisers unsupported. Meanwhile the armored +cruisers of Arbuthnot were already under fire from Hipper's squadron +and suffering severely. At 6.16 the <i>Defense</i>, the flagship of +the squadron, blew up; the <i>Warrior</i> was badly disabled, and +the <i>Black Prince</i> was so crippled as to be sunk during the night +action. As Evan-Thomas made his turn, one of his battleships, the +<i>Warspite</i>, was struck by a shell that jammed her steering gear +in such a way as to send her head on toward the Germans. She served to +shield the <i>Warrior</i> from destruction, <a name="page_399"></a> +<a name="page_400"></a><a name="page_401"><span class="page">Page +401</span></a> but suffered thirty hits from heavy projectiles +before she was brought under control and taken out of action. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 545px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig082.png" width="545" height="741" alt="Fig. 82"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MAY 31, 1916</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">2nd and 3rd phases</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Between six and 6.15 Jellicoe received bearings from Vice Admiral +Burney (of the Sixth Battle Division), Evan-Thomas, and Beatty +which enabled him for the first time to plot accurately the position +of the German battle fleet. This information revealed the fact +that previous plotting based on bearings coming from Goodenough +and others was seriously wrong. The Germans were twelve miles to +the west of where they were supposed to be. Jellicoe then formed +line of battle, not on the starboard wing, which was nearest the +head of the German advance, but on the port wing, which was farthest +away, and speed was reduced to 14 knots in order to enable the +battle cruisers to take station at the head of the line. Indeed +some of the ships in the rear or sixth division had to stop their +engines to avoid collision during deployment. By this time the +ships of the sixth division began to come under the shells of the +German battle fleet and they returned the fire. By half past six +all sixteen of the German dreadnoughts were firing at the British +lines, the slow predreadnoughts being so far to the rear as to +be unable to take part. The battleship fire, however, neither at +this point nor later showed the extraordinary accuracy displayed +by the battle cruisers at the beginning, but this may possibly +be attributed to the gathering mistiness that hung over the sea, +darkened by the low-lying smoke from the host of ships. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As soon as Scheer realized that he had not only run right into the +arms of the Grand Fleet, but lay in the worst tactical position +imaginable with an overwhelming force concentrated on the head +of his line, he turned away to escape. The battle cruisers (at +6.30) swung away sharply from east to south, the ships turning +in succession. Meanwhile the torpedo flotillas tried to cover the +turn by a gallant attack on the British battle line. At the same +time smoke screens also were laid to cover the retirement. The +<i>Invincible</i>, Hood's flagship, which was leading the British +line, was at this juncture struck by a shell that penetrated her +armor and exploded a magazine. The ship instantly broke in two and +went to the bottom, and <a name="page_402"></a><a name="page_403"> +<span class="page">Page 403</span></a> only four officers and two +men were saved. Almost at the same instant the German battle +cruiser <i>Lützow</i>, Hipper's flagship, was so badly +disabled by shells and torpedo that she fell out of line helpless. +Hipper managed, however, to board a destroyer and two hours later +succeeded in shifting his flag to the <i>Moltke</i>. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 770px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig083.png" width="770" height="523" alt="Fig. 83"> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +At 6.35 Scheer performed a difficult maneuver that the fleet had +practiced for just the situation that existed at this time. He +wheeled his battleships simultaneously to starboard, forming line +again on a westerly course. Twenty minutes later, finding that he +was no longer under fire from the Grand Fleet, he repeated the +maneuver, the ships turning again to starboard and forming line +ahead again on an easterly, then southerly course. These changes of +course were made under cover of smoke screens and were not observed +by the British. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +By this time the Grand Fleet had formed line of battle on a +southeasterly course and by 7.10 its leaders were concentrating +their fire on the head of the German line, which was now caught +under an overwhelming superiority of force. Unfortunately for the +Germans the visibility conditions at this time were worse for them +than for their enemy, for while the British ships were nearly or +quite invisible, the Germans every now and then stood silhouetted +against the western sky. The British fire at this time was heavy +and accurate. The German fleet seemed marked for destruction. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For Scheer it was now imperative to withdraw if he could. Accordingly +at this juncture he sent out a flotilla of destroyers in a desperate +effort to cover the retreat of his fleet. They fired a number of +torpedoes at the English battle line, and retired with the loss +of one boat. Their stroke succeeded, for Jellicoe turned his whole +line of battleships away to avoid the torpedoes. Beatty, holding +his course at the head of the line, signaled Admiral Jerram of +the <i>King George V</i> to follow astern, but he was evidently +bound to the orders of his commander in chief. For the second time +<a name="page_404"><span class="page">Page 404</span></a> that +day Beatty was left unsupported in his fight at the head of the +line. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile Scheer's capital ships had simultaneously wheeled away +in line to the westward under cover of the torpedo attacks and +smoke screens made by the destroyers. This was the third time within +an hour that they had effected this maneuver, and the skill with +which the battleships managed these turns in line under a rain of +fire speaks well for German seamanship. Meanwhile, to rëenforce +the covering movement made by the destroyers, Scheer sent out his +battle cruisers in a sortie against Beatty, who was pressing hard +on the head of the German line. The following account from Commander +von Hase of the <i>Derfflinger</i>, which led this sortie, is +interesting not only for its description of what occurred at this +time but also as a picture of a personal experience of the terrific +fire that the battle cruisers of both sides had to sustain throughout +the greater part of the engagement. It was on them that the brunt +of the fighting fell. The narrative is quoted from the pages of +the <i>Naval and Military Record</i>: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"By now our Commander-in-Chief had realized the danger threatening +our fleet, the van of which was enclosed in a semicircle by the +hostile fleet. We were, in fact, absolutely 'in the soup' (in absoluten +Wurstkessel)! There was only one way to get clear of this tactically +disadvantageous position: to turn the whole fleet about and steer on +an opposite course. First to evade this dangerous encirclement. But +the maneuver must be unobserved and executed without interference. +The battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats must cover the movement of the +fleet. At about[1] 9.12 the Commander-in-Chief made the signal to +alter course, and almost simultaneously made by W/T [wireless] the +historic signal to the battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats: 'Charge +the enemy!' (Ran an den Feind!) Without turning a hair the captain +ordered 'Full speed ahead, course south-east.' Followed by the +<i>Seydlitz, Molke</i>, and <i>Von der Tann</i>, we steamed at +first south-east, then, from 9.15 onward, directly towards the head +of the enemy's line. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: There was a difference of two hours in time between +the German and the English standard.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"And now an infernal fire was opened on us, especially <a +name="page_405"><span class="page">Page 405</span></a> on the +<i>Derfflinger</i>, as leading ship. Several ships were concentrating +their fire upon us. I selected a target and fired as rapidly as +possible. The range closed from 12,000 to 8,000 meters, and still +we steamed full speed ahead into this inferno of fire, presenting +a splendid target to the enemy, while he himself was very difficult +to see. Salvo after salvo fell in our immediate vicinity, and shell +after shell struck our ship. They were the most exciting minutes. +I could no longer communicate with Lt. von Stosch (who was in the +foretop control), as the telephone and voice-pipes had been shot +away, so I had to rely an my own observations to direct the fire. +At 9.13, previous to which all four 12 in. turrets were in action, +a serious catastrophe occurred. A 15 in. shell penetrated the armor +of No. 3 turret and exploded inside. The gallant turret captain, Lt. +von Boltenstern, had both his legs torn off, and with him perished +practically the entire guns' crew. The explosion ignited three +cartridges, flames from which reached the working chamber, where +eight more cartridges were set on fire, and passed down to the +magazine, igniting still more cartridges. They burned fiercely, +the flames roaring high above the turret—but they burned +only, they did not explode—as our enemy's cartridges had +done—and that saved the ship! Still, the effect of the burning +cartridges was catastrophic; the flames killed everything within +their reach. Of the 78 men of the turret crew only five escaped, +some badly wounded, by crawling out through the holes for expelling +empty cartridge cases. The remaining 73 men died instantly. A few +seconds after this catastrophe another disaster befell us. A 15 +in. shell pierced the shield of No. 4 turret and burst inside, +causing frightful destruction. With the exception of one man, who +was blown out of the turret hatch by the blast of air, the entire +crew, including all the men in the magazines and shell-rooms, 80 +souls in all, were instantly killed. All the cartridges which had +been taken out of their metal cases were ignited, so that flames +were now shooting sky-high from both the after turrets.... +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The enemy's shooting was splendid. Shell after shell crashed into +us, and my heart stood still as I thought of what must be happening +inside the ship. My thoughts were rudely disturbed. Suddenly it +was to us as if the world had come to an end. A terrific roar, +a mighty explosion, and then darkness <a name="page_406"><span +class="page">Page 406</span></a> fell upon us. We shook under a +tremendous blow, which lifted the conning-tower bodily off its +base, to which it sank back vibrating. A heavy shell had struck +the gunnery control station about 20 inches from me. The shell +burst, but did not penetrate because it had hit the thick armor at +an angle, but huge pieces of plating were torn away.... We found, +however, that all the artillery connections were undamaged. Splinters +had penetrated the lookout slits of the conning-tower, wounding +several people inside. The explosion had forced open the door, +which jammed, and two men were unable to move it. But help from an +unexpected quarter was at hand. Again we heard a terrific roar and +crash, and with the noise of a thunderbolt a 15 in. shell exploded +beneath the bridge. The blast of air swept away everything that was +not firmly riveted down, and the chart-house disappeared bodily. +But the astounding thing was that this same air pressure closed +the door of the conning-tower! The Englishman was polite; having +first opened the door, he carefully shut it again for us. I searched +with my glass for the enemy, but, although the salvos were still +falling about us, we could see practically nothing of him; all +that was really visible were the huge, golden-red flames from the +muzzles of his guns.... Without much hope of hurting the enemy I +fired salvo after salvo from the forward turrets. I could feel +how our shooting was calming the nerves of the crew. Had we not +fired at this moment the whole ship's company would have been +overpowered by a great despair, for everyone knew that a few minutes +more of this would finish us. But so long as we fired things could +not be so bad with us. The medium guns fired also, but only two +of the six 5.9's on one side were still in action. The fourth gun +was split from end to end by a burst in the muzzle, and the third +was shot to pieces...." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The battle-cruisers were recalled just in time—so it would +appear—to save them from annihilation, and Com. von Hase +proceeds: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"All hands were now busy quelling the fires. Thick clouds of yellow +gas still poured from both after turrets, but the flooding of the +magazines soon got rid of this. None of us had believed that a +ship could stand so many heavy hits. Some twenty 15 in. hits were +counted after the battle, and about the same number of bad hits from +smaller calibers. The <i>Lützow</i> <a name="page_407"><span +class="page">Page 407</span></a> was out of sight (she sank later), +but the <i>Seydlitz, Moltke</i>, and <i>Von der Tann</i> were still +with us. They, too, had been badly punished, the <i>Seydlitz</i> +worst of all. Flames still roared from one of her turrets, and +all the other ships were burning. The bow of the <i>Seydlitz</i> +was deep in the water. Every battle-cruiser had suffered severe +casualties.... But the death charge had achieved its purpose by +covering the retreat of the battle fleet.... Our ship was very +heavily battered, and in many places the compartments were mere +heaps of débris. But vital parts were not hit, and, thanks +to the strong armor, the engines, boilers, steering gear, and nearly +all auxiliaries were undamaged. For a long time the engine-room +was filled with noxious fumes, necessitating the use of gas masks. +The entire ship was littered with thousands of large and small +shell splinters, among which we found two practically undamaged +15 in. shell caps, which were later used in the wardroom as wine +coolers. The belt armour was pierced several times, but either +the leaks were stopped or the inflow of water was localized in +small compartments. In Wilhelmshaven we buried our dead, nearly +200 in all." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +By 8 o'clock the German battleships had vanished, with the British +steering westward by divisions in pursuit. But never again did +the two battle fleets regain touch with each other. Occasional +contact with an enemy vessel was made by other units of Jellicoe's +force. About 8.20 another destroyer attack was threatened, and +again Jellicoe swerved away, at the same time, however, sending +the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and two destroyer flotillas, +which succeeded in breaking up the attempt. At 8.30 he reformed +his fleet in column and continued on a southwesterly course until +9 o'clock. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Fourth Phase</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As darkness came on, Jellicoe, declining to risk his ships under +conditions most favorable to torpedo attack, arranged his battleships +in four squadrons a mile apart, with destroyer flotillas five miles +astern, and sent a mine-layer to lay a mine field in the neighborhood +of the Vyl lightship, covering the route over which the Germans were +expected to pass if they <a name="page_408"><span class="page">Page +408</span></a> attempted to get home via the Horn Reef. He then +headed southeast. Beatty also drew off from pursuit with his battle +cruisers. Jellicoe's plan was to avoid a general night action, but +to hold such a position as to compel the Germans to fight again +the following morning in order to reach their bases. During the +night (between ten and 2.35) there were several sharp conflicts, +mainly between the destroyers and light cruisers of the opposing +fleets, with considerable loss on both sides. On the British side, +two armored cruisers, <i>Black Prince</i> and <i>Warrior</i>, went +down—both crippled by damages sustained during the day—and +five destroyers. Six others were severely damaged. On the German +side, the battle cruiser <i>Lützow</i> sank as a result of +her injuries, the predreadnought battleship <i>Pommern</i> was +blown up by a torpedo, three light cruisers were sunk, and four +or five other ships suffered from torpedo or mine. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The contacts made by British destroyers and cruisers confirm the +accounts of the Germans as to the course of their fleet during +the night. About nine o'clock Scheer changed course sharply from +west to southeast and cut through the rear of the British fleet. +At dawn, about 2.40, he was twenty miles to eastward of Jellicoe on +the road to Wilhelmshaven. At noon the greater part of the German +fleet was safe in port. Some of the lighter ships, to escape the +assaults of the British destroyers during the night, headed north +and got home by way of the Skagerrak and the Kiel Canal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Jellicoe had avoided a night pursuit for the sake of fighting on +better terms the next morning, but at dawn he found his destroyers +scattered far and wide. Judging it unwise to pursue the High Seas +Fleet without a screening force, and discovering by directional +wireless that it was already south of Horn Reef and in the neighborhood +of the mine fields, he gave up the idea of renewing the engagement +and turned north. He spent the forenoon in sweeping the scene of +the previous day's fighting, collecting his dispersed units, and +then returned to his bases. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The claim of victory, which was promptly and loudly made by the +German press, is absurd enough. After the Grand Fleet arrived there +could be only one thought for the Germans <a name="page_409"><span +class="page">Page 409</span></a> and that was a fighting retreat. +Nevertheless, they had every reason to be proud of what they had +done. They had met a force superior by a ratio of about 8 to 5 +and had escaped after inflicting nearly twice as much damage as +they had sustained. These losses may be compared by means of the +following table[1]: +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="top" rowspan="17">BRITISH,</td> + <td class="top" rowspan="4">Three Battle Cruisers,</td> + <td>QUEEN MARY</td> + <td class="right">26,350</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr> +<tr><td>INDEFATIGABLE</td> + <td class="right">18,800</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>INVINCIBLE</td> + <td class="right">17,250</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3"> </td></tr> + +<tr><td class="top" rowspan="4">Three Armored Cruisers,</td> + <td>DEFENSE</td> + <td class="right">14,600</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>WARRIOR</td> + <td class="right">13,550</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>BLACK PRINCE</td> + <td class="right">13,550</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3"> </td></tr> + +<tr><td class="top" rowspan="9">Eight Destroyers,</td> + <td>TIPPERARY</td> + <td class="right">1,430</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>NESTOR</td> + <td class="right">890</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>NOMAD</td> + <td class="right">890</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>TURBULENT</td> + <td class="right">1,100</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>FORTUNE</td> + <td class="right">965</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>ARDENT</td> + <td class="right">935</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>SHARK</td> + <td class="right">935</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>SPARROWHAWK</td> + <td class="right_bb">935</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>Total</td> + <td class="right">111,980</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="5"> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="top" rowspan="13">GERMANS,</td> + <td>One Battle Cruiser</td> + <td>LUETZOW</td> + <td class="right">26,180</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr> +<tr><td>One Pre-dreadnought,</td> + <td>POMMERN</td> + <td class="right">13,200</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td rowspan="4">Four Light Cruisers,</td> + <td>WIESBADEN</td> + <td class="right">5,400</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>ELBING</td> + <td class="right">4,500</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>ROSTOCK</td> + <td class="right">4,900</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>FRAUENLOB</td> + <td class="right">2,700</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="4"> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="top" rowspan="6">Five Destroyers,</td> + <td>V-4</td> + <td class="right">570</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>V-48</td> + <td class="right">750</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>V-27</td> + <td class="right">640</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>V-29</td> + <td class="right">640</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>S-33</td> + <td class="right_bb">700</td><td class="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td>Total</td> + <td class="right">60,180</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +Personnel, killed and wounded: BRITISH, about 6,600: GERMANS, 3,076. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Figures in these tables taken from Lieut. Comdr. H. +H. Frost, U. S. N., <i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings</i>, Jan., +1920, p. 84.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With all allowance for the poor visibility conditions and the deepening +twilight, it must be admitted also that Scheer handled <a +name="page_410"><span class="page">Page 410</span></a> his ships +with great skill. Caught in a noose by an overwhelming force, he +disentangled himself by means of the torpedo attacks of his destroyer +flotillas and turned away under cover of their smoke screens. After +nightfall he boldly cut through the rear of the British fleet in +battle line, and reached his base in safety with the great bulk +of his ships. Meanwhile at practically all stages of the fighting +German gunnery was both rapid and accurate, the seamanship was +admirable, and there was no lack of courage of the highest order. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As to material, Admiral Jellicoe notes the superiority of the German +fleet in range-finding devices, searchlights, smoke screens, a +star shell—unknown to the British and invaluable for night +fighting—and in the armor piercing quality of the shells. +Moreover the Germans were completely equipped with systems of director +firing, while the British were not. According to Admiral Sir Percy +Scott,[1] "at the Battle of Jutland ... the commander in chief +had only six ships of his fleet completely fitted with director +firing ... he had not a single cruiser in the fleet fitted for +director firing." +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Fifty Years in the Royal Navy</span>, +p. 278.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The greatest superiority of all probably lay in the structural +features of the newer German ships. For some years prior to the +war Admiral von Tirpitz had devoted himself to the problem of under +water protection, to localize the effect of torpedo and mine on +the hull of a ship. To quote the words of von Tirpitz:[2] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">My Memoirs</span>, Vol. I, p. 171.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We built a section of a modern ship by itself and carried out +experimental explosions on it with torpedo heads, carefully testing +the result every time. We tested the possibility of weakening the +force of the explosion by letting the explosive gases burst in +empty compartments without meeting any resistance. We ascertained +the most suitable steel for the different structural parts, and +found further that the effect of the explosion was nullified if +we compelled it to pulverize coal in any considerable quantity. +This resulted in a special arrangement of the coal bunkers. We +were then able to meet the force of the explosion ... by a strong, +carefully constructed <a name="page_411"><span class="page">Page +411</span></a> steel wall which finally secured the safety of the +interior of the ship." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The only German armored ship that succumbed to the blow of a single +torpedo was the <i>Pommern</i>, an old vessel, built before the +fruits of these experiments were embodied in the German fleet. The +labor of von Tirpitz was well justified by the results, as may be +seen by the instantaneous fashion in which the three British battle +cruisers went to the bottom, compared with the ability of the German +battle cruisers to stand terrific pounding and yet stay afloat and +keep going. According to the testimony of a German officer,[1] +the <i>Lützow</i> was literally shot to pieces in the battle +and even then it took three torpedoes to settle her. Actually she +was sunk by opening her seacocks to prevent her possible capture. +The remarkable ability of the battle cruiser <i>Göben</i>, in +Turkish waters, to survive shell, mines, and torpedo, bears the +same testimony, as does the <i>Mainz</i>, which, in the action of +the Heligoland Bight had to be sunk by one of her own officers, as +in the case of the <i>Lützow</i>. It is possible that Jellicoe +assumed an inferiority of the British armor piercing shell because +of this power of the German ships to stay afloat. But photographs +published after the armistice showed that British shells penetrated +the 11-inch turret armor of the <i>Seydlitz</i> and the 13-inch +of the <i>Derfflinger</i> with frightful effect. The difference +was in the fact that they did not succeed in sinking those ships, +which, after all is the chief object of a shell, and this must +be attributed to better under-water construction. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Quoted in <i>Naval and Military Record</i>, Dec. 24, +1919, p. 822.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The only criticism it seems possible to suggest on Scheer's tactics +is the unwariness of his pursuit, which might so easily have led +to the total destruction of the German fleet. Strangely enough, +although a Zeppelin hovered over the British fleet at dawn of the +day after the battle, no aircraft of any kind scouted ahead of the +Germans the day before. In pursuing Beatty, Scheer had to take +a chance, well aware that if the Grand Fleet were within reach, +Beatty's wireless would bring it upon him. But Scheer was evidently +perfectly willing to <a name="page_412"><span class="page">Page +412</span></a> risk the encounter. Such criticism as arose in +Germany—from Captain Persius, for example—centered +on "Tirpitz's faulty constructional methods"; which, in the light +of the facts of the battle would seem to be the very last thing +to hit upon. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As for types and weapons it is clear that the armored cruisers +served only as good targets and death traps. The British would +have been better off if every armored cruiser had been left at +home. The dominating feature of the story is the influence of the +torpedo on Jellicoe's tactics. It is fair to say that it was the +Parthian tactics of the German destroyer, both actual and potential, +that saved the High Seas Fleet and robbed the British of a greater +Trafalgar. At every crisis in the battle it was either what the +German destroyer did or might do that governed the British commander's +maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather +than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers +might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost +all contact with their enemy for the rest of the battle, it was +because of a destroyer attack. At this time eleven destroyers +accomplished the feat of driving 27 dreadnoughts from the field! +Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril +of destroyer attacks under cover of darkness, and finally Jellicoe +decided not to risk an action the following morning because his +capital ships had no screening forces against the torpedo of the +enemy. It is worth noting in this connection that although the +Admiralty were aware of the battle in progress, they held back +the Harwich force of destroyers and light cruisers which would +have proved a welcome reënforcement in pursuing the retreating +fleet. The reason for this decision has never been published. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In connection with the important part played by the German destroyers +at Jutland it is worth remarking that before the war it was the +Admiralty doctrine that destroyers could not operate successfully +by day, and they were accordingly painted black for night service. +The German destroyers were painted gray. After Jutland the British +flotillas also were painted the battleship gray. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_413"><span class="page">Page 413</span></a> Naturally +the failure of the superior fleet to crush the inferior one aroused +a storm of criticism, the most severe emanating from English naval +writers. The sum and substance is the charge of overcaution on the +part of the British Commander in Chief. It is held that Jellicoe +should have formed his battle line on his starboard instead of +his port wing, thus turning toward the enemy and concentrating +on the head of their column at once. Forming on the port division +caused the battle fleet to swerve away from the enemy and open +the range just at the critical moment of contact, leaving Beatty +unsupported in his dash across the head of the enemy's line. It is +said that the latter even sent a signal to the <i>Marlborough</i> +for the battleships to fall in astern of him, and the failure to +do so made his maneuver fruitless. Apparently this message was +not transmitted to the flagship at the time. In answer Jellicoe +explains in great detail that the preliminary reports received +from Goodenough and others as to the position of the High Seas +Fleet were so meager and conflicting that he could not form line +of battle earlier than he did, and secondly that deploying on the +starboard division at the moment of sighting the enemy would have +thrown the entire battle fleet into confusion, blanketed their +fire, and created a dangerous opening for torpedo attack from the +destroyers at the head of the German column. On this point Scheer +agrees with the critics. Deploying on the starboard division instead +of the port, he says, "would have greatly impeded our movements and +rendered a fresh attack on the enemy's line extremely difficult." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The second point of criticism rested on the turning away of the +battleships at the critical point of the torpedo attack at 7.20, +under cover of which the German battleships wheeled to westward and +disappeared. Jellicoe's reply is that if he had swung to starboard, +turning toward the enemy, he would have headed into streams of +approaching torpedoes under conditions of mist and smoke that were +ideal for torpedo attack, and if he had maintained position in line +ahead he would have courted heavy losses. In connection with this +turn he calls attention to the fact that British light cruisers <a +name="page_414"><span class="page">Page 414</span></a> and destroyers +could not be used to deliver a counter attack because, on account of +the rapid changes of course and formation made by the battlefleet, +they had been unable to reach their proper station in the van. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thirdly, if conditions for night battle were too risky why did +the Grand Fleet fail to keep sufficient touch with the enemy by +means of its light flotillas so as to be informed of his movements +and prevent his escape? There were frequent contacts during that +short night, and the Germans were sighted steering southeast. The +attacks made by British destroyers certainly threw the German line +into confusion, and some of the light vessels were driven to the +north, reaching German bases by way of the Baltic. Nevertheless +the fleet succeeded in cutting through without serious loss. To +this there seems to be no answer. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Lastly, to the query why Jellicoe did not seek another action in +the morning, as originally intended, he replies that he discovered +by directional wireless that the Germans were already safe between +the mine fields and the coast, and that he could not safely proceed +without his screening force of destroyers and light cruisers, which, +after their night operations, were widely scattered. From German +accounts, however, we find no mention of a shelter behind mine +fields, but astonishment at the fact that they were permitted to go +on their way unmolested. Morning found the two fleets only twenty +miles apart, and the Germans had a half day's steaming before they +could reach port. They were in no condition to fight. The battleship +<i>Ostfriesland</i> had struck a mine and had to be towed. The +battle cruiser <i>Seydlitz</i> had to be beached to keep her from +sinking, and other units were limping along with their gun decks +almost awash. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Certainly the tactics of Jellicoe do not suggest those of Blake, +Hawke, or Nelson. They do not fit Farragut's motto—borrowed from +Danton[1]—"l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace," or +Napoleon's "frappez vite, frappez fort." War, as has been observed +before, cannot be waged without taking risks. The British had a heavy +margin to gamble on. <a name="page_415"><span class="page">Page +415</span></a> As it happened, 23 out of the entire 28 battleships +came out of the fight without so much as a scratch on their paint; +and, after deployment, only one out of the battle line of 27 +dreadnoughts received a single hit. This was the <i>Colossus</i>, +which had four men wounded by a shell. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: And borrowed by Danton from Cicero.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The touchstone of naval excellence is Nelson. As Mahan has so ably +pointed out, while weapons change principles remain. Dewey, in +deciding to take the chances involved in a night entry of Manila +Bay did so in answer to his own question, "What would Farragut +do?" Hence in considering Jutland one may take a broader view than +merely a criticism of tactics. In a word, does the whole conduct +of the affair reveal the method and spirit of Nelson? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At Trafalgar there was no need for a deployment after the enemy +was sighted because in the words of the famous Memorandum, "the +order of sailing is to be the order of battle." The tactics to +be followed when the French appeared had been carefully explained +by Nelson to his commanders. No signal was needed—except +the fine touch of inspiration in "England expects every man to +do his duty." In brief, the British fleet had been so thoroughly +indoctrinated, and the plan was so simple, that there was no room +for hesitation, uncertainty, or dependence on the flagship for +orders at the last minute. It is hard to see evidence of any such +indoctrination of the Grand Fleet before Jutland. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Again, Nelson was, by example and precept, constantly insisting +on the initiative of the subordinate. "The Second in Command will +... have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon +the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or +destroyed.... Captains are to look to their particular line as +their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor +perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his +ship alongside that of an enemy." At Jutland, despite the urgent +signals of Beatty at two critical moments, neither Burney of the +sixth division nor Jerram of the first felt free to act independently +of the orders of the Commander in Chief. The latter tried, as Nelson +emphatically <a name="page_416"><span class="page">Page 416</span></a> +did not, to control from the flagship every movement of the entire +fleet. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Further, if naval history has taught anything it has established +a point so closely related to the responsibility and initiative +of the subordinate as to be almost a part of it; namely, a great +fleet that fights in a single rigid line ahead never achieves a +decisive victory. Blake, Tromp, and de Ruyter fought with squadrons, +expecting—indeed demanding—initiative on the part of +their flag officers. That was the period when great and decisive +victories were won. The close of the 17th century produced the +"Fighting Instructions," requiring the unbroken line ahead, and +there followed a hundred years of indecisive battles and bungled +opportunities. Then Nelson came and revived the untrammeled tactics +of the days of Blake with the added glory of his own genius. It +appears that at Jutland the battleships were held to a rigid unit +of fleet formation as in the days of the Duke of York or Admiral +Graves. And concentration with a long line of dreadnoughts is no +more possible to-day than it was with a similar line of two-decked +sailing ships a century and a half ago. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Finally, in the matter of spirit, the considerations that swayed +the movements of the Grand Fleet at all stages were apparently +those of what the enemy might do instead of what might be done +to the enemy, the very antithesis of the spirit of Nelson. It is +no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander in Chief +that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his ships. +The existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the +Allied cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging +on its use. But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the +British fleet exist merely to maintain a numerical preponderance +over its enemy or to crush that enemy—whatever the cost? +If the battle of Jutland receives the stamp of approval as the +best that could have been done, then the British or the American +officer of the future will know that he is expected primarily to +"play safe." But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or +Nelson, the men who made the traditions of the Service and forged +the anchors of the British Empire. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_417"><span class="page">Page 417</span></a> Thus +the great battle turned out to be indecisive; in fact, it elated +the Germans with a feeling of success and depressed the British +with a keen sense of failure. Nevertheless, the control of the +sea remained in the hands of the English, and never again did the +High Seas Fleet risk another encounter. The relative positions +at sea of the two adversaries therefore remained unaltered. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the other hand, if the British had destroyed the German fleet +the victory would have been priceless. As Jervis remarked at Cape +St. Vincent, "A victory is very essential to England at this hour." +The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in Allied prospects. The Verdun +offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the +Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians +had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation +of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic +suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of the +war. Without a German battle fleet, the British could have forced the +fighting almost to the very harbors of the German coast—bottling +up every exit by a barrage of mines. The blockade, therefore, could +have been drawn close to the coast defenses. Moreover, with the High +Seas Fleet gone, the British fleet could have entered and taken +possession of the Baltic, which throughout the war remained a German +lake. By this move England would have threatened the German Baltic +coast with invasion and extended her blockade in a highly important +locality, cutting off the trade between Sweden and Germany. She +would also have come to the relief of Russia, which was suffering +terrible losses from the lack of munitions. Indeed it would have +saved that ally from the collapse that withdrew her from the war. +With no German "fleet in being" great numbers of workers in English +industry and vast quantities of supplies might have been transferred +to the support of the army. The threat of invasion would have been +removed, and the large army that was kept in England right up to the +crisis of March, 1918,[1] would have been free to reenforce the army +at the front. Finally, without the personnel <a name="page_418"><span +class="page">Page 418</span></a> of the German fleet there could have +been no ruthless submarine campaign the year after, such as actually +came so near to winning the war. Thus, while the German claim to +a triumph that drove the British from the seas is ridiculous, it +is equally so to argue, as the First Lord of the Admiralty did, +that there was no need of a British victory at Jutland, that all +the fruits of victory were gained as it was. The subsequent history +of the war tells a different tale. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: A quarter of a million men were sent from England at +this time.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Grand Fleet</span>, 1914-1916, Admiral Viscount + Lord Jellicoe of Scapa, 1919.<br> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The German High Seas Fleet in the World War</span>, + Vice Admiral von Scheer, 1920.<br> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Battle of Jutland</span>, Commander Carlyon + Bellairs, M. P., 1920.<br> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Naval Annual</span>, 1919, Earl Brassey.<br> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">A Description of the Battle of Jutland</span>, Lieut. + Commander H. H. Frost, U. S. N., in <span class="sc">U. S. Naval + Institute Proceedings</span>, vol. 45, pp. 1829 ff, 2019 ff; vol. + 46, pp. 61 ff.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The British Navy in Battle</span>, A. H. Pollen, + 1919.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_419"><span class="page">Page 419</span></a> +CHAPTER XVIII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE WORLD WAR [<i>Continued</i>]: COMMERCE WARFARE +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Interdiction of enemy trade has always been the great weapon of +sea power; and hence, though mines, submarines, and the menace +of the High Seas Fleet itself made a close blockade of the German +coast impossible, Great Britain in the World War steadily extended +her efforts to cut off Germany's intercourse with the overseas +world. Germany, on the other hand, while unwilling or unable to +take the risks of a contest for surface control of the sea, waged +cruiser warfare on British and Allied commerce, first by surface +vessels, and, when these were destroyed, by submarines. In the +policies adopted by each belligerent there is an evident analogy to +the British blockade and the French commerce destroying campaigns +of the Napoleonic Wars. And just as in the earlier conflict British +sea power impelled Napoleon to a ruinous struggle for the domination +of Europe, so in the World War, though in a somewhat different +fashion, the blockade worked disaster for Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The consequences of the blockade," writes the German General von +Freytag-Loringhoven, "showed themselves at once. Although we succeeded +in establishing our war economics by our internal strength, yet +the unfavorable state of the world economic situation was felt by +us throughout the war. That alone explains why our enemies found +ever fresh possibilities of resistance, because the sea stood open +to them, and why victories which would otherwise have been absolutely +decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not bring us +nearer peace." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_420"><span class="page">Page 420</span></a> For each +group of belligerents, indeed, the enemy's commerce warfare assumed +a vital significance. "No German success on land," declares the +conservative British Annual Register for 1919, "could have ruined or +even very gravely injured the English-speaking powers. The success +of the submarine campaign, on the other hand, would have left the +United States isolated and have placed the Berlin Government in +a position to dominate most of the rest of the world." "The war +is won for us," declared General von Hindenburg on July 2, 1917, +"if we can withstand the enemy attacks until the submarine has +done its work." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Commerce warfare at once involves a third party, the neutral; and +it therefore appears desirable, before tracing the progress of +this warfare, to outline briefly the principles of international +law which, by a slow and tortuous process, have grown up defining +the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents in naval war. +<i>Blockade</i> is among the most fundamental of these rights accorded +to the belligerent, upon the conditions that the blockade shall be +limited to enemy ports or coasts, confined within specified limits, +and made so effective as to create evident danger to traffic. It +assumes control of the sea by the blockading navy, and, before the +days of mines and submarines, it was enforced by a cordon of ships +off the enemy coast. A blockade stops direct trade or intercourse +of any kind. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whether or not a blockade is established, a belligerent has the +right to attempt the prevention of <i>trade in contraband</i>. +A neutral nation is under no obligation whatever to restrain its +citizens from engaging in this trade. In preventing it, however, +a belligerent warship may stop, visit, and search any merchant +vessel on the high seas. If examination of the ship's papers and +search show fraud, contraband cargo, offense in respect to blockade, +enemy ownership or service, the vessel may be taken as a prize, +subject to adjudication in the belligerent's prize courts. The +right of merchant vessels to carry defensive armament is well +established; but resistance justifies destruction. Under certain +circumstances prizes may be destroyed <a name="page_421"><span +class="page">Page 421</span></a> at sea, after removal of the ship's +papers and full provision for the safety of passengers and crew. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Declaration of London,[1] drawn up in 1909, was an attempt to +restate and secure general acceptance of these principles, with +notable modifications. Lists were drawn up of <i>absolute</i> contraband +(munitions, etc., adapted obviously if not exclusively for use in +war), <i>conditional</i> contraband (including foodstuffs, clothing, +rolling stock, etc., susceptible of use in war but having non-warlike +uses as well), and free goods (including raw cotton and wool, hides, +and ores). The most significant provision of the Declaration was +that the doctrine of <i>continuous voyage</i> should apply only to +absolute contraband. This doctrine, established by Great Britain +in the French wars and expanded by the United States in the American +Civil War, holds that the ultimate enemy destination of a cargo +determines its character, regardless of transshipment in a neutral +port and subsequent carriage by sea or land. The Declaration of +London was never ratified by Great Britain, and was observed for +only a brief period in the first months of the war. Had it been +ratified and observed, Germany would have been free to import all +necessary supplies, other than munitions, through neutral states +on her frontiers. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Printed in full in <span class="sc">International Law +Topics</span> of the U. S. Naval War College, 1910, p. 169 ff.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Blockade of Germany</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Unable to establish a close blockade, and not venturing at once to +advance the idea of a "long range" blockade, England was nevertheless +able to impose severe restrictions upon Germany by extending the +lists of contraband, applying the doctrine of continuous voyage +to both absolute and conditional contraband, and throwing upon the +owners of cargoes the burden of proof as to destination. Cotton +still for a time entered Germany, and some exports were permitted. +But on March 1, 1915, in retaliation for Germany's declaration +of a "war area" around the British Isles, Great Britain asserted +her purpose to establish what amounted to a complete embargo <a +name="page_422"><span class="page">Page 422</span></a> on German +trade, holding herself free, in the words of Premier Asquith, "to +detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy +destination, ownership, or origin." In a note of protest on March 30, +the United States virtually recognized the legitimacy of a long-range +blockade—an innovation of seemingly wide possibilities—and +confined its objections to British interference with lawful trade +between neutrals, amounting in effect to a blockade of neutral +ports. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a matter of fact, in spite of British efforts, there had been an +immense increase of indirect trade with Germany through neutrals. +While American exports to Germany in 1915 were $154,000,000 less +than in 1913, and in fact practically ceased altogether, American +exports to Holland and the Scandinavian states increased by +$158,000,000. This trade continued up to the time when the United +States entered the war, after which all the restrictions which +England had employed were given a sharper application. By a simple +process of substitution, European neutrals had been able to import +commodities for home use, and export their own products to Germany. +Now, in order to secure supplies at all, they were forced to sign +agreements which put them on rations and gave the Western Powers +complete control of their exports to Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The effect of the Allied blockade upon Germany is suggested by the +accompanying chart. In the later stages of the war it created a +dearth of important raw materials, crippled war industries, brought +the country to the verge of starvation, and caused a marked lowering +of national efficiency and morale. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Germany protested vigorously to the United States for allowing +her foodstuffs to be shut out of Germany while at the same time +shipping to England vast quantities of munitions. Throughout the +controversy, however, Great Britain profited by the fact that while +her methods caused only financial injury to neutrals, those employed +by Germany destroyed or imperiled human lives. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_423"><span class="page">Page 423</span></a> +<i>The Submarine Campaign</i> +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 556px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig084.png" width="556" height="375" alt="Fig. 84"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">From <i>The Blockade of Germany</i>, Alonzo + E. Taylor, <span class="sc">World's Work</span>, Oct. 1919.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">Decreased supply of commodities in successive + years of the war.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +The German submarine campaign may be dated from February 18, 1915, +when Germany, citing as a precedent Great Britain's establishment +of a military area in the North Sea, proclaimed a <i>war zone</i> +"in the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole +English Channel," within which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk +without assurance of safety to passengers or crew. Furthermore, as +a means of keeping neutrals out of British waters, Germany declared +she would assume no responsibility for destruction of neutral ships +within this zone. What this meant was to all intents and purposes a +"paper" submarine blockade of the British Isles. Its illegitimacy +arose from the fact that it was conducted surreptitiously over a +vast area, and was only in the slightest degree effective, causing a +destruction <a name="page_424"><span class="page">Page 424</span></a> +each month of less than one percent of the traffic. Had it been +restricted to narrow limits, it would have been still less effective, +owing to the facility of countermeasures in a small area. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Determined, however, upon a spectacular demonstration of its +possibilities, Germany first published danger notices in American +newspapers, and then, on May 7, 1915, sank the unarmed Cunard liner +<i>Lusitania</i> off the Irish coast, with a loss of 1198 lives, +including 102 Americans. In spite of divided American sentiment and +a strong desire for peace, this act came little short of bringing the +United States into the war. Having already declared its intention to +hold Germany to "strict accountability," the United States Government +now stated that a second offense would be regarded as "deliberately +unfriendly," and after a lengthy interchange of notes secured the +pledge that "liners will not be sunk without warning and without +safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do +not try to escape or offer resistance." Violations of this pledge, +further controversies, and increased friction with neutrals marked the +next year or more, during which, however, sinkings did not greatly +exceed the level of about 150,000 tons a month already attained. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During this period Allied countermeasures were chiefly of a defensive +character, including patrol of coastal areas, diversion of traffic +from customary routes, and arming of merchantmen. This last measure, +making surface approach and preliminary warning a highly dangerous +procedure for the submarine, led Germany to the announcement that, +after March 1, 1916, all armed merchant vessels would be torpedoed +without warning. But how were U-boat commanders to distinguish +between enemy and neutral vessels? Between vessels with or without +guns? The difficulty brings out clearly the fact that while the +submarines made good pirates, they were hampered in warfare on +legitimate lines. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Germany redoubled U-boat activities to lend strength to her peace +proposals at the close of 1916, and when these failed she decided +to disregard altogether the cobwebs of legalism that had hitherto +hindered her submarine war. On February <a name="page_425"><span +class="page">Page 425</span></a> 1, 1917, she declared unrestricted +warfare in an immense barred zone within limits extending from +the Dutch coast through the middle of the North Sea to the Faroe +Islands and thence west and south to Cape Finisterre, and including +also the entire Mediterranean east of Spain. An American ship was +to be allowed to enter and leave Falmauth once a week, and there +was a crooked lane leading to Greece. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 549px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig085.png" width="549" height="568" alt="Fig. 85"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">GERMAN BARRED ZONES</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">British mined area and North Sea mine + barrage.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +In thus announcing her intention to sink all ships on sight in +European waters, Germany burned her bridges behind her. She staked +everything on this move. Fully anticipating the <a name="page_426"><span +class="page">Page 426</span></a> hostility of the United States, +she hoped to win the war before that country could complete its +preparations and give effective support to the Allies. General +von Hindenburg's statement has already been quoted. It meant that +the army was to assume the defensive, while the navy carried out +its attack on Allied communications. Admiral von Capelle, head +of the German Admiralty, declared that America's aid would be +"absolutely negligible." "My personal view," he added, "is that +the U-boat will bring peace within six months." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As it turned out, Germany's disregard of neutral rights in 1917, +like the violation of Belgium in 1914, reacted upon her and proved +the salvation of the Western Powers. After the defection of Russia, +France was in imperative need of men. Great Britain needed ships. +Neither of these needs could have been supplied save by America's +throwing her utmost energies into active participation in the war. +This was precisely the result of the proclamation of Feb. 1, 1917. +The United States at once broke off diplomatic relations, armed +her merchant vessels in March, and on April 6 declared a state +of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Having traced the development of submarine warfare to this critical +period, we may now turn to the methods and weapons employed by +both sides at a time when victory or defeat hinged on the outcome +of the war at sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Germany's submarine construction and losses appear in the following +table from official German sources, the columns showing first the +total number built up to the date given, next the total losses to +date, and finally the remainder with which Germany started out +at the beginning of each year. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After 1916 Germany devoted the facilities of her shipyards entirely +to submarine construction, and demoralized the surface fleet to +secure personnel. Of the entire number built, not more than a score +were over 850 tons. The U C boats were small mine-layers about 160 +feet in length, with not more than two weeks' cruising period. +The U B'g were of various sizes, mostly small, and some of them +were built in sections for transportation by rail. The U boats +proper, which constituted the largest and most important class, had +a speed of <a name="page_427"><span class="page">Page 427</span></a> +about 16 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged, and could +remain at sea for a period of 5 or 6 weeks, the duration of the +cruise depending chiefly upon the supply of torpedoes. In addition +there were a half dozen large submarine merchantmen of the type +of the <i>Deutschland</i>, which made two voyages to America in +1916; and a similar number of big cruisers of 2000 tons or more +were completed in 1918, mounting two 6-inch guns and capable of +remaining at sea for several months. The 372 boats built totaled +209,000 tons and had a personnel of over 11,000 officers and men. +There were seldom more than 20 or 30 submarines in active operation +at one time. One third of the total number were always in port, +and the remainder in training. +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="left_btrb"> </td> + <td class="center_btrb">Boats built</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Losses</td> + <td class="center_btb">Remainder<br>(On Jan. 1 of year + following)</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right_br">End of 1914</td> + <td class="center_br">31</td> + <td class="center_br">5</td> + <td class="center">26</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right_br">1915</td> + <td class="center_br">93</td> + <td class="center_br">25</td> + <td class="center">68</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right_br">1916</td> + <td class="center_br">188</td> + <td class="center_br">50</td> + <td class="center">138</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right_br">1917</td> + <td class="center_br">291</td> + <td class="center_br">122</td> + <td class="center">169</td></tr> +<tr><td class="right_brb">1918</td> + <td class="center_brb">372</td> + <td class="center_brb">202</td> + <td class="center_bb">170</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +It is evident from her limited supply of submarines at the outbreak +of war that Germany did not contemplate their use as commerce +destroyers. To the Allied navies also, in spite of warnings from +a few more far-sighted officers, their use for this purpose came +as a complete surprise. New methods had to be devised, new weapons +invented, new types of ship built and old ones put to uses for +which they were not intended—in short, a whole new system +of warfare inaugurated amidst the preoccupations of war. As usual +in such circumstances, the navy taking the aggressive with a new +weapon gained a temporary ascendancy, until effective counter-measures +could be contrived. It is easy to say that all this should have +been foreseen and provided for, but it is a question to what <a +name="page_428"></a><a name="page_429"><span class="page">Page +429</span></a> extent preparations could profitably have been +made before Germany began her campaign. It has already been pointed +out in the chapter preceding that, had the German fleet been +destroyed at Jutland, subsequent operations on the German coast +might have made the submarine campaign impossible, and preparations +unnecessary. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 499px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig086.png" width="499" height="791" alt="Fig. 86"> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Anti-Submarine Tactics</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of the general categories of anti-submarine tactics,—detection, +evasion, and destruction—it was naturally those of evasion +that were first employed. Among these may be included suspension +of sailings upon warning of a submarine in the vicinity, diversion +of traffic from customary routes, camouflage, and zigzag courses +to prevent the enemy from securing favorable position and aim. +The first method was effective only at the expense of a severe +reduction of traffic, amounting in the critical months of 1917 +to 40 per cent of a total stoppage. The second sometimes actually +aided the submarine, for in confined areas such as the Mediterranean +it was likely to discover the new route and reap a rich harvest. +Camouflage was discarded as of slight value; but shifts of course were +employed to advantage by both merchant and naval vessels throughout +the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Methods of detection depended on both sight and sound. Efficient +lookout systems on shipboard, with men assigned to different sectors +so as to cover the entire horizon, made it possible frequently +to detect a periscope or torpedo wake in time to change course, +bring guns to bear, and escape destruction. According to a British +Admiralty estimate, in case a submarine were sighted the chances +of escape were seven to three, but otherwise only one to four. +Aircraft of all kinds proved of great value in detecting the presence +of U-boats, as well as in attacking them. Hydrophones and other +listening devices, though at first more highly perfected by the +enemy, were so developed during the war as to enable patrol vessels +to discover the presence and even determine the course and speed +of a submerged foe. Along with these devices, a system of <a +name="page_430"><span class="page">Page 430</span></a> information +was organized which, drawing information from a wide variety of +sources, enabled Allied authorities to trace the cruise of a U-boat, +anticipate its arrival in a given locality, and prophesy the duration +of its stay. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Among methods of destruction, the mounting of guns on merchantmen +was chiefly valuable, as already suggested, because of its effect +in forcing submarines to resort to illegal and barbarous methods +of warfare. Hitherto, submarines had been accustomed to operate an +the surface, board vessels, and sink them by bombs or gunfire. Visit +and search, essential in order to avoid injury to neutrals, was now +out of the question, for owing to the surface vulnerability of the +submarine it might be sent to the bottom by a single well-directed +shot. In brief, the guns on the merchant ship kept submarines beneath +the surface, forced them to draw upon their limited and costly +supply of torpedoes, and hindered them from securing good position +and aim for torpedo attack. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Much depended, of course, upon the range of the ship's guns and +the size and experience of the gun-crews. When the United States +began arming her ships in March, 1917, she was able to put enough +trained men aboard to maintain lookouts and man guns both night +and day. A dozen or more exciting duels ensued between ships and +U-boats before the latter learned that such encounters did not +repay the risks involved. On October 19, 1917, the steamer <i>J. +L. Luckenbach</i> had a four-hour running battle with a submarine +in which the ship fired 202 rounds and the pursuer 225. The latter +scored nine hits, but was at last driven off by the appearance of +a destroyer. To cite another typical engagement, the <i>Navajo</i>, +in the English Channel, July 4, 1917, was attacked first by torpedo +and then by gunfire. The 27th shot from the ship hit the enemy's +conning tower and caused two explosions. "Men who were on deck +at the guns and had not jumped overboard ran aft. The submarine +canted forward at an angle of almost 40 degrees, and the propeller +could be plainly seen lashing the air."[1] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: For more detailed narratives of this and other episodes +of the submarine campaign, see Ralph D. Payne, <span class="sc">The +Fighting Fleets</span>, 1918.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_431"><span class="page">Page 431</span></a> In coastal +waters where traffic converged, large forces of destroyers and +other craft were employed for purposes of escort, mine sweeping, +and patrol. Yet, save as a means of keeping the enemy under water +and guarding merchant ships, these units had only a limited value +owing to the difficulty of making contact with the enemy. During +the later stages of the war destroyers depended chiefly upon the +depth bomb, an invention of the British navy, which by means of +the so-called "Y guns" could be dropped in large numbers around +the supposed location of the enemy. It was in this way that the +United States Destroyers <i>Fanning</i> and <i>Nicholson</i>, while +engaged as convoy escorts, sank the <i>U-58</i> and captured its +crew. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The "mystery" or "Q" ships (well-armed vessels disguised as harmless +merchantmen) were of slight efficacy after submarines gave up surface +attack. In fact, it was the submarine itself which, contrary to all +pre-war theories, proved the most effective type of naval craft against +its own kind. Whereas fuel economy compelled German submarines to +spend as much time as possible on the surface, the Allied under-water +boats, operating near their bases, could cruise awash or submerged +and were thus able to creep up on the enemy and attack unawares. +According to Admiral Sims, Allied destroyers, about 500 in all, were +credited with the certain destruction of 34 enemy submarines; yachts, +patrol craft, etc., over 3000 altogether, sank 31; whereas about 100 +Allied submarines sank probably 20.[1] Since 202 submarines were +destroyed, this may be an underestimate of the results accomplished +by each type, but it indicates relative efficiency. Submarines +kept the enemy beneath the surface, led him to stay farther away +from the coast, and also, owing to the disastrous consequences +that might ensue from mistaken identity, prevented the U-boats +from operating in pairs. The chief danger encountered by Allied +submarines was from friendly surface vessels. On one occasion an +American submarine, the AL-10, approaching a destroyer of the same +service, was forced to dive and was then given a bombardment of +depth charges. This bent plates, extinguished lights, and brought +the submarine again to the <a name="page_432"><span class="page">Page +432</span></a> surface, where fortunately she was identified in the +nick of time. The two commanders had been roommates at Annapolis. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Victory at Sea</span>, <i>World's +Work</i>, May, 1920, p. 56.] +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Work of the United States Navy</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Having borne the brunt of the naval war for three years, the British +navy welcomed the reënforcements which the United States was +able to contribute, and shared to the utmost the experience already +gained. On May 3, 1917, the first squadron of 6 American destroyers +arrived at Queenstown, and was increased to 50 operating in European +waters in November, and 70 at the time of the armistice. A flotilla +of yachts, ill adapted as they were for such service, did hazardous +duty as escorts in the Bay of Biscay; and a score of submarines +crossed the Atlantic during the winter to operate off Ireland and +in the Azores. Five dreadnoughts under Admiral Rodman from the U. +S. Atlantic fleet became a part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Probably the most notable work of the American navy was in projects +where American manufacturing resources and experience in large-scale +undertakings could be brought to bear. In four months, from July +to November, 1917, the United States Navy constructed an oil pipe +line from the west to the east coast of Scotland, thus eliminating +the long and dangerous northern circuit. Five 14-inch naval guns, +on railway mountings, with a complete train of 16 cars for each gun, +were equipped by the navy, manned entirely with naval personnel, and +were in action in France from August, 1918, until the armistice, +firing a total of 782 rounds on the German lines of communication, +at ranges up to 30 miles. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The American proposal of a mine barrage across the entrance to the +North Sea from Scotland to Norway at first met with slight approval +abroad, so unprecedented was the problem of laying a mine-field 230 +miles in length, from 15 to 30 miles in width, and extending at +least 240 feet downward in waters the total depth of which was 400 +or more feet. Even the mine barrier at the Straits of Dover had +proved ineffective owing to heavy tides, currents, and bad bottom +conditions, <a name="page_433"><span class="page">Page 433</span></a> +until it was strengthened by Admiral Keyes in 1918. By employing a +large type of mine perfected by the United States Naval Bureau of +Ordnance, it was found possible, however, to reduce by one-third +the number of mines and the amount of wire needed for the North +Sea Barrage. The task was therefore undertaken, and completed in +the summer of 1918. Out of a total of 70,000 mines, 56,570, or +about 80 per cent, were planted by American vessels. The barrage +when completed gave an enemy submarine about one chance in ten of +getting through. According to reliable records, it accomplished +the destruction or serious injury of 17 German submarines, and by +its deterrent effect, must have practically closed the northern +exit to both under-water and surface craft. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 383px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig087.png" width="383" height="268" alt="Fig. 87"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the Channel exit of the North Sea, a vigorous blow at the German +submarine nests on the Belgian coast was finally struck on April +22-23, 1918, by the Dover Force under Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, +in one of the most brilliant naval operations of the war. Of the +two Belgian ports, Ostend and Zeebrugge, the latter was much more +useful to the Germans because better protected, less exposed to +batteries on the land front, and connected by a deeper canal with +the main base 8 miles distant at Bruges. It was planned, however, +to attack <a name="page_434"><span class="page">Page 434</span></a> +both ports, with the specific purpose of sinking 5 obsolete cruisers +laden with concrete across the entrances to the canals. The operation +required extensive reconstruction work on the vessels employed, a +thorough course of training for personnel, suitable conditions of +atmosphere, wind, and tide, and execution of complicated movements +in accordance with a time schedule worked out to the minute. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At Ostend the attack failed owing to a sudden shift of wind which +blew the smoke screen laid by motor boats back upon the two block +ships, and so confused their approach that they were stranded and +blown up west of the entrance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At Zeebrugge, two of the three block ships, the <i>Iphigenia</i> +and the <i>Intrepid</i>, got past the heavy guns on the mole, through +the protective nets, and into the canal, where they were sunk athwart +the channel by the explosion of mines laid all along their keels. To +facilitate their entrance, the cruiser <i>Vindictive</i> (Commander +Alfred Carpenter), fitted with a false deck and 18 brows or gangways +for landing forces, had been brought up 25 minutes earlier—to +be exact, at a minute past midnight—along the outer side of +the high mole or breakwater enclosing the harbor. Here, in spite of +a heavy swell and tide, she was held in position by the ex-ferryboat +<i>Daffodill</i>, while some 300 or 400 bluejackets and marines +swarmed ashore under a violent fire from batteries and machine +guns and did considerable injury to the works on the mole. Fifteen +minutes later, an old British submarine was run into a viaduct +connecting the mole with the shore and there blown up, breaking a +big gap in the viaduct. Strange to say, the <i>Vindictive</i> and +her auxiliaries, after lying more than an hour in this dangerous +position, succeeded in taking aboard all survivors from the landing +party and getting safely away. Motor launches also rescued the crews +of the blockships and the men—all of them wounded—from +the submarine. One British destroyer and two motor boats were sunk, +and the casualties were 176 killed, 412 wounded, and 49 missing. +For a considerable period thereafter, all the larger German torpedo +craft remained cooped up at Bruges, and the Zeebrugge blockships +still obstructed the channel at the end of the war. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 809px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig088.png" width="809" height="526" alt="Fig. 88"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND + BRITISH BLOCKSHIPS + <a name="page_435"><span class="page">Page 435</span></a> +</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="center"> +<a name="page_436"><span class="page">Page 436</span></a> +<i>The Convoy System</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of all the anti-submarine measures employed, prior to the North +Sea Barrage and the Zeebrugge attack, the adoption of the convoy +system was undoubtedly the most effective in checking the loss +of tonnage at the height of the submarine campaign. Familiar as +a means of commerce protection in previous naval wars, the late +adoption of the convoy system in the World War occasioned very +general surprise. It was felt by naval authorities, however, that +great delay would be incurred in assembling vessels, and in restricting +the speed of all ships of a convoy to that of the slowest unit. +Merchant captains believed themselves unequal to the task of keeping +station at night in close order, with all lights out and frequent +changes of course, and they thought that the resultant injuries +would be almost as great as from submarines. Furthermore, so long +as a large number of neutral vessels were at sea, it appeared a very +doubtful expedient to segregate merchant <a name="page_437"><span +class="page">Page 437</span></a> vessels of belligerent nationality +and thus distinguish them as legitimate prey. +</p> + +<table class="image" style="width: 605px;"> +<tr><td> + <img src="images/fig089.png" width="605" height="288" alt="Fig. 89"> +</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS + DESTROYED BY GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES</td></tr> +<tr><td class="center">(Figures in thousands of gross tons)</td></tr> +<tr><td class="indent">The accompanying chart shows the merchant +shipping captured or destroyed by Germany in the course of the war. +After 1914 the losses were inflicted almost entirely by submarines, +either by mine laying or by torpedoes. According to a British +Admiralty statement of Dec. 5, 1919, the total loss during the war +was 14,820,000 gross tons, of which 8,918,000 was British, and +5,918,000 was Allied or neutral. The United States lost 354,450 +tons. During the same period the world's ship construction amounted +to 10,850,000 tons, and enemy shipping captured and eventually put +into Allied service totalled 2,393,000 tons, so that the net loss +at the close of the war was about 1,600,000 tons.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +But in April, 1917, the situation was indeed desperate. The losses +had become so heavy that of every 100 ships leaving England it was +estimated that 25 never returned.[1] The American commander in +European waters, Admiral Sims, reports Admiral Jellicoe as saying at +this time, "They will win unless we can stop these losses—and +stop them soon."[2] Definitely adopted in May following, the convoy +system was in general operation before the end of the summer, with +a notable decline of sinkings in both the Mediterranean and the +Atlantic. The following table, based on figures from the Naval +Annual for 1919, indicates the number of vessels sunk for each +submarine destroyed. It shows the decreased effectiveness of submarine +operations after September 1, 1917, which is taken as the date +when the convoy system had come into full use, and brings out the +crescendo of losses in 1917. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: Brassey's <span class="sc">Naval Annual</span>, 1919.] +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 2: <i>World's Work</i>, Sept., 1919.] +</p> + +<table class="data"> +<tr><td class="left_btrb"> </td> + <td class="center_btrb">Vessels sunk<br>per<br>submarine<br>destroyed</td> + <td class="center_btrb">Total No. sunk</td> + <td class="center_btb"> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Aug. 1, 1914- Feb., 1915</td> + <td class="center_br">10.4</td> + <td class="center_br"> </td> + <td>69 ships sunk, almost entirely by surface cruisers.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Feb. 1, 1915- + Feb. 1, 1917</td> + <td class="center_br">48</td> + <td class="center_br">544<br>(two years)</td> + <td>Half by torpedo; 148 without warning; 3,066 lives + lost.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Feb. 1, 1917- + Sept. 1, 1917</td> + <td class="center_br">67</td> + <td class="center_br">736<br>(7 months)</td> + <td>572 by torpedo; 595 (69%) with out warning.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br">Sept. 1, 1917- + April 1, 1918</td> + <td class="center_br">20.2</td> + <td class="center_br">548<br>(7 months)</td> + <td>448 (82%) without warning.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td class="left_br"> </td> + <td> </td></tr> +<tr><td class="left_brb">April 1, 1918- + Nov. 1, 1918</td> + <td class="center_brb">12</td> + <td class="center_brb">252<br>(7 months)</td> + <td class="left_bb">239 (91%) without warning.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p class="indent"> +From July 26, 1917, to October 26, 1918, 90,000 vessels were convoyed, +with a total loss from the convoys of 436, or <a name="page_438"><span +class="page">Page 438</span></a> less than half of one per cent. +The convoy system forced submarines to expose themselves to the +attacks of destroyer escorts, or else to work close in shore to set +upon vessels after the dispersion of the convoy. But when working +close to the coast they were exposed to Allied patrols and submarines. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Testifying before a German investigation committee, Captain Bartenbach, +of the V-boat section of the German Admiralty, gave the chief perils +encountered by his boats as follows: (1) mines, (2) Allied submarines, +which "destroyed a whole series of our boats," (3) aircraft of all +types, (4) armed merchantmen, (5) hydrophones and listening devices. +Admiral Capelle in his testimony referred to the weakening of their +efforts due to "indifferent material and second-rate crews." +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Transport Work</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Dependent in large measure upon the anti-submarine campaign for +its safety and success, yet in itself an immense achievement, the +transport of over 2,000,000 American troops to France must be regarded +as one of the major naval operations of the war. Of these forces +48% were carried in British, and 43% in American transports. About +83% of the convoy work was under the protection of American naval +vessels. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The transportation work of the British navy, covering a longer +period, was, of course, on a far greater scale. Speaking in Parliament +on October 29, 1917, Premier Lloyd George indicated the extent of +this service as follows: "Since the beginning of the war the navy +has insured the safe transportation to the British and Allied armies +of 13,000,000 men, 12,000,000 horses, 25,000,000 tons of explosives +and supplies, and 51,000,000 tons of coal and oil. The loss of +men out of the whole 13,000,000 was 3500, of which only 2700 were +lost through the action of the enemy. Altogether 130,000,000 tons +have been transported by British ships." These figures, covering but +three years of the war, are of significance chiefly as indicating +the immense transportation problems of the British and Allied navies +and the use made of sea communications. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These three main Allied naval operations—the blockade of <a +name="page_439"><span class="page">Page 439</span></a> Germany, +the anti-submarine campaign, and the transportation of American +troops to France—were unquestionably decisive factors in +the war. Failure in any one of them would have meant victory for +Germany. The peace of Europe, it is true, could be achieved only by +overcoming Germany's military power on land. A breakdown there, with +German domination of the Continent, would have created a situation +which it is difficult to envisage, and which very probably would have +meant a peace of compromise and humiliation for England and America. +It is obvious, however, that, but for the blockade, Germany could +have prolonged the war; but for American reënforcements, France +would have been overrun; but for the conquest of the submarine, +Great Britain would have been forced to surrender. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the spring of 1918 Germany massed her troops on the western +front and began her final effort to break the Allied lines and +force a decision. With supreme command for the first time completely +centralized under Marshal Foch, and with the support of American +armies, the Allies were able to hold up the enemy drives, and on +July 18 begin the forward movement which pushed the Germans back +upon their frontiers. Yet when the armistice was signed on November +11, the German armies still maintained cohesion, with an unbroken +line on foreign soil. Surrender was made inevitable by internal +breakdown and revolution, the first open manifestations of which +appeared among the sailors of the idle High Seas Fleet at Kiel. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On November 21, 1918, this fleet, designed as the great instrument +for conquest of world empire, and in its prime perhaps as efficient +a war force as was ever set afloat, steamed silently through two +long lines of British and Allied battleships assembled off the +Firth of Forth, and the German flags at the mainmasts went down +at sunset for the last time. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +REFERENCES +</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Brassey's Naval Annual</span>, 1919.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">The Victory at Sea</span>, Vice-Admiral W. S. Sims, + U. S. N., 1920.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Annual Report</span> of the U. S Secretary of the + Navy, 1918</p> + +<p class="list"> +<a name="page_440"><span class="page">Page 440</span></a> +<span class="sc">The Dover Patrol</span>, 1915-1917, Admiral Sir + Reginald Bacon, R. N., 1919.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Zeebrugge and Ostend Dispatches</span>, ed. by C. + Sanford Terry, 1919.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">Laying the North Sea Mine Barrage</span>, Captain + R. R. Belknap, U. S. N., U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, + Jan.-Feb., 1920.</p> + +<p class="list"> +<span class="sc">American Submarine Operations in the World + War</span>, by Prof. C. S. Alden, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. + June-July, 1920.</p> + +<p class="list"> +For more popular treatment see also <span class="sc">Submarine and + Anti-Submarine</span>, Sir Henry Newbolt, 1919; <span class="sc">The + Fighting Fleets</span>, Ralph D. Payne, 1918; <span class="sc">The + U-Boat Hunters</span>, James B. Connolly, 1918; <span class="sc">Sea + Warfare</span>, Rudyard Kipling, 1917; etc.</p> + +<h2><a name="page_441"><span class="page">Page 441</span></a> +CHAPTER XIX</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +CONCLUSION +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The brief survey of sea power in the preceding chapters has shown +that the ocean has been the highway for the march of civilization and +empire. Crete in its day became a great island power and distributed +throughout the Mediterranean the wealth and the arts of its own +culture and that of Egypt. In turn, Phœnicia held sway on the inland +sea, and though creating little, she seized upon and developed the +material and intellectual resources of her neighbors, and carried +them not only to the corners of the Mediterranean, but far out +on the unknown sea. Later when Phœnicia was subject to Persia, +Athens by her triremes saved the growing civilization of Greece, +and during a brief period of glory planted the seeds of Greek, +as opposed to Asiatic culture, on the islands and coasts of the +Ægean. After Athens, Carthage inherited the trident, and +in turn fell before the energy of a land power, Rome. And as the +Roman Empire grew to include practically all of the known world, +every waterway, river and ocean, served to spread Roman law, +engineering, and ideals of practical efficiency, at the same time +bringing back to the heart of the Empire not only the products of +the colonies, but such impalpable treasures as the art, literature, +and philosophy of Greece. This was the story of the sea in antiquity. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the dissolution of the Roman empire, as Christian peoples +were struggling in blood and darkness, a great menace came from +Arabia, the Saracen invasion, which was checked successfully and +repeatedly by the navy of Constantinople. To this, primarily, is due +the preservation of the Christian ideal in the world. Later, the cities +of Italy began to reëstablish sea commerce, which had been for +centuries interrupted by <a name="page_442"><span class="page">Page +442</span></a> pirates. Venice gained the ascendancy, and Venetian +ships carried the Crusading armies during the centuries when western +peoples went eastward to fight for the Cross and brought back new +ideas they had learned from the Infidels. Then there arose a new +Mohammedan threat, the Turk, determined like the earlier Saracen +to conquer the world for the Crescent. Constantinople, betrayed by +Christian nations, fell, Christian peoples of the Levant were made +subject to the Turk, and thereafter till our day the Ægean +was a Turkish lake. About the same time a new Mohammedan sea power +arose in the Moors of the African coast, and for a century and more +the Mediterranean was a no-man's land between the rival peoples +and the rival religions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile the trade with the East by caravan routes to the Arabian +Gulf had been stopped by the presence of the Turk. To reach the +old markets, therefore, new routes had to be found and there came +the great era of discovery. The new world was only an accidental +discovery in a search for the westward route to Asia. The claims of +Spain to this new region called forth her fleets of trading ships. +But the lure of the West attracted the energies of the English +also, and England and Spain clashed. As Spain became more and more +dependent on her western colonies for income, and yet failed to +establish her ascendancy over the Atlantic routes, she declined +in favor of her enemies, England and Holland. The latter country, +being dependent on the sea for sustenance, early captured a large +part of the world's carrying trade, especially in the Mediterranean +and the East. Her rich profits excited the envy and rivalry of the +English, and in consequence, after three hard-fought naval wars, +the scepter of the sea passed to England. The subsequent wars between +England and France served only to strengthen England's control of +trade routes and extend her colonial possessions; with one notable +exception, when France, denying to her rival the control of the sea +at a critical juncture in the American Revolution, deprived her +of her richest and most extensive colony. It was primarily England +with her navy that broke the power of Napoleon in the subsequent +conflict, and throughout a century <a name="page_443"><span +class="page">Page 443</span></a> of peace the spread of English +speech and institutions has extended to the uttermost parts of +the world. One power in our day challenged Britain's control of +the sea—now even more essential to her security than it was +in the 17th century to that of Holland—and the World War +was the consequence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In all this story it is interesting to note that insularity in +position is the reverse of insularity in fact. Crete touched the +far shores of the Mediterranean because she was an island and her +people were forced upon the sea. Similarly, Phœnicia, driven to +sea by mountains and desert at her back, spread her sails beyond +the Pillars of Hercules. And England, hemmed in by the Atlantic, +has carried her goods and her language to every nook and cranny of +the earth. Thus the ocean has served less to separate than to bring +together. As a common highway it has not only excited quarrels, but +established common interests between nations. Special agreements +governing the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, navigation +regulations and the like, have long since brought nations together in +peace on a common ground. It has also gone far to create international +law for the problems of war. Rules governing blockade, contraband, +and neutral rights have been agreed upon long since. But, as every +war has proved, international law has needed a higher authority to +enforce its rules in the teeth of a powerful belligerent. To remedy +this defect is one of the purposes of a League of Nations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Such has been the significance of the sea. The nations who have +used it have made history and have laid the rest of the world under +their dominion intellectually, commercially, and politically. Indeed, +the story of the sea is the history of civilization. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the conclusion of this survey, it is appropriate to pause and +summarize what is meant by the term "sea power." It is a catch +phrase, made famous by Mahan and glibly used ever since. What does +sea power mean? What are its elements? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Obviously it means, in brief, a nation's ability to enforce its will +upon the sea. This means a navy superior to those of its enemies. +But it means also strategic bases equipped for supplying a fleet for +battle or offering refuge in defeat. To these <a name="page_444"><span +class="page">Page 444</span></a> bases there must run lines of +communication guarded from interruption by the enemy. Imagine, for +instance, the Suez or the Panama Canal held by a hostile force, +or a battlefleet cut off from its fuel supply of coal or oil. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The relation of shipping to sea power is not what it was in earlier +days. Merchantmen are indeed still useful in war for transport +and auxiliary service, but it is no longer true that men in the +merchant service are trained for man-of-war service. The difference +between them has widened as the battleship of to-day differs from +a merchantman of to-day. Nor can a merchantship be transformed +into a cruiser, as in the American navy of a hundred years ago. +The place of shipping in sea power is therefore subsidiary. In +fact, unless a nation can control the sea, the amount of its wealth +dispersed in merchantmen is just so much loss in time of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The major element in sea power is the fleet, but possession of +the largest navy is no guarantee of victory or even of control +of the sea. Size is important, but it is an interesting fact that +most of the great victories in naval history have been won by a +smaller fleet over a larger. The effectiveness of a great navy +depends first on its quality, secondly, on how it is handled, and +thirdly, on its power of reaching the enemy's communications. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The quality of a navy is two-fold, material and personal. In material, +the great problem of modern days is to keep abreast of the time. The +danger to a navy lies in conservatism and bureaucratic control. There +is always the chance that a weaker power may defeat the stronger, not +by using the old weapons, but by devising some new weapon that will +render the old ones obsolete. The trouble with the professional man +in any walk of life has always been that he sticks to the traditional +ways. In consequence he lays himself open to the amateur, who, +caring nothing about tradition, beats him with something novel. +The inventions that have revolutionized naval warfare have come +from men outside the naval profession. Thus the Romans, unable to +match the Carthaginians in seamanship, made that seamanship of no +value by their invention of the corvus. Greek fire not only saved +the insignificant fleets of the Eastern <a name="page_445"><span +class="page">Page 445</span></a> Empire, but annihilated the huge +armadas of Saracen and Slav. If the South in our Civil War had +possessed the necessary resources, her ironclad rams would have +made an end of the Union navy and of the war. In our own time the +German submarine came within an ace of winning the war despite +all the Allied dreadnoughts, because its potentialities had not +been realized and no counter measures devised. A navy that drops +behind is lost. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The personal side is a matter of training and morale. The material +part is of no value unless it is operated by skill and by the will +to win. Slackness or inexperience or lack of heart in officers +or men—any of these may bring ruin. Napoleon once spoke of +the Russian army as brave, but as "an army without a soul." A navy +must have a soul. Unfortunately, the tendency in recent years has +been to emphasize the material and the mechanical at the expense of +the intellectual and spiritual. With all the enormous development +of the ships and weapons, it must be remembered that the man is, +and always will be, greater than the machine. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As to handling the navy, first of all the War Staff and the commander +in chief must solve the strategic problem correctly. The fate of +the Spanish Armada in the 16th Century and that of the Russian +navy at the beginning of the 20th are eloquent of the effect of +bad strategy on a powerful fleet. Secondly, the commander in chief +must be possessed of the right fighting doctrine—the spirit +of the offensive. In all ages the naval commander who sought to +achieve his purpose by avoiding battle went to disaster. The true +objective must be, now as always, <i>the destruction of the enemy's +fleet</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Such are the material and the spiritual essentials of sea power. +The phrase has become so popular that a superior fleet has been +widely accepted as a talisman in war. The idea is that a nation +with sea power must win. But with all the tremendous "influence of +sea power on history," the student must not be misled into thinking +that sea power is invincible. The Athenian navy went to ruin under +the catapults of Syracuse whose navy was insignificant. Carthage, +the sea power, succumbed to a land power, Rome. In modern times +France, <a name="page_446"><span class="page">Page 446</span></a> +with a navy second to England's, fell in ruin before Prussia, which +had practically no navy at all. And in the World War it required +the entry of a new ally, the United States, to save the Entente +from defeat at the hands of land power, despite an overwhelming +superiority on the sea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The significance of sea power is <i>communications</i>. Just so +far as sea control affects lines of communications vital to either +belligerent, so far does it affect the war. To a sea empire like +the British, sea control is essential as a measure of defense. +If an enemy controls the sea the empire will fall apart like a +house of cards, and the British Isles will be speedily starved +into submission. It is another thing, however, to make the navy +a sword as well as a shield. Whenever the British navy could cut +the communications of the enemy, as in the case of the wars with +Spain and Holland, it was terribly effective. When it fought a +nation like Russia in the Crimean War, it hardly touched the sources +of Russian supplies, because these came by the interior land +communications. So also the French navy in 1870 could not touch +a single important line of German communications and its effect +therefore was negligible. If in 1914 Russia, for example, had been +neutral, no Allied naval superiority could have saved France from +destruction by the combined armies of Germany and Austria, just +as the Grand Fleet was powerless to check the conquest or deny +the possession of Belgium. It must be borne in mind that a land +power has the advantages of central position and interior lines, and +the interior lines of to-day are those of rail and motor transport, +offering facilities for a rapid concentration on any front. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of course, modern life and modern warfare are so complex that few +nations are able to live and wage war entirely on their own resources; +important communications extend across the sea. In this respect +the United States is singularly fortunate. With the exception of +rubber, every essential is produced in our country, and the sea +power that would attempt to strangle the United States by a blockade +on two coasts would find it unprofitable even if it were practicable. +A hostile navy would have to land armies to strike directly at +the manufacturing <a name="page_447"><span class="page">Page +447</span></a> cities near the seaboard in order to affect our +communications. In brief, sea power is decisive just so far as it +cuts the enemy's communications. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Finally in considering sea power we should note the importance +of coördinating naval policies with national. The character +of a navy and the size of a navy depend on what policy a nation +expects to stand for. It is the business of a navy to stand behind +a nation's will. For Great Britain, circumstances of position have +long made her policy consistent, without regard to change of party. +She had to dominate the sea to insure the safety of the empire. With +the United States, the situation has been different. The nation has +not been conscious of any foreign policy, with the single exception +of the Monroe Doctrine. And even this has changed in character +since it was first enunciated. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the present day, for example, how far does the United States +purpose to go in the Monroe Doctrine? Shall we attempt to police +the smaller South and Central American nations? Shall we make the +Caribbean an area under our naval control? What is to be our policy +toward Mexico? How far are we willing to go to sustain the Open Door +policy in the Far East? Are we determined to resist the immigration +of Asiatics? Are we bound to hold against conquest our outlying +possessions,—the Philippines, Guam, Hawaiian Islands, and +Alaska? Shall we play a "lone hand" among nations, or join an +international league? Until there is some answer to these questions +of foreign policy, our naval program is based on nothing definite. In +short, the naval policy of a nation should spring from its national +policy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On that national policy must be based not only the types of ships +built and their numbers, but also the number and locale of the +naval bases and the entire strategic plan. In the past there has +been too little mutual understanding between the American navy +and the American people. The navy—the Service, as it is +appropriately called—is the trained servant of the republic. +It is only fair to ask that the republic make clear what it expects +that servant to do. But before a national policy is accepted, it must +be thought out to its logical conclusion <a name="page_448"><span +class="page">Page 448</span></a> by both the popular leaders and +naval advisers. As Mahan has said, "the naval officer must be a +statesman as well as a seaman." Is the policy accepted going to +conflict with that of another nation; if so, are we prepared to +accept the consequences? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The recent history of Germany is a striking example of the effect +of a naval policy on international relations. The closing decade +of the 19th century found Great Britain still following the policy +of "splendid isolation," with France and Russia her traditional +enemies. Her relations with Germany were friendly, as they always +had been. At the close of the century, the Kaiser, inspired by Mahan's +"<i>Influence of Sea Power on History,</i>" launched the policy of +a big navy. First, he argued, German commerce was growing with +astonishing rapidity. It was necessary, according to Mahan, to have a +strong navy to protect a great carrying trade. This von Tirpitz[1] +emphasizes, though he never makes clear just what precise danger +threatened the German trading fleets, provided Germany maintained a +policy of friendly relations with England. Secondly, Germany found +herself with no outlet for expansion. The best colonial fields had +already been appropriated by other countries, chiefly England. To +back up German claims to new territory or trading concessions, it +was necessary to have a strong navy. All this was strictly by the +book, and it is characteristic of the German mind that it faithfully +followed the text. "<i>Unsere Zukunft</i>," cried the Kaiser, "<i>liegt +auf dem Wasser!</i>" But what was implied in this proposal? A great +navy increasing rapidly to the point of rivaling that of England +could be regarded by that country only as a pistol leveled at her +head. England would be at the mercy of any power that could defeat +her navy. And this policy coupled with the demand for "a place in +the sun," threatened the rich colonies that lay under the British +flag. It could not be taken otherwise. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">My Memoirs</span>, Chap. xv and +<i>passim.</i>] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These implications began to bear fruit after their kind. In the +place of friendliness on the part of the English,—a friendliness +uninterrupted by war, and based on the blood of their royal family +and the comradeship in arms against <a name="page_449"><span +class="page">Page 449</span></a> France in the days of Louis XIV, +Frederick the Great, and Napoleon—there developed a growing +hostility. In vain missions were sent by the British Government +to promote a better understanding, for the Germans declined to +accept either a "naval holiday" or a position of perpetual naval +inferiority. In consequence, England abandoned her policy of isolation, +and came to an understanding with her ancient enemies, Russia and +France. Thus Germany arrayed against herself all the resources of +the British Empire and in this act signed her own death warrant. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A final word as to the future of sea power. The influence of modern +inventions is bound to affect the significance of the sea in the +future. Oceans have practically dwindled away as national barriers. +Wireless and the speed of the modern steamship have reduced the +oceans to ponds. "Splendid isolation" is now impossible. Modern +artillery placed at Calais, for instance, could shell London and +cover the transportation of troops in the teeth of a fleet. Aircraft +cross land and sea with equal ease. The submersible has come to +stay. Indeed, it looks as if the navy of the future will tend first +to the submersible types and later abandon the sea for the air, +and the "illimitable pathways of the sea" will yield to still more +illimitable pathways of the sky. The consequence is bound to be a +closer knitting of the peoples of the world through the conquering +of distance by time. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This bringing together breeds war quite as easily as peace, and +the progress of invention makes wars more frightful. The closely +knit economic structure of Europe did not prevent the greatest +war in history and there is little hope for the idea that wars +can never occur again. The older causes of war lay in pressure +of population, the temptation of better lands, racial hatreds or +ambitions, religious fanaticism, dynastic aims, and imperialism. +Some of these remain. The chief modern source of trouble is trade +rivalry, with which imperialism is closely interwoven and trade +rivalry makes enemies of old friends. There is, therefore, a place +for navies still. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At present there are two great naval powers, Great Britain and +the United States. A race in naval armaments between <a +name="page_450"><span class="page">Page 450</span></a> the two +would be criminal folly, and could lead to only one disastrous +end. The immediate way toward guaranteeing freedom of the seas is +a closer entente between the two English-speaking peoples, whose +common ground extends beyond their speech to institutions and ideals +of justice and liberty. The fine spirit of cöoperation produced +by the World War should be perpetuated in peace for the purpose +of maintaining peace. In his memoirs van Tirpitz mourns the fact +that now "Anglo-Saxondom" controls the world. There is small danger +that where public opinion rules, the two peoples will loot the world +to their own advantage. On the other hand, there is every prospect +that, for the immediate future, sea power in their hands can be made +the most potent influence toward peace, and the preservation of +that inheritance of civilization which has been slowly accumulated +and spread throughout the world by those peoples of every age who +have been the pathfinders on the seas. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_451"><span class="page">Page 451</span></a> +INDEX</h2> + +<p class="center">A.</p> + +<p class="index">Abercromby, British general, +<a href="#page_226">226</a>, <a href="#page_252">252</a></p> + +<p class="index">Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy, British cruisers, loss +of, <a href="#page_355">355</a></p> + +<p class="index">Aboukir Bay, battle of, <i>see</i> Nile</p> + +<p class="index">Actium, campaign of, <a href="#page_61">61-64</a>; +battle of, <a href="#page_64">64-69</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ægospotami, battle of, <a href="#page_24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_47">47</a></p> + +<p class="index">Agrippa, Roman admiral, <a href="#page_62">62-66</a></p> + +<p class="index">Aircraft, in World War, <a href="#page_411">411</a>, +<a href="#page_429">429</a>, <a href="#page_449">449</a></p> + +<p class="index">Albuquerque, Portuguese viceroy, +<a href="#page_118">118</a></p> + +<p class="index">Alfred, king of England, <a href="#page_71">71</a>, +<a href="#page_130">130</a>, <a href="#page_145">145</a></p> + +<p class="index">Algeciras Convention, <a href="#page_347">347</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ali Pasha, Turkish admiral, <a href="#page_104">104</a>, +<a href="#page_105">105</a>, <a href="#page_107">107</a></p> + +<p class="index">Allemand, French admiral, +<a href="#page_224">224</a></p> + +<p class="index">Almeida, Portuguese leader, +<a href="#page_117">117-118</a></p> + +<p class="index">Amboyna, <a href="#page_143">143</a>, +<a href="#page_170">170</a></p> + +<p class="index">Amiens, treaty of, <a href="#page_227">227</a>, +<a href="#page_259">259</a>, <a href="#page_261">261</a></p> + +<p class="index">Amsterdam, <a href="#page_119">119</a>, +<a href="#page_133">133</a>, <a href="#page_141">141</a>, +<a href="#page_142">142</a></p> + +<p class="index">Anthony, Roman general, at Actium, +<a href="#page_61">61-68</a></p> + +<p class="index">Antwerp, <a href="#page_119">119</a>, +<a href="#page_133">133</a>, <a href="#page_140">140</a></p> + +<p class="index">Arabs, at war with Eastern Empire, +<a href="#page_72">72-83</a>, <a href="#page_441">441-442</a>; +as traders, <a href="#page_83">83</a>; ships of, +<a href="#page_117">117</a></p> + +<p class="index">Arbuthnot, British admiral, +<a href="#page_388">388</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ariabignes, Persian admiral, <a href="#page_33">33</a>, +<a href="#page_36">36</a></p> + +<p class="index">Aristides, <a href="#page_36">36</a></p> + +<p class="index">Armada, <i>see</i> Spanish Armada</p> + +<p class="index">Armed Neutrality, league of, +<a href="#page_253">253</a></p> + +<p class="index">Armor, <a href="#page_289">289</a>, +<a href="#page_296">296</a></p> + +<p class="index">Armstrong, Sir William, <a href="#page_289">289</a></p> + +<p class="index">Athens, <i>see</i> Greece</p> + +<p class="index"><i>Audacious</i>, British ship, +<a href="#page_355">355</a></p> + +<p class="index">August 10, battle of, <a href="#page_334">334</a></p> + +<p class="index">Austerlitz battle of, <a href="#page_279">279</a></p> + +<p class="index">Austria, in Napoleonic Wars, +<a href="#page_232">232</a>, <a href="#page_244">244</a>, +<a href="#page_253">253</a>, <a href="#page_279">279</a>; at war +with Italy, <a href="#page_296">296-303</a>; in Triple Alliance, +<a href="#page_345">345</a>; in World War, +<a href="#page_351">351</a></p> + + +<p class="center">B.</p> + +<p class="index">Bacon, Roger, <a href="#page_111">111</a>, +<a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_121">121</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bagdad Railway, <a href="#page_346">346</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bantry Bay, action in, <a href="#page_194">194</a>; +attempted landing in, <a href="#page_233">233</a></p> + +<p class="index">Barbarigo, Venetian admiral, +<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_104">104-105</a></p> + +<p class="index">Barbarossa, Turkish admiral, +<a href="#page_90">90-92</a>, <a href="#page_95">95-97</a></p> + +<p class="index">Barham, First Lord of Admiralty, +<a href="#page_266">266</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bart, Jean, French naval leader, +<a href="#page_195">195</a></p> + +<p class="index">Battle cruiser, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p> + +<p class="index">Beachy Head, battle of, <a href="#page_194">194</a></p> + +<p class="index">Beatty, British admiral, at Heligoland Bight, +<a href="#page_352">352-354</a>; at Dogger Bank, +<a href="#page_370">370-373</a>; at Jutland, +<a href="#page_389">389-408</a>, <a href="#page_413">413</a>, +<a href="#page_415">415</a></p> + +<p class="index">Berlin Decree, <a href="#page_279">279</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bismarck, <a href="#page_297">297</a>, +<a href="#page_345">345</a></p> + +<p class="index">Blake, British admiral, <a href="#page_169">169</a>, +<a href="#page_171">171-182</a>, <a href="#page_194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_414">414</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p> + +<p class="index">Blockade, in American Civil War, +<a href="#page_290">290</a>; in World War, +<a href="#page_419">419-424</a>, <a href="#page_439">439</a></p> + +<p class="index">Boisot, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_139">139</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bonaparte, <i>see</i> Napoleon</p> + +<p class="index">Bossu, Spanish admiral, +<a href="#page_138">138-139</a></p> + +<p class="index">Boxer Rebellion, <a href="#page_329">329-330</a></p> + +<p class="index">Boyne, battle of, <a href="#page_194">194</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bragadino, Venetian general, +<a href="#page_100">100</a></p> + +<p class="index">Breda, peace of, <a href="#page_188">188</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bridport, British admiral, <a href="#page_232">232</a>, +<a href="#page_233">233</a>, <a href="#page_234">234</a></p> + +<p class="index">Brill, capture of, <a href="#page_138">138</a></p> + +<p class="index">Brueys, French admiral, <a href="#page_224">224</a>, +<a href="#page_248">248</a>, <a href="#page_250">250</a></p> + +<p class="index">Burney, British admiral, <a href="#page_401">401</a>, +<a href="#page_415">415</a></p> + +<p class="index">Bushnell, David, <a href="#page_293">293-294</a></p> + + +<p class="center">C.</p> + +<p class="index">Cabot, John, <a href="#page_121">121</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cadiz, founded, <a href="#page_17">17</a>; British +expeditions to, <a href="#page_155">155</a>, +<a href="#page_165">165</a>, <a href="#page_168">168</a>; blockaded +<a name="page_452"><span class="page">Page 452</span></a> by Blake, +<a href="#page_181">181</a>; blockaded by Jervis, +<a href="#page_244">244</a>; Allied fleet in, +<a href="#page_270">270</a>, <a href="#page_274">274</a>, +<a href="#page_277">277</a></p> + +<p class="index">Calder, British admiral, <a href="#page_243">243</a>; +in action with Villeneuve, <a href="#page_266">266</a>, +<a href="#page_267">267-269</a>, <a href="#page_270">270</a></p> + +<p class="index">Camara, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_319">319</a></p> + +<p class="index">Camperdown, battle of, <a href="#page_223">223</a>, +<a href="#page_234">234-237</a></p> + +<p class="index">Canidius, Roman general, <a href="#page_67">67</a></p> + +<p class="index">Carden, British admiral, +<a href="#page_375">375-379</a></p> + +<p class="index">Carpenter, Alfred, British commander, +<a href="#page_434">434</a></p> + +<p class="index">Carthage, founded, <a href="#page_18">18</a>; at war +with Greece, <a href="#page_20">20</a>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>; in +Punic Wars, <a href="#page_49">49-60</a>, <a href="#page_76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_441">441</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cervantes, <a href="#page_102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_119">119</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cervera, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_315">315</a>; +in Santiago campaign, <a href="#page_321">321-326</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ceylon, <a href="#page_83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_226">226</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a></p> + +<p class="index">Champlain, battle of Lake, +<a href="#page_284">284</a></p> + +<p class="index">Charlemagne, <a href="#page_85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_130">130</a></p> + +<p class="index">Charles II of England, <a href="#page_183">183</a>, +<a href="#page_188">188</a>, <a href="#page_189">189</a></p> + +<p class="index">Charles V of Spain, <a href="#page_91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_92">92</a>, <a href="#page_126">126</a>, +<a href="#page_127">127</a>, <a href="#page_134">134</a></p> + +<p class="index">Charleston, attack on, <a href="#page_69">69</a></p> + +<p class="index">Chatham, raided by Dutch, +<a href="#page_188">188</a></p> + +<p class="index">Chauncey, U. S. commodore, +<a href="#page_283">283</a></p> + +<p class="index">China, in ancient times, <a href="#page_25">25</a>; +first ships to, <a href="#page_118">118</a>; at war with Japan, +<a href="#page_304">304-310</a>; in disruption, +<a href="#page_328">328-329</a></p> + +<p class="index">Chios, battle of, <a href="#page_286">286</a></p> + +<p class="index">Churchill, Winston, <a href="#page_375">375-378</a>, +<a href="#page_381">381</a>, <a href="#page_383">383</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cinque Ports, <a href="#page_145">145</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, in Actium campaign, +<a href="#page_61">61</a>, <a href="#page_63">63-68</a></p> + +<p class="index">Clerk, John, <a href="#page_203">203</a>, +<a href="#page_204">204</a></p> + +<p class="index">Collingwood, British admiral, +<a href="#page_239">239</a>, <a href="#page_243">243</a>; at Trafalgar, +<a href="#page_272">272</a>, <a href="#page_274">274-277</a></p> + +<p class="index">Colonna, admiral of Papal States, +<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_105">105</a></p> + +<p class="index">Colport, British admiral, +<a href="#page_233">233</a></p> + +<p class="index">Columbus, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_120">120</a>, <a href="#page_121">121</a>; voyages +of, <a href="#page_122">122-125</a></p> + +<p class="index">Commerce, of Phœnicians, <a href="#page_16">16-19</a>; +under Roman Empire, <a href="#page_70">70</a>; with the East, +<a href="#page_110">110</a>, <a href="#page_113">113-118</a>; in +northern Europe, <a href="#page_131">131-132</a>; in modern times, +<a href="#page_312">312-313</a></p> + +<p class="index">Commerce Warfare, in Dutch War of Independence, +<a href="#page_137">137-138</a>; in Napoleonic Wars, +<a href="#page_259">259-260</a>; in War of 1812, +<a href="#page_281">281</a>, <a href="#page_284">284</a>; in World +War, <a href="#page_369">369</a>, <a href="#page_419">419-440</a></p> + +<p class="index">Communications, in warfare, +<a href="#page_446">446</a></p> + +<p class="index">Compass, introduction of, +<a href="#page_111">111</a></p> + +<p class="index">Condalmiero, Venetian admiral, +<a href="#page_93">93</a>, <a href="#page_96">96</a></p> + +<p class="index">Conflans, French admiral, <a href="#page_197">197</a>, +<a href="#page_198">198</a>, <a href="#page_199">199</a></p> + +<p class="index">Constantinople, founded, <a href="#page_71">71</a>; +attacked by Arabs, <a href="#page_72">72-83</a>; attacked by Russians, +<a href="#page_83">83-84</a>; sacked by Crusaders, +<a href="#page_85">85</a>; captured by Turks, <a href="#page_86">86</a>, +<a href="#page_89">89</a>, <a href="#page_110">110</a>; in World +War, <a href="#page_375">375</a>, <a href="#page_381">381-382</a>, +<a href="#page_384">384</a>; <a href="#page_441">441</a>, +<a href="#page_442">442</a></p> + +<p class="index">Continental System, <a href="#page_279">279-280</a>, +<a href="#page_285">285</a></p> + +<p class="index">Continuous Voyage, doctrine of, +<a href="#page_290">290</a>, <a href="#page_420">420-421</a></p> + +<p class="index">Contraband, <a href="#page_253">253</a></p> + +<p class="index">Convoy, System in World War, +<a href="#page_436">436-438</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cook, Captain James, <a href="#page_219">219-220</a></p> + +<p class="index">Copenhagen, battle of, <a href="#page_223">223</a>, +<a href="#page_236">236</a>, <a href="#page_252">252-259</a></p> + +<p class="index">Corinthian Gulf, battle of, <a href="#page_35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_40">40-43</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cornwallis, British admiral, +<a href="#page_263">263</a>, <a href="#page_265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_267">267</a>, <a href="#page_270">270</a></p> + +<p class="index">Coronel, battle of, <a href="#page_359">359-361</a></p> + +<p class="index">Corsica, <a href="#page_17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_238">238</a></p> + +<p class="index">Corunna, Armada sails from, <a href="#page_158">158</a>; +attacked by Drake, <a href="#page_165">165</a>; Allied fleet in, +<a href="#page_269">269</a></p> + +<p class="index">Corvi, <a href="#page_52">52</a>, +<a href="#page_55">55</a>, <a href="#page_444">444</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cradock, British admiral, at Coronel, +<a href="#page_358">358-361</a></p> + +<p class="index">Crete, <a href="#page_15">15-16</a>, +<a href="#page_25">25</a>, <a href="#page_26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_43">43</a>, <a href="#page_247">247</a>, +<a href="#page_442">442</a>, <a href="#page_443">443</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cromwell, Oliver, <a href="#page_170">170</a>, +<a href="#page_181">181</a>, <a href="#page_182">182</a></p> + +<p class="index">Custozza, battle of, <a href="#page_297">297</a>, +<a href="#page_298">298</a></p> + +<p class="index">Cyprus, <a href="#page_88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_99">99</a>.</p> + + +<p class="center">D.</p> + +<p class="index">Da Gama, Vasco, <a href="#page_114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_116">116-117</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dardanelles, German squadron enters, +<a href="#page_356">356-357</a>; campaign of, +<a href="#page_374">374-385</a></p> + +<p class="index">Darius, king of Persia, <a href="#page_21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_27">27</a>, <a href="#page_28">28</a></p> + +<p class="index">De Grasse, French admiral, at Virginia Capes, +<a href="#page_207">207-211</a>; at Saints'</p> <p class="index">Passage, +<a href="#page_212">212-215</a></p> + +<p class="index">De Guichen, French admiral, <a href="#page_203">203</a>, +<a href="#page_204">204</a></p> + +<p class="index">Denmark, in Copenhagen campaign, +<a href="#page_252">252-259</a></p> + +<p class="index">De Ruyter, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_173">173</a>, +<a href="#page_175">175</a>, <a href="#page_179">179</a>, +<a href="#page_182">182</a>, <a href="#page_184">184-190</a>, +<a href="#page_194">194</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p> + +<p class="index">D'Estaing, French admiral, +<a href="#page_202">202-203</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a></p> + +<p class="index">Destroyer, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p> + +<p class="index">Dewa, Japanese admiral, <a href="#page_339">339</a>, +<a href="#page_341">341</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dewey, U. S. admiral, at Manila, +<a href="#page_316">316-320</a>, <a href="#page_415">415</a></p> + +<p class="index"> De Witt, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_172">172</a>, +<a href="#page_177">177</a> <a name="page_453"><span class="page">Page +453</span></a></p> + +<p class="index">Diaz, Bartolomeo, <a href="#page_114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_116">116</a></p> + +<p class="index">Diedrichs, German admiral, +<a href="#page_320">320</a></p> + +<p class="index">Director fire, <a href="#page_350">350</a>, +<a href="#page_410">410</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dirkzoon, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_138">138</a></p> + +<p class="index">Diu, battle of, <a href="#page_118">118</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dogger Bank, Russian fleet off, +<a href="#page_335">335</a>; action off, <a href="#page_364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_369">369-374</a></p> + +<p class="index">Don Juan of Austria, at Lepanto, +<a href="#page_100">100-109</a>; <a href="#page_135">135</a></p> + +<p class="index">Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral, +<a href="#page_91">91</a>, <a href="#page_92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_95">95-98</a></p> + +<p class="index">Doria, Gian Andrea, Genoese admiral +<a href="#page_98">98-108</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dragut, Turkish commander, <a href="#page_90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_98">98</a></p> + +<p class="index">Drake, Sir Francis, British admiral, voyages of, +<a href="#page_153">153-155</a>; in Armada campaign, +<a href="#page_157">157-163</a>; last years of, +<a href="#page_165">165</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dreadnought, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p> + +<p class="index">Drepanum, battle of, <a href="#page_57">57</a></p> + +<p class="index">Duguay-Trouin, French commander, +<a href="#page_195">195</a>, <a href="#page_197">197</a></p> + +<p class="index">Duilius, Roman consul, <a href="#page_52">52</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dumanoir, French admiral, +<a href="#page_277">277</a></p> + +<p class="index">Duncan, British admiral, at Camperdown, +<a href="#page_234">234-237</a></p> + +<p class="index">Dungeness, battle of, <a href="#page_172">172</a></p> + + +<p class="center">E.</p> + +<p class="index">East Indies Companies, British and Dutch, +<a href="#page_141">141</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ecnomus, battle of, <a href="#page_53">53-56</a></p> + +<p class="index">Egypt, early ships of, <a href="#page_15">15</a>; +Napoleon in, <a href="#page_233">233</a>, <a href="#page_347">347</a>, +<a href="#page_357">357</a>, <a href="#page_374">374</a>, +<a href="#page_441">441</a></p> + +<p class="index">Elizabeth, queen of England, +<a href="#page_125">125</a>, <a href="#page_138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_151">151</a>, <a href="#page_152">152</a>, +<a href="#page_155">155</a>, <a href="#page_166">166</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Emden</i>, German cruiser, +<a href="#page_355">355</a>; cruise of, +<a href="#page_366">366-368</a></p> + +<p class="index">England, early naval history of, +<a href="#page_145">145-151</a>; at war with Spain, +<a href="#page_151">151-167</a>; at war with Holland, +<a href="#page_168">168-192</a>; at war with France, +<a href="#page_193">193-221</a>; plans for invasion of, +<a href="#page_197">197-198</a>, <a href="#page_232">232</a>, +<a href="#page_261">261-265</a>. <i>See</i> Great Britain</p> + +<p class="index">Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia, +<a href="#page_347">347</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ericsson, John, <a href="#page_287">287</a>, +<a href="#page_290">290</a>, <a href="#page_292">292</a></p> + +<p class="index">Erie, battle of Lake, <a href="#page_284">284</a></p> + +<p class="index">Eurybiades, Spartan commander, +<a href="#page_32">32</a>, <a href="#page_45">45</a></p> + +<p class="index">Evan-Thomas, British admiral, +<a href="#page_390">390</a>, <a href="#page_392">392</a>, +<a href="#page_393">393</a>, <a href="#page_396">396-398</a>, +<a href="#page_401">401</a></p> + +<p class="index">Evertsen, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_174">174</a></p> + + +<p class="center">F.</p> + +<p class="index">Falkland Islands, battle of, +<a href="#page_363">363-366</a></p> + +<p class="index">Farragut, U. S. admiral, <a href="#page_292">292</a>, +<a href="#page_296">296</a>, <a href="#page_317">317</a>, +<a href="#page_381">381</a>, <a href="#page_414">414</a></p> + +<p class="index">Fighting Instructions, of British Navy, +<a href="#page_184">184</a>, <a href="#page_187">187</a>, +<a href="#page_190">190</a>, <a href="#page_200">200</a>, +<a href="#page_206">206</a>, <a href="#page_211">211</a>, +<a href="#page_216">216-217</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p> + +<p class="index">Fireships, <a href="#page_162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_178">178</a></p> + +<p class="index">First of June, battle of, +<a href="#page_227">227-232</a></p> + +<p class="index">Fisher, British admiral, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_359">359</a>, <a href="#page_377">377</a>, +<a href="#page_378">378</a>, <a href="#page_381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_384">384</a></p> + +<p class="index">Fisher, Fort, capture of, +<a href="#page_293">293</a></p> + +<p class="index">Fleet in Being, <a href="#page_190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_321">321</a>, <a href="#page_331">331</a>, +<a href="#page_358">358</a>, <a href="#page_417">417</a></p> + +<p class="index">Foch, French general, <a href="#page_439">439</a></p> + +<p class="index">Foley, British captain, <a href="#page_249">249</a>, +<a href="#page_256">256</a></p> + +<p class="index">Four Days' Battle, in Dutch Wars, +<a href="#page_185">185-186</a></p> + +<p class="index">France, at war with England in +<a href="#page_18">18</a>th century, <a href="#page_193">193-221</a>; +in Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_222">222-280</a>; in Far East, +<a href="#page_329">329</a>; aids Russia, <a href="#page_335">335</a>; +in World War, <a href="#page_345">345</a>, <a href="#page_347">347</a> +Francis I, of France, <a href="#page_91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_125">125</a></p> + +<p class="index">Frobisher, Martin, <a href="#page_158">158</a></p> + +<p class="index">Fulton, Robert, <a href="#page_270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_287">287</a>; his submarine, +<a href="#page_293">293-295</a></p> + + +<p class="center">G.</p> + +<p class="index">Gabbard, battle of, <a href="#page_176">176</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Galleon of Venice</i>, Venetian ship, +<a href="#page_93">93</a>, <a href="#page_96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_97">97</a>, <a href="#page_98">98</a>, +<a href="#page_103">103</a></p> + +<p class="index">Galley, galleon, galleas, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p> + +<p class="index">Gallipoli Peninsula, operations on, +<a href="#page_383">383-385</a>; <i>see</i> Dardanelles</p> + +<p class="index">Ganteaume, French admiral, <a href="#page_263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_265">265</a></p> + +<p class="index">Genoa, <a href="#page_82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_85">85</a>; at war with Venice <a href="#page_88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_122">122</a>, <a href="#page_135">135</a></p> + +<p class="index">Germany, early commerce under Hausa, +<a href="#page_131">131-133</a>; unification of, +<a href="#page_286">286</a>; in Far East, <a href="#page_320">320</a>, +<a href="#page_328">328</a>, <a href="#page_330">330</a>; aids Russia, +<a href="#page_335">335</a>; growth of, <a href="#page_345">345-347</a>; +in World War, <a href="#page_345">345</a>ff.</p> + +<p class="index">Gibraltar, captured by British, +<a href="#page_196">196</a>; blockaded, <a href="#page_218">218</a>, +<a href="#page_227">227</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Göben</i>, German battle cruiser, escape +of, <a href="#page_355">355-357</a>; <a href="#page_381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_411">411</a></p> + +<p class="index">Goodenough, British naval officer, at Heligoland +Bight, <a href="#page_352">352-353</a>; at Jutland, +<a href="#page_396">396</a>, <a href="#page_401">401</a>, +<a href="#page_413">413</a></p> + +<p class="index">Grand Fleet, British, <a href="#page_349">349</a>; +strength of, <a href="#page_350">350</a>, <a href="#page_351">351</a>, +<a href="#page_369">369</a>; at Jutland, +<a href="#page_386">386-417</a>; <a href="#page_432">432</a></p> + +<p class="index">Graves, British admiral, <a href="#page_209">209-211</a> +<a name="page_454"><span class="page">Page 454</span></a></p> + +<p class="index">Gravina, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_266">266</a>, +<a href="#page_274">274</a>, <a href="#page_277">277</a></p> + +<p class="index">Great Britain, in Napoleonic Wars, +<a href="#page_222">222-280</a>; in War of 1812, +<a href="#page_280">280-285</a>; in World War, +<a href="#page_345">345</a> ff. <i>See</i> England.</p> + +<p class="index">Greece, <a href="#page_16">16</a>; at war with +Persia, <a href="#page_27">27-39</a>; in Peloponnesian War, +<a href="#page_39">39-47</a>; <a href="#page_441">441</a></p> + +<p class="index">Greek fire, <a href="#page_77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_78">78</a>, <a href="#page_80">80</a>, +<a href="#page_94">94</a>, <a href="#page_444">444</a></p> + +<p class="index">Grenville, Sir Richard, <a href="#page_165">165</a></p> + +<p class="index">Guns, gunpowder, <i>see</i> Ordnance</p> + +<p class="index">Gunfleet, battle of, <a href="#page_186">186-188</a></p> + + +<p class="center">H.</p> + +<p class="index">Hampton Roads, battle of, <a href="#page_287">287</a>, +<a href="#page_291">291-292</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hannibal, <a href="#page_60">60</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hanseatic League, <a href="#page_131">131-133</a>, +<a href="#page_145">145</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hase, German naval officer, quoted +<a href="#page_404">404-407</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hawke, British admiral, <a href="#page_198">198-200</a>, +<a href="#page_227">227</a>, <a href="#page_414">414</a>, +<a href="#page_416">416</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hawkins, John, <a href="#page_151">151</a>, +<a href="#page_152">152-153</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a></p> + +<p class="index">Heath, British admiral, <a href="#page_388">388</a></p> + +<p class="index">Heimskirck, Jacob van, Dutch seaman, +<a href="#page_141">141</a>, <a href="#page_142">142</a></p> + +<p class="index">Heligoland, <a href="#page_227">227</a>, +<a href="#page_280">280</a>; battle of, <a href="#page_297">297</a>, +<a href="#page_299">299</a></p> + +<p class="index">Heligoland Bight, battle of, +<a href="#page_351">351-354</a>, <a href="#page_411">411</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hellespont, <a href="#page_28">28</a>, +<a href="#page_36">36</a></p> + +<p class="index">Henry, Prince, the Navigator, +<a href="#page_114">114</a>, <a href="#page_116">116</a></p> + +<p class="index">Henry VIII, of England, <a href="#page_146">146</a>, +<a href="#page_148">148</a></p> + +<p class="index">Herbert, Lord Torrington, British admiral, +<a href="#page_194">194</a>, <a href="#page_195">195</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hermæa, battle of, <a href="#page_56">56</a></p> + +<p class="index">High Seas Fleet, of Germany, +<a href="#page_349">349</a>; strength of, <a href="#page_350">350</a>; +at Jutland, <a href="#page_373">373</a>, +<a href="#page_387">387-417</a>; surrender of, +<a href="#page_439">439-440</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hindenberg, German general, +<a href="#page_420">420</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hipper, German admiral, at Dogger Bank, +<a href="#page_370">370</a>, <a href="#page_373">373</a>; at Jutland, +<a href="#page_390">390-391</a>, <a href="#page_393">393</a>, +<a href="#page_396">396-398</a>, <a href="#page_403">403</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hobson, U. S. naval officer, +<a href="#page_324">324</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hoche, French general, <a href="#page_233">233</a></p> + +<p class="index">Holland, <i>see</i> Netherlands</p> + +<p class="index">Holland, John P., <a href="#page_296">296</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hood, British admiral, at Virginia Capes, +<a href="#page_207">207-211</a>; at Saints' Passage, +<a href="#page_212">212</a>, <a href="#page_215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_238">238</a>, <a href="#page_239">239</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hood, British rear-admiral, at Jutland, +<a href="#page_388">388</a>, <a href="#page_392">392</a>, +<a href="#page_397">397</a>, <a href="#page_398">398</a>, +<a href="#page_401">401</a></p> + +<p class="index">Horton, Max, British commander, +<a href="#page_355">355</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hotham, British admiral, +<a href="#page_238">238-239</a></p> + +<p class="index">Howard, Thomas, of Effingham, +<a href="#page_158">158</a>, <a href="#page_160">160</a>, +<a href="#page_178">178</a></p> + +<p class="index">Howe, British admiral, <a href="#page_202">202</a>; +at First of June, <a href="#page_227">227-232</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hudson, Henry, <a href="#page_141">141</a></p> + +<p class="index">Hughes, British admiral</p> + + +<p class="center">I.</p> + +<p class="index">Interior Lines, defined, <a href="#page_28">28</a></p> + +<p class="index">Italy, at war with Austria, +<a href="#page_296">296-303</a>; in World War, +<a href="#page_345">345</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ito, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu, +<a href="#page_306">306-308</a></p> + + +<p class="center">J.</p> + +<p class="index">Jamaica, captured by British, +<a href="#page_181">181</a></p> + +<p class="index">Janissaries, <a href="#page_89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_105">105</a></p> + +<p class="index">Japan, at war with China, +<a href="#page_304">304-310</a>; at war with Russia, +<a href="#page_330">330-343</a></p> + +<p class="index">Jellicoe, British admiral, <a href="#page_350">350</a>; +at Jutland, <a href="#page_387">387-417</a>, +<a href="#page_437">437</a></p> + +<p class="index">Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, British admiral, +<a href="#page_232">232</a>, <a href="#page_234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_236">236</a>; character of, +<a href="#page_239">239-240</a>; at Cape St. Vincent, +<a href="#page_241">241-244</a>, <a href="#page_263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_295">295</a>, <a href="#page_417">417</a></p> + +<p class="index">Jones, Paul, American naval officer, +<a href="#page_200">200-201</a>, <a href="#page_202">202</a></p> + +<p class="index">Juan, <i>see</i> Don Juan</p> + +<p class="index">Jutland, battle of, <a href="#page_374">374</a>, +<a href="#page_386">386-418</a></p> + + +<p class="center">K.</p> + +<p class="index">Kamimura, Japanese admiral, +<a href="#page_334">334</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Karlsrühe</i>, German cruiser, +<a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_367">367</a></p> + +<p class="index">Keith, British admiral, <a href="#page_263">263</a></p> + +<p class="index">Kentish Knock, battle of, +<a href="#page_172">172</a></p> + +<p class="index">Keyes, British naval officer, +<a href="#page_352">352</a>, <a href="#page_353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_433">433</a></p> + +<p class="index">Kiao-chau, seized by Germany, +<a href="#page_320">320</a>, <a href="#page_328">328</a>, +<a href="#page_334">334</a>, <a href="#page_346">346</a>, +<a href="#page_366">366</a></p> + +<p class="index">Kiel Canal, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_349">349</a>, <a href="#page_408">408</a></p> + +<p class="index">Kitchener, British general, +<a href="#page_377">377-379</a>, <a href="#page_383">383</a>, +<a href="#page_384">384</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Königsberg</i>, German cruiser, +<a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_367">367</a></p> + +<p class="index">Korea, <a href="#page_304">304</a>, +<a href="#page_310">310</a>, <a href="#page_330">330</a>, +<a href="#page_343">343</a></p> + + +<p class="center">L.</p> + +<p class="index">Lake, Simon, <a href="#page_296">296</a></p> + +<p class="index">La Hogue, battle of, <a href="#page_195">195</a></p> + +<p class="index">La Touche Tréville, French admiral, +<a href="#page_262">262</a>, <a href="#page_265">265</a> <a +name="page_455"><span class="page">Page 455</span></a></p> + +<p class="index">Lepanto, campaign of, <a href="#page_100">100-103</a>; +battle of, <a href="#page_103">103-108</a>, +<a href="#page_148">148</a></p> + +<p class="index">Lepidus, Roman general, <a href="#page_61">61</a></p> + +<p class="index">Leyden, siege of, <a href="#page_139">139-140</a></p> + +<p class="index">Lowestoft, battle of, +<a href="#page_184">184-185</a></p> + +<p class="index">London, Declaration of, <a href="#page_421">421</a></p> + +<p class="index">Louis XIV of France, <a href="#page_185">185</a>, +<a href="#page_189">189</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_191">191</a>, <a href="#page_193">193</a>, +<a href="#page_195">195</a>, <a href="#page_448">448</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Lusitania</i>, loss of, +<a href="#page_424">424</a></p> + + +<p class="center">M.</p> + +<p class="index">McGiffin, American naval officer, at the Yalu, +<a href="#page_305">305</a>, <a href="#page_307">307</a>, +<a href="#page_309">309</a></p> + +<p class="index">Macdonough, U. S. commodore, +<a href="#page_284">284</a></p> + +<p class="index">Magellan, Portuguese navigator, +<a href="#page_119">119-121</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mahan, American naval officer, quoted, +<a href="#page_60">60</a>, <a href="#page_189">189</a>, +<a href="#page_197">197</a>, <a href="#page_216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_270">270</a>, <a href="#page_310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_313">313</a>, <a href="#page_324">324</a>, +<a href="#page_345">345</a>; in Spanish-American War, +<a href="#page_321">321</a>, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_443">443</a>, <a href="#page_448">448</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Maine</i>, U. S. battleship, +<a href="#page_314">314</a></p> + +<p class="index">Makaroff, Russian admiral, +<a href="#page_332">332</a></p> + +<p class="index">Malta, <a href="#page_17">17</a>; siege of, +<a href="#page_98">98</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a>, +<a href="#page_247">247</a>, <a href="#page_253">253</a>, +<a href="#page_261">261</a>, <a href="#page_266">266</a>, +<a href="#page_280">280</a>, <a href="#page_356">356</a></p> + +<p class="index">Manila, battle of, <a href="#page_316">316-320</a></p> + +<p class="index">Marathon, battle of, <a href="#page_28">28</a>, +<a href="#page_37">37</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mardonius, <a href="#page_27">27</a>, +<a href="#page_37">37</a>, <a href="#page_38">38</a></p> + +<p class="index">Martel, Charles, <a href="#page_82">82</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mary Queen of Scots, <a href="#page_151">151</a>, +<a href="#page_152">152</a></p> + +<p class="index">Matelieff, de Jonge, Dutch seaman, +<a href="#page_143">143</a></p> + +<p class="index">Medina Sidonia, Duke of, +<a href="#page_156">156-162</a>, <a href="#page_178">178</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Merrimac</i>, Confederate ram, +<a href="#page_290">290</a>; in action with <i>Monitor</i>, +<a href="#page_291">291-292</a></p> + +<p class="index">Milne, British admiral, <a href="#page_357">357</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mine barrage, in North Sea, +<a href="#page_432">432-433</a></p> + +<p class="index">Missiessy, French admiral, <a href="#page_224">224</a>, +<a href="#page_263">263</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mohammed, <a href="#page_72">72</a>, +<a href="#page_73">73</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mohammedans, <i>see</i> Arabs</p> + +<p class="index"><i>Monitor</i>, U. S. ironclad, +<a href="#page_287">287</a>, <a href="#page_290">290-292</a></p> + +<p class="index">Monk, British admiral, <a href="#page_173">173-179</a>, +<a href="#page_183">183</a>, <a href="#page_185">185-188</a>, +<a href="#page_190">190</a>, <a href="#page_191">191</a>, +<a href="#page_194">194</a></p> + +<p class="index">Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#page_313">313</a>, +<a href="#page_347">347</a>, <a href="#page_447">447</a></p> + +<p class="index">Montojo, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_317">317</a>, +<a href="#page_319">319</a></p> + +<p class="index">Moore, British admiral, <a href="#page_373">373</a></p> + +<p class="index">Muaviah, Emir of Syria, <a href="#page_73">73-78</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mukden, battle of, <a href="#page_335">335</a></p> + +<p class="index">Müller, German naval officer, +<a href="#page_367">367</a></p> + +<p class="index">Muza, Mohammedan general, <a href="#page_79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_82">82</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mycale, battle of, <a href="#page_38">38</a></p> + +<p class="index">Mylæ, battle of, <a href="#page_52">52-53</a></p> + + +<p class="center">N.</p> + +<p class="index">Napoleon, quoted, <a href="#page_222">222</a>, +<a href="#page_223">223</a>, <a href="#page_224">224</a>, +<a href="#page_233">233</a>; in Italy, <a href="#page_238">238</a>, +<a href="#page_239">239</a>; in Egypt, <a href="#page_244">244-248</a>, +<a href="#page_252">252</a>; plans northern coalition, +<a href="#page_253">253</a>; attempts invasion of England, +<a href="#page_261">261-265</a>; instructs Villeneuve, +<a href="#page_269">269</a>, <a href="#page_270">270</a>; adopts +continental system, <a href="#page_279">279-280</a>, +<a href="#page_414">414</a>, <a href="#page_419">419</a>, +<a href="#page_445">445</a></p> + +<p class="index">Naupaktis, battle of, <a href="#page_43">43-45</a></p> + +<p class="index">Navarino, battle of, <a href="#page_286">286</a></p> + +<p class="index">Navigation, progress in, +<a href="#page_111">111-112</a></p> + +<p class="index">Navigation Acts, <a href="#page_170">170</a></p> + +<p class="index">Navy, British, administration of, +<a href="#page_146">146</a>, <a href="#page_150">150</a>; under +Commonwealth, <a href="#page_168">168</a>; training of officers +for, <a href="#page_183">183</a>; at Restoration, +<a href="#page_183">183</a>; in <a href="#page_18">18</a>th century, +<a href="#page_202">202</a>; in French Revolutionary Wars, +<a href="#page_225">225</a>; mutiny in, <a href="#page_234">234-235</a>; +in War of 1812, <a href="#page_281">281</a>; +size of, in World War, <a href="#page_350">350</a>. <i>See</i> +England, Great Britain.<br> French, in <a href="#page_18">18</a>th +century, <a href="#page_201">201-202</a>; in French Revolution, +<a href="#page_223">223-225</a>. <i>See</i> France.<br> United +States, in War of 1812, <a href="#page_281">281-284</a>; in Civil War, +<a href="#page_290">290-296</a>; in World War, +<a href="#page_432">432-433</a>. <i>See</i> United States</p> + +<p class="index">Nebogatoff, Russian admiral, +<a href="#page_336">336</a>, <a href="#page_342">342</a></p> + +<p class="index">Nelson, Horatio, British admiral, +<a href="#page_169">169</a>, <a href="#page_178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_179">179</a>, <a href="#page_182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_223">223</a>; in Mediterranean, +<a href="#page_238">238-240</a>; at Cape St. Vincent, +<a href="#page_241">241-244</a>; at the Nile, +<a href="#page_244">244-252</a>; at Copenhagen, +<a href="#page_252">252-259</a>; in the Channel, +<a href="#page_259">259</a>; in Trafalgar campaign and battle, +<a href="#page_265">265-270</a>, <a href="#page_310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_360">360</a>, <a href="#page_414">414</a>, +<a href="#page_415">415</a></p> + +<p class="index">Netherlands, at war with Hansa, +<a href="#page_132">132</a>; commerce of, <a href="#page_133">133</a>, +<a href="#page_140">140-143</a>, <a href="#page_168">168</a>, +<a href="#page_191">191</a>, <a href="#page_442">442</a>; at war +with Spain, <a href="#page_134">134-140</a>; at war with England, +<a href="#page_168">168</a>, <a href="#page_192">192</a>; in War +of American Revolution, <a href="#page_200">200</a>, +<a href="#page_232">232</a>; in Napoleonic Wars, +<a href="#page_237">237</a>, <a href="#page_279">279</a> + +<p class="index">New York, taken by British, <a href="#page_184">184</a>, +<a href="#page_191">191</a>; held by Howe, +<a href="#page_202">202</a></p> + +<p class="index">Nicosia, siege of, <a href="#page_99">99-100</a></p> + +<p class="index">Nile, campaign of, <a href="#page_244">244-248</a>; +battle of, <a href="#page_249">249-252</a></p> + +<p class="index">Nore, mutiny at, <a href="#page_234">234-235</a></p> + +<p class="index">North Sea Mine Barrage, <i>see</i> Mine Barrage</p> + + +<p class="center">O. <a name="page_456"><span class="page">Page +456</span></a></p> + +<p class="index">Octavius, Roman emperor, at Actium, +<a href="#page_61">61-69</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ontario, campaign on Lake, +<a href="#page_283">283</a></p> + +<p class="index">Open Door Policy, <a href="#page_330">330</a>, +<a href="#page_447">447</a></p> + +<p class="index">Oquendo, Spanish naval officer, +<a href="#page_157">157</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ordnance, early types of, <a href="#page_94">94</a>; +introduced on ships, <a href="#page_146">146</a>; at Armada, +<a href="#page_150">150</a>; breech-loading, +<a href="#page_289">289</a>; rifled, <a href="#page_289">289</a>; +long range, <a href="#page_374">374</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Oregon</i>, U. S. battleship, cruise of, +<a href="#page_314">314</a>, <a href="#page_315">315</a>; at Santiago, +<a href="#page_326">326</a>, <a href="#page_327">327</a></p> + + +<p class="center">P.</p> + +<p class="index">Panama Canal, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_362">362</a></p> + +<p class="index">Parker, British admiral, at Copenhagen, +<a href="#page_254">254-258</a></p> + +<p class="index">Parma, Duke of, <a href="#page_135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_156">156</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_160">160</a>, <a href="#page_162">162</a></p> + +<p class="index">Peloponnesian War, <a href="#page_39">39-47</a></p> + +<p class="index">Penn, British admiral, <a href="#page_174">174</a>, +<a href="#page_175">175</a>, <a href="#page_181">181</a></p> + +<p class="index">Perry, U. S. Commodore, <a href="#page_284">284</a></p> + +<p class="index">Persano, Italian admiral, at Lissa, +<a href="#page_298">298-303</a></p> + +<p class="index">Persia, conquers Phœnicia, <a href="#page_20">20-21</a>; +at war with Greece, <a href="#page_27">27-39</a></p> + +<p class="index">Pharselis, battle of, <a href="#page_75">75</a></p> + +<p class="index">Philip II, of Spain, <a href="#page_99">99</a>, +<a href="#page_100">100</a>, <a href="#page_101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_128">128</a>, <a href="#page_134">134</a>, +<a href="#page_151">151</a>, <a href="#page_152">152</a>, +<a href="#page_156">156</a>, <a href="#page_157">157</a>, +<a href="#page_158">158</a>, <a href="#page_165">165</a>, +<a href="#page_166">166</a></p> + +<p class="index">Phœnicia, commerce and colonies of, +<a href="#page_16">16-20</a>, <a href="#page_25">25-26</a>; at +Salamis, <a href="#page_33">33-34</a>, <a href="#page_36">36</a>, +<a href="#page_49">49</a>, <a href="#page_441">441</a>, +<a href="#page_443">443</a></p> + +<p class="index">Phormio, Greek admiral, <a href="#page_39">39-45</a></p> + +<p class="index">Platea, battle of, <a href="#page_21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_37">37</a>, <a href="#page_38">38</a></p> + +<p class="index">Port Arthur, <a href="#page_307">307</a>; given +to Japan, <a href="#page_310">310</a>; seized by Russia, +<a href="#page_329">329</a>; operations around, +<a href="#page_332">332-335</a>; fall of, <a href="#page_334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_343">343</a></p> + +<p class="index">Portland, battle of, <a href="#page_173">173-175</a></p> + +<p class="index">Portsmouth, Treaty of, <a href="#page_343">343</a></p> + +<p class="index">Portugal, commerce and colonies of, +<a href="#page_114">114-121</a>; decline of, +<a href="#page_143">143</a></p> + +<p class="index">Prevesa, battle of, <a href="#page_96">96-98</a>, +<a href="#page_103">103</a></p> + +<p class="index">Prussia, in Northern Coalition, +<a href="#page_253">253</a>; at war with Austria, +<a href="#page_297">297</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ptolemy, <a href="#page_112">112</a></p> + + +<p class="center">Q.</p> + +<p class="index">"Q-ships," <a href="#page_431">431</a></p> + +<p class="index">Quiberon Bay, battle of, +<a href="#page_198">198-199</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a></p> + + +<p class="center">R.</p> + +<p class="index">Raleigh, Sir Walter, <a href="#page_149">149</a>, +<a href="#page_164">164</a></p> + +<p class="index">Recalde, Spanish naval officer, +<a href="#page_157">157</a></p> + +<p class="index">Renaissance, <a href="#page_86">86</a>, +<a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_121">121</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Revenge</i>, Drake's flagship, +<a href="#page_149">149</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a>; last fight +of, <a href="#page_165">165</a></p> + +<p class="index">Robeck, British admiral, at Dardanelles, +<a href="#page_379">379</a></p> + +<p class="index">Rodman, U. S. admiral, <a href="#page_432">432</a></p> + +<p class="index">Rodney, British admiral, <a href="#page_203">203</a>; +at Saints' Passage, <a href="#page_212">212-217</a></p> + +<p class="index">Rojdestvensky, Russian admiral, cruise of, +<a href="#page_335">335-339</a>; at Tsushima, +<a href="#page_339">339-343</a></p> + +<p class="index">Rome, in Punic Wars, <a href="#page_49">49-60</a>; +in Actium campaign, <a href="#page_61">61-70</a>; wars of Eastern +Empire, <a href="#page_71">71-86</a>; <a href="#page_441">441</a></p> + +<p class="index">Rooke, British admiral, <a href="#page_196">196</a></p> + +<p class="index">Roosevelt, Theodore, <a href="#page_316">316</a>, +<a href="#page_324">324</a>, <a href="#page_343">343</a>, +<a href="#page_347">347</a></p> + +<p class="index">Rosyth, British base, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_387">387</a></p> + +<p class="index">Rupert, Prince, <a href="#page_169">169</a>, +<a href="#page_185">185</a>, <a href="#page_186">186</a></p> + +<p class="index">Russia, in Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_253">253</a>, <a href="#page_259">259</a>, +<a href="#page_266">266</a>, <a href="#page_280">280</a>; in Far +East, <a href="#page_328">328-330</a>; at war with Japan, +<a href="#page_330">330-343</a>, in World War, +<a href="#page_345">345</a>, <a href="#page_375">375</a>, +<a href="#page_417">417</a>, <a href="#page_446">446</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ruyter. <i>See</i> De Ruyter</p> + + +<p class="center">S.</p> + +<p class="index">Saint Andrée, Jean Bon, +<a href="#page_228">228</a></p> + +<p class="index">St. Vincent, battle of Cape, +<a href="#page_223">223</a>, <a href="#page_233">233</a>, +<a href="#page_241">241-244</a></p> + +<p class="index">St. Vincent, Earl of. <i>See</i> Jervis</p> + +<p class="index">Saints' Passage, battle of, +<a href="#page_212">212-217</a></p> + +<p class="index">Salamis, battle of, <a href="#page_21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_32">32-39</a>; <a href="#page_45">45-47</a>; campaign +of, <a href="#page_28">28-32</a></p> + +<p class="index">Salonika, <a href="#page_385">385</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sampson, U. S. admiral, in Santiago campaign, +<a href="#page_320">320-327</a></p> + +<p class="index">San Juan de Ulna, fight at, +<a href="#page_153">153</a></p> + +<p class="index">Santa Cruz, Spanish admiral, +<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_155">155</a>, <a href="#page_157">157</a></p> + +<p class="index">Santiago, battle of, <a href="#page_320">320-327</a></p> + +<p class="index">Saracens. <i>See</i> Arabs</p> + +<p class="index">Scapa Flow, British base, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a>, <a href="#page_355">355</a>, +<a href="#page_386">386</a>, <a href="#page_432">432</a></p> + +<p class="index">Scheer, German admiral, at Jutland, +<a href="#page_387">387-411</a></p> + +<p class="index">Scheldt River, <a href="#page_133">133</a>; battle +in, <a href="#page_139">139</a>; blockaded by Dutch, +<a href="#page_142">142</a>, <a href="#page_156">156</a>, +<a href="#page_225">225</a>, <a href="#page_261">261</a></p> + +<p class="index">Scheveningen, battle of, <a href="#page_177">177</a></p> + +<p class="index">Schley, U. S. naval officer, in Santiago campaign, +<a href="#page_321">321-323</a>, <a href="#page_326">326</a> <a +name="page_457"><span class="page">Page 457</span></a></p> + +<p class="index">Schoonevelt, battle of, <a href="#page_189">189</a></p> + +<p class="index">Scott, Sir Percy, British admiral, +<a href="#page_348">348</a>, <a href="#page_410">410</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sea Beggars, <a href="#page_135">135-137</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sea Power, preserves Greece, <a href="#page_39">39</a>; +England's gains by, <a href="#page_191">191</a>, +<a href="#page_196">196-197</a>, <a href="#page_220">220</a>; in +Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_222">222-223</a>, +<a href="#page_285">285</a>; in World War, +<a href="#page_348">348-349</a>, <a href="#page_385">385</a>; influence +of, <a href="#page_441">441-443</a>; elements of, +<a href="#page_443">443-445</a></p> + +<p class="index">Selim the Drunkard, Sultan of Turkey, +<a href="#page_99">99</a></p> + +<p class="index">Semenoff, Russian naval officer, +<a href="#page_335">335</a>, <a href="#page_339">339</a></p> + +<p class="index">Seymour, British admiral, at Armada, +<a href="#page_158">158</a></p> + +<p class="index">Shafter, U. S. general, <a href="#page_324">324</a>, +<a href="#page_325">325</a></p> + +<p class="index">Shimonoseki, Treaty of, <a href="#page_310">310</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ships of War, "round" and "long," +<a href="#page_19">19</a>; trireme, <a href="#page_19">19</a>, +<a href="#page_21">21-24</a>; penteconter, <a href="#page_32">32</a>; +liburna, <a href="#page_62">62</a>; galley, <a href="#page_69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_93">93-95</a>; dromon, <a href="#page_74">74</a>; +galleas, <a href="#page_102">102-103</a>, <a href="#page_148">148</a>; +junk, <a href="#page_117">117</a>; Viking craft, +<a href="#page_131">131</a>; galleon, <a href="#page_147">147-149</a>; +two and three-deckers, <a href="#page_178">178</a>; steam, +<a href="#page_287">287</a>; submarine, <a href="#page_293">293-296</a>, +<a href="#page_426">426-428</a>; destroyer, <a href="#page_296">296</a>, +<a href="#page_412">412</a>; battle cruiser, +<a href="#page_343">343</a>, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_369">369</a>; dreadnought, <a href="#page_343">343</a>, +<a href="#page_348">348</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sicily, <a href="#page_17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_46">46</a>; in Punic Wars, +<a href="#page_50">50-59</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sims, U. S. admiral, <a href="#page_431">431</a>, +<a href="#page_437">437</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sinope, bombardment of, <a href="#page_288">288</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sirocco. Turkish admiral, <a href="#page_104">104</a>, +<a href="#page_105">105</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sluis, battle of, <a href="#page_146">146</a></p> + +<p class="index">Solebay, battle of, <a href="#page_189">189</a></p> + +<p class="index">Soliman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey, +<a href="#page_92">92</a>, <a href="#page_98">98</a></p> + +<p class="index">Souchon, German admiral, <a href="#page_356">356</a>, +<a href="#page_357">357</a></p> + +<p class="index">Spain, at war with Turks, +<a href="#page_100">100-108</a>; discoveries of, +<a href="#page_121">121-128</a>; at war with Dutch, +<a href="#page_134">134-143</a>; at war with England, +<a href="#page_151">151-167</a>, <a href="#page_442">442</a>; in +Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_240">240</a>, +<a href="#page_265">265</a>; at war with United States, +<a href="#page_313">313-328</a></p> + +<p class="index">Spanish Armada, <a href="#page_128">128</a>, +<a href="#page_141">141</a>, <a href="#page_149">149</a>, +<a href="#page_156">156-167</a>, <a href="#page_445">445</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sparta. <i>See</i> Greece.</p> + +<p class="index">Spee, German admiral, <a href="#page_358">358-366</a>, +<a href="#page_369">369</a></p> + +<p class="index">Steam navigation, beginnings of, +<a href="#page_287">287</a></p> + +<p class="index">Sturdee, British admiral, +<a href="#page_363">363-365</a></p> + +<p class="index">Submarine, early types of, +<a href="#page_293">293-296</a>; in World War, +<a href="#page_350">350</a>, <a href="#page_420">420</a>, +<a href="#page_423">423-439</a>, <a href="#page_445">445</a></p> + +<p class="index">Suez Canal, <a href="#page_357">357</a>, +<a href="#page_374">374</a></p> + +<p class="index">Suffren, French admiral, <a href="#page_201">201</a>, +<a href="#page_203">203</a>, <a href="#page_217">217-218</a>, +<a href="#page_220">220</a>, <a href="#page_228">228</a></p> + +<p class="index">Syracuse, at war with Athens, +<a href="#page_46">46-47</a>, <a href="#page_76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_247">247</a></p> + + +<p class="center">T.</p> + +<p class="index">Tactics, of galleys, <a href="#page_94">94-95</a>; +after use of sails and guns, <a href="#page_163">163-164</a>; +in Dutch wars, <a href="#page_179">179</a>; +in <a href="#page_18">18</a>th century, <a href="#page_194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_216">216-217</a>; after use of armor, +<a href="#page_296">296-297</a>; influenced by Lissa, +<a href="#page_310">310</a>; at Jutland, +<a href="#page_411">411-416</a>; in submarine warfare, +<a href="#page_429">429-431</a></p> + +<p class="index">Takeomi, Japanese naval officer, +<a href="#page_339">339</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tegetthoff, Austrian admiral, at Lissa, +<a href="#page_299">299-303</a></p> + +<p class="index">Teneriffe, attacked by Blake, +<a href="#page_181">181</a></p> + +<p class="index">Terschelling, raided by English, +<a href="#page_188">188</a></p> + +<p class="index">Texel, battle of, <a href="#page_189">189</a>, +<a href="#page_190">190</a></p> + +<p class="index">Themistocles, <a href="#page_28">28</a>, +<a href="#page_31">31</a>, <a href="#page_32">32</a>, +<a href="#page_37">37</a>, <a href="#page_43">43</a>, +<a href="#page_45">45</a></p> + +<p class="index">Theophanes, <a href="#page_84">84</a>, +<a href="#page_85">85</a></p> + +<p class="index">Thermopylæ, battle of, <a href="#page_29">29</a>, +<a href="#page_31">31</a></p> + +<p class="index">Ting, Chinese admiral, at the Yalu, +<a href="#page_305">305</a>, <a href="#page_306">306</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tirpitz, German admiral, <a href="#page_346">346</a>, +<a href="#page_410">410</a>, <a href="#page_411">411</a>, +<a href="#page_448">448</a>, <a href="#page_450">450</a></p> + +<p class="index">Togo, Japanese admiral, <a href="#page_304">304</a>; +at battle of 10th of August, +<a href="#page_333">333-334</a>; at Tsushima, +<a href="#page_339">339-342</a></p> + +<p class="index">Togo, Japanese squadron commander, +<a href="#page_339">339</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tordesillas, Treaty of, <a href="#page_125">125</a></p> + +<p class="index">Torpedoes, origin of name, <a href="#page_295">295</a>; +Whitehead, <a href="#page_296">296</a>; in Russo-Japanese war, +<a href="#page_342">342</a>, <a href="#page_343">343</a></p> + +<p class="index">Torrington, Earl of. <i>See</i> Herbert</p> + +<p class="index">Toscanelli, Paul, <a href="#page_122">122</a></p> + +<p class="index">Toulon, French base, <a href="#page_226">226</a>, +<a href="#page_238">238</a>, <a href="#page_246">246</a>, +<a href="#page_263">263</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tourville, French admiral, <a href="#page_194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_195">195</a></p> + +<p class="index">Trafalgar, battle of, <a href="#page_178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_179">179</a>, <a href="#page_223">223</a>, +<a href="#page_236">236</a>, <a href="#page_265">265-279</a>.</p> + +<p class="index">Transport service, in World War, +<a href="#page_438">438-439</a></p> + +<p class="index">Triple Alliance, <a href="#page_345">345</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tromp, Cornelius, Dutch admiral, +<a href="#page_185">185-188</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tromp, Martin, Dutch admiral, +<a href="#page_169">169</a>, <a href="#page_171">171-179</a>, +<a href="#page_182">182</a>, <a href="#page_185">185</a>, +<a href="#page_190">190</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p> + +<p class="index">Troubridge, British naval officer, +<a href="#page_239">239</a>, <a href="#page_241">241</a>, +<a href="#page_250">250</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tsuboi, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu, +<a href="#page_306">306-309</a> <a name="page_458"><span +class="page">Page 458</span></a></p> + +<p class="index">Tsushima, battle of, <a href="#page_339">339-343</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tunis, <a href="#page_18">18</a>; captured by Spanish, +<a href="#page_91">91-92</a>; attacked by Blake, +<a href="#page_180">180</a></p> + +<p class="index">Turkey, rise of, <a href="#page_89">89-90</a>; +at war with Venice and Spain, <a href="#page_90">90-109</a>; in +World War, <a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_357">357</a>, +<a href="#page_374">374-384</a>, <a href="#page_442">442</a></p> + +<p class="index">Tyrwhitt, British naval officer, +<a href="#page_351">351</a>, <a href="#page_352">352</a>, +<a href="#page_353">353</a></p> + + +<p class="center">U.</p> + +<p class="index">Ulm, battle of, <a href="#page_279">279</a></p> + +<p class="index">Uluch Ali, Turkish leader, <a href="#page_90">90</a>; +in Lepanto campaign, <a href="#page_101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_104">104</a>, <a href="#page_106">106-108</a></p> + +<p class="index">United States, in American Revolution, +<a href="#page_200">200-212</a>; in War of 1812, +<a href="#page_280">280-285</a>; in +Civil War, <a href="#page_286">286</a>, <a href="#page_290">290-296</a>; +in Spanish-American War, <a href="#page_313">313-328</a>; in World +War, <a href="#page_424">424</a>, <a href="#page_432">432-433</a>, +<a href="#page_438">438-439</a>; naval problems of, +<a href="#page_446">446-447</a>. <i>See</i> Navy</p> + + +<p class="center">V.</p> + +<p class="index">Valdes, Pedro de, Spanish naval officer, +<a href="#page_157">157</a>, <a href="#page_161">161</a></p> + +<p class="index">Valdes, Pedrode, Spanish naval officer, +<a href="#page_157">157</a>, <a href="#page_161">161</a></p> + +<p class="index">Vandals, <a href="#page_71">71</a>, +<a href="#page_72">72</a></p> + +<p class="index">Veniero, Venetian admiral, +<a href="#page_101">101-103</a>, <a href="#page_105">105</a></p> + +<p class="index"><i>Vengeur du Peuple</i>, French ship, +<a href="#page_228">228</a>, <a href="#page_230">230</a></p> + +<p class="index">Venice, early history of, <a href="#page_82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_85">85</a>; commerce of, <a href="#page_87">87-89</a>, +<a href="#page_442">442</a>; at war with Turks, +<a href="#page_90">90-109</a>; ships of, <a href="#page_147">147</a></p> + +<p class="index">Vikings, <a href="#page_49">49</a>, +<a href="#page_71">71</a>, <a href="#page_83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_130">130-131</a></p> + +<p class="index">Villaret de Joyeuse, French admiral, at First of +June, <a href="#page_228">228-231</a></p> + +<p class="index">Villeneuve, French admiral, <a href="#page_224">224</a>; +at the Nile, <a href="#page_250">250</a>; in Trafalgar campaign +and battle, <a href="#page_265">265-270</a>, +<a href="#page_273">273-276</a></p> + +<p class="index">Virginia Capes, battle of, <a href="#page_68">68</a>, +<a href="#page_201">201</a>, <a href="#page_207">207-211</a>, +<a href="#page_442">442</a></p> + + +<p class="center">W.</p> + +<p class="index">Wangenheim, Baron von, <a href="#page_357">357</a></p> + +<p class="index">Wei-hai-wei, <a href="#page_310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_329">329</a></p> + +<p class="index">William II, German emperor, <a href="#page_328">328</a>, +<a href="#page_345">345</a>, <a href="#page_347">347</a>, +<a href="#page_448">448</a></p> + +<p class="index">William III of England, <a href="#page_193">193</a>, +<a href="#page_194">194</a></p> + +<p class="index">William, Prince of Orange, <a href="#page_134">134</a>, +<a href="#page_137">137</a>, <a href="#page_140">140</a></p> + +<p class="index">Wilson, Woodrow, President of United States, +<a href="#page_387">387</a></p> + +<p class="index">Winter, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_235">235</a></p> + +<p class="index">Witjeft, Russian admiral, <a href="#page_331">331</a>, +<a href="#page_333">333</a></p> + + +<p class="center">X.-Y.-Z.</p> + +<p class="index">Xerxes, <a href="#page_28">28</a>, +<a href="#page_31">31</a>, <a href="#page_32">32-39</a></p> + +<p class="index">"Y-guns," <a href="#page_431">431</a></p> + +<p class="index">Yalu, battle of, <a href="#page_304">304-310</a></p> + +<p class="index">York, Duke of, afterward James II of England, +<a href="#page_184">184</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a></p> + +<p class="index">Zama, battle of, <a href="#page_60">60</a></p> + +<p class="index">Zeebrugge, attack on, +<a href="#page_433">433-435</a></p> + + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full"> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF SEA POWER***</p> +<p>******* This file should be named 24797-h.txt or 24797-h.zip *******</p> +<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br> +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/4/7/9/24797">http://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/7/9/24797</a></p> +<p>Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed.</p> + +<p>Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution.</p> + + + +<pre> +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/license">http://www.gutenberg.org/license)</a>. + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS,' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/pglaf. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://www.gutenberg.org/about/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/pglaf + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Each eBook is in a subdirectory of the same number as the eBook's +eBook number, often in several formats including plain vanilla ASCII, +compressed (zipped), HTML and others. + +Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks replace the old file and take over +the old filename and etext number. The replaced older file is renamed. +VERSIONS based on separate sources are treated as new eBooks receiving +new filenames and etext numbers. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org">http://www.gutenberg.org</a> + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + +EBooks posted prior to November 2003, with eBook numbers BELOW #10000, +are filed in directories based on their release date. If you want to +download any of these eBooks directly, rather than using the regular +search system you may utilize the following addresses and just +download by the etext year. + +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext06/">http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext06/</a> + + (Or /etext 05, 04, 03, 02, 01, 00, 99, + 98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 92, 91 or 90) + +EBooks posted since November 2003, with etext numbers OVER #10000, are +filed in a different way. The year of a release date is no longer part +of the directory path. The path is based on the etext number (which is +identical to the filename). The path to the file is made up of single +digits corresponding to all but the last digit in the filename. For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/GUTINDEX.ALL">http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/GUTINDEX.ALL</a> + +*** END: FULL LICENSE *** +</pre> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig001.png b/24797-h/images/fig001.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7d9f29 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig001.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig002.png b/24797-h/images/fig002.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc5eb46 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig002.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig003.png b/24797-h/images/fig003.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..029268d --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig003.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig004.png b/24797-h/images/fig004.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..73dace3 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig004.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig005.png b/24797-h/images/fig005.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6d876d --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig005.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig006.png b/24797-h/images/fig006.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4dc71ff --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig006.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig007.png b/24797-h/images/fig007.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee903da --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig007.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig008.png b/24797-h/images/fig008.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f62496 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig008.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig009.png b/24797-h/images/fig009.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b9e0b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig009.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig010.png b/24797-h/images/fig010.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3bbfb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig010.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig011.png b/24797-h/images/fig011.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4810a25 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig011.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig012.png b/24797-h/images/fig012.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..95acf7f --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig012.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig013.png b/24797-h/images/fig013.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cf97b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig013.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig014.png b/24797-h/images/fig014.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5412e7f --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig014.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig015.png b/24797-h/images/fig015.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..83672b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig015.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig016.png b/24797-h/images/fig016.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..20046fb --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig016.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig017.png b/24797-h/images/fig017.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f124d5d --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig017.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig018.png b/24797-h/images/fig018.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0054d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig018.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig019.png b/24797-h/images/fig019.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..bae3d0d --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig019.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig020.png b/24797-h/images/fig020.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..71a8d6c --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig020.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig021.png b/24797-h/images/fig021.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f2325b --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig021.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig022.png b/24797-h/images/fig022.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a87454 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig022.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig023.png b/24797-h/images/fig023.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..335069d --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig023.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig024.png b/24797-h/images/fig024.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b235106 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig024.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig025.png b/24797-h/images/fig025.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..87411b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig025.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig026.png b/24797-h/images/fig026.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..05d6fea --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig026.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig027.png b/24797-h/images/fig027.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e89a1a --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig027.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig028.png b/24797-h/images/fig028.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d65bdeb --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig028.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig029.png b/24797-h/images/fig029.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e6c933 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig029.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig030.png b/24797-h/images/fig030.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0e6ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig030.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig031.png b/24797-h/images/fig031.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bd07a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig031.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig032.png b/24797-h/images/fig032.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f229a29 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig032.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig033.png b/24797-h/images/fig033.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbdbeb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig033.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig034.png b/24797-h/images/fig034.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..639f641 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig034.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig035.png b/24797-h/images/fig035.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..11065fe --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig035.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig036.png b/24797-h/images/fig036.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..94bc289 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig036.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig037.png b/24797-h/images/fig037.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..c418dd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig037.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig038.png b/24797-h/images/fig038.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..da4fdc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig038.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig039.png b/24797-h/images/fig039.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..68a82e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig039.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig040.png b/24797-h/images/fig040.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5afacb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig040.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig041.png b/24797-h/images/fig041.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..02ddade --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig041.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig042.png b/24797-h/images/fig042.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..73c18a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig042.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig043.png b/24797-h/images/fig043.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8ae075 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig043.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig044.png b/24797-h/images/fig044.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..a61d76a --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig044.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig045.png b/24797-h/images/fig045.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb31b47 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig045.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig046.png b/24797-h/images/fig046.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..511f8e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig046.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig047.png b/24797-h/images/fig047.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..00f1358 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig047.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig048.png b/24797-h/images/fig048.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..988f3d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig048.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig049.png b/24797-h/images/fig049.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..99f970d --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig049.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig050.png b/24797-h/images/fig050.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca695c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig050.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig051.png b/24797-h/images/fig051.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a56994 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig051.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig052.png b/24797-h/images/fig052.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f098aef --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig052.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig053.png b/24797-h/images/fig053.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..10a1283 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig053.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig054.png b/24797-h/images/fig054.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b21c84 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig054.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig055.png b/24797-h/images/fig055.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..26d5d68 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig055.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig056.png b/24797-h/images/fig056.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..67acb48 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig056.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig057.png b/24797-h/images/fig057.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b57067 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig057.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig058.png b/24797-h/images/fig058.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..94db8a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig058.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig059.png b/24797-h/images/fig059.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..aef2cc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig059.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig060.png b/24797-h/images/fig060.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3136e7a --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig060.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig061.png b/24797-h/images/fig061.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..544d531 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig061.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig062.png b/24797-h/images/fig062.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..daeba62 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig062.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig063.png b/24797-h/images/fig063.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4da904b --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig063.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig064.png b/24797-h/images/fig064.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6524e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig064.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig065.png b/24797-h/images/fig065.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..a49e102 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig065.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig066.png b/24797-h/images/fig066.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8c69a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig066.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig067.png b/24797-h/images/fig067.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0354a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig067.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig068.png b/24797-h/images/fig068.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..69eafc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig068.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig069.png b/24797-h/images/fig069.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..304b1d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig069.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig070.png b/24797-h/images/fig070.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5234456 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig070.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig071.png b/24797-h/images/fig071.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..beeb237 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig071.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig072.png b/24797-h/images/fig072.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8ccec9 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig072.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig073.png b/24797-h/images/fig073.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2cad6e --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig073.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig074.png b/24797-h/images/fig074.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e78b1b --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig074.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig075.png b/24797-h/images/fig075.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9642d9c --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig075.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig076.png b/24797-h/images/fig076.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa5381f --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig076.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig077.png b/24797-h/images/fig077.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0bbab8b --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig077.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig078.png b/24797-h/images/fig078.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..518e84e --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig078.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig079.png b/24797-h/images/fig079.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a10f20 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig079.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig080.png b/24797-h/images/fig080.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ad93a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig080.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig081.png b/24797-h/images/fig081.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..78f7364 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig081.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig082.png b/24797-h/images/fig082.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9add73 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig082.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig083.png b/24797-h/images/fig083.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1423b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig083.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig084.png b/24797-h/images/fig084.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a1b8ae --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig084.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig085.png b/24797-h/images/fig085.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fbe6ae --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig085.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig086.png b/24797-h/images/fig086.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9009300 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig086.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig087.png b/24797-h/images/fig087.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..eaf793e --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig087.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig088.png b/24797-h/images/fig088.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..6aa6003 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig088.png diff --git a/24797-h/images/fig089.png b/24797-h/images/fig089.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0596ee3 --- /dev/null +++ b/24797-h/images/fig089.png |
