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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, A History of Sea Power, by William Oliver
+Stevens and Allan Westcott
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: A History of Sea Power
+
+
+Author: William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott
+
+
+
+Release Date: March 10, 2008  [eBook #24797]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF SEA POWER***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall
+
+
+
+Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
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+
+
+
+
+
+A HISTORY OF SEA POWER
+
+by
+
+WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS and ALLAN WESTCOTT
+
+Professors in the United States Naval Academy
+
+With Maps, Diagrams, and Illustrations
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+New York
+George H. Doran Company
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+This volume has been called into being by the absence of any brief
+work covering the evolution and influence of sea power from the
+beginnings to the present time. In a survey at once so comprehensive
+and so short, only the high points of naval history can be touched.
+Yet it is the hope of the authors that they have not, for that
+reason, slighted the significance of the story. Naval history is
+more than a sequence of battles. Sea power has always been a vital
+force in the rise and fall of nations and in the evolution of
+civilization. It is this significance, this larger, related point
+of view, which the authors have tried to make clear in recounting
+the story of the sea. In regard to naval principles, also, this
+general survey should reveal those unchanging truths of warfare
+which have been demonstrated from Salamis to Jutland. The tendency
+of our modern era of mechanical development has been to forget the
+value of history. It is true that the 16" gun is a great advance
+over the 32-pounder of Trafalgar, but it is equally true that the
+naval officer of to-day must still sit at the feet of Nelson.
+
+The authors would acknowledge their indebtedness to Professor F.
+Wells Williams of Yale, and to the Classical Departments of Harvard
+and the University of Chicago for valuable aid in bibliography.
+Thanks are due also to Commander C. C. Gill, U. S. N., Captain T. G.
+Frothingam, U. S. N. R., Dr. C. Alphonso Smith, and to colleagues of
+the Department of English at the Naval Academy for helpful criticism.
+As to the "References" at the conclusion of each chapter, it should
+be said that they are merely references, not bibliographies. The
+titles are recommended to the reader who may wish to study a period
+in greater detail, and who would prefer a short list to a complete
+bibliography.
+
+    WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS
+
+    ALLAN WESTCOTT
+
+United States Naval Academy,
+  _June_, 1920.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+CHAPTER
+     I  THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES
+    II  ATHENS AS A SEA POWER:
+           1. THE PERSIAN WAR
+           2. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
+   III  THE SEA POWER OF ROME:
+           1. THE PUNIC WARS
+           2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY
+    IV  THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES:
+           THE EASTERN EMPIRE
+     V  THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES [_Continued_]:
+           VENICE AND THE TURK
+    VI  OPENING THE OCEAN ROUTES:
+           1. PORTUGAL AND THE NEW ROUTE TO INDIA
+           2. SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD
+   VII  SEA POWER IN THE NORTH:
+           HOLLAND'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
+  VIII  ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA
+    IX  RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER:
+           WARS WITH THE DUTCH
+     X  RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER [_continued_]:
+           WARS WITH FRANCE TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
+    XI  NAPOLEONIC WARS:
+           THE FIRST OF JUNE AND CAMPERDOWN
+   XII  NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Continued_]:
+           THE RISE OF NELSON
+  XIII  NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Concluded_]:
+           TRAFALGAR AND AFTER
+   XIV  REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE:
+           HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA
+    XV  RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
+   XVI  THE WORLD WAR:
+           THE FIRST YEAR
+  XVII  THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]:
+           THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+ XVIII  THE WORLD WAR [_Concluded_]:
+           COMMERCE WARFARE
+   XIX  CONCLUSION
+        INDEX
+
+
+
+
+MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+EGYPTIAN SHIP
+SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER
+GREEK WAR GALLEY
+GREEK MERCHANT SHIP
+ROUTE OF XERXES' FLEET TO BATTLE OF SALAMIS
+SCENE OF PRELIMINARY NAVAL OPERATIONS, CAMPAIGN OF SALAMIS
+THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, 480 B. C.
+THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT--ABOUT 450 B. C.
+SCENE OF PHORMIO'S CAMPAIGN
+BATTLE OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF, 429 B. C.
+SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS
+ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS
+CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS, 256 B. C.
+POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
+SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B. C.
+THE SARACEN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, ABOUT 715 A. D.
+EUROPE'S EASTERN FRONTIER
+CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY
+THEATER OF OPERATIONS, VENICE AND THE TURK
+16TH CENTURY GALLEY
+BATTLE OF LEPANTO, OCTOBER 7, 1571
+CROSS-STAFF
+THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WORLD IN 1450
+PORTUGUESE VOYAGES AND POSSESSIONS
+FLAGSHIP OF COLUMBUS
+CHART OF A. D. 1589
+THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 16TH CENTURY
+GALLEON
+CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA
+ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA
+THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL
+SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE 17TH CENTURY
+  BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND FRANCE
+THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEBRUARY 18, 1653
+THE THAMES ESTUARY
+THREE-DECKED SHIP OF THE LINE, 18TH CENTURY
+THE WEST INDIES
+SCENE OF THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN
+BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, SEPTEMBER 5, 1781
+BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, APRIL 12, 1782
+BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1794
+BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN, OCTOBER 11, 1797
+BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14, 1797
+THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST, 1798
+COAST MAP--FROM ALEXANDRIA TO ROSETTA MOUTH OF THE NILE
+BATTLE OF THE NILE
+BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN
+POSITION OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, 1805
+NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE
+NELSON'S VICTORY
+BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805
+TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30
+EARLY IRONCLADS
+BUSHNELL'S TURTLE
+FULTON'S NAUTILUS
+BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866
+BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPTEMBER 17, 1894
+APPROACHES TO MANILA
+BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898
+WEST INDIES--MOVEMENTS IN SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN
+BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898
+THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
+HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR
+ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCTOBER 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905
+BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905
+HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION
+HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, 12:30-1:40
+BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOVEMBER 1, 1914
+ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS
+BATTLE OF FALKLAND ISLANDS, DECEMBER 8, 1914
+THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPTEMBER 1-NOVEMBER 9, 1914
+THEATER OF OPERATIONS, IN THE NORTH SEA
+DOGGER BANK ACTION, JANUARY 24, 1915
+THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE
+DARDANELLES DEFENSES
+CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
+BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION
+TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLE CRUISER: THE DERFLINGER
+TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER: THE LION
+BATTLE OF JUTLAND: FIRST PHASE
+TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLESHIP: THE IRON DUKE
+BATTLE OF JUTLAND: SECOND AND THIRD PHASES
+TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLESHIP: THE KOENIG
+EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY
+GERMAN BARRED ZONES
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES OF GERMAN SUBMARINES
+OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA
+ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND BRITISH BLOCKSHIPS
+BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS DESTROYED BY
+  GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES
+
+
+
+
+A HISTORY OF SEA POWER
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES
+
+Civilization and sea power arose from the Mediterranean, and the
+progress of recent archeological research has shown that civilizations
+and empires had been reared in the Mediterranean on sea power long
+before the dawn of history. Since the records of Egypt are far
+better preserved than those of any other nation of antiquity, and
+the discovery of the Rosetta stone has made it possible to read
+them, we know most about the beginnings of civilization in Egypt.
+We know, for instance, that an Egyptian king some 2000 years before
+Christ possessed a fleet of 400 fighting ships. But it appears
+now that long before this time the island of Crete was a great
+naval and commercial power, that in the earliest dynasties of Egypt
+Cretan fleets were carrying on a commerce with the Nile valley.
+Indeed, the Cretans may have taught the Egyptians something of the
+art of building sea-going ships for trade and war.[1] At all events,
+Crete may be regarded as the first great sea power of history, an
+island empire like Great Britain to-day, extending its influence
+from Sicily to Palestine and dominating the eastern Mediterranean
+for many centuries. From recent excavations of the ancient capital
+we get an interesting light on the old Greek legends of the Minotaur
+and the Labyrinth, going back to the time when the island kingdom
+levied tribute, human as well as monetary, on its subject cities
+throughout the Ægean.
+
+[Footnote 1: It is interesting to note that the earliest empires,
+Assyria and Egypt, were not naval powers, because they arose in rich
+river valleys abundantly capable of sustaining their inhabitants.
+They did not need to command the sea.]
+
+On this sea power Crete reared an astonishingly advanced civilization.
+Until recent times, for instance, the Phœnicians had been credited
+with the invention of the alphabet. We know now that 1000 years
+before the Phœnicians began to write the Cretans had evolved a
+system of written characters--as yet undeciphered--and a decimal
+system for numbers. A correspondingly high stage of excellence
+had been reached in engineering, architecture, and the fine arts,
+and even in decay Crete left to Greece the tradition of mastery
+in laws and government.
+
+[Illustration: EGYPTIAN SHIP
+
+From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
+
+The power of Crete was already in its decline centuries before
+the Trojan War, but during a thousand years it had spread its own
+and Egyptian culture over the shores of the Ægean. The destruction
+of the island empire in about 1400 B.C. apparently was due to some
+great disaster that destroyed her fleet and left her open to invasion
+by a conquering race--probably the Greeks--who ravaged her cities
+by sword and fire. On account of her commanding position in the
+Mediterranean, Crete might again have risen to sea power but for
+the endless civil wars that marked her subsequent history.
+
+The successor to Crete as mistress of the sea was Phœnicia. The
+Phœnicians, oddly enough, were a Semitic people, a nomadic race
+with no traditions of the sea whatever. When, however, they migrated
+to the coast and settled, they found themselves in a narrow strip
+of coast between a range of mountains and the sea. The city of Tyre
+itself was erected on an island. Consequently these descendants of
+herdsmen were compelled to find their livelihood upon the sea--as
+were the Venetians and the Dutch in later ages--and for several
+hundred years they maintained their control of the ocean highways.
+
+The Phœnicians were not literary, scientific, or artistic; they
+were commercial. Everything they did was with an eye to business.
+They explored the Mediterranean and beyond for the sake of tapping
+new sources of wealth, they planted colonies for the sake of having
+trading posts on their routes, and they developed fighting ships for
+the sake of preserving their trade monopolies. Moreover, Phœnicia
+lay at the end of the Asiatic caravan routes. Hence Phœnician ships
+received the wealth of the Nile valley and Mesopotamia and distributed
+it along the shores of the Mediterranean. Phœnician ships also
+uncovered the wealth of Spain and the North African coast, and,
+venturing into the Atlantic, drew metals from the British Isles.
+According to Herodotus, a Phœnician squadron circumnavigated Africa
+at the beginning of the seventh century before Christ, completing
+the voyage in three years. We should know far more now of the extent
+of the explorations made by these master mariners of antiquity
+were it not for the fact that they kept their trade routes secret
+as far as possible in order to preserve their trade monopoly.
+
+In developing and organizing these trade routes the Phœnicians
+planted colonies on the islands of the Mediterranean,--Sicily,
+Sardinia, Corsica, and Malta. They held both shores of the Straits
+of Gibraltar, and on the Atlantic shores of Spain established posts
+at Cadiz and Tarshish, the latter commonly supposed to have been
+situated just north of Cadiz at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River.
+Cadiz was their distributing point for the metals of northern Spain
+and the British Isles. The most famous colony was Carthage, situated
+near the present city of Tunis. Carthage was founded during the first
+half of the ninth century before Christ, and on the decay of the
+parent state became in turn mistress of the western Mediterranean,
+holding sway until crushed by Rome in the Punic Wars.
+
+Of the methods of the Phœnicians and their colonists in establishing
+trade with primitive peoples, we get an interesting picture from
+Herodotus,[1] who describes how the Carthaginians conducted business
+with barbarous tribes on the northern coast of Africa.
+
+[Footnote 1: HISTORY, translated by Geo. Rawlinson, vol. III, p.
+144.]
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER]
+
+"When they (the Carthaginian traders) arrive, forthwith they unload
+their wares, and having disposed them in orderly fashion on the
+beach, leave them, and returning aboard their ships, raise a great
+smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, came dawn to the shore,
+and laying out to view so much gold as they think the wares to be
+worth, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come
+ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it up and
+go their way; but if it does not seem sufficient they go aboard
+their ships once more and wait patiently. Then the others approach
+and add to the gold till the Carthaginians are satisfied. Neither
+party deals unfairly with the other; for the Carthaginians never
+touch the gold till it comes up to the estimated value of their
+goods, nor do the natives ever carry off the goads till the gold
+has been taken away."
+
+In addition to the enormous profits of the carrying trade the Phœnicians
+had a practical monopoly of the famous "Tyrian dyes," which were in
+great demand throughout the known world. These dyes were obtained
+from two kinds of shellfish together with an alkali prepared from
+seaweed. Phœnicians were also pioneers in the art of making glass.
+It is not hard to understand, therefore, how Phœnicia grew so
+extraordinarily rich as to rouse the envy of neighboring rulers,
+and to maintain themselves the traders of Tyre and Sidon had to
+develop fighting fleets as well as trading fleets.
+
+Early in Egyptian history the distinction was made between the
+"round" ships of commerce and the "long" ships of war. The round
+ship, as the name suggests, was built for cargo capacity rather
+than for speed. It depended on sail, with the oars as auxiliaries.
+The long ship was designed for speed, depending on oars and using
+sail only as auxiliary. And while the round ship was of deep draft
+and rode to anchor, the shallow flat-bottomed long ships were drawn
+up on shore. The Phœnicians took the Egyptian and Cretan models
+and improved them. They lowered the bows of the fighting ships,
+added to the blunt ram a beak near the water's edge, and strung
+the shields of the fighting men along the bulwarks to protect the
+rowers. To increase the driving force and the speed, they added a
+second and then a third bank of oars, thus producing the "bireme" and
+the "trireme." These were the types they handed down to the Greeks,
+and in fact there was little advance made beyond the Phœnician war
+galley during all the subsequent centuries of the Age of the Oar.
+
+About the beginning of the seventh century before Christ the Phœnicians
+had reached the summit of their power on the seas. Their extraordinary
+wealth tempted the king of Assyria, in 725 B.C., to cross the mountain
+barrier with a great army. He had no difficulty in overrunning the
+country, but the inhabitants fled to their colonies. The great
+city of Tyre, being on an island, defied the invader, and finally
+the Assyrian king gave up and withdrew to his own country. Having
+realized at great cost that he could not subdue the Phœnicians
+without a navy, he set about finding one. By means of bribes and
+threats he managed to seduce three Phœnician cities to his side.
+These furnished him sixty ships officered by Phœnicians, but manned
+by Assyrian crews.
+
+With this fleet an attack was made on Tyre, but such was the contempt
+felt by the Tyrians for their enemy that they held only twelve ships
+for defense. These twelve went out against the sixty, utterly routed
+them, and took 500 prisoners. For five years longer the Assyrian
+king maintained a siege of Tyre from the mainland, attempting to
+keep the city from its source of fresh water, but as the Tyrians
+had free command of the sea, they had no difficulty in getting
+supplies of all kinds from their colonies. At the end of five years
+the Assyrians again returned home, defeated by the Phœnician control
+of the sea. When, twenty years later, Phœnicia was subjugated by
+Assyria, it was due to the lack of union among the scattered cities
+and colonies of the great sea empire. Widely separated, governed
+by their own princes, the individual colonies had too little sense
+of loyalty for the mother country. Each had its own fleets and its
+own interests; in consequence an Assyrian fleet was able to destroy
+the Phœnician fleets in detail. From this point till the rise of
+Athens as a sea power, the fleets of Phœnicia still controlled the
+sea, but they served the plans of conquest of alien rulers.
+
+As a dependency of Persia, Phœnicia enabled Cambyses to conquer
+Egypt. However, when the Phœnician fleet was ordered to subjugate
+Carthage, already a strong power in the west, the Phœnicians refused
+on the ground of the kinship between Carthage and Phœnicia. And
+the help of Phœnicia was so essential to the Persian monarch that
+he countermanded the order. Indeed the relation of Phœnicia to
+Persia amounted to something more nearly like that of an ally than
+a conquered province, for it was to the interests of Persia to
+keep the Phœnicians happy and loyal.
+
+When, in 498 B.C., the Greeks of Asia and the neighboring islands
+revolted, it was due chiefly to the loyalty of the Phœnicians that the
+Persian empire was saved. Thereafter, the Persian yoke was fastened
+on the Asiatic Greeks, and any prospect of a Greek civilization
+developing on the eastern shore of the Ægean was destroyed.
+
+[Illustration: GREEK WAR GALLEY
+
+From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
+
+But on the western shore lay flourishing Greek cities still independent
+of Persian rule. Moreover, the coastal towns like Corinth and Athens
+were developing considerable power on the sea, and it was evident
+that unless European Greece were subdued it would stand as a barrier
+between Persia and the western Mediterranean. Darius perceived the
+situation and prepared to destroy these Greek states before they
+should become too formidable. The story of this effort, ending at
+Salamis and Platea, and breaking for all time the power of Persia,
+belongs in the subsequent chapter that narrates the rise and fall
+of Athens as a sea power.
+
+At this point, it is worth pausing to consider in detail the war
+galley which the Phœnicians had developed and which they handed
+down to the Greeks at this turning point in the world's history.
+The bireme and the trireme were adopted by the Greeks, apparently
+without alteration, save that at Salamis the Greek galleys were
+said to have been more strongly built and to have presented a lower
+freeboard than those of the Phœnicians. A hundred years later,
+about 330 B.C., the Greeks developed the four-banked ship, and
+Alexander of Macedon is said to have maintained on the Euphrates
+a squadron of seven-banked ships. In the following century the
+Macedonians had ships of sixteen banks of oars, and this was probably
+the limit for sea-going ships in antiquity. These multiple banked
+ships must have been most unhandy, for a reversal of policy set in
+till about the beginning of the Christian era the Romans had gone
+back to two-banked ships. In medieval times war galleys reverted
+to a single row of oars on each side, but required four or five
+men to every oar.
+
+[Illustration: GREEK MERCHANT SHIP
+
+From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
+
+At the time of the Persian war the trireme was the standard type of
+warship, as it had been for the hundred years before, and continued
+to be during the hundred years that followed. In fact, the name
+trireme was used loosely for all ships of war whether they had two
+banks of oars or three. But the fleets that fought in the Persian
+war and in the Peloponnesian war were composed of three-banked ships,
+and fortunately we have in the records of the Athenian dockyards
+accurate information as to structural detail.
+
+The Athenian trireme was about 150 feet in length with a beam of 20
+feet. The beam was therefore only 2/15 of the length. (A merchant
+ship of the same period was about 180 feet long with a beam of 1/4
+its length.) The trireme was fitted with one mast and square sail,
+the latter being used only when the wind was fair, as auxiliary
+to the oars, especially when it needed to retire from battle. In
+fact, the phrase "hoist the sail" came to be used colloquially
+like our "turn tail" as a term for running away.
+
+The triremes carried two sails, usually made of linen, a larger
+one used in cruising and a smaller one for emergency in battle.
+Before action it was customary to stow the larger sail on shore,
+and the mast itself was lowered to prevent its snapping under the
+shock of ramming.
+
+The forward part of the trireme was constructed with a view to
+effectiveness in ramming. Massive catheads projected far enough to
+rip away the upper works of an enemy, while the bronze beak at the
+waterline drove into her hull. This beak, or ram, was constructed
+of a core of timber heavily sheathed with bronze, presenting three
+teeth. Although the ram was the prime weapon of the ship, it often
+became so badly wrenched in collision as to start the whole forward
+part of the vessel leaking.
+
+The rowers were seated on benches fitted into a rectangular structure
+inside the hull. These benches were so compactly adjusted that
+the naval architects allowed only two feet of freeboard for every
+bank of oars. Thus the Roman quinquiremes of the Punic wars stood
+only about ten feet above water. The covering of this rectangular
+structure formed a sort of hurricane deck, standing about three
+feet above the gangway that ran around the ship at about the level
+of the bulwarks. This gangway and upper deck formed the platform
+for the fighting men in battle. Sometimes the open space between
+the hurricane deck and the gangway was fenced in with shields or
+screens to protect the rowers of the uppermost bank of oars from
+the arrows and javelins of the enemy.
+
+The complement of a trireme amounted to about 200 men. The captain,
+or "trierarch," commanded implicit obedience. Under him were a
+sailing master, various petty officers, sailors, soldiers or marines,
+and oarsmen.
+
+The trireme expanded in later centuries to the quinquereme: upper
+works were added and a second mast, but in essentials it was the
+same type of war vessel that dominated the Mediterranean for three
+thousand years--an oar driven craft that attempted to disable its
+enemy by ramming or breaking away the oars. After contact the fighting
+was of a hand to hand character such as prevailed in battles on
+land. These characteristics were as true of the galley of Lepanto
+(1571 A.D.) as of the trireme of Salamis (480 B.C.). Of the three
+cardinal virtues of the fighting ship, mobility, seaworthiness,
+and ability to keep the sea, or cruising radius, the oar-driven
+type possessed only the first. It was fast, it could hold position
+accurately, it could spin about almost on its own axis, but it was
+so frail that it had to run for shelter before a moderate wind
+and sea. In consequence naval operations were limited to the summer
+months. As to its cargo capacity, it was so small that it was unable
+to carry provisions to sustain its own crew for more than a few
+days. As a rule the trireme was beached at night, with the crew
+sleeping on shore, and as far as possible the meals were cooked
+and eaten on shore. In the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), for
+example, the Spartans fell upon the Athenians when their ships
+were drawn up on the beach and the crews were cooking their dinner.
+Moreover, the factors of speed and distance were both limited by
+the physical fatigue of the oarsmen. In the language of to-day,
+therefore, the oar-driven man-of-war had a small "cruising radius."
+
+This dependence on the land and this sensitiveness to weather are
+important facts in ancient naval history. It is fair to say that
+storms did far more to destroy fleets and naval expeditions than
+battles during the entire age of the oar. The opposite extreme
+was reached in Nelson's day. His lumbering ships of the line made
+wretched speed and straggling formations, but they were able to
+weather a hurricane and to keep the sea for an indefinite length
+of time.
+
+As a final word on the beginnings of navies, emphasis should be
+laid on the enormous importance of these early mariners, such as
+the Cretans and the Phœnicians, as builders of civilization. The
+venturesome explorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port
+not only opened up a new source of wealth but also established a
+reciprocal relation that quickened civilization at both ends of
+his route. The cargo ships that left the Nile delta distributed the
+arts of Egypt as well as its wheat, and the richest civilization of
+the ancient world, that of Greece, rose on foundation stones brought
+from Egypt, Assyria, and Phœnicia. It may be said of Phœnicia herself
+that she built-up her advanced culture on ideas borrowed almost
+wholly from her customers. But control of the seas for trade involved
+control of the seas for war, and behind the merchantman stood the
+trireme. It is significant and appropriate that a Phœnician coin
+that has come down to us bears the relief of a ship of war.
+
+In contrast with these early sea explorers and sea fighters stand
+the peoples of China and India. Having reached a high state of
+culture at an early period, they nevertheless, sought no contact
+with the world outside and became stagnant for thousands of years.
+Indeed, among the Hindus the crossing of the sea was a crime to be
+expiated only by the most agonizing penance. Hence these peoples
+of Asia, the most numerous in the world, exercised no influence
+on the development of civilization compared with a mere handful
+of people in Crete or the island city of Tyre. And for the same
+reason China and India ceased to progress and became for centuries
+mere backwaters of history.
+
+It is worth noting also that the Mediterranean, leading westwards
+from the early developed nations of Asia Minor and Egypt, opened
+a westward course to the advance of discovery and colonization,
+and this trend continued as the Pillars of Hercules led to the
+Atlantic and eventually to the new world. For every nation that
+bordered the Mediterranean illimitable highways opened out for
+expansion, provided it possessed the stamina and the skill to win
+them. And in those days they were practically the only highways.
+Frail as the early ships were and great as were the perils they
+had to face, communications by water were far centuries faster
+and safer than communications by land. Hence civilization followed
+the path of the sea. Even in these early beginnings it is easy
+to see that sea-borne commerce leads to the founding of colonies
+and the formation of an empire whose parts are linked together
+by trade routes, and finally, that the preservation of such an
+empire depends an the naval control of sea. This was as true of
+Crete and Phœnicia as it was later true of Venice, Holland, and
+England.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+THE SEA KINGS OF CRETE, J. Baikie, 1910.
+PHœNICIA, Story of the Nations Series, George Rawlinson, 1895.
+THE SAILING SHIP, E. Keble Chatterton, 1909.
+SHIPS AND THEIR WAYS OF OTHER DAYS, E. Keble Chatterton, 1913.
+ANCIENT SHIPS, Cecil Torr, 1894.
+ARCHEOLOGIE NAVALE, Auguste Jal, 1840.
+THE PREHISTORIC NAVAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE NORTH OF EUROPE,
+  G. H. Buhmer, in Report of the U. S. National Museum, 1893.
+  This article contains a complete bibliography on the subject of
+  ancient ships.
+SEA POWER AND FREEDOM (chap. 2), Gerard Fiennes, 1918.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+ATHENS AS A SEA POWER
+
+1. THE PERSIAN WAR
+
+In determining to crush the independence of the Greek cities of
+the west, Darius was influenced not only by the desire to destroy a
+dangerous rival on the sea and an obstacle to further advances by the
+Persian empire, but also to tighten his hold on the Greek colonies of
+Asia Minor. Helped by the Phœnician fleet and the treachery of the
+Lesbians and Samians, he had succeeded in putting down a formidable
+rebellion in 500 B.C. In this rebellion the Asiatic Greeks had
+received help from their Athenian brethren on the other side of
+the Ægean; indeed just so long as Greek independence flourished
+anywhere there would always be the threat of revolt in the Greek
+colonies of Persia. Darius perceived rightly that the prestige and
+the future power of his empire depended on his conquering Greece.
+
+In 492 he dispatched Mardonius with an army of invasion to subdue
+Attica and Eretria, and at the same time sent forth a great fleet to
+conquer the independent island communities of the Ægean. Mardonius
+succeeded in overcoming the tribes of Thrace and Macedonia, but the
+fleet, after taking the island of Thasus, was struck by a storm
+that wrecked three hundred triremes with a loss of 20,000 lives. As
+the broken remnants of the fleet returned to Asia, leaving Mardonius
+with no sea communications, and harassed by increasing opposition,
+he was compelled to retreat also. In 490 Darius sent out another
+army under Mardonius, this time embarking it on a fleet of 600
+triremes which succeeded in arriving safely at the coast of Attica
+in the bay of Marathon. While the army was disembarking it was
+attacked by Miltiades and utterly defeated. The second expedition,
+therefore, came to nothing. But Marathon can hardly be called a
+decisive battle because it merely postponed the invasion; it affected
+in no way the communications of the Persians and it did not weaken
+seriously their military resources.
+
+The great savior of Greece at this crisis was the Athenian,
+Themistocles. He foresaw the renewed efforts of the Persian king
+to destroy Greece, and realized also that the most vital point in
+the coming conflict would be the control of the sea. Accordingly
+he urged upon the Athenians the necessity of building a powerful
+fleet. In this policy he was aided by one of those futile wars
+so characteristic of Greek history, a war between Athens and the
+island of Ægina. In order to overcome the Æginetans, who had a
+large fleet, the Athenians were compelled to build a larger one,
+and by the time this purpose was accomplished rumors came that
+the Persian king was getting ready another invasion of Greece.
+
+_Campaign of Salamis_
+
+The third attempt was undertaken ten years after the second, in
+the year 480, under Xerxes, the successor to Darius. This time the
+very immensity of the forces employed was to overcome all opposition
+and all misfortunes. An army, variously estimated at from one to
+five million men, crossed the Hellespont on a bridge of boats to
+invade the peninsula from the north, while a fleet of 1200 triremes
+was assembled to insure the command of the sea.
+
+Against the unlimited resources of the Persian empire and the unity
+of plan represented by Xerxes and his generals, the Greeks had
+little to offer. They possessed the two advantages of the defensive,
+knowledge of the terrain and interior lines,[1] but their resources
+were small and their spirit divided. Greece in those days was, as
+was later said of Italy, "merely a geographical expression." The
+various cities were mutually jealous and hostile, and it took a great
+common danger to bring them even into a semblance of coöperation.
+Even during this desperate crisis the cities of western Greece,
+counting themselves reasonably safe from invasion, declined to
+send a ship or a man for the common cause.
+
+[Footnote 1: "'Interior Lines' conveys the meaning that from a
+central position one can assemble more rapidly on either of two
+opposite fronts than the enemy can, and therefore utilize force
+more effectively." NAVAL STRATEGY, A. T. Mahan, p. 32.]
+
+[Illustration: ROUTE OF XERXES' FLEET TO BATTLE OF SALAMIS]
+
+The Persian army advanced without opposition as far as the pass of
+Thermopylæ, which guarded the only road into the rest of Greece.
+Twelve days after the army had started on its march the great fleet
+crossed the Ægean to establish contact with the army and bring
+supplies. The army was checked by the valor of Leonidas, and the
+Persian fleet was intercepted by a Greek fleet which stood guard
+over the channel leading to the Gulf of Lamia, thus protecting the
+sea flank of Leonidas. The Persian fleet, after crossing the open
+sea safely, made its base at Sepias preparatory to the attack on
+the Greek fleet. The latter numbered only about 380 vessels to some
+1200 of their enemy and the prospects for the Persian cause looked
+bright indeed. But as the very number of the Persian ships made it
+impossible to beach all of them for the night a large proportion
+of them were anchored, lying in eight lines, prows toward the sea.
+At dawn a northeast gale fell upon them, and, according to the
+Greek accounts, wrecked 400 triremes, together with an uncounted
+number of transports. Meanwhile the Greek ships had taken refuge
+under the lee of the island of Eubœa, and the news of the Persian
+disaster was signaled to them by the watchers on the heights.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF PRELIMINARY NAVAL OPERATIONS, CAMPAIGN OF
+SALAMIS]
+
+As soon as the weather moderated the Greeks returned to their position
+in the straits near Artemisium, and during the next three days the
+two fleets fought stubbornly but without advantage to either side.
+During the second day a southerly gale caught a flying squadron
+of some 200 triremes, that had been dispatched round the island of
+Eubœa to catch the Greeks in the rear, and not one of the Persian
+ships survived. The Greek rear guard squadron of fifty brought
+the welcome news to the main fleet and served as a much needed
+reënforcement. Although the Persian armada had lost about half
+its force in three days by storms, the odds were still so heavily
+against the Greeks that they found themselves in constant peril
+of having their flanks turned in this open sea fighting.
+
+On the afternoon of the third day the pass of Thermopyæ was forced,
+thanks to the treachery of a Greek and the contemptible policy of
+the Spartan government which steadily refused the plea of Leonidas
+for reënforcements. With Thermopyæ taken there was no further reason
+for the Greek fleet to try to hold the straits north of Eubœa,
+and during the night it retired unobserved. The following day the
+Persian fleet advanced and brought to the army the supplies which
+it sorely needed.
+
+With the fall of Thermopyæ and the contact established between his
+army and his fleet, Xerxes found his route open for the invasion
+of Attica. Since there was no possibility of opposing him on land,
+the population of the province was removed and Athens left to its
+fate. Themistocles, who was in command of the Athenian division of
+the Greek fleet, now urged the assembling of the fleet at Salamis,
+partly to cover the withdrawal of the Athenians and partly to assist
+in the defense of the Isthmus of Corinth, which was to be the next
+stand of the Greeks. The advice was adopted and the fleet assembled
+off the town of Salamis. Athenian refugees had crowded into the town
+and from the heights above they watched the smoke of their burning
+city. Their own future and the future of Athenian civilization hung
+on the long lines of triremes drawn up on the shore.
+
+A glance at the map of the region of Salamis shows the advantages
+offered by the position for the defensive. The fighting off Artemisium
+had shown the peril of attacking a greatly superior force in the open
+because of the danger of being outflanked. In the narrow straits
+between Salamis and the mainland the Greek line of battle would
+rest its flanks on the opposite shores. But it is one thing to
+choose a position and another to get the enemy to accept battle in
+that position. If the Persians ignored the Greek fleet and moved to
+the Isthmus, the Greeks would be caught in an awkward predicament. To
+regain touch with the Greek army, the fleet would be then compelled
+to come out of the straits and fight at a disadvantage in the open.
+There was only one chance of defeating the Persian fleet and that
+was to make it fight in the narrow waters of the strait where numbers
+would not count so heavily. Everything depended on bringing this
+to pass.
+
+Nor could the Greeks wait indefinitely for the Persians. Already
+the incorrigible jealousies of rival cities had almost reached the
+point of disintegrating the fleet. Although the commander in chief
+was the Spartan general Eurybiades, the whole Spartan contingent
+was on the point of deserting in a body to its own coasts. The
+situation was saved by Themistocles. Having wrung from his allies
+a reluctant consent to stop at Salamis temporarily to cover the
+withdrawal of the Athenian populace, the story is that he secretly
+dispatched a messenger to Xerxes to say that if he would attack
+at once he could crush the entire naval forces of the Greeks at a
+blow, but if he delayed the Greeks would scatter. Acting on this
+advice, Xerxes landed troops on the island of Psyttaleia, dispatched
+a squadron to block the western outlet of Salamis Straits, and
+proceeded to move the main body of his fleet to attack the Greeks
+by way of the eastern channel. The preparations were made during
+the night and were not completed till dawn of the day of battle,
+September 20, 480 B.C.
+
+The debates in the allied fleet came to an end with the appearance
+of the Persians. The shrewd plan of Themistocles had succeeded.
+The Greeks would have to fight with their backs to the wall, but
+they would fight with better chance of success than under any other
+circumstances.
+
+The Greek force consisted of about 380 vessels. Of these, Athens
+contributed 180, Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnesus were
+represented by 89 and the remainder were made up of squadrons from
+the island states. Some of these island contingents contained a
+type of ship different from the triremes, the penteconter. This was
+a galley with only one bank of oars, but these were long sweeps,
+each manned by five oarsmen. The penteconter was an early prototype
+of the galley of the Christian era.
+
+The Persians had been reduced by this time to about 600 ships,
+although there had been numerous reënforcements since the disaster
+at Cape Sepias. The fleet was "Persian" only in name, for, except
+for bands of Persian archers on some of the ships, it was composed
+of elements levied from each of the subject nations that followed
+the sea. Indeed Persia is a curious example in history of a nation
+with a purely artificial sea power, for its navy was composed of
+aliens entirely. Thus the squadron that was sent to blockade the
+western end of the straits was Egyptian, the right wing of the fleet
+as it advanced to the attack was composed of Phœnicians, and the
+center and left was made up of Cyprians, Cilicians, Samothracians,
+and Ionians, the latter only recently in rebellion against Persia
+and at that time welcoming help from Athens in a cause in which
+Athens herself was now involved. Apparently there was no compunction
+felt on this account, for the Ionians distinguished themselves by
+gallant fighting against their Greek brethren. Nevertheless, it
+is not hard to imagine difficulties involved in the task of making
+a unit of such an assortment of peoples. The fleet was commanded
+by a Persian, Prince Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes.
+
+At daybreak the Persian triremes drew up in three lines on each
+side of the island of Psyttaleia and advanced into the straits.
+But the narrowing waters of the channel made it necessary to reduce
+the front and bear to the left. Consequently all formation was
+lost, and the Persian triremes poured into the narrows "in a
+stream,"--to quote the phrase of the tragedian Æschylus, who fought
+on an Athenian trireme in this battle and describes it in one of
+his plays.
+
+Facing the invader was a smaller array of ships but a better ordered
+line of battle. On the Greek left was the Athenian division opposing
+the advancing triremes of Phœnicia; on the right was the Spartan
+division facing the Greeks of Asia Minor. The two fleets rushed toward
+each other, but just before contact the Persians found themselves
+embarrassed by their very number of ships. As may be seen by the
+map, they had an awkward turn to make in entering the narrows. At
+this point, just opposite the peninsula of Salamis, the straits
+are only about 2000 yards wide, making it impossible for more than
+80 or 90 triremes to advance abreast. As a result the Phœnician
+wing of the line was extended considerably in advance of the rest,
+forced ahead by the pressure of ships behind. Although, as a matter
+of fact, the Spartan wing also was somewhat in advance of the rest of
+the Greek line, the first shock of battle came between the Phœnicians
+and the Athenians.
+
+[Illustration: After Grundy, _The Great Persian War._
+
+THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, 480 B. C.
+
+  1 The Original Position
+  2 The Advance
+  3 The Contact]
+
+This initial advantage offered by an exposed wing was immediately
+seized upon. While the Athenians bore the frontal attack, the Æginetans
+on their right fell upon the Phœnicians' flank. This double attack
+on the Persian right wing eventually proved the turning point of
+the battle. The Phœnicians, however, had the reputation of being
+the foremost sea fighters in the world, and they bore themselves
+well. Similarly the Asiatic Greeks proved themselves foemen worthy
+of their brethren from the Peloponnesus, and the fight was maintained
+with great ferocity all along the line. The inhabitants of Athens
+who had been removed to Salamis blackened the shores on one side of
+the Strait, as anxious watchers of the tremendous spectacle. Opposite
+them on the slope of Mt. Ægaleos sat Xerxes himself, surrounded by
+his staff, a less anxious spectator but no less interested in the
+outcome.
+
+About seven o'clock a fresh westerly wind arose, as it does at
+this day in that region, and as it did some years later during a
+battle won by an Athenian admiral in the Gulf of Corinth.[1] This
+wind blows every morning with considerable violence for about two
+hours; and in this battle it must have tended to make the bows of
+the Persian ships pay off--thus exposing their sides to the Greek
+rams--and drift back upon the galleys that were crowding forward
+from the rear in the attempt to get into the battle.
+
+[Footnote 1: The Battle of the Corinthian Gulf: v. p. 43]
+
+The Greeks pressed their advantage, using their rams to sink an
+adversary or disable her by cutting away her oars. Where the mêlée
+was too close for such tactics they tried to take their enemy by
+boarding. On every Greek trireme was a specially organized boarding
+party consisting of 36 men--18 marines, 14 heavily armed soldiers,
+and four bowmen; and the Greeks seem to have been superior to their
+enemy at close quarters. On the Persian side the superiority lay in
+their archers and javelin throwers. Toward the end of the battle,
+for instance, a Samothracian trireme performed a remarkable feat.
+Having been disabled by an Æginetan ship, the Samothracian cleared the
+decks of her assailant with arrows and javelins and took possession.
+Although the invaders seem to have fought with the greatest courage
+and determination, the disadvantage of confusion at the outset of
+the battle, augmented by the head wind, told decisively against
+them. They were unable to take advantage of their superiority in ships
+on account of the narrowness of the channel, and indeed found that
+the very multitude of their ships only added to their difficulties.
+
+The retreat began with the flower of the Persian fleet, the Phœnician
+division. Caught at the opening of the battle with the Athenians in
+front and the Æginetans on the left flank, they were never able to
+extricate themselves, although they fought stubbornly. The foremost
+ships, many in a disabled condition, began to retreat; others backed
+water to make way for them; the rearmost finding it impossible to
+reach the battle at all, withdrew out of the straits; and soon the
+retreat became general. As the Phœnicians withdrew, the Athenians
+and the Æginetans fell upon the center of the Persian line, and the
+rout became general with the Greeks in full pursuit. The latter
+pressed their enemy as far as the island of Psyttaleia, thus cutting
+off the Persian force on the island from their communications.
+Whereupon Aristides, the Athenian, led a force in boats from Salamis
+to the island and put to death every man of the Persian garrison.
+The Persian ships fled to their base at Phaleron, while the Greeks
+returned to their base at Salamis.
+
+The battle of Salamis was won, but at the moment neither side realized
+its decisive character. The Greeks had lost 40 ships; the Persians
+had lost over 200 sunk, and an indeterminate number captured.
+Nevertheless, the latter could probably have mustered a considerable
+force for another attack--which the Greeks expected--if their morale
+had not been so badly shaken. Their commander, Ariabignes, was
+among the killed, and there was no one else capable of reorganizing
+the shattered forces. Xerxes, fearing for the safety of his bridge
+over the Hellespont, gave orders for his ships to retire thither to
+protect it, and the very night after the battle found the remains
+of the Persian fleet in full flight across the Ægean.
+
+The news reached the Greeks at noon of the following day and they
+set out in pursuit, but having gone as far as Andros without coming
+up with the enemy, they paused for a council of war. The Athenians
+urged the policy of going on and destroying the bridge over the
+Hellespont, but they were voted down by their allies, who preferred
+to leave well enough alone.
+
+It is customary to speak of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis
+as due to their superior physique and fighting qualities. This
+superiority may be claimed for the Greek soldiers at Marathon and
+Platæ, where the Persian army was actually Persian. The Asiatic
+soldier, forced into service and flogged into battle, was indeed
+no match for the virile and warlike Greek. But at Salamis it was
+literally a case of Greek meeting Greek, except in the case of the
+Phœnicians--who had the reputation of being the finest seafighters
+in the world--and it is not easy to see how the battle was won by
+sheer physical prowess. There is no evidence to show any lack of
+either courage or fighting ability on the Persian side. The decisive
+feature of the battle was the fatal exposure of the Phœnician wing
+at the very outset. However, it is worth noting that the invaders
+had been maneuvering all night and were tired--especially the
+oarsmen--when called upon to enter battle against an enemy that
+was fresh. In that respect there was undoubtedly some advantage
+to the Greeks, but it can hardly have been of prime importance.
+
+The immediate results of the victory at Salamis were soon apparent.
+The all-conquering Persian army suddenly found itself in a critical
+situation. Cut off from its supplies by sea, it had to retreat or
+starve, for the country which it occupied was incapable of furnishing
+supplies for a host so enormous. Xerxes left an army of occupation in
+Thessaly consisting of 300,000 men under Mardonius, but the rest were
+ordered to get back to Persia as best they could. A panic-stricken
+rout to the Hellespont began, and for the next forty-five days
+a great host, that had never been even opposed in battle, went
+to pieces under famine, disease, and the guerilla warfare of the
+inhabitants of the country it traversed, and it was only a broken
+and demoralized remnant of the great army that survived to see the
+Hellespont. This great military disaster was due entirely to the
+fact that Salamis had deprived Xerxes of the command of the sea.
+Indeed, if the advice of Themistodes had been taken and the Greek
+fleet had proceeded to the Hellespont and held the position, not even
+a remnant of the retreating army would have survived. It happened
+that the bridge had been carried away by storms and the army had to
+be ferried over by the ships of the beaten and demoralized Persian
+fleet, an operation which would have been impossible in the face
+of the victorious Greeks.
+
+Xerxes still held to the idea of conquering Greece; but the chance
+was gone. Mardonius, it is true, remained in Thessaly with an army,
+but it was no longer an army of millions. The Greeks assembled an
+army of about 100,000 men and in the battle of Platæa the following
+year utterly defeated it. On the same day the Greeks destroyed
+what was left of the Persian fleet in the battle of Mycale, on
+the coast of Asia Minor. This, strictly speaking, was not a naval
+battle at all, for the Persians had drawn their ships up on shore
+and built a stockade around them. The Greeks landed their crews,
+took the stockade by storm and burnt the ships. These later victories
+were the direct consequences of the earlier victory of Salamis.
+
+Another phase of the Persian plan of conquering the Greeks must not
+be overlooked. Xerxes had stirred up Carthage to undertake a naval
+and military expedition against the Greeks of Sicily, in order that
+all the independent Greek states might be crushed simultaneously.
+Again the weather came to the rescue, for the greater part of the
+Carthaginian fleet was wrecked by storms. The survivors of the
+expedition laid siege to the city of Himera, but were eventually
+driven back to their ships in rout with the loss of their general.
+Thus the Greek civilization of Sicily was saved at the same time
+as that of Athens.
+
+East and west, therefore, the grandiose plan of the Persian despot
+fell in ruin, and with it fell the prestige and the power of the
+empire. The Ionians revolted and joined Athens as allies, and the
+control of the Ægean passed from Persia to Athens. With this loss
+of sea power began the decline of Persia as a world power.
+
+The significance of this astounding defeat of the greatest military
+and naval power of the time lies in the fact that European, or
+more particularly Greek, civilization was spared to develop its
+own individuality. Had Xerxes succeeded, the paralyzing régime of
+an Asiatic despotism would have stifled the genius of the Greek
+people. Self-government would never have had its beginnings in
+Greece, and a subjugated Athens would never have produced the "Age
+of Pericles." In the two generations following Salamis, Athens
+made a greater original contribution to literature, philosophy,
+science, and art than any other nation in any two centuries of
+its existence.
+
+For the fact that this priceless heritage was left to later ages
+the world is indebted chiefly to the Greeks who fought at Salamis.
+The night before that battle the cause of Greece seemed doomed
+beyond hope. The day after, the invaders began a retreat that ended
+forever their hopes of conquest. This amazing change of fortune was
+due to the fact that the success of the Persian invasion depended
+on the control of the sea. Hence the Greeks, though unable to muster
+an army large enough to meet the Persian host on land, defeated
+it disastrously by winning a victory on the sea.
+
+2. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
+
+After Salamis, Athens rose to a commanding position among the Greek
+states. Her period of supremacy was brief, lasting less than 75
+years, but while it endured it rested on her triremes. In the middle
+of the fifth century she had 100,000 men in her navy, practically
+as many as Great Britain in her fleet before 1914. Although the
+period of Athenian supremacy was short-lived, it is interesting
+because it produced a great naval genius, Phormio, and because
+it wrecked itself as Persian sea power had done, in an attempt at
+foreign conquest.
+
+Scarcely had the Persian invasion come to an end when bickering broke
+out among the various Greek states, much of it directed against Athens.
+She had small difficulty, however, in maintaining her ascendancy in
+northern Greece on account of her superiority on the sea, and it
+was during the half century after Salamis that Athens arose to
+her splendid climax as the intellectual and artistic center of
+the world.
+
+[Illustration: After Shepherd's _Historical Atlas._
+
+THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT--ABOUT 450 B.C.]
+
+In 431 began the Peloponnesian War. Its immediate cause was the
+help given by Athens to Corcyra (Corfu) in a war against Corinth.
+Corinth called on Sparta for help, and in consequence northern and
+southern Greece were locked in a mortal struggle. The Athenians
+had a naval base at Naupaktis on the Gulf of Corinth, and in 429,
+two years after war broke out, the Athenian Phormio found himself
+supplied with only twenty triremes with which to maintain control
+of that important waterway. At the same time Sparta was setting in
+motion a large land and water expedition with the object of sweeping
+Athenian influence from all of western Greece and of obtaining
+control of the Gulf of Corinth. A fleet from Corinth was to join
+another at Leukas, one of the Ionian Islands, and then proceed to
+operate on the northern coast of the gulf while an army invaded
+the province.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF PHORMIO'S CAMPAIGNS]
+
+As it happened, the army moved off without waiting for the coöperation
+of the fleet and eventually went to pieces in an ineffectual siege of
+an inland city. When the fleet started out from Corinth it numbered
+47 triremes. As this was more than twice the number possessed by
+Phormio, the Corinthian admiral evidently counted on being secure
+from attack. Accordingly he used some of his triremes as transports
+and started on his journey without taking the precaution to train
+his oarsmen or practice maneuvers. But as he skirted along the
+southern coast he was surprised to see the Athenian ships moving in
+a parallel course as if on the alert for an opportunity to attack.
+When the Corinthian ships bore up from Patræ to cross to the Ætolian
+shore, the Athenian column steered directly toward them. At this
+threat the Corinthian fleet turned away and put in at Rhium, a
+point near the narrowest part of the strait, in order to make the
+crossing under cover of night. The Corinthian admiral made the same
+fatal mistake committed by the commander of the Spanish Armada
+2000 years later in a similar undertaking, that of trying to avoid
+an enemy on the sea rather than fight him before carrying out an
+invasion of the enemy's coast. This ignominious conduct on the
+part of the Corinthian admiral was partly due to the fact that he
+was encumbered with his transports, but chiefly to the fact that
+he knew that in fighting qualities his men were no match for the
+Athenians. The latter had no peers on the sea at that time. Since
+Salamis they had progressed far in naval science and efficiency
+and were filled with the confidence that comes from knowledge and
+experience.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF, 429 B. C.
+
+Corinthian Formation and Circling Tactics of Phormio.]
+
+All night Phormio watched his enemy and at dawn surprised him in
+mid-crossing. On seeing Phormio advance to the attack, the Corinthian
+drew up his squadron in a defensive position, ranging his vessels
+in concentric circles, bows outward, like the spokes of a wheel.
+In the center of this formation he placed his transports, together
+with five of his largest triremes to assist at any threatened spot.
+The formation suggests a leader of infantry rather than an admiral;
+moreover, it revealed a fatal readiness to give up the offensive
+to an enemy force less than half his own.
+
+At any rate there was no lack of decision on the part of Phormio.
+He advanced rapidly in line ahead formation, closed in near the
+enemy's prows as if he intended to strike at any moment and circled
+round the line. The Corinthian triremes, having no headway and
+manned by inexperienced rowers, began crowding back on one another
+as they tried to keep in position for the expected attack. Then the
+same early morning wind that had embarrassed the Persian ships at
+Salamis sprang up and added to the confusion of fouling ships and
+clashing oar blades. Choosing his opening, Phormio flew the signal
+for attack and rammed one of the flagships of the Corinthian fleet.
+The Athenians fell upon their enemy and almost at the first blow
+routed the entire Corinthian force. In addition to those triremes
+that were sunk outright, twelve remained as prizes with their full
+complement of crews, and the rest scattered in flight. Phormio
+returned in triumph to Naupaktis with the loss of scarcely a man.
+
+So humiliating a defeat had to be avenged, and Sparta organized
+a new expedition. This time a fleet of 77 triremes was collected.
+Meanwhile Phormio had sent to Athens the news of his victory together
+with an urgent plea for reënforcements. Unfortunately the great
+Pericles was dying and the government had fallen into weak and
+unscrupulous hands. Consequently while 20 triremes were ordered to
+the support of Phormio, political intrigue succeeded in diverting
+this squadron to carry out a futile expedition to Crete, and Phormio
+was left to contest the control of the gulf against a fleet of 77
+with nothing more than his original twenty.
+
+It is interesting to observe what strategy Phormio adopted in this
+difficult situation. In the campaign of Salamis, Themistocles chose
+the narrow waters of the strait as the safest position for a fleet
+outnumbered by the enemy, because of the protection offered to the
+flanks by the opposite shores. But Phormio, commanding a fleet about
+one-fourth that of his adversary, chose the open sea. Apparently
+his decision was based on the fact that the superiority of the
+Athenian ship lay in its greater speed and skill in maneuvering.
+Unable to cope with his adversary in full force, he might by his
+superior mobility beat him in detail. Accordingly, he boldly took
+the open sea.
+
+For about a week the two fleets lay within sight of each other,
+with Phormio trying to draw his enemy out of the narrows into open
+water and his adversary attempting to crowd him into a corner against
+the share. Finally the Peloponnesian, realizing that Phormio would
+have to defend his base, and hoping to force him to fight at a
+disadvantage, moved upon Naupaktis. As this port was undefended,
+Phormio was compelled to return thither.
+
+The Peloponnesian fleet advanced in line of four abreast with the
+Spartan admiral and the twenty Spartan triremes--the best in the
+fleet--in the lead. At the signal from the admiral the column swung
+"left into line" and bore down in line abreast upon the Athenians
+who were ranging along the shore in line ahead. The object of the
+maneuver was to cut the Athenians off from the port and crowd them
+upon the shore. The latter, however, developed such a burst of
+speed that eleven of the twenty succeeded in reaching Naupaktis;
+the remaining nine drove ashore and their crews escaped. Apparently
+the victory of the Spartan was as complete as it was easy. But while
+the rest of the fleet busied itself with the deserted Athenian
+triremes on the share, the Spartan squadron continued in the pursuit
+of the eleven Athenian ships that were heading for Naupaktis. Ten
+of the eleven reached port and drew up in a position of defense.
+The eleventh, less speedy than the rest, was being overhauled by
+the Spartan flagship which was pushing the pursuit far in advance
+of the rest of the squadron. The captain of the Athenian ship,
+seeing this situation, determined on a bold stroke. Instead of
+pushing on into the harbor he pulled round a merchant ship that lay
+anchored at the mouth, and rammed his pursuer amidships, disabling
+her at a blow. The Spartan admiral promptly killed himself and the
+rest of the ship's company were too panic stricken to resist.
+
+At this disaster the rest of the Spartan squadron hesitated, dropped
+oars or ran into shallow water. Seeing his opportunity, Phormio
+dashed out of the harbor with his ten triremes and fell upon the
+Spartans. In spite of the ridiculous disparity of forces, this
+handful of Athenian ships pressed their attack so gallantly that
+they destroyed the Spartan advance wing and then, catching the
+rest of the fleet in disorder, routed the main body as well. By
+nightfall Phormio had rescued eight of the nine Athenian triremes
+that had fallen into the hands of the enemy and sent the scattered
+remnants of the Peloponnesian fleet in full flight towards Corinth.
+This battle of Naupaktis remains one of the most brilliant naval
+victories in history, a victory won against overwhelming odds by
+quick decision and superb audacity.
+
+Only a half century separates Salamis from the battle of the Corinthian
+Gulf and the battle of Naupaktis, but during that period there had
+been a great advance in naval science.
+
+As far as naval tactics are concerned, Salamis was merely a fight
+between two mobs of ships, except that when opportunity offered,
+a vessel used her ram. Otherwise the only difference from land
+fighting was the fact that the combatants stood on floating platforms.
+But in the Peloponnesian war we see not only the birth of naval
+tactics but a very high development, especially as revealed in
+these two victories of Phormio.
+
+With the development of a naval science rose also a naval profession.
+At Salamis Themistocles was a politician and Eurybiades was a soldier;
+it happened that they were made fleet commanders for the emergency.
+Phormio was a naval officer by profession, and he won by genius
+combined with superior efficiency in the personnel under his command.
+In his courage, resourcefulness, in the spirit he inspired, and
+the high pitch of skill he developed among his officers and men,
+he is an ideal type for every later age. Little is known of his
+life and character beyond the story of these two exploits, but
+they are sufficient to give him the name of the first great admiral
+of history.
+
+His exploits illustrate, too, at the very outset of naval history,
+the vital truth that the man counts more than the machine. In these
+later days, when the tendency is to measure naval power merely by
+counting dreadnoughts, and to settle all hypothetical combats by
+the proportion of strength at a given point on the game board, it
+is well to remember that the most overwhelming victories have been
+won by the skill and audacity of a great leader, which overcame
+odds that would be reckoned by the experts as insuperable.
+
+The Peloponnesian war dragged on with varying fortunes for ten
+years. The Athenians were regularly successful on the sea and
+unsuccessful on land. They seem to have laid an unwise dependence
+on their navy for a state situated on the mainland with land
+communications open to the enemy. They attempted to make an island
+of their state by withdrawing into the city of Athens the entire
+population of Attica, leaving open to the invader the rest of the
+province. The repeated ravaging of Attica by Peloponnesian armies
+weakened both the resources and the morale of the Athenians, and
+the crowding of the inhabitants into the city resulted in frightful
+mortality from the plague. At the same time the naval expeditions
+sent out to harry the coast of the Peloponnesus accomplished nothing
+of real advantage.
+
+In 421 a truce was agreed upon between Athens and Sparta, which
+was to last fifty years. Both sides were sorely weakened by the
+protracted struggle and neither had gained any real advantage over
+the other. Without waiting to recuperate from the losses of the
+war, Athens embarked in 415 on an ambitious plan of conquering
+Syracuse, and gaining all of Sicily as an Athenian colony. In the
+event of success Athens would have a western outpost for the eventual
+control of the Mediterranean, as she already had an eastern outpost
+in Ionia, which gave her control of the Ægean.
+
+In the light of the event it is customary to refer to this expedition
+as the climax of folly, and yet it is clear that if the commander
+in chief had not wasted time in interminable delays the Athenians
+might easily have won their objective. At first the Syracusans felt
+hopeless because of the large army and fleet dispatched against
+them, and the great naval prestige of their enemy, but as delay
+succeeded delay, assistance arrived from Corinth and Sparta, and
+the besieged citizens took heart. The siege dragged on for the
+greater part of two years, with the offensive gradually slipping
+from the Athenians to the Syracusans, till finally the invaders
+found their troops besieged on shore and their ships bottled up
+in the harbor by a line of galleys anchored across the entrance.
+The Syracusans knew that they were no match for the Athenians on
+the open sea, but with a fleet crowded into a harbor with no room
+for maneuvering, the problem was not essentially different from
+that of fighting on land. They built a fleet of ships with specially
+strengthened bows for ramming and erected catapults for throwing
+heavy stones on the decks of the enemy. Meanwhile, the Athenian
+ships had deteriorated from lack of opportunity to refit and their
+crews had been heavily reduced by disease. In a pitched battle
+between the two fleets in the harbor, the Athenians were worsted.
+Shortly after as the Athenians were attempting to break through
+the barrier and escape, they were again attacked by the Syracusans.
+There was no room for maneuvering; the Athenian ships were jammed
+together in a mass in which all advantage of numbers was lost.
+Moreover, against the deadly rain of huge stones the Athenians had
+no defense whatever.
+
+The result was an overwhelming victory for the Syracusans. Out
+of 110 triremes the Athenians lost fifty. The besieging army went
+to pieces in attempting a retreat across the island, and the whole
+expedition came to a tragic end. This defeat of the Athenian fleet
+in the harbor of Syracuse was the ruin of Athens. When the news
+reached Greece, many of her dependencies revolted, the Peloponnesian
+war had broken out anew, and she had no strength left to hold her
+own. The deathblow was given when a Spartan admiral destroyed all
+that was left of the Athenian navy at Ægospotami in the year 405.
+Thereafter Athens was merely a conquered province, permitted to
+keep a fleet of only twelve ships, and watched by a garrison of
+Spartan soldiers in the citadel.
+
+The downfall of Athenian sea power at Syracuse may be compared
+with the downfall of Persian sea power at Salamis. Just as the
+latter prevented the spread of an Asiatic form of civilization
+in Europe and gave Greek civilization a chance to develop, so the
+former put an end to the extension of a strong Hellenic power in
+Italy and left opportunity for the rise of the civilization of
+Rome.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+HISTORY OF GREECE, Ernst Curtius, 1874.
+HISTORY OF GREECE, George Grote, 1856.
+THE GREAT PERSIAN WAR, G. B. Grundy, 1901.
+HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN WARS, Herodotus, ed. and transl. by Geo.
+  Rawlinson, 1862.
+HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, Thucydides, ed. and transl.
+  by Jowett.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE SEA POWER OF ROME
+
+1. THE PUNIC WARS
+
+When peoples have migrated in the past, they have frequently changed
+their habits to conform to new topographical surroundings. We have
+seen that the Phœnicians, originally a nomadic people, became a
+seafaring race because of the conditions of the country they settled
+in; and on the other hand, at a later period, the Vikings who overran
+Normandy or Britain forsook the sea and became farmers. The popular
+idea that a race follows the sea because of an "instinct in the blood
+of the race" has little to stand on. When, however, the colonists
+from Phœnicia settled Carthage and founded an empire, they continued
+the traditions of their ancestors and built up their power on a
+foundation of ships. This was due to the conditions--topographical
+and geographical--which surrounded them, and which were much like
+those of the mother country. Carthage possessed the finest harbor
+on the coast of Africa, situated in the middle of the Mediterranean,
+where all the trade routes crossed. To counteract these attractions
+of the sea there was nothing but the arid and mountainous character
+of the interior. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Carthaginians,
+like their ancestors, should build an empire of the sea.
+
+As early as the sixth century B.C. Carthage had established her
+power so securely in the western Mediterranean as to be able to
+set down definite limits beyond which Rome agreed not to go. Thus
+the opening sentence of a treaty between the two nations in 509
+B. C. ran as follows:
+
+"Between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and
+their allies there shall be peace and alliance upon the conditions
+that neither the Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the
+Fair Promontory[1] unless compelled by bad weather or an enemy;
+and in case they are forced beyond it they shall not be allowed
+to take or purchase anything except what is barely necessary for
+refitting their vessels or for sacrifice, and they shall depart
+within five days."[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: A cape on the African coast about due north from
+Carthage.]
+
+[Footnote 2: GENERAL HISTORY, Polybius, Bk. III, chap. 3.]
+
+A second and a third treaty emphasized even mare strongly the
+Carthaginian dictatorship over the Mediterranean.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS]
+
+It was inevitable, therefore, that as Rome expanded her interests
+should come in collision with those of Carthage. The immediate
+causes of the Punic wars are of no consequence for our purpose;
+the two powers had rival interests in Sicily, and the clash of
+these brought on the war in the year 264 B.C. There followed a
+mortal struggle between Rome and Carthage that extended through
+three distinct wars and a period of aver a hundred years.
+
+When the two nations faced each other in arms, Carthage had the
+advantage of prestige and the greatest navy in the world. Her weaknesses
+lay in the strife of political factions and the mercenary character
+of her forces. Her officers were usually Carthaginians, but it was
+considered beneath the dignity of a Carthaginian to be a private.
+The rank and file, therefore, were either hired or pressed into
+service from the subject provinces. In the case of Xanthippus,
+who defeated Regulus in the first Punic war, even the commanding
+officer was a Spartan mercenary. These troops would do well so
+long as campaigns promised plunder but would became disaffected
+if things went wrong.
+
+The Romans, on the other hand, had only a small navy and no naval
+experience; their strength lay in their legionaries. And in further
+contrast with their enemy they had none but Romans in their forces,
+or allies who were proud of fighting on the side of Rome. Consequently
+they fought in the spirit of intense patriotism which could stand
+the moral strain of defeat and even disaster. On land there was
+no better fighter than the Roman soldier. At sea, however, all
+the advantage lay with the Carthaginian, and it soon became clear
+that if the Romans were to succeed they would have to learn to
+fight on water.
+
+For the first three years Carthaginian fleets raided the coasts of
+Sicily and Italy with impunity. Finally, in desperation, Rome set
+about the creation of a fleet, and the story is that a Carthaginian
+quinquereme that had been wrecked an the coast was taken as a model,
+and while the ships were building, rowers were trained in rowing
+machines set up an shore. The first contact with the enemy was not
+encouraging. The new fleet, which was constructed in two months,
+consisted of 100 quinqueremes and 30 triremes. Seventeen of these
+while on a trial cruise were blockaded in the harbor of Messina
+by twenty Carthaginian ships, and the Roman commander was obliged
+to surrender after his crews had landed and escaped.
+
+The next encounter was a different story. The Romans, realizing
+their ignorance of naval tactics and their superiority in land
+fighting, determined to make the next naval battle as nearly as
+possible like an engagement of infantry. Accordingly the ships
+were fitted with boarding gangways with a huge hooked spike at the
+end, like the beak of a crow, which gave them their name, "corvi"
+or "crows."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: The following is the description in Polybius of what
+they were like and how they were worked.
+
+"They [the Romans] erected on the prow of every vessel a round pillar
+of wood, of about twelve feet in height, and of three palms breadth
+in diameter, with a pulley at the top. To this pillar was fitted a
+kind of stage, eighteen feet in length and four feet broad, which
+was made ladder-wise, of strong timbers laid across, and cramped
+together with iron: the pillar being received into an oblong square,
+which was opened for that purpose, at the distance of six feet
+within the end of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways
+was a parapet, which reached just above the knee. At the farthest
+end of this stage or ladder was a bar of iron, whose shape was
+somewhat like a pestle; but it was sharpened at the bottom, or
+lower point; and on the top of it was a ring. The whole appearance
+of this machine very much resembled those that are used in grinding
+corn. To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, by which, with
+the help of the pulley that was at the top of the pillar, they
+hoisted up the machines, and, as the vessels of the enemy came near,
+let them fall upon them, sometimes on their prow, and sometimes
+on their sides, as occasion best served. As the machine fell, it
+struck into the decks of the enemy, and held them fast. In this
+situation, if the two vessels happened to lie side by side, the
+Romans leaped on board from all parts of their ships at once. But
+in case that they were joined only by the prow, they then entered
+two and two along the machine; the two foremost extending their
+bucklers right before them to ward off the strokes that were aimed
+against them in front; while those that followed rested the boss
+of their bucklers upon the top of the parapet on either side, and
+thus covered both their flanks." GENERAL HISTORY, Book 1.]
+
+Armed with this new device, the Consul Duilius took the Roman fleet
+to sea to meet an advancing Carthaginian fleet and encountered
+it off the port of Mylæ (260 B.C.). The Carthaginians had such
+contempt for their enemy that they advanced in irregular order,
+permitting thirty of their ships to begin the battle unsupported
+by the rest of the fleet. One after the other the Carthaginian
+quinqueremes were grappled and stormed, for once the great _corvus_
+crashed down on a deck all the arts of seamanship were useless.
+Before the day was over the Carthaginians had lost 14 ships sunk
+and 31 captured, a total of half their fleet, and the rest had
+fled in disorder towards Carthage.
+
+The unexpected had happened, as it so frequently does in history.
+The amateurs had beaten the professionals, not by trying to achieve
+the same efficiency but by inventing something new that would make
+that efficiency useless. Thus, as we nave seen, the Syracusans,
+who were no match for the Athenians in the open sea, destroyed
+the sea power of Athens by bottling up her fleet in a harbor and
+bombarding it with catapults. It is an instance such as we shall
+see recurring throughout naval history, in which the power of a
+great fleet is largely or completely neutralized by a new or device
+in the hands of the nation with the smaller navy.
+
+The significance of Mylæ lay in the fact that a new naval power
+had arisen, that henceforth Rome must be reckoned with on the sea.
+The victory served to encourage the Romans to enlarge their navy,
+and with it to press the war into the enemy's territory. Soon after
+Mylæ they gained possession of the greater part of Sicily, and in
+the year 256 they dispatched a fleet to carry the offensive into
+Africa. This Roman fleet of 330 ships met, just off Ecnomus, on
+the southern coast of Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet of 350, and a
+great battle took place, interesting for the grand scale on which
+it was fought and the tactics employed.
+
+The Romans, an seeing their enemy, assumed a formation hitherto
+unknown in tactics at sea. Their first and second squadrons formed
+the sides of an acute-angled triangle; the third squadron formed
+the base of the triangle, towing the transports, and the fourth
+squadron brought up the rear, covering the transports. The whole
+formed a compact wedge, pushing forward like a great spear head
+to pierce the enemy's line.
+
+Admirable as this formation was, the Carthaginians were no less
+skillful in their tactics for destroying it. Instead of keeping
+an unbroken line to receive the attack, they stationed their left
+wing at same distance from the center so as to overlap the Roman
+right, and their right wing in column ahead, so as to overlap the
+Roman left. As the Romans advanced, the Carthaginian center purposely
+gave way, drawing the advance wings of their enemy away from the
+transports and the two squadrons in the rear. Then they faced about
+and attacked. Meanwhile the two Carthaginian squadrons on the flanks
+swung round the Roman wedge, the left wing engaging the Roman third
+squadron, which was hampered by the transports, and driving it
+toward the shore. At the same time the Carthaginian right wing
+attacked the fourth, or reserve, squadron from the rear and drove
+it into the open sea. Thus the battle went on in three distinct
+engagements, each separated by considerable distance from the others.
+The outcome is thus narrated by Polybius:
+
+[Illustration: ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS]
+
+"Because in each of these divisions the strength of the combatants
+was nearly equal, the success was also for some time equal. But
+in the progress of the action the affair was brought at last to
+a decision: a different one, perhaps, from what might reasonably
+have been expected in such circumstances. For the Roman squadron
+that had begun the engagement gained so full a victory, that Amilcar
+[the Carthaginian commander] was forced to fly, and the consul
+Manlius brought away the vessels that were taken.
+
+"The other consul, having now perceived the danger in which the
+triarii[1] and the transports were involved, hastened to their
+assistance with the second squadron, which was still entire. The
+triarii, having received these succors, when they were Just upon
+the point of yielding, again resumed their courage, and renewed
+the fight with vigor: so that the enemy, being surrounded on every
+side in a manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at once
+both in the front and rear were at last constrained to steer away
+to sea.
+
+[Footnote 1: The rear guard, or fourth squadron.]
+
+"About this time Manlius also, returning from the engagement, observed
+that the ships of the third squadron were forced in close to the
+shore, and there blocked up by the left division of the Carthaginian
+fleet. He joined his forces, therefore, with those of the other
+consul, who had now placed the transports and triarii in security,
+and hastened to assist these vessels, which were so invested by
+the enemy that they seemed to suffer a kind of siege. And, indeed,
+they must have all been long before destroyed if the Carthaginians,
+through apprehension of the _corvi_, had not still kept themselves
+at distance, and declined a close engagement. But the consuls,
+having now advanced together, surround the enemy, and take fifty
+of their ships with all the men. The rest, being few in number,
+steered close along the shore, and saved themselves by flight.
+
+[Illustration: CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS, 256
+B.C.]
+
+"Such were the circumstances of this engagement; in which the victory
+at last was wholly on the side of the Romans. Twenty-four of their
+ships were sunk in the action, and more than thirty of the
+Carthaginians. No vessel of the Romans fell into the hands of the
+enemy; but sixty-four of the Carthaginians were taken with their
+men."[2]
+
+[Footnote 2: Polybius's GENERAL HISTORY, Book I, Chap. 2.]
+
+The battle of Ecnomus had no such decisive effect on history as
+the battle of Salamis, but it was on a far greater scale and it
+reveals an enormous advance in tactics. Three hundred thousand
+men, rowers and warriors, were engaged, and nearly 700 ships. Up
+to the battle of Actium, two centuries later, Ecnomus remained
+the greatest naval action in history. Moreover, the tactics of the
+rival fleets show a high degree of discipline and efficiency. The
+Carthaginian plan of dividing their enemy's force and defeating it
+by a concentrated attack on his transport division, was skillfully
+carried out and came perilously near succeeding. Had the first
+and second squadrons of the Carthaginians been able to carry out
+their part of the plan and "contain" the corresponding advance
+squadrons of the Romans, the result would have been an overwhelming
+victory for Carthage, involving not only the destruction of the
+Roman fleet but also the capture of the Roman army of invasion.
+
+This victory left open the way for the advance into Africa. The
+Romans had landed and marched almost to the gates of Carthage when
+the army was destroyed by the skill of a Spartan, Xanthippus, and
+Regulus, the Consul in command, was captured. This astonishing
+catastrophe inflicted on the Roman legionaries was due to the use
+of elephants, and offers a curious parallel to the effect of the
+_corvi_ on the Carthaginian sailors. Such was the terror inspired
+by these animals that the Roman soldier would not stand before
+them until a year or two later, in Sicily, the Consul Cecilius
+showed how they could not only be repulsed but turned back on their
+own army by the use of javelins and arrows.
+
+Nothing daunted by the loss of their army, Rome dispatched a fleet
+of 350 ships to Africa to carry off the remnants of the defeated
+army that were besieged in the city of Aspis. They were met by a
+hastily organized Carthaginian fleet off the promontory of Hermæa
+in a brief action in which the Romans were overwhelmingly victorious.
+The latter took 114 vessels with their crews. The Roman expedition
+continued on its course to Africa, rescued the besieged troops and
+turned back in high feather toward Sicily. The Consuls in command
+had been warned by the pilots not to attempt to skirt the southern
+coast of Sicily at that season of the year, but the warning was
+disregarded. Suddenly, as the fleet was approaching the shore it
+was overwhelmed by a great gale, and out of 464 vessels only eighty
+survived.
+
+Frightful as this loss was in ships and men, Rome proceeded at
+once to build another fleet, to the number of 250, which, with
+characteristic energy, was made ready for service in three months.
+This force also, after an ineffectual raid on the African coast,
+fell victim to a storm on the way home with the loss of 150 ships.
+
+Unwilling to relinquish the mastery of the sea that had been won
+by an uninterrupted series of victories, Rome sent another fleet
+to attack a Carthaginian force lying in the harbor of Drepanum.
+As the Romans approached, the Carthaginians went out to meet them,
+and so maneuvered as to force them to fight with an enemy in front
+and the rocks and shoals of the coast in their rear. The Roman ships
+were never able to extricate themselves from this predicament,
+and the greater part were either taken or wrecked on the coast.
+The Consul in command managed to escape with about thirty of his
+vessels, but 93 were taken with their crews. This is the single
+instance of a pitched battle between Roman and Carthaginian fleets
+in which the victory went to Carthage, a victory due entirely to
+better seamanship. The immediate result of this success was the
+destruction of the Roman squadron lying in the port of Lilybæum
+which was assisting the troops in the siege of that town.
+
+Still another Roman fleet that had the temerity to anchor in an
+exposed position was destroyed by a storm. "For so complete was
+the destruction," writes Polybius, "that scarcely a single plank
+remained entire."
+
+Stunned by these disasters, the government at Rome gave up the idea
+of contesting any further the command of the sea. The citizens, how
+ever, were not willing to submit, and displayed a magnificent spirit
+of patriotism in this the darkest period of the war. Individuals
+of means, or groups of individuals, pledged each a quinquereme,
+fully equipped, for a new fleet, asking reimbursement from the
+government only in case of victory. By these private efforts a
+force of 200 quinqueremes was constructed. At this time, as at the
+very beginning, the model for the Roman ships was a prize taken
+from the enemy.
+
+[Illustration: POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC WAR]
+
+Meanwhile the Carthaginians, confident that the Romans were finally
+driven from the sea, had allowed their own fleet to disintegrate.
+Accordingly when the astonishing news reached them that the Romans
+were again abroad they were compelled to fill their ships with
+raw levies of troops and inexperienced rowers and sailors. And,
+since the Carthaginian troops who were besieging the city of Eryx
+in Sicily were in need of supplies, a large number of transports
+were sent with the fleet. The Carthaginian commander planned to
+make a landing unobserved, leave his transports, exchange his raw
+crews for some of the veterans before Eryx and then give battle
+to the Roman fleet.
+
+This program failed because of the initiative of the Roman Consul
+commanding the new fleet. Having got word of the coming of the
+Carthaginians and divining their plan, he braved an unfavorable
+wind and a rough sea for the sake of forcing an action before they
+could establish contact with their army. Accordingly he sought
+out his enemy and met him (in the year 241 B.C.) off the island
+of Ægusa, near Lilybæum. Almost at the first onset the Romans won
+an overwhelming victory, capturing seventy and sinking fifty of
+the Carthaginian force.
+
+This final desperate effort of Rome was decisive. The Carthaginians
+had no navy left, and their armies in Sicily were cut off from
+all communications with their base. Accordingly ambassadors went
+to Rome to sue for peace, and the great struggle that had lasted
+without intermission for twenty-four years and reduced both parties
+to the point of exhaustion, ended with a triumph for Rome through
+a victory on the sea. By the treaty of peace Carthage was obliged
+to pay a heavy indemnity and yield all claim to Sicily.
+
+Whatever historical moral may be drawn from the story of the first
+Punic war, the fact remains that a nation of landsmen met the greatest
+maritime power in the world and defeated it on its own element. In
+every naval battle save one the Romans were victors. It is true,
+however, that in the single defeat off Drepanum and in the dreadful
+disasters inflicted by storms, Rome lost through lack of knowledge
+of wind and sea. No great naval genius stands above the rest, to
+whom the final success can be attributed. Rome won simply through
+the better fighting qualities of her rank and file and the stamina
+of her citizens. To quote the phrase of a British writer,[1] Rome
+showed the superior "fitness to win."
+
+[Footnote 1: Fred Jane, HERESIES OF SEA POWER, _passim_.]
+
+_The Second Punic War_
+
+In the first Punic war the prize was an island, Sicily. Naturally,
+therefore, the fighting was primarily naval. The second Punic war
+(218-202 B.C.) was essentially a war on land. Carthage, driven
+from Sicily, turned to Spain and made the southern part of the
+peninsula her province. Using this as his base, Hannibal marched
+overland, crossed the Alps, and invaded Italy from the north. Had
+he followed up his unbroken series of victories by marching on
+the capital instead of going into winter quarters at Capua, it is
+possible that Rome might have been destroyed and all subsequent
+history radically changed. The Romans had no general who could
+measure up to the genius of Hannibal, but their spirit was unbroken
+even by the slaughter of Cannæ, and their allies remained loyal.
+Moreover, Carthage, thanks to factional quarrels and personal
+jealousies, was deaf to all the requests sent by Hannibal for
+reënforcements when he needed them most. In the end, Scipio, after
+having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, dislodged Hannibal
+from Italy by carrying an invasion into Africa. At the battle of
+Zama the Romans defeated Hannibal and won the war.
+
+It is difficult to see any significant use of sea power in this
+second Punic war. Neither side seemed to realize what might be
+done in cutting the communications of the other, and both sides
+seemed to be able to use the sea at will. Of course due allowance
+must be made for the limitations of naval activity. The quinquereme
+was too frail to attempt a blockade or to patrol the sea lanes in
+all seasons. Nevertheless both sides used the sea for the transport
+of troops and the conveying of intelligence, and neither side made
+any determined effort to establish a real control of the sea.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: For a distinguished opinion to the contrary, v. Mahan,
+INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 14 ff. In this view, however,
+Mahan is not supported by Mommsen (vol. II, p. 100). See also Jane,
+HERESIES OF SEA POWER, 60 ff.]
+
+_The Third Punic War_ (149-146 B.C.)
+
+The third Punic war has no naval interest. Rome, not satisfied with
+defeating her rival in the two previous wars, took a convenient
+pretext to invade Carthage and destroy every vestige of the city.
+With this the great maritime empire came to an end, and Rome became
+supreme in the Mediterranean.
+
+2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY; THE CAMPAIGN OF ACTIUM
+
+After the fall of Carthage no rival appeared to contest the sovereignty
+of Rome upon the sea. The next great naval battle was waged between
+two rival factions of Rome herself at the time when the republic
+had fallen and the empire was about to be reared on its ruins. This
+was the battle of Actium, one of the most decisive in the world's
+history.
+
+The rivalry between Antony and Octavius as to who should control
+the destinies of Rome was the immediate cause of the conflict.
+In the parceling out of spoil from the civil wars following the
+murder of Cæsar, Octavius had taken the West, Lepidus the African
+provinces, and Antony the East. Octavius soon ousted Lepidus and
+then turned to settle the issue of mastery with Antony. In this he
+had motives of revenge as well as ambition. Antony had robbed him
+of his inheritance from Cæsar, and divorced his wife, the sister of
+Octavius, in favor of Cleopatra, with whom he had become completely
+infatuated. In this quarrel the people of Rome were inclined to
+support Octavius, because of their indignation over a reported
+declaration made by Antony to the effect that he intended to make
+Alexandria rather than Rome the capital of the empire and rule East
+and West from the Nile rather than the Tiber. Both sides began
+preparations for the conflict. Antony possessed the bulk of the
+Roman navy and the Roman legions of the eastern provinces. To his
+fleet he added squadrons of Egyptian and Phœnician vessels of war,
+and to his army he brought large bodies of troops from the subject
+provinces of the East. In addition he spent great sums of money by
+means of his agents in Rome to arouse disaffection against Octavius.
+At the outset he acted with energy and caused his antagonist the
+gravest anxiety. It was clear also that Antony intended to take
+the offensive. He established winter quarters at Patras, on the
+Gulf of Corinth, during the winter of 32-31 B.C., billeting his
+army in various towns on the west coast of Greece, and keeping
+it supplied by grain ships from Alexandria. His fleet he anchored
+in the Ambracian Gulf, a landlocked bay, thirty miles wide, lying
+north of the Gulf of Corinth; it is known to-day as the Gulf of
+Arta.
+
+Octavius, however, was equally determined not to yield the offensive
+to his adversary, and boldly collected ships and troops for a movement
+in force against Antony's position. His troops were also Roman
+legionaries, experienced in war, but his fleet was considerably
+less in numbers and the individual ships much smaller than the
+quinqueremes and octiremes of Antony. The ships of Octavius were
+mostly biremes and triremes. These disadvantages, however, were
+offset by the fact that his admiral, Agrippa, was an experienced
+sea-fighter, having won a victory near Mylæ during the civil wars,
+and by the other fact that the crews under him, recruited from
+the Dalmatian coast, were hardy, seafaring men. These were called
+Liburni, and the type of ship they used was known as the _Liburna_.
+This was a two-banked galley, but the term was already becoming
+current for any light man of war, irrespective of the number of
+banks of oars. In contrast with these Liburni, who divided their
+days between fishing and piracy and knew all the tricks of fighting
+at sea, the crews of Antony's great fleet were in many cases landsmen
+who had been suddenly impressed into service.
+
+As soon as Antony had moved his force to western Greece he seemed
+paralyzed by indecision and made no move to avail himself of his
+advantageous position to strike. He had plenty of money, while
+his adversary was at his wit's end to find even credit. He had
+the admiration of his soldiers, who had followed him through many
+a campaign to victory, while Octavius had no popularity with his
+troops, most of whom were reluctant to fight against their old
+comrades in arms. And finally, Antony had a preponderating fleet
+with which he could command the sea and compel his opponent to
+fight on the defensive in Italian territory. All these advantages
+he allowed to slip away.
+
+During the winter of 32-31 one-third of Antony's crews perished
+from lack of proper supplies and the gaps were filled by slaves,
+mule-drivers, and plowmen--any one whom his captains could seize and
+impress from the surrounding country. The following spring Agrippa
+made a feint to the south by capturing Methone at the southern tip
+of the Peloponnesus, thus threatening the wheat squadrons from
+Egypt on which Antony depended. Next came the news that Octavius
+had landed an army in Epirus and was marching south. Then Antony
+realized that his adversary was aiming to destroy the fleet in the
+Ambracian Gulf and hastened thither. He arrived with a squadron
+ahead of his troops, at almost the same instant as Octavius, and if
+Octavius had had the courage to attack the tired and disorganized
+crews of Antony's squadron, Antony would have been lost. But by
+dressing his crews in the armor of legionaries and drawing up his
+ships in a position for fighting, with oars suspended, he "bluffed"
+his enemy into thinking that he had the support of his troops.
+When the latter arrived Antony established a great camp on Cape
+Actium, which closes the southern side of the Gulf, and fortified
+the entrance on that side.
+
+Thereafter for months the two forces faced each other on opposite
+sides of the Gulf, neither side risking more than insignificant
+skirmishes. During this time Octavius had free use of the sea for
+his supplies, while the heavier fleet of Antony lay idle in harbor.
+Nevertheless, Octavius did not dare to risk all on a land battle, and
+conducted his campaign in a characteristically timid and vacillating
+manner which should have made it easy for Antony to take the aggressive
+and win. But the famous lieutenant of Julius Cæsar was no longer the
+man who used to win the devotion of his soldiers by his courage and
+audacity. He was broken by debauchery and torn this way and that by
+two violently hostile parties in his own camp. One party, called the
+Roman, wanted him to come to an understanding with Octavius, or beat
+him in battle, and go to Rome as the restorer of the republic. The
+other party, the Egyptian, was Cleopatra and her following. Cleopatra
+was interested in holding Antony to Egypt, to consolidate through
+him a strong Egyptian empire, and she was not at all interested in
+the restoration of Roman liberties. In Antony's desire to please
+Cleopatra and his attempt to deceive his Roman friends into thinking
+that he was working for their aims, may be seen the explanation
+of the utter lack of strategy or consistent plan in his entire
+campaign against Octavius.
+
+At the beginning of July Antony apparently proposed a naval battle.
+Instantly the suspicions of the Roman party were awakened. They
+cried out that Antony was evidently going back to Egypt without
+having won the decisive battle against Octavius on land, which
+would really break the enemy's power, and without paying any heed
+to the political problems at Rome. Such a furor was raised between
+the two parties that Antony abandoned his plan and made a feint
+toward the land battle in Epirus that the Romans wanted. Meanwhile
+two of his adherents, one a Roman, the other a king from Asia Minor,
+exasperated by the insolence of Cleopatra, deserted to Octavius.
+
+August came and went without action or change in the situation.
+Meanwhile as Antony's camp had been placed in a pestilential spot
+for midsummer heat, he suffered great losses from disease. By this
+time Cleopatra was interested in nothing but a return to Egypt.
+Accordingly she persuaded Antony to order a naval battle without
+asking anybody's advice, and he set the date August 29 for the
+sally of his fleet. The Romans were amazed and protested, but in
+vain. Preparations went on in such a way as to make it clear to the
+observing that what Antony was planning was not so much a battle
+as a return to Egypt. Vessels which he did not need outside for
+battle he ordered burned, although such ships would usually be kept
+as reserves to make up losses in fighting. Moreover, he astonished
+the captains by ordering them to take out into action the big sails
+which were always left ashore before a battle. Nor did his explanation
+that they would be needed in pursuit satisfy them. It appeared also
+that he was employing trusted slaves at night to load the Egyptian
+galleys with all of Cleopatra's treasure. Two more Roman leaders,
+satisfied as to Antony's real intention, deserted to Octavius and
+informed him of Antony's plans.
+
+Meanwhile a heavy storm had made it impossible to attempt the action
+on August 29 or several days after. On the 2d of September (31
+B.C.) the sea became smooth again. Octavius and Agrippa drew out
+their fleet into open water, about three-quarters of a mile from
+the mouth of the gulf, forming line in three divisions. They waited
+till nearly noon before Antony's fleet began to make its expected
+appearance to offer battle. This also was formed in three divisions
+corresponding to those of their enemy. The Egyptian division of
+sixty ships under Cleopatra took up a safe position in the rear
+of the center.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B.C.]
+
+There was a striking contrast in the types of ships in the opposing
+ranks. The galleys of Octavius were low in the water, and nimble in
+their handling; those of Antony were bulky and high, with five to
+ten banks of oars, and their natural unhandiness was made worse by
+a device intended to protect them against ramming. This consisted
+of a kind of boom of heavy timbers rigged out on all sides of the
+hull. In addition to the higher sides these ships supported towers
+and citadels built upon their decks, equipped with every form of
+the artillery of that day, especially catapults capable of hurling
+heavy stones upon the enemy's deck.
+
+Against such formidable floating castles, the light ships of Agrippa
+and Octavius could adopt only skirmishing tactics. They rushed in
+where they could shear away the oar blades of an enemy without
+getting caught by the great grappling irons swung out from his
+decks. They kept clear of the heavy stones from the catapults through
+superior speed and ability to maneuver quickly, but they were unable
+to strike their ponderous adversaries any vital blow. On the other
+hand the great hulks of Antony were unable to close with them,
+and though the air was filled with a storm of arrows, stones and
+javelins, neither side was able to strike decisively at the other.
+As at Salamis the opposite shores were lined with the opposing
+armies, and every small success was hailed by shouts from a hundred
+thousand throats on the one side and long drawn murmurs of dismay
+from an equal host on the other.
+
+In these waters a north wind springs up every afternoon--a fact
+that Antony and Cleopatra had counted on--and as soon as the breeze
+shifted the royal galley of Cleopatra spread its crimson sail and,
+followed by the entire Egyptian division, sailed through the lines
+and headed south. Antony immediately left his flagship, boarded
+a quinquereme and followed. This contemptible desertion of the
+commander in chief was not generally known in his fleet; as for the
+disappearance of the Egyptian squadron, it was doubtless regarded
+as a good riddance. The battle, therefore, went on as stubbornly
+as ever.
+
+Late in the afternoon Agrippa, despairing of harming his enemy by
+ordinary tactics, achieved considerable success by the use of javelins
+wrapped in burning tow, and fire rafts that were set drifting upon
+the clumsy hulks which could not get out of their way. By this means
+a number of Antony's ships were destroyed, but the contest remained
+indecisive. At sunset Antony's fleet retired in some disorder to
+their anchorage in the gulf. Octavius attempted no pursuit but
+kept the sea all night, fearing a surprise attack or an attempted
+flight from the gulf.
+
+Meanwhile a flying wing of Octavius's fleet had been sent in pursuit
+of Antony and Cleopatra, who escaped only after a rear guard action
+had been fought in which two of Cleopatra's ships were captured.
+The fugitives put ashore at Cape Tænarus, to enable Antony to send
+a message to his general, Canidius, ordering him to take his army
+through Macedonia into Asia. Then the flight was resumed to Alexandria.
+
+On the morning of the 3d Octavius sent a message to the enemy's
+camp announcing the fact of Antony's desertion and calling on the
+fleet and army to surrender. The Roman soldiers were unwilling to
+believe that their commander had been guilty of desertion, and
+were confident that he had been summoned away on important business
+connected with the campaign. Their general, however, did not dare
+convey to them Antony's orders because they would betray the truth
+and provoke mutiny. Consequently he did nothing. Certain Roman
+senators and eastern princes saw the light and quietly went over
+to the camp of Octavius. Several days of inaction followed, during
+which the desertions continued and the rumor of Antony's flight
+found increasing belief. On the seventh day, Canidius, who found
+himself in a hopeless dilemma, also went over to Octavius. This
+desertion by the commander settled the rest of the force. A few
+scattered into Macedonia, but the great bulk of the army and all
+that was left of the fleet surrendered. Nineteen legions and more
+than ten thousand cavalry thus came over to Octavius and took service
+under him. This was the real victory of Actium. In the words of
+the Italian historian Ferrero, "it was a victory gained without
+fighting, and Antony was defeated in this supreme struggle, not
+by the valor of his adversary or by his own defective strategy
+or tactics, but by the hopeless inconsistency of his double-faced
+policy, which, while professing to be republican and Roman, was
+actually Egyptian and monarchical."
+
+The story of the naval battle of Actium is a baffling problem to
+reconstruct on account of the wide divergence in the accounts.
+For instance, the actual number of ships engaged is a matter of
+choice between the extremes of 200 to 500 on a side. And the
+consequences were so important to Octavius and to Rome that the
+accounts were naturally adorned afterwards with the most glowing
+colors. Every poet who lived by the bounty of Augustus in later
+years naturally felt inspired to pay tribute to it in verse. But the
+actual naval battle seems to have been of an indecisive character.
+For that matter, even after the wholesale surrender of Antony's
+Roman army and fleet, neither Anthony nor Octavius realized the
+importance of what had happened. Antony had recovered from worse
+disasters before, and felt secure in Alexandria. Octavius at first
+followed up his advantage with timid and uncertain steps. Only
+after the way was made easy by the hasty submission of the Asiatic
+princes and the wave of popularity and enthusiasm that was raised
+in Rome by the news of the victory, did Octavius press the issue
+to Egypt itself. There the war came to an end with the suicide
+of both Antony and Cleopatra.
+
+As in the case of the indecisive naval battle off the capes of
+the Chesapeake, which led directly to the surrender of Cornwallis,
+an action indecisive in character may be most decisive in results.
+Actium may not have been a pronounced naval victory but it had
+tremendous consequences. As at Salamis, East and West met for the
+supremacy of the western world, and the East was beaten back. It
+is not likely that the Egyptian or the Syrian would have dominated
+the genius of the western world for any length of time, but the
+defeat of Octavius would have meant a hybrid empire which would
+have fallen to pieces like the empire of Alexander, leaving western
+Europe split into a number of petty states. On the other hand,
+Octavius was enabled to build on the consequences of Actium the
+great outlines of the Roman empire, the influence of which on the
+civilized world to-day is still incalculable. When he left Rome
+to fight Antony, the government was bankrupt and the people torn
+with faction. When he returned he brought the vast treasure of
+Egypt and found a people united to support him. Actium, therefore,
+is properly taken as the significant date for the beginning of the
+Roman empire. Octavius took the name of his grand-uncle Cæsar,
+the title of Augustus, and as "Imperator" became the first of the
+Roman emperors.
+
+The relation of the battle of Actium to this portentous change
+in the fortunes of Octavius was formally recognized by him on the
+scene where it took place. Nicopolis, the City of Victory, was
+founded upon the site of his camp, with the beaks of the captured
+ships as trophies adorning its forum. The little temple of Apollo on
+the point of Actium he rebuilt on an imposing scale and instituted
+there in honor of his victory the "Actian games," which were held
+thereafter for two hundred years.
+
+After the battle of Actium and the establishment of a powerful
+Roman empire without a rival in the world, there follows a long
+period in which the Mediterranean, and indeed all the waterways
+known to the civilized nations, belonged without challenge to the
+galleys of Rome. Naval stations were established to assist in the
+one activity left to ships of war, the pursuit of pirates, but
+otherwise there was little or nothing to do. And during this long
+period, indeed, down to the Middle Ages, practically nothing is
+known of the development in naval types until the emergence of the
+low, one- or two-banked galley of the wars between the Christian
+and the Mohammedan. The first definite description we have of warships
+after the period of Actium comes at the end of the ninth century.
+
+There was some futile naval fighting against the Vandals in the days
+when Rome was crumbling. Finally, by a curious freak of history,
+Genseric the Vandal took a fleet out from Carthage against Rome,
+and swept the Mediterranean. In the year 455, some six centuries
+after Rome had wreaked her vengeance on Carthage, this Vandal fleet
+anchored unopposed in the Tiber and landed an army that sacked
+the imperial city, which had been for so long a period mistress
+of the world, and had given her name to a great civilization.
+
+During the four centuries in which the _Pax Romana_ rested upon
+the world, it is easy to conceive of the enormous importance to
+history and civilization of having sea and river, the known world
+over, an undisputed highway for the fleets of Rome. Along these
+routes, even more than along the military roads, traveled the
+institutions, the arts, the language, the literature, the laws,
+of one of the greatest civilizations in history. And ruthless as
+was the destruction of Vandal and Goth in the city itself and in
+the peninsula, they could not destroy the heritage that had been
+spread from Britain to the Black Sea and from the Elbe to the upper
+waters of the Nile.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+HISTORY OF ROME, Theodor Mommsen, tr. by W. P. Dickson, 1867.
+GENERAL HISTORY, Polybius, transl. by Hampton, 1823.
+HISTORY OF THE ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE, Chas. Merivale (vol. III.),
+  1866.
+THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME, G. Ferrero, tr. by A. E.
+  Zemmern, 1909.
+ÉTUDES SUR L'HISTOIRE MILITAIRE ET MARITIME DES GRECS ET DES
+  ROMAINS, Paul Serre, 1888.
+FLEETS OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, W. W. Tarn, in _Journal of
+  Hellenic Studies_, 1907.
+HERESIES OF SEA POWER (pp. 40-71), Fred Jane, 1906.
+INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON HISTORY (pp. 15 ff.), A. T. Mahan, 1889.
+For a complete bibliography of Roman sea power, v. INFLUENCE OF
+  SEA POWER ON THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (Doctoral Dissertation),
+  F. W. Clark, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES: THE EASTERN EMPIRE
+
+The thousand years following the collapse of the Roman empire, a
+period generally referred to as the Middle Ages, are characterized
+by a series of barbarian invasions. Angles, Saxons, Goths, Visigoths,
+Huns, Vandals, Vikings, Slavs, Arabs, and Turks poured over the
+broken barriers of the empire and threatened to extinguish the last
+spark of western and Christian civilization. Out of this welter
+of invasions and the anarchy of petty kingdoms arose finally the
+powerful nations that perpetuated the inheritance from Athens,
+Rome, and Jerusalem, and developed on this foundation the newer
+institutions of political and intellectual freedom that have made
+western civilization mistress of the world. For this triumph of
+West over East, of Christianity over barbarism, we have to thank
+partly the courage and genius of great warriors and statesmen who
+arose here and there, like Alfred of England and Martel of France,
+but chiefly the Eastern Empire, with its capital at Constantinople,
+which stood through this entire epoch as the one great bulwark against
+which the invasions dashed in vain. In this story of defense, the
+Christian fleets won more than one Salamis, as we shall see in
+the course of this chapter.
+
+In the year 328 A.D. the Emperor Constantine the Great moved his
+capital to Byzantium and named it "New Rome." In honor of its founder,
+however, the name was changed soon to "Constantinople," which it
+has retained ever since. It may seem strange that after so many
+glorious centuries Rome should have been deprived of the honor of
+being the center of the great empire which bore its own name, but
+in the fourth century the city itself had no real significance.
+All power rested in the person of the Emperor himself, and wherever
+he went became for the time being the capital for all practical
+purposes. At this time the empire was already on the defensive and
+the danger lay in the east. Constantine needed a capital nearer
+the scene of future campaigns, nearer his weakest frontier, the
+Danube, and nearer the center of the empire. Byzantium not only
+served these purposes but also possessed natural advantages of a
+very high order. It was situated where Europe and Asia meet, it
+commanded the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean,
+and it was a natural citadel. Whoever captured the city must needs
+be powerful by land and sea. Under the emperor's direction the new
+capital was greatly enlarged and protected by a system of massive
+walls. Behind these walls the city stood fast for over a thousand
+years against wave after wave of barbarian invasion.
+
+Of the wars with the Persians, the Vandals, and the Huns nothing
+need be said here, for they do not involve the operations of fleets.
+The city was safe so long as no enemy appeared with the power to
+hold the sea. That power appeared in the seventh century when the
+Arabs, or "Saracens," as they were called in Europe, swept westward
+and northward in the first great Mohammedan invasion.
+
+Most migrations are to be explained by the pressure of enemies,
+or the lack of food and pasturage in the countries left behind,
+or the discovery of better living conditions in the neighboring
+countries. But the impulse behind the two tremendous assaults of
+Islam upon Europe seems to have been religious fanaticism of a
+character and extent unmatched in history. The founder of the Faith,
+Mohammed, taught from 622 to 632. He succeeded in imbuing his followers
+with the passion of winning the world to the knowledge of Allah
+and Mohammed his prophet. The unbeliever was to be offered the
+alternatives of conversion or death, and the believer who fell in
+the holy wars would be instantly transported to Paradise. Men who
+actually believe that they will be sent to a blissful immortality
+after death are the most terrible soldiers to face, for they would
+as readily die as live. In fact Cromwell's "Ironsides" of a later
+day owed their invincibility to very much the same spirit. At all
+events, by the time of Mohammed's death all Arabia had been converted
+to his faith and, fired with zeal, turned to conquer the world.
+Hitherto the tribes of Arabia were scattered and disorganized,
+and Arabia as a country meant nothing to the outside world. Now
+under the leadership of the Prophet it had become a driving force
+of tremendous power. Mohammedan armies swept over Syria into Persia.
+In 637, only five years after Mohammed's death, Jerusalem surrendered,
+and shortly afterwards Egypt was conquered. Early in the eighth
+century the Arabs ruled from the Indus on the east, and the Caucasus
+on the north, to the shores of the Atlantic on the west. Their
+empire curved westward along the coast of northern Africa, through
+Spain, like one of their own scimitars, threatening all Christendom.
+Indeed, the Arab invasion stands unparalleled in history for its
+rapidity and extent.
+
+[Illustration: THE SARACEN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, ABOUT 715 A.D.]
+
+The one great obstacle in the way was the Christian, or Roman,
+empire with its center at Constantinople. Muaviah, the Emir of
+Syria, was the first to perceive that nothing could be done against
+the empire until the Arabs had wrested from it the command of the
+sea. Accordingly he set about building a great naval armament.
+In 649 this fleet made an attack on Cyprus but was defeated. The
+following year, however, it took an important island, Aradus, off
+the coast of Syria, once a stronghold of the Phœnicians, and sacked
+it with savage barbarity. An expedition sent from Constantinople to
+recover Alexandria was met by this fleet and routed. This first naval
+victory over the Christians gave the Saracens unbounded confidence in
+their ability to fight on the sea. They sailed into the Ægean, took
+Rhodes, plundered Cos, and returned loaded with booty. Muaviah,
+elated with these successes, planned a great combined land and
+water expedition against the Christian capital.
+
+At this point it is worth pausing to consider what the fighting
+ship of this period was like. As we have seen in the preceding
+chapter the Roman navy sank into complete decay. At the end of the
+fourth century there was practically no imperial navy in existence.
+The conquest of the Vandals by Belisarius in the sixth century
+involved the creation of a fleet, but when that task was over the
+navy again disappeared until the appearance of the Arabs compelled
+the building of a new imperial fleet. The small provincial squadrons
+then used to patrol the coasts were by no means adequate to meet
+the crisis.
+
+The warships of this period were called "dromons," a term that
+persists even in the time of the Turkish invasion eight centuries
+later. The word means "fast sailers" or "racers." The dromon was
+not the low galley of the later Middle Ages but a two-banked ship,
+probably quite as large as the Roman quinquereme, carrying a complement
+of about 300 men. Amidships was built a heavy castle or redoubt of
+timbers, pierced with loopholes for archery. On the forecastle
+rose a kind of turret, possibly revolving, from which, after Greek
+fire was invented, the tubes or primitive cannon projected the
+substance on the decks of the enemy. The dromon had two masts, lateen
+rigged, and between thirty and forty oars to a side.
+
+There were two classes of dromons, graded according to size, and a
+third class of ship known as the "pamphylian," which was apparently
+of a cruiser type, less cumbered with superstructure. In addition
+there were small scout and dispatch boats of various shapes and
+sizes.
+
+Both Christian and Saracen fought with these kinds of warships.
+Apparently the Arabs simply copied the vessels they found already
+in use by their enemies, and added no new device of their own.
+
+[Illustration: EUROPE'S EASTERN FRONTIER]
+
+In 655 Muaviah started his great double invasion against Constantinople.
+He sent his fleet into the Ægean, while he himself with an army
+tried to force the passes of the Taurus mountains. Before the Arab
+fleet had gone far it met the Christian fleet, commanded by the
+Emperor himself, off the town of Phaselis on the southwestern coast
+of Asia Minor. A great battle followed. The Christian emperor,
+Constantine II, distinguished himself by personal courage throughout
+the action, but the day went sorely against the Christians. At last
+the flagship was captured and he himself survived only by leaping
+into a vessel that came to his rescue while his men fought to cover
+his escape. It was a terrible defeat, for 20,000 Christians had been
+killed and the remnants of their fleet were in full retreat. But
+the Saracens had bought their victory at such a price that they
+were themselves in no condition to profit by it, and the naval
+expedition went no further. Meanwhile Muaviah had not succeeded
+in forcing the Taurus with his army, so that the grand assault
+came to nothing after all.
+
+The following year the murder of the Caliph brought on a civil
+war among the Saracens, in consequence of which Muaviah arranged
+a truce with Constantine. The latter was thus enabled to turn his
+attention to the beating back of the Slavs in the east and the
+recovery of imperial possessions in the west, notably the city
+and province of Carthage. During the last of these campaigns he
+was killed by a slave.
+
+The death of this energetic and able ruler seemed to Muaviah the
+opportunity to begin fresh operations against the Christian empire.
+Three great armies invaded the territory of the Cross. One plundered
+Syracuse, another seized and fortified a post that threatened the
+existence of Carthage, a third pushed to the shores of the Sea of
+Marmora. These were, however, only preliminary to the grand assault
+on the capital itself.
+
+In 673 a great Arab armada forced the Hellespont and captured Cyzicus.
+With this as a base, the fleet landed an army on the northern shore
+of the Sea of Marmora. By these means Constantinople was invested
+by land and sea. But the great walls proved impregnable against
+the attacks of the army, and the Christian fleet, sheltered in
+the Golden Horn, was able to sally out from time to time and make
+successful raids on detachments of the Saracen ships. This state
+of affairs continued for six months, after which Muaviah retired
+with his army to Cyzicus, leaving a strong naval guard to hold
+the straits.
+
+The next spring Muaviah again landed his army on the European side
+and besieged the city for several months. The second year's operations
+were no more successful than the first, and again the Arab force
+retired to Cyzicus for the winter.
+
+The Arab commander was determined to stick it out until he had
+forced the surrender of the city by sheer exhaustion, but his plan
+had a fatal error. During the winter months the land blockade was
+abandoned, with the result that supplies for the next year's siege
+were readily collected for the beleaguered city. Emperor and citizens
+alike rose to the emergency with a spirit of devotion that burned
+brighter with every year of the siege. Meanwhile the Christians
+of the outlying provinces of Syria and Africa were also fighting
+stubbornly and with considerable success against the enemy. The
+year 676 passed without any material change in the situation.
+
+[Illustration: CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY]
+
+During the siege a Syrian architect named Callinicus is said to
+have come to Constantinople with a preparation of his own invention,
+"Greek fire," which he offered the Emperor for use against the Saracen.
+This, according to one historian, "was a semi-liquid substance,
+composed of sulphur, pitch, dissolved niter, and petroleum boiled
+together and mixed with certain less important and more obscure
+substances.... When ejected it caught the woodwork which it fell
+and set it so thoroughly on fire that there was no possibility
+of extinguishing the conflagration. It could only be put out, it
+is said, by pouring vinegar, wine, or sand upon it."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE ART OF WAR, Oman, p. 546.]
+
+Constantine IV, the Emperor, was quick to see the possibilities
+of the innovation and equipped his dromons with projecting brass
+tubes for squirting the substance upon the enemy's ships. These are
+sometimes referred to as "siphons," but it is not clear just how
+they were operated. One writer[2] is of the opinion that something
+of the secret of gunpowder had been obtained from the East and that
+the substance was actually projected by a charge of gunpowder;
+in short, that these "siphons" were primitive cannon. In addition
+to these tubes other means were prepared for throwing the fire.
+Earthenware jars containing it were to be flung by hand or arbalist,
+and darts and arrows were wrapped with tow soaked in the substance.
+
+[Footnote 2: THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, Foord, p. 139.]
+
+The Christian fleet was no match for the Saracen in numbers, but
+Constantine pinned his faith on the new invention. Accordingly,
+during the fourth year of the siege, 677, he boldly led his fleet
+to the attack. We have no details of this battle beyond the fact
+that the Greek fire struck such terror by its destructive effect that
+the Saracens were utterly defeated. This unexpected blow completed
+the growing demoralization of the besiegers. The army returned
+to the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and the survivors of the
+fleet turned homewards. Constantine followed up his victory with
+splendid energy. He landed troops on the Asiatic shore, pursued
+the retreating Arabs and drove the shattered remnant of their army
+back into Syria. The fleet was overtaken by a storm in the Ægean and
+suffered heavily. Before the ships could reassemble, the Christians
+were upon them and almost nothing was left of the great Saracen
+armada. Thus the second great assault on Constantinople was shattered
+by the most staggering disaster that had ever befallen the cause
+of Islam.
+
+The Christian empire once more stood supreme, and that supremacy
+was attested by the terms of peace which the defeated Muaviah was
+glad to accept. There was to be a truce of thirty years, during
+which the Christian emperor was to receive an annual tribute of
+3000 pounds of gold, fifty Arab horses and fifty slaves.
+
+It is unfortunate that there was no Herodotus to tell the details
+of this victory, for it was tremendously important to European
+civilization. Western Europe was then a welter of barbarism and
+anarchy, and if Constantinople had fallen, in all probability the
+last vestige of Roman civilization would have been destroyed. Moreover,
+the battle is of special interest from a tactical point of view
+because it was won by a new device, Greek fire, which was the most
+destructive naval weapon up to the time when gunpowder and artillery
+took its place. Indeed this substance may be said to have saved
+Christian civilization for several centuries, for the secret of
+its composition was carefully preserved at Constantinople and the
+Arabs never recovered from their fear of it.
+
+The victory did not, however, mark the crisis of the struggle.
+In the half century that followed, Constantinople suffered from
+weak or imbecile emperors while the Caliphate gained ground under
+able rulers and generals. In the first fifteen years of the eighth
+century the Saracens reached the climax of their power. Under a
+great general, Muza, they conquered Spain and spread into southern
+France. It was he who conceived the grandiose plan of conquering
+Christendom by a simultaneous attack from the west and from the
+east, converging at the city of Rome. One army was to advance from
+Asia Minor and take Constantinople; another was to cross the Pyrenees
+and overrun the territory of the Franks. Had the enterprise been
+started at the time proposed there could have been little opposition
+in the west, for the Franks were then busy fighting each other,
+but luckily Muza fell into disgrace with the Caliph at this time
+and his great project was undertaken by less able hands and on
+a piecemeal plan.
+
+The eastern line of invasion was undertaken first in the year 717.
+A fleet of warships and transports to the number of 1800 sailed
+to the Hellespont, carrying about 80,000 troops, while a great
+army collected at Tarsus and marched overland toward the same
+destination. Meanwhile two more fleets were being prepared in the
+ports of Africa and Egypt, and a third army was being collected
+to reënforce the first expedition. This army was to be under the
+personal command of the Caliph himself. The third attack on the
+Christian capital was intended to be the supreme effort.
+
+Fortunately, the ruler of Constantinople at this hour of peril
+was a man of ability and energy, Leo III; but the empire had sunk
+so low as a result of the misrule of his predecessors that his
+authority scarcely extended beyond the shores of the Sea of Marmora,
+and his resources were at a low ebb. The navy on which so much
+depended was brought to a high point of efficiency, but it was so
+inferior in numbers to the Saracen armada that he dared not attempt
+even a defense of the Dardanelles.
+
+For the Arabs all went well at first. Unopposed they transported a
+part of their army to the European shore, moved toward Constantinople
+and invested it by land and sea. One detachment was sent to cover
+Adrianople, which was occupied by a Christian garrison; the rest
+of the force concentrated on the capital itself.
+
+Meanwhile the Christian fleet lay anchored in the shelter of the
+Golden Horn, protected by a boom of chains and logs. As the Saracen
+ships came up to occupy the straits above the city they fell into
+confusion in trying to stem the rapid current. Seeing his opportunity,
+the emperor ordered the boom opened, and leading the way in his
+flagship, he fell upon the huddle of Saracen vessels in the channel.
+The latter could make little resistance, and before the main body of
+the fleet could work up to the rescue, the Christians had destroyed
+twenty and taken a number of prizes back to the Horn. Again Greek
+fire had proved its deadly efficacy. Elated with this success,
+Leo ordered the boom opened wide and, lying in battle order at
+the mouth of the Horn, he challenged the Arab fleet to attack. But
+such was the terror inspired by Greek fire that the Grand Vizier,
+in spite of his enormous superiority in numbers, declined to close.
+Instead he withdrew his dromons out of the Bosphorus and thereafter
+followed the less risky policy of a blockade. This initial success
+of the Christian fleet had the important effect of leaving open
+the sea route to the Black Sea, through which supplies could still
+reach the beleaguered city.
+
+The Arabs then sat down to wear out the defenders by a protracted
+siege on land and sea. In the spring of 718 the new army and the
+two new fleets arrived on the scene. One of the latter succeeded,
+probably by night, in passing through the Bosphorus and closing
+the last inlet to the city. The situation for the defenders became
+desperate. Many of the men serving on these new fleets, however,
+were Christians. These took every opportunity to desert, and gave
+important information to the emperor as to the disposition of the
+Arab ships. Acting on this knowledge, Leo took his fleet out from
+the shelter of the boom and moved up the straits against the African
+and Egyptian squadrons that were blockading the northern exit. The
+deserters guided him to where these squadrons lay, at anchor and
+unprepared for action. What followed was a massacre rather than
+a battle. The Christian members of the crews deserted wholesale
+and turned upon their Moslem officers. Ship after ship was rammed
+by the Christian dromons or set on fire by the terrible substance
+which every Arab regarded with superstitious dread. Some were driven
+ashore, others captured, many more sunk or burnt to the water's
+edge. Of a total of nearly 800 vessels practically nothing was
+left.
+
+Leo followed up this spectacular naval victory by transporting
+a force from the garrison of the city to the opposite shore of
+the Bosphorus, attacking the army encamped there and driving it
+in rout. Meanwhile the Bulgarian chieftain had responded to Leo's
+appeal and, relieving the siege of Adrianople, beat back the Saracen
+army at that point with great slaughter. The fugitives of that army
+served to throw into panic the troops encamped round the walls
+of Constantinople, already demoralized by disease, the death of
+their leaders, and the annihilation of the African and Egyptian
+fleets in the Bosphorus.
+
+The great retreat began. The Arab soldiers started back through
+Asia Minor, but only 30,000 out of the original force of 180,000
+lived to reach Tarsus. The fleet set sail for the Ægean, and as
+in the similar retreat of a half century before, the Arabs were
+overwhelmed by a storm with terrible losses. The Christian ships
+picked off many survivors, and the Christians of the islands destroyed
+others that sought shelter in any port. It is said that out of
+the original armada of 1800 vessels only five returned to Syria!
+Thus the third and supreme effort of the Saracen ended in one of
+the greatest military disasters in history.
+
+The service of the Christian fleet in the salvation of the empire
+at this time is thus summarized by a historian:
+
+"The fleet won most of the credit for the fine defense; it invariably
+fought with admirable readiness and discipline, and was handled in
+the most masterful manner. It checked the establishment of a naval
+blockade at the very outset, and broke it when it was temporarily
+formed in 718; it enabled the army to operate at will on either
+shore of the Bosphorus, and it followed up the retreating Saracens
+and completed the ruin of the great armament."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, Foard, p. 170.]
+
+The winning stroke in this campaign was the tremendous naval victory
+at the mouth of the Bosphorus, and this, even more emphatically
+than Constantine's victory in 677, deserves to be called another
+Salamis. Not only did it save the Christian empire but it checked
+the Caliphate at the summit of its power and started it on its
+decline. Not for thirty years afterwards was the Saracen able to
+put any considerable fleet upon the sea.
+
+It was ten years after the Arab defeat at Constantinople that the
+armies of the west began the other part of Muza's project--the
+conquest of the Franks. By this time the Frankish power was united
+and able to present a powerful defense. In six bitterly contested
+battles between Tours and Poitiers in 732 Charles Martel defeated
+the Arabs in a campaign that may well be called the Marathon, or
+better, the Platæa, of the Middle Ages, for it completed the work
+done by the imperial navy at Constantinople. From this time forward
+the power of the Saracen began to ebb by land and sea.
+
+As it ebbed, the new cities of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice began to
+capture the trade and hold the control of the sea that once had
+been Saracen, until the Christian control was so well established
+as to make possible the Crusades. Later, as we shall see, a second
+invasion of Mohammedans, the Turks, ably assisted by the descendants
+of the Arabs who conquered Spain, once more threatened to control
+the Mediterranean for the cause of Islam. But the Persian Gulf
+and the Indian Ocean, which fell into the hands of the Arabs as
+soon as they took to the water, remained in Arab hands down to
+the times of the Portuguese. In those waters, because they were
+cut off from the Mediterranean, the Saracen had no competitor.
+As early as the eighth century Ceylon was an Arab trading base,
+and when the Portuguese explorers arrived at the end of the 15th
+century they found the Arabs still dominating the water routes
+of India and Asia, holding as they had held for seven centuries
+a monopoly of the commerce of the east.
+
+Of the Mediterranean during the struggle between Christian and
+Saracen a recent English writer makes the following suggestive comment:
+
+"The function of the Mediterranean has thus undergone a change.
+In early times it had been a barrier; later, under the Phœnicians,
+it became a highway, and to the Greeks a defense. We find that the
+Romans made it a basis for sea power and subdued all the lands
+on its margin. With the weakening of Rome came a weakening of sea
+power. The Barbary states and Spain became Saracen only because
+the naval power of the eastern empire was not strong enough to hold
+the whole sea, but neither was the Saracen able to gain supreme
+control. Thus the conditions were the same as in the earlier days
+of the conflict between Rome and Carthage: the Mediterranean became
+a moat separating the rivals, though first one and then the other
+had somewhat more control. The islands became alternately Saracen
+and Christian. Crete and Sicily were held for centuries before
+they were regained by a Christian power."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: GEOGRAPHY AND WORLD POWER, Fairgrieve, p. 125.]
+
+The victory of 718 saved Constantinople from any further peril
+from the Arabs, but it was again in grave peril, two centuries
+later, when a sudden invasion of Russians in great force threatened
+to accomplish at a stroke what the Saracens had failed to do in three
+great expeditions. The King of Kiev, one of the race of Vikings
+that had fought their way into southern Russia, collected a huge
+number of ships, variously estimated from one to ten thousand, and
+suddenly appeared in the Bosphorus. Probably there were not more
+than 1500 of these vessels all told and they must have been small
+compared with the Christian dromons; nevertheless they presented an
+appalling danger at that moment. The Christian fleet was watching
+Crete, the army was in the east winning back territory from the
+Arabs, and Constantinople lay almost defenseless. The great walls
+could be depended an to hold off a barbarian army, but a fleet
+was needed to hold the waterways; otherwise the city was doomed.
+
+In the Horn lay a few antiquated dromons and a few others still on
+the stocks. To Theophanes the Patrician was given this nucleus of
+a squadron with which to beat back the Russians. Desperate and even
+hopeless as the situation appeared, he went to work with the greatest
+energy, patching up the old ships, and hurrying the completion of
+the new. Meanwhile the invaders sent raiding parties ashore that
+harried the unprotected country districts with every refinement
+of cruelty. In order to make each ship count as much as possible
+as an offensive unit, Theaphanes made an innovation by fitting out
+Greek fire tubes on the broadsides as well as in the bows. This
+may be noted as the first appearance of the broadside armament
+idea, which had to wait six hundred years more before it became
+finally established.
+
+When the new ships had been completed and the old ones made serviceable,
+Theophanes had exactly fifteen men of war. With this handful of
+vessels, some hardly fit to take the sea, he set out from the Horn
+and boldly attacked the Russian fleet that blocked the entrance to
+the strait. Never was there a more forlorn hope. Certainly neither
+the citizens on the walls nor the men on the ships had any expectation
+of a return.
+
+What followed would be incredible were it not a matter of history.
+These fifteen ships were immediately swallowed up by the huge fleet
+of the enemy, but under the superb leadership of Theophanes each
+one fought with the fury of desperation. They had one hope, the
+weapon that had twice before saved the city, Greek fire. The Russians
+swarmed alongside only to find their ships taking fire with a flame
+that water would not quench. Contempt of their feeble enemy changed
+soon to a wild terror. There was but one impulse, to get out of
+reach of the Christians, and the ships struggled to escape. Soon
+the whole Russian fleet was in wild flight with the gallant fifteen
+in hot pursuit. Some of these could make but slow headway because
+of their unseaworthiness, but when all was over the Russians are
+said to have lost two-thirds of their entire force. The invaders who
+had been left on shore were then swept into the sea by reënforcements
+that had arrived at Constantinople, and not a vestige was left
+of the Russian invasion. Once more Greek fire and the Christian
+navy had saved the empire; and for sheer audacity, crowned with a
+victory of such magnitude, the feat of Theophanes stands unrivaled
+in history.
+
+From the tenth century on, Constantinople began to find her rivalries
+in the west. The coronation of Charlemagne in 800 had marked the
+final separation of the eastern and the western empire. As noted
+above, the passing of the Saracens gave opportunity for the growth
+of commercial city-states like Genoa, Pisa and Venice, and their
+interests clashed not only with one another but also with those
+of Constantinople.
+
+The climax came in 1204 when Venice succeeded in diverting the
+Fourth Crusade to an expedition of vengeance for herself, first
+against the city of Zara and then against Constantinople. This
+time the Eastern Empire had no fleet ready for defense and the
+Venetian galleys filled the waters under the city walls. Many of
+these galleys were fitted with a kind of flying bridge, a long
+yard that extended from the mast to the top of the wall and stout
+enough to bear a file of men that scrambled by this means to the
+parapets. After many bloody repulses the city was finally captured,
+and there followed a sack that for utter barbarity outdid anything
+ever perpetrated by Arab or Turk. Thus the city that for nearly a
+thousand years had saved Christian civilization was, by a hideous
+irony of fate, taken and sacked by a Crusading army.
+
+When the second Mohammedan invasion threatened Europe, Constantinople,
+weak on land and impotent by sea, and deserted by the Christian
+nations of the west, was unable to put up a strong resistance. At
+last, in 1453, it was captured by the Turks, and became thereafter
+the capital of the Moslem power. Great as this catastrophe was,
+it cannot compare with what would have happened if the city had
+fallen to the Saracen, the Hun, or the Russian during the dark
+centuries when the nations of the west were scarcely in embryo.
+In the 15th century they were strong enough to take up the sword
+that Constantinople had dropped and draw the line beyond which
+the Turk was not permitted to go.
+
+Although it has been the fashion since Gibbon to sneer at the Eastern
+Empire, it must be remembered with respect as the last treasure
+house of the inheritance bequeathed by Rome and Greece during the
+dark centuries of barbarian and Saracen. Even in its ruin it sent its
+fugitives westward with the manuscripts of a language and literature
+then little known, the Greek, and thereby added greatly to the
+growing impetus of the Renaissance. It is significant also that
+during its thousand years of life, as long as it kept its hold on
+the sea it stood firm. When it yielded that, its empire dwindled
+to a mere city fortress whose doom was assured long before it fell.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY, Vol. II., 1913.
+THE HISTORY OF THE SARACENS, E. Gibbon & S. Ockley.
+HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, Edward
+  Gibbon, ed. by J. B. Bury.
+THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, E. A. Foord, 1911.
+MILITARY AND RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES, Paul Lacroix,
+  1874.
+HISTORY OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE, J. B. Bury, 1889.
+HISTORY OF THE EASTERN ROMAN EMPIRE, J. B. Bury, 1912.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES [_Continued_]: VENICE AND THE TURK
+
+The city-state of Venice owed its origin to the very same barbarian
+invasions that wrecked the old established cities of the Italian
+peninsula. Fugitives from these towns in northern Italy and the
+outlying country districts fled to the islets and lagoons for shelter
+from the Hun, the Goth, and the Lombard. As the sea was the Venetians'
+barrier from the invader, so also it had to be their source of
+livelihood, and step by step through the centuries they built up
+their commerce until they practically controlled the Mediterranean,
+for trade or for war.
+
+As early as 991 a Doge of Venice made a treaty with the Saracens
+inaugurating a policy held thereafter by Venice till the time of
+Lepanto; namely, to trade with Mohammedans rather than fight them.
+The supreme passion of Venice was to make money, as it had been of
+ancient Phœnicia, and to this was subordinated every consideration
+of race, nationality, and religion. The first important step was
+the conquest of the Dalmatian pirates at the beginning of the 11th
+century. This meant the Venetian control of the Adriatic. When the
+Crusades began, the sea routes to the Holy Land were in the hands
+of the Venetians; indeed it was this fact that made the Crusades
+possible. As the carrying and convoying agent of the Crusaders,
+Venice developed greatly in wealth and power. With direct access to
+the Brenner Pass, she became a rich distributing center for Eastern
+goods to northern Europe. In all important Levantine cities there
+was a Venetian quarter, Venetians had special trading privileges,
+and many seaports and islands came directly under Venetian rule.
+
+[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS, VENICE AND THE TURK]
+
+This rapid expansion naturally roused the jealousy of others. In
+1171 Venice fought an unsuccessful war with Constantinople, and
+yet continued to grow in wealth and power. In 1204, as we have
+seen, Venice avenged herself by diverting the Fourth Crusade to
+the siege and sack of her eastern rival. As the reward of that
+nefarious exploit Venice received the greater part of the eastern
+empire, and became the dominating power in the Mediterranean. During
+the 13th and 14th centuries, however, she was compelled to fight
+with her rebellious colonies and her new rivals, Genoa and Padua.
+The wars with Genoa very nearly proved fatal to Venice, but just
+when matters seemed most desperate she was saved by a naval victory
+against a Genoese fleet in her own waters. In consequence of these
+wars between Venice and Genoa both were heavy losers in wealth
+and lives; Genoa never recovered from her defeat, but her rival
+showed amazing powers of recuperation. She extended her territory
+in Italy to include the important cities of Treviso, Padua, Vicenza,
+and Verona, and in 1488 acquired the island of Cyprus in the Levant.
+At this time the Venetian state owned 3300 ships, manned by 36,000
+men, and stood at the height of her power.
+
+Already, however, a new enemy had appeared who threatened not only
+Venice but all Europe. This was the Ottoman Turk. The Turks were
+not like the Arabs, members of the Indo-European family, but a
+race from the eastern borders of the Caspian Sea, a branch of the
+Mongolian stock. As these peoples moved south and west they came in
+contact with Mohammedanism and became ardent converts. Eventually
+they swept over Asia Minor, crossed the Dardanelles, took Adrianople,
+and pushed into Serbia. Thus, when Constantinople fell in 1453 it
+had been for some time a mere island of Christianity surrounded by
+Moslems. Indeed it was only the civil wars among the Turks themselves
+that held them back so long from the brilliant career of conquest
+that characterized the 15th and early 16th centuries, for these
+later followers of Mohammed had all the fanaticism of the Saracens.
+Before the fall of Constantinople and the transfer of the Turkish
+seat of government to that city, a corps of infantry was organized
+that became the terror of the Christian world--the Janissaries. By
+a grim irony of the Sultan, who created this body of troops, these
+men were exclusively of Christian parentage, taken as children either
+in the form of a human tribute levied on the Christian population
+of Constantinople, or as captives in the various expeditions in
+Christian territory. The Janissaries were brought up wholly to a
+military life, they were not permitted to marry, and their lives
+were devoted to fighting for the Crescent. For a long time they
+were invincible in the open field.
+
+The first half of the 16th century saw the Turks in Persia, in the
+east, and at the gates of Vienna in the west. For a time they got
+a foothold in Italy by seizing Otranto. They had conquered Egypt
+and Syria, penetrated Persia, and in Arabia gained the support of
+the Arabs for the Turkish sultan as the successor to the Caliphs.
+Constantinople, therefore, became not only the political capital
+for the Turkish empire but the religious center of the whole Moslem
+world. Moreover, the Arab states on the southern borders of the
+Mediterranean acknowledged the suzerainty of the Turkish ruler.
+
+This fact was of great importance, for it enabled the Turks to become
+masters of the inland sea. In 1492 the greater part of the Moors--the
+descendants of the Arab conquerors of Spain--were expelled from the
+Peninsula by the conquest of Granada. This event was hailed with
+joy throughout Christendom, but it had an unexpected and terrible
+consequence. Flung back into northern Africa, and filled with hatred
+because of the persecution they had endured, these Moors embarked
+on a career of piracy directed against Christians. In making common
+cause with the Turks they supplied the fleets that the Turkish
+power needed to carry out its schemes of conquest. Apparently the
+Turks had never taken to salt water as the Arabs had done, but in
+these Moorish pirates they found fighters on the sea well worthy
+to stand comparison with their peerless fighters on land, the
+Janissaries. Between 1492 and 1580, the date of Ali's death, there
+was a period in which the Moorish corsairs were supreme. It produced
+three great leaders, each of whom in turn became the terror of the
+sea: Kheyr ed Din, known as Barbarossa, Dragut, and Ali. It is a
+curious fact that the first and third were of Christian parentage.
+
+So long as the Turk invaded Christian territory by land alone,
+the Venetians were unconcerned. They made what treaties they could
+for continuing their trade with communities that had fallen into
+the conquerors' hands. But when the Turk began to spread out by
+sea it was inevitable that he must clash with the Venetian, and so
+there was much fighting. Yet even after a successful naval campaign
+the emissary of Venice was obliged to come before the Sultan, cap
+in hand, to beg trading privileges in Turkish territory. Everything
+in Venetian policy was subordinated to the maintenance of sufficient
+friendly relations with the Turk to assure a commercial monopoly in
+the Levant. Although the Moslem peril grew more and more menacing,
+Venice remained unwilling to join in any united action for the
+common good of Europe.
+
+Of course Venice was not alone in this policy. In 1534 Francis
+the First, for example, in order to humiliate his rival, Charles
+V, secretly sent word to Barbarossa of the plans being made against
+him. Indeed France showed no interest in combating the Turk even
+at the time when he was at the summit of his power. But Venice, as
+the dominating naval power, had the means of checking the Turkish
+invasion if she had chosen to do so. Instead she permitted the
+control of the Mediterranean to slip from her into the hands of
+the Moslems with scarcely a blow.
+
+The leading part in the resistance to the Moslem sea power was
+taken by Spain under Charles V. He had, as admiral of the navy,
+Andrea Doria, the Genoese, the ablest seaman on the Christian side.
+Early in his career he had captured a notorious corsair; later
+in the service of Spain, he defeated the Turks at Patras (at the
+entrance to the Gulf of Corinth), and again at the Dardanelles.
+These successes threatened Turkish supremacy on the Mediterranean,
+and Sultan Soliman "the Magnificent," the ruler under whom the
+Turkish empire reached its zenith, summoned the Algerian corsair
+Barbarossa and gave him supreme command over all the fleets under
+the Moslem banner. At this time, 1533, Barbarossa was seventy-seven
+years old, but he had lost none of his fire or ability. On the
+occasion of being presented to the Sultan, he uttered a saying
+that might stand as the text for all the writings of Mahan: "Sire,
+he who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also."
+
+The following year Barbarossa set out from Constantinople with
+a powerful fleet and proceeded to ravage the coast of Italy. He
+sacked Reggio, burnt and massacred elsewhere on the coast without
+opposition, cast anchor at the mouth of the Tiber and if he had
+chosen could have sacked Rome and taken the Pope captive. He then
+returned to Constantinople with 11,000 Christian captives.
+
+Charles V was roused by this display of corsair power and barbarity
+to collect a force that should put an end to such raids. Barbarossa
+had recently added Tunis to his personal domains, and the great
+expedition of ships and soldiers which the emperor assembled was
+directed against that city. Despite the warning given by the King
+of France, Barbarossa was unable to oppose the Christian host with
+a force sufficiently strong to defend the city. The Christians
+captured it and the chieftain escaped only by a flight along the
+desert to the port of Bona where he had a few galleys in reserve.
+With these he made his way to Algiers before Andrea Doria could
+come up with him. The Christians celebrated the capture of Tunis by
+a massacre of some 30,000 inhabitants and returned home, thanking
+God that at last Barbarossa was done for. Indeed, with the loss
+of his fleet and his newly acquired province it seemed as if the
+great pirate was not likely to give much trouble, but the Christians
+had made the mistake of leaving the work only half done.
+
+In 1537, two years after the fall of Tunis, the Sultan declared war
+on Venice. The Turkish fleet, although led by the Sultan Soliman
+himself, was defeated by the Venetians off Corfu. Doria, in the
+service of Charles V, caught and burned ten richly laden Turkish
+merchant ships and then defeated a Turkish squadron. The prestige
+of the Crescent on the sea was badly weakened by these events,
+but suddenly Barbarossa appeared and raided the islands of the
+Archipelago and the coasts of the Adriatic with a savagery and
+sweep unmatched by anything in his long career. He arrived in the
+Golden Horn laden with booty, and delivered to his master, the
+Sultan, 18,000 captives.
+
+This exploit changed the complexion of affairs. During the winter
+of 1537-1538 the naval yards of Constantinople were busy with the
+preparations for a new fleet which should take the offensive against
+the Venetians and the Christians generally. In the spring Barbarossa
+got out into the Archipelago and, raiding at will, swept up another
+batch of prisoners to serve as galley slaves for the new ships.
+Meanwhile the Mediterranean states nerved themselves for a final
+effort. Venice contributed 81 galleys, the Pope sent 36, and Spain,
+30. Later the Emperor sent 50 transports with 10,000 soldiers,
+and 49 galleys, together with a number of large sailing ships.
+Venice also added 14 sailing ships of war, or "nefs," and Doria
+22; these formed a special squadron. The Venetian nefs were headed
+by Condalmiero in his flagship the _Galleon of Venice_, the most
+formidable warship in the Mediterranean, and the precursor of a
+revolution in naval architecture and naval tactics.
+
+[Illustration: 16TH CENTURY GALLEY]
+
+Although the sailing ship was coming more and more into favor because
+of the discoveries across the Atlantic, the galley was the man
+of war of this period. The dromons of the Eastern empire, with
+their stout build and two banks of oars, had given way to a long,
+narrow vessel with a single bank of oars which had been developed
+by men who lived on the shores of the sheltered lagoons of the
+Adriatic. The prime characteristic of this type was its mobility.
+For the pirate whose business it was to lie in wait and dash out
+on a merchantman, this quality of mobility--independence of wind
+and speed of movement--was of chief importance. Similarly, in order
+to combat the pirate it was necessary to possess the same
+characteristic. Of course, as in all the days of rowed ships, this
+freedom of movement was limited by the physical exhaustion of the
+rowers. In the ships of Greek and Roman days these men had some
+protection from the weapons of the enemy and from the weather,
+but in the 16th century galley, whether Turkish or Christian, they
+were chained naked to their benches day and night, with practically
+nothing to shelter them from the weather or from the weapons of
+an enemy. So frightful were the hardships of the life that the
+rowers were almost always captives, or felons who worked out their
+sentences on the rowers' bench. An important difference between
+the galley of this period and the earlier types of rowed ship is
+the fact that in the galley there was but one row of oars on a
+side, but these oars were very long and manned by four or five men
+apiece.
+
+A typical galley was about 180 feet over all with a beam of 19
+feet and a depth of hold of about 7-1/2 feet. A single deck sloped
+from about the water line to a structure that ran fore and aft
+amidships, about six feet wide, which served as a gangway between
+forecastle and poop and gave access to the hold. The forecastle
+carried the main battery of guns, and was closed in below so as to
+provide quarters for the fighting men. The poop had a deck house
+and a smaller battery; this deck also was closed in, furnishing
+quarters for the officers. There were two or three masts, lateen
+rigged, adorned in peace or war with the greatest profusion of
+banners and streamers. Indeed huge sums of money were expended on
+the mere ornament of these war galleys, particularly in the elaborate
+carvings that adorned the stern and prow.
+
+In the conflict of Christian and Moslem, when Constantinople was
+the capital of Christendom, Greek fire on two critical occasions
+routed the Saracens. This substance was never understood in western
+Europe, and for centuries the secret was carefully preserved in
+the eastern capital. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
+it was used by the Moslem against the Christian, but the discovery
+of gunpowder soon made the earlier substance obsolete. In the 16th
+century cannon had already reached considerable dimensions, but in
+a naval battle between galleys these weapons were not used after
+the first volley or so. The tactics were little different from
+those of the day of the trireme, consisting simply of ramming, and
+fighting at close quarters with arquebus, bows, pike, and sword.
+
+Twenty feet from the bows of every galley projected her metal beak,
+and all her guns pointed forward; hence in the naval tactics of
+the period everything turned on a head-on attack. The battle line,
+therefore, was line abreast. For the same reasons a commander had
+to fear an attack on his flank, and he maneuvered usually to get
+at least one flank protected by the shore. The battle line in the
+days of the galley could be dressed as accurately as a file of
+soldiers, but the fighting was settled in a close mêlée in which
+all formation was lost from the moment of collision between the
+two fleets.
+
+_The Campaign of Prevesa_
+
+Such were the men of war and the tactics common to Christian and
+corsair during the 16th century. While the Christians were slowly
+collecting their armada, Barbarossa, with a force of 122 galleys,
+set out to catch his enemy in detail if he could. Pirate as he
+was, the old ruffian had a clear strategic grasp of what he might
+do with a force that was inferior to the fleet collecting against
+him. The Christians were to mobilize at Corfu. The Papal squadron
+had collected in the Gulf of Arta, and Barbarossa made for it. By
+sheer luck just before he arrived it had moved to the rendezvous.
+If he had followed it up immediately, he might have crushed both
+the Papal and Venetian contingents, because Doria and the Spanish
+fleet had not yet arrived; but apparently he felt uncertain as
+to just how far off these reënforcements were and therefore did
+not attempt the stroke. Instead, he took up a defensive position
+in the Gulf of Arta, exactly where Antony had collected his fleet
+before the battle of Actium.
+
+In September (1538) the Christian fleet under Doria left Corfu and
+crossed to the Gulf. Barbarossa had drawn up his force in battle
+array inside the entrance, under the guns of the Turkish fortress
+at Prevesa. Since this entrance is obstructed by a bar with too
+little water for Doria's heavier ships, he lay outside. Thus the
+two fleets faced each other, each waiting for the other to make
+the next move. For the first time in their careers the greatest
+admiral on the Christian side was face to face with the greatest on
+the Moslem side. Both were old men, Doria over seventy and Barbarossa
+eighty-two. The stage was set for another decisive battle on the scene
+of Actium. The town of Prevesa stood on the site of Octavius's camp,
+and again East and West faced each other for the mastery of the sea.
+With the vastly greater strength of the Christian fleet, and the
+known skill of its leader, everything pointed to an overwhelming
+victory for the Cross. What followed is one of the most amazing
+stories in history.
+
+Having the interior lines and the smooth anchorage, Barbarossa
+had only to watch his enemy go to pieces in the open roadstead
+in trying to maintain a blockade. His officers, however, scorned
+such a policy, and, being appointees of the Sultan and far from
+subordinate in spirit to their chief, they were finally able to
+force his hand and compel him to offer battle to the Christians
+by leaving the security of the gulf and the fortress and going
+out into the open, exactly where Doria wanted him. Accordingly
+on the 27th of September, the Turkish fleet sailed out to offer
+battle. It happened that Doria had gone ten miles away to Sessola
+for anchorage, and the _Galleon of Venice_ lay becalmed right in
+the path of the advancing fleet. Condalmiero sent word for help,
+and Doria ordered him to begin fighting, assuring him that he would
+soon be reënforced.
+
+The Turkish galleys, advancing in a crescent formation, soon enveloped
+the lonely ship. Her captain ordered his crew to lie down on her
+deck while he alone stood, in full armor, a target to the host of
+Moslems who pushed forward in their galleys anxious for the honor
+of capturing this great ship. Condalmiero ordered his gunners to
+hold their fire until the enemy were within arquebus range. Then
+the broadsides of the galleon blazed and the surrounding galleys
+crumpled and sank. A single shot weighing 120 pounds sank a galley
+with practically all on board. The signal to retreat was given
+and speedily obeyed.
+
+Thereafter there were to be no more rushing tactics. Barbarossa
+organized his galleys in squadrons of twenty, which advanced, one
+after the other, delivered their fire, and retired. All the rest
+of the day, from about noon till sunset, this strange conflict
+between the single galleon and the Turkish fleet went on. The ship
+was cumbered with her fallen spars; she had lost thirteen men killed
+and forty wounded. The losses would have been far greater but for
+the extraordinarily thick sides of the galleon. After sundown the
+Turkish fleet appeared to be drawing up in line for the last assault.
+On the _Galleon of Venice_ there was no thought of surrender; the
+ammunition was almost spent and the men were exhausted with their
+tremendous efforts, but they stood at their posts determined to
+defend their ship to the last man.
+
+Then, to their astonishment Barbarossa drew off, sending some of
+his galleys to pursue and cut off certain isolated Christian units,
+but leaving the field to the Venetian galleon. Meanwhile, during all
+that long, hot afternoon the great fleet of Andrea Doria, instead
+of pressing forward to the relief of the _Galleon of Venice_ and
+crushing Barbarossa with its great superiority in numbers, was
+going through strange parade maneuvers about ten miles away. Doria's
+explanation was that he was trying to decoy Barbarossa out into
+deeper water where the guns of the nefs could be used, but there is
+no other conclusion to be reached than that Doria did not want to
+fight. Fortune that day offered him everything for an overwhelming
+victory, one that might have ranked with the decisive actions of the
+world's history, and he threw it away under circumstances peculiarly
+disgraceful and humiliating. Never did commander in chief so richly
+deserve to be shot on his own deck. The following day as a fair
+wind blew for Corfu, Doria spread sail and retired from the gulf,
+while Barbarossa, roaring with laughter, called on his men to witness
+the cowardice of this Christian admiral.
+
+The victory lay with Barbarossa. With a greatly inferior force
+he had challenged Doria and attacked. Doria had not only declined
+the challenge but fled back to Corfu. No wonder the Sultan ordered
+the cities of his domain to be illuminated. Barbarossa's prizes
+included two galleys and five nefs, but he, too, had failed in
+an inexplicable fashion in drawing off from the assault on the
+_Galleon of Venice_ at the end of the day's fighting. It is with
+her, with the gallant Condalmiero and his men, that all the honor of
+the day belongs. Nothing in the adventurous 16th century surpasses
+their splendid, disciplined valor on this occasion.
+
+The astonishing powers of resistance and the deadly effect of the
+broadsides of the _Galleon of Venice_ displayed in a long and successful
+fight against an entire fleet of galleys should have had the effect
+of making a revolution in naval architecture fifty years before
+that change actually occurred. But men of war of those days were
+built after the models of Venetian architects, and the latter clung
+doggedly to the galley. They overlooked the great defensive and
+offensive powers of the galleon displayed in this story and saw
+only the fact that she was becalmed and unable to move.
+
+Doria's failure left conditions in the Mediterranean as bad as
+ever. Barbarossa died at the age of ninety, but one of the last
+acts of his life was to ransom a follower of his, Dragut, Pasha
+of Tripoli, who had served under him at Prevesa and, having been
+captured two years later, served four years as a galley slave on
+the ship of Gian Andrea Doria, the grandnephew and heir of Andrea
+Doria. Dragut soon assumed the leadership laid down by Barbarossa,
+his master, fighting first the elder Doria and then his namesake
+with great skill and audacity. For years the Knights of Malta had
+been a thorn in the side of the Moslems who roamed the sea, and
+in 1565 a gigantic effort was made by the Sultan, together with
+his tributaries from the Barbary states, to wipe out this naval
+stronghold. The siege that followed was distinguished by the most
+reckless courage and the most desperate fighting on both sides. It
+extended from May 18 to September 8, costing the Christians 8000
+and the Moslems 30,000 lives. In the midst of the siege Dragut
+himself was slain, and the conduct of the siege fell into less
+capable hands. Finally the Turks withdrew.
+
+The death of Soliman the Magnificent, in 1566, brought to the head
+of the Turkish state a ruler known by the significant name, Selim
+the Drunkard. Weak and debauched as he was, nevertheless he aspired
+to add to the Turkish dominions as his father had done. Accordingly,
+he informed Venice that she must evacuate Cyprus. Previous to this
+time Venice had succeeded, by means of heavy bribes to the Sultan's
+ministers, in keeping her hold on this important island, but this
+policy only tempted further arrogance on the part of the Turk.
+Further, the time was propitious for such a stroke because Venice
+was impoverished by bad harvests and the loss of her naval arsenal
+by fire, Spain was occupied in troubles with the Moors, and France,
+torn with civil war, wanted to keep peace with the Sultan at any
+price. During the terrible siege of Malta Venice had remained neutral;
+now that the danger came home to her she cried for help, and not
+unnaturally there were those who sneered at her in this crisis
+and bade her save herself.
+
+The Pope, however, had long been anxious to organize a league of
+Christian peoples to win back the Mediterranean to the Cross and draw
+a line beyond which the Crescent should never pass. In this plight
+of Venice he saw an opportunity, because hitherto the persistent
+neutrality or the unwillingness of the Venetians to fight the Turk to
+the finish had been one of the chief obstacles to concerted action.
+He therefore pledged his own resources to Venice and attempted
+to collect allies by the appeal to the Cross. The results were
+discouraging, but a force of Spanish, Papal, and Venetian galleys
+was finally collected and after endless delays dispatched to the
+scene in the summer of 1570.
+
+Meanwhile the Turks had been pressing their attack on Cyprus and
+were besieging the city of Nicosia. If the Christians had been
+moved by any united spirit they could have relieved Nicosia and
+struck a heavy blow at the Turkish fleet, which lay unready and
+stripped of its men in the harbor. But Gian Doria, who inherited
+from his great uncle his great dislike of Venetians, and who probably
+had secret instructions from his master, Philip II, to help as
+little as possible, succeeded in blocking any vigorous move on the
+part of the other commanders. Finally, after a heated quarrel, he
+sailed back to Sicily with his entire fleet, and the rest followed.
+The allies had gone no nearer Cyprus than the port of Suda in Crete.
+The whole expedition, therefore, came to nothing.
+
+In September Nicosia fell to the Turk, who then turned to the conquest
+of Famagusta, the last stronghold of the Venetians on the island.
+Bragadino, the commander of the besieged forces, fought against
+desperate odds with a courage and skill worthy of the best traditions
+of his native city, hoping to repulse the Turks until help could
+arrive. But Doria's defection in 1570 decided the fate of the city
+the following year. After fifty-five days of siege, with no resources
+left, Bragadino was compelled, on August 4, 1571, to accept an offer
+of surrender on honorable terms. The Turkish commander, enraged
+at the loss of 50,000 men, which Bragadino's stubborn defense had
+cost, no sooner had the Venetians in his power than he massacred
+officers and men and flayed their commander alive. This news did
+not reach the Christians, however, until their second expedition
+was almost at grips with the Turks at Lepanto.
+
+_The Campaign of Lepanto_
+
+Undismayed by the failure of his first attempt, Pope Pius had
+immediately gone to work to reorganize his Holy League. He had
+to overcome the mutual hatred and mistrust that lay between Spain
+and Venice, aggravated by the recent conduct of Doria, but neither
+the Pope nor Venice could do without the help of Spain. There was
+much bickering between the envoys in the Papal chambers, and it
+was not till February, 1571, that the terms of the new enterprise
+were agreed upon. By this contract no one of the powers represented
+was to make a separate peace with the Porte. The costs were divided
+into six parts, of which Spain undertook three, Venice, two, and
+the Pope, one. Don Juan, the illegitimate brother of Philip II, was
+to be commander in chief. Although only twenty-four, this prince
+had won a military reputation in suppressing the Moorish rebellion
+in Spain, and, having been recognized by Philip as a half brother,
+he had a princely rank that would subordinate the claims of all the
+rival admirals. Finally, the rendezvous was appointed at Messina.
+
+The aged Venetian admiral, Veniero, had been compelled by the situation
+in the east to divide his force into two parts, one at Crete, and
+the other under himself at Corfu. By the time he received orders
+to proceed to the rendezvous, he learned that Ali, the corsair
+king of Algiers, known better by his nickname of "Uluch" Ali, was
+operating at the mouth of the Adriatic with a large force. To reach
+Messina with his divided fleet, Veniero ran the risk of being caught
+by Ali and destroyed in detail, but the situation was so critical
+that he took the risk and succeeded in slipping past the corsair
+undiscovered. In permitting this escape, and in fact in allowing
+all the other units of the Christian fleet to assemble at Messina,
+Ali missed a golden opportunity to destroy the whole force before
+it ever collected. Instead, he continued his ravages on the coasts
+of the Adriatic, bent only on plunder. He carried his raids almost
+to the lagoons of Venice itself, and indeed might have attacked
+the city had he not been hampered by a shortage of men.
+
+Although the Turks were having their own way, unopposed, and the
+situation was growing daily more critical, the Christian fleet was
+slow in assembling. For a whole month Veniero waited in Messina
+for the arrival of Don Juan and the Spanish squadrons. Philip,
+apparently, used one pretext after another to delay the prince,
+and once on his way Don Juan had to tarry at every stage of the
+journey to witness ceremonial fêtes held in his honor. Philip acted
+in good faith as far as his preparations went, but he wanted to
+save his galleys for use against the Moors of the Barbary coast,
+which was nearer the ports of Spain, and was indifferent to the
+outcome of the quarrel between Venice and the Porte. Undoubtedly
+Doria and the other Spanish officers were fully informed of their
+royal master's desires in this expedition as in the one of the
+year before. They were to avoid battle if they could.
+
+On August 25 Don Juan arrived at Messina and was joyously received
+by the city and the fleet. Nevertheless, it was the 12th of September
+before the decision was finally reached to seek out the Turkish
+fleet and offer battle. Fortunately Don Juan was a high-spirited
+youth who shared none of his brother's half-heartedness; he went
+to work to organize the discordant elements under his command into
+as much of a unit as he could, and to imbue them with the idea of
+aggressive action. In this spirit he was seconded by thousands
+of young nobles and soldiers of fortune from Spain and Italy, who
+had flocked to his standard like the knight errants of the age of
+chivalry, burning to distinguish themselves against the infidel.
+Among these, oddly enough, was a young Spaniard, Cervantes, who
+was destined in later years to laugh chivalry out of Europe by
+his immortal "Don Quixote."
+
+In order to knit together the three elements, Spanish, Venetian,
+and Papal, Don Juan so distributed their forces that no single
+squadron could claim to belong to any one nation. As the Venetian
+galleys lacked men, he put aboard them Spanish and Italian infantry.
+Before leaving Messina, he had given every commander written
+instructions as to his cruising station and his place in the battle
+line. The fighting formation was to consist of three squadrons of
+the line and one of reserve. The left wing was to be commanded
+by the Venetian Barbarigo; the center, by Don Juan himself, in the
+flagship _Real_, with Colonna, the Papal commander on his right and
+Veniero, the Venetian commander, on his left, in their respective
+flagships. The right wing was intrusted to Doria, and the reserve,
+amounting to about thirty galleys, was under the Spaniard, Santa
+Cruz. In front of each squadron of the line two Venetian galleasses
+were to take station in order to break up the formation of the
+Turkish advance. The total fighting force consisted of 202 galleys,
+six galleasses, and 28,000 infantrymen besides sailors and oarsmen.
+
+The Venetian galleasses deserve special mention because they attracted
+considerable attention by the part they subsequently played in
+the action. Sometimes the word was applied to any specially large
+galley, but these represented something different from anything
+in either Christian or Turkish fleets. They were an attempt to
+reach a combination of galleon and galley, possessing the bulk,
+strength, and heavy armament of the former, together with the oar
+propulsion of the latter to render them independent of the wind.
+But like most, if not all, compromise types, the galleass was
+short-lived. It was clumsy and slow, being neither one thing nor
+the other. Most of the time on the cruise these galleasses had
+to be towed in order to keep up with the rest of the fleet. It
+is interesting to note that, despite the example of the _Galleon
+of Venice_ at Prevesa, there was not a single galleon in the whole
+force.
+
+On September 16 the start from Messina was made. The fleet crossed
+to the opposite shore of the Adriatic, creeping along the coast and
+in the lee of the islands after the manner of oar driven vessels
+that were unable to face a fresh breeze or a moderate sea. Delayed
+by unfavorable winds, it was not till October 6 that it arrived
+at the group of rocky islets lying just north of the opening of
+the Gulf of Corinth, or Lepanto[1] where the Turkish fleet was
+known to be mobilized. Meanwhile trouble had broken out among the
+Christians. Serious fighting had taken place between Venetians and
+Spaniards, and Veniero, without referring the case to Don Juan,
+had hanged a Spanish soldier who had been impudent to him, thus
+enraging the commander in chief. In a word, the various elements
+were nearly at the point of fighting each other before the object
+of their crusade was even sighted.
+
+[Footnote 1: Lepanto is the modern name of Naupaktis, the naval
+base of Athens in the gulf. It had been a Venetian stronghold,
+but fell to the Turks in 1499. The name Lepanto is given to both
+the town and the gulf.]
+
+At dawn of the 7th the lookout on the _Real_ sighted the van of
+the Turkish fleet coming out to the attack, and this news had a
+salutary effect. Don Juan called a council of war, silenced those
+like Doria who still counseled avoiding battle, and then in a swift
+sailing vessel went through the fleet exhorting officers and men
+to do their utmost. The sacrament was then administered to all,
+the galley slaves freed from their chains, and the standard of
+the Holy League, the figure of the Crucified Savior, was raised
+to the truck of the flagship.
+
+As the Christians streamed down from the straits to meet their
+enemy, they faced a serious peril. The Turks were advancing in
+full array aided by a wind at their backs; the same wind naturally
+was against the Christians, who had to toil at their oars with great
+labor to make headway. If the wind held there was every prospect
+that the Turks would be able to fall upon their enemy before Don
+Juan could form his line of battle. Fortunately, toward noon the
+wind shifted so as to help the Christians and retard the Turks.
+This shift just enabled most of the squadrons to fall into their
+appointed stations before the collision. Two of the galleasses,
+however, were not able to reach their posts in advance of the right
+wing before the mêlée began, and the right wing itself, though it
+had ample time to take position, kept on its course to the south,
+leaving the rest of the fleet behind. To Turk and Christian alike
+this move on the part of Doria meant treachery, for which Doria's
+previous conduct gave ample color, but there was no time to draw
+back or reorganize the line.
+
+The Turkish force, numbering 222 galleys, swept on to the attack,
+also in three divisions, stretched out in a wide crescent. The
+commander in chief, Ali Pasha, led the center, his right was commanded
+by Sirocco, the Viceroy of Egypt, and his left by "Uluch" Ali. This
+arrangement should have brought Ali, the greatest of the Moslem
+seafighters of his day, face to face with Doria, the most celebrated
+admiral in Christendom. The two opposing lines swung together with a
+furious plying of oars and a tumult of shouting. The four galleasses
+stationed well in front of the Christian battle line opened an
+effective fire at close quarters on the foremost Turkish galleys
+as they swept past. In trying to avoid the heavy artillery of these
+floating fortresses, the Turks fell into confusion, losing their
+battle array almost at the very moment of contact, and masking
+the fire of many of their ships. This was an important service
+to the credit of the galleasses, but as they were too unwieldy to
+maneuver readily they seem to have taken no further part in the
+action.
+
+The first contact took place about noon between Barbarigo's and
+Sirocco's squadrons. The Venetian had planned to rest his left
+flank so close to the shore as to prevent the Turks from enveloping
+it, but Sirocco, who knew the depth of water better, was able to
+pour a stream of galleys between the end of Barbarigo's line and
+the coast so that the Christians at this point found themselves
+attacked in front and rear. For a while it looked as if the Turks
+would win, but the Christians fought with the courage of despair.
+There was no semblance of line left; only a mêlée of ships laid
+so close to each other as to form almost a continuous platform
+over which the fighting raged hand to hand. Both the leaders fell.
+Barbarigo was mortally wounded, and Sirocco was killed when his
+flagship was stormed. The loss of the Egyptian flagship and commander
+seemed to decide the struggle at this point. The Christian slaves,
+freed from the rowers' benches, were supplied with arms and joined
+in the fighting with the fury of vengeance on their masters. A
+backward movement set in among the Turkish ships; then many headed
+for the shore to escape.
+
+Meanwhile, shortly after the Christian left had been engaged the
+two centers crashed together. Such was the force of the impact
+that the beak of Ali Pasha's galley drove as far as the fourth
+rowing bench of the _Real_. Instantly a fury of battle burst forth
+around the opposing flagships. Attack and counter attack between
+Spanish infantry and Turkish Janissaries swayed back and forth
+across from one galley to another amid a terrific uproar. Once
+the _Real_ was nearly taken, but Colonna jammed the bows of his
+galley alongside and saved the situation by a counter attack. On
+the other side of the flagship Veniero was also at one time in
+grave peril but was saved by the timely assistance of his comrades.
+Though wounded in the leg, this veteran of seventy fought throughout
+the action as stoutly as the youngest soldier.
+
+The prompt action of Colonna turned the tide in the center, for
+after clearing the Turks from the deck of the _Real_, the Christians,
+now reënforced, made a supreme effort that swept the length of
+Ali Pasha's galley and left the Turkish commander in chief among
+the slain. In fighting of this character no quarter was given;
+of the 400 men on the Turkish flagship not one was spared. Don
+Juan immediately hoisted the banner of the League to the masthead
+of the captured ship. This sign of victory broke the spirit of
+the Turks and nerved the Christians to redoubled efforts. As on
+the left wing so in the center the offensive now passed to the
+allies. Thus after two hours' fighting the Turks were already beaten
+on left and center, though fighting still went on hotly in tangled
+and scattered groups of ships.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF LEPANTO, OCT. 7. 1571
+
+Formation of the two fleets just before contact, about 11 a. m.]
+
+On the Christian right, however, the situation was different. Doria
+had from the beginning left the right center "in the air" by sailing
+away to the south. He explained this singular conduct afterwards by
+saying that he noticed Ali moving seaward as if to try an enveloping
+movement round the Christians' southern flank, and therefore moved
+to head him off. However plausible this may be, the explanation did
+not satisfy Doria's captains, who obeyed his signals with indignant
+rage. At all events Ali had a considerably larger force than Doria,
+and after the latter had drawn away so far as to create a wide
+gap between his own squadron and the center, Ali suddenly swung
+his galleys about in line and fell upon the exposed flank, leaving
+Doria too far away to interfere. The Algerian singled out a detached
+group of about fifteen galleys, among which was the flagship of
+the Knights of Malta. No Christian flag was so hated as the banner
+of this Order, and the Turks fell upon these ships with shouts
+of triumph. One after another was taken and it began to look as
+if Ali would soon roll up the entire flank and pluck victory from
+defeat.
+
+But Santa Cruz, who was still laboring through the straits when
+the battle began, was now in a position to help. After an hour's
+fighting with all the advantage on Ali's side, Santa Cruz arrived
+with his reserve squadron and turned the scale. By this time, too,
+Doria managed to reach the scene with a part of his squadron. Thus
+Ali found himself outnumbered and in danger of capture. Signaling
+retreat, he collected a number of his galleys and, boldly steering
+through the field of battle, escaped to lay at the feet of the
+Sultan the captured flag of the Knights of Malta. Some thirty-five
+others of his force made their way safely back to Lepanto.
+
+The fighting did not end till evening. By that time the Christians
+had taken 117 galleys and 20 galliots, and sunk or burnt some fifty
+other ships of various sorts. Ten thousand Turks were captured and
+many thousands of Christian slaves rescued. The Christians lost
+7500 men; the Turks, about 30,000. It was an overwhelming victory.
+
+As far as the tactics go, Lepanto was, like Salamis, an infantry
+battle on floating platforms. It was fought and won by the picked
+infantrymen of Spain and Italy; the day of seamanship had not yet
+arrived. For the conduct of the most distinguished admiral on the
+Christian side, Gian Andrea Doria, little justification can be
+found. Even if we accept his excuse at its face value, the event
+proved his folly. It is strange that in this, the supreme victory
+of the Cross over the Crescent on the sea, a Doria should have
+tarnished his reputation so foully, even as his great-uncle Andrea
+had tarnished his in the battle of Prevesa. It seems as if in both, as
+Genoese, the hatred of Venice extinguished every other consideration
+of loyalty to Christendom.
+
+What were the consequences of Lepanto, and in what sense can it
+be called a decisive battle? The question at first seems baffling.
+Overwhelming as was the defeat of the Turks, Ali had another fleet
+ready the next spring and was soon ravaging the seas again. Twice
+there came an opportunity for the two fleets to meet for another
+battle, but Ali declined the challenge. After Lepanto he seemed
+unwilling, without a great superiority, to risk another close action
+and contented himself with a "fleet in being." In this new attitude
+toward the Christians lies the hint to the answer. The significance
+of Lepanto lies in its moral effect. Never before had the Turkish
+fleet been so decisively beaten in a pitched battle. The fame of
+Lepanto rang through Europe and broke the legend of Turkish
+invincibility on the sea.
+
+The material results, it must be admitted, were worse than nothing
+at the time. In 1573 Don Juan was amazed and infuriated to learn
+that Venice, contrary to the terms of the Holy League, had secretly
+arranged a separate peace with the Sultan. The terms she accepted
+were those of a beaten combatant. Venice agreed to the loss of
+Cyprus, paid an indemnity of 300,000 ducats, trebled her tribute
+for the use of Zante as a trading post, and restored to the Turk
+all captures made on the Albanian and Dalmatian coast. Apparently
+the Venetian had to have his trade at any price, including honor.
+At this news Don Juan tore down the standard of the allies and
+raised the flag of Castile and Aragon. In two years and after a
+brilliant victory, the eternal Holy League, which was pledged to
+last forever, fell in pieces.
+
+As for Venice, her ignoble policy brought her little benefit. She
+steadily declined thereafter as a commercial and naval power. Her
+old markets were in the grip of the Turk, and the new discoveries of
+ocean routes to the east--beyond the reach of the Moslem,--diverted
+the course of trade away from the Mediterranean, which became,
+more and more, a mere backwater of the world's commerce. In fact,
+it was not until the cutting of the Suez Canal that the inland
+sea regained its old time importance.
+
+In the long unsuccessful struggle of Christian against the Turk
+Venice must bear the chief blame, for she had the means and the
+opportunity to conquer if she had chosen the better part. And yet
+the story of this chapter shows also that the rest of Christendom
+was not blameless. If Christians in the much extolled Age of Faith
+had shown as much unity of spirit as the Infidels, the rule of the
+Turk would not have paralyzed Greece, the Balkans, the islands of
+the Ægean, and the coasts of Asia Minor for nearly five centuries.
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+LA GUERRE DE CHYPRE ET LA BATAILLE DE LéPANTE, J. P. Jurien de
+  la Gravière, 1888.
+By the same author, DORIA ET BARBEROUSSE, 1886.
+HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE SECOND (vol. III.), W. H.
+  Prescott, 1858.
+SEA WOLVES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, E. Hamilton Currey. This
+  contains a full bibliography.
+THE NAVY OF VENICE, Alethea Wiel, 1910.
+THE EASTERN QUESTION (chap. V.), J. A. R. Marriott, 1917.
+BARBARY CORSAIRS, Story of the Nations Series, Lane-Poole, 1890.
+DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY (Introduction), J. S. Corbett, 1898.
+GEOGRAPHY AND WORLD POWER, James Fairgrieve, 1917.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+OPENING THE OCEAN ROUTES
+
+1. PORTUGAL AND THE NEW ROUTE TO INDIA
+
+From the days of the Phœnicians to the close of the 15th century,
+all trade between Europe and Asia crossed the land barrier east of
+the Mediterranean. Delivered by Mohammedan vessels at the head of
+the Persian Gulf or the ports of the Red Sea, merchandise followed
+thence the caravan routes across Arabia or Egypt to the Mediterranean,
+quadrupling in value in the transit. Intercourse between East and
+West, active under the Romans, was again stimulated by the crusades
+and by Venetian traders, until in the 14th and the 15th centuries
+the dyes, spices, perfumes, cottons, muslins, silks, and jewels
+of the Orient were in demand throughout the western world. This
+assurance of a ready market and large profits, combined with the
+capture of Constantinople by the Turks (1453), their piratical
+attacks in the Mediterranean which continued unchecked until Lepanto,
+and their final barring of all trade routes through the Levant,
+revived among nations of western Europe the old legends of all-water
+routes to Asia, either around Africa or directly westward across
+the unknown sea.
+
+With the opening of ocean routes and the discovery of America,
+a rivalry in world trade and colonial expansion set in which has
+continued increasingly down to the present time, forming a dominant
+element in the foreign policies of maritime nations and a primary
+motive for the possession and use of navies. The development of
+overseas trade, involving the factors of merchant shipping, navies,
+and control of the seas, is thus an integral part of the history
+of sea power. The great voyages of discovery are also not to be
+disregarded, supplying as they did the basis for colonial claims,
+and illustrating at the same time the progress of nautical science
+and geographical knowledge.
+
+[Illustration: CROSS-STAFF]
+
+The art of navigation, though still crude, had by the 15th century
+so advanced that the sailor was no longer compelled to skirt the
+shore, with only rare ventures across open stretches of sea. The
+use of the compass, originating in China, had been learned from the
+Arabs by the crusaders, and is first mentioned in Europe towards
+the close of the 12th century. An Italian in England, describing a
+visit to the philosopher Roger Bacon in 1258, writes as follows:
+"Among other things he showed me an ugly black stone called a magnet
+... upon which, if a needle be rubbed and afterward fastened to
+a straw so that it shall float upon the water, the needle will
+instantly turn toward the pole-star; though the night be never so
+dark, yet shall the mariner be able by the help of this needle to
+steer his course aright. But no master-mariner," he adds, "dares
+to use it lest he should fall under the imputation of being a
+magician."[1] By the end of the 13th century the compass was coming
+into general use; and when Columbus sailed he had an instrument
+divided as in later times into 360 degrees and 32 points, as well as
+a quadrant, sea-astrolabe, and other nautical devices. The astrolabe,
+an instrument for determining latitude by measuring the altitude of
+the sun or other heavenly body, was suspended from the finger by a
+ring and held upright at noon till the shadow of the sun passed the
+sights. The cross-staff, more frequently used for the same purpose
+by sailors of the time, was a simpler affair less affected by the
+ship's roll; it was held with the lower end of the cross-piece
+level with the horizon and the upper adjusted to a point on a line
+between the eye of the observer and the sun at the zenith. By these
+various means the sailor could steer a fixed course and determine
+latitude. He had, however, as yet no trustworthy means of reckoning
+longitude and no accurate gauge of distance traveled. The log-line
+was not invented until the 17th century, and accurate chronometers
+for determining longitude did not come into use until still later.
+A common practice of navigators, adopted by Columbus, was to steer
+first north or south along the coast and then due west on the parallel
+thought to lead to the destination sought.
+
+[Footnote 1: Dante's tutor Brunetto Latini, quoted in THE DISCOVERY
+OF AMERICA, Fiske, Vol. I, p. 314.]
+
+[Illustration: THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WORLD IN 1450, SHOWING THE
+VOYAGES OF COLUMBUS, VASCO DE GAMA, MAGELLAN, AND DRAKE]
+
+With the revival of classical learning in the Renaissance, geographical
+theories also became less wildly imaginative than in the medieval
+period, the charts of which, though beautifully colored and highly
+decorated with fauna and flora, show no such accurate knowledge
+even of the old world as do those of the great geographer Ptolemy,
+who lived a thousand years before. Ptolemy (200 A.D.), in company
+with the majority of learned men since Aristotle, had declared
+the earth to be round and had even estimated its circumference
+with substantial accuracy, though he had misled later students
+by picturing the Indian Ocean as completely surrounded by Africa,
+which he conceived to extend indefinitely southward and join Asia
+on the southeast, leaving no sea-route open from the Atlantic. There
+was another body of opinion of long standing, however, which outlined
+Africa much as it actually is. Friar Roger Bacon, whose interest
+in the compass has already been mentioned, collected statements of
+classical authorities and other evidence to show that Asia could
+be reached by sailing directly westward, and that the distance was
+not great; and this material was published in Paris in a popular
+_Imago Mundi_ of 1410. In general, the best geographical knowledge
+of the period, though it underestimated the distance from Europe
+westward to Asia and was completely ignorant of the vast continents
+lying between, gave support to the theories which the voyages of
+Diaz, Vasco da Gama, and Columbus magnificently proved true.
+
+When the best sailors of the time were Italians, and when astronomical
+and other scientific knowledge of use in navigation was largely
+monopolized by Arabs and Jews, it seems strange that the isolated
+and hitherto insignificant country of Portugal should have taken,
+and for a century or more maintained primacy in the great epoch
+of geographical discovery. The fact is explained, not so much by
+her proximity to the African coast and the outlying islands in the
+Atlantic, as by the energetic and well-directed patronage which
+Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460) extended to voyages of
+exploration and to the development of every branch of nautical
+art. The third son of John the Great of Portugal, and a nephew on
+his mother's side of Henry IV of England, the prince in 1415 led
+an armada to the capture of Ceuta from the Moors, and thereafter,
+as governor of the conquered territory and of the southern province
+of Portugal, settled at Saigres near Cape St. Vincent. On this
+promontory, almost at the western verge of the known world, Henry
+founded a city, Villa do Iffante, erected an observatory on the
+cliff, and gathered round him the best sailors, geographers and
+astronomers of his age.
+
+[Illustration: PORTUGUESE VOYAGES AND POSSESSIONS]
+
+Under this intelligent stimulus, Portuguese navigators within a
+century rounded the Cape of Good Hope, opened the sea route to
+the Indies, discovered Brazil, circumnavigated the globe, and made
+Portugal the richest nation in Europe, with a great colonial empire
+and claims to dominion over half the seas of the world. Portuguese
+ships carried her flag from Labrador (which reveals its discoverers
+in its name) and Nova Zembla to the Malay Archipelago and Japan.
+
+It is characteristic of the crusading spirit of the age that Prince
+Henry's first ventures down the African coast were in pursuance of
+a vague plan to ascend one of the African rivers and unite with
+the legendary Christian monarch Prester John (Presbyter or Bishop
+John, whose realm was then supposed to be located in Abyssinia) in
+a campaign against the Turk. But crusading zeal changed to dreams
+of wealth when his ships returned from the Senegal coast between
+1440 and 1445 with elephants' tusks, gold, and negro slaves. The
+Gold Coast was already reached; the fabled dangers of equatorial
+waters--serpent rocks, whirlpools, liquid sun's rays and boiling
+rivers--were soon proved unreal; and before 1480 the coast well
+beyond the Congo was known.
+
+The continental limits of Africa to southward, long clearly surmised,
+were verified by the voyage of Bartolomeo Diaz, in 1487. Diaz rounded
+the cape, sailed northward some 200 miles, and then, troubled by
+food shortage and heavy weather, turned backward. But he had blazed
+the trail. The cape he called _Tormentoso_ (tempestuous) was renamed
+by his sovereign, João II, Cape _Bon Esperanto_--the Cape of Goad
+Hope. The Florentine professor Politian wrote to congratulate the
+king upon opening to Christianity "new lands, new seas, new worlds,
+dragged from secular darkness into the light of day."
+
+It was not until ten years later that Vasco da Gama set out to
+complete the work of Diaz and establish contact between east and
+west. The contour of the African coast was now so well understood
+and the art of navigation so advanced that Vasco could steer a
+direct course across the open sea from the Cape Verde Islands to
+the southern extremity of Africa, a distance of 3770 miles (more
+than a thousand miles greater than that of Columbus' voyage from
+the Canaries to the Bahamas), which he covered in one hundred days.
+After touching at Mozambique, he caught the steady monsoon winds
+for Calicut, on the western coast of the peninsula of India, then a
+great _entrepôt_ where Mohammedan and Chinese fleets met each year
+to exchange wares. Thwarted here by the intrigues of Mohammedan
+traders, who were quick to realize the danger threatening their
+commercial monopoly, he moved on to Cannanore, a port further north
+along the coast, took cargo, and set sail for home, reaching the
+Azores in August of 1499, with 55 of his original complement of
+148 men. They came back, in the picturesque words of the Admiral,
+"With the pumps in their hands and the Virgin Mary in their mouths,"
+completing a total voyage of 13,000 miles. The profits are said
+to have been sixty-fold.
+
+The ease with which in the next two decades Portugal extended and
+consolidated her conquest of eastern trade is readily accounted
+for. She was dependent indeed solely upon sea communications, over
+a distance so great as to make the task seem almost impossible.
+But the craft of the east were frail in construction and built for
+commerce rather than for warfare. The Chinese junks that came to
+India are described as immense in size, with large cabins for the
+officers and their families, vegetable gardens growing on board,
+and crews of as many as a thousand men; but they had sails of matted
+reed that could not be lowered, and their timbers were loosely
+fastened together with pegs and withes. The Arab ships, according
+to Marco Polo, were also built without the use of nails. Like the
+Portuguese themselves, the Arab or Mohammedan merchants belonged
+to a race of alien invaders, little liked by the native princes
+who retained petty sovereignties along the coast. But the real
+secret of Portuguese success lay in the fact that their rivals were
+traders rather than fighters, who had enjoyed a peaceful monopoly for
+centuries, and who could expect little aid from their own countries
+harassed by the Turk. The Portuguese on the other hand inherited
+the traditions of Mediterranean seamanship and warfare, and, above
+all, were engaged in a great national enterprise, led by the best
+men in the land, with enthusiastic government support.
+
+After Vasco's return, fleets were sent out each year, to open the
+Indian ports by either force or diplomacy, destroy Moslem merchant
+vessels, and establish factories and garrisons. In 1505 Francisco de
+Almeida set sail with the largest fleet as yet fitted out (sixteen
+ships and sixteen caravels), an appointment as Viceroy of Cochin,
+Cannanore, and Quilon, and supreme authority from the Cape to the
+Malay Peninsula. Almeida in the next four years defeated the Mohammedan
+traders, who with the aid of Egypt had by this time organized to
+protect themselves, in a series of naval engagements, culminating
+on February 3, 1509, in the decisive battle of Diu.
+
+Mir Hussain, Admiral of the Gran Soldan of Egypt and commander in
+chief of the Mohammedan fleet in this battle, anchored his main
+force of more than a hundred ships in the mouth of the channel
+between the island of Diu and the mainland, designing to fall back
+before the Portuguese attack towards the island, where he could
+secure the aid of shore batteries and a swarm of 300 or more foists
+and other small craft in the harbor. Almeida had only 19 ships
+and 1300 men, but against his vigorous attack the flimsy vessels
+of the east were of little value. The battle was fought at close
+quarters in the old Mediterranean style, with saber, cutlass, and
+culverin; ramming, grappling, and boarding. Before nightfall Almeida
+had won. This victory ensured Portugal's commercial control in
+the eastern seas.
+
+Alfonso d'Albuquerque, greatest of the Portuguese conquistadores,
+succeeded Almeida in 1509. Establishing headquarters in a central
+position at Goa, he sent a fleet eastward to Malacca, where he set
+up a fort and factory, and later fitted out expeditions against
+Ormuz and Aden, the two strongholds protecting respectively the
+entrances to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The attack on Aden
+failed, but Ormuz fell in 1515. Albuquerque died in the same year
+and was buried in his capital at Goa. His successor opened trade and
+founded factories in Ceylon. In 1526 a trading post was established
+at Hugli, near the mouth of the Ganges. Ormuz became a center for
+the Persian trade, Malacca for trade with Java, Sumatra, and the
+Spice Islands. A Portuguese envoy, Fernam de Andrada, reached Canton
+in 1517--in the first European ship to enter Chinese waters--and
+Pekin three years later. Another adventurer named Mendez Pinto spent
+years in China and in 1548 established a factory near Yokohama,
+Japan. Brazil, where a squadron under Cabral had touched as early
+as 1502, was by 1550 a prosperous colony, and in later centuries
+a chief source of wealth. Mozambique, Mombassa, and Malindi, on
+the southeastern coast of Africa, were taken and fortified as
+intermediate bases to protect the route to Asia. The muslins of
+Bengal, the calicoes of Calicut, the spices from the islands, the
+pepper of Malabar, the teas and silks of China and Japan, now found
+their way by direct ocean passage to the Lisbon quays.
+
+A few strips along the African coast, tenuously held by sufferance
+of the great powers, and bits of territory at Goa, Daman, and Diu
+in India, are the twentieth century remnants of Portugal's colonial
+empire. The greater part of it fell away between 1580 and 1640, when
+Portugal was under Spanish rule. But her own system of colonial
+administration, or rather exploitation, was if possible worse than
+Spain's. Her scanty resources of man power were exhausted in colonial
+warfare. The expulsion of Protestants and Jews deprived her of
+elements in her population that might have known how to utilize
+wealth from the colonies to build up home trade and industries.
+Her situation was too distant from the European markets; and the
+raw materials landed at Lisbon were transshipped in Dutch bottoms
+for Amsterdam and Antwerp, which became the true centers of
+manufacturing and exchange. Cervantes, in 1607, could still speak
+of Lisbon as the greatest city in Europe,[1] but her greatness was
+already decaying; and her fate was sealed when Philip of Spain
+closed her ports to Dutch shipping, and Dutch ships themselves
+set sail for the east.
+
+[Footnote 1: PERSILES AND SIGISMUDA, III, i.]
+
+But the period of Portugal's maritime ascendancy cannot be left
+without recording, even if in barest outline, the circumnavigation
+of the globe by Fernão da Magalhães, or Magellan, who, though he
+made this last voyage of his under the Spanish flag, was Portuguese
+by birth and had proved his courage and iron resolution under Almeida
+and Albuquerque in Portugal's eastern campaigns. Seeking a westward
+passage to the Spice Islands, the five vessels of 75 to 100 tons
+composing his squadron cleared the mouth of the Guadalquivir on
+September 20, 1519. They established winter quarters in the last
+of March at Port St. Julian on the coast of Patagonia. Here, on
+Easter Sunday, three of his Spanish captains mutinied. Magellan
+promptly threw a boat's crew armed with cutlasses aboard one of
+the mutinous ships, killed the leader, and overcame the unruly
+element in the crew. The two other ships he forced to surrender
+within 24 hours. One of the guilty captains was beheaded and the
+other marooned on the coast when the expedition left in September.
+Five weeks were now spent in the labyrinths of the strait which has
+since borne the leader's name. "When the capitayne Magalianes,"
+so runs the contemporary English translation of the story of the
+voyage, "was past the strayght and sawe the way open to the other
+mayne sea, he was so gladde thereof that for joy the teares fell
+from his eyes."
+
+He had sworn he would go on if he had to eat the leather from the
+ships' yards. With three vessels--one had been shipwrecked in the
+preceding winter and the other deserted in the straits--they set out
+across the vast unknown expanse of the Pacific. "In three monethes
+and xx dayes they sailed foure thousande leagues in one goulfe
+by the sayde sea called Pacificum.... And havying in this tyme
+consumed all their bysket and other vyttayles, they fell into such
+necessitie that they were in forced to eate the pouder that remayned
+thereof being now full of woormes.... Theyre freshe water was also
+putryfyed and become yellow. They dyd eate skynnes and pieces of
+lether which were foulded about certeyne great ropes of the shyps."
+On March 6, 1521, they reached the Ladrones, and ten days later, the
+Philippines, even these islands having never before been visited by
+Europeans. Here the leader was killed in a conflict with the natives.
+One ship was now abandoned, and another was later captured by the
+Portuguese. Of the five ships that had left Spain with 280 men,
+a single vessel, "with tackle worn and weather-beaten yards," and 18
+gaunt survivors reached home. "It has not," writes the historian
+John Fiske of this voyage, "the unique historic position of the
+first voyage of Columbus, which brought together two streams of
+human life that had been disjoined since the glacial period. But
+as an achievement in ocean navigation that voyage of Columbus sinks
+into insignificance beside it.... When we consider the frailness
+of the ships, the immeasurable extent of the unknown, the mutinies
+that were prevented or quelled, and the hardships that were endured,
+we can have no hesitation in speaking of Magellan as the prince
+of navigators."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA, Vol. II, p. 210.]
+
+2. SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD
+
+It is generally taken for granted that the great movement of the
+Renaissance, which spread through western Europe in the 15th and
+the 16th centuries, quickening men's interest in the world about
+them rather than the world to come, and inspiring them with an
+eagerness and a confident belief in their own power to explore
+its hidden secrets, was among the forces which brought about the
+great geographical discoveries of the period. Its influence in
+this direction is evident enough in England and elsewhere later on;
+but, judging by the difficulties of Columbus in securing support,
+it was not in his time potent with those in control of government
+policy and government funds. The Italian navigator John Cabot and
+his son Sebastian made their voyages from England in 1498 and 1500
+with very feeble support from Henry VII, though it was upon their
+discoveries that England later based her American claims. Even in
+Spain there seems to have been little eagerness to emulate the
+methods by which her neighbor Portugal had so rapidly risen to
+wealth and power.
+
+But the influence of revived classical information on geographical
+matters was keenly felt; and the idea of a direct westerly passage
+to India was suggested, not only by Portugal's monopoly of the
+Cape route, but by classical authority, generally accepted by the
+best geographers of the time. The _Imago Mundi_ of 1410, already
+mentioned, embodying Roger Bacon's arguments that the Atlantic washed
+the shores of Asia and that the voyage thither was not long, was a
+book carefully studied by Columbus. Paul Toscanelli, a Florentine
+physicist and astronomer, adopting and developing this theory, sent
+in 1474 to Alfonso V of Portugal a map of the world in which he
+demonstrated the possibilities of the western route. The distance
+round the earth at the equator he estimated almost exactly to be
+24,780 statute miles, and in the latitude of Lisbon 19,500 miles;
+but he so exaggerated the extent of Europe and Asia as to reduce
+the distance between them by an Atlantic voyage to about 6500 miles,
+putting the east coast of China in about the longitude of Oregon.
+This distance he still further shortened by locating Cipango (Japan)
+far to the eastward of Asia, in about the latitude of the Canary
+Islands and distant from them only 3250 miles.
+
+With all these opinions Columbus was familiar, for the list of his
+library and the annotations still preserved in his own handwriting,
+show that he was not an ignorant sailor, nor yet a wild visionary,
+but prepared by closest study for the task to which he gave his
+later years. His earlier career, on the other hand, had supplied
+him with abundant practical knowledge. Born in Genoa, a mother
+city of great seamen, probably in the year 1436, he had received
+a fair education in Latin, geography, astronomy, drafting, and
+other subjects useful to the master-mariner of those days. He had
+sailed the Mediterranean, and prior to his great adventure, had
+been as far north as Iceland, and on many voyages down the African
+coast. Following his brother Bartholomew, who was a map-maker in
+the Portuguese service, he came about 1470 to Lisbon, even then a
+center of geographical knowledge and maritime activity. Probably
+as early as this time the idea of a western voyage was in his mind.
+
+Skepticism may account for Portugal's failure to listen to his
+proposals; and her interest was already centered in the route around
+Africa under her exclusive control. The tale of his years of search
+for assistance is well known. Indeed, while the fame of Columbus
+rests rightly enough upon his discovery of a new world, of whose
+existence he had never dreamed and which he never admitted in his
+lifetime, his greatness is best shown by his faith in his vision,
+and the steadfast energy and fortitude with which he pushed towards
+its practical accomplishment, during years of vain supplication, and
+amid the trials of the voyage itself. He had actually left Granada,
+when Isabella of Spain at last agreed to support his venture. In
+the contract later drawn up he drove a good bargain, contingent
+always upon success; he was to be admiral and viceroy of islands
+and continents discovered and their surrounding waters, with control
+of trading privileges and a tenth part of the wealth of all kinds
+derived.
+
+With the explorations of Columbus on his first and his three later
+voyages (in 1496, 1498, and 1502) we are less concerned than with
+the first voyage itself as an illustration of the problems and
+dangers faced by the navigator of the time, and with the effect of
+the discovery of the new world upon Spain's rise as a sea power.
+The three caravels in which he sailed were typical craft of the
+period. The _Santa Maria_, the largest, was like the other two, a
+single-decked, lateen-rigged, three-masted vessel, with a length
+of about 90 feet, beam of about 20 feet, and a maximum speed of
+perhaps 6-1/2 knots. She was of 100 tons burden and carried 52
+men. The _Pinta_ was somewhat smaller. The _Niña_ (Baby) was a
+tiny, half-decked vessel of 40 tons. Heavily timbered and seaworthy
+enough, the three caravels were short provisioned and manned in
+part from the rakings of the Palos jail.
+
+Leaving Palos August 3, 1492, Columbus went first to the Canaries,
+and thence turned his prow directly westward, believing that he
+was on the parallel that touched the northern end of Japan. By
+a reckoning even more optimistic than Toscanelli's, he estimated
+the distance thither to be only 2500 miles. Thence he would sail
+to Quinsay (Hang Chow), the ancient capital of China, and deliver
+the letter he carried to the Khan of Cathay. The northeast trade
+winds bore them steadily westward, raising in the minds of the
+already fear-stricken sailors the certainty that against these
+head winds they could never beat back. At last they entered the
+vast expanse of the Sargasso Sea, six times as large as France,
+where they lay for a week almost becalmed, amid tangled masses of
+floating seaweeds. To add to their perplexities, they had passed
+the line of no variation, and the needle now swung to the left of the
+pole-star instead of the right. On the last day of the outward voyage
+they were 2300 miles to the westward according to the information
+Columbus shared with his officers and men; according to his secret
+log they were 2700 miles from the Canaries, and well beyond the
+paint where he had expected to strike the islands of the Asiatic
+coast. The mutinous and panic-stricken spirit of his subordinates,
+the uncertainty of Columbus himself, turned to rejoicing when at
+2:00 A.M. of Friday, October 12, a sailor on the _Pinta_ sighted
+the little island of the Bahamas, which, since the time of the
+Vikings, was the first land sighted by white men in the new world.
+
+[Illustration: FLAGSHIP OF COLUMBUS]
+
+The three vessels cruised southward, in the belief, expressed by
+the name Indian which they gave the natives, that they were in
+the archipelago east of Asia. Skirting the northern coast of Cuba
+and Hayti, they sought for traces of gold, and information as to
+the way to the mainland. The _Santa Maria_ was wrecked on Christmas
+Day; the _Pinta_ became separated; Columbus returned in the
+little _Ninã_, putting in first at the Tagus, and reaching Palos
+on March 15, 1493.
+
+Though his voyage gave no immediate prospect of immense profits,
+yet it was the general belief that he had reached Asia, and by a
+route three times as short as that by the Cape of Good Hope. The
+Spanish court celebrated his return with rejoicing. Appealing to
+the Pope, at this time the Spaniard Rodrigo Bargia, King Ferdinand
+lost no time in securing holy sanction for his gains. A Papal bull
+of May 3, 1493, conferred upon Spain title to all lands discovered
+or yet to be discovered in the western ocean. Another on the day
+following divided the claims of Spain and Portugal by a line running
+north and south "100 leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde
+Islands" (an obscure statement in view of the fact that the Cape
+Verdes lie considerably to the westward of the other group), and
+granted to Spain a monopoly of commerce in the waters "west and
+south" (again an obscure phrase) of this line, so that no other
+nation could trade without license from the power in control. This
+was the extraordinary Papal decree dividing the waters of the world.
+Small wander that the French king, Francis I, remarked that he
+refused to recognize the title of the claimants till they could
+produce the will of Father Adam, making them universal heirs; or
+that Elizabeth, when a century later England became interested
+in world trade, disputed a division contrary not only to common
+sense and treaties but to "the law of nations." The Papal decree,
+intended merely to settle the differences of the two Catholic states,
+gave rise to endless disputes and preposterous claims.
+
+The treaty of Tordesillas (1494) between Spain and Portugal fixed
+the line of demarcation more definitely, 370 miles west of the
+Cape Verde Islands, giving Portugal the Brazilian coast, and by
+an additional clause it made illegitimate trade a crime punishable
+by death. Another agreement in 1529 extended the line around to
+the Eastern Hemisphere, 17 degrees east of the Moluccas, which, if
+Spain had abided by it, would have excluded her from the Philippines.
+After Portugal fell under Spanish rule in 1580, Spain could claim
+dominion over all the southern seas.
+
+[Illustration: CHART OF A.D. 1589
+
+Showing Papal line of Demarcation]
+
+The enthusiasm and confident expectation with which Spain set out
+to exploit the discoveries of Columbus's first voyage changed to
+disappointment when subsequent explorations revealed lands of
+continental dimensions to be sure, but populated by ignorant savages,
+with no thoroughfare to the ancient civilization and wealth of
+the East, and no promise of a solid, lucrative commerce such as
+Portugal had gained. Mines were opened in the West Indies, but it
+was not until the conquest of Mexico by Cortez (1519-1521) laid open
+the accumulated wealth of seven centuries that Spain had definite
+assurance of the treasure which was to pour out of America in a
+steadily increasing stream. The first two vessels laden with Mexican
+treasure returned in 1523. Ten years later the exploration and
+conquest of Peru by Pizarro trebled the influx of silver and gold.
+The silver mines of Europe were abandoned. The Emperor Charles, as
+Francis I said, could fight his European campaigns on the wealth
+of the Indies alone.
+
+But between Spain and her "sinews of war" lay 3000 miles of ocean.
+To hold the colonies themselves, to guard the plate fleets against
+French, Dutch, and English raiders, to protect her own coastline
+and maintain communications with her possessions in Italy and the
+Low Countries, to wage war against the Turk in the Mediterranean,
+Spain felt the need of a navy. Indeed, in view of these varied
+motives for maritime strength, it is surprising that Spain depended
+so largely on impressed merchant vessels, and had made only the
+beginnings of a royal navy at the time of the Grand Armada.[1]
+Not primarily a nation of traders or sailors, she had, by grudging
+assistance to the greatest of sea explorers, fallen into a rich
+colonial empire, to secure and make the most of which called for
+sea power.
+
+[Footnote 1: "For the kings of England have for many years been
+at the charge to build and furnish a navy of powerful ships for
+their own defense, and for the wars only; whereas the French, the
+Spaniards, the Portugals, and the Hollanders (till of late) have
+had no proper fleet belonging to their princes or state." Sir Walter
+Raleigh, A DISCOURSE OF THE INVENTION OF SHIPS.]
+
+It is possible, however, to lay undue stress on the factor just
+mentioned in accounting for both the rise and the decay of Spain.
+Her ascendancy in Europe in the 16th century was due chiefly to
+the immense territories united with her under Charles the Fifth
+(1500-1558), who inherited Spain, Burgundy, and the Low Countries,
+and added Austria with her German and Italian provinces by his
+accession to the imperial throne. Under Charles's powerful leadership
+Spain became the greatest nation in Europe; but at the same time her
+resources in men and wealth were exhausted in the almost constant
+warfare of his long reign. The treasures of America flowed through
+the land like water, in the expressive figure of a German historian,
+"not fertilizing it but laying it waste, and leaving sharper dearth
+behind."[2] The revenues of the plate fleet were pledged to German
+or Genoese bankers even before they reached the country, and were
+expended in the purchase of foreign luxuries or in waging imperial
+wars, rather than in the encouragement of home agriculture, trade,
+and industry. While the vast possessions of church and nobility
+escaped taxation, the people were burdened with levies on the movement
+and sale of commodities and on the common necessities of life.
+Prohibition of imports to keep gold in the country was ineffectual,
+for without the supplies brought in by Dutch merchantmen Spain would
+have starved, and Philip II often had to connive in violations
+of his own restrictions. Prohibition of exports to keep prices
+down was an equally Quixotic measure, the chief effect of which
+was to kill trade. Spain could not supply the needs of her own
+colonies, and in fact illustrates the truth that a nation cannot,
+in the end, profit greatly by colonies unless it develops industries
+to utilize their raw materials and supply their demands.
+
+[Footnote 2: DAS ZEITALTER DER FUGGER, Vol. II, p. 150.]
+
+For some time before the Armada Spain was on the downward path,
+as a result of the conditions mentioned. On the other hand, while
+the Armada relieved England of a terrible danger and dashed Spain's
+hope of domination in the north, it was not of itself a fatal blow.
+The war still continued, with other Spanish expeditions organized on
+a grand scale, and ended in 1604, so far as England was concerned,
+with that country's renunciation of trade to the Indies and aid
+to the Dutch.
+
+But even if Spain's rise and decline were not primarily a result
+of sea power, still, taking the term to include the extension of
+shipping and maritime trade as well as the employment of naval
+forces in strictly military operations, there are lessons to be
+drawn from the use or neglect of sea power by both sides in Spain's
+long drawn-out struggle with Holland and England.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+_General_
+
+THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE, a History of the Foundations of the
+  Modern World, by Prof. W. C. Abbot, 1918.
+THE STORY OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERY, J. Jacobs, 1913.
+SHIPS AND THEIR WAYS OF OTHER DAYS, E. Keble Chatterton, 1906.
+THE DAWN OF NAVIGATION, Thomas G. Ford, U. S. Naval Institute
+  Proceedings, Vol. XXXIII., 1-3.
+THE DAWN OF MODERN GEOGRAPHY, 2 vols., C. Raymond Beazley, 1904.
+
+_Portugal_
+
+  PRINCE HENRY THE NAVIGATOR, C. Raymond Beazley, 1895.
+VASCO DA GAMA AND HIS SUCCESSORS, 1460-1580, K. G. Jayne, 1910.
+RISE OF PORTUGUESE POWER IN INDIA, R. S. Whiteway, 1910.
+CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, Vol. I., Ch. I.
+HISTORY OF THE INDIAN NAVY, Lieut. C. R. Low, 1877.
+
+_Spain_
+
+  THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA, John Fiske, 1893.
+SPAIN IN AMERICA, E. G. Bourne, American Nation Series, 1909.
+SPAIN, Martin Hume, Cam. Modern Hist. Series, 1898.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+SEA POWER IN THE NORTH: HOLLAND'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
+
+The first sea-farers in the storm-swept waters of the north, at
+least in historic times, were the Teutonic tribes along the North
+Sea and the Baltic. On land the Teutons held the Rhine and the
+Danube against the legions of Rome, spread later southward and
+westward, and founded modern European states out of the wreckage
+of the Roman Empire. On the sea, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes in the
+5th century began plundering the coasts of what is now England,
+and, after driving the Celts into mountain fastnesses, established
+themselves in permanent control.
+
+_The Vikings_
+
+These Teutonic voyagers were followed toward the close of the 8th
+century by their Scandinavian kindred to the northward, the
+Vikings--superb fighting men and daring sea-rovers who harried
+the coasts of western Europe for the next 200 years. There were no
+navies to stop them. "These sea dragons," exclaimed Charlemagne,
+"will tear my kingdom asunder!" In England no king before Alfred
+had a navy; and Alfred was compelled to organize a strong sea force
+to bring the invaders to terms.
+
+Elsewhere the Vikings met little opposition. Wherever they found
+lands that attracted them, they conquered and settled dawn. Thus
+Normandy came into being. They swept up the rivers, burning and
+looting where they pleased, from the Elbe to the Rhone. They carried
+their raids as far south as Sicily and the Mediterranean coast of
+Africa, and as far north and west as Iceland, Greenland, and the
+American continent. In the east, by establishing a Viking colony
+at Nishni Novgorod, they laid the foundations of the Russian empire,
+and their leader, Rus, gave it his name. Following river courses,
+others penetrated inland as far as Constantinople, where, being
+bought off by the emperor, they took service as imperial guards.
+
+Their extraordinary voyages were made in boats that resemble so
+closely Greek and Roman models--even Phœnician, for that matter--as
+to suggest that the Vikings learned their ship-building from
+Mediterranean traders who forced their way into the Baltic in very
+early times. For example, the Viking method of making a rib in
+three parts is identical with the method of the Greeks and Romans.
+The chief points of difference are that Viking ships were sharp
+at both ends--like a canoe, were round-bottomed instead of flat,
+and had one steering oar instead of two. The typical Viking ship
+was only about 75 feet in length; but a royal vessel--the _Dragon_
+of the chief--sometimes attained a length of 300 feet, with sixty
+pairs of oars.
+
+If the Vikings had had national organization under one head, they
+might well have laid the rest of Europe under tribute. In the 11th
+century, Cnut, a descendant of the Vikings, ruled in person over
+England, Denmark, and Norway. But their ocean folk-wanderings seem
+to have ended as suddenly as they began, and the effects were social
+rather than political. Where they settled, they brought a strain
+of the hardiest racial stock in Europe to blend with that of the
+conquered peoples.
+
+_The Hanseatic League_
+
+During the Middle Ages, peaceful trading gradually gained the upper
+hand over piracy and conquest. From the Italian cities the wares
+of the south and the Orient came over the passes of the Alps and
+down the German rivers, where trading cities grew up to act as
+carriers of merchandise and civilization among the nations of the
+north. The merchant guilds of these cities, banded together in
+the Hanseatic League, for at least three centuries dominated the
+northern seas.
+
+Perhaps the most extensive commercial combination ever formed for
+the control of sea trade, the Hanseatic League began with a treaty
+between Lübeck and Hamburg in 1174, and at the height of its power
+in the 14th and 15th centuries it included from 60 to 80 cities,
+of which Lübeck, Cologne, Brunswick, and Danzig were among the
+chief. The league cleared northern waters of pirates, and used
+embargo and naval power to subdue rivals and promote trade. It
+established factories or trading stations from Nishni Novgorod to
+Bergen, London, and Bruges. From Russia it took cargoes of fats,
+tallows, wax, and wares brought into Russian markets from the east;
+from Scandinavia, iron and copper; from England, hides and wool; from
+Germany, fish, grain, beer, and manufactured goods of all kinds.
+The British pound sterling (Österling) and pound avoirdupois, in
+fact the whole British system of weights and coinage, are legacies
+from the German merchants who once had their headquarters in the
+Steelyard, London.
+
+In the early 15th century the league attempted to shut Dutch ships
+from the Baltic trade by restricting their cargoes to wares produced
+in their own country, and by coercing Denmark into granting the
+league special privileges on the route through the Sound. This
+policy, culminating in the destruction of the Dutch grain fleet
+in 1437, led to a naval struggle which extended over four years
+and ended in a truce by which the Dutch secured the freedom of the
+Baltic. It was a typical naval war for sea control and commercial
+advantage, in which the Dutch as a rule seem to have got the better,
+and in which the legend first made its appearance of a Dutch admiral
+sweeping the seas with a broom nailed to his mast.
+
+From this time the power of the Hansa declined. This was partly
+because the free cities came more and more under the rule of German
+princes with no interest in, or knowledge of, commerce; partly
+because of rivalry arising from the union of the Scandinavian states
+(1397) and the growth of England, France, and the Low Countries
+to national strength and commercial independence; and partly also
+because of the decline of German fisheries when the herring suddenly
+shifted from the Baltic to the North Sea. Underlying these varied
+causes, however, and significant of the far-reaching effect of
+changing trade-routes upon the progress and prosperity of nations,
+was the fact that, when the Mediterranean trade route was closed
+by the Turks, and also the route through Russia by Ivan III, the
+German cities were side-tracked. Antwerp and Amsterdam were not
+only more centrally located for the distribution of trade, but
+also much nearer for Atlantic traffic--an advantage which Germany
+has ever since keenly envied.
+
+Long before the rise of the Low Countries as a maritime power,
+Ghent and Bruges had enjoyed an early preëminence owing to their
+development of cloth manufacture, and the latter city as a terminus
+for the galleys of Venice and Genoa. After the silting up of the
+port of Bruges (1432), Antwerp grew in importance, and in the 16th
+century became the chief market and money center of Europe. Its
+inhabitants numbered about 100,000, with a floating population
+of upwards of 50,000 more. It contained the counting-houses of
+the great bankers of Europe--the Fuggers of Germany, the Pazzi
+of Florence, the Dorias of Genoa. Five thousand merchants were
+registered on the Bourse, as many as 500 ships often left the city
+in a single day, and two or three thousand more might be seen anchored
+in the Scheldt or lying along the quays.[1] Amsterdam by 1560 was
+second to Antwerp with a population of 40,000, and forged ahead
+after the sack of Antwerp by Spanish soldiers in 1576 and the Dutch
+blockade of the Scheldt during the struggle with Spain.
+
+[Footnote 1: Blok, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS, Part
+II, Ch. XII.]
+
+This early prosperity of the Netherland cities may be attributed
+less to aggressive maritime activity than to their flourishing
+industries, their natural advantages as trading centers at the
+mouths of the Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse, and the privileges of
+self-government enjoyed by the middle classes under the House of
+Burgundy and even under Charles the Fifth. Charles taxed them
+heavily--his revenues from the Low Countries in reality far exceeded
+the treasure he drew from America; but he was a Fleming born, spoke
+their language, and accorded them a large measure of political and
+religious freedom. The grievances which after his death led to
+the Dutch War of Independence, are almost personified in the son
+who succeeded him in 1555--Philip II, a Spaniard born and bred,
+who spoke no Flemish and left Brussels for the last time in 1573,
+dour, treacherous, distrustful, fanatical in religion; a tragic
+character, who, no doubt with great injustice to the Spanish, has
+somehow come to represent the character of Spain in his time.
+
+_The Dutch Struggle for Freedom_
+
+The causes of the long war in the Netherlands, which began in 1566
+and ended with their independence 43 years later, is best explained
+in terms of general principles rather than specific grievances.
+"A conflict in which the principle of Catholicism with unlimited
+royal autocracy as Spain recognized it, was opposed to toleration
+in the realm of religion, with a national government according to
+ancient principles and based on ancient privileges,"--so the Dutch
+historian Blok sums up the issues at stake. The Prince of Orange,
+just before he was cut down by an assassin, asserted in his famous
+_Defense_ three fundamental principles: freedom to worship God;
+withdrawal of foreigners; and restoration of the charters, privileges,
+and liberties of the land. The Dutch fought for political, religious,
+and also for economic independence. England gave aid, not so much
+for religious motives as because she saw that her political safety
+and commercial prosperity hinged on the weakening of Spain.
+
+Resembling our American Revolution in the character of the struggle
+as well as the issues at stake--though it was far more bloody and
+desperate--the Dutch War of Independence was fought mainly within
+the country itself, with the population divided, and the Spanish
+depending on land forces to maintain their rule; but, as in the
+American war, control of the sea was a vital factor. For munitions,
+supplies, gold, for the transport of the troops themselves, Spain
+had to depend primarily on the sea. It is true one could continue
+on Spanish territory from Genoa, which was Spain's watergate into
+Italy, across the Mont Cenis Pass, and through Savoy, Burgundy,
+Lorraine, and Luxembourg to Brussels, and it was by this route that
+Parma's splendid army of 10,000 "Blackbeards" came in 1577. But
+this was an arduous three months' march for troops and still more
+difficult for supplies. To cross France was as a rule impossible;
+when Don Juan of Austria went to Flanders for the brief period of
+leadership ended by his death of camp fever in 1578, he passed
+through French territory disguised as a Moorish slave. By the sea
+route, upon which Spain was after all largely dependent, and the
+complete control of which would have made her task infinitely easier,
+she was constantly exposed to Huguenot, Dutch, and English privateers.
+These gentry cared little whether or not their country was actually
+at war with Spain, but took their letters of marque, if they carried
+them, from any prince or ruler who would serve their turn.
+
+With this opportunity to strike at Spanish communications, it will
+appear strange that the Dutch should not have immediately seized
+their advantage and made it decisive. One curious difficulty lay
+in the fact that throughout the war Dutch shipping actually carried
+the bulk of Spanish trade and drew from it immense profits. Even
+at the close of the century, while the war was still continuing,
+nine-tenths of Spain's foreign trade and five-sixths of her home
+trade was in foreign--and most of it in Dutch--hands. Hence any
+form of sea warfare was sure to injure Dutch trade. The Revolution,
+moreover, began slowly and feebly, with no well-thought-out plan of
+campaign, and could not at once fit out fully organized forces to
+cope with those of Spain. The Dutch early took to commerce warfare,
+but it was at first semi-piratical, and involved the destruction
+of ships of their own countrymen.
+
+The Sea Beggars--_Zee Geuzen_ or _Gueux der Mer_--made their
+appearance shortly after the outbreak of rebellion. "_Vyve les
+geus par mer et par terre,_" wrote the patriot Count van Brederode
+as early as 1566. The term "beggar" is said to have arisen from a
+contemptuous remark by a Spanish courtier to Margaret of Parma, when
+the Dutch nobles presented their grievances in Brussels. Willingly
+accepting the name, the patriots applied it to their forces both
+by land and by sea. Letters of marque were first issued by Louis
+of Nassau, brother of William of Orange, and in 1569 there were
+18 ships engaged, increased in the next year to 84. The bloody
+and licentious De la Marek, who wore his hair and beard unshorn
+till he had avenged the execution of his relative, Egmont, was
+a typical leader of still more wild and reckless crews. It was
+no uncommon practice to go over the rail of a merchant ship with
+pike and ax and kill every Spaniard on board. In 1569 William of
+Orange appointed the Seigneur de Lumbres as admiral of the beggar
+fleet, and issued strict instructions to him to secure better order,
+avoid attacks on vessels of friendly and neutral states, enforce
+the articles of war, and carry a preacher on each ship. The booty
+was to be divided one-third to the Prince for the maintenance of
+the war, one-third to the captains to supply their vessels, and
+one-third to the crews, one-tenth of this last share going to the
+admiral in general command.
+
+[Illustration: THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 16TH CENTURY]
+
+The events of commerce warfare, though they often involve desperate
+adventures and hard fighting, are not individually impressive, and
+the effectiveness of this warfare is best measured by collective
+results. On one occasion, when a fleet of transports fell into the
+hands of patriot forces off Flushing in 1572, not only were 1000
+troops taken, but also 500,000 crowns of gold and a rich cargo, the
+proceeds of which, it is stated, were sufficient to carry on the whole
+war for a period of two years. Again it was fear of pirates (Huguenot
+in this case) that in December of 1568 drove a squadron of Spanish
+transports into Plymouth, England, with 450,000 ducats ($960,000)
+aboard for the pay of Spanish troops. Elizabeth seized the money
+(on the ground that it was still the property of the Genoese bankers
+who had lent it and that she might as well borrow it as Philip),
+and minted it into English coin at a profit of £3000. But Alva at
+Antwerp, with no money at all, was forced to the obnoxious "Hundreds"
+tax--requiring a payment of one per cent on all possessions, five
+per cent on all real estate transfers, and 10 per cent every time
+a piece of merchandise was sold--a typical tax after the Spanish
+recipe, which, though not finally enforced to its full extent, aroused
+every Netherlander as a fatal blow at national prosperity. To return
+to the general effect of commerce destruction, it is estimated
+that Spain thus lost annually 3,000,000 ducats ($6,400,000), a sum
+which of course meant vastly more then than now. When the Duke
+of Alva retired from command in 1578, the pay of Spanish troops
+was 6,500,000 ducats in arrears.
+
+Among the exploits of organized naval forces, the earliest was the
+capture of Brill, by which, according to Motley, "the foundations
+of the Dutch republic were laid." Driven out of England by Elizabeth,
+who upon the representations of the Spanish ambassador ordered her
+subjects not to supply the Beggars with "meat, bread or beer,"
+a fleet of 25 vessels and 300 or 400 men left Dover towards the
+end of March, 1572, with the project of seizing a base on their
+own coast. On the afternoon of April 1, they appeared off the town
+of Brill, located on an island at the mouth of the Meuse. The
+magistrates and most of the inhabitants fled; and the Beggars battered
+down the gates, occupied the town, and put to death 13 monks and
+priests. When Spanish forces attempted to recapture the city, the
+defenders opened sluice gates to cut off the northern approach,
+and at the same time set fire to the boats which had carried the
+Spanish to the island. The Spanish, terrorized by both fire and
+water, waded through mud and slime to the northern shore. During
+the same week Flushing was taken, and before the end of June the
+Dutch were masters of nearly the entire Zealand coast.
+
+In the north the Spanish at first found an able naval leader in
+Admiral Bossu, himself a Hollander, who for a time kept the coast
+clear of Beggars. In October, 1573, however, 30 of his ships were
+beaten in the Zuyder Zee by 25 under Dirkzoon, who captured five
+of the Spanish vessels and scattered the rest with the exception
+of the flagship. The latter, a 32-gun ship terrifyingly named the
+_Inquisition_ and much stronger than any of the others on either
+side, held out from three o'clock in the afternoon until the next
+morning. Three patriot vessels closed in on her, attacking with
+the vicious weapons of the period--pitch, boiling oil, and molten
+lead. By morning the four combatants had drifted ashore in a tangled
+mass. When Bossu at last surrendered, 300 men, out of 382 in his
+ship's complement, were dead or disabled.
+
+Though not yet able to stand up against Spanish infantry, the Dutch
+in naval battles were usually successful. In the Scheldt, January
+29, 1574, 75 Spanish vessels were attacked by 64 Dutch under Admiral
+Boisot. After a single broadside, the two fleets grappled, and in
+a two-hour fight at close quarters eight of the Spanish ships were
+captured, seven destroyed, and 1200 Spaniards killed. The Spanish
+commander, Julian Romero, escaped through a port-hole, is said to
+have remarked afterwards, "I told you I was a land fighter and no
+sailor; give me a hundred fleets and I would fare no better."
+
+In September following, Admiral Boisot brought some of his victorious
+ships and sailors to the relief of Leyden, whose inhabitants and
+garrison had been reduced by siege to the very last extremities.
+The campaign that followed was typical of this amphibious war.
+Boisot's force, with those already an the scene, numbered about
+2500, equipped with some 200 shallow-draft boats and row-barges
+mounting an average of ten guns each. Among them was the curious
+_Ark of Delft_, with shot-proof bulwarks and paddle-wheels turned
+by a crank. As a result of ruthless flooding of the country, ten
+of the fifteen miles between Leyden and the outer dyke were easily
+passed; but five miles from the city ran the Landscheidung or inner
+dyke, which was above water, and beyond this an intricate system
+of canals and flooded polders, with forts and villages held by a
+Spanish force four times as strong. The most savage fighting on
+decks, dykes, and bridges marked every step forward; the Dutch in
+their native element attacking with cutlass, boathook and harpoon,
+while the superior military discipline of the Spanish could not
+come in play. But at least 20 inches of water were necessary to
+float the Dutch vessels, and it was not until October 3 that a
+spring tide and a heavy northwest gale made it possible to reach the
+city walls. In storm and darkness, terrified by the rising waters,
+the Spanish fled. The relief of the city marked a turning-point in
+the history of the revolt.
+
+During the six terrible years of Alva's rule in the Netherlands
+(1567-1573) the Dutch sea forces contributed heavily toward the
+maintenance of the war, assured control of the Holland and Zealand
+coasts, and more than once, as at Brill and Leyden, proved the
+salvation of the patriot cause. Holland and Zealand, the storm-centers
+of rebellion, were not again so devastated, though the war dragged
+on for many years, maintained by the indomitable spirit of William
+of Orange until his assassination in 1584, and afterward by the
+military skill of Maurice of Nassau and the aid of foreign powers.
+The seven provinces north of the Scheldt, separating from the Catholic
+states of the south, prospered in trade and industry as they shook
+themselves free from the stifling rule of Spain. By a twelve-year
+truce, finally ratified in 1609, they became "free states over
+which Spain makes no pretensions," though their independence was
+not fully recognized until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The
+war, while it ruined Antwerp, increased the prosperity of Holland
+and Zealand, which for at least twenty years before the truce were
+busily extending their trade to every part of the world.
+
+_Growth of Dutch Commerce_
+
+The story of this expansion of commerce is a striking record. The
+grain and timber of the Baltic, the wines of France and Spain,
+the salt of the Cape Verde Islands, the costly wares of the east,
+came to the ports of the Meuse and Zuyder Zee. In 1590 the first
+Dutch traders entered the Mediterranean, securing, eight years
+later, the permission of the Sultan to engage in Constantinople
+trade. In 1594 their ships reached the Gold Coast, and a year later
+four vessels visited Madagascar, Goa, Java, and the Moluccas or
+Spice Islands. A rich Zealand merchant had a factory at Archangel
+and a regular trade into the White Sea. Seeking a reward of 25,000
+florins offered by the States for the discovery of a northeast
+passage, Jacob van Heimskirck sailed into the Arctic and wintered
+in Nova Zembla; Henry Hudson, in quest of a route northwestward,
+explored the river and the bay that bear his name and died in the
+Polar Seas.
+
+Statistics, while not very trustworthy and not enlightening unless
+compared with those for other nations, may give some idea of the
+preponderance of Dutch shipping. At the time of the truce she is
+said to have had 16,300 ships, about 10,000 of which were small
+vessels in the coasting trade. Of the larger, 3000 were in the
+Baltic trade, 2000 in the Spanish, 600 sailed to Italy, and the
+remainder to the Mediterranean, South America, the Far East, and
+Archangel. The significance of these figures may be made clearer by
+citing Colbert's estimate that at a later period (1664) there were
+20,000 ships in general European carrying trade, 16,000 of which
+were Dutch. Throughout the 17th century Dutch commerce continued to
+prosper, and did not reach its zenith until early in the century
+following.
+
+In the closing years of the 16th century several private companies
+were founded in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Zealand to engage in eastern
+trade. These were combined in 1602 into the United East Indies
+Company, which sent large fleets to the Orient each year, easily
+ousted the Portuguese from their bases on the coast and islands,
+and soon established almost a monopoly, leaving to England only a
+small share of trade with Persia and northwest India. The relative
+resources invested by English and Dutch in Eastern ventures is
+suggested by the fact that the British East Indies Company founded in
+1600 had a capital of £80,000, while the Dutch Company had £316,000.
+By 1620 the shares of the Dutch company had increased to three
+times their original value, and they paid average dividends of 18
+per cent for the next 200 years.
+
+In this Dutch conquest of eastern trade, like that of the Portuguese
+a century earlier, we have an illustration of what has since been a
+guiding principle in the history of sea power--a national policy of
+commercial expansion sturdily backed by foreign policy and whenever
+necessary by naval force. The element of national policy is evident
+in the fact that Holland--and England until the accession of James I
+in 1603--preferred war rather than acceptance of Spanish pretensions
+to exclusive rights in the southern seas. The Dutch, like the
+Portuguese, saw clearly the need of political control. They made
+strongholds of their trading bases, and gave their companies power
+to oust competitors by force. As a concession to Spanish pride,
+the commerce clause in the Truce of 1609 was made intentionally
+unintelligible--but the Dutch interpreted it to suit themselves.
+As for the element of force, every squadron that sailed to the
+east was a semi-military expedition. The Dutch seaman was sailor,
+fighter, and trader combined. The merchant was truly, in the phrase
+of the age, a "merchant adventurer," lucky indeed and enriched
+if, after facing the perils of navigation in strange waters, the
+possible hostility of native rulers, and the still greater danger
+from European rivals, half his ships returned. The last statement
+is no hyperbole; of 9 ships sent to the East from Amsterdam in
+1598, four came back, and just half of the 22 sent out from the
+entire Netherlands.
+
+From time to time, either to maintain the blockade of the Scheldt
+and assist in operations on the Flanders coast, or to protect their
+trade and strike a direct blow at Spain, the Dutch fitted out purely
+naval expeditions. One of the most effective, from the standpoint
+of actual fighting, was that led by van Heimskirck, already famous
+for Arctic exploration and exploits in the Far East. In 1607 he
+took 21 converted merchantmen and 4 transports to the Spanish coast
+to protect Dutch vessels from the east and the Mediterranean.
+Encountering off Gibraltar an enemy force of 11 large galleons
+and as many galleys under Alvarez d'Avila, a veteran of Lepanto,
+he destroyed half the Spanish force and drove the rest into port,
+killing about 2000 Spanish and coming out of the fight with the
+loss of only 100 men. Heimskirck concentrated upon the galleons
+and came to close action after the fashion which seems to have
+been characteristic of the Dutch in naval engagements throughout
+the war. "Hold your fire till you hear the crash," he cried, as
+he drove his prow into the enemy flagship; and the battle was won
+after a struggle yard-arm to yard-arm. Bath admirals were killed.
+
+Portugal, broken by the Spanish yoke, could offer little resistance
+in the Far East. In 1606 a Dutch fleet of 12 ships under Matelieff
+de Jonge laid siege to Malacca, and gave up the attempt only after
+destroying 10 galleons sent to relieve the town. Matelieff then
+sailed to the neighboring islands, and established the authority
+of the company at Bantam, Amboyna, Ternate, and other centers of
+trade.
+
+Other fleets earlier and later promoted the interests of the company
+by the same means. English traders, with scanty government encouragement
+from the Stuart kings, were not as yet dangerous rivals. A conflict
+occurred with them in 1611 off Surat; and at Amboyna in 1623 the
+Dutch seized the English Company's men, tortured ten of them, and
+broke up the English base. For more than a century Holland remained
+supreme in the east; she has retained her colonial empire down to
+the 20th century; and she did not surrender her commercial primacy
+until exhausted by the combined attacks of England and France.
+Less successful than England in the development of colonies, she
+has stood out as the greatest of trading nations.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+_The Vikings_
+
+THE VIKING AGE, H. F. Du Chaillu, 1889.
+
+_The Hansa_
+
+THE HANSA TOWNS, H. Zimmerman, 1889.
+HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Clive Day, 1913 (bibliography).
+CIVILIZATION DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, George Burton Adams, 1918.
+CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, Vols. I and II.
+
+_Dutch Sea Power_
+
+MOTLEY'S RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC (still the best source in English
+  for political and naval history of the period).
+HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS, P. J. Blok, trans. Ruth
+  Putnam, 1898-1912.
+HISTORY OF COMMERCE IN EUROPE, W. H. Gibbins, 1917.
+THE SEA BEGGARS, Dingman Versteg, 1901.
+SOME EXPLOITS OF THE OLD DUTCH NAVY, Lieut. H. H. Frost, U. S.
+  Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1919.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA
+
+By reason of England's insularity, it is an easy matter to find
+instances from even her early history of the salutary or fatal
+influence of sea power. Romans, Saxons, Danes swept down upon England
+from the sea. By building a fleet, King Alfred, said to have been
+the true father of the British navy, kept back the Danes. It was
+the dispersion of the English fleet by reason of the lateness of
+the season that enabled William the Conqueror, in the small open
+vessels interestingly pictured in the Bayeux tapestry, to win a
+footing on the English shore.
+
+But during the next three centuries, with little shipping and little
+trade save that carried on by the Hansa, with no enemy that dangerously
+threatened her by sea, England had neither the motives nor the
+national strength and unity to develop naval power. She claimed,
+it is true, dominion over the narrow waters between her and her
+possessions in France, and also over the "four seas" surrounding
+her; and as early as 1201 an ordinance was passed requiring vessels
+in these waters to lower sails ("vail the bonnet") and also to
+"lie by the lee" when so ordered by King's ships. But though these
+claims were revived in the 17th century against the Dutch, and
+though the requirement that foreign vessels strike their topsails
+to the British flag remained in the Admiralty Instructions until
+after Trafalgar, they were at this time enforced chiefly to rid
+the seas of pirates--the common enemies of nations. During this
+period there were a few "king's ships," the sovereign's personal
+property, forming a nucleus around which a naval force of fishing
+and merchant vessels could be assembled in time of war. The Cinque
+Ports, originally Dover, Sandwich, Hastings, Romney and Hythe, long
+enjoyed certain trading privileges in return for the agreement
+that when the king passed overseas they would "rigge up fiftie and
+seven ships" (according to a charter of Edward I) with 20 armed
+soldiers each, and maintain them for 15 days.
+
+An attack in 1217 by such a fleet, under the Governor of Dover
+Castle, affords perhaps the earliest instance of maneuvering for
+the weather-gage. The English came down from the windward and, as
+they scrambled aboard the enemy, threw quicklime into the Frenchmen's
+eyes. At Sluis, in 1340, to take another instance of early English
+naval warfare, Edward III defeated a large French fleet and a number
+of hired Genoese galleys lashed side by side in the little river
+Eede in Flanders. Edward came in with a fair wind and tide and fell
+upon the enemy as they lay aground at the stem and unmanageable.
+This victory gave control of the Channel for the transport of troops
+in the following campaign. But like most early naval combats, it
+was practically a land battle over decks, and, although sanguinary
+enough, it is from a naval stand paint interesting chiefly for
+such novelties as a scouting force of knights on horseback along
+the shore.
+
+The beginnings of a permanent and strong naval establishment, as
+distinct from merchant vessels owned by the king or in his service,
+must be dated, however, from the Tudors and the period of national
+rehabilitation following the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and
+the War of the Roses (1455-1485). One reason for this was that
+the employment of artillery on shipboard and the introduction of
+port-holes made it increasingly difficult to convert merchant craft
+into dependable men-of-war. Henry VIII took a keen interest in
+his navy, devoted the revenues of forfeited church property to
+its expansion, established the first Navy Board (1546), and is
+even credited with the adoption of sailing vessels as the major
+units of his fleet.
+
+_From Oar to Sail_
+
+The use of heavy ordnance, already mentioned, as well as the increasing
+size and efficiency of sail-craft that came with the spread of
+ocean commerce and navigation, naturally pointed the way to this
+transition in warfare from oar to sail. The galley was at best a
+frail affair, cumbered with oars, benches and rowers, unable to
+carry heavy guns or withstand their fire. Once sailing vessels had
+attained reasonable maneuvering qualities, their superior strength
+and size, reduced number of non-combatant personnel, and increased
+seaworthiness and cruising radius gave them a tremendous superiority.
+That the change should have begun in the north rather than in the
+Mediterranean, where naval and military science had reached its
+highest development, must be attributed not only to the rougher
+weather conditions of the northern seas, and the difficulty of
+obtaining slaves as rowers, but also to the fact that the southern
+nations were more completely shackled by the traditions of galley
+warfare.
+
+[Illustration: GALLEON]
+
+Yet for the new type it was the splendid trading vessels of Venice
+that supplied the design. For the Antwerp and London trade, and in
+protection against the increasing danger from pirates, the Venetians
+had developed a compromise between the war-galley and the round-ship
+of commerce, a type with three masts and propelled at least primarily
+by sails, with a length about three times its beam and thus shorter
+and more seaworthy than the galley, but longer, lower and swifter
+than the clumsy round-ship. To this new type the names _galleass_ and
+_galleon_ were bath given, but in English and later usage _galleass_
+came to be applied to war vessels combining oar and sail, and _galleon_
+to either war or trading vessels of medium size and length and
+propelled by sail alone.
+
+The Spanish found the galleon useful in the Atlantic carrying trade,
+but, as shown at Lepanto, they retained the galley in warfare;
+whereas Henry VIII of England was probably the first definitely
+to favor sail for his men-of-war. An English navy list of 1545
+shows four clumsy old-fashioned "great-ships" of upwards of 1000
+tons, but second to these a dozen newer vessels of distinctly galleon
+lines, lower than the great-ships, flush-decked, and sail-driven.
+Though in engagements with French galleys during the campaign of
+1545 these were handicapped by calm weather, they seem to have
+held their own both in battle and in naval opinion. Of the royal
+ships at the opening of Elizabeth's reign (1558), there were 11
+large sailing vessels of 200 tans and upwards, and 10 smaller ones,
+but only two galleys, and these "of no continuance and not worth
+repair."[1] In comment on these figures, it should be added that
+there were half a hundred large ships available from the merchant
+service, and also that pinnaces and other small craft still combined
+oar and sail.
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Corbett, Vol. I, p. 133.]
+
+In England the superiority of sail propulsion was soon definitely
+recognized, and discussion later centered on the relative merits
+of the medium-sized galleon and the big "great-ship." The
+characteristics of each are well set forth in a contemporary naval
+treatise by Sir William Monson: the former with "flush deck fore and
+aft, sunk and low in the water; the other lofty and high-charged,
+with a half-deck, forecastle, and copperidge-heads [athwortship
+bulkheads where light guns were mounted to command the space between
+decks]." The advantages of the first were that she was speedy and
+"a fast ship by the wind" so as to avoid boarding by the enemy,
+and could run in close and fire effective broadsides between wind
+and water without being touched; whereas the big ship was more
+terrifying, more commodious, stronger, and could carry more and
+heavier guns. Monson, like many a later expert, suspended judgment
+regarding the two types; but Sir Walter Raleigh came out strongly
+for the smaller design. "The greatest ships," he writes, "are the
+least serviceable...., less nimble, less maniable; 'Grande navi
+grande fatiga,' saith the Spaniard. A ship of 600 tons will carry
+as good ordnance as a ship of 1200 tons; and though the greater
+have double her number, the lesser will turn her broadsides twice
+before the greater can wind once." And elsewhere: "The high charging
+of ships makes them extreme leeward, makes them sink deep in the
+water, makes them labor, and makes them overset. Men may not expect
+the ease of many cabins and safety at once in sea-service."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: WORKS, Oxford ed. 1829, Vol. VIII, p. 338.]
+
+These statements were made after the Armada; but the trend of English
+naval construction away from unwieldy ships such as used by the Spanish
+in the Armada, is clearly seen in vessels dating from 1570-1580--the
+_Foresight, Bull,_ and _Tiger_ (rebuilt from galleasses), the
+_Swiftsure, Dreadnought, Revenge,_ and others of names renowned
+in naval annals. These were all of about the dimensions of the
+_Revenge,_ which was of 440 tons, 92 feet over all, 32 feet beam,
+and 15 feet from deck to keel. That is to say, their length was
+not more than three times their beam, and their beam was about
+twice their depth in the hold--the characteristic proportions of
+the galleon type.
+
+The progressiveness of English ship construction is highly significant,
+for to it may be attributed in large measure the Armada victory.
+Spain had made no such advances; in fact, until the decade of the
+Armada, she hardly had such a thing as a royal navy. The superiority
+of the English ships was generally recognized. An English naval
+writer in 1570 declared the ships of his nation so fine "none of
+any other region may seem comparable to them"; and a Spaniard some
+years later testified that his people regarded "one English ship
+worth four of theirs."
+
+Though not larger than frigates of Nelson's time, these ships were
+crowded with an even heavier armament, comprising guns of all sizes
+and of picturesque but bewildering nomenclature. According to
+Corbett,[1] the ordnance may be divided into four main classes
+based on caliber, the first two of the "long gun" and the other
+two of the carronade or mortar type.
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Vol. I, p. 384.]
+
+I. Cannon proper, from 16 to 28 caliber, of 8.5-inch bore and 12
+feet in length, firing 65-pound shot. The demi-cannon, which was
+the largest gun carried on ships of the time, was 6.5 inches by
+9 feet and fired 30-pound shot.
+
+II. Culverins, 28 to 34 caliber long guns, 5 inches by 12 feet,
+firing 17-pound shot. Demi-culverins were 9-pounders. Slings, bases,
+sakers, port-pieces, and fowlers belonged to this class.
+
+III. Perriers, from 6 to 8 caliber, firing stone-balls, shells,
+fire-balls, etc.
+
+IV. Mortars, of 1.5 caliber, including petards and murderers.
+
+The "great ordnance," or cannon, were muzzle-loading. The secondary
+armament, mounted in tops, cageworks, bulkheads, etc., were
+breech-loading; but these smaller pieces fell out of favor as time
+went on owing to reliance on long-range fire and rareness of boarding
+actions. Down to the middle of the 19th century there was no great
+improvement in ordnance, save in the way of better powder and boring.
+Even in Elizabeth's day the heaviest cannon had a range of three
+miles.
+
+These advances in ship design and armament were accompanied by
+some changes in naval administration. In 1546 the Navy Board was
+created, which continued to handle matters of what may be termed
+civil administration until its functions were taken over by the
+Board of Admiralty in the reorganization of 1832. The chief members
+of the Navy Board, the Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor of Ships,
+Surveyor of Ordnance, and Clerk of Ships, were in Elizabethan times
+usually experienced in sea affairs. To John Hawkins, Treasurer from
+1578 to 1595, belongs chief credit for the excellent condition of
+ships in his day. The Lord High Admiral, a member of the nobility,
+exercised at least nominal command of the fleet in peace and war. For
+vice admiral under him a man of practical experience was ordinarily
+chosen. On shipboard, the only "gentleman" officers were the captains;
+the rest--masters, master's mates, pilots, carpenters, boatswains,
+coxswains, and gunners--were, to quote a contemporary description,
+"mechanick men that had been bred up from swabbers." But owing
+to the small proportion of soldiers on board, the English ships
+were not like those of Spain, which were organized like a camp,
+with the soldier element supreme and the sailors "slaves to the
+rest."
+
+_The Political Situation_
+
+The steps taken to build up the navy in the decade or more preceding
+the Armada were well justified by the political and religious strife
+in western Europe and the dangers which on all sides threatened the
+English realm. France, the Netherlands, and Scotland were torn by
+religious warfare. In England the party with open or secret Catholic
+sympathies was large, amounting to perhaps half the population,
+the strength of whose loyalty to Elizabeth it was difficult to
+gage. Since 1568 Elizabeth had held captive Mary Queen of Scots,
+driven out of her own country by the Presbyterian hierarchy, and
+a Catholic with hereditary claims to the English throne. Before
+her death, Philip of Spain had conspired with her to assassinate
+the heretic Elizabeth; after Mary's execution in 1587 he became
+heir to her claims and entered the more willingly upon the task
+of conquering England and restoring it to the faith. For years,
+in fact, there had been a state of undeclared hostility between
+England and Spain, and acts which, with sovereigns less cautious
+and astute than both Elizabeth and Philip, would have meant war.
+In 1585 Elizabeth formed an alliance with the Netherlands, and sent
+her favorite, Leicester, there as governor-general, and Sir Philip
+Sidney as Governor of Flushing, which with two other "cautionary
+towns" she took as pledges of Dutch loyalty. The motives for this
+action are well stated in a paper drawn up by the English Privy
+Council in 1584, presenting a situation interesting in its analogy
+to that which faced the United States when it entered the World
+War:
+
+"The conclusion of the whole was this: Although her Majesty should
+thereby enter into the war presently, yet were she better to do
+it now, while she may make the same out of her realm, having the
+help of the people of Holland, and before the King of Spain shall
+have consummated his conquest of those countries, whereby he shall
+be so provoked by pride, solicited by the Pope, and tempted by the
+Queen's own subjects, and shall be so strong by sea; and so free
+from all other actions and quarrels--yea, shall be so formidable
+to all the rest of Christendom, as that her Majesty shall no wise
+be able, with her own power, nor with the aid of any other, neither
+by land nor sea, to withstand his attempts, but shall be forced
+to give place to his insatiable malice, which is most terrible
+to be thought of, but miserable to suffer."
+
+These were the compelling reasons for England's entry into the
+war. The aid to Holland and the execution of Mary, on the other
+hand, were sufficient to explain Philip's attempted invasion. The
+grievance of Spain owing to the incursions of Hawkins and Drake
+into her American possessions, and England's desire to break Spain's
+commercial monopoly, were at the time relatively subordinate, though
+from a naval standpoint the voyages are interesting in themselves
+and important in the history of sea control and sea trade.
+
+_Hawkins and Drake_
+
+John Hawkins was a well-to-do ship-owner of Plymouth, and as already
+stated, Treasurer of the Royal Navy, with a contract for the upkeep
+of ships. His first venture to the Spanish Main was in 1562, when
+he kidnapped 300 negroes on the Portuguese coast of Africa and
+exchanged them at Hispanola (Haiti), for West Indian products,
+chartering two additional vessels to take his cargo home. Though
+he might have been put to death if caught by either Portugal or
+Spain, his profits were so handsome by the double exchange that
+he tried it again in 1565, this time taking his "choice negroes
+at £160 each" to Terra Firme, or the Spanish Main, including the
+coasts of Venezuela, Colombia, and the Isthmus. When the Spanish
+authorities, warned by their home government, made some show of
+resistance, Hawkins threatened bombardment, landed his men, and
+did business by force, the inhabitants conniving in a contraband
+trade very profitable to them.
+
+On his third voyage he had six vessels, two of which, the _Jesus
+of Lubeck_ and the _Minion_, were Queen's ships hired out for the
+voyage. The skipper of one of the smaller vessels, the _Judith_,
+was Francis Drake, a relative and protégé of the Hawkins family,
+and then a youth of twenty-two. On September 16, 1567, after a
+series of encounters stormier than ever in the Spanish settlements,
+the squadron homeward bound was driven by bad weather into the
+port of Mexico City in San Juan de Ulua Bay. Here, having a
+decided superiority over the vessels in the harbor, Hawkins secured
+the privilege of mooring and refitting his ships inside the island
+that formed a natural breakwater, and mounted guns on the island
+itself. To his surprise next morning, he beheld in the offing 13
+ships of Spain led by an armed galleon and having on board the
+newly appointed Mexican viceroy. Hawkins, though his guns commanded
+the entrance, took hostages and made some sort of agreement by
+which the Spanish ships were allowed to come in and moor alongside.
+But the situation was too tense to carry off without an explosion.
+Three days later the English were suddenly attacked on sea and
+shore. They at once leaped into their ships and cut their cables,
+but though they hammered the Spanish severely in the fight that
+followed, only two English vessels, the _Minion_ and the _Judith_,
+escaped, the _Minion_ so overcrowded that Hawkins had to drop 100 of
+his crew on the Mexican coast. Drake made straight for Plymouth,
+nursing a bitter grievance at the alleged breach of faith, and
+vowing vengeance on the whole Spanish race. "The case," as Drake's
+biographer, Thomas Fuller, says, "was clear in sea-divinity, and
+few are such infidels as not to believe doctrines which make for
+their own profit."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE HOLY STATE, Bk. II, Ch. XXII.]
+
+In the next three years, following the example of many a French
+Huguenot privateersman before him, and forsaking trade for semi-private
+reprisal (in that epoch a few degrees short of piracy), he made
+three voyages to the Spanish Indies. On the third, in 1572, he
+raided Nombre de Dios with fire and sword. Then, leaguing himself
+with the mixed-breed natives or cameroons, he waylaid a guarded
+mule-train bearing treasure across the Isthmus, securing 15 tons of
+silver which he buried, and as much gold as his men could stagger
+away under. It was on this foray that he first saw the Pacific
+from a height of the Cordilleras, and resolved to steer an English
+squadron into this hitherto unmolested Spanish sea.
+
+The tale of Drake's voyage into the Pacific and circumnavigation
+of the globe is a piratical epic, the episodes of which, however,
+find some justification in the state of virtual though undeclared
+hostilities between England and Spain, in the Queen's secret sanction,
+and in Spain's own policy of ruthless spoliation in America. Starting
+at the close of 1577 with five small vessels, the squadron was
+reduced by shipwreck and desertion until only the flagship remained
+when Drake at last, on September 6 of the next year, achieved his
+midwinter passage of the Straits of Magellan and bore down, "like
+a visitation of God" as a Spaniard said, upon the weakly defended
+ports of the west coast. After ballasting his ship with silver from
+the rich Potosi mines, and rifling even the churches, he hastened
+onward in pursuit of a richly laden galleon nicknamed _Cacafuego_--a
+name discreetly translated _Spitfire_, but which, to repeat a joke
+that greatly amused Drake's men at the time, it was proposed to
+change to _Spitsilver_, for when overtaken and captured the vessel
+yielded 26 tons of silver, 13 chests of pieces of eight, and gold
+and jewels sufficient to swell the booty to half a million pounds
+sterling.
+
+For 20 years the voyage across the northern Pacific had been familiar
+to the Spanish, who had studied winds and currents, laid down routes,
+and made regular crossings. Having picked up charts and China pilots,
+and left the whole coast in panic fear, Drake sailed far to the
+northward, overhauled his ship in a bay above San Francisco, then
+struck across the Pacific, and at last rounded Good Hope and put
+into Plymouth in September of the third year. It suited Elizabeth's
+policy to countenance the voyage. She put the major part of the
+treasure into the Tower, took some trinkets herself, knighted Drake
+aboard the _Golden Hind_, and when the Spanish ambassador talked
+war she told him, in a quiet tone of voice, that she would throw
+him into a dungeon.
+
+This red-bearded, short and thickset Devon skipper, bold of speech
+as of action, was now the most renowned sailor of England, with a
+name that inspired terror on every coast of Spain. It was inevitable,
+therefore, that when Elizabeth resolved upon open reprisals in
+1585, Drake should be chosen to lead another, and this time fully
+authorized, raid on the Spanish Indies. Here he sacked the cities
+of San Domingo and Carthagena, and, though he narrowly missed the
+plate fleet, brought home sufficient spoils for the individuals
+who backed the venture. In the year 1587 with 23 ships and orders
+permitting him to operate freely on Spain's home coasts, he first
+boldly entered Cadiz, in almost complete disregard of the puny
+galleys guarding the harbor, and destroyed some 37 vessels and
+their cargoes. Despite the horrified protests of his Vice Admiral
+Borough (an officer "of the old school" to be found in every epoch)
+at these violations of traditional methods, he then took up a position
+off Saigres where he could harry coastwise commerce, picked up the
+East Indiaman _San Felipe_ with a cargo worth a million pounds
+in modern money, and even appeared off Lisbon to defy the Spanish
+Admiral Santa Cruz. Thus he "singed the King of Spain's beard,"
+and set, in the words of a recent biographer, "what to this day
+may serve as the finest example of how a small, well-handled fleet,
+acting on a nicely timed offensive, may paralyze the mobilization
+of an overwhelming force."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Corbett, Vol. II, p. 108.]
+
+_The Grand Armada_
+
+At the time of this Cadiz expedition Spanish preparations for the
+invasion of England were already well under way, Philip being now
+convinced that by a blow at England all his aims might be secured--the
+subjugation of the Netherlands, the safety of Spanish America,
+the overthrow of Protestantism, possibly even his accession to
+the English throne. As the secret instructions to Medina Sidonia
+more modestly stated, it was at least believed that by a vigorous
+offensive and occupation of English territory England could be forced
+to cease her opposition to Spain. For this purpose every province
+of the empire was pressed for funds. Pope Sixtus VI contributed
+a million gold crowns, which he shrewdly made payable only when
+troops actually landed on English soil. Church and nobility were
+squeezed as never before. The Cortes on the eve of the voyage voted
+8,000,000 ducats, secured by a tax on wine, meat, and oil, the
+common necessities of life, which was not lifted for more than two
+hundred years.
+
+To gain control of the Channel long enough to throw 40,000 troops
+ashore at Margate, and thereafter to meet and conquer the army
+of defense--such was the highly difficult objective, to assure
+the success of which Philip had been led to hope for a wholesale
+defection of English Catholics to the Spanish cause. Twenty thousand
+troops were to sail with the Armada; Alexander Farnese, Duke of
+Parma, was to add 17,000 veterans from Flanders and assume supreme
+command. With the Spanish infantry once landed, under the best
+general in Europe, it was not beyond reason that England might become
+a province of Spain.
+
+What Philip did not see clearly, what indeed could scarcely be
+foreseen from past experience, was that no movement of troops should
+be undertaken without first definitely accounting for the enemy
+fleet. The Spanish had not even an open base to sail to. With English
+vessels thronging the northern ports of the Channel, with 90 Dutch
+ships blockading the Scheldt and the shallows of the Flanders coast,
+it would be necessary to clear the Channel by a naval victory,
+and maintain control until it was assured by victory on land. The
+leader first selected, Santa Cruz--a veteran of Lepanto--at least
+put naval considerations uppermost and laid plans on a grand scale,
+calling for 150 major ships and 100,000 men, 30,000 of them sailors.
+But with his death in 1587 the campaign was again thought of primarily
+from the army standpoint. The ships were conceived as so many
+transports, whose duty at most was to hold the English fleet at
+bay. Parma was to be supreme. To succeed Santa Cruz as naval leader,
+and in order, it is said, that the gray-haired autocrat Philip
+might still control from his cell in the Escorial, the Duke of
+Medina Sidonia was chosen--an amiable gentleman of high rank, but
+consciously ignorant of naval warfare, uncertain of purpose, and
+despondent almost from the start. Medina had an experienced Vice
+Admiral in Diego Flores de Valdes, whose professional advice he
+usually followed, and he had able squadron commanders in Recalde,
+Pedro de Valdes, Oquendo, and others; but such a commander-in-chief,
+unless a very genius in self-effacement, was enough to ruin a far
+more auspicious campaign.
+
+Delayed by the uncertain political situation in France, even more
+than by Drake's exploits off Cadiz, the Armada was at last, in
+May of 1588, ready to depart. The success of the Catholic party
+under the leadership of the Duke of Guise gave assurance of support
+rather than hostility on the French flank. There were altogether
+some 130 ships, the best of which were 10 war galleons of Portugal
+and 10 of the "Indian Guard" of Spain. These were supported by
+the Biscayan, Andalusian, Guipuscoan, and Levantine squadrons of
+about 10 armed merchantmen each, four splendid Neapolitan galleasses
+that gave a good account of themselves in action, and four galleys
+that were driven upon the French coast by storms and took no part
+in the battle--making a total (without the galleys) of about 64
+fighting ships. Then there were 35 or more pinnaces and small craft,
+and 23 _urcas_ or storeships of little or no fighting value. The
+backbone of the force was the 60 galleons, large, top-lofty vessels,
+all but 20 of them from the merchant service, with towering poops
+and forecastles that made them terrible to look upon but hard to
+handle. On board were 8,000 sailors and 19,000 troops.
+
+Dispersed by a storm on their departure from Lisbon, the fleet
+again assembled at Corunna, their victuals already rotten, and
+their water foul and short. Medina Sidonia even now counseled
+abandonment; but religious faith, the fatalistic pride of Spain,
+and Philip's dogged fixity of purpose drove them on. Putting out
+of Corunna on July 22, and again buffeted by Biscay gales, they
+were sighted off the Lizard at daybreak of July 30, and a pinnace
+scudded into Plymouth with the alarm.
+
+[Illustration: CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA]
+
+For England the moment of supreme crisis had come, Elizabeth's
+policy of paying for nothing that she might expect her subjects
+to contribute had left the royal navy short of what the situation
+called for, and the government seems also, even throughout the
+campaign, to have tied the admirals to the coast and kept them from
+distant adventures by limited supplies of munitions and food. But
+in the imminent danger, the nobility, both Catholic and Protestant,
+and every coastwise city, responded to the call for ships and men.
+Their loyalty was fatal to Philip's plan. The royal fleet of 25
+ships and a dozen pinnaces was reënforced until the total craft of
+all descriptions numbered 197, not more than 140 of which, however,
+may be said to have had a real share in the campaign. For a month
+or more a hundred sail had been mobilized at Plymouth, of which
+69 were greatships and galleons. These were smaller in average
+tonnage than the Spanish ships, but more heavily armed, and manned
+by 10,000 capable seamen. Lord Henry Seymour, with Palmer and Sir
+William Winter under him, watched Parma at the Strait of Dover,
+with 20 ships and an equal number of galleys, barks and pinnaces.
+The Lord High Admiral, Thomas Howard of Effingham, a nobleman of 50
+with some naval experience and of a family that had long held the
+office, commanded the western squadron, with Drake as Vice Admiral
+and John Hawkins as Rear Admiral. The _Ark_ (800 tons), _Revenge_
+(500), and _Victory_ (800) were their respective flagships. Martin
+Frobisher in the big 1100-ton _Triumph_, Lord Sheffield in the
+_White Bear_ (1000), and Thomas Fenner in the _Nonpareil_ (500)
+were included with the Admirals in Howard's inner council of war.
+"Howard," says Thomas Fuller, "was no deep-seaman, but he had
+skill enough to know those who had more skill than himself and
+to follow their instructions." As far as as possible for a
+commoner, Drake exercised command.
+
+[Illustration: From Pigafetta's _Discorso sopro l'Ordinanza dell'
+Armata Catholico_ (Corbett's _Drake_, Vol. II, p. 213).
+
+ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA, PROBABLY ADOPTED WITH
+SOME MODIFICATIONS AND SHOWING THE INFLUENCE OF GALLEY WARFARE]
+
+On the morning of the 31st the Armada swept slowly past Plymouth
+in what has been described as a broad crescent, but which, from a
+contemporary Italian description, seems to have been the "eagle"
+formation familiar to galley warfare, in line abreast with wide
+extended wings bent slightly forward, the main strength in center
+and guards in van and rear. Howard was just completing the arduous
+task of warping his ships out of the harbor. Had Medina attacked at
+once, as some of his subordinates advised, he might have compelled
+Howard to close action and won by superior numbers. But his orders
+suggested the advisability of avoiding battle till he had joined with
+Parma; and for the Duke this was enough. As the Armada continued its
+course, Howard fell in astern and to windward, inflicting serious
+injuries to two ships of the enemy rear.
+
+[Illustration: From Hale's _Story of the Great Armada._
+
+THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL]
+
+A week of desultory running battle ensued as the fleets moved slowly
+through the Channel; the English fighting "loose and large," and
+seeking to pick off stragglers, still fearful of a general action,
+but taking advantage of Channel flaws to close with the enemy and
+sheer as swiftly away; the Spanish on the defensive but able to
+avoid disaster by better concerted action and fleet control. Only
+two Spanish ships were actually lost, one of them Pedro de Valdes'
+flagship _Neustra Señora del Rosario_, which had been injured in
+collision and surrendered to Drake without a struggle on the night
+of August 1, the other the big _San Salvador_ of the Guipuscoan
+squadron, the whole after part of which had been torn up by an
+explosion after the fighting on the first day. But the Spanish
+inferiority had been clearly demonstrated and they had suffered
+far more in morale than in material injuries when on Sunday, August
+7, they dropped anchor in Calais roads. The English, on their part,
+though flushed with confidence, had seen their weakness in organized
+tactics, and now divided their fleet into four squadrons, with
+the flag officers and Frobisher in command.
+
+It betrays the fatuity of the Spanish leader, if not of the whole
+plan of campaign, that when thus practically driven to refuge in
+a neutral port, Medina Sidonia thought his share of the task
+accomplished, and wrote urgent appeals to Parma to join or send
+aid, though the great general had not enough flat-boats and barges
+to float his army had he been so foolhardy as to embark, or the
+Dutch so benevolent as to let him go. But the English, now reënforced
+by Seymour's squadron, gave the Duke little time to ponder his next
+move. At midnight eight fire hulks, "spurting flames and their
+ordnance exploding," were borne by wind and tide full upon the
+crowded Spanish fleet. Fearful of _maquinas de minas_ such as had
+wrought destruction a year before at the siege of Antwerp, the
+Spanish made no effort to grapple the peril but slipped or cut cables
+and in complete confusion beat off shore.
+
+At dawn the Spanish galleons, attempting with a veering wind from
+the southward and westward to form in order off Gravelines, were set
+upon in the closest approach to a general engagement that occurred
+in the campaign. While Howard and several of his ships were busy
+effecting the capture of a beached galleass, Drake led the attack
+in the _Revenge_, seeking to force the enemy to leeward and throw
+the whole body upon the shallows of the Flanders coast. With splendid
+discipline, the Spanish weather ships, the flagship _San Martin_
+among them, fought valiantly to cover the retreat. But it was an
+unequal struggle, the heavier and more rapid fire of the English
+doing fearful execution on decks crowded with men-at-arms. Such
+artillery combat was hitherto unheard of. Though warned of the new
+northern methods, the Spanish were obsessed by tradition; they were
+prepared for grappling and boarding, and could they have closed,
+their numbers and discipline would have told. Both sides suffered
+from short ammunition; but the Armada, with no fresh supplies, was
+undoubtedly in the worse case. "They fighting with their great
+ordnance," writes Medina Sidonia, "and we with harquebus fire and
+musketry, the distance being very small." Six-inch guns against
+bows and muskets tells the tale.
+
+A slackening of the English pursuit at nightfall after eight hours'
+fighting, and an off-shore slant of wind at daybreak, prevented
+complete disaster. One large galleon sank and two more stranded
+and were captured by the Dutch. These losses were not indeed fatal,
+but the remaining ships staggering away to leeward were little
+more than blood-drenched wrecks. Fifteen hundred had been killed
+and wounded in the day's action, and eleven ships and some eight
+thousand men sacrificed thus far in the campaign. The English,
+on the other hand, had suffered no serious ship injuries and the
+loss of not above 100 men. In the council held next day beyond the
+Straits of Dover, only a few of the Spanish leaders had stomach
+for further fighting; the rest preferred to brave the perils of a
+return around the Orkneys rather than face again these defenders
+of the narrow seas. Before a fair wind they stood northward, Drake
+still at their heels, though by reason of short supplies he left
+them at the Firth of Forth.
+
+In October, fifty ships, with 10,000 starved and fever-stricken
+men, trailed into the Biscay ports of Spain. Torn by September
+gales, the rest of the Armada had been sunk or stranded on the rough
+coasts of Scotland and Ireland. "The wreckers of the Orkneys and the
+Faroes, the clansmen of the Scottish isles, the kernes of Donegal
+and Galway, all had their part in the work of murder and robbery.
+Eight thousand Spaniards perished between the Giant's Causeway and
+the Blaskets. On a strand near Sligo an English captain numbered
+eleven hundred corpses which had been cast up by the sea."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE, Green, Vol. II, p. 448.]
+
+"Flavit Deus, et dissipati sunt"--"The Lord sent His wind, and
+scattered them." So ran the motto on the English medal of victory.
+But storms completed the destruction of a fleet already thoroughly
+defeated. Religious faith, courage, and discipline had availed
+little against superior ships, weapons, leadership, and nautical
+skill. "Till the King of Spain had war with us," an Englishman
+remarked, "he never knew what war by sea meant."[2] It might be
+said more accurately that the battle gave a new meaning to war
+by sea.
+
+[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Monson, NAVAL TRACTS, Purchas, Vol. III, p.
+121.]
+
+From the standpoint of naval progress, the campaign demonstrated
+definitely the ascendancy of sail and artillery. For the old galley
+tactics a new system now had to be developed. Since between sailing
+vessels head-on conflict was practically eliminated, and since
+guns mounted to fire ahead and astern were of little value save
+in flight or pursuit, the arrangement of guns in broadside soon
+became universal, and fleets fought in column, or "line ahead,"
+usually close-hauled on the same or opposite tacks. While these
+were lessons for the next generation, there is more permanent value
+in the truth, again illustrated, that fortune favors the belligerent
+quicker to forsake outworn methods and to develop skill in the use
+of new weapons. The Spanish defeat illustrates also the necessity
+of expert planning and guidance of a naval campaign, with naval
+counsels and requirements duly regarded; and the fatal effect of
+failure to concentrate attention on the enemy fleet. It is doubtful,
+however, whether it would have been better, as Drake urged, and as
+was actually attempted in the month before the Armada's arrival, if
+the English had shifted the war to the coast of Spain. The objections
+arise chiefly from the difficulties, in that age, of maintaining
+a large naval force far from its base, all of which the Spanish
+encountered in their northward cruise. It is noteworthy that, even
+after the brief Channel operations, an epidemic caused heavy mortality
+in the English fleet. Finally, the Armada is a classic example
+of the value of naval defense to an insular nation. In the often
+quoted words of Raleigh, "To entertain the enemy with their own
+beef in their bellies, before they eat of our Kentish capons, I
+take it to be the wisest way, to do which his Majesty after God
+will employ his good ships at sea."
+
+Upon Spain, already tottering from inherent weakness, the Armada
+defeat had the effect of casting down her pride and confidence
+as leader of the Catholic world. Though it was not until three
+centuries later that she lost her last colonies, her hold on her
+vast empire was at once shaken by this blow at her sea control.
+While she maintained large fleets until after the Napoleonic Wars,
+she was never again truly formidable as a naval power. But the victory
+lifted England more than it crushed Spain, inspiring an intenser
+patriotism, an eagerness for colonial and commercial adventure, an
+exaltation of spirit manifested in the men of genius who crowned
+the Elizabethan age.
+
+_The Last Years of the War_
+
+The war was not ended; and though Philip was restrained by the
+rise of Protestant power in France under Henry of Navarre, he was
+still able to gather his sea forces on almost as grand a scale. In
+the latter stages of the war the naval expeditions on both sides
+were either, like the Armada, for the purpose of landing armies on
+foreign soil, or raids on enemy ports, colonies and commerce. Thus
+Drake in 1589 set out with a force of 18,000 men, which attacked
+Corunna, moved thence upon Lisbon, and lost a third or more of
+its number in a fruitless campaign on land. Both Drake and the
+aged Hawkins, now his vice admiral, died in the winter of 1595-96
+during a last and this time ineffective foray upon the Spanish
+Main. Drake was buried off Puerto Bello, where legend has it his
+spirit still awaits England's call--
+
+  "Take my drum to England, hang et by the shore,
+Strike et when your powder's running low.
+  If the Dons sight Devon, I'll leave the port of Heaven,
+An' drum them up the Channel as we drummed them long ago."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE'S DRUM, Sir Henry Newbolt.]
+
+We are still far from the period when sea control was thought of
+as important in itself, apart from land operations, or when fleets
+were kept in permanent readiness to take the sea. It is owing to
+this latter fact that we hear of large flotillas dispatched by
+each side even in the same year, yet not meeting in naval action.
+Thus in June of 1596 the Essex expedition, with 17 English and
+18 Dutch men-of-war and numerous auxiliaries, seized Cadiz and
+burned shipping to the value of 11,000,000 ducats. There was no
+naval opposition, though Philip in October of the same year had
+ready a hundred ships and 16,000 men, which were dispersed with
+the loss of a quarter of their strength in a gale off Finisterre.
+Storms also scattered Philip's fleet in the next year; in 1598,
+Spanish transports landed 5,000 men at Calais; and England's fears
+were renewed in the year after that by news of over 100 vessels
+fitting out for the Channel, which, however, merely protected the
+plate fleet by a cruise to the Azores. As late as 1601, Spain landed
+3500 troops in Ireland.
+
+But if these major operations seem to have missed contact, there
+were many lively actions on a minor scale, the well-armed trading
+vessels of the north easily beating off the galley squadrons guarding
+Gibraltar and the routes past Spain. Among these lesser encounters, the
+famous "Last Fight of the Revenge," which occurred during operations
+of a small English squadron off the Azores in 1591, well illustrates
+the fighting spirit of the Elizabethan Englishman and the ineptitude
+which since the Armada seems to have marked the Spaniard at sea.
+In Drake's old flagship, attacked by 15 ships and surrounded by
+a Spanish fleet of 50 sail, a bellicose old sea-warrior named Sir
+Richard Grenville held out from nightfall until eleven the next
+day, and surrendered only after he had sunk three of the enemy,
+when his powder was gone, half his crew dead, the rest disabled,
+and his ship a sinking wreck. "Here die I, Richard Grenville," so
+we are given his last words, "with a joyful and a quiet mind, for
+that I have ended my life as a good soldier ought to do, who has
+fought for his country and his queen, his honor and his religion."
+
+The naval activities mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraphs
+had no decisive effect upon the war, which ended, for England at
+least, with the death of Elizabeth in 1603 and the accession of
+James Stuart of Scotland to the English throne. James at once adopted
+a policy of _rapprochement_ with Spain, which while it guaranteed
+peace during the 22 years of his reign, was by its renunciation of
+trade with the Indies, aid to the Dutch, and leadership of Protestant
+Europe, a sorry sequel to the victory of fifteen years before.
+
+The Armada nevertheless marks the decadence of Spanish sea power.
+With the next century begins a new epoch in naval warfare, an age
+of sail and artillery, in which Dutch, English, and later French
+fleets contested for the sea mastery deemed essential to colonial
+empire and commercial prosperity.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Sir Julian Corbett, 2 vols., 1898.
+THE SUCCESSORS OF DRAKE, Sir Julian Corbett, 1900.
+THE STORY OF THE GREAT ARMADA, J. R. Hale, no date.
+ARMADA PAPERS, Sir John Knox Laughtun, 2 vols., Navy Records
+  Society, 1894.
+LA ARMADA INVENCIBLE, Captain Fernandez Duro, 1884.
+A HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1509-1660,
+  by M. Oppenheim, 1896.
+A HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, William Laird Clowes, Vol. 1., 1897.
+THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, W. Cunningham, 1907.
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS IN THE TUDOR NAVY, Capt. G. Goldingham,
+  United Service Magazine, June, 1918.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER: WARS WITH THE DUTCH.
+
+In the Dutch Wars of the 17th century the British navy may be said
+to have caught its stride in the march that made Britannia the
+unrivaled mistress of the seas. The defeat of the Armada was caused
+by other things besides the skill of the English, and the steady
+decline of Spain from that point was not due to that battle or to
+any energetic naval campaign undertaken by the English thereafter.
+In fact, save for the Cadiz expedition of 1596, in which the Dutch
+coöperated, England had a rather barren record after the Armada
+campaign down to the middle of the 17th century. During that period
+the Dutch seized the control of the seas for trade and war. They
+appropriated what was left of the Levantine trade in the Mediterranean,
+and contested the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies and the
+Spanish in the West. Indeed the Dutch were at this time freely
+acknowledged to be the greatest sea-faring people of Europe.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: "Dutch exports reached a figure in the 17th century,
+which was not attained by the English until 1740. Even the Dutch
+fisheries, which employed over 2000 boats, were said to be more
+valuable than the manufactures of France and England combined."
+A HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Clive Day, p. 194.]
+
+When the Commonwealth came into power in England the new government
+turned its attention to the navy, which had languished under the
+Stuarts. A great reform was accomplished in the bettering of the
+living conditions for the seamen. Their pay was increased, their
+share of prize money enlarged, and their food improved. At the
+same time, during the years 1648-51, the number of ships of the
+fleet was practically doubled, and the new vessels were the product
+of the highest skill in design and honest work in construction. The
+turmoil between Roundhead and Royalist had naturally disorganized
+the officer personnel of the fleet. Prince Rupert, nephew of Charles
+I, had taken a squadron of seven Royalist ships to sea, hoping to
+organize, at the Scilly Islands or at Kinsdale in Ireland, bases
+for piratical raids on the commerce of England, and it was necessary
+to bring him up short. Moreover, Ireland was still rebellious,
+Barbados, the only British possession in the West Indies, was held
+for the King, and Virginia also was Royalist. To establish the
+rule of the Commonwealth Cromwell needed an efficient fleet and
+an energetic admiral.
+
+For the latter he turned to a man who had won a military reputation
+in the Civil War second only to that of the great Oliver himself,
+Robert Blake, colonel of militia. Blake was chosen as one of three
+"generals at sea" in 1649. As far as is known he had never before
+set foot on a man of war; he was a scholarly man, who had spent ten
+years at Oxford, where he had cherished the ambition of becoming
+a professor of Greek. At the time of his appointment he was fifty
+years old, and his entire naval career was comprised in the seven
+or eight remaining years of his life, and yet he so bore himself
+in those years as to win a reputation that stands second only to
+that of Nelson among the sea-fighters of the English race.
+
+Blake made short work of Rupert's cruising and destroyed the Royalist
+pretensions to Jersey and the Scillies. One of his rewards for
+the excellent service rendered was a position in the Council of
+State, in which capacity he did much toward the bettering of the
+condition of the sailors, which was one of the striking reforms
+of the Commonwealth. His test, however, came in the first Dutch
+War, in which he was pitted against Martin Tromp, then the leading
+naval figure of Europe.
+
+In the wars with Spain, English and Dutch had been allies, but
+the shift of circumstances brought the two Protestant nations into
+a series of fierce conflicts lasting throughout the latter half
+of the 17th century. The outcome of these was that England won
+the scepter of the sea which she has ever since held. The main
+cause of the war was the rivalry of the two nations on the sea.
+There were various other specific reasons for bad feeling on both
+sides, as for instance a massacre by the Dutch of English traders
+at Amboyna in the East Indies, during the reign of James I, which
+still rankled because it had never been avenged. The English on
+their side insisted on a salute to their men of war from every
+ship that passed through the Channel, and claimed the rights to
+a tribute, of all herrings taken within 30 miles off the English
+coast.
+
+Cromwell formulated the English demands in the Navigation Act of
+1651. The chief of these required that none but English ships should
+bring cargoes to England, save vessels of the country whence the
+cargoes came. This was frankly a direct blow at the Dutch carrying
+trade, one to which the Dutch could not yield without a struggle.
+
+For this struggle the Netherlanders were ill prepared. The Dutch
+Republic was a federation of seven sovereign states, lacking a strong
+executive and torn by rival factions. Moreover, her geographical
+position was most vulnerable. Pressed by enemies on her land frontiers,
+she was compelled to maintain an army of 57,000 men in addition to
+her navy. As the resources of the country were wholly inadequate
+to support the population, her very life depended on the sea. For
+the Holland of the 17th century, as for the England of the 20th, the
+fleets of merchantmen were the life blood of the nation. Unfortunately
+for the Dutch, this life blood had to course either through the
+Channel or else round the north of Scotland. Either way was open
+to attacks by the British, who held the interior position. Further,
+the shallows of the coasts and bays made necessary a flat bottomed
+ship of war, lighter built than the English and less weatherly
+in deep water.
+
+In contrast the British had a unity of government under the iron
+hand of Cromwell, they had the enormous advantage of position,
+they were self-sustaining, and their ships were larger, stouter
+and better in every respect than those of their enemies. Hence,
+although the Dutch entered the conflict with the naval prestige
+on their side, it is clear that the odds were decidedly against
+them.
+
+_The First Dutch War_
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE 17TH
+CENTURY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND FRANCE]
+
+The fighting did not wait for a declaration of war. Blake met Tromp,
+who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen, off Dover on May 19,
+1652. On coming up with him Blake fired guns demanding the required
+salute. Tromp replied with a broadside. Blake attacked with his
+flagship, well ahead of his own line, and fought for five hours with
+Tromp's flagship and several others. The English were outnumbered
+about three to one, and Blake might have been annihilated had not
+the English admiral, Bourne, brought his squadron out from Dover
+at the sound of the firing and fallen upon Tromp's flank. As the
+Dutch Admiral's main business was to get his convoy home, he fell
+back slowly toward the coast of France, both sides maintaining a
+cannonade until they lost each other in the darkness. Apparently
+there was little attempt at formation after the first onset; it
+was close quarters fighting, and only the wild gunnery of the day
+saved both fleets from enormous losses. As it was, Blake's flagship
+was very severely hammered.
+
+Following this action, Tromp reappeared with 100 ships, but failed
+to keep Blake from attacking and ruining the Dutch herring fisheries
+for that year. This mistake temporarily cost Tromp his command.
+He was superseded by DeWith, an able man and brave, but no match
+for Blake. On September 28, 1652, Blake met him off the "Kentish
+Knock" shoal at the mouth of the Thames. In order to keep the weather
+gage, which would enable him to attack at close quarters, Blake
+took the risk of grounding on the shoal. His own ship and a few
+others did ground for a time, but they served as a guide to the
+rest. In the ensuing action Blake succeeded in putting the Dutch
+between two fires and inflicting a severe defeat. Only darkness
+saved the Dutch from utter destruction.
+
+The effect of this victory was to give the English Council of State
+a false impression of security. In vain Blake urged the upkeep of
+the fleet. Two months later, November 30, 1652, Tromp, now restored
+to command, suddenly appeared in the Channel with 80 ships and a
+convoy behind him. Blake had only 45 and these only partly manned,
+but he was no man to refuse a challenge and boldly sailed out to
+meet him. It is said that during the desperate struggle--the "battle
+of Dungeness"--Blake's flagship, supported by two others, fought
+for some time with twenty of the Dutch. As Blake had the weather
+gage and retained it, he was able to draw off finally and save his
+fleet from destruction. All the ships were badly knocked about and
+two fell into the hands of the enemy. Blake came back so depressed
+by his defeat that he offered to resign his command, but the Council
+of State would not hear of such a thing, handsomely admitted their
+responsibility for the weakness of the fleet, and set at work to
+refit. Meanwhile for the next three months the Channel was in Tromp's
+hands. This is the period when the legend describes him as hoisting
+a broom to his masthead.
+
+By the middle of February the English had reorganized their fleet
+and Blake took the sea with another famous Roundhead soldier, Monk,
+as one of his divisional commanders. At this time Tromp lay off
+Land's End waiting for the Dutch merchant fleet which he expected
+to convoy to Holland. On the 18th the two forces sighted each other
+about 15 miles off Portland. Then followed the "Three Days' Battle,"
+or the battle of Portland, one of the most stubbornly contested
+fights in the war and its turning point.
+
+In order to be sure to catch Tromp, Blake had extended his force
+of 70 or 80 ships in a cross Channel position. Under cover of a
+fog Tromp suddenly appeared and caught the English fleet divided.
+Less than half were collected under the immediate command of Blake,
+only about ten were in the actual vicinity of his flagship, and
+the rest were to eastward, especially Monk's division which he
+had carelessly permitted to drift to leeward four or five miles.
+As the wind was from the west and very light, Monk's position made
+it impossible for him to support his chief for some time. Tromp saw
+his opportunity to concentrate on the part of the English fleet
+nearest him, the handful of ships with Blake. The latter had the
+choice of either bearing up to make a junction with Monk and the
+others before accepting battle or of grappling with Tromp at once,
+trusting to his admirals to arrive in time to win a victory. It
+was characteristic of Blake that he chose the bolder course.
+
+The fighting began early in the afternoon and was close and furious
+from the outset. Again Blake's ship was compelled to engage several
+Dutch, including Tromp's flagship. De Ruyter, the brilliant lieutenant
+of Tromp, attempted to cut Blake off from his supports on the north,
+and Evertsen steered between Blake and Penn's squadron on the south.
+(See diagram 1.) Blake's dozen ships might well have been surrounded
+and taken if his admirals had not known their business. Penn tacked
+right through Evertsen's squadron to come to the side of Blake,
+and Lawson foiled de Ruyter by bearing away till he had enough
+southing to tack in the wake of Penn and fall upon Tromp's rear
+(diagram 2). Evertsen then attempted to get between Monk and the
+rest of the fleet and two hours after the fight in the center began
+Monk also was engaged. When the lee vessels of the "red" or center
+squadron came on the scene about four o'clock, they threatened to
+weather the Dutch and put them between two fires. To avoid this
+and to protect his convoy, Tromp tacked his whole fleet together--an
+exceedingly difficult maneuver under the circumstances--and drew
+off to windward. Darkness stopped the fighting for that day. All
+night the two fleets sailed eastward watching each other's lights,
+and hastily patching up damages.
+
+[Illustration: Based on diagram of Mahan's in Clowes, _The Royal
+Navy_, Vol. II, p. 180-1.
+
+THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEB. 18, 1653]
+
+Morning discovered them off the Isle of Wight, with the English
+on the north side of the Channel. As Tromp's chief business was to
+save his convoy and as the English force was now united, he took
+a defensive position. He formed his own ships in a long crescent,
+with the outward curve toward his enemy, and in the lee of this
+line he placed his convoy. The wind was so light that the English
+were unable to attack until late. The fighting, though energetic,
+had not proved decisive when darkness fell.
+
+The following day, the 20th, brought a fresh wind that enabled
+the English to overhaul the Dutch, who could not move faster than
+the heavily laden merchantmen, and force a close action. Blake
+tried to cut off Tromp from the north so as to block his road home.
+Vice Admiral Penn, leading the van, broke through the Dutch battle
+line and fell upon the convoy, but Blake was unable to reach far
+enough to head off his adversary before he rounded Cape Gris Nez
+under cover of darkness and found anchorage in Calais roads. That
+night, favored by the tide and thick weather, Tromp succeeded in
+carrying off the greater part of his convoy unobserved. Nevertheless
+he had left in Blake's hand some fifty merchantmen and a number
+of men of war variously estimated from five to eighteen. At the
+same time the English had suffered heavily in men and ships. On
+Blake's flagship alone it is said that 100 men had been killed
+and Blake and his second in command, Deane, were both wounded, the
+former seriously.
+
+The result of this three days' action was to encourage the English
+to press the war with energy and take the offensive to the enemy's
+own coast. English crews had shown that they could fight with a
+spirit fully equal to that of the Dutch, and English ships and
+weight of broadside, as de Ruyter frankly declared to his government,
+were decidedly superior. The fact that the shallow waters of the
+Dutch coast made necessary a lighter draft man of war than that
+of the English proved a serious handicap to the Dutch in all their
+conflicts with the British. Both fleets were so badly shot up by
+this prolonged battle that there was a lull in operations until
+May.
+
+In that month Tromp suddenly arrived off Dover and bombarded the
+defenses. The English quickly took the sea to hunt him down. As
+Blake was still incapacitated by his wound, the command was given
+to Monk. The latter, with a fleet of over a hundred ships, brought
+Tromp to action on June 2 (1653) in what is known as the "Battle
+of the Gabbard" after a shoal near the mouth of the Thames, where
+the action began. Tromp was this time not burdened with a convoy
+but his fleet was smaller in numbers than Monk's and, as he well
+knew, inferior in other elements of force. Accordingly, he adapted
+defensive tactics of a sort that was copied afterwards by the French
+as a fixed policy. He accepted battle to leeward, drawing off in a
+slanting line from his enemy with the idea of catching the English
+van as it advanced to the attack unsupported by the rest of the
+fleet, and crippling it so severely that the attack would not be
+pressed. As it turned out, a shift of the wind gave him the chance
+to fall heavily upon the English van, but a second shift gave back
+the weather gage to the English and the two fleets became fiercely
+engaged at close quarters. Blake, hearing the guns, left his sick
+bed and with his own available force of 18 ships sailed out to join
+battle. The sight of this fresh squadron flying Blake's flag, turned
+the fortune of battle decisively. The Dutch escaped destruction
+only by finding safety in the shallows of the Flemish coast, where
+the English ships could not follow.
+
+After this defeat the Dutch were almost at the end of their resources
+and sued far peace, but Cromwell's ruthless demands amounted to
+a practical loss of independence, which even a bankrupt nation
+could not accept. Accordingly, every nerve was strained to build
+a fleet that might yet beat the English. The latter, for their
+part, were equally determined not to lose the fruits of their hard
+won victories. Since Blake's active share in the battle of the
+Gabbard aggravated his wound so severely that he was carried ashore
+more nearly dead than alive, Monk retained actual command.
+
+Monk attempted to maintain a close blockade of the Dutch coast
+and to prevent a junction between Tromp's main fleet at Flushing
+and a force of thirty ships at Amsterdam. In this, however, he was
+outgeneraled by Tromp, who succeeded in taking the sea with the
+greatest of all Dutch fleets, 120 men of war. The English and the
+Dutch speedily clashed in the last, and perhaps the most furiously
+contested, battle of the war, the "Battle of Scheveningen." The
+action began at six in the morning of July 30, 1653. Tromp had the
+weather gage, but Monk, instead of awaiting his onslaught, tacked
+towards him and actually cut through the Dutch line. Tromp countered
+by tacking also, in order to keep his windward position, and this
+maneuver was repeated three times by Tromp and Monk, and the two
+great fleets sailed in great zigzag courses down the Dutch coast a
+distance of forty miles, with bitter fighting going on at close
+range between the two lines. Early in the action the renowned Tromp
+was killed, but his flag was kept flying and there was no flinching
+on the part of his admirals. About one o'clock a shift of the wind
+gave the weather gage to the English. Some of the Dutch captains
+then showed the white feather and tried to escape. This compelled
+the retirement of DeWith, who had succeeded to the command, and
+who, as he retreated, fired on his own fugitives as well as on
+the English. As usual in those battles with the Dutch, the English
+had been forced to pay a high price for their victory. Their fleet
+was so shattered that they were obliged to lift the blockade and
+return home to refit. But for the Dutch it was the last effort.
+Again they sued for peace. Cromwell drove a hard bargain; he insisted
+on every claim England had ever made against the Netherlands before
+the war, but on this occasion he agreed to leave Holland her
+independence.
+
+Thus in less than two years the First Dutch War came to an end. In
+the words of Mr. Hannay,[1] the English historian, its "importance
+as an epoch in the history of the English Navy can hardly be
+exaggerated. Though short, for it lasted barely twenty-two months,
+it was singularly fierce and full of battles. Yet its interest is
+not derived mainly from the mere amount of fighting but from the
+character of it. This was the first of our naval wars conducted
+by steady, continuous, coherent campaigns. Hitherto our operations
+on the sea had been of the nature of adventures by single ships
+and small squadrons, with here and there a great expedition sent
+out to capture some particular port or island."
+
+[Footnote 1: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. I, p. 217.]
+
+As to the intensity of the fighting, it is worth noting that in this
+short period six great battles took place between fleets numbering
+as a rule from 70 to 120 ships on a side. By comparison it may be
+remarked that at Trafalgar the total British force numbered 27
+ships of the line and the Allies, 33. Nor were the men of war of
+Blake and Tromp the small types of an earlier day. In 1652 the
+ship of the line had become the unit of the fleet as truly as it
+was in 1805. It is true that Blake's ships were not the equal of
+Nelson's huge "first rates," because the "two-decker" was then
+the most powerful type. The first three-decker in the English navy
+was launched in the year of Blake's death, 1657. The fact remains,
+however, that these fleet actions of the Dutch Wars took place
+on a scale unmatched by any of the far better known engagements
+of the 18th or early 19th century.
+
+A curious naval weapon survived from the day when Howard drove
+Medina Sidonia from Calais roads, the fireship, or "brander." This
+was used by both English and Dutch. Its usefulness, of course, was
+confined to the side that held the windward position, and even
+an opponent to leeward could usually, if he kept his head, send
+out boats to grapple and tow the brander out of harm's way. In the
+battle of Scheveningen, however, Dutch fireships cost the English
+two fine ships, together with a Dutch prize, and very nearly destroyed
+the old flagship of Blake, the _Triumph_. She was saved only by
+the extraordinary exertions of her captain, who received mortal
+injury from the flames he fought so courageously.
+
+This First Dutch War is interesting in what it reveals of the advance
+in tactics. Tromp well deserves his title as the "Father of Naval
+Tactics," and he undoubtedly taught Blake and Monk a good deal by
+the rough schooling of battle, but they proved apt pupils. From
+even the brief summary of these great battles just given, it is
+evident that Dutch and English did not fight each other in helter
+skelter fashion. In fact, there is revealed a great advance in
+coördination over the work of the English in the campaign of the
+Armada. These fleets worked as units. This does not mean that they
+were not divided into squadrons. A force of 100 ships of the line
+required division and subdivision, and considerable freedom of
+movement was left to division and squadron commanders under the
+general direction of the commander in chief, but they were all
+working consciously together. Just as at Trafalgar Nelson formed
+his fleet in two lines (originally planned as three) and allowed
+his second in command a free hand in carrying out the task assigned
+him, so Tromp and Blake operated their fleets in squadrons--Tromp
+usually had five--and expected of their subordinates responsibility
+and initiative. All this is in striking contrast with the practice
+that paralyzed tactics in the latter 17th and 18th centuries, which
+sacrificed everything to a rigid line of battle in column ahead,
+and required every movement to emanate from the commander in chief.
+
+Although details about the great battles of the First Dutch War
+are scanty, there is enough recorded to show that both sides used
+the line ahead as the normal battle line. It is equally clear,
+however, that they repeatedly broke through each other's lines
+and aimed at concentration, or destroying in detail. These two
+related principles, which had to be rediscovered toward the end of
+the 18th century, were practiced by Tromp, de Ruyter, and Blake.
+Their work has not the advantage of being as near our day as the
+easy, one-sided victories over the demoralized French navy in the
+Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, but the day may come when the
+British will regard the age of Blake as the naval epoch of which
+they have the most reason to be proud. Then England met the greatest
+seamen of the day led by one of the greatest admirals of history
+and won a bitterly fought contest by virtue of better ships and
+the spirit of Cromwell's "Ironsides."
+
+_Porto Farina and Santa Cruz_
+
+Nor did the age of Blake end with the First Dutch War. As soon
+as the admiral was able to go aboard ship, Cromwell sent him with
+a squadron into the Mediterranean to enforce respect for the
+Commonwealth from the Italian governments and the Barbary states.
+He conducted his mission with eminent success. Although the Barbary
+pirates did not course the sea in great fleets as in the palmy
+days of Barbarossa, they were still a source of peril to Christian
+traders. Blake was received civilly by the Dey of Algiers but
+negotiations did not result satisfactorily. At Tunis he was openly
+flouted. The Pasha drew up his nine cruisers inside Porto Farina
+and defied the English admiral to do his worst. Blake left for a
+few days to gain the effect of surprise and replenish provisions.
+On April 4, 1655, he suddenly reappeared and stood in to the attack.
+
+The harbor of Porto Farina was regarded as impregnable. The entrance
+was narrow and the shores lined with castles and batteries. As Blake
+foresaw, the wind that took him in would roll the battle smoke upon
+the enemy. In a short time he had silenced the fire of the forts
+and then sent boarding parties against the Tunisian ships, which
+were speedily taken and burnt. Then he took his squadron out again,
+having destroyed the entire Tunisian navy, shattered the forts, and
+suffered only a trifling loss. This exploit resounded throughout
+the Mediterranean. Algiers was quick to follow Tunis in yielding
+to Blake's demands. It is characteristic of this officer that he
+should have made the attack on Tunis entirely without orders from
+Cromwell, and it is equally characteristic of the latter that he
+was heartily pleased with the initiative of his admiral in carrying
+out the spirit rather than the letter of his instructions.
+
+Meanwhile Cromwell had been wavering between a war against France
+or Spain. The need of a capture of money perhaps influenced him to
+turn against Spain, for this country still drew from her western
+colonies a tribute of gold and silver, which naturally would fall a
+prey to the power that controlled the sea. One month after Blake's
+exploit at Tunis, another English naval expedition set out to the
+West Indies to take Santo Domingo. Although Jamaica was seized and
+thereafter became an English possession, the expedition as a whole
+was a disgraceful failure, and the leaders, Penn and Venables, were
+promptly clapped by Cromwell into the Tower on their return. This
+stroke against Spain amounted to a declaration of war, and on Blake's
+return to England he was ordered to blockade Cadiz. One detachment
+of the plate fleet fell into the hands of his blockading ships and
+the silver ingots were dispatched to London. Blake continued his
+blockade in an open roadstead for six months, through autumn and
+winter, an unheard of thing in those days and exceedingly difficult.
+Blake was himself ill, his ships were not the copper-bottomed ones
+of a hundred years later, and there was not, as in later days, an
+English base at Gibraltar. But he never relaxed his vigilance.
+
+In April (1657) he learned that another large plate fleet had arrived
+at Santa Cruz, Teneriffe. Immediately he sailed thither to take or
+destroy it. If Porto Farina had been regarded as safe from naval
+attack, Santa Cruz was far more so. A deep harbor, with a narrow,
+funnel entrance, and backed by mountains, it is liable to dead
+calms or squally bursts of wind from the land. In addition to its
+natural defenses it was heavily fortified. Blake, however, reckoned
+on coming in with a flowing tide and a sea breeze that, as at Porto
+Farina, would blow his smoke upon the defenses. He rightly guessed
+that if he sailed close enough under the castles at the harbor
+entrance their guns could not be sufficiently depressed to hit
+his ships, and as he saw the galleons and their escorts lined up
+along the shore he perceived also that they were masking the fire
+of their own shore batteries. For the most difficult part of his
+undertaking, the exit from the harbor, he trusted to the ebbing
+tide with the chance of a shift in the wind in his favor.
+
+Early on the morning of April 20th (1657) he sailed in. As he had
+judged, the fire of the forts did little damage. By eight o'clock
+the English ships were all at their appointed stations and fighting.
+During the entire day Blake continued his work of destruction till
+it was complete, and at dusk drifted out on the ebb. Some writers
+mention a favoring land breeze that helped to extricate the English,
+but according to Blake's own words, "the wind blew right into the
+bay." In spite of this head wind the ships that were crippled were
+warped or towed out and not one was lost. The English suffered
+in the entire action only 50 killed and 120 wounded, and repairs
+were so easily made that Blake returned to his blockading station
+at once.
+
+This was the greatest of Blake's feats as it also was his last.
+All who heard of it--friend or enemy--pronounced it as without
+parallel in the history of ships. A few months later Blake was
+given leave to return home. He had long been a sick man, but his
+name alone was worth a fleet and Cromwell had not been able to spare
+him. As it happened, he did not live long enough to see England
+again. Cromwell, who knew the worth of his faithful admiral, gave
+him a funeral of royal dignity and interment in Westminster Abbey.
+
+Blake never showed, perhaps, great strategic insight--Tromp and
+de Ruyter were his superiors there, as was also Nelson--but he,
+more than any other, won for England her mastery of the sea, and
+no other can boast his record of great victories. These he won
+partly by skill and forethought but chiefly by intrepidity. We
+can do no better than leave his fame in the words of the Royalist
+historian, Clarendon--a political enemy--who says: "He quickly made
+himself signal there (on the sea) and was the first man who declined
+the old track ... and disproved those rules that had long been in
+practice, to keep his ships and men out of danger, which had been
+held in former times a point of great ability and circumspection,
+as if the principal requisite in the captain of a ship had been
+to come home safe again. He was the first man who brought ships
+to contemn castles on shore, which had been thought ever very
+formidable.... He was the first that infused that proportion of
+courage into the seamen by making them see what mighty things they
+could do if they were resolved, and taught them to fight in fire
+as well as on water. And though he hath been very well imitated
+and followed, he was the first that drew the copy of naval courage
+and bold resolute achievement."
+
+The chaos that followed the death of the Protector resulted in
+Monk's bringing over the exiled Stuart king--Charles II. Thereafter
+Round Head and Royalist served together in the British navy. An
+important effect of the Restoration was organization of a means of
+training the future officers of the fleet. The Navy as a profession
+may be said to date from this time, in contrast with the practice of
+using merchant skippers and army officers, which had prevailed to
+so great a degree hitherto. Under the new system "young gentlemen"
+were sent to sea as "King's Letter Boys"--midshipmen--to learn
+the ways of the navy and to grow up in it as a preparation for
+command. This was an excellent reform but it resulted in making
+the navy the property of a social caste from that day to this,
+and it made promotion, for a century and more, largely subject to
+family influence.
+
+Another effect of the Restoration was to break down the fighting
+efficiency of the fleet as it had been in the days of Blake. The
+veterans of the First Dutch War fought with their old time courage
+and discipline, but the newer elements did not show the same devotion
+and initiative. The effect on the material was still worse, for
+the fleet became a prey to the cynical dishonesty that Charles
+II inspired in every department of his government.
+
+_The Second Dutch War_
+
+Five years after Charles II became king, England was involved in
+another war with the Netherlands. There was still bad feeling between
+the two peoples, and trading companies in the far east or west
+kept up a guerilla warfare which flooded both governments with
+complaints. The chief cause seems to have been the desire of the
+English Guinea Company to get rid of their Dutch competitors who
+persistently undersold them in the slave markets of the West Indies.
+Before there was any declaration of war an English squadron was sent
+out to attack the Dutch company's settlement on the West African
+coast. After this it crossed the Atlantic and took New Amsterdam,
+which thereafter became New York. The Dutch retaliated by sending
+out one of their squadrons to retake their African post and threaten
+the Atlantic colonies. In March, 1665, war was declared.
+
+In this conflict the relative strengths of the two navies were about
+the same as in the previous war. The Dutch had made improvements
+in their ships, but they still suffered from the lack of unity
+in organization and spirit. The first engagement was the battle
+of Lowestoft, on June 3, 1665. The English fleet was under the
+personal command of the Duke of York, later James II; the Dutch
+were led by de Ruyter. The two forces numbered from 80 to 100 ships
+each, and strung out as they were, must have extended over nearly
+ten miles of sea. The Duke of York formed his fleet in the pattern
+that he set by his own "Fighting Instructions," which governed the
+tactics of all navies thereafter for a hundred years, namely, the
+entire force drawn up in single line. This line bore down abreast
+toward the enemy until it reached gunshot, then swung into line
+ahead and sailed on a course parallel to that of the enemy. De
+Ruyter arranged his fleet accordingly, and the two long lines passed
+each other on opposite tacks three times, cannonading furiously
+at close range. This meant that the force was distributed evenly
+along the enemy's line and as against an evenly matched force these
+tactics could result, as a rule, only in mere inconclusive artillery
+duels which each side would claim as victories. In the battle of
+Lowestoft, however, several of the captains in the Dutch center
+flinched at the third passing and bore up to leeward, leaving a
+wide gap in de Ruyter's line. The English broke through at this
+point and hammered the weakened Dutch line in the center with a
+superior force. This was the decisive point in the battle and de
+Ruyter was forced to retreat. The Dutch would have suffered even
+greater loss than they did had it not been for the masterly fashion
+in which Cornelius Tromp--son of the famous Martin Tromp--covered
+the retreat.
+
+The defeat of the Dutch was due to the bad conduct of the captains
+in the center, four of whom were shot by order of de Ruyter and
+others dismissed from the service. It is interesting to note that
+while the first half of the battle was fought on the formal lines
+that were soon to be the cast iron rule of conduct for the British
+navy, and led to nothing conclusive; the second half was characterized
+by the breaking of the enemy's line, in the older style of Blake,
+and led to a pronounced victory.
+
+At this time Louis XIV had pledged himself to give aid to the
+Netherlands in case of attack by a third Power. But when the Dutch
+and his own ministers called on him to make good his promise he
+offered more promises and no fulfillment. The rumor of an approaching
+French squadron which was to make junction with de Ruyter, who had
+now been placed in command of the Dutch fleet, caused the English
+government to make the grave mistake of detaching Prince Rupert
+with 20 ships to look for the mythical French force. This division
+left Monk, who was again in command of the fleet, with only 57
+ships. Hearing that de Ruyter was anchored on the Flanders coast,
+Monk went out to find him. De Ruyter left his anchorage to meet the
+English, and on June 1, 1666, the two forces met in mid-Channel,
+between Dunkirk and the Downs. As the Dutch force heavily outnumbered
+him--nearly two to one--Monk might have been expected to avoid
+fighting, but he acted in the spirit of Blake. Having the windward
+position he decided that he could strike the advanced division
+under Tromp and maul it severely before the rest of the Dutch could
+succor it. Accordingly he boldly headed for the enemy's van. When
+Monk attacked he had only about 35 ships in hand, for the rest were
+straggling behind too far to help. Thus began the famous "Four
+Days' Battle," characterized by Mahan as "the most remarkable, in
+some of its aspects that has ever been fought upon the ocean."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, p. 125.]
+
+The fighting was close and furious and in its unparalleled duration
+numbers were bound to tell. On the third day Monk retreated to
+the Thames, but on being joined by Rupert's squadron immediately
+sallied forth to do battle again. On this day, June 4, the Dutch
+succeeded in cutting through his formation and putting him between
+two fires. Indeed Monk escaped destruction only by breaking through
+his ring of enemies and finding refuge in the Thames. The Dutch had
+won a great victory, for the English had lost some twenty ships
+and 5000 in killed and wounded. But Monk was right in feeling a
+sense of pride in the fight that he had made against great odds.
+The losses that he had inflicted were out of all proportion to the
+relative strength of the two forces. Unfortunately the new spirit
+that was coming into the navy of the Restoration was evidenced by
+the fact that a number of English captains, finding the action too
+hot for them, deserted their commander in chief. On the Dutch side
+de Ruyter's handling of his fleet was complicated by the conduct
+of Cornelius Tromp. This officer believed that he, not de Ruyter,
+should have been made commander of the Dutch fleet and in this
+action as in the next, acted with no regard for his chief's orders.
+
+As a consequence of the Four Days' Battle, Dutchmen again controlled
+the Channel and closed the mouth of the Thames to trade. The English
+strained every nerve to create a fleet that should put an end to
+this humiliating and disastrous situation. The preparations were
+carried out with such speed that on July 22 (1666), Monk and Rupert
+anchored off the end of the Gunfleet shoal with a fleet of about
+80 ships of the line and frigates. On the 25th the English sighted
+de Ruyter, with a fleet slightly larger in numbers, in the broad
+part of the Thames estuary. Monk, forming his fleet in the long
+line ahead, sailed to the attack. The action that followed is called
+the "Battle of St. James's Day" or the "Gunfleet."
+
+[Illustration: THE THAMES ESTUARY]
+
+Whether or not Monk was influenced by his princely colleague it
+is impossible to say, but the tactics of this engagement do not
+suggest the Monk of earlier battles. He followed the "Fighting
+Instructions" and in spite of them won a victory, but it might
+have been far more decisive. The English bore down in line abreast,
+then formed line ahead on reaching gunshot, the van, center, and
+rear, engaging respectively the Dutch van, center, and rear. In these
+line ahead attacks the rear usually straggled. Tromp, commanding
+the Dutch rear, saw his chance to attack Smith, commanding the
+English rear, before his squadron was in proper formation. Smith
+retreated, and Tromp, eager to win a victory all by himself, abandoned
+the rest of the Dutch fleet and pursued Smith. Thus the action
+broke into two widely separated parts. The English van and center
+succeeded in forcing the corresponding Dutch divisions to retreat,
+and if Monk had turned to the help of Smith he might have taken
+or destroyed all of the 39 ships in Tromp's division. Instead,
+he and Rupert went careering on in pursuit of the enemy directly
+ahead of them. Eventually de Ruyter's ships found refuge in shallow
+water and then Monk turned to catch Tromp. But the latter proved too
+clever for his adversaries and slipped between them to an anchorage
+alongside of de Ruyter.
+
+Although the victory was not nearly so decisive as it should have
+been with the opportunity offered, nevertheless it served the need
+of the hour. De Ruyter was no longer able to blockade the Thames and
+the Straits of Dover. And Monk, following up his success, carried
+the war to the enemy's coast, where he burned a merchant fleet
+of 160 vessels in the roadstead of the island of Terschelling,
+and destroyed one of the towns. Early in 1666 active operations
+on both sides dwindled down, and Charles, anxious to use naval
+appropriations for other purposes, allowed the fleet to fall into
+a condition of unreadiness for service. One of the least scandals in
+this corrupt age was the unwillingness or inability of the officials
+to pay the seamen their wages. In consequence large numbers of
+English prisoners in Holland actually preferred taking service
+in the Dutch navy rather than accepting exchange, on the ground
+that the Dutch government paid its men while their own did not.
+
+Early in June, 1667, de Ruyter took advantage of the condition of
+the English fleet by inflicting perhaps the greatest humiliation on
+England that she has ever suffered. Entering the Thames unopposed,
+he was prevented from attacking London only by unfavorable wind and
+tide. He then turned his attention to the dockyards of Chatham and
+burnt or captured seven great ships of the line, besides numerous
+smaller craft, carried off the naval stores at Sheerness, and then
+for the next six weeks kept a blockade on the Thames and the eastern
+and southern coasts of England. This mortifying situation continued
+until the signing of the "Peace of Breda" concluded the war.
+
+_The Third Dutch War_
+
+Less than five years later Charles again made war on the Netherlands.
+For this there was not the shadow of excuse, but Louis XIV saw
+fit to attack the Dutch, and Charles was ever his willing vassal.
+The English began hostilities without any declaration of war by
+a piratical attack on a Dutch convoy.
+
+At this juncture Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Attacked
+on her land frontiers by France, then the dominating military power,
+and on her sea frontiers by England, the strongest naval power, she
+seemed to have small chance to survive. But her people responded
+with a heroism worthy of her splendid history. They opened their
+dykes to check the armies of invasion and strained every nerve to
+equip a fleet large enough to cope with the combined navies of
+France and England. In this Third Dutch War four great naval battles
+were fought: that of Solebay, May 28, 1672, the two engagements
+off Schooneveldt, May 28 and June 4, 1673, and that of the Texel,
+August 11, 1673.
+
+In all of these the honors go to the Dutch and their great admiral,
+de Ruyter. Since these actions did not restore the Netherlands to
+their old-time position or check the ascendancy of England, they
+need not be discussed individually here. The outstanding feature
+of the whole story is the surpassing skill and courage of de Ruyter
+in the face of overwhelming odds. In this war he showed the full
+stature of his genius as never before, and won his title as the
+greatest seaman of the 17th century. After his death one must wait
+till the day of Suffren and Nelson to find men worthy to rank with
+him.
+
+In this campaign de Ruyter showed his powers not only as a tactician
+but as a strategist. In the words of Mahan, the Dutch "made a strategic
+use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based their
+sea operations. To this they were forced by the desperate odds under
+which they were fighting; but they did not use their shoals as a
+mere shelter,--the warfare they waged was the defensive-offensive.
+When the wind was fair for the allies to attack, de Ruyter kept
+under cover of his islands, or at least on ground where the enemy
+dared not follow; but when the wind served so that he might attack
+in his own way he turned and fell upon them."[1] That is, instead of
+accepting the tame rôle of a "fleet in being" and hiding in a safe
+harbor, de Ruyter took and held the sea, always on the aggressive,
+always alert to catch his enemy in a position of divided forces
+or exposed flank and strike hard. His master, Martin Tromp, is
+regarded as the father of the line ahead formation for battle, but
+he undoubtedly taught de Ruyter its limitations as well as its
+advantages, and there is no trace of the stupid formalism of the
+Duke of York's regulations in de Ruyter's brilliant work.
+
+[Footnote 1: INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, p. 144.]
+
+At this time he had no worthy opponent. As Monk was dead, the Duke of
+York had again assumed active command with Rupert as his lieutenant.
+Although the Duke was honestly devoted to the navy he was dull-witted,
+and in spite of the advantage of numbers and the dogged courage of
+officers and men which so often in English history has made up for
+stupid leadership, he was wholly unable to cope with de Ruyter's
+genius. As for the French navy, their ships were superb, the best
+in Europe, but their officers had no experience and apparently
+small desire for close fighting. At all events, despite the odds
+against him, de Ruyter defeated the allies in all four battles,
+prevented their landing an army of invasion, and broke up their
+attempt to blockade the coast.
+
+The war was unpopular in England and as it met with ill success
+it became more so. After the battle of the Texel, in 1673, active
+operations died down to practically nothing, and at the beginning
+of the year England made peace. By this time Holland had managed
+to find other allies on the Continent--Spain and certain German
+states--and while she had to continue her struggle against Louis
+XIV by land she was relieved of the menace of her great enemy on
+the sea. Fifteen years later, by a curious freak of history, a
+Dutch prince became King William III of England, and the two old
+enemies became united in alliance. But the Netherlands had exhausted
+themselves by their protracted struggle. They had saved their
+independence, but after the close of the 17th century they ceased
+to be a world power of any consequence.
+
+The persistent enmity of the French king for the Dutch gained nothing
+for France but everything for England. Unwittingly he poured out his
+resources in money and men to the end that England should become
+the great colonial and maritime rival of France. As a part of her
+spoils England had gained New York and New Jersey, thus linking her
+northern and southern American colonies, and she had taken St. Helena
+as a base for her East Indies merchantmen. She had tightened her
+hold in India, and by repeatedly chastising the Barbary pirates had
+won immunity for her traders in the Mediterranean. At the beginning
+of the Second Dutch War Monk had said with brutal frankness, "What
+matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade
+which the Dutch have." This, the richest prize of all, fell from
+the hands of the Dutch into those of the English. During the long
+drawn war which went on after the English peace of 1674, while
+Holland with her allies fought against Louis XIV, the great bulk
+of the Dutch carrying trade passed from the Dutch to the English
+flag. The close of the 17th century, therefore, found England fairly
+started on her career as an ocean empire, unified by sea power.
+Her navy, despite the vices it had caught from the Stuart régime,
+had become firmly established as a permanent institution with a
+definite organization. By this time every party recognized its
+essential importance to England's future.
+
+Nevertheless, whatever satisfaction may be felt by men of English
+speech in this rapid growth of England's power and prestige as
+a result of the three wars with the Dutch, one cannot avoid the
+other side of the picture. A people small in numbers but great
+in energy and genius was hounded to the point of extinction by
+the greed of its powerful neighbors. Peace-loving, asking merely
+to be let alone, the only crime of the Dutch was to excite the
+envy of the English and the French.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+See next chapter, page 221.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER [_Continued_]. WARS WITH FRANCE TO THE
+FRENCH REVOLUTION
+
+The effect of the expulsion of James II from the throne of England
+coupled with the accession of the Dutch prince, William of Orange,
+was to make England change sides and take the leadership in the
+coalition opposed to Louis XIV. From this time on, for over 125
+years, England was involved in a series of wars with France. They
+began with the threat of Louis to dominate Europe and ended with
+the similar threat on the part of Napoleon. In all this conflict
+the sea power of England was a factor of paramount importance. Even
+when the fighting was continental rather than naval, the ability
+of Great Britain to cut France off from her overseas possessions
+resulted in the transfer of enormous tracts of territory to the
+British Empire. During the 18th century, the territorial extent
+of the expire grew by leaps and bounds, with the single important
+loss of the American colonies. And even this brought no positive
+advantage to France for it did not weaken her adversary's grip
+on the sea.
+
+_The War of the League of Augsburg_
+
+The accession of William III was the signal for England's entry
+into the war of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) against France,
+and the effort of the French king to put James II back again upon
+the English throne. By this time the French navy had been so greatly
+strengthened that at the outset it outnumbered the combined fleets of
+the English and the Dutch. It boasted the only notable admiral of this
+period, Tourville, but it missed every opportunity to do something
+decisive. It failed to keep William from landing in England with an
+army; it failed also to keep the English from landing and supplying
+an army in Ireland, where they raised the siege of Londonderry and
+won the decisive victory of the Boyne. On the other hand the British
+navy was handled with equal irresolution and blindness in strategy.
+It accomplished what it did in keeping communications open with
+Ireland through the mistakes of the French, and its leaders seemed
+to be equally unaware of the importance of winning definitely the
+control of the sea.
+
+[Illustration: THREE-DECKED SHIP OF THE LINE, 18TH CENTURY]
+
+If the naval strategy on both sides was feeble the tactics were
+equally so. The contrast between the fighting of Blake, Monk, Tromp
+and de Ruyter and that of the admirals of this period is striking.
+For example, on May 1, 1689, the English admiral Herbert and the
+French admiral Châteaurenault fought an indecisive action in Bantry
+Bay, Ireland. After considerable powder had been shot away without
+the loss of a ship on either side, the French went back to protect
+their transports in the bay; Herbert also withdrew, and was made
+Earl of Torrington for his "victory." This same officer commanding
+a Dutch and English fleet encountered the French under Tourville
+off Beachy Head on the south coast of England (July 10, 1690).
+It is true that Tourville's force was stronger, but Torrington
+acted with no enterprise and was thoroughly beaten. At the same
+time the French admiral showed lack of push in following up his
+victory, which might have been crushing. By this time the line
+ahead order of fighting had become a fetich on both sides. The
+most noted naval battle of this war is that of La Hogue (May 29,
+1692), which has been celebrated as a great British victory. In
+this action an allied fleet of 99 were opposed to a French fleet
+of 44 under Tourville. Tourville offered battle under such odds
+only because he had imperative orders from his king to fight the
+enemy. During the action the French did not lose a single ship, but
+in the four days' retreat the vessels became separated in trying
+to find shelter and fifteen were destroyed or taken. This was a
+severe blow to the the French navy but by no means decisive. The
+subsequent inactivity of the fleet was due to the demands of the
+war on land.
+
+As the war became more and more a continental affair, Louis was
+compelled to utilize all his resources for his military campaigns.
+For this reason the splendid fleet with which he had begun the
+war gradually disappeared from the sea. Some of these men of war
+were lent to great privateersmen like Jean Bart and Du Guay Trouin,
+who took out powerful squadrons of from five to ten ships of the
+line, strong enough to overcome the naval escorts of a British
+convoy, and ravaged English commerce. In this matter of protecting
+shipping the naval strategy was as vacillating and blind as in
+everything else. Nevertheless no mere commerce destroying will
+serve to win the control of the sea, and despite the losses in
+trade and the low ebb to which English naval efficiency had sunk,
+the British flag still dominated the ocean routes while the greater
+part of the French fleet rotted in port.
+
+In this war of the League of Augsburg, Louis XIV was fighting
+practically all Europe, and the strain was too great for a nation
+already weakened by a long series of wars. By the terms of peace
+which he found himself obliged to accept, he lost nearly everything
+that he had gained by conquest during his long reign.
+
+_Wars of the Spanish and the Austrian Succession_
+
+After a brief interval of peace war blazed out again over the question
+whether a French Bourbon should be king of Spain,--the War of the
+Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. England's aim in this war was to
+acquire some of the Spanish colonies in America and to prevent
+any loss of trading privileges hitherto enjoyed by the English
+and the Dutch. But as it turned out nothing of importance was
+accomplished in the western hemisphere except by the terms of peace.
+The French and Spanish attempted no major operations by sea. But
+the English navy captured Minorca, with its important harbor of
+Port Mahon, and Rooke, with more initiative than he had ever shown
+before in his career, took Gibraltar (August 4, 1704). These two
+prizes made Great Britain for the first time a Mediterranean power,
+and the fact that she held the gateway to the inland sea was of
+great importance in subsequent naval history.
+
+In addition to these captures the terms of peace (the Treaty of
+Utrecht) yielded to England from the French Newfoundland, the Hudson
+Bay territory, and Nova Scotia. All that the French had left on the
+eastern coast of Canada was Cape Breton Island, with Louisburg,
+which was the key to the St. Lawrence. As for commercial privileges,
+England had gained from the Portuguese, who had been allies in
+the war, a practical monopoly of their carrying trade; and from
+France she had taken the entire monopoly of the slave trade to
+the Spanish American colonies which had been formerly granted by
+Spain to France. Holland got nothing out of the war as affecting
+her interests at sea,--not even a trading post. Her alliance with
+Great Britain had become as some one has called it, that of "the
+giant and the dwarf." At the conclusion of the War of the Spanish
+Succession, to quote the words of Mahan, "England was _the_ sea
+power; there was no second."
+
+In this war as in the preceding, French privateersmen made great
+inroads on British commerce, and some of these privateering operations
+were conducted on a grand scale. For example, Du Guay Trouin took
+a squadron of six ships of the line and two frigates, together
+with 2000 troops, across the Atlantic and attacked Rio Janeiro.
+He had little difficulty in forcing its submission and extorting
+a ransom of $400,000. The activities of the privateers led to a
+clause in the treaty of peace requiring the French to destroy the
+fortifications of the port of Dunkirk, which was notorious as the
+nest of these corsairs.
+
+The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748, was another of the
+dynastic quarrels of this age, with France and Spain arrayed against
+England. It has no naval interest for our purposes here. The peace
+of 1748, however, leaving things exactly as they were when the war
+began, settled none of the existing grudge between Great Britain
+and France. Eight years later, hostilities began again in the Seven
+Years' War, 1756-1763, in which Great Britain entered on the side
+of Prussia against a great coalition of Continental powers headed
+by France.
+
+_The Seven Years' War_
+
+The naval interest of this war is centered in the year 1759, when
+France, having lost Louisburg on account of England's control of
+the sea, decided to concentrate naval and military forces on an
+invasion of England. Before the plans for this projected thrust
+were completed, Quebec also had fallen to the British. The attempted
+invasion of 1759 is not so well known as that of Napoleon in 1805,
+but it furnished the pattern that Napoleon copied and had a better
+chance of success than his. In brief, a small squadron under the
+famous privateer Thurot was to threaten the Scotch and Irish coasts,
+acting as a diversion to draw off the British fleet. Meanwhile
+the squadron at Toulon was to dodge the British off that port,
+pass the Straits and join Conflans, who had the main French fleet
+at Brest. The united forces were then to cover the crossing of
+the troops in transports and flatboats to the English coast.
+
+This plan was smashed by Admiral Hawke in one of the most daring
+feats in British naval annals. Thurot got away but did not divert
+any of the main force guarding the Channel. The Toulon fleet also
+eluded the English for a time but went to pieces outside the Straits
+largely on account of mismanagement on the part of its commander.
+The remnants were either captured or driven to shelter in neutral
+ports by the English squadron under Boscawen. On November 9, a
+heavy gale and the necessities of the fleet compelled Hawke to lift
+his blockade of Brest and take shelter in Torbay, after leaving
+four frigates to watch the port. On the 14th, Conflans, discovering
+that his enemy was gone, came out, with the absurd idea of covering
+the transportation of the French army before Hawke should appear
+again. That very day Hawke returned to renew the blockade, and
+learning that Conflans had been seen heading southeast, decided
+rightly that the French admiral was bound for Quiberon Bay to make
+an easy capture of a small British squadron there under Duff before
+beginning the transportation of the invading army.
+
+For five days pursuer and pursued drifted in calms. On the 19th
+a stiff westerly gale enabled Hawke to overtake Conflans, who was
+obliged to shorten sail for fear of arriving at his destination in
+the darkness. The morning of the 20th found the fleets in sight
+of each other but scattered. All the forenoon the rival admirals
+made efforts to gather their units for battle. A frigate leading
+the British pursuit fired signal guns to warn Duff of the enemy's
+presence, and the latter, cutting his cables, was barely able to
+get out in time to escape the French fleet and join Hawke. Conflans
+then decided that the English were too strong for him, and abandoning
+his idea of offering battle, signaled a general retreat and led
+the way into Quiberon Bay.
+
+Hawke instantly ordered pursuit. The importance of this signal
+can be realized only by taking into account the tremendous gale
+blowing and the exceedingly dangerous character of the approach to
+Quiberon Bay, lined as it was with sunken rocks. Hawke had little
+knowledge of the channels but he reasoned that where a French ship
+could go an English one could follow, and the perils of the entry
+could not outweigh in his mind the importance of crushing the navy
+of France then and there. The small British superiority of numbers
+which Conflans feared was greatly aggravated by the conditions
+of his flight. The slower ships in his rear were crushed by the
+British in superior force and the English coming alongside the
+French on their lee side were able to use their heaviest batteries
+while the French, heeled over by the gale, had to keep their lowest
+tier of ports closed for fear of being sunk. One of their ships tried
+the experiment of opening this broadside and promptly foundered.
+
+Darkness fell on a scene of wild confusion. Two of the British
+vessels were lost on a reef, but daylight revealed the fact that
+the French had scattered in all directions. Only five of their
+ships had been destroyed and one taken, but the organization and
+the morale were completely shattered. The idea of invasion thus
+came to a sudden end in Quiberon Bay. The daring and initiative
+of Hawke in defying weather and rocks in his pursuit of Conflans
+is the admirable and significant fact of this story, for the actual
+fighting amounted to little. It is the sort of thing that marked
+the spirit of the Dutch Wars and of Blake at Santa Cruz, and is
+strikingly different from the tame and stupid work of other admirals,
+English or French, in his own day.
+
+The Seven Years' War ended in terms of the deepest humiliation
+for France--a "Carthaginian peace." She was compelled to renounce
+to England all of Canada with the islands of the St. Lawrence, the
+Ohio valley and the entire area east of the Mississippi except
+New Orleans. Spain, which had entered the war on the side of France
+in 1761, gave up Florida in exchange for Havana, captured by the
+English, and in the West Indies several of the Lesser Antilles
+came under the British flag. It is hardly necessary to point out
+that the loss of these overseas possessions on such a tremendous
+scale was due to the ability of the British navy to cut the
+communications between them and the mother country.
+
+Naval administration in England at this time was corrupt, and the
+admirals, with the notable exception of Hawke, were lacking in
+enterprise; they were still slaves to the "Fighting Instructions."
+But in all these respects the French were far worse, and the British
+government never lost sight of the immense importance of sea power.
+Its strategy was sound.
+
+_The War of American Independence_
+
+The peace of 1763 was so humiliating that every patriotic Frenchman
+longed for the opportunity of revenge. This offered itself in the
+revolt of the American colonies against the North Ministry in 1775.
+From the outset French neutrality as regards the American rebels
+was most benevolent; nothing could be more pleasing to France than
+to see her old enemy involved in difficulties with the richest and
+most populous of her colonies. For the first two or three years
+France gave aid surreptitiously, but after the capture of Burgoyne
+in 1777, she decided to enter the war openly and draw in allies
+as well. She succeeded in enlisting Spain in 1779 and Holland the
+year following. The entrance of the latter was of small military
+value, perhaps, but at all events France so manipulated the rebellion
+in the colonies as to bring on another great European war. In this
+conflict for the first time she had no enemies to fight on the
+Continent; hence she was free to throw her full force upon the
+sea, attacking British possessions in every quarter of the world.
+The War of the American Revolution became therefore a maritime war,
+the first since the conflicts with the Dutch in the 17th century.
+
+While Paul Jones was in Paris waiting for his promised command,
+he forwarded to the Minister of Marine a plan for a rapid descent
+in force on the American coast. If his plan had been followed and
+properly executed the war might have been ended in America at one
+blow. But this project died in the procrastination and red tape of
+the Ministry of Marine, and a subsequent proposal for an attack
+on Liverpool dwindled into the mere commerce-destroying cruise
+which is memorable only for Jones's unparalleled fight with the
+_Serapis_. Eventually the navy of France was thrown into the balance
+to offset that of Great Britain, and it is largely to this fact
+that the United States owes its independence; men and munitions
+came freely from overseas and on one momentous occasion, the Battle
+of the Virginia Capes, the French navy performed its part decisively
+in action. But on a score of other occasions it failed pitiably on
+account of the lack of a comprehensive strategic plan and the want
+of energy and experience on the part of the commanding officers.
+
+It is true that the French navy had made progress since the Seven
+Years' War. In 1778, it possessed 80 good line of battle ships.
+To this force, a year later, Spain was able to contribute nearly
+sixty. But England began the war with 150. Thus even if the French
+and Spanish personnel had been as well trained and as energetic
+as the British they would have had a superior force to contend
+with, particularly as the allied fleet was divided between the
+ports of Spain and France, and under dual command. But in efficiency
+the French and Spanish navies were vastly inferior to the British.
+Spanish efficiency may be dismissed at the outset as worthless. For
+the French officer the chief requisite was nobility of birth. The
+aristocracy of England furnished the officers for its service also,
+but in the French navy, considerations of social grade outweighed
+those of naval rank, a condition that never obtained in the British.
+In consequence, discipline--the principle of subordination animated
+by the spirit of team work--was conspicuously wanting in the French
+fleets. Individual captains were more concerned about their own
+prerogatives than about the success of the whole. This condition
+is illustrated by the conduct of the captains under Suffren in
+the Bay of Bengal, where the genius of the commander was always
+frustrated by the wilfulness of his subordinates. Finally in the
+matter of tactics the French were brought up on a fatally wrong
+theory, that of acting on the defensive, of avoiding decisive action,
+of saving a fleet rather than risking it for the sake of victory.
+Hence, though they were skilled in maneuvering, and ahead of the
+British in signaling, though their ships were as fine as any in
+the world, this fatal error of principle prevented their taking
+advantage of great opportunities and sent them to certain defeat
+in the end.
+
+Thus it is clear that the sea power of France and Spain was not
+formidable if the English had taken the proper course of strategy.
+This should have been to bottle up French and Spanish fleets in
+their own ports from Brest to Cadiz. Such a policy would have left
+enough ships to attend to the necessities of the army in America
+and the pursuit of French and American privateers, and accomplished
+the primary duty of preventing the arrival of French squadrons and
+French troops on the scene of war. Here the British government
+made its fatal mistake. Instead of concentrating on the coast of
+France and Spain, it tried to defend every outlying post where
+the flag might be threatened. Thus the superior English fleet was
+scattered all over the world, from Calcutta to Jamaica, while the
+French fleets came and went at will, sending troops and supplies
+to America and challenging the British control of the sea. Had the
+French navy been more efficient and energetic in its leadership
+France might have made her ancient enemy pay far more dearly for
+her strategic blunder. As it was, England lost her colonies in
+America.
+
+Instead of the swift stroke on the American coast which Paul Jones
+had contemplated, a French fleet under d'Estaing arrived in the
+Delaware about five months after France had entered the war and
+after inexcusable delays on the way. In spite of the loss of precious
+time he had an opportunity to beat an inferior force under Howe
+at New York and seize that important British base, but his
+characteristic timidity kept him from doing anything there. From
+the American coast he went to the West Indies, where he bungled
+every opportunity of doing his duty. He allowed St. Lucia to fall
+into British hands and failed to capture Grenada. Turning north
+again, he made a futile attempt to retake Savannah, which had fallen
+to the English. Then at the end of 1779, at about the darkest hour
+of the American cause, he returned to France, leaving the colonists
+in the lurch. D'Estaing was by training an infantry officer, and
+his appointment to such an important naval command is eloquent of
+the effect of court influence in demoralizing the navy. "S'il avait
+été aussi marin que brave," was the generous remark of Suffren on
+this man. It is true that on shore, where he was at home, d'Estaing
+was personally fearless, but as commander of a fleet, where he was
+conscious of inexperience, he showed timidity that should have
+brought him to court martial.
+
+In March, 1780, the French fleet in the West Indies was put under
+the command of de Guichen, a far abler man than d'Estaing, but
+similarly indoctrinated with the policy of staying on the defensive.
+His rival on the station was Rodney, a British officer of the old
+school, weakened by years and illness, but destined to make a name
+for himself by his great victory two years later. In many respects
+Rodney was a conservative, and in respect to an appetite for prize
+money he belonged to the 16th century, but his example went a long
+way to cure the British navy of the paralysis of the Fighting
+Instructions and bring back the close, decisive fighting methods
+of Blake and de Ruyter.
+
+In this same year in which Rodney took command of the West Indies
+station, a Scotch gentleman named Clerk published a pamphlet on
+naval tactics which attracted much attention. It is a striking
+commentary on the lack of interest in the theory of the profession
+that no British naval officer had ever written on the subject. This
+civilian, who had no military training or experience, worked out
+an analysis of the Fighting Instructions and came to the conclusion
+that the whole conception of naval tactics therein contained was
+wrong, that decisive actions could be fought only by concentrating
+superior forces on inferior. One can imagine the derision heaped
+on the landlubber who presumed to teach admirals their business,
+but there was no dodging the force of his point. Of course the
+mathematical precision of his paper victories depended on the enemy's
+being passive while the attack was carried out, but fundamentally
+he was right. The history of the past hundred years showed the
+futility of an unbroken line ahead, with van, center, and rear
+attempting to engage the corresponding divisions of the enemy.
+Decisive victories could be won only by close, concentrated fighting.
+It may be true, as the British naval officers asserted, that they
+were not influenced by Clerk's ideas, but the year in which his
+book appeared marks the beginning of the practice of his theory
+in naval warfare.
+
+At the time of the American Revolution the West Indies represented
+a debatable ground where British interests clashed with those of
+her enemies, France, Spain, and Holland. It was very rich in trade
+importance; in fact, about one fourth of all British commerce was
+concerned with the Caribbean. Moreover, it contained the rival
+bases for operations on the American coast. Hence it became the
+chief theater of naval activity. Rodney's business was to make the
+area definitely British in control, to protect British possessions
+and trade and to capture as much as possible of enemy possessions
+and trade. On arriving at his station in the spring of 1780, he
+sought de Guichen. The latter had shown small enterprise, having
+missed one opportunity to capture British transports and another
+to prevent the junction of Rodney's fleet with that of Parker who
+was awaiting him. Even when the junction was effected, the British
+total amounted to only 20 ships of the line to de Guichen's 22,
+and the French admiral might still have offered battle. Instead
+he followed the French strategy of his day, by lying at anchor
+at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting for the British to sail away
+and give him an opportunity to capture an island without having
+to fight for it.
+
+Rodney promptly sought him out and set a watch of frigates off
+the port. When de Guichen came out on April 15 (1780) to attend
+to the convoying of troops, Rodney was immediately in pursuit,
+and on the 17th the two fleets were in contact. Early that morning
+the British admiral signaled his plan "to attack the enemy's rear,"
+because de Guichen's ships were strung out in extended order with
+a wide gap between rear and center. De Guichen, seeing his danger,
+wore together and closed the gap. This done, he again turned northward
+and the two fleets sailed on parallel courses but out of gunshot.
+
+[Illustration: THE WEST INDIES]
+
+About eleven 0' clock, some four hours after his first signal,
+Rodney again signaled his intention to engage the enemy, and shortly
+before twelve he sent up the order, "for every ship to bear down
+and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeable to the
+21st article of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Rodney had
+intended to concentrate his ships against their _actual_ opposites at
+the time,--the rear of the French line, which was still considerably
+drawn out; but the captain of the leading ship interpreted the
+order to mean the _numerical_ opposites in the enemy's line, after
+the style of fighting provided for by the Instructions from time
+immemorial. Rodney's first signal informing the fleet that he intended
+to attack the enemy's rear meant nothing to his captain at this
+time. Accordingly he sailed away to engage the first ship in the
+French van, followed by the vessels immediately astern of him,
+and thus wrecked the plan of his commander in chief.
+
+Nothing could illustrate better the hold of the traditional style
+of fighting on the minds of naval officers than this blunder, though
+it is only fair to add that there was some excuse in the ambiguity
+Of the order. Rodney was infuriated and expressed himself with
+corresponding bitterness. He always regarded this battle as the one
+on which his fame should rest because of what it might have been
+if his subordinates had given him proper support. The interesting
+point lies in the fact that he designed to throw his whole force
+on an inferior part of the enemy's force--the principle of
+concentration. In a later and much more famous battle, as we shall
+see, Rodney departed still further from the traditional tactics
+by "breaking the line," his own as well as that of the French,
+and won a great victory.
+
+Meanwhile there occurred another operation not so creditable. Rodney
+had spent a large part of his life dodging creditors, and it was
+due to the generous loan of a French gentleman in Paris that he
+did not drag out the years of this war in the Bastille for debt.
+When Holland entered the war he saw an opportunity to make a fortune
+by seizing the island of St. Eustatius, which had been the chief
+depot in the West Indies for smuggling contraband into America.
+To this purpose he subordinated every other consideration. The
+island was an easy prize, but the quarrels and lawsuits over the
+distribution of the booty broke him down and sent him back to England
+at just the time when he was most needed in American waters, leaving
+Hood in acting command.
+
+In March, 1781, de Grasse sailed from Brest with a fleet of 26
+ships of the line and a large convoy. Five of his battleships were
+detached for service in the East, under Suffren, of whom we shall
+hear more later. The rest proceeded to the Caribbean. On arriving
+at Martinique de Grasse had an excellent opportunity to beat Hood,
+who had an inferior force; but like his predecessors, d'Estaing and
+de Guichen, he was content to follow a defensive policy, excusing
+himself on the ground of not exposing his convoy. While at Cape
+Haitien he received messages from Rochambeau and Washington urging
+his coöperation with the campaign in America. To his credit be
+it said that on this occasion he acted promptly and skillfully,
+and the results were of great moment.
+
+At this time the British had subdued Georgia and South Carolina,
+and Cornwallis was attempting to carry the conquest through North
+Carolina. In order to keep in touch with his source of supplies
+the sea, however, he was compelled to fall back to Wilmington.
+From there, under orders from General Clinton, he marched north
+to Yorktown, Virginia, where he was joined by a small force of
+infantry. Washington and Rochambeau had agreed on the necessity of
+getting the coöperation of the West Indies fleet in an offensive
+directed either at Clinton in New York or at Cornwallis at Yorktown.
+Rochambeau preferred the latter alternative, because it involved
+fewer difficulties, and the message to de Grasse was accompanied
+by a private memorandum from him to the effect that he preferred
+the Chesapeake as the scene of operations. Accordingly de Grasse
+sent the messenger frigate back with word of his intention to go to
+Chesapeake Bay. He then made skillful arrangements for the transport
+of all available troops, and set sail with every ship he could
+muster, steering by the less frequented Old Bahama Channel in order
+to screen his movement.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN]
+
+On August 30 (1781) de Grasse anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just inside
+the Chesapeake Capes, with 28 ships of the line. The two British
+guard frigates were found stupidly at anchor inside the bay; one
+was taken and the other chased up the York river. De Grasse then
+landed the troops he had brought with him, and these made a welcome
+reënforcement to Lafayette, who was then opposing Cornwallis. At
+the same time Washington was marching south to join Lafayette,
+and word had been sent to the commander of a small French squadron
+at Newport to make junction with de Grasse, bringing the siege
+artillery necessary to the operations before Yorktown. Thus the
+available farces were converging on Cornwallis in superior strength,
+and his only route for supplies and reënforcements lay by sea.
+All depended on whether the British could succeed in forcing the
+entrance to Chesapeake Bay.
+
+Hood, with 14 ships of the line, had followed on the trail of de
+Grasse, and as it happened looked into Chesapeake Bay just three
+days before the French admiral arrived. Finding no sign of the
+French, Hood sailed on to New York and joined Admiral Graves, who
+being senior, took command of the combined squadrons. As it was
+an open secret at that time that the allied operations would be
+directed at Cornwallis, Graves immediately sailed for the Capes,
+hoping on the way to intercept the Newport squadron which was known
+to be bound far the same destination. On reaching the Capes, September
+5, he found de Grasse guarding the entrance to the bay with 24 ships
+of the line, the remaining four having been detailed to block the
+mouths of the James and York rivers. To oppose this force Graves
+had only 19 ships of the line, but he did not hesitate to offer
+battle.
+
+In de Grasse's mind there were two things to accomplish: first,
+to hold the bay, and secondly, to keep the British occupied far
+enough at sea to allow the Newport squadron to slip in. Of course
+he could have made sure of both objects and a great deal more by
+defeating the British fleet in a decisive action, but that was not
+the French naval doctrine. The entrance to the Chesapeake is ten
+miles wide but the main channel lies between the southern promontory
+and a shoal called the Middle Ground three miles north of it. The
+British stood for the channel during the morning and the French,
+taking advantage of the ebbing tide at noon, cleared the bay, forming
+line of battle as they went. As they had to make several tacks to
+clear Cape Henry, the ships issued in straggling order, offering
+an opportunity for attack which Graves did not appreciate. Instead
+he went about, heading east an a course parallel to that of de
+Grasse, and holding the windward position. When the two lines were
+nearly opposite each other the British admiral ware down to attack.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, SEPT. 5, 1781
+
+(After diagram in Mahan's _Major Operations in the War of American
+Independence,_ p. 180.)]
+
+Graves's method followed the orthodox tradition exactly, and with
+the unvarying result. As the attacking fleet bore down in line ahead
+at an angle, the van of course came into action first, unsupported for
+some time by the rest. As the signal for close action was repeated,
+this angle was made sharper, and in attempting to close up the line
+several ships got bunched in such a way as to mask their fire.
+Meanwhile the rear, the seven ships under Hood, still trailing
+along in line ahead, never got into the action at all. Graves had
+signaled for "close action," but Hood chose to believe that the
+order for line ahead still held until the signal was repeated,
+whereupon he bore down. As the French turned away at the same time,
+to keep their distance, Hood contributed nothing to the fighting
+of the day. At sunset the battle ended. The British had lost 90
+killed and 246 wounded; the French, a total of 200. Several of the
+British ships were badly damaged, one of which was in a sinking
+condition and had to be burned. The two fleets continued on an
+easterly course about three miles apart, and for five days more
+the two maneuvered without fighting. Graves was too much injured by
+the first day's encounter to attack again and de Grasse was content
+to let him alone. Graves still had an opportunity to cut back and
+enter the bay, taking a position from which it would have been
+hard to dislodge him and effecting the main object of the expedition
+by holding the mouth of the Chesapeake. But this apparently did not
+occur to him. De Grasse, who had imperiled Washington's campaign
+by cruising so far from the entrance, finally returned on the 11th,
+and found that the Newport squadron had arrived safely the day
+before. When Graves saw that the French fleet was now increased to
+36 line-of-battle ships, he gave up hope of winning the bay and
+returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis to his fate. A little
+over a month later, October 19, the latter surrendered, and with
+his sword passed the last hope of subduing the American revolution.
+
+This battle of the Capes, or Lynnhaven, has never until recent
+times been given its true historical perspective, largely because
+in itself it was a rather tame affair. But as the historian Reich[1]
+observes, "battles, like men, are important not for their dramatic
+splendor but for their efficiency and consequences.... The battle
+off Cape Henry had ultimate effects infinitely more important than
+Waterloo." Certainly there never was a more striking example of
+the "influence of sea power" on a campaign. Just at the crisis of
+the American Revolution the French navy, by denying to the British
+their communications by sea, struck the decisive blow of the war.
+This was the French _revanche_ for the humiliation of 1763.
+
+[Footnote 1: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPE, p. 24.]
+
+The British failure in this action was due to a dull commander
+in chief carrying out a blundering attack based on the Fighting
+Instructions. Blame must fall also on his second in command, Hood,
+who, though a brilliant officer, certainly failed to support his
+chief properly when there was an obvious thing to do. Perhaps if
+the personal relations between the two had been more cordial Hood
+would have taken the initiative. But in those days the initiative
+of a subordinate was not encouraged, and Hood chose to stand on
+his dignity.
+
+Although the war was practically settled by the fall of Yorktown,
+it required another year or so to die out. In this final year a
+famous naval battle was fought which went far toward establishing
+British predominance in the West Indies, and which revealed something
+radically different in naval tactics from the practice of the time.
+
+In the spring of 1782, Rodney was back in command of the West Indian
+station, succeeding Hood, who continued to serve as commander of a
+division. The British base was Gros Islet Bay in Santa Lucia. De
+Grasse was at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting to transport troops
+to Santo Domingo, where other troops and ships were collected. There,
+joining with a force of Spaniards from Cuba, he was to conduct a
+campaign against Jamaica. It was Rodney's business to break up this
+plan. During a period of preparation on both sides, reënforcements
+joined the rival fleets, that of the British amounting to enough to
+give Rodney a marked superiority in numbers. Moreover his ships
+were heavier, as he had five 3-deckers to the French one, and about
+200 more guns. The superiority of speed, as well, lay with Rodney
+because more of his ships had copper sheathing. A still further
+advantage lay in the fact that he was not burdened with the problem
+of protecting convoys and transports as was de Grasse. Thus, in the
+event of conflict, the advantages lay heavily with the British.
+
+On the morning of April 8, the English sentry frigate off Fort
+Royal noted that the French were coming out, and hastened with
+the news to Rodney at Santa Lucia. The latter put to sea at once.
+He judged rightly that de Grasse would steer for Santo Domingo, in
+order to get rid of his transports at their destination as soon
+as possible, and on the morning of the 9th he sighted the French
+off the west coast of the island of Dominica. On the approach of
+the English fleet, de Grasse signaled his transports to run to
+the northwest, while he took his fleet on a course for the channel
+between the islands of Dominica and Guadeloupe. As the British would
+be sure to pursue the fleet, this move would enable the convoy to
+escape.
+
+The channel toward which de Grasse turned his fleet is known as
+the Saints' Passage from a little group of islands, "les isles des
+Saintes," lying to the north of it. In the course of the pursuit,
+Hood, with the British van division of nine ships, had got ahead of
+the rest and offered a tempting opening for attack in superior force.
+If de Grasse had grasped his opportunity he might have inflicted a
+crushing blow on Rodney and upset the balance of superiority. But
+the lack of aggressiveness in the French doctrine was again fatal
+to French success. De Grasse merely sent his second in command
+to conduct a skirmish at long range--and thus threw his chance
+away.
+
+The light winds and baffling calms kept both fleets idle for a day.
+On the 11th de Grasse tried to work his fleet through the channel
+on short tacks. Just as he had almost accomplished his purpose he
+discovered several of his vessels still so far to westward as to
+be in danger of capture. In order to rescue these he gave up the
+fruits of laborious beating against the head wind and returned.
+The following morning, April 12 (1782), discovered the two fleets
+to the west of the strait and so near that the French could no
+longer evade battle. The French came down on the port tack and the
+British stood toward them, with their admiral's signal flying to
+"engage to leeward." When the two lines converged to close range,
+the leading British ship shifted her course slightly so as to run
+parallel with that of the French, and the two fleets sailed past each
+other firing broadsides. So far the battle had followed traditional
+line-ahead pattern.
+
+Just as the leading ship of the British came abreast of the rearmost
+of the French, the wind suddenly veered to the southward, checking
+the speed of the French ships and swinging their bows over toward
+the English line. At best a line of battle in the sailing ship
+days was an uneven straggling formation, and the effect of this
+flaw of wind, dead ahead, was to break up the French line into
+irregular groups separated by wide gaps. One of these opened up
+ahead as Rodney's flagship, the _Formidable_, forged past the French
+line. His fleet captain, Douglas, saw the opportunity and pleaded
+with Rodney to cut through the gap. "No," he replied, "I will not
+break my line." Douglas insisted. A moment later, as the _Formidable_
+came abreast of the opening, the opportunity proved too tempting
+and Rodney gave his consent. His battle signal, "engage the enemy
+to leeward," was still flying, but the _Formidable_ luffed up and
+swung through the French line followed by five others. The ship
+immediately ahead of the _Formidable_ also cut through a gap, and
+the sixth astern of the flagship went through as well, followed by
+the entire British rear. As each vessel pierced the broken line
+she delivered a terrible fire with both broadsides at close range.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, APRIL 12, 1782
+
+After diagram in Mahan's _Influence of Sea Power Upon History_,
+p. 486.]
+
+The result of this maneuver was that the British fleet found itself
+to windward of the French in three groups, while the French ships
+were scattered to leeward and trying to escape before the wind,
+leaving three dismasted hulks between the lines. An isolated group
+of six ships in the center, including de Grasse's _Ville de Paris_,
+offered a target for attack, but the wind was light and Rodney
+indolent in pursuit. Of these, one small vessel was overhauled
+and the French flagship was taken after a heroic defense, that
+lasted until sunset, against overwhelming odds. De Grasse's efforts
+to reform his fleet after his line was broken had met with failure,
+for the van fled to the southwest and the rear to the northwest,
+apparently making little effort to succor their commander in chief
+or retrieve the fortunes of the day.
+
+Rodney received a peerage for this day's work but he certainly
+did not make the most of his victory. Apparently content with the
+five prizes he had taken, together with the person of de Grasse,
+he allowed the bulk of the French fleet to escape when he had it in
+his power to capture practically all. On this point his subordinate,
+Hood, expressed himself with great emphasis:
+
+"Why he (Rodney) should bring the fleet to because the _Ville de
+Paris_ was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under easy
+sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy, in the night,
+which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled him to have
+taken almost every ship the next day.... Had I had the honor of
+commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the 12th, I may, without
+much imputation of vanity, say the flag of England should now have
+graced the sterns of _upwards_ of twenty sail of the enemy's ships
+of the line."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Quoted by Mahan, THE ROYAL NAVY (Clowes), Vol. III,
+p. 535.]
+
+Sir Charles Douglas, who had been responsible for Rodney's breaking
+the line, warmly agreed with Hood's opinion on this point. Nevertheless,
+although the victory was not half of what it might have been in younger
+hands, it proved decisive enough to shatter the naval organization
+of the French in the West Indies. It stopped the projected campaign
+against Jamaica and served to write better terms for England in
+the peace treaty of January 20, 1783.
+
+Tactically this battle has become famous for the maneuver of "breaking
+the line," contrary to the express stipulations of the Fighting
+Instructions. Certainly the move was not premeditated. Rodney may
+well be said to have been pushed into making it, and two of his
+captains made the same move on their own initiative. Indeed it
+is quite likely that, after the event, too much has been made of
+this as a piece of deliberate tactics, for the sudden shift of
+wind had paid off the bows of the French ships so that they were
+probably heading athwart the course of the British line, and the
+British move was obviously the only thing to do. But the lesson of
+the battle was clear,--the decisive effect of close fighting and
+concentrated fire. In the words of Hannay, "It marked the beginning
+of that fierce and headlong yet well calculated style of sea fighting
+which led to Trafalgar and made England undisputed mistress of the
+sea."[1] It marked, therefore, the end of the Fighting Instructions,
+which had deadened the spirit as well as the tactics of the British
+navy for over a hundred years.
+
+[Footnote 1: Rodney (ENGLISH MEN OF ACTION SERIES), p. 213.]
+
+The tactical value of "breaking the line" is well summarized by
+Mahan in the following passage:
+
+"The effect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle, depends
+upon several conditions. The essential idea is to divide the opposing
+force by penetrating through an interval found, or made, in it,
+and then to concentrate upon that one of the fractions which can
+be least easily helped by the other. In a column of ships this
+will usually be the rear. The compactness of the order attacked,
+the number of the ships cut off, the length of time during which
+they can be isolated and outnumbered, will all affect the results.
+A very great factor in the issue will be the moral effect, the
+confusion introduced into a line thus broken. Ships coming up toward
+the break are stopped, the rear doubles up, while the ships ahead
+continue their course. Such a moment is critical, and calls for
+instant action; but the men are rare who in an unforeseen emergency
+can see, and at once take the right course, especially if, being
+subordinates, they incur responsibility. In such a scene of confusion
+the English, without presumption, hoped to profit by their better
+seamanship; for it is not only 'courage and devotion,' but skill,
+which then tells. All these effects of 'breaking the line' received
+illustration in Rodney's great battle in 1782."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, pp. 380-381.]
+
+Before we leave the War of American Independence mention should
+be made of Commodore Suffren who, as we have seen, left de Grasse
+with five ships of the line to conduct a campaign in the Indian
+Ocean in the spring of 1781. His purpose was to shake the British
+hold on India, which had been fastened by the genius of Clive in
+the Seven Years' War. But the task given to Suffren was exceedingly
+difficult. His squadron was inadequate--for instance, he had only
+two frigates for scout and messenger duty--and he had no port that
+he could use as a base in Indian waters. To conduct any campaign
+at all he was compelled to live off his enemy and capture a base.
+These were risky prospects for naval operations several thousand
+miles from home, and for the faintest hope of success required an
+energy and initiative which had never before appeared in a French
+naval commander. In addition to these handicaps of circumstance Suffren
+soon discovered that he had to deal with incorrigible slackness
+and insubordination in his captains.
+
+In spite of everything, however, Suffren achieved an amazing degree
+of success. He succeeded in living off the prizes taken from the
+British, and he took from them the port of Trincomalee for a base. He
+fought five battles off the coast of India against the British Vice
+Admiral Hughes, in only one of which was the latter the assailant,
+and in all of which Suffren bore off the honors. He was constantly
+hampered, however, by the inefficiency and insubordination of his
+captains. On four or five occasions, including an engagement at the
+Cape Verde Islands on his way to India, it was only this misconduct
+that saved the British from the crushing attack that Suffren had
+planned. Unfortunately for him his victories were barren of result,
+for the terms of peace gave nothing in India to the French which
+they had not possessed before. As Trincomalee had belonged to the
+Dutch before the British captured it, this port was turned back
+to Holland.
+
+Nevertheless Suffren deserves to be remembered both for what he
+actually accomplished under grave difficulties and what he might
+have done had he been served by loyal and efficient subordinates.
+Among all the commanders of this war he stands preeminent for naval
+genius, and this eminence is all the more extraordinary when one
+realizes that his resourcefulness, tenacity, aggressiveness, his
+contempt of the formal, parade tactics of his day, were notoriously
+absent in the rest of the French service. Such was the admiration
+felt for him by his adversaries that after the end of the war,
+when the French squadron arrived at Cape Town on its way home and
+found the British squadron anchored there, all the British officers,
+from Hughes down, went aboard the French flagship to tender their
+homage.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: "If ever a man lived who justified Napoleon's maxim
+that war is an affair not of men but of a man, it was he. It was
+by his personal merit that his squadron came to the very verge of
+winning a triumphant success. That he failed was due to the fact
+that the French Navy... was honeycombed by the intellectual and moral
+vices which were bringing France to the great Revolution--corruption,
+self-seeking, acrid class insolence, and skinless, morbid vanity."--THE
+ROYAL NAVY, David Hannay, II, 287.]
+
+Although the War of American Independence was unsuccessfully fought
+by Great Britain and she was compelled to recognize the independence
+of her rebellious colonies, she lost comparatively little else by the
+terms of peace. As we have seen, her hold in India was unchanged.
+The stubborn defense of Gibraltar throughout the war, aided by
+occasional timely relief by a British fleet, saved that stronghold
+for the English flag. To Spain England was forced to surrender
+Florida and Minorca. France got back all the West Indian islands
+she had lost, with the exception of Tobago, but gained nothing
+besides. The war therefore did not restore to France her colonial
+empire of former days or make any change in the relative overseas
+strength of the two nations. Despite the blunders of the war no
+rival sea power challenged that of Great Britain at the conclusion
+of peace.
+
+Meanwhile, just before the war and during its early years, an English
+naval officer was laying the foundation for an enormous expansion
+of the British empire in the east. This was James Cook, a man who
+owed his commission in the navy and his subsequent fame to nothing
+in family or political influence, but to sheer genius. Of humble
+birth, he passed from the merchant service into the navy and rose
+by his extraordinary abilities to the rank of master. Later he
+was commissioned lieutenant and finally attained the rank of post
+captain.[1] Such rank was hardly adequate recognition of his great
+powers, but it was unusually high for a man who was not born a
+"gentleman."
+
+[Footnote 1: Full captain's rank, held only by a captain in command
+of a vessel of at least 20 guns.]
+
+At the end of the Seven Years' War he distinguished himself, by
+his work in surveying and sounding an the coasts of Labrador and
+Newfoundland, as a man of science. In consequence, he was detailed
+to undertake expeditions for observing the transit of Venus and
+for discovering the southern continent which was supposed to exist
+in the neighborhood of the Antarctic circle. In the course of this
+work Cook practically established the geography of the southern half
+of the globe as we know it to-day. And by his skill and study of
+the subject he conquered the great enemy of exploring expeditions,
+scurvy. Thirty years before, another British naval officer, Anson,
+had taken a squadron into the Pacific and lost about three-fourths
+of his men from this disease. When the war of the American Revolution
+broke out, Cook was abroad on one of his expeditions, but the French
+and American governments issued orders to their captains not to
+molest him on account of his great service to the cause of scientific
+knowledge. Unfortunately he was killed by savages at the Sandwich
+Islands in 1779.
+
+The bearing of his work on the British empire lies chiefly in his
+careful survey of the east coast of Australia, which he laid claim
+to in the name of King George, and the circumnavigation of New
+Zealand, which later gave title to the British claim on those islands.
+Thus, while the American colonies in the west were winning their
+independence, another territory in the east, far more extensive,
+was being brought under British sway, destined in another century
+to become important dominions of the empire. The Dutch had a claim
+of priority in discovery through the early voyages of Tasman, but
+they attempted no colonization and Dutch sea power was too weak
+to make good a technical claim in the face of England's navy.
+
+Finally, when the results of a century of wars between France and
+England are summarized, we find that France had lost all her great
+domain in America except a few small islands in the West Indies.
+In brief, it is due to British control of the sea during the 18th
+century that practically all of the continent north of the Rio
+Grande is English in speech, laws, and tradition.
+
+This control of the sea exercised by England was not the gift of
+fortune. It was a prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in
+peace and hard fighting in war. France had the opportunity to wrest
+from England the control of the sea as England had won it from
+Holland, for France at the close of the 17th century dominated
+Europe. In population and in wealth she was superior to her rival.
+But the arrogance of her king kept her embroiled in futile wars on
+the Continent, with little energy left for the major issue, the
+conquest of the sea. Finally, when the war of American Independence
+left her a free hand to concentrate on her navy as against that of
+England, France lost through the fatal weakness of policy which
+corrupted all her officers with the single brilliant exception of
+Suffren. The French naval officer avoided battle on principle,
+and when he could not avoid it he accepted the defensive. To the
+credit of the English officer be it said that, as a rule, he sought
+the enemy and took the aggressive; he had the "fighting spirit."
+This difference between French and British commanders had as much
+to do with the ultimate triumph of England on the sea as anything
+else. It retrieved many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer
+hard hitting.
+
+The history of the French navy points a moral applicable to any
+service and any time. When a navy encourages the idea that ships
+must not be risked, that a decisive battle must be avoided because
+of what might happen in case of defeat, it is headed for the same
+fate that overwhelmed the French.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, A. T. Mahan, 1890.
+A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, David Hannay, 1909.
+THE ROYAL NAVY (vols. II, III), W. L. Clowes et al., 1903.
+ADMIRAL BLAKE, English Men of Action Series, David Hannay, 1909.
+RODNEY, English Men of Action Series, David Hannay, 1891.
+MONK, English Men of Action Series, Julian Corbett, 1907.
+ENGLAND IN THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR, J. S. Corbett, 1907.
+THE GRAVES PAPERS, F. E. Chadwick, 1916.
+STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY, BIOGRAPHIES, J. K. Laughton, 1887.
+FROM HOWARD TO NELSON, ed. by J. K. Laughton, 1899.
+MAJOR OPERATIONS IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, A. T.
+  Mahan, 1913.
+SEA KINGS OF BRITAIN, Geoffrey Callender, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE FIRST OF JUNE AND CAMPERDOWN
+
+Ten years after the War of American Independence, British sea power
+was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with France.
+This time it was with a France whose navy, demoralized by revolution,
+was less able to dispute sea control, but whose armies, organized
+into an aggressive, empire-building force by the genius of Napoleon,
+threatened to dominate Europe, shaking the old monarchies with
+dangerous radical doctrines, and bringing all Continental nations
+into the conflict either as enemies or as allies. The dismissal
+of the French envoy from England immediately after the execution
+of Louis XVI (Jan. 21, 1793) led the French Republic a week later
+to a declaration of war, which continued with but a single
+intermission--from October, 1801, to May, 1803--through the next
+22 years.
+
+The magnitude of events on land in this period, during which French
+armies fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew kingdoms, and
+remade the map of Europe, obscures the importance of the warfare
+on the sea. Yet it was Great Britain by virtue of her navy and
+insular position that remained Napoleon's least vulnerable and
+most obstinate opponent, forcing him to ever renewed and exhausting
+campaigns, reviving continental opposition, and supporting it with
+subsidies made possible by control of sea trade. In Napoleon's own
+words the effect of this pressure is well summarized: "To live
+without ships, without trade, without colonies, is to live as no
+Frenchman can consent to do." The Egyptian campaign, conceived as
+a thrust at British sources of wealth in the East, and defeated
+at the Nile; the organization of the northern neutrals against
+England, overthrown at Copenhagen; the direct invasion of the British
+Isles, repeatedly planned and thwarted at St. Vincent, Camperdown,
+and Trafalgar; the final and most nearly successful effort to ruin
+England by closing her continental markets and thus, in Napoleon's
+phrase, "defeating the sea by the land"--these were the successive
+measures by which he sought to shake the grip of sea power.
+
+The following narrative of these events is in three divisions:
+the first dealing with the earlier engagements of the First of
+June and Camperdown, fought by squadrons based on home ports; the
+second with the war in the Mediterranean and the rise of Nelson as
+seen in the campaigns of St. Vincent, the Nile, and Copenhagen;
+the third with the Trafalgar campaign and the commercial struggle
+to which the naval side of the war was later confined. The career
+of Nelson is given an emphasis justified by his primacy among naval
+leaders and the value of his example for later times.
+
+The effect of land events in obscuring the naval side of the war,
+already mentioned, is explained not merely by their magnitude, but
+by the fact that, though Great Britain was more than once brought
+to the verge of ruin, this was a consequence not of the enemy's power
+on the sea, but of his victories on land. Furthermore, the slow
+process which ended in the downfall of Napoleon and the reduction of
+France to her old frontiers was accomplished, not so conspicuously
+by the economic pressure of sea power, as by the efforts of armies
+on battlefields from Russia to Spain. On the sea British supremacy
+was more firmly established, and the capacities of France and her
+allies were far less, than in preceding conflicts of the century.
+
+_The French Navy Demoralized_
+
+The explanation of this weakness of the French navy involves an
+interesting but somewhat perplexing study of the influences which
+make for naval growth or decay. That its ineffectiveness was due
+largely to an inferior national instinct or genius for sea warfare,
+as compared with England, is discredited by the fact that the disparity
+was less obvious in previous wars; for, as Lord Clowes has insisted,
+England won no decisive naval victory against superior forces from
+the second Dutch War to the time of Nelson. The familiar theory
+that democracy ruined the French navy will be accepted nowadays
+only with some qualifications, especially when it is remembered
+that French troops equally affected by the downfall of caste rule
+were steadily defeating the armies of monarchical powers. It is
+true, however, that navies, as compared with armies, are more
+complicated and more easily disorganized machines, and that it
+would have taxed even Napoleonic genius to reorganize the French
+navy after the neglect, mutiny, and wholesale sweeping out of trained
+personnel to which it was subjected in the first furies of revolution.
+Whatever the merits of the officers of the old régime, selected as
+they were wholly from the aristocracy and dominated by the defensive
+policy of the French service, three-fourths of them were driven out
+by 1791, and replaced by officers from the merchant service, from
+subordinate ratings, and from the crews. Suspicion of aristocracy
+was accompanied in the navy by a more fatal suspicion of skill. In
+January, 1794, the regiments of marine infantry and artillery, as
+well as the corps of seamen-gunners, were abolished on the ground
+that no body of men should have "the exclusive privilege of fighting
+the enemy at sea," and their places were filled by battalions of
+the national guard. Figures show that as a result, French gunnery
+was far less efficient than in the preceding war.
+
+The strong forces that restored discipline in the army had more
+difficulty in reaching the navy; and Napoleon's gift for discovering
+ability and lifting it to command was marked by its absence in
+his choice of leaders for the fleets. Usually he fell back on
+pessimistic veterans of the old régime like Brueys, Missiessy, and
+Villeneuve. An exception, Allemand, showed by his cruise out of
+Rochefort in 1805 what youth, energy, and daring could accomplish
+even with inferior means. Considering the importance of leadership
+as a factor in success, we may well believe that, had a French
+Nelson, or even a Suffren, been discovered in this epoch, history
+would tell a different tale. If further reasons for the decadence
+of the navy are needed, they may be found in the extreme difficulty
+of securing naval stores and timber from the Baltic, and in the
+fact that, though France had nearly three times the population of
+the British Isles, her wealth, man-power, and genius were absorbed
+in the war on land.
+
+Aside from repulsion at the violence of the French revolution and
+fear of its contagion, England had a concrete motive for war in
+the French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands and the Scheldt,
+the possession of which by an ambitious maritime nation England has
+always regarded as a menace to her safety and commercial prosperity.
+"This government," declared the British Ministry in December, 1792,
+"will never view with indifference that France shall make herself,
+directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries or general
+arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe."
+
+In prosecuting the war, Great Britain fought chiefly with her main
+weapon, the navy, leaving the land war to her allies. A contemporary
+critic remarked that she "worked with her navy and played with her
+army"; though the latter did useful service in colonial conquests
+and in Egypt, the two expeditionary forces to the Low Countries in
+1793 and 1799 were ill-managed and ineffective. The tasks of the
+fleet were to guard the British Isles from raids and invasion,
+to protect British commerce in all parts of the world, and, on
+the offensive, to seize enemy colonies, cut off enemy trade, and
+coöperate in the Mediterranean with allied armies. To accomplish
+these aims, which called for a wide dispersion of forces, the British
+naval superiority over France was barely adequate. According to
+the contemporary naval historian James, the strength of the two
+fleets at the outbreak of war was as follows:
+
+           Ships of the               Aggregate
+               line         Guns      broadsides
+------------------------------------------------
+British         115        8,718        88,957
+French           76        6,002        73,057
+
+Of her main fighting units, the ships-of-the-line, England could put
+into commission about 85, which as soon as possible were distributed
+in three main spheres of operation: in the Mediterranean and its
+western approaches, from 20 to 25; in the West Indies, from 10 to
+12; in home waters, from the North Sea to Cape Finisterre, from
+20 to 25, with a reserve of some 25 more in the home bases on the
+Channel. Though this distribution was naturally altered from time
+to time to meet changes in the situation, it gives at least an
+idea of the general disposition of the British forces throughout
+the war. France, with no suitable bases in the Channel, divided
+her fleet between the two main arsenals at Brest and Toulon, with
+minor squadrons at Rochefort and, during the Spanish alliance,
+in the ports of Spain.
+
+_Distant Operations_
+
+In the West Indies and other distant waters, France could offer
+but little effective resistance, and operations there may hence
+be dismissed briefly, but with emphasis on the benefit which naval
+control conferred upon British trade, the main guaranty of England's
+financial stability and power to keep up the war. Fully one-fifth
+of this trade was with the West Indies. Consequently, both to swell
+the volume of British commerce and protect it from privateering,
+the seizure of the French West Indian colonies--"filching the sugar
+islands," as Sheridan called it--was a very justifiable war measure,
+in spite of the scattering of forces involved. Hayti was lost to
+France as a result of the negro uprising under Toussaint l'Ouverture.
+Practically all the French Antilles changed hands twice in 1794,
+the failure of the British to hold them arising from a combination
+of yellow fever, inadequate forces of occupation, and lax blockade
+methods on the French coast, which permitted heavy reënforcements
+to leave France. General Abercromby, with 17,000 men, finally took
+all but Guadaloupe in the next year. As Holland, Spain, and other
+nations came under French control, England seized their colonies
+likewise--the Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon
+in 1795; the Moluccas and other Dutch islands in the East Indies in
+1796; Trinidad (Spanish) in 1797; Curaçao (Dutch) in 1800; and the
+Swedish and Danish West Indies in 1801. By the Treaty of Amiens in
+1802 all these except Trinidad and Ceylon were given back, and had
+to be retaken in the later period of the war, Guadaloupe remaining
+a privateers' nest until its final capture in 1810. Though French
+trade was ruined, it was impossible to stamp out privateering,
+which grew with the growth of British commerce which it preyed
+upon, and the extent of which is indicated by the estimate that
+in 1807 there were from 200 to 300 privateers on the coasts of
+Cuba and Hayti alone. As for the captured islands, Great Britain
+in 1815 retained only Malta, Heligoland, and the Ionian Islands in
+European waters; Cape Colony, Mauritius, and Ceylon on the route
+to the East; and in the Caribbean, Demerara on the coast, Santa
+Lucia, Trinidad, and Tobago--some of them of little intrinsic value,
+but all useful outposts for an empire of the seas.
+
+In the Channel and Bay of Biscay, the first year of war passed
+quietly. Lord Howe, commanding the British Channel fleet, had behind
+him a long, fine record as a disciplinarian and tactician; he had
+fought with Hawke at Quiberon Bay, protected New York and Rhode
+Island against d'Estaing in 1778, and later thrown relief into
+Gibraltar in the face of superior force. Now 68 years of age, he
+inclined to cautious, old-school methods, such as indeed marked
+activities on both land and sea at this time, before Napoleon had
+injected a new desperateness into war. Both before and after the
+"Glorious First of June" the watch on the French coast was merely
+nominal; small detachments were kept off Brest, but the main fleet
+rested in Portsmouth throughout the winter and took only occasional
+cruises during the remainder of the year.
+
+_The Battle of the First of June_
+
+Though there had been no real blockade, the interruption of her
+commerce, the closure of her land frontiers, and the bad harvest
+of 1793, combined to bring France in the spring following to the
+verge of famine, and forced her to risk her fleet in an effort to
+import supplies from overseas. On April 11 an immense flotilla
+of 120 grain vessels sailed from the Chesapeake under the escort
+of two ships-of-the-line, which were to be strengthened by the
+entire Brest fleet at a rendezvous 300 miles west of Belleisle.
+Foodstuffs having already been declared subject to seizure by both
+belligerents, Howe was out on May 2 to intercept the convoy. A
+big British merchant fleet also put to sea with him, to protect
+which he had to detach 8 of his 34 ships, but with orders to 6 of
+these that they should rejoin his force on the 20th off Ushant.
+Looking into Brest on the 19th, Howe found the French battle fleet
+already at sea. Not waiting for the detachment, and thus losing its
+help in the battle that was to follow, he at once turned westward
+and began sweeping with his entire fleet the waters in which the
+convoy was expected to appear.
+
+The French with 26 ships-of-the-line--and thus precisely equal to
+Howe in numbers--had left Brest two days before. The crews were
+largely landsmen; of the flag officers and captains, not one had
+been above the grade of lieutenant three years before, and nine of
+them had been merchant skippers with no naval experience whatever.
+On board were two delegates of the National Convention, whose double
+duties seem to have been to watch the officers and help them command.
+To take the place of experience there was revolutionary fervor,
+evidenced in the change of ship-names to such resounding appellations
+as _La Montagne, Patriote, Vengeur du Peuple, Tyrannicide_, and
+_Revolutionnaire_. There was also more confidence than was ever felt
+again by French sailors during the war. "Intentionally disregarding
+subtle evolutions," said the delegate Jean Bon Saint Andree, "perhaps
+our sailors will think it more appropriate and effective to resort
+to the boarding tactics in which the French were always victorious,
+and thus astonish the world by new prodigies of valor." "If they
+had added to their courage a little training," said the same
+commissioner after the battle, "the day might have been ours."
+
+The commander in chief, Villaret de Joyeuse, who had won his lieutenancy
+and the esteem of Suffren in the American war, was no such scorner
+of wary tactics. Thus when the two fleets, more by accident than
+calculation on either side, came in contact on the morning of May
+28, 1794, about 400 miles west of Ushant, it would have been quite
+possible for him to have closed with the British, who were 10 miles
+to leeward in a fresh southerly wind. But his orders were not to
+fight unless it were essential to protect the convoy, and since
+this was thought to be close at hand, he first drew away to the
+eastward, with the British in pursuit.
+
+The chase continued during the remainder of this day and the day
+following, with partial engagements and complicated maneuvering,
+the net result of which was that in the end Howe, in spite of the
+superior sailing qualities of the French ships, had kept in touch
+with them, driven his own vessels through their line to a windward
+position, and forced the withdrawal of four units, with the loss of
+but one of his own. Two days of thick weather followed, during which
+both fleets stood to the northwest in the same relative positions,
+the French, very fortunately indeed, securing a reënforcement of
+four fresh ships from detachments earlier at sea.
+
+Now 26 French to 25 British, the two fleets on the morning of the
+final engagement were moving to westward on the still southerly wind,
+in two long, roughly parallel lines. Confident of the individual
+superiority of his ships, the British admiral had no wish for further
+maneuvering, in which his own captains had shown themselves none
+too reliable and the enemy commander not unskilled. Possibly also
+he feared the confusion of a complicated plan, for it was notorious
+(as may be verified by looking over his correspondence) that Howe
+had the greatest difficulty in making himself intelligible with
+tongue or pen. His orders were therefore to bear up together toward
+the enemy and attack ship to ship, without effort at concentration,
+and with but one noteworthy departure from the time-honored tactics
+in which he had been schooled. This was that the battle should be
+close and decisive. The instructions were that each ship should
+if possible break through the line astern of her chosen opponent,
+raking the ships on each side as she went through, and continue
+the action to leeward, in position to cut off retreat. "I don't
+want the ships to be bilge to bilge," said Howe to the officers
+of his flagship, the _Queen Charlotte_, "but if you can lock the
+yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be the quicker decided."
+The approach was leisurely, nearly in line abreast, on a course
+slightly diagonal to that of the enemy. At 10 A. M. the _Queen
+Charlotte_, in the center of the British line, shoved past just
+under the stern of Villaret's flagship, the _Montagne_, raking
+her with a terrible broadside which is said to have struck down
+300 of her men. As was likely to result from the plan of attack,
+the ships in the van of the attacking force were more closely and
+promptly engaged than those of the rear; only six ships actually
+broke through, but there was hot fighting all along the line.
+
+Famous among the struggles in the mêlée was the epic three-hour
+combat of the _Brunswick_, next astern of Howe, and the _Vengeur_,
+both 74's. With the British vessel's anchors hooked in her opponent's
+port forechannels, the two drifted away to leeward, the _Brunswick_
+by virtue of flexible rammers alone able to use her lower deck guns,
+which were given alternately extreme elevation and depression and
+sent shot tearing through the _Vengeur's_ deck and hull; whereas
+the _Vengeur_, with a superior fire of carronades and musketry,
+swept the enemy's upper deck. When the antagonists wrenched apart,
+the _Brunswick_ had lost 158 of her complement of 600 men. The
+_Vengeur_ was slowly sinking and went down at 6 P. M., with a loss
+of 250 killed and wounded and 100 more drowned. "As we drew away,"
+wrote a survivor, "we heard some of our comrades still offering
+prayers for the welfare of their country; the last cries of these
+unfortunates were, 'Vive la République!' They died uttering them."
+
+Out of the confusion, an hour after the battle had begun, Villaret
+was able to form a column of 16 ships to leeward, and though ten of
+his vessels lay helpless between the lines, three drifted or were
+towed down to him and escaped. Howe has been sharply criticized
+for letting these cripples get away; but the battered condition
+of his fleet and his own complete physical exhaustion led him to
+rest content with six prizes aside from the sunken _Vengeur_. The
+criticism has also been made that he should have further exerted
+himself to secure a junction with the detachment on convoy duty,
+which on May 19 was returning and not far away. If he had at that
+time held his 32 ships between Brest and Rochefort, with scouts
+well distributed to westward, he would have been much more certain
+to intercept both Villaret's fleet and the convoy, which would have
+approached in company, and both of which, with the British searching
+in a body at sea, stood a good chance of escape. Howe's hope, no
+doubt, was to meet the convoy unguarded. The latter, protected by
+fog, actually crossed on May 30 the waters fought over on the 29th,
+and twelve days later safely reached the French coast. Robespierre
+had told Villaret that if the convoy were captured he should answer
+for it with his life. Hence the French admiral declared years later
+that the loss of his battleships troubled him relatively little.
+"While Howe amused himself refitting them, I saved the convoy,
+and I saved my head."
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1794
+
+Based on diagram in Mahan's _Influence of Sea Power upon the French
+Revolution,_ Vol. I, p. 136.]
+
+Though the escape of the convoy enabled the French to boast a "strategic
+victory," the First of June in reality established British prestige
+and proved a crushing blow to French morale. A British defeat,
+on the other hand, might have brought serious consequences, for
+within a year's time the Allied armies, including the British under
+the Duke of York, were driven out of Holland, the Batavian Republic
+was established in league with France (February, 1795), and both
+Spain and Prussia backed out of the war. Austria remained England's
+only active ally.
+
+During the remainder of 1794 and the year following only minor or
+indecisive encounters occurred in the northern theater of war, lack
+of funds and naval supplies hampering the recovery of the French
+fleet from the injuries inflicted by Howe. Ill health forcing the
+latter's retirement from sea duty, he was succeeded in the Channel by
+Lord Bridport, who continued his predecessor's easy-going methods
+until the advent of Jervis in 1798, instituted a more rigorous
+régime. It was not yet recognized that the wear and tear on ships
+and crews during sea duty was less serious than the injurious effect
+of long stays in port upon sea spirit and morale.
+
+_French Projects of Invasion_
+
+With their fleets passive, the French resorted vigorously to commerce
+warfare, and at the same time kept England constantly perturbed by
+rumors, grandiose plans, and actual undertakings of invasion. That
+these earlier efforts failed was due as much to ill luck and bad
+management as to the work of Bridport's fleet. Intended, moreover,
+primarily as diversions to keep England occupied at home and sicken
+her of the war, they did not altogether fail of their aim. Some
+of these projects verged on the ludicrous, as that of corraling
+a band of the criminals and royalist outlaws that infested France
+and dropping them on the English coast for a wild campaign of murder
+and pillage. Fifteen hundred of these _Chouans_ were actually landed
+at Fishguard in February of 1798, but promptly surrendered, and
+France had to give good English prisoners in exchange for them on
+the threat that they would be turned loose again on French soil.
+
+Much more serious was General Hoche's expedition to Ireland of
+the winter before. Though Hoche wished to use for the purpose the
+army of over 100,000 with which he had subdued revolt in the Vendée,
+the Government was willing to venture a force of only 15,000, which
+set sail from Brest, December 15, 1796, in 17 ships-of-the-line,
+together with a large number of smaller war-vessels and transports.
+Heavy weather and bad leadership, helped along by British frigates
+with false signals, scattered the fleet on the first night out. It
+never again got together; and though a squadron with 6,000 soldiers
+on board was actually for a week or more in the destination, Bantry
+Bay, not a man was landed, and by the middle of January nearly all of
+the flotilla was back in France. The British squadron under Colport,
+which had been on the French coast at the time of the departure, had
+in the meanwhile been obliged to make port for supplies. Bridport
+with the main fleet left Portsmouth, 250 miles from the scene of
+operations, four days after news of the French departure. During
+the whole affair neither he nor Colport took a single prize.
+
+Even so small a force cöoperating with rebellion in Ireland might
+have proved a serious annoyance, though not a grave danger. Invasion
+on a grand scale, which Napoleon's victorious campaign in Italy
+and the peace with Austria (preliminaries at Loeben, April, 1797)
+now made possible, was effectually forestalled by two decisive
+victories at sea. Bonaparte, who was to lead the invasion, did not
+minimize its difficulties. "To make a descent upon England without
+being master of the sea," he wrote at this time, "is the boldest and
+most difficult operation ever attempted." Yet the flotilla of small
+craft necessary was collected, army forces were designated, and in
+February of 1798 Bonaparte was at Dunkirk. All this served no doubt
+to screen the Egyptian preparations, which amid profound secrecy
+were already under way. The Egyptian campaign was an indirect blow
+at England; but the direct blow would certainly have been struck
+had not the naval engagements of Cape St. Vincent (February, 1797)
+and Camperdown (October, 1797) settled the question of mastery
+of the sea by removing the naval support of Spain and Holland on
+the right and left wings.
+
+_The Battle of Camperdown_
+
+Admiral Duncan's victory of Camperdown, here taken first as part
+of the events in northern waters, is noteworthy in that it was
+achieved not only against ever-dangerous opponents, but with a
+squadron which during the preceding May and June had been in the
+very midst of the most serious mutiny in the history of the British
+navy. In Bridport's fleet at Portsmouth this was not so much a
+mutiny as a well organized strike, the sailors it is true taking
+full control of the ships, and forcing the Admiralty and Parliament
+to grant their well justified demands for better treatment and better
+pay. Possibly a secret sympathy with their grievances explains the
+apparent helplessness of the officers. The men on their part went
+about the business quietly, and even rated some of their former
+officers as midshipmen, in special token of esteem. At the Nore,
+however, and in Duncan's squadron at Yarmouth, the mutiny was marked
+by bloodshed and taint of disloyalty, little surprising in view of
+the disaffected Irish, ex-criminals, impressed merchant sailors,
+and other unruly elements in the crews. In the end 18 men were
+put to death and many others sentenced.
+
+Duncan faced the trouble with the courage but not the mingling of
+fair treatment and sharp justice which marked its suppression by
+that great master of discipline, Jervis, in the fleet off Spain.
+On his own ship and another, Duncan drew up the loyal marines under
+arms, spoke to the sailors, and won their allegiance, picking one
+troublesome spirit up bodily and shaking him over the side. But
+the rest of the squadron suddenly sailed off two days later to
+join the mutineers at the Nore, where all the ships were then in
+the hands of the crews. With his two faithful ships, Duncan made
+for the Texel, swearing that if the Dutch came out he would go
+down with colors flying. Fortunately he was rejoined before that
+event by the rest of his squadron, the mutinous ships having been
+either retaken by the officers or voluntarily surrendered by the
+men.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN, OCTOBER 11, 1797, ABOUT 12:30
+P.M.
+
+British, 16 of the line; Dutch, 15 of the line.]
+
+The whole affair, among the ships in Thames mouth, was over in a
+month's time, from mid-May to mid-June, so quickly that the enemy had
+little chance to seize the advantage. The Dutch, driven willy-nilly
+into alliance with France and not too eager to embark upon desperate
+adventures in the new cause, were nevertheless not restrained from
+action by any kind feeling for England, who had seized their ships
+and colonies and ruined their trade. When at last, during a brief
+withdrawal of Duncan, their fleet under Admiral de Winter attempted
+a cruise, it was in a run-down condition. Aside from small units,
+it consisted of 15 ships (4 of 74 guns, 5 of 68, 2 of 64, and 4
+under 60), against Duncan's stronger force of 16 (7 of 74, 7 of 64
+and 2 of 50). The Dutch ships were flat-bottomed and light-draft for
+navigation in their shallow coastal waters, and generally inferior
+to British vessels of similar rating, even though the latter were
+left-overs from the Channel Fleet.
+
+On the morning of the Battle of Camperdown, October 11, 1797, the
+Dutch were streaming along their coast on a northwest wind bent on
+return into the Texel. Pressing forward in pursuit, Duncan when
+in striking distance determined to prevent the enemy's escape into
+shallow water by breaking through their line and attacking to leeward.
+The signal to this effect, however, was soon changed to "Close
+action," and only the two leading ships eventually broke through.
+The two British divisions--for they were still in cruising formation
+and strung out by the pursuit--came down before the wind. Onslow,
+the second in command, in the _Monarch_, struck the line first
+at 12:30 and engaged the Dutch _Jupiter_, fourth from the rear.
+Eighteen minutes later Duncan in the _Venerable_ closed similarly
+to leeward of the _Staten Generaal_, and afterward the _Vrijheid_,
+in the Dutch van.
+
+The two leaders were soon supported--though there was straggling
+on both sides; and the battle that ensued was the bloodiest and
+fiercest of this period of the war. The British lost 825 out of a
+total of 8221 officers and men,[1] more than half the loss occurring
+in the first four ships in action. The British ships were also
+severely injured by the gruelling broadsides during the onset,
+but finally took 11 prizes, all of them injured beyond repair.
+Though less carefully thought out and executed, the plan of the
+attack closely resembles that of Nelson at Trafalgar. The head-on
+approach seems not to have involved fatal risks against even such
+redoubtable opponents as the Dutch, and it insured decisive results.
+
+[Footnote 1: As compared with this loss of 10%, the casualties
+in Nelson's three chief battles were as follows: Nile, 896 out of
+7401, or 12.1%; Copenhagen, 941 out of 6892, or 13.75%; Trafalgar,
+1690 out of 17,256, or 9.73%.]
+
+Duncan's otherwise undistinguished career, and the somewhat unstudied
+methods of his one victory, may explain why he has not attained the
+fame which the energy displayed and results achieved would seem
+to deserve. "He was a valiant officer," writes his contemporary
+Jervis, "little versed in subtleties of tactics, by which he would
+have been quickly confused. When he saw the enemy, he ran down upon
+them, without thinking of a fixed order of battle. To conquer,
+he counted on the bold example he gave his captains, and the event
+completely justified his hopes."
+
+Whatever its tactical merits, the battle had the important strategic
+effect of putting the Dutch out of the war. The remnants of their fleet
+were destroyed in harbor during an otherwise profitless expedition
+into Holland led by the Duke of York in 1799. By this time, when
+naval requirements and expanding trade had exhausted England's
+supply of seamen, and forced her to relax her navigation laws,
+it is estimated that no less than 20,000 Dutch sailors had left
+their own idle ships and were serving on British traders and
+men-of-war.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: For references, see end of Chapter XIII, page 285.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+THE NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Continued_]: THE RISE OF NELSON
+
+In the Mediterranean, where the protection of commerce, the fate
+of Italy and all southern Europe, and the exposed interests of
+France gave abundant motives for the presence of a British fleet,
+the course of naval events may be sufficiently indicated by following
+the work of Nelson, who came thither in 1793 in command of the
+_Agamemnon_ (64) and remained until the withdrawal of the fleet at
+the close of 1796. Already marked within the service, in the words
+of his senior, Hood, as "an officer to be consulted on questions
+relative to naval tactics," Nelson was no doubt also marked as
+possessed of an uncomfortable activity and independence of mind.
+Singled out nevertheless for responsible detached service, he took
+a prominent part in the occupation of Corsica, where at the siege
+of Calvi he lost the sight of his right eye, and later commanded
+a small squadron supporting the left flank of the Austrian army
+on the Riviera.
+
+In these latter operations, during 1795 and 1796, Nelson felt that
+much more might have been done. The Corniche coast route into Italy,
+the only one at first open to the French, was exposed at many points
+to fire from ships at sea, and much of the French army supplies as
+well as their heavy artillery had to be transported in boats along
+the coast. "The British fleet could have prevented the invasion
+of Italy," wrote Nelson five years later, "if our friend Hotham
+[who had succeeded Hood as commander in chief in the Mediterranean]
+had kept his fleet on that coast."[1] Hotham felt, perhaps rightly,
+that the necessity of watching the French ships at Toulon made this
+impossible. But had the Toulon fleet been destroyed or effectually
+crippled at either of the two opportunities which offered in 1795, no
+such need would have existed; the British fleet would have dominated
+the Mediterranean, and exercised a controlling influence on the
+wavering sympathies of the Italian states and Spain. At the first
+of these opportunities, on the 13th and 14th of March, Hotham said
+they had done well enough in capturing two French ships-of-the-line.
+"Now," remarked Nelson, whose aggressive pursuit had led to the
+capture, "had we taken 10 sail and allowed the 11th to escape,
+when it had been possible to have got at her, I should not have
+called it well done." And again of the second encounter: "To say how
+much we wanted Lord Hood on the 13th of July, is to say, 'Will you
+have all the French fleet, or no action?'" History, and especially
+naval history, is full of might-have-beens. Aggressive action
+establishing naval predominance might have prevented Napoleon's
+brilliant invasion and conquest of Italy; Spain would then have
+steered clear of the French alliance; and the Egyptian campaign
+would have been impossible.
+
+[Footnote 1: DISPATCHES, June 6, 1800.]
+
+The succession of Sir John Jervis to the Mediterranean command
+in November, 1795, instituted at once a new order of things, in
+which inspiring leadership, strict discipline, and closest attention
+to the health of crews, up-keep vessels, and every detail of ship
+and fleet organization soon brought the naval forces under him to
+what has been judged the highest efficiency attained by any fleet
+during the war. Jervis had able subordinates--Nelson, Collingwood
+and Troubridge, to carry the list no further; but he may claim a
+kind of paternal share in molding the military character of these
+men.
+
+Between Jervis and Nelson in particular there existed ever the
+warmest mutual confidence and admiration. Yet the contrast between
+them well illustrates the difference between all-round professional
+and administrative ability, possessed in high degree by the older
+leader, and supreme fighting genius, which, in spite of mental
+and moral qualities far inferior, has rightly won Nelson a more
+lasting fame. As a member of parliament before the war, as First
+Lord of the Admiralty from 1801 to 1803, and indeed in his sea
+commands, Jervis displayed a breadth of judgment, a knowledge of
+the world, a mastery of details of administration, to which Nelson
+could not pretend. In the organization of the Toulon and the Brest
+blockades, and in the suppression of mutiny in 1797, Jervis better
+than Nelson illustrates conventional ideals of military discipline.
+When appointed to the Channel command in 1799 he at once adopted
+the system of keeping the bulk of the fleet constantly on the enemy
+coast "well within Ushant with an easterly wind." Captains were to
+be on deck when ships came about at whatever hour. In port there
+were no night boats and no night leave for officers. To one officer
+who ventured a protest Jervis wrote that he "ought not to delay
+one day his intention to retire." "May the discipline of the
+Mediterranean never be introduced in the Channel," was a toast on
+Jervis's appointment to the latter squadron. "May his next glass
+of wine choke the wretch," was the wish of an indignant officer's
+wife. Jervis may have been a martinet, but it was he, more than
+any other officer, who instilled into the British navy the spirit
+of war.
+
+In the Mediterranean, however, he arrived too late. There, as in
+the Atlantic, the French Directory after the experiments of 1794
+and 1795 had now abandoned the idea of risking their battleships;
+and while these still served effectively in port as a fleet in
+being, their crews were turned to commerce warfare or transport
+flotilla work for the army. Bonaparte's ragged heroes were driving
+the Austrians out of Italy. Sardinia made peace in May of 1796.
+Spain closed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French
+Republic in August, putting a fleet of 50 of the line (at least
+on paper) on Jervis's communications and making further tenure
+of the Mediterranean a dangerous business. By October, 26 Spanish
+ships had joined the 12 French then at Toulon. Even so, Jervis with
+his force of 22 might have hazarded action, if his subordinate Mann,
+with a detached squadron of 7 of these, had not fled to England.
+Assigning to Nelson the task of evacuating Corsica and later Elba,
+Jervis now took station outside the straits, where on February 13,
+1797, Nelson rejoined his chief, whose strength still consisted
+of 15 of the line.
+
+_The Battle of Cape St. Vincent_
+
+The Spanish fleet, now 27, was at this time returning to Cadiz,
+as a first step toward a grand naval concentration in the north. A
+stiff Levanter having thrown the Spanish far beyond their destination,
+they were returning eastward when on February 14, 1797, the two
+fleets came in contact within sight of Cape St. Vincent. In view
+of the existing political situation, and the known inefficiency of
+the Spanish in sea fighting, Jervis decided to attack. "A victory,"
+he is said to have remarked, "is very essential to England at this
+hour."
+
+As a fresh westerly wind blew away the morning fog, the Spanish
+were fully revealed to southward, running before the wind, badly
+scattered, with 7 ships far in advance and thus to leeward of the
+rest. After some preliminary pursuit, the British formed in a single
+column (Troubridge in the _Culloden_ first, the flagship _Victory_
+seventh, and Nelson in the _Captain_ third from the rear), and
+took a southerly course which would carry them between the two
+enemy groups. As soon as they found themselves thus separated,
+the Spanish weather division hauled their wind, opened fire, and
+ran to northward along the weather side of the British line; while
+the lee division at first also turned northward and made some effort
+to unite with the rest of their company by breaking through the
+enemy formation, but were thrown back by a heavy broadside from
+the _Victory_. Having accomplished his first purpose, Jervis had
+already, at about noon, hoisted the signal to "tack in succession,"
+which meant that each ship should continue her course to the point
+where the _Culloden_ came about and then follow her in pursuit
+of the enemy weather division. This critical and much discussed
+maneuver appears entirely justified. The British by tacking in
+succession kept their column still between the parts of the enemy,
+its rear covering the enemy lee division, and the whole formation
+still in perfect order and control, as it would not have been had
+the ships tacked simultaneously. Again, if the attack had been
+made on the small group to leeward, the Spanish weather division
+could easily have run down into the action and thus brought their
+full strength to bear.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14, 1797
+
+BRITISH: 15 ships, 1232 guns.  SPANISH: 27 ships, 2286 guns.]
+
+But against an enemy so superior in numbers more was needed to keep
+the situation in hand. Shortly before one o'clock, when several
+British vessels had already filled away on the new course, Nelson
+from his position well back in the column saw that the leading
+ships of the main enemy division were swinging off to eastward
+as if to escape around the British rear. Eager to get into the
+fighting, of which his present course gave little promise, and
+without waiting for orders, he wore out of the column, passed between
+the two ships next astern, and threw himself directly upon the three
+big three-deckers, including the flagship _Santisima Trindad_ (130
+guns), which headed the enemy line. Before the fighting was over, his
+ship was badly battered, "her foretopmast and wheel shot away, and
+not a sail, shroud or rope left";[1] but the _Culloden_ and other
+van ships soon came up, and also Collingwood in the _Excellent_
+from the rear, after orders from Jervis for which Nelson had not
+waited. Out of the mêlée the British emerged with four prizes,
+Nelson himself having boarded the _San Nicolas_ (80), cleared her
+decks, and with reënforcements from his own ship passed across
+her to receive the surrender of the _San Josef_ (112). The swords
+of the vanquished Spanish, Nelson says, "I gave to William Fearney,
+one of my bargemen, who placed them with the greatest _sangfroid_
+under his arm."
+
+[Footnote 1: Nelson's DISPATCHES, Vol. II, p. 345.]
+
+For Nelson's initiative (which is the word for such actions when
+they end well) Jervis had only the warmest praise, and when his
+fleet captain, Calder, ventured a comment on the breach of orders,
+Jervis gave the tart answer, "Ay, and if ever you offend in the
+same way I promise you a forgiveness beforehand." Jervis was made
+Earl St. Vincent, and Nelson, who never hid his light under a bushel,
+shared at least in popular acclaim. It was not indeed a sweeping
+victory, and there is little doubt that had the British admiral
+so chosen, he might have done much more. But enough had been
+accomplished to discourage Spanish naval activities in the French
+cause for a long time to come. They were hopelessly outclassed;
+but in their favor it should be borne in mind that their ships
+were miserably manned, the crews consisting of ignorant peasants
+of whom it is reported that they said prayers before going aloft,
+and with whom their best admiral, Mazzaredo, had refused to sail.
+Moreover, they were fighting half-heartedly, lacking the inspiration
+of a great national cause, without which victories are rarely won.
+
+The defeat of the Spanish, as Jervis had foreseen, was timely.
+Mantua had just capitulated; British efforts to secure an honorable
+peace had failed; consols were at 51, and specie payments stopped
+by the Bank of England; Austria was on the verge of separate
+negotiations, the preliminaries of which were signed at Loeben on
+April 18; France, in the words of Bonaparte, could now "turn all
+her forces against England and oblige her to a prompt peace."[1]
+The news of St. Vincent was thus a ray of light on a very dark
+horizon. Its strategic value, along with the Battle of Camperdown,
+has already been made clear.
+
+[Footnote 1: CORRESPONDENCE, III, 346.]
+
+The British fleet, after refitting at Lisbon, took up a blockade
+of the Spanish at Cadiz which continued through the next two years.
+Discontent and mutiny, which threatened with each fresh ship from
+home, was guarded against by strict discipline, careful attention to
+health and diet, and by minor enterprises which served as diversions,
+such as the bombardment of Cadiz and the unsuccessful attack on Santa
+Cruz in the Canary Islands, July 24-25, 1797, in which Nelson lost
+his right arm.
+
+[Illustration: THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST 1798]
+
+_The Battle of the Nile_
+
+Nelson's return to the Cadiz blockade in May, 1798, after months
+of suffering in England, was coincident with the gathering of a
+fresh storm cloud in the Mediterranean, though the direction in
+which it threatened was still completely concealed. While Sicily,
+Greece, Portugal and even Ireland were mentioned by the British
+Admiralty as possible French objectives, Egypt was apparently not
+thought of. Yet its strategic position between three continents
+remained as important as in centuries past, controlling the trade
+of the Levant and threatening India by land or sea. "The time is
+not far distant," Bonaparte had already written, "when we shall feel
+that truly to destroy England we must take possession of Egypt."
+In point of fact the strength of England rested not merely on the
+wealth of the Indies, but on her merchant fleets, naval control,
+home products and manufactures, in short her whole industrial and
+commercial development, too strong to be struck down by a blow in
+this remote field. Still, if the continued absence of a British
+fleet from the Mediterranean could be counted on, the Egyptian
+campaign was the most effective move against her that offered at
+the time. It was well that the British Admiralty rose to the danger.
+Jervis, though he pointed out the risks involved, was directed to
+send Nelson with an advance squadron of 3 ships, later strengthened
+to 14, to watch the concentration of land and naval forces at Toulon.
+"The appearance of a British fleet in the Mediterranean," wrote
+the First Lord, Spencer, in urging the move, "is a condition on
+which the fate of Europe may be stated to depend."
+
+Before a strong northwest wind the French armada on May 19 left
+Toulon--13 of the line, 13 smaller vessels, and a fleet of transports
+which when joined by contingents from Genoa, Corsica, and Civita
+Vecchia brought the total to 400 sail, crowded with over 30,000
+troops. Of the fighting fleet there is the usual tale of ships
+carelessly fitted out, one-third short-handed, and supplied with
+but two months' food--a tale which simply points the truth that
+the winning of naval campaigns begins months or years before.
+
+The gale from which the French found shelter under Sardinia and
+Corsica fell later with full force on Nelson to the westward of
+the islands. His flagship the _Vanguard_ lost her foremast and
+remaining topmasts, while at the same time his four frigates, so
+essential in the search that followed, were scattered and failed
+to rejoin. Having by extraordinary exertions refitted in Sardinia
+in the short space of four days, he was soon again off Toulon,
+but did not learn of the enemy's departure until May 31, and even
+then he got no clue as to where they had gone. Here he was joined
+on June 7 by the promised reënforcements, bringing his squadron
+to 13 74's and the _Leander_ of 50 guns.
+
+The ensuing search continued for two months, until August 1, the
+date of the Battle of the Nile. During this period, Nelson appears
+to best advantage; in the words of David Hannay, he was an "embodied
+flame of resolution, with none of the vulgar bluster that was to
+appear later."
+
+Moving slowly southward, the French flotilla had spent ten days
+in the occupation of Malta--the surrender of which was chiefly
+due to French influence among the Knights of St. John who held the
+island--and departed on June 19 for their destination, following
+a circuitous route along the south side of Crete and thence to
+the African coast 70 miles west of Alexandria.
+
+Learning off Cape Passaro on the 22d of the enemy's departure from
+Malta, Nelson made direct for Alexandria under fair wind and press
+of sail. He reached the port two days ahead of Bonaparte, and finding
+it empty, at once set out to retrace his course, his impetuous
+energy betraying him into what was undoubtedly a hasty move. The
+two fleets had been but 60 miles apart on the night of the 25th.
+Had they met, though Bonaparte had done his utmost by organization
+and drill to prepare for such an emergency, a French disaster would
+have been almost inevitable, and Napoleon, in the amusingly partisan
+words of Nelson's biographer Southey, "would have escaped those
+later crimes that have incarnadined his soul." Nelson had planned
+in case of such an encounter to detach three of his ships to attack
+the transports.
+
+The trying month that now intervened, spent by the British fleet
+in a vain search along the northern coast of the Mediterranean,
+a brief stop at Syracuse for water and supplies, and return, was
+not wholly wasted, for during this time the commander in chief
+was in frequent consultation with his captains, securing their
+hearty support, and familiarizing them with his plans for action
+in whatever circumstances a meeting might occur. An interesting
+reference to this practice of Nelson's appears in a later
+characterization of him written by the French Admiral Décres to
+Napoleon. "His boastfulness," so the comment runs, "is only equalled
+by his ineptitude, but he has the saving quality of making no pretense
+to any other virtues than boldness and good nature, so that he is
+accessible to the counsels of those under him." As to who dominated
+these conferences and who profited by them we may form our own
+opinion. It was by such means that Nelson fostered a spirit of
+full coöperation and mutual confidence between himself and his
+subordinates which justified his affectionate phrase, "a band of
+brothers."
+
+The result was seen at the Nile. If rapid action lost the chance
+of battle a month before, it did much to insure victory when the
+opportunity came, and it was made possible by each captain's full
+grasp of what was to be done. "Time is everything," to quote a
+familiar phrase of Nelson; "five minutes may spell the difference
+between victory and defeat." It was two in the afternoon when the
+British, after looking into Alexandria, first sighted the French
+fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, and it was just sundown when the
+leading ship _Goliath_ rounded the _Guerrier's_ bows. The battle
+was fought in darkness. In the face of a fleet protected by shoals
+and shore batteries, with no trustworthy charts or pilots, with ships
+still widely separated by their varying speeds, a less thoroughly
+drilled force under a less ardent leader would have felt the necessity
+of delaying action until the following day. Nelson never hesitated.
+His ships went into action in the order in which they reached the
+scene.
+
+The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion
+which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the repeated letters
+from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor,
+in spite of repeated soundings which showed this course possible,
+the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of despondent inertia still
+lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.
+Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was
+known that their range did not cover the head of the French line.
+The frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely
+warning were at anchor in the bay. Numerous water parties were
+on shore and with them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables
+from one vessel to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had
+been vaguely planned. At a hurried council it was proposed to put
+to sea, but this was given up for the sufficient reason that there
+was no time. The French were cleared for action only on the out-board
+side. Their admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a
+fear reasonable enough if his ships had been sailing before the
+wind at sea; but at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective
+and the wind blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van
+would be far more dangerous, since support could less easily be
+brought up from the rear.
+
+[Illustration: COAST MAP
+
+From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth of the Nile]
+
+It was on the head of the line that the attack came. Nelson had
+given the one signal that "his intention was to attack the van
+and center as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before
+developed." This plan called for doubling, two ships to the enemy's
+one. With a fair wind from the north-northwest Captain Foley in
+the _Goliath_ at 6 p.m. reached the _Guerrier_, the headmost of
+the thirteen ships in the enemy line. Either by instant initiative,
+or more likely in accordance with previous plans in view of such an
+opportunity, he took his ship inside the line, his anchor dragging
+slightly so as to bring him up on the quarter of the second enemy
+vessel, the _Conquérant_. The _Zealous_, following closely,
+anchored on the bows of the _Guerrier_; the _Orion_ engaged inside
+the fifth ship; the _Theseus_ inside the third; and the _Audacious_,
+passing between the first two of the enemy, brought up on the
+_Conquérant's_ bow. With these five engaged inside, Nelson in the
+_Vanguard_ and the two ships following him engaged respectively
+outside the third, fourth and fifth of the enemy. Thus the concentration
+on the van was eight to five.
+
+About a half hour later the _Bellerophon_ and the _Majestic_
+attacked respectively the big flagship _Orient_ (110) in the
+center and the _Tonnant_ (80) next astern, and against these superior
+antagonists suffered severely, losing in killed and wounded 390
+men divided about equally between them, which was nearly half the
+total loss of 896 and greater than the total at Cape St. Vincent.
+Both later drifted almost helpless down the line. The _Culloden_
+under Troubridge, a favorite of both Jervis and Nelson, had
+unfortunately grounded and stuck fast on Aboukir shoal; but the
+_Swiftsure_ and the _Alexander_ came up two hours after the battle
+had begun as a support to the ships in the centre, the _Swiftsure_
+engaging the _Orient_, and the _Alexander_ the _Franklin_ next
+ahead, while the smaller _Leander_ skillfully chose a position
+where she could rake the two. By this time all five of the French
+van had surrendered; the _Orient_ was in flames and blew up about
+10 o'clock with the loss of all but 70 men. Admiral Brueys, thrice
+wounded, died before the explosion. Of the four ships in the rear,
+only two, the _Guillaume Tell_ under Admiral Villeneuve and the
+_Généreux_, were able to cut their cables next morning and get
+away. Nelson asserted that, had he not been incapacitated by a
+severe scalp wound in the action, even these would not have escaped.
+Of the rest, two were burned and nine captured. Among important
+naval victories, aside from such one-sided slaughters as those of
+our own Spanish war, it remains the most overwhelming in history.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE NILE]
+
+The effect was immediate throughout Europe, attesting dearly the
+contemporary importance attached to sea control. "It was this battle,"
+writes Admiral de la Gravière, "which for two years delivered over
+the Mediterranean to the British and called thither the squadrons
+of Russia, which shut up our army in the midst of a hostile people
+and led the Porte to declare against us, which put India beyond
+our reach and thrust France to the brink of ruin, for it rekindled
+the hardly extinct war with Austria and brought Suvaroff and the
+Austro-Russians to our very frontiers."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: GUERRES MARITIMES, II, 129.]
+
+The whole campaign affords an instance of an overseas expedition
+daringly undertaken in the face of a hostile fleet (though it should
+be remembered that the British were not in the Mediterranean when
+it was planned), reaching its destination by extraordinary good
+luck, and its possibilities then completely negatived by the
+reëstablishment of enemy naval control. The efforts of the French
+army to extricate itself northward through Palestine were later
+thwarted partly by the squadron under Commodore Sidney Smith, which
+captured the siege guns sent to Acre by sea and aided the Turks in
+the defense of the fortress. In October of 1799 Bonaparte escaped
+to France in a frigate. French fleets afterwards made various futile
+efforts to succor the forces left in Egypt, which finally surrendered
+to an army under Abercromby, just too late to strengthen the British
+in the peace negotiations of October, 1801.
+
+Nelson's subsequent activities in command of naval forces in Italian
+waters need not detain us. Physically and nervously weakened from
+the effects of his wound and arduous campaign, he fell under the
+influence of Lady Hamilton and the wretched court of Naples, lent
+naval assistance to schemes of doubtful advantage to his country,
+and in June of 1800 incurred the displeasure of the Admiralty by
+direct disobedience of orders to send support to Minorca. He returned
+to England at the close of 1800 with the glory of his victory somewhat
+tarnished, and with blemishes on his private character which
+unfortunately, as will be seen, affected also his professional
+reputation.
+
+_The Copenhagen Campaign_
+
+Under the rapid scene-shifting of Napoleon, the political stage
+had by this time undergone another complete change from that which
+followed the battle of the Nile. Partly at least as a consequence
+of that battle, the so-called Second Coalition had been formed by
+Great Britain, Russia, and Austria, the armies of the two latter
+powers, as already stated, carrying the war again to the French
+frontiers. It required only the presence of Bonaparte, in supreme
+control after the _coup d'état_ of the Eighteenth _Brumaire_
+(9 Nov., 1799), to turn the tide, rehabilitate the internal
+administration of France, and by the victories of Marengo in June
+and Hohenlinden in December of 1800 to force Austria once more to
+a separate peace. Paul I of Russia had already fallen out with his
+allies and withdrawn his armies and his great general, Suvaroff,
+a year before. Now, taken with a romantic admiration for Napoleon,
+and angry when the British, after retaking Malta, refused to turn
+it over to him as Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, he was
+easily manipulated by Napoleon into active support of the latter's
+next move against England.
+
+This was the Armed Neutrality of 1800, the object of which, from
+the French standpoint, was to close to England the markets of the
+North, and combine against her the naval forces of the Baltic.
+Under French and Russian pressure, and in spite of the fact that
+all these northern nations stood to suffer in one way or another
+from rupture of trade relations with England, the coalition was
+accomplished in December, 1800; Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark
+pledging themselves to resist infringements of neutral rights,
+whether by extension of contraband lists, seizure of enemy goods
+under neutral flag, search of vessels guaranteed innocent by their
+naval escort, or by other methods familiar then as in later times.
+These were measures which England, aiming both to ruin the trade
+of France and to cut off her naval supplies, felt bound to insist
+upon as the belligerent privileges of sea power.
+
+To overcome this new danger called for a mixture of force and diplomacy,
+which England supplied by sending to Denmark an envoy with a 48-hour
+ultimatum, and along with him 20 ships-of-the-line, which according
+to Nelson were "the best negotiators in Europe." The commander in
+chief of this squadron was Sir Hyde Parker, a hesitant and mediocre
+leader who could be trusted to do nothing (if that were necessary),
+and Nelson was made second in command. Influence, seniority, a clean
+record, and what-not, often lead to such choices, bad enough at
+any time but indefensible in time of war. Fortunately for England,
+when the reply of the Danish court showed that force was required,
+the two admirals virtually changed places with less friction than
+might have been expected, and Nelson "Lifted and carried on his
+shoulders the dead weight of his superior,"[1] throughout the ensuing
+campaign.
+
+[Footnote 1: Mahan, INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON FRENCH REVOLUTION
+AND EMPIRE, II, 52.]
+
+When the envoy on March 23 returned to the fleet, then anchored in
+the Cattegat, he brought an alarming tale of Danish preparations,
+and an air of gloom pervaded the flagship when Nelson came aboard
+for a council of war. Copenhagen, it will be recalled, is situated
+on the eastern coast of Zealand, on the waterway called the Sound
+leading southward from the Cattegat to the Baltic. Directly in
+front of the city, a long shoal named the Middle Ground separates
+the Sound into two navigable channels, the one nearer Copenhagen
+known as the King's Deep (_Kongedyb_). The defenses of the Danish
+capital, so the envoy reported, were planned against attack from
+the northward. At this end of the line the formidable Trekroner
+Battery (68 guns), together with two ships-of-the-line and some
+smaller vessels, defended the narrow entrance to the harbor; while
+protecting the city to the southward, along the flats at the edge
+of the King's Deep, was drawn up an array of about 37 craft ranging
+from ships-of-the-line to mere scows, mounting a total of 628 guns,
+and supported at some distance by batteries on land. Filled with
+patriotic ardor, half the male population of the city had volunteered
+to support the forces manning these batteries afloat and ashore.
+
+Nelson's plan for meeting these obstacles, as well as his view of
+the whole situation, as presented at the council, was embodied in
+a memorandum dated the following day, which well illustrates his
+grasp of a general strategic problem. The Government's instructions,
+as well as Parker's preference, were apparently to wait in the
+Cattegat until the combined enemy forces should choose to come
+out and fight. Instead, the second in command advocated immediate
+action. "Not a moment," he wrote, "should be lost in attacking the
+enemy; they will every day and hour be stronger." The best course,
+in his opinion, would be to take the whole fleet at once into the
+Baltic against Russia, as a "home stroke," which if successful
+would bring down the coalition like a house of cards. If the Danes
+must first be dealt with, he proposed, instead of a direct attack,
+which would be "taking the bull by the horns," an attack from the
+rear. In order to do so, the fleet could get beyond the city either
+by passing through the Great Belt south of Zealand, or directly
+through the Sound. Another resultant advantage, in case the five
+Swedish sail of the line or the 14 Russian ships at Revel should
+take the offensive, would be that of central position, between
+the enemy divisions.
+
+"Supposing us through the Belt," the letter concludes, "with the
+wind northwesterly, would it not be possible to either go with
+the fleet or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one
+Bomb and two Fireships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron
+at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment,
+and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The
+measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion that the boldest
+measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous
+assertion of her force, directed with judgment."
+
+Here was a striking plan of aggressive warfare, aimed at the heart of
+the coalition. The proposal to leave part of the fleet at Copenhagen
+was indeed a dangerous compromise, involving divided forces and
+threatened communications, but was perhaps justified by the known
+inefficiency of the Russians and the fact that the Danes were actually
+fought and defeated with a force no greater than the plan provided.
+In the end the more conservative course was adopted of settling
+with Denmark first. Keeping well to the eastern shore, the fleet
+on March 30 passed into the Sound without injury from the fire of
+the Kronenburg forts at its entrance, and anchored that evening
+near Copenhagen.
+
+Three days later, on April 2, 1801, the attack was made as planned,
+from the southward end of the Middle Ground. Nelson in the _Elephant_
+commanded the fighting squadron, which consisted of seven 74's,
+three 64's and two of 50 guns, with 18 bomb vessels, sloops, and
+fireships. The rest of the ships, under Parker, were anchored at
+the other end of the shoal and 5 miles north of the city; it seems
+they were to have coöperated, but the south wind which Nelson needed
+made attack impossible for them. Against the Danish total of 696
+guns on the ships and Trekroner fortification, Nelson's squadron
+had 1014, but three of his main units grounded during the approach
+and were of little service. There was no effort at concentration,
+the British when in position engaging the whole southern part of
+the Danish line. "Here," in the words of Nelson's later description,
+"was no maneuvering; it was downright fighting"--a hotly contested
+action against ships and shore batteries lasting from 10 a. m., when
+the _Elephant_ led into position on the bow of Commodore Fischer's
+flagship _Dannebroge_, until about one.
+
+In the midst of the engagement, as Nelson restlessly paced the
+quarterdeck, he caught sight of the signal "Leave off action" flown
+from Sir Hyde's flagship. Instead of transmitting the signal to the
+vessels under him, Nelson kept his own for "Close action" hoisted.
+Colonel Stewart, who was on board at the time, continues the story as
+follows: "He also observed, I believe to Captain Foley, 'You know,
+Foley, I have only one eye--I have a right to be blind sometimes';
+and then with an archness peculiar to his character, putting the
+glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not see the
+signal.'" It was obeyed, however, by the light vessels under Captain
+Riou attacking the Trekroner battery, which were suffering severely,
+and which could also more easily effect a retreat.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, APRIL 2, 1801]
+
+Shortly afterward the Danish fire began to slacken and several
+of the floating batteries surrendered, though before they could
+be taken they were frequently remanned by fresh forces from the
+shore. Enough had been accomplished; and to end a difficult
+situation--if not to extricate himself from it--Nelson sent the
+following summons addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen, the
+Danes": "Lord Nelson has orders to spare Denmark when no longer
+resisting; if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord
+Nelson will be obliged to set fire to the floating batteries he
+has taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who
+have defended them."
+
+A truce followed, during which Nelson removed his ships. Next day
+he went ashore to open negotiations, while at the same time he
+brought bomb vessels into position to bombard the city. The cessation
+of hostilities was the more readily agreed to by the Danes owing
+to the fact that on the night before the battle they had received
+news, which they still kept concealed from the British, of the
+assassination of the Czar Paul. His successor, they knew, would be
+forced to adopt a policy more favorable to the true interests of
+Russian trade. The league in fact was on the verge of collapse. A
+fourteen weeks' armistice was signed with Denmark. On April 12 the
+fleet moved into the Baltic, and on May 5, Nelson having succeeded
+Parker in command, it went on to Revel, whence the Russian squadron
+had escaped through the ice to Kronstadt ten days before. On June
+17 a convention was signed with Russia and later accepted by the
+other northern states, by which Great Britain conceded that neutrals
+might engage in trade from one enemy port to another, with the
+important exception of _colonial_ ports, and that naval stores
+should not be contraband; whereas Russia agreed that enemy goods
+under certain conditions might be seized in neutral ships, and
+that vessels under naval escort might be searched by ships-of-war.
+In the meantime, Nelson, realizing that active operations were
+over with, resigned his command.
+
+In the opinion of the French naval critic Gravière, the campaign
+thus ended constitutes in the eyes of seamen Nelson's best title to
+fame--"_son plus beau titre gloire._"[1] Certainly it called forth
+the most varied talents--grasp of the political and strategical
+situation; tact and force of personality in dealing with an inert
+commander in chief; energy in overcoming not only military obstacles
+but the doubts and scruples of fellow officers; aggressiveness in
+battle; and skill in negotiations. In view of the Czar's murder--of
+which the British Government would seem to have had an inkling
+beforehand--it may be thought that less strenuous methods would
+have served. On the contrary, however, hundreds of British merchant
+vessels had been seized in northern ports, trade had been stopped,
+and the nation was threatened with a dangerous increment to her
+foes. Furthermore, after a brief interval of peace, Great Britain
+had to face ten years more of desperate warfare, during which nothing
+served her better than that at Copenhagen the northern neutrals
+had had a sharp taste of British naval power. Force was needed.
+That it was employed economically is shown by the fact that, when a
+renewal of peace between France and Russia in 1807 again threatened
+a northern confederation, Nelson's accomplishment with 12 ships
+was duplicated, but this time with 25 of the line, 40 frigates,
+27,000 troops, the bombardment of Copenhagen, and a regular land
+campaign.
+
+[Footnote 1: GUERRES MARITIMES, Vol. II, p. 43.]
+
+Upon Nelson's return to England, popular clamor practically forced
+his appointment to command the Channel defense flotilla against
+the French armies which were now once more concentrated on the
+northern coast. This service lasted for only a brief period until
+the signing of peace preliminaries in October, 1801.
+
+During the eight years of hostilities thus ended Great Britain, it
+is true, had been fighting largely on the defensive, but on a line
+of defense carried to the enemy's sea frontiers and comparable to
+siege lines about a city or fortress, which, when once established,
+thrust upon the enemy the problem of breaking through. The efforts
+of France to pierce this barrier, exerted in various directions
+and by various means, were, as we have seen, defeated by naval
+engagements, which insured to England the control of the sea. During
+this period, France lost altogether 55 ships-of-the-line, Holland
+18, Spain 10, and Denmark 2, a total of 85, of which at least 50
+were captured by the enemy. Great Britain lost 20, but only 5 by
+capture. The British battle fleet at the close of hostilities had
+increased to 189 capital ships; that of France had shrunk to 45.
+
+For purposes of commerce warfare the French navy had suffered the
+withdrawal of many of its smaller fighting vessels and large numbers
+of its best seamen, attracted into privateering by the better promise
+of profit and adventure. As a result of this warfare, about 3500
+British merchantmen were destroyed, an average of 500 a year,
+representing an annual loss of 2-1/2 per cent of all the ships of
+British register. But in the meantime the French merchant marine
+and commerce had been literally swept off the seas. In 1799 the
+Directory admitted there was "not a single merchant ship on the seas
+carrying the French flag." French imports from Asia, Africa, and
+America in 1800 amounted to only $300,000, and exports to $56,000,
+whereas England's total export and import trade had nearly doubled,
+from 44-1/2 million pounds sterling in 1792 to nearly 78 million in
+1800. It is true that, owing to the exigencies of war, the amount of
+British shipping employed in this trade actually fell off slightly,
+and that of neutrals increased from 13 to 34%. But the profits
+went chiefly to British merchants. England had become the great
+storehouse and carrier for the Continent, "Commerce," in the phrase
+engraved on the elder Pitt's monument, "being united with and made
+to flourish by war."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Figures on naval losses from Gravière, GUERRES MARITIMES,
+Vol. II, ch. VII, and on commerce, from Mahan, FRENCH REVOLUTION
+AND EMPIRE, Vol. II, ch. XVII.]
+
+REFERENCES
+
+See end of Chapter XIII, page 285.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+THE NAPOLEONIC WAR [_Concluded_]: TRAFALGAR AND AFTER
+
+The peace finally ratified at Amiens in March, 1802, failed to
+accomplish any of the purposes for which England had entered the
+war. France not only maintained her frontiers on the Scheldt and
+the Rhine, but still exercised a predominant influence in Holland
+and western Italy, and excluded British trade from territories
+under her control. Until French troops were withdrawn from Holland,
+as called for by the treaty, England refused to evacuate Malta.
+Bonaparte, who wished further breathing space to build up the French
+navy, tried vainly to postpone hostilities by threatening to invade
+England and exclude her from all continental markets. "It will be
+England," he declared, "that forces us to conquer Europe." The
+war reopened in May of 1803.
+
+With no immediate danger on the Continent and with all the resources
+of a regenerated France at his command, Bonaparte now undertook
+the project of a descent upon England on such a scale as never
+before. Hazardous as he always realized the operation to be--it
+was a thousand to one chance, he told the British envoys, that he
+and his army would end at the bottom of the sea--he was definitely
+committed to it by his own threats and by the expectation of France
+that he would now annihilate her hereditary foe.
+
+_Napoleon's Plan of Invasion_
+
+An army of 130,000 men, with 400 guns and 20 days' supplies, was
+to embark from four ports close to Boulogne as a center, and cross
+the 36 miles of Channel to a favorable stretch of coast between
+Dover and Hastings, distant from London some 70 miles. The transport
+flotilla, as finally planned, was to consist of 2000 or more small
+flat-bottomed sailing vessels with auxiliary oar propulsion-_chaloupes_
+and _bateaux canonnières_, from 60 to 80 feet over all, not over 8
+feet in draft, with from two to four guns and a capacity for 100
+to 150 men. Large open boats (_péniches_) were also to be used,
+and all available coast craft for transport of horses and supplies.
+Shipyards from the Scheldt to the Gironde were soon busy building
+the special flotilla, and as fast as they were finished they skirted
+the shores to the points of concentration under protection of coast
+batteries. Extensive harbor and defense works were undertaken at
+Boulogne and neighboring ports, and the 120 miles from the Scheldt
+to the Somme was soon bristling with artillery, in General Marmont's
+phrase, "a coast of iron and bronze."
+
+The impression was spread abroad that the crossing was to be effected
+by stealth, in calm, fog, or the darkness of a long winter night,
+without the protection of a fleet. Almost from the first, however,
+Bonaparte seems to have had no such intention. The armament of the
+flotilla itself proved of slight value, and he was resolved to
+take no uncalled-for risks, on an unfamiliar element, with 100,000
+men. An essential condition, which greatly complicated the whole
+undertaking, became the concentration of naval forces in the Channel
+sufficient to secure temporary control. "Let us be masters of the
+Strait for 6 hours," Napoleon wrote to Latouche-Treville in command
+of the Toulon fleet, "and we shall be masters of the world." In
+less rhetorical moments he extended the necessary period to from
+two to fifteen days.
+
+Up to the spring of 1804 neither army nor flotilla was fully ready,
+and thereafter the crossing was always definitely conditioned upon a
+naval concentration. But the whole plan called for swift execution.
+As time lapsed, difficulties multiplied. Harbors silted up, transports
+were wrecked by storms, British defense measures on land and sea grew
+more formidable, the Continental situation became more threatening.
+The Boulogne army thus became more and more--what Napoleon perhaps
+falsely declared later it had always been--an army concentrated
+against Austria. To get a fleet into the Channel without a battle
+was almost impossible, and once in, its position would be dangerous
+in the extreme. Towards the end, in the opinion of the French student
+Colonel Desbrière, Napoleon's chief motive in pressing for fleet
+coöperation was the belief that it would lead to a decisive naval
+action which, though a defeat, would shift from his own head the
+odium of failure.
+
+Whether this theory is fully accepted or not, the fact remains that
+the only sure way of conquering England was by a naval contest.
+Her first and main defense was the British fleet, which, spread out
+to the limits of safety to watch French ships wherever harbored,
+guarded not only against a concentration in the Channel, but against
+incursions into other fields. The immediate defense of the coasts was
+intrusted to flotillas of armed boats, over 700 in all, distributed
+along the coast from Leith south-about to Glasgow, with 100 on the
+coast of Ireland. Naval men looked upon these as of slight value,
+a concession, according to Earl St. Vincent, to "the old women
+in and out" (of both sexes) at home. The distribution of the main
+battle squadrons varied, but in March, 1805, at the opening of the
+Trafalgar campaign they were stationed as follows: Boulogne and the
+Dutch forces were watched by Admiral Keith with 11 of the line and
+150 smaller units scattered from the Texel to the Channel Islands.
+The 21 French ships under Ganteaume at Brest, the strategic center,
+were closely blockaded by Cornwallis, whose force, by Admiralty
+orders, was not to fall below 18 of the line. A small squadron had
+been watching Missiessy's 5 ships at Rochefort and upon his escape
+in January had followed him to the West Indies. The 5 French and 10
+Spanish at Ferrol and the 6 or more ready for sea at Cadiz were
+held in check by forces barely adequate. In the Gulf of Lyons Nelson
+with 13 ships had since May, 1803, stood outside the distant but
+dangerous station of Toulon. Owing to the remoteness from bases,
+a close and constant blockade was here impossible; moreover, it
+was the policy to let the enemy get out in the hope of bringing
+him to action at sea.
+
+[Illustration: POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, 1805]
+
+To effect a concentration in the Channel in the face of these obstacles
+was the final aim of all Napoleon's varied naval combinations of
+1804 and 1805--combinations which impress one with the truth of
+Gravière's criticism that the Emperor lacked "_le sentiment exact
+des difficultes de la marine_," and especially, one should perhaps
+add, _de la marine française_. The first plan, the simplest and,
+therefore, most promising, was that Latouche Treville with the
+Toulon fleet should evade Nelson and, after releasing ships on
+the way, enter the Channel with 16 of the line, while Cornwallis
+was kept occupied by Ganteaume. This was upset by the death of
+Latouche, France's ablest and most energetic admiral, in August
+of 1804, and by the accession, two months later, of Spain and the
+Spanish navy to the French cause. After many misgivings Napoleon
+chose Villeneuve to succeed at Toulon. Skilled in his profession,
+honest, and devoted, he was fatally lacking in self-confidence
+and energy to conquer difficulties. "It is sad," wrote an officer
+in the fleet, "to see that force which under Latouche was full of
+activity, now without faith in either their leader or themselves."
+
+The final plan, though still subject to modifications, was for
+a concentration on a larger scale in the West Indies. Villeneuve
+was to go thither, picking up the Cadiz ships on the way, join
+the Rochefort squadron if it were still there, and wait 40 days
+for the Brest fleet. Upon its arrival the entire force of 40 ships
+was to move swiftly back to the Channel. It was assumed that the
+British squadrons, in alarm for the colonies, would in the meantime
+be scattered in pursuit.
+
+_The Pursuit of Villeneuve_
+
+Villeneuve put to sea in a rising gale on January 17, 1805, but
+was soon back in port with damaged ships, the only effect being
+to send Nelson clear to Egypt in search of him. A successful start
+was made on March 30. Refusing to wait for 5 Spanish vessels at
+Carthagena, Villeneuve with 11 sail reached Cadiz on April 9, picked
+up one French vessel and two Spanish under Admiral Gravina, and
+leaving 4 more to follow was off safely on the same night for the
+West Indies.
+
+From Gibraltar to the Admiralty in London, Villeneuve's appearance
+in the Atlantic created a profound stir. His departure from Cadiz
+was known, but not whither he had gone. The five ships on the Cadiz
+blockade fell back at once to the Channel. A fast frigate from
+Gibraltar carried the warning to Calder off Ferrol and to the Brest
+blockade, whence it reached London on April 25. A convoy for Malta
+and Sicily with 6000 troops under Gen. Craig--a pledge which Russia
+called for before sending her own forces to southern Italy--was already
+a week on its way and might fall an easy victim. In consequence of
+an upheaval at the Admiralty, Lord Barham, a former naval officer
+now nearly 80 years of age, had just begun his memorable 9 months'
+administration as First Lord of the Admiralty and director of the
+naval war. Immediately a whole series of orders went out to the
+fleets to insure the safety of the troop ships, the maintenance of
+the Ferrol blockade, an eventual strengthening of forces outside
+the Channel, and the safety of the Antilles in case Villeneuve
+had gone there.
+
+Where was Nelson? His scout frigates by bad judgment had lost Villeneuve
+on the night of March 31 east of Minorca, with no clue to his future
+course. Nelson took station between Sardinia and the African coast,
+resolved not to move till he "knew something positive." In the
+absence of information, the safety of Naples, Sicily, and Egypt
+was perhaps not merely an obsession on his part, but a proper
+professional concern; but it is strange that no inkling should
+have reached him from the Admiralty or elsewhere that a western
+movement from Toulon was the only one Napoleon now had in mind.
+It was April 18 before he received further news of the enemy, and
+not until May 5 was he able to get up to and through the Straits
+against steady head winds; even then he could not, as he said,
+"run to the West Indies without something beyond mere surmise."
+Definite reports from Cadiz that the enemy had gone thither reached
+him through an Admiral Campbell in the Portuguese service, and were
+confirmed by the fact that they had been seen nowhere to northward.
+On the 12th, leaving the _Royal Sovereign_ (100) to strengthen
+the escort of Craig's convoy, which had now appeared, he set out
+westward with 10 ships in pursuit of the enemy's 18.
+
+He reached Barbados on June 4, only 21 days after Villeneuve's
+arrival at Martinique. The latter had found that the Rochefort
+squadron--as a result of faulty transmission of Napoleon's innumerable
+orders--was already back in Europe, and that the Brest squadron had
+not come. In fact, held tight in the grip of Cornwallis, it was
+destined never to leave port. But a reënforcement of 2 ships had
+reached Villeneuve with orders to wait 35 days longer and in the
+meantime to harry the British colonies. Disgruntled and despondent, he
+had scarcely got troops aboard and started north on this mission when
+he learned that Nelson was hot on his trail. The troops were hastily
+thrown into frigates to protect the French colonies. Without other
+provision for their safety, and in disregard of orders, Villeneuve
+at once turned back for Europe, hoping the Emperor's schemes would
+still be set forward by his joining the ships at Ferrol.
+
+Nelson followed four days later, on June 13, steering for his old
+post in the Mediterranean, but at the same time despatching the
+fast brig _Curieux_ to England with news of the French fleet's
+return. This vessel by great good fortune sighted Villeneuve in
+mid-ocean, inferred from his northerly position that he was bound
+for Ferrol, and reached Portsmouth on July 8. Barham at the Admiralty
+got the news the next morning, angry that he had not been routed out
+of bed on the arrival of the captain the night before. By 9 o'clock
+the same morning, orders were off to Calder on the Ferrol station
+in time so that on the 22d of July he encountered the enemy, still
+plowing slowly eastward, some 300 miles west of Cape Finisterre.
+
+As a result of admirable communication work and swift administrative
+action the critic of Nelson at Cape St. Vincent now had a chance
+to rob the latter of his last victory and end the campaign then
+and there. His forces were adequate. Though he had only 14 ships
+to 20, his four three-deckers, according to the estimates of the
+time, were each worth two of the enemy 74's, and on the other hand,
+the 6 Spanish ships with Villeneuve could hardly be counted for
+more than three. In the ensuing action, fought in foggy weather,
+two of the Spanish were captured and one of Calder's three-deckers
+was so injured that it had to be detached. The two fleets remained
+in contact for three days following, but neither took the aggressive.
+In a subsequent court martial Calder was reprimanded for "not having
+done his utmost to renew the said engagement and destroy every
+ship of the enemy."
+
+[Illustration: NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE, MARCH-SEPTEMBER,
+1805]
+
+On July 27 the Allied fleet staggered into Vigo, and a week later,
+after dropping three ships and 1200 sick men, it moved around to
+Corunna and Ferrol. Instead of being shaken down and strengthened
+by the long cruise, it was, according to the commander's plaintive
+letters, in worse plight than when it left Toulon. Nevertheless,
+ten days later he was ready to leave port, with 29 units, 14 of them
+raw vessels from Ferrol, and 11 of them Spanish. If, as Napoleon
+said, France was not going to give up having a navy, something
+might still be done. His orders to Villeneuve were to proceed to
+Brest and thence to Boulogne. "I count," he ended, "on your zeal
+in my service, your love of your country, and your hatred of that
+nation which has oppressed us for 40 generations, and which a little
+preseverance on your part will now cause to rëenter forever the
+ranks of petty powers."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Orders of 26 July, Desbrière, PROJETS, Vol. V, p. 672.]
+
+Such were Villeneuve's instructions, the wisdom or sincerity of
+which it was scarcely his privilege to question (though it may
+be ours). In passing judgment on his failure to execute them it
+should be remembered that two months later, to avoid the personal
+disgrace of being superseded, he took his fleet out to more certain
+disaster than that which it now faced in striking northward from
+Corunna. "_Un poltron du tête et non de la cœur_"[2] the French
+Admiral was handicapped throughout by a paralyzing sense of the
+things he could not do.
+
+[Footnote 2: Gravière II, 136.]
+
+If he had sailer northward he would have found the British fleet
+divided. Nelson, it is true, after returning to Cadiz had fallen
+back from Gibraltar to the Channel, where he left his eleven ships
+with the Brest squadron in remarkable condition after more than two
+years at sea. Calder had also joined, bringing Cornwallis' total
+strength to 39. These stood between the 21 French at Brest and
+the 29 at Ferrol. But on August 16 Cornwallis divided his forces,
+keeping 18 (including 10 three-deckers) and sending Calder back to
+the Spanish coast with the rest. Napoleon called this a disgraceful
+blunder (_insigne bêtise_), and Mahan adds, "This censure was just."
+Sir Julian Corbeh says it was a "master stroke... in all the campaign
+there is no movement--not even Nelson's chase of Villeneuve--that
+breathes more deeply the true spirit of war." According to Napoleon,
+Villeneuve might have "played prisoners' base with Calder's squadron
+and fallen upon Cornwallis, or with his 30 of the line have beaten
+Calder's 20 and obtained a decisive superiority."
+
+So perhaps a Napoleonic admiral. Villeneuve left Ferrol on August
+13 and sailed northwest on a heavy northeast wind till the 15th.
+Then, his fixed purpose merely strengthened by false news from a
+Danish merchantman of 25 British in the vicinity, he turned before
+the wind for Cadiz. As soon as he was safely inside, the British
+blockaders again closed around the port.
+
+_The Battle of Trafalgar_
+
+After twenty-five days in England, Nelson took command off Cadiz
+on September 28, eager for a final blow that would free England for
+aggressive war. There was talk of using bomb vessels, Congreve's
+rockets, and Francis's (Robert Fulton's) torpedoes to destroy the
+enemy in harbor, but it soon became known that Villeneuve would
+be forced to put to sea. On October 9, Nelson issued the famous
+Memorandum, or battle plan, embodying what he called "the Nelson
+touch," and received by his captains with an enthusiasm which the
+inspiration of the famous leader no doubt partly explains. This
+plan, which had been formulating itself in Nelson's mind as far
+back as the pursuit of the French fleet to the West Indies, may
+be regarded as the product of his ripest experience and genius;
+the praise is perhaps not extravagant that "it seems to gather
+up and coördinate every tactical principle that has ever proved
+effective."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Corbett. THE CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR, p. 349.]
+
+[Illustration: NELSON'S VICTORY
+
+Built in 1765. 2162 tons.]
+
+Though the full text of the Memorandum will repay careful study,
+its leading principles may be sufficiently indicated by summary.
+Assuming 40 British ships to 46 of the enemy (the proportions though
+not the numbers of the actual engagement), it provides first that
+"the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the
+fleet in two lines of 16 ships each, with an advanced squadron of
+8 of the fastest sailing two-decked ships." This made for speed
+and ease in maneuvering, and was based on the expressed belief
+that so many units could not be formed and controlled in the
+old-fashioned single line without fatal loss of time. The ships
+would now come into action practically in cruising formation, which
+was commonly in two columns. The only noteworthy change contemplated
+was that the flagships of the first and second in command should
+shift from first to third place in their respective columns, and
+even this change was not carried out. Perhaps because the total
+force was smaller than anticipated, the advance squadron was merged
+with the two main divisions on the night before the battle, and
+need not be further regarded. Collingwood, the second in command,
+was given freedom of initiative by the provision that "after my
+intentions are made known to him he will have entire direction
+of his line."
+
+The plan next provides, first for attack from to leeward, and second
+for attack from to windward. In either case, Collingwood's division
+was to bring a superior force to bear on 12 ships of the enemy rear,
+while Nelson would "cut two, three or four ships ahead of their
+center so far as to ensure getting at their commander in chief."
+"Something must be left to chance... but I look with confidence
+to a victory before the van of the enemy can succor their rear."
+And further, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship
+alongside that of an enemy."
+
+Of the attack from the windward a very rough diagram is given, thus:
+
+[Illustration]
+
+But aside from this diagram, the lines of which are not precisely
+straight or parallel in the original, and which can hardly be reconciled
+with the instructions in the text, there is no clear indication that
+the attack from the windward (as in the actual battle) was to be
+delivered in line abreast. What the text says is: "The divisions
+of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the
+enemy's center. The signal will most probably then be given for the
+lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering
+sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line
+and to cut through." Thus, if we assume a convergent approach in
+column, there was to be no slow deployment of the rear or leeward
+division into line abreast to make the attack of all its ships
+simultaneous; rather, in the words of a captain describing what
+really happened, they were simply to "scramble into action" at
+best speed. Nor is there any suggestion of a preliminary shift
+from line ahead in the case of Nelson's division. Though endless
+controversy has raged over the point, the prescribed approach seems
+to have been followed fairly closely in the battle.
+
+The concentration upon the rear was not new; in fact, it had become
+almost conventional, and was fully anticipated by the enemy. More
+originality lay in the manner of "containing" the center and van.
+For this purpose, in the first place, the approach was to be at
+utmost speed, not under "battle canvas" but with all sail spread.
+In the second place, the advance of Nelson's division in column,
+led by the flagship, left its precise objective not fully disclosed
+to the enemy until the last moment, and open to change as advantage
+offered. It could and did threaten the van, and was finally directed
+upon the center when Villeneuve's presence there was revealed.
+Finally, the very serious danger of enemy concentration upon the head
+of the column was mitigated not only by the speed of the approach,
+but by the concentration there of three heavy three-deckers. The
+plan in general had in view a particular enemy, superior in numbers
+but weak in gunnery, slow in maneuver, and likely to avoid decisive
+action. It aimed primarily at rapidity of movement, but combined
+also the merits of concentration, simplicity, flexibility, and
+surprise.
+
+In this discussion of the scheme of the battle, around which interest
+chiefly centers, the actual events of the engagement have been
+in some measure anticipated, and may now be told more briefly.
+Driven to desperation by the goadings of Napoleon and the news
+that Admiral Rosily was approaching to supersede him, Villeneuve
+at last resolved to put to sea. "The intention of His Majesty,"
+so the Minister of Marine had written, "is to seek in the ranks,
+wherever they may be found, officers best suited for superior command,
+requiring above all a noble ambition, love of glory, decision of
+character, and unbounded courage. His Majesty wishes to destroy that
+circumspection which is the reproach of the navy; that defensive
+system which paralyzes our fleet and doubles the enemy's. He counts
+the loss of vessels nothing if lost with honor; he does not wish
+his fleet blockaded by an enemy inferior in strength; and if that
+is the situation at Cadiz he advises and orders you to attack."
+
+The Allied fleet worked out of Cadiz on the 19th of October and
+on the 20th tacked southward under squally westerly winds. On the
+21st, the day of the battle, the wind was still from the west, light
+and flawy, with a heavy swell and signs of approaching storm. At dawn
+the two fleets were visible to each other, Villeneuve about 9 miles
+northeast and to leeward of the British and standing southward from
+Cape Trafalgar. The French Admiral had formed his main battle line
+of 21 ships, French and Spanish intermingled, with the _Santisima
+Trinidad_ (128) in the center and his flagship _Bucentaure_ next;
+the remaining 12 under the Spanish Admiral Gravina constituted
+a separate squadron stationed to windward to counter an enemy
+concentration, which was especially expected upon the rear.
+
+As the British advance already appeared to threaten this end of
+their line, the Allied fleet wore together about 9 o'clock, thus
+reversing their order, shifting their course northward, and opening
+Cadiz as a refuge. The maneuver, not completed until an hour later,
+left their line bowed in at the center, with a number of ships slightly
+to leeward, while Gravina's squadron mingled with and prolonged
+the rear in the new order.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCT. 21, 1805
+
+Position of ships about noon, when _Royal Sovereign_ opened fire.
+
+(From plan by Capt. T. H. Tizard, R.N., British Admiralty Report,
+1913.)]
+
+The change, though it aroused Nelson's fear lest his quarry should
+escape, facilitated his attack as planned, by exposing the enemy rear
+to Collingwood's division. As rapidly as the light airs permitted,
+the two British columns bore down, Nelson in the _Victory_ (100)
+leading the windward division of 12 ships, closely followed by
+the heavy _Neptune_ and _Téméraire_, while Collingwood in the
+freshly coppered and refitted _Royal Sovereign_ set a sharp pace
+for the 15 sail to leeward. Of the forty ships Nelson had once
+counted on, some had not come from England, and a half dozen others
+were inside the straits for water. While the enemy were changing
+course, Collingwood had signaled his division to shift into a line
+of bearing, an order which, though rendered almost ineffective by
+his failure to slow down, served to throw the column off slightly
+and bring it more nearly parallel to the enemy rear. (See plan.)
+Both commanders clung to the lead and pushed ahead as if racing
+into the fray, thus effectually preventing deployment and leaving
+trailers far behind. Nelson went so far as to try to jockey his
+old friend out of first place by ordering the _Mars_ to pass him,
+but Collingwood set his studding sails and kept his lead. Possibly
+it was then he made the remark that he wished Nelson would make no
+more signals, as they all knew what they had to do, rather than
+after Nelson's famous final message: "England expects that every
+man will do his duty."
+
+Nelson, uncertain of Villeneuve's place in the line and anxious to
+prevent escape northward, steered for a gap ahead of the _Santisima
+Trinidad_, as if to threaten the van. But at 12:00 noon, as the
+first shots were fired at the _Royal Sovereign_, flags were broken
+from all ships, and Villeneuve's location revealed. Swinging to
+southward under heavy fire, the _Victory_ passed under the stern
+of the _Bucentaure_ and then crashed into the _Redoutable_, which
+had pushed close up to the flagship. The relative effectiveness
+of the gunnery in the two fleets is suggested by the fact that
+the _Victory_ while coming in under the enemy's concentrated fire
+had only 50 killed and wounded, whereas the raking broadside she
+finally poured into the _Bucentaure's_ stern is said to have swept
+down 400 men. Almost simultaneously with the leader, the _Téméraire_
+and _Neptune_ plunged into the line, the former closing with the
+_Bucentaure_ and the latter with the _Santisima Trinidad_ ahead.
+Other ships soon thrust into the terrific artillery combat which
+centered around the leaders in a confused mingling of friend and
+foe.
+
+At about 12:10, nearly half an hour before the _Victory_ penetrated
+the Allied line, the _Royal Sovereign_ brought up on the leeward
+side of the _Santa Ana_, flagship of the Spanish Admiral Alava,
+after raking both her and the _Fougueux_ astern. The _Santa Ana_
+was thirteenth in the actual line, but, as Collingwood knew, there
+were 16, counting those to leeward, among the ships he had thus
+cut off for his division to subdue. As a combined effect of the
+light breeze and the manner of attack, it was an hour or more before
+the action was made general by the advent of British ships in the
+rear. All these suffered as they closed, but far less than those
+near the head of the line. Of the total British casualties fully
+a third fell upon the four leading ships--_Victory, Téméraire,
+Royal Sovereign_ and _Belleisle_.
+
+Not until about three o'clock were the shattered but victorious
+British in the center threatened by the return of the ten ships in
+the Allied van. Culpably slow, however hindered by lack of wind,
+several of these joined stragglers from Gravina's division to leeward;
+the _Intrépide_, under her brave skipper Infernet, set an example all
+might well have followed by steering straight for the _Bucentaure_,
+and surrendered only to overwhelming odds; five others under Rear
+Admiral Dumanoir skirted to windward and escaped with the loss of
+one of their number, cut off by two British late-comers, _Spartiate_
+and _Minotaur_.
+
+"Partial firing continued until 4:30, when a victory having been
+reported to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Nelson, he died of
+his wound." So reads the _Victory's_ log. The flagship had been
+in deadly grapple with the _Redoutable_, whose complement, like
+that of many another French and Spanish ship in the action, showed
+that the decadence of their navies was not due to lack of fighting
+spirit in the rank and file. Nelson was mortally wounded by a musket
+shot from the mizzen-top soon after the ships closed. In his hour
+of supreme achievement death came not ungraciously, giving final
+assurance of the glory which no man ever faced death more eagerly
+to win.
+
+Of the Allied fleet, four fled with Dumanoir, but were later engaged
+and captured by a British squadron near Corunna. Eleven badly battered
+survivors escaped into Cadiz. Of the 18 captured, 11 were wrecked or
+destroyed in the gales that swept the coast for several days after
+the battle; three were recaptured or turned back to their crews
+by the prize-masters, and only four eventually reached Gibraltar.
+
+[Illustration: TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30
+
+From plan attached to report of Capt. Prigny, Villeneuve's Chief
+of Staff (Deshrière, _Trafalgar_, App. p. 128.)]
+
+The Trafalgar victory did not indeed reduce France to terms, and
+it thus illustrates the limitations of naval power against an enemy
+not primarily dependent upon the sea. But it freed England from
+further threat of invasion, clinched her naval predominance, and
+opened to her the prospect of taking a more aggressive part in
+the land war. Even this prospect was soon temporarily thrust into
+the background. On the very day of Trafalgar Napoleon's bulletins
+announced the surrender of 60,000 Austrians at Ulm, and the Battle
+of Austerlitz a month later crushed the Third Coalition. The small
+British contingents in Germany and southern Italy hastened back to
+their transports. It was only later, when France was approaching
+exhaustion, that British forces in the Spanish peninsula and elsewhere
+took a conspicuous part in the Continental war.
+
+_The Continental System_
+
+England's real offensive strength lay not in her armies but in
+her grip on Europe's intercourse with the rest of the world. And
+on the other hand, the only blow that Napoleon could still strike
+at his chief enemy was to shut her from the markets of Europe--to
+"defeat the sea by the land." This was the aim of his Continental
+System. It meant a test of endurance--whether he could force France
+and the rest of Europe to undergo the tremendous strain of commercial
+isolation for a sufficient period to reduce England to ruin.
+
+The Continental System came into being with Napoleon's famous Berlin
+Decree of November, 1806, which, declaring a "paper" blockade of the
+British Isles, put all trade with England under the ban. Under this
+decree and later supplementary measures, goods of British origin,
+whatever their subsequent ownership, were confiscated or destroyed
+wherever French agents could lay hands on them; and neutral vessels
+were seized and condemned for entering British ports, accepting
+British convoy, or even submitting to British search.
+
+England's chief retaliatory measure was the Orders in Council of
+November, 1807. Her object in these orders and later modifications
+was not to cut off trade with the Continent, but to control it to
+her own profit and the injury of the enemy--in short, "no trade
+except through England." The orders aimed to compel the aid of
+neutrals by excluding neutral ships from the Continent unless they
+should first enter British ports, pay British dues, and (as would
+be an inevitable consequence) give covert assistance in carrying
+on British trade.
+
+The Continental System reached its greatest efficiency during the
+apogée of Napoleon's power in 1809 and 1810. To check forbidden
+traffic, which continued on an enormous scale, he annexed Holland
+to his empire, and threw a triple cordon of French troops along
+Germany's sea frontier. As a result, in the critical year of 1811
+goods piled up in British warehouses, factories closed, bankruptcies
+doubled, and her financial system tottered.[1] But to bar the tide
+of commerce at every port from Trieste to Riga was like trying
+to stem the sea. At each leak in the barrier, sugar, coffee, and
+British manufactures poured in, and were paid for at triple or
+tenfold prices, not in exports, but in coin. Malta, the Channel
+Islands, and Heligoland (seized by England from Denmark in 1807)
+became centers of smuggling. The beginning of the end came when
+the Czar, tired of French dictation and a policy ruinous to his
+country, opened his ports, first to colonial products (December,
+1810), and a year later to all British wares. Six hundred vessels,
+brought under British convoy into the Baltic, docked at Libau,
+and caravans of wagons filled the roads leading east and south.
+
+[Footnote 1: In spite of this crisis, British trade showed progressive
+increase in each half decade from 1800 to 1815, and did not fall off
+again until the five years after the war. The figures (in millions
+of pounds sterling) follow: 1801-05, 61 million; 1806-10, 67 million;
+1811-15, 74 million; 1816-20, 60 million.--Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE,
+p. 355.]
+
+In June of 1812 Napoleon gathered his "army of twenty nations" for
+the fatal Russian campaign. Now that they had served their purpose,
+England on June 23 revoked her Orders in Council. The Continental
+System had failed.
+
+_The War of 1812_
+
+In the same month, on June 18, the United States declared war on
+Great Britain. Up to 1807 her commerce and shipping, in the words
+of President Monroe, had "flourished beyond example," as shown by
+the single fact that her re-export trade (in West Indies products)
+was greater in that year than ever again until 1915.[1] Later they
+had suffered from the coercion of both belligerents, and from her
+own futile countermeasures of embargo and non-intercourse. Her
+final declaration came tardily, if not indeed unwisely as a matter
+of practical policy, however abundantly justified by England's
+commercial restrictions and her seizure of American as well as
+British seamen on American ships. An additional motive, which had
+decisive weight with the dominant western faction in Congress,
+was the hope of gaining Canada or at least extending the northern
+frontier.
+
+[Footnote 1: United States exports rose from a value of 56 million
+dollars in 1803 to 108 million in 1807; then fell to 22 million in
+1808, and after rising to about 50 million before the war, went
+down to 6 million in 1814.--_Ibid._, p 480.]
+
+A subordinate episode in the world conflict, the War of 1812 cannot
+be neglected in naval annals. The tiny American navy retrieved
+the failures of American land forces, and shook the British navy
+out of a notorious slackness in gunnery and discipline engendered
+by its easy victories against France and Spain.
+
+In size the British Navy in 1812 was more formidable than at any
+earlier period of the general war. Transport work with expeditionary
+forces, blockade and patrol in European waters, and commerce protection
+from the China Sea to the Baltic had in September, 1812, increased
+the fleet to 686 vessels in active service, including 120 of the
+line and 145 frigates. There were 75 in all on American stations,
+against the total American Navy of 16, of which the best were the fine
+44-gun frigates _Constitution, President_ and _United States_.
+In the face of such odds, and especially as England's European
+preoccupations relaxed, the result was inevitable. After the first
+year of war, while a swarm of privateers and smaller war vessels
+still took heavy toll of British commerce, the frigates were blockaded
+in American ports and American commerce was destroyed.
+
+But before the blockade closed down, four frigate actions had been
+fought, three of them American victories. In each instance, as will
+be seen from the accompanying table, the advantage in weight of
+broadside was with the victor. The American frigates were in fact
+triumphs of American shipbuilding, finer in lines, more strongly
+timbered, and more heavily gunned than British ships of their class.
+But that good gunnery and seamanship figured in the results is
+borne out by the fact that of the eight sloop actions fought during
+the war, with a closer approach to equality of strength, seven
+were American victories. The British carronades that had pounded
+French ships at close range proved useless against opponents that
+knew how to choose and hold their distance and could shoot straight
+with long 24'S.
+
+------------------+----------+----+------+----+------+-------------------
+                  |          |    |Wt. of|    |Casu- |
+     Ship[1]      |Commander |Guns|broad-|Crew|alties|  Place and date
+                  |          |    |side  |    |      |
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+Constitution[2]   |Hull      | 54 |  684 |456 |  14  |750 miles east of
+                  |          |    |      |    |      | Boston, Aug. 19,
+Guerrière (Brit.) |Dacres    | 49 |  556 |272 |  79  | 1812.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+United States[2]  |Decatur   | 54 |  786 |478 |  12  |Off Canary Islands,
+Macedonian (Brit.)|Carden    | 49 |  547 |301 | 104  | Oct. 25. 1812.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+Constitution[2]   |Bainbridge| 52 |  654 |475 |  34  |Near Bahia, Dec.
+Java (Brit.)      |Lambert   | 49 |  576 |426 | 150  | 29, 1812.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+Chesapeake        |Lawrence  | 50 |  542 |379 | 148  |Off Boston, June 1,
+Shannon (Brit.)[2]|Broke     | 52 |  550 |330 |  83  | 1813.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+
+[Footnote 1: The figures are from Roosevelt's NAVAL WAR OF 1812,
+in which 7% is deducted for the short weight of American shot.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Victorious.]
+
+"It seems," said a writer in the London _Times_, "that the Americans
+have some superior mode of firing." But when Broke with his crack
+crew in the _Shannon_ beat the _Chesapeake_ fresh out of port, he
+demonstrated, as had the Americans in other actions, that the
+superiority was primarily a matter of training and skill.
+
+On the Great Lakes America's naval efforts should have centered,
+for here was her main objective and here she was on equal terms.
+Both sides were tremendously hampered in communications with their
+main sources of supply. But with an approach from the sea to Montreal,
+the British faced no more serious obstacle in the rapids of the St.
+Lawrence above than did the Americans on the long route up the
+Mohawk, over portages into Oneida Lake, and thence down the Oswego
+to Ontario, or else from eastern Pennsylvania over the mountains to
+Lake Erie. The wilderness waterways on both sides soon saw the
+strange spectacle of immense anchors, cables, cannon, and ship
+tackle of all kinds, as well as armies of sailors, shipwrights,
+and riggers, making their way to the new rival bases at Sackett's
+Harbor and Kingston, both near the foot of Lake Ontario.
+
+Of the whole lake and river frontier, Ontario was of the most vital
+importance. A decisive American victory here, including the capture
+of Kingston, would cut enemy communications and settle the control
+of all western Canada. Kingston as an objective had the advantage
+over Montreal that it was beyond the direct reach of the British
+navy. The British, fully realizing the situation, made every effort
+to build up their naval forces on this lake, and gave Commodore Yeo,
+who was in command, strict orders to avoid action unless certain
+of success. On the other hand, the American commander, Chauncey,
+though an energetic organizer, made the mistake of assuming that his
+mission was also defensive. Hence when one fleet was strengthened by
+a new ship it went out and chased the other off the lake, but there
+was little fighting, both sides engaging in a grand shipbuilding
+rivalry and playing for a sure thing. Naval control remained unsettled
+and shifting throughout the war. It was fortunate, indeed, says
+the British historian, James, that the war ended when it did, or
+there would not have been room on the lake to maneuver the two
+fleets. The _St. Lawrence_, a 112-gun three-decker completed at
+Kingston in 1814, was at the time the largest man-of-war in the
+world.
+
+Possibly a growing lukewarmness about the war, manifested on both
+sides, prevented more aggressive action. But it did not prevent two
+brilliant American victories in the lesser theaters of Lake Erie
+and Lake Champlain. Perry's achievement on Lake Erie in building
+a superior flotilla in the face of all manner of obstacles was even
+greater than that of the victory itself. The result of the latter,
+won on September 10, 1813, is summed up in his despatch: "We have
+met the enemy and they are ours--2 ships, 2 brigs, 1 schooner, and
+1 sloop." It assured the safety of the northwestern frontier.
+
+On Lake Champlain Macdonough's successful defense just a year later
+held up an invasion which, though it would not have been pushed
+very strenuously in any case, might have made our position less
+favorable for the peace negotiations then already under way. In
+this action, as in the one on Lake Erie, the total strength of each
+of the opposing flotillas, measured in weight of broadsides (1192
+pounds for the British against 1194 far the Americans), was about
+that of a single ship-of-the-line. But the number of units employed
+raised all the problems of a squadron engagement. Macdonough's
+shrewd choice of position in Plattsburg Bay, imposing upon the
+enemy a difficult approach under a raking fire, and his excellent
+handling of his ships in action, justify his selection as the ablest
+American naval leader developed by the war.
+
+At the outbreak of the American War, France and England had been
+engaged in a death grapple in which the rights of neutrals were
+trampled under foot. Napoleon, by his paper blockade and confiscations
+on any pretext, had been a more glaring offender. But America's
+quarrel was after all not with France, who needed American trade,
+but with England, a commercial rival, who could back her restrictions
+by naval power. Once France was out of the war, the United States
+found it easy to come to terms with England, whose commerce was
+suffering severely from American privateers.[1] At the close of the
+war the questions at issue when it began had dropped into abeyance,
+and were not mentioned in the treaty terms.
+
+[Footnote 1: According to figures cited in Mahan's WAR OF 1812, (Vol.
+II, p. 224), 22 American naval vessels took 165 British prizes, and
+526 privateers took 1344 prizes. In the absence of adequate motives
+on either side for prolonging the war, these losses, though not
+more severe than those inflicted by French cruisers, were decisive
+factors for peace.]
+
+The view taken of the aggressions of sea power in the Napoleonic
+Wars will depend largely on the view taken regarding the justice of
+the cause in which it fought. It saved the Continent from military
+conquest. It preserved the European balance of power, a balance
+which statesmen of that age deemed essential to the safety of Europe
+and the best interests of America and the rest of the world. On
+the other hand, but for the sacrifices of England's land allies,
+the Continental System would have forced her to make peace, though
+still undefeated at sea. Even if her territorial accessions were
+slight, England came out of the war undisputed "mistress of the
+seas" as she had never been before, and for nearly a century to come
+was without a dangerous rival in naval power and world commerce.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+For general history of the period see: HISTORIES OF THE BRITISH NAVY
+by Clowes (Vols. V, VI, 1900) and Hannay (1909), Mahan's INFLUENCE
+OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE (1892) and WAR
+OF 1812 (1905), Chevalier's HISTOIRE DE LA MARINE FRANçAISE
+SOUS LA PREMIèRE RéPUBLIQUE (1886), Gravière's GUERRES MARITIMES
+(1885), Callender's SEA KINGS OF BRITAIN (Vol. III, 1911),
+and Maltzahn's NAVAL WARFARE (tr. Miller, 1908).
+
+Among biographies: Mahan's and Laughton's lives of Nelson, Anson's
+LIFE OF JERVIS (1913), Clark Russell's LIFE OF COLLINGWOOD (1892),
+and briefer sketches in FROM HOWARD TO NELSON, ed. Laughton (1899).
+
+For the Trafalgar campaign see:
+
+British Admiralty blue-book on THE TACTICS OF TRAFALGAR (with
+bibliography, 1913), Corbett's CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR (1910), Col.
+Desbrière's PROJETS ET TENTATIVES DE DéBARQUEMENT AUX ILES BRITANNIQUES
+(1902) and CAMPAGNE MARITIME DE TRAFALGAR (1907).
+
+See also Col. C. E. Callwell's MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MARITIME
+PREPONDERANCE (1913), and Professor Clive Day's HISTORY OF COMMERCE
+(revised edition, 1911, with bibliography).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE: HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA.
+
+During the 19th century, from 1815 to 1898, naval power, though
+always an important factor in international relations, played in
+general a passive rôle. The wars which marked the unification of
+Germany and Italy and the thrusting back of Turkey from the Balkans
+were fought chiefly on land. The navy of England, though never
+more constantly busy in protecting her far-flung empire, was not
+challenged to a genuine contest for mastery of the seas. In the
+Greek struggle for independence there were two naval engagements
+of some consequence--Chios (1822), where the Greeks with fireships
+destroyed a Turkish squadron and gained temporary control of the
+Ægean, and Navarino (1827), in which a Turkish force consisting
+principally of frigates was wiped out by a fleet of the western
+powers. But both of these actions were one-sided, and showed nothing
+new in types or tactics. In the American Civil War control of the
+sea was important and even decisive, but was overwhelmingly in the
+hands of the North. Hence the chief naval interest of the period
+lies not so much in the fighting as in the revolutionary changes in
+ships, weapons, and tactics--changes which parallel the extraordinary
+scientific progress of the century; and the engagements may be
+studied now, as they were studied then, as testing and illustrating
+the new methods and materials of naval war.
+
+_Changes in Ships and Weapons_
+
+Down to the middle of the 19th century there had been only a slow
+and slight development in ships and weapons for a period of nearly
+300 years. A sailor of the Armada would soon have felt at home in
+a three-decker of 1815. But he would have been helpless as a child
+in the fire-driven iron monsters that fought at Hampton Roads. The
+shift from sail to steam, from oak to iron, from shot to shell, and
+from muzzle-loading smoothbore to breech-loading rifle began about
+1850; and progress thereafter was so swift that an up-to-date ship
+of each succeeding decade was capable of defeating a whole squadron
+of ten years before. Success came to depend on the adaptability
+and mechanical skill of personnel, as well as their courage and
+discipline, and also upon the progressive spirit of constructors
+and naval experts, faced with the most difficult problems, the
+wrong solution of which would mean the waste of millions of dollars
+and possible defeat in war. Every change had to overcome the spirit
+of conservatism inherent in military organizations, where seniority
+rules, errors are sanctified by age, and every innovation upsets
+cherished routine. Thus in the contract for Ericsson's _Monitor_
+it was stipulated that she should have masts, spars, and sails!
+
+The first successful steamboat for commerce was, as is well known,
+Robert Fulton's flat-bottomed side-wheeler _Clermont_, which in
+August, 1807, made the 150 miles from New York to Albany in 32
+hours. During the war of 1812 Fulton designed for coast defense
+a heavily timbered, double-ender floating battery, with a single
+paddle-wheel located inside amidships. On her trial trip in 1815
+this first steam man-of-war, the U. S. S. _Fulton_, carried 26 guns
+and made over 6 knots, but she was then laid up and was destroyed
+a few years later by fire. Ericsson's successful application of
+the screw propeller in 1837 made steam propulsion more feasible
+for battleships by clearing the decks and eliminating the clumsy
+and exposed side-wheels. The first American screw warship was the
+U. S. S. _Princeton_, of 1843, but every ship in the American Navy
+at the outbreak of the Civil War had at least auxiliary sail rig.
+Though by 1850 England had 30 vessels with auxiliary steam, the
+_Devastation_ of 1869 was the first in the British service to use
+steam exclusively. Long after this time old "floating museums"
+with sail rig and smoothbores were retained in most navies for
+motives of economy, and even the first ships of the American "White
+Squadron" were encumbered with sails and spars.
+
+[Illustration: EARLY IRONCLADS]
+
+Progress in ordnance began about 1822, when explosive shells, hitherto
+used only in mortars, were first adopted for ordinary cannon with
+horizontal fire. At the time of the Crimean War shells were the
+usual ammunition for lower tier guns, and at Sinope in 1853 their
+smashing effect against wooden hulls was demonstrated when a Russian
+squadron destroyed some Turkish vessels which fired only solid
+shot. The great professional cry of the time, we are told, became
+"For God's sake, keep out the shell."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Custance, THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 9.]
+
+In 1851 Minié rifles supplanted in the British army the old smoothbore
+musket or "Brown Bess," with which at ranges above 200 yards it was
+difficult to hit a target 11 feet square. This change led quickly
+to the rifling of heavy ordnance as well. The first Armstrong rifles
+of 1858--named after their inventor, Sir William Armstrong, head
+of the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich--included guns up to 7-inch
+diameter of bore. The American navy, however, depended chiefly
+on smoothbores throughout the Civil War.
+
+Breech-loading, which had been used centuries earlier, came in
+again with these first rifles, but after 1865 the British navy
+went back to muzzle-loading and stuck to it persistently for the
+next 15 years. By that time the breech-loading mechanism had been
+simplified, and its adoption became necessary to secure greater length
+of gun barrel, increased rapidity of fire, and better protection for
+gun-crews. About 1880 quick-fire guns of from 3 to 6 inches, firing
+12 or 15 shots a minute, were mounted in secondary batteries.
+
+As already suggested, the necessity for armor arose from the smashing
+and splintering effect of shell against wooden targets and the
+penetrating power of rifled guns. To attack Russian forts in the
+Crimea, the French navy in 1855 built three steam-driven floating
+batteries, the _Tonnant, Lave_, and _Dévastation_, each protected
+by 4.3-inch plates and mounting 8 56-lb. guns. In the reduction of
+the Kinburn batteries, in October of the same year, these boats
+suffered little, but were helped out by an overwhelming fire from
+wooden ships, 630 guns against 81 in the forts.
+
+The French armored ship _Gloire_ of 1859 caused England serious worry
+about her naval supremacy, and led at once to H. M. S. _Warrior_,
+like the _Gloire_, full rigged with auxiliary steam. The _Warrior's_
+4.5-inch armor, extending from 6 feet below the waterline to 16 feet
+above and covering about 42 per cent of the visible target, was
+proof against the weapons of the time. At this initial stage in
+armored construction, naval experts turned with intense interest
+to watch the work of ironclads against ships and forts in the
+American Civil War.
+
+_The American Civil War_
+
+The naval activities of this war are too manifold to follow in
+detail. For four years the Union navy was kept constantly occupied
+with the tasks of blockading over 3000 miles of coast-line, running
+down enemy commerce destroyers, cooperating with the army in the
+capture of coast strongholds, and opening the Mississippi and other
+waterways leading into the heart of the Confederacy. To make the
+blockade effective and cut off the South from the rest of the world,
+the Federal Government unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of
+"continuous voyage," seizing and condemning neutral ships even when
+bound from England to Bermuda or the Bahamas, if their cargo was
+ultimately destined for Southern ports. The doctrine was declared
+inapplicable when the last leg of the journey was by land,[1] doubtless
+because there was little danger of heavy traffic across the Mexican
+frontier. Blockade runners continued to pour goods into the South
+until the fall of Fort Fisher in 1865; but as the blockade became
+more stringent, it crippled the finances of the Confederacy, shut
+out foodstuffs and munitions, and shortened, if it did not even
+have a decisive effect in winning the war.
+
+[Footnote 1: Peterhoff Case, 1866 (5 Wall, 28).]
+
+To meet these measures the South was at first practically without
+naval resources, and had to turn at once to new methods of war. Its
+first move was to convert the steam frigate _Merrimac_, captured
+half-burned with the Norfolk Navy Yard, into an ironclad ram. A
+casemate of 4 inches of iron over 22 inches of wood, sloping 35
+degrees from the vertical, was extended over 178 feet, or about
+two-thirds of her hull. Beyond this structure the decks were awash.
+The _Merrimac_ had an armament of 6 smoothbores and 4 rifles, two
+of the latter being pivot-guns at bow and stern, and a 1500-lb.
+cast-iron beak or ram. With her heavy load of guns and armor she
+drew 22 feet aft and could work up a speed of barely 5 knots.
+
+Faced with this danger, the North hurriedly adopted Ericsson's
+plan for the _Monitor_,[2] which was contracted for on October
+4, 1861, and launched after 100 days. Old marlin-spike seamen
+pooh-poohed this "cheesebox on a raft." As a naval officer said,
+it might properly be worshiped by its designer, for it was an image
+of nothing in the heavens above, or the earth beneath, or the waters
+under the earth. It consisted of a revolving turret with 8-inch
+armor and two 11-inch smoothbore guns, set on a raft-like structure
+142 feet in length by 41-1/2 feet in beam, projecting at bow, stern,
+and sides beyond a flat-bottomed lower hull. Though unseaworthy,
+the _Monitor_ maneuvered quickly and drew only 10-1/2 feet. She
+was first ordered to the Gulf, but on March 6 this destination
+was suddenly changed to the Chesapeake.
+
+[Footnote 2: So called by Ericsson because it would "admonish"
+the South, and also suggest to England "doubts as to the propriety
+of completing four steel-clad ships at three and one-half millions
+apiece."]
+
+The South in fact won the race in construction and got its ship
+first into action by a margin of just half a day. At noon on March
+8, with the iron-workers still driving her last rivets, the _Merrimac_
+steamed out of Norfolk and advanced ponderously upon the three sail
+and two steam vessels then anchored in Hampton Roads.
+
+In the Northern navy there had been much skepticism about the ironclad
+and no concerted plan to meet her attack. Under a rain of fire
+from the Union ships, and from share fortifications too distant
+to be effective, the _Merrimac_ rammed and sank the sloop-of-war
+_Cumberland_, and then, after driving the frigate _Congress_ aground,
+riddled her with shells. Towards nightfall the Confederate vessel
+moved dawn stream, to continue the slaughter next day.
+
+About 12 o'clock that night, after two days of terrible buffeting
+on the voyage down the coast, the little _Monitor_ anchored on
+the scene lighted up by the burning wreck of the _Congress_. The
+first battle of ironclads began next morning at 8:30 and continued
+with slight intermission till noon. It ended in a triumph, not
+for either ship, but for armor over guns. The _Monitor_ fired 41
+solid shot, 20 of which struck home, but merely cracked some of
+the _Merrimac's_ outer plates. The _Monitor_ was hit 22 times by
+enemy shells. Neither craft was seriously harmed and not a man was
+killed on either side, though several were stunned or otherwise
+injured. Lieut. Worden, in command of the _Monitor_, was nearly
+blinded by a shell that smashed in the pilot house, a square iron
+structure then located not above the turret but on the forward
+deck.
+
+The drawn battle was hailed as a Northern victory. Imagination
+had been drawing dire pictures of what the _Merrimac_ might do. At
+a Cabinet meeting in Washington Sunday morning, March 9, Secretary
+of War Stanton declared: "The _Merrimac_ will change the course of
+the war; she will destroy _seriatim_ every naval vessel; she will
+lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution. I have no
+doubt that the enemy is at this minute on the way to Washington, and
+that we shall have a shell from one of her guns in the White House
+before we leave this room." The menace was somewhat exaggerated. With
+her submerged decks, feeble engines, and general awkwardness, the
+_Merrimac_ could scarcely navigate in Hampton Roads. In the first
+day's fighting her beak was wrenched off and a leak started, two
+guns were put out of action, and her funnel and all other top-hamper
+were riddled. As was shown by Farragut in Mobile Bay, and again by
+Tegetthoff at Lissa, even wooden vessels, if in superior numbers,
+might do something against an ironclad in an aggressive mêlée.
+
+Both the antagonists at Hampton Roads ended their careers before
+the close of 1862; the _Merrimac_ was burned by her crew at the
+evacuation of Norfolk, and the _Monitor_ was sunk under tow in a
+gale off Hatteras. But turret ships, monitors, and armored gunboats
+soon multiplied in the Union navy and did effective service against
+the defenses of Southern harbors and rivers. Under Farragut's energetic
+leadership, vessels both armored and unarmored passed with relatively
+slight injury the forts below New Orleans, at Vicksburg, and at the
+entrance to Mobile Bay. Even granting that the shore artillery was
+out of date and not very expertly served, it is well to realize that
+similar conditions may conceivably recur, and that the superiority
+of forts over ships is qualified by conditions of equipment and
+personnel.
+
+Actually to destroy or capture shore batteries by naval force is
+another matter. As Ericsson said, "A single shot will sink a ship,
+while 100 rounds cannot silence a fort."[1] Attacks of this kind
+against Fort McAllister and Charleston failed. At Charleston, April
+7, 1863, the ironclads faced a cross-fire from several forts, 47
+smoothbores and 17 rifles against 29 smoothbores and 4 rifles in
+the ships, and in waters full of obstructions and mines.
+
+[Footnote 1: Wilson, IRONCLADS IN ACTION, Vol. I, p. 91.]
+
+The capture of Fort Fisher, commanding the main entrance to Wilmington,
+North Carolina, was accomplished in January, 1865, by the combined
+efforts of the army and navy. The fort, situated on a narrow neck
+of land between the Cape Fear River and the sea, had 20 guns on
+its land face and 24 on its sea face, 15 of them rifled. Against
+it were brought 5 ironclads with 18 guns, backed up by over 200
+guns in the rest of the fleet. After a storm of shot and shell
+for three successive days, rising at times to "drum-fire," the
+barrage was lifted at a signal and troops and sailors dashed forward
+from their positions on shore. Even after this preparation the
+capture cost 1000 men. As at Kinhurn in the Crimean War, the
+effectiveness of the naval forces was due less to protective armor
+than to volume of fire.
+
+_Submarines and Torpedoes_
+
+In the defense of Southern harbors, mines and torpedoes for the
+first time came into general use, and the submarine scored its
+first victim. Experiments with these devices had been going on
+for centuries, but were first brought close to practical success
+by David Bushnell, a Connecticut Yankee of the American Revolution.
+His tiny submarine, resembling a mud-turtle standing on its tail,
+embodied many features of modern underwater boats, including a
+primitive conning tower, screw propulsion (by foot power), a vertical
+screw to drive the craft down, and a detachable magazine with 150
+pounds of gunpowder. The _Turtle_ paddled around and even under
+British men-of-war off New York and New London, but could not drive
+a spike through their copper bottoms to attach its mine.
+
+Robert Fulton, probably the greatest genius in nautical invention,
+carried the development of bath mines and submarines much further.
+His _Nautilus_, so-called because its collapsible sail resembled
+that of the familiar chambered nautilus, was surprisingly ahead of
+its time; it had a fish-like shape, screw propulsion (by a two-man
+hand winch), horizontal diving rudder, compressed air tank, water
+tank filled or emptied by a pump, and a torpedo[1] consisting of
+a detachable case of gunpowder. A lanyard ran from the torpedo
+through an eye in a spike, to be driven in the enemy hull, and
+thence to the submarine, which as it moved away brought the torpedo
+up taut against the spike and caused its explosion. Fulton interested
+Napoleon in his project, submerged frequently for an hour or more,
+and blew up a hulk in Brest harbor. But the greybeards in the French
+navy frowned on these novel methods, declaring them "immoral" and
+"contrary to the laws of war."
+
+[Footnote 1: This name, coined by Fulton, was from the _torpedo
+electricus_, or cramp fish, which kills its victim by electric
+shock.]
+
+[Illustration: BUSHNELL'S TURTLE]
+
+Later the British Government entered into negotiations with the
+inventor, and in October, 1804, used his mines in an unsuccessful
+attack an the French flotilla of invasion at Boulogne. Only one
+pinnace was sunk. Fulton still maintained that he could "sweep
+all military marines off the ocean."[2] But Trafalgar ended his
+chances. As the old Admiral Earl St. Vincent remarked, "Pitt [the
+Prime Minister] would be the greatest fool that ever existed to
+encourage a mode of war which they who command the sea do not want
+and which if successful would deprive them of it." So Fulton took
+£15,000 and dropped his schemes.
+
+[Footnote 2: Letter to Pitt, Jan. 6, 1806.]
+
+[Illustration: FULTON'S NAUTILUS]
+
+Much cruder than the _Nautilus_, owing to their hurried construction,
+were the Confederate "Davids" of the Civil War. One of these launches,
+which ran only semi-submerged, drove a spar torpedo against the
+U. S. S. _New Ironsides_ off Charleston, but it exploded on the
+rebound, too far away. The C. S. S. _Hunley_ was a real submarine,
+and went down readily, but on five occasions it failed to emerge
+properly, and drowned in these experiments about 35 men. In August,
+1864, running on the surface, it sank by torpedo the U. S. Corvette
+_Housatonic_ off Charleston, but went down in the suction of the
+larger vessel, carrying to death its last heroic crew.
+
+By the end of the century, chiefly owing to the genius and patient
+efforts of two American inventors, John P. Holland and Simon Lake,
+the submarine was passing from the experimental to the practical
+stage. Its possibilities were increased by the Whitehead torpedo
+(named after its inventor, a British engineer established in Fiume,
+Austria), which came out in 1868 and was soon adopted in European
+navies. With gyroscopic stabilizing devices and a "warmer" for the
+compressed air of its engine, the torpedo attained before 1900
+a speed of 28 knots and a possible range of 1000 yards. Its first
+victim was the Chilean warship _Blanco_, sunk in 1891 at 50 yards
+after two misses. Thornycroft in England first achieved speed for
+small vessels, and in 1873 began turning out torpedo boats. Destroyers
+came in twenty years later, and by the end of the century were
+making over 30 knots.
+
+Long before this time the lessons of the Civil War had hastened the
+adoption of armor, the new ships ranging from high-sided vessels
+with guns in broadside, as in the past, to low freeboard craft
+influenced by the _Monitor_ design, with a few large guns protected
+by revolving turrets or fixed barbettes, and with better provision
+for all-around fire. Ordnance improved in penetrating power, until
+the old wrought-iron armor had to be 20 inches thick and confined
+to waterline and batteries. Steel "facing" and the later plates of
+Krupp or Harveyized steel made it possible again to lighten and
+spread out the armor, and during the last decade of the century
+it steadily increased its ascendancy over the gun.
+
+_The Battle of Lissa_
+
+The adoption of armor meant sacrifice of armament, and a departure
+from Farragut's well-tried maxim, "The best protection against the
+enemy's fire is a well-sustained fire from your own guns." Thus
+the British _Dreadnought_ of 1872 gave 35% of its displacement to
+armor and only 5% to armament. Invulnerability was secured at the
+expense of offensive power. That aggressive tactics and weapons
+retained all their old value in warfare was to receive timely
+illustration in the Battle of Lissa, fought in the year after the
+American war. The engagement illustrated also another of Farragut's
+pungent maxims to the effect that iron in the ships is less important
+than "iron in the men"--a saying especially true when, as with the
+Austrians at Lissa, the iron is in the chief in command.
+
+In 1866 Italy and Prussia attacked Austria in concert, Italy having
+secured from Bismarck a pledge of Venetia in the event of victory.
+Though beaten at Custozza on June 24, the Italians did their part
+by keeping busy an Austrian army of 80,000. Moltke crushed the
+northern forces of the enemy at Sadowa on July 3, and within three
+weeks had reached the environs of Vienna and practically won the
+war. Lissa was fought on July 20, just 6 days before the armistice.
+This general political and military situation should be borne in
+mind as throwing some light on the peculiar Italian strategy in
+the Lissa campaign.
+
+Struggling Italy, her unification under the House of Piedmont as
+yet only partly achieved, had shown both foresight and energy in
+building up a fleet. Her available force on the day of Lissa consisted
+of 12 armored ships and 16 wooden steam vessels of same fighting
+value. The ironclads included 7 armored frigates, the best of which
+were the two "kings," _Re d'Italia_ and _Re di Portogallo_, built
+the year before in New York (rather badly, it is said), each armed
+with about 30 heavy rifles. Then there was the new single-turret
+ram _Affondatore_, or "Sinker," with two 300-pounder 10-inch rifles,
+which came in from England only the day before the battle. Some
+of the small protected corvettes and gunboats were of much less
+value, the _Palestro_, for instance, which suffered severely in
+the fight, having a thin sheet of armor over only two-fifths of
+her exposed hull.
+
+The Austrian fleet had the benefit of some war experience against
+Denmark in the North Sea two years before, but it was far inferior
+and less up-to-date, its armored ships consisting of 7 screw frigates
+armed chiefly with smoothbores. Of the wooden ships, there were
+7 screw frigates and corvettes, 9 gunboats and schooners, and 3
+little side-wheelers--a total of 19. The following table indicates
+the relative strength:
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+        |Armored | Wooden |Small craft|  Total |  Rifles  |Total w't
+        |--------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|of metal
+        |No.|Guns|No.|Guns| No.| Guns |No.|Guns|No.|Weight|
+--------|---|----|---|----|----|------|---|----|---|------|---------
+Austria |  7| 176|  7| 304| 12 |  52  | 22| 532|121| 7,130| 23,538
+Italy   | 12| 243| 11| 382|  5 |  16  | 28| 641|276|28,700| 53,236
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Thus in general terms the Italians were nearly twice as strong
+in main units, could fire twice as heavy a weight of metal from
+all their guns, and four times as heavy from their rifles. Even
+without the _Affondatore_, their advantage was practically as great
+as this from the beginning of the war.
+
+With such a preponderance, it would seem as if Persano, the Italian
+commander in chief, could easily have executed his savage-sounding
+orders to "sweep the enemy from the Adriatic, and to attack and
+blockade them wherever found." He was dilatory, however, in assembling
+his fleet, negligent in practice and gun drill, and passive in his
+whole policy to a degree absolutely ruinous to morale. War was
+declared June 20, and had long been foreseen; yet it was June 25
+before he moved the bulk of his fleet from Taranto to Ancona in
+the Adriatic. Here on the 27th they were challenged by 13 Austrian
+ships, which lay off the port cleared for action for two hours, while
+Persano made no real move to fight. It is said that the Italian
+defeat at Custozza three days before had taken the heart out of
+him. On July 8 he put to sea for a brief three days' cruise and
+went through some maneuvers and signaling but no firing, though
+many of the guns were newly mounted and had never been tried by
+their crews.
+
+At this time Napoleon III of France had already undertaken mediation
+between the hostile powers. In spite of the orders of June 8, quoted
+above, which seem sufficiently definite, and urgent orders to the
+same effect later, Persano was unwilling to take the offensive,
+and kept complaining of lack of clear instructions as to what he
+should do. He was later convicted of cowardice and negligence;
+but the campaign he finally undertook against Lissa was dangerous
+enough, and it seems possible that some secret political maneuvering
+was partly responsible for his earlier delay.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: In July Persano wrote to the Deputy Boggio: "Leave the
+care of my reputation to me; I would rather be wrongly dishonored
+than rightly condemned. Patience will bring peace; I shall be called
+a traitor, but nevertheless Italy will have her fleet intact, and
+that of Austria will be rendered useless." Quoted in Bernotti,
+IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, p. 177.]
+
+It is significant at least that the final proposal to make a descent
+upon the fortified island of Lissa came not from Persana but from
+the Minister of Marine. On July 15 the latter took up the project
+with the fleet chief of staff, d'Amico, and with Rear Admiral Vacca,
+but not until later with Persano. All agreed that the prospect
+of a truce allowed no time for a movement against Venice or the
+Austrian base at Pola, but that they should strike a swift stroke
+elsewhere. Lissa commanded the Dalmatian coast, was essential to
+naval control in the Adriatic, and was coveted by Italy then as
+in later times. It would be better than trying to crush the enemy
+fleet at the risk of her own if she could enter the peace conference
+with possession of Lissa a _fait accompli_.
+
+Undertaken in the face of an undefeated enemy fleet, this move has
+been justly condemned by naval strategists. But with a less alert
+opponent the coup might have succeeded. Tegetthoff, the Austrian
+commander, was not yet 41 years of age, but had been in active
+naval service since he was 18, and had led a squadron bravely in
+a fight with the Danes two years before off Heligoland. He had
+his heterogeneous array of fighting craft assembled at Pola at
+the outbreak of war. "Give me everything you have," he told the
+Admiralty when they asked him what ships he wanted; "I'll find
+some use for them." His crews were partly men of Slav and Italian
+stock from the Adriatic coast, including 600 from Venice; there
+is no reason for supposing them better than those of Persano. The
+influence of their leader, however, inspired them with loyalty and
+fighting spirit, and their defiance of the Italians at Ancona on
+June 27 increased their confidence. When successive cable messages
+from Lissa satisfied him that the Italian fleet was not attempting
+a diversion but was actually committed to an attack on the island,
+Tegetthoff set out thither on July 19 with his entire fighting
+force. His order of sailing was the order of battle. "Every captain
+knew the admiral's intention as well as the admiral himself did;
+every officer knew what had to be done, and every man had some
+idea of it, and above all knew that he had to fight."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Laughton, STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY, Tegetthoff, p. 164.]
+
+In the meantime the Italian drive on Lissa had gone ahead slowly.
+The island batteries were on commanding heights and manned by marines
+and artillerymen resolved to fight to the last ditch. During the
+second day's bombardment the _Affondatore_ appeared, and also some
+additional troops needed to complete the landing force. Two-thirds
+of the guns on shore were silenced that day, and if the landing
+operations had been pushed, the island captured, and the fleet
+taken into the protected harbor of St. Giorgio, Tegetthoff would
+have had a harder problem to solve. But as the mist blew away with
+a southerly wind at 10 o'clock on the next day, July 20, the weary
+garrison on the heights of the island gave cheer after cheer as
+they saw the Austrian squadron plunging through the head seas at
+full speed from the northeastward, while the Italian ships hurriedly
+drew together north of the island to meet the blow.
+
+The Austrians advanced in three successive divisions, ironclads,
+wooden frigates, and finally the smaller vessels, each in a wedge-shaped
+formation (shown by the diagram), with the apex toward the enemy.
+The object was to drive through the Italian line if possible near
+the van and bring on a close scrimmage in which all ships could
+take part, ramming tactics could be employed, and the enemy would
+profit less by their superiority in armor and guns. Like Nelson's at
+Trafalgar, Tegetthoff's formation was one not likely to be imitated,
+but it was at least simple and well understood, and against a passive
+resistance it gave the results planned.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866]
+
+"_Ecco i pescatori!_" (Here come the fishermen), cried Persana,
+with a scorn he was far from actually feeling. The Italians were
+in fact caught at a disadvantage. One of their best ships, the
+_Formidabile_, had been put _hors de combat_ by the batteries
+on the day before. Another, coming in late from the west end of
+the island, took no part in the action. The wooden ships, owing
+to the cowardice of their commander, Albini, also kept out of the
+fight, though Persano signaled desperately to them to enter the
+engagement and "surround the enemy rear." With his remaining ironclads
+Persano formed three divisions of three ships each and swung across
+the enemy's bows in line ahead. Just at the critical moment, and
+for no very explicable motive, he shifted his flag from the _Re
+d'Italia_ in the center to the _Affondatore_, which was steaming
+alone on the starboard side of the line. The change was not noted
+by all his ships, and thus caused confusion of orders. The delay
+involved also left a wider gap between van and center, and through
+this the Austrians plunged, Tegetthoff in his flagship _Erzherzog
+Ferdinand Max_ leading the way.
+
+Here orderly formation ended, and only the more striking episodes
+stand out in a desperate close combat, during which the black ships
+of Austria and the gray of Italy rammed or fired into each other
+amid a smother of smoke and spray. The Austrian left flank and
+rear held up the Italian van; the Austrian ironclads engaged the
+Italian center; and the wooden ships of the Austrian middle division,
+led by the 92-gun _Kaiser_, smashed into the Italian rear. Of all
+the Austrian ships, the big _Kaiser_, a relic of other days, saw
+the hardest fighting. Twice she avoided the _Affondatore's_ ram,
+and she was struck by one of her 300-pound projectiles. Then the
+_Re di Portogallo_ bore down, but Petz, the _Kaiser's_ captain,
+rang for full speed ahead and steered for the ironclad, striking
+a glancing blow and scraping past her, while both ships poured in
+a heavy fire. The _Kaiser_ soon afterward drew out of the action,
+her foremast and funnel down, and a bad blaze burning amidships.
+Altogether she fired 850 rounds in the action, or about one-fifth
+of the total fired by the Austrians, and she received 80 hits,
+again one-fifth of the total. Of the 38 Austrians killed and 138
+wounded in the battle, she lost respectively 24 and 75.
+
+The _Kaiser's_ combat, though more severe, was typical of what
+was going on elsewhere. The Italian gunboat _Palestro_ was forced
+to withdraw to fight a fire that threatened her magazines. The
+_Re d'Italia_, which was at first supposed by the Austrians to be
+Persano's flagship, was a center of attack and had her steering
+gear disabled. As she could go only straight ahead or astern, the
+Austrian flagship seized the chance and rammed her squarely amidships
+at full speed, crashing through her armor and opening an immense
+hole. The Italian gunboat heeled over to starboard, then back again,
+and in a few seconds went down, with a loss of 381 men.
+
+This spectacular incident practically decided the battle. After
+an hour's fighting the two squadrons drew apart about noon, the
+Austrians finally entering St. Giorgio harbor and the Italians
+withdrawing to westward. During the retreat the fire on the _Palestro_
+reached her ammunition and she blew up with a loss of 231 of her
+crew. Except in the two vessels destroyed, the Italian losses were
+slight--8 killed and 40 wounded. But the armored ships were badly
+battered, and less than a month later the _Affondatore_ sank in a
+squall in Ancona harbor, partly, it was thought, owing to injuries
+received at Lissa.
+
+For a long time after this fight, an exaggerated view was held
+regarding the value of ramming, line abreast formation, and bow
+fire. Weapons condition tactics, and these tactics of Tegetthoff
+were suited to the means he had to work with. But they were not
+those which should have been adopted by his opponents; nor would
+they have been successful had the Italians brought their broadsides
+to bear on a parallel course and avoided a mêlée. What the whole
+campaign best illustrates--and the lesson has permanent interest--is
+how a passive and defensive policy, forced upon the Italian fleet
+by the incompetence of its admiral or otherwise, led to its
+demoralization and ultimate destruction. After a long period of
+inactivity, Persano weakened his force against shore defenses before
+he had disposed of the enemy fleet, and was then taken at a
+disadvantage. His passive strategy was reflected in his tactics.
+He engaged with only a part of his force, and without a definite
+plan; "A storm of signals swept over his squadron" as it went into
+action. What really decided the battle was not the difference in
+ships, crews, or weapons, but the difference in aggressiveness
+and ability of the two admirals in command.
+
+_The Battle of the Yalu_
+
+Twenty-eight years elapsed after Lissa before the next significant
+naval action, the Battle of the Yalu, between fleets of China and
+Japan. Yet the two engagements may well be taken together, since
+at the Yalu types and tactics were still transitional, and the
+initial situation at Lissa was duplicated--line abreast against
+line ahead. The result, however, was reversed, for the Japanese
+in line ahead took the initiative, used their superior speed to
+conduct the battle on their own terms, and won the day.
+
+Trouble arose in the Far East over the dissolution of the decrepit
+monarchy of Korea, upon which both Japan and China cast covetous
+eyes. As nominal suzerain, China in the spring of 1894 sent 2000
+troops to Korea to suppress an insurrection, without observing
+certain treaty stipulations which required her to notify Japan. The
+latter nation despatched 5000 men to Chemulpo in June. Hostilities
+broke out on July 25, when four fast Japanese cruisers, including the
+_Naniwa Kan_ under the future Admiral Togo, fell upon the Chinese
+cruiser _Tsi-yuen_ and two smaller vessels, captured the latter
+and battered the cruiser badly before she got away, and then to
+complete the day's work sank a Chinese troop transport, saving
+only the European officers on board.
+
+After this affair the Chinese Admiral Ting, a former cavalry officer
+but with some naval experience, favored taking the offensive, since
+control of the sea by China would at once decide the war. But the
+Chinese Foreign Council gave him orders not to cruise east of a
+line from Shantung to the mouth of the Yalu. Reverses on land soon
+forced him to give all his time to troop transportation, and this
+occupied both navies throughout the summer.
+
+On September 16, the day before the Battle of the Yalu, the Chinese
+battleships escorted transports with 5000 troops to the mouth of
+the Yalu, and on the following morning they were anchored quietly
+outside the river. "For weeks," writes an American naval officer
+who was in command of one of the Chinese battleships, "we had
+anticipated an engagement, and had had daily exercise at general
+quarters, etc., and little remained to be done.... The fleet went
+into action as well prepared as it was humanly possible for it
+to be with the same officers and men, handicapped as they were
+by official corruption and treachery ashore."[1] As the midday
+meal was in preparation, columns of black smoke appeared to
+southwestward. The squadron at once weighed anchor, cleared for
+action, and put on forced draft, while "dark-skinned men, with
+queues tightly coiled around their heads, and with arms bare to the
+elbow, clustered along the decks in groups at the guns, waiting to
+kill or be killed." Out of the smoke soon emerged 12 enemy cruisers
+which, with information of the Chinese movements, had entered the
+Gulf intent on battle.
+
+[Footnote 1: Commander P. N. McGiffin, THE BATTLE OF THE YALU,
+_Century Magazine_, August, 1895, pp. 585-604.]
+
+The forces about to engage included the best ships of both nations.
+There were 12 on each side, excluding 4 Chinese torpedo boats, and
+10 actually in each battle line. The main strength of the Chinese
+was concentrated in two second-class battleships, the _Ting-yuen_
+and the _Chen-yuen_, Stettin-built in 1882, each of 7430 tons, with
+14-inch armor over half its length, four 12-inch Krupp guns in two
+barbettes, and 6-inch rifles at bow and stern. The two barbettes
+were _en echelon_ (the starboard just ahead of the port), in such a
+way that while all four guns could fire dead ahead only two could bear
+on the port quarter or the starboard bow. These ships were designed
+for fighting head-on; and hence to use them to best advantage Admiral
+Ting formed his squadron in line abreast, with the _Ting-yuen_ and
+_Chen-yuen_ in the center. The rest of the line were a "scratch
+lot" of much smaller vessels--two armored cruisers (_Lai-yuen_ and
+_King-yuen_) with 8 to 9-inch armored belts; three protected
+cruisers (_Tsi-yuen, Chi-yuen_, and _Kwang-ping_) with 2 to 4-inch
+armored decks; on the left flank the old corvette _Kwang-chia_;
+and opposite her two other "lame ducks" of only 1300 tons, the
+_Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_. Ting had properly strengthened his
+center, but had left his flanks fatally weak. On board the flagship
+_Ting-yuen_ was Major von Hannekin, China's military adviser, and
+an ex-petty officer of the British navy named Nichols. Philo N.
+McGiffin, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, commanded
+the _Chen-yuen_.
+
+The Japanese advanced in column, or line ahead, in two divisions.
+The first, or "flying squadron," was led by Rear Admiral Tsuboi
+in the _Yoshino_, and consisted of four fast protected cruisers.
+Four similar ships, headed by Vice Admiral Ito in the _Matsushima_,
+formed the chief units of the main squadron, followed by the older
+and slower ironclads, _Fuso_ and _Hiyei_. The little gunboat
+_Akagi_ and the converted steamer _Saikio Maru_ had orders not
+to engage, but nevertheless pushed in on the left of the line.
+Aside from their two battleships, the Chinese had nothing to compare
+with these eight new and well-armed cruisers, the slowest of which
+could make 17-1/2 knots.
+
+In armament the Japanese also had a marked advantage, as the following
+table, from Wilsan's _Ironclads in Action_, will show:
+
+---------------------------------------------------------------
+      |SHIPS |         GUNS                |SHOTS IN 10 MINUTES
+      |------|-----------------------------|-------------------
+      |      |      |  Large   |Small q. f.|       | Weight of
+      |Number|6-inch|quick fire|and machine|Number |   metal
+------|------|------|----------|-----------|-------|-----------
+China |  12  |  40  |    2     |    130    |   33  |   4,885
+Japan |  10  |  34  |   66     |    154    |  185  |  11,706
+---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The smaller quick-fire and machine guns proved of slight value
+on either side, but the large Japanese quick-firers searched all
+unprotected parts of the enemy ships with a terrific storm of shells.
+After the experience of July 25, the Chinese had discarded much
+of their woodwork and top hamper, including boats, thin steel
+gun-shields, rails, needless rigging, etc., and used coal and sand
+bags an the upper decks; but the unarmored ships nevertheless suffered
+severely. From the table it is evident that the Japanese could
+pour in six times as great a volume of fire. The Chinese had a
+slight advantage in heavier guns, and their marksmanship, it is
+claimed, was equally accurate (possibly 10% hits on each side), but
+their ammunition was defective and consisted mostly of non-bursting
+projectiles. They had only 15 rounds of shell for each gun.
+
+During the approach the Japanese steered at first for the enemy
+center, thus concealing their precise objective, and then swung to
+port, with the aim of attacking on the weaker side of the Chinese
+battleships (owing to their barbette arrangement) and on the weaker
+flank of the line. In the meantime the Chinese steamed forward at
+about 6 knots and turned somewhat to keep head-on, thus forcing the
+Japanese to file across their bows. At 12.20 p.m. the _Chen-yuen_
+and _Ting-yuen_ opened at 5800 yards on Tsuboi's squadron, which
+held its fire until at 3000 yards or closer it swung around the
+Chinese right wing.
+
+The main squadron followed. Admiral Ito has been criticized for thus
+drawing his line across the enemy's advance, instead of attacking
+their left flank. But he was previously committed to the movement,
+and executed it rapidly and for the most part at long range. Had
+the Chinese pressed forward at best speed, Lissa might have been
+repeated. As it was, they cut off only the _Hiyei_. To avoid ramming,
+this old ironclad plunged boldly between the _Chen-yuen_ and
+_Ting-yuen_. She was hit 22 times and had 56 killed and wounded,
+but managed to pull through.
+
+Before this time the _Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_ on the right
+flank of the Chinese line had crumpled under a heavy cross-fire
+from the flying squadron. These ships had wooden cabins on deck
+outboard, and the whole superstructure soon became roaring masses
+of flames. Both dropped out of line and burned to the water's edge.
+The two ships on the opposite flank had seized an early opportunity
+to withdraw astern of the line, and were now off for Port Arthur
+under full steam, "followed," writes McGiffin, "by a string of
+Chinese anathemas from our men at the guns."
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPT. 17, 1894]
+
+The Japanese van turned to port and was thus for some time out
+of action. The main division turned to starboard and circled the
+Chinese rear. Of the 6 Chinese ships left in the line, the four
+smaller seem now to have moved on to southward, while both Japanese
+divisions concentrated on the two battleships _Chen-yuen_ and
+_Ting-yuen_. These did their best to keep head to the enemy, and
+stood up doggedly, returning slowly the fire of the circling
+cruisers. Tsuboi soon turned away to engage the lighter vessels.
+Finally, at 3.26, as the _Matsushima_ closed to about 2000 yards,
+the _Chen-yuen_ hit her fairly with a last remaining 12-inch shell.
+This one blow put Ito's flagship out of action, exploding some
+ammunition, killing or wounding 50 or more men, and starting a
+dangerous fire. The Japanese hauled off, while according to Chinese
+accounts the battleships actually followed, but at 4.30 came again
+under a severe fire. About 5.30, when the Chinese were practically
+out of ammunition, Ito finally withdrew and recalled his van.
+
+Of the other Chinese ships, the _Chi-yuen_ made a desperate attempt
+to approach the Japanese van and went down at 3.30 with screws
+racing in the air. The _King-yuen_, already on fire, was shot to
+pieces and sunk an hour later by the _Yoshino's_ quick-firers.
+As the sun went down, the _Lai-yuen_ and _Kwang-ping_, with two
+ships from the river mouth, fell in behind the battleships and
+staggered off towards Port Arthur, unpursued. The losses on the
+two armored ships had been relatively slight--56 killed and
+wounded. The Japanese lost altogether 90 killed and 204 wounded,
+chiefly on the _Matsushima_ and _Hiyei_.
+
+Though China saved her best ships from the battle, her fighting
+spirit was done for. The battleships were later destroyed by Japanese
+torpedo operations after the fall of Wei-hai-wei. Her crews had on
+the whole fought bravely, handicapped as they were by their poor
+materials and lack of skill. For instance, when McGiffin called
+for volunteers to extinguish a fire on the _Chen-yuen's_ forecastle,
+swept by enemy shells, "men responded heartily and went to what
+seemed to them certain death." It was at this time that the commander
+himself, leading the party, was knocked over by a shell explosion
+and then barely escaped the blast of one of his own 12-inch guns
+by rolling through an open hatch and falling 8 feet to a pile of
+débris below.
+
+In the way of lessons, aside from the obvious ones as to the value
+of training and expert leadership and the necessity of eliminating
+inflammables in ship construction, the battle revealed on the one
+hand the great resisting qualities of the armored ship, and on
+the other hand the offensive value of superior gunfire. Admiral
+Mahan said at the time that "The rapid fire gun has just now fairly
+established its position as the greatest offensive weapon in naval
+warfare."[1] Another authority has noted that, both at Lissa and
+the Yalu, "The winning fleet was worked in divisions, as was the
+British fleet in the Dutch wars and at Trafalgar, and the Japanese
+fleet afterwards at Tsushima." Remarking that experiments with
+this method were made by the British Channel Fleet in 1904, the
+writer continues: "The conception grew out of a study of Nelson's
+Memorandum. Its essence was to make the fleet flexible in the hands
+of the admiral, and to enable any part to be moved by the shortest
+line to the position where it was most required."[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: LESSONS FROM THE YALU FIGHT, _Century Magazine_, August,
+1895, p. 630.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Custance, THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 103.]
+
+By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) which closed the war,
+Japan won Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Pescadores
+Islands and Formosa, and China's withdrawal from Korea. But just as
+she was about to lay hands on these generous fruits of victory,
+they were snatched out of her grasp by the European powers, which
+began exploiting China for themselves. Japan had to acquiesce and
+bide her time, using her war indemnity and foreign loans to build
+up her fleet. The Yalu thus not only marks the rise of Japan as
+a formidable force in international affairs, but brings us to a
+period of intensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far
+East and elsewhere which gave added significance to naval power
+and led to the war of 1914.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Aside from those already cited see:
+ROBERT FULTON, ENGINEER AND ARTIST, H. W. Dickinson, 1913.
+THE STORY OF THE GUNS, J. E. Tennant, 1864.
+THE BRITISH NAVY, Sir Thomas Brassey, 1884.
+CLOWES' HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. VII (p. 20, bibliography).
+NAVAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 19TH CENTURY, N. Barnaby, 1904.
+THE TORPEDO IN PEACE AND WAR, F. T. Jane, 1898.
+SUBMARINE WARFARE, H. C. Fyfe, 1902.
+THE SUBMARINE IN WAR AND PEACE, Simon Lake, 1918.
+FOUR MODERN NAVAL CAMPAIGNS, Lissa, W. L. Clowes, 1902.
+THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN NAVAL WAR, Journal of the United Service
+  Institution, Vol. XI, pp. 104ff.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
+
+Even more significant in its relation to sea power than the revolution
+in armaments during the 19th century was the extraordinary growth
+of ocean commerce. The total value of the world's import and export
+trade in 1800 amounted in round numbers to 1-1/2 billion dollars,
+in 1850 to 4 billion, and in 1900 to nearly 24 billion. In other
+words, during a period in which the population of the world was not
+more than tripled, its international exchange of commodities was
+increased 16-fold. This growth was of course made possible largely
+by progress in manufacturing, increased use of steam navigation,
+and vastly greater output of coal and iron.[1] At the end of the
+Napoleonic wars England was the only great commercial and industrial
+state. At the close of the century, though with her colonies she
+still controlled one-fourth of the world's foreign trade, she faced
+aggressive rivals in the field. The United States after her Civil
+War, and Germany after her unification and the Franco-Prussian
+War, had achieved an immense industrial development, opening up
+resources in coal and iron that made them formidable competitors.
+Germany in particular, a late comer in the colonial field, felt
+that her future lay upon the seas, as a means of securing access on
+favorable terms to world markets and raw materials. Other nations
+also realized that their continued growth and prosperity would
+depend upon commercial expansion. This might be accomplished in a
+measure by cheaper production and superior business organization,
+but could be greatly aided by political means--by colonial activity,
+by securing control or special privileges in unexploited areas
+and backward states, by building up a merchant fleet under the
+national flag. Obviously, since the seas join the continents and
+form the great highways of trade, this commercial and political
+expansion would give increased importance to naval power.
+
+[Footnote 1: Coal production increased during the century from
+11.6 million tons to 610 million, and pig iron from half a million
+tons to 37 million. Figures from Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Ch.
+XXVIII.]
+
+Admiral Mahan, an acute political observer as well as strategist,
+summed up the international situation in 1895 and again in 1897 as
+"an equilibrium on the [European] Continent, and, in connection
+with the calm thus resulting, an immense colonizing movement in
+which all the great powers were concerned."[1] Later, in 1911, he
+noted that colonial rivalries had again been superseded by rivalries
+within Europe, but pointed out that the European tension was itself
+largely the product of activities and ambitions in more distant
+spheres. In fact the international developments of recent times,
+whether in the form of colonial enterprises, armament competition,
+or actual warfare, find a common origin in economic and commercial
+interests. Commerce and quick communications have drawn the world
+into closer unity, yet by a kind of paradox have increased the
+possibilities of conflict. Both by their common origin and by their
+far-reaching consequences, it is thus possible to connect the story
+of naval events from the Spanish-American to the World War, and to
+gather them up under the general title, "rivalry for world power."
+
+1. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
+
+To this rivalry the United States could hardly hope or desire to
+remain always a passive spectator, yet, aside from trying to stabilize
+the western hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine, she cherished down
+to the year 1898 a policy of isolation from world affairs. During
+the first half of the 19th century, it is true, her interests were
+directed outward by a flourishing merchant marine. In 1860 the
+American merchant fleet of 2,500,000 tons was second only to Great
+Britain's and nearly equal to that of all other nations combined.
+But its decay had already begun, and continued rapidly. The change
+from wood to iron construction enabled England to build cheaper
+ships; and American shipping suffered also from lack of government
+patronage, diversion of capital into mare profitable projects of
+Western development, and loss of a third of its tonnage by destruction
+or shift to foreign register during the Civil War. At the outbreak
+of that war 72 per cent of American exports were carried in American
+bottoms; only 9 per cent in 1913. Thus the United States had reached
+the unsatisfactory condition of a nation with a large and rapidly
+growing foreign commerce and an almost non-existent merchant marine.
+
+[Footnote 1: NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 104.]
+
+This was the situation when the nation was thrust suddenly and
+half unwillingly into the main stream of international events by
+the Spanish-American War. Though this war made the United States
+a world power, commercial or political aggrandizement played no
+part in her entry into the struggle. It arose solely from the
+intolerable conditions created by Spanish misrule in Cuba, and
+intensified by armed rebellion since 1895. Whatever slight hope
+or justification for non-intervention remained was destroyed by
+the blowing up of the _U. S. S. Maine_ in Havana harbor, February
+15, 1898, with the loss of 260 of her complement of 354 officers
+and men. Thereafter the United States pushed her preparations for
+war; but the resolution of Congress, April 19, 1898, authorizing
+the President to begin hostilities expressly stated that the United
+States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba,
+and after its pacification would "leave the government and control
+of the island to its people."
+
+It was at once recognized that the conflict would be primarily
+naval, and would be won by the nation that secured control of the
+sea. The paper strength of the two navies left little to choose,
+and led even competent critics like Admiral Colomb in England to
+prophesy a stalemate--a "desultory war." Against five new American
+battleships, the _Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon_ and _Texas_,
+the first four of 10,000 tons, and the armored cruisers _Brooklyn_
+and _New York_ of 9000 and 8000 tans, Spain could oppose the
+battleship _Pelayo_, a little better than the _Texas_ and five
+armored cruisers, the _Carlos V, Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante
+Oquendo_, and _Vizcaya_, each of about 7000 tons, and the somewhat
+larger and very able former Italian cruiser _Cristobal Colon_.
+Figures and statistics, however, give no idea of the actual weakness
+of the Spanish navy, handicapped by shiftless naval administration,
+by dependence on foreign sources of supply, and by the incompetence
+and lack of training of personnel. Of the squadron that came to
+Cuba under Admiral Cervera, the _Colon_ lacked two 10-inch guns
+for her barbettes, and the _Vizcaya_ was so foul under water that
+with a trial speed of 18-1/2 knots she never made above 13--Cervera
+called her a "buoy." There was no settled plan of campaign; to
+Cervera's requests for instructions came the ministerial reply
+that "in these moments of international crisis no definite plans
+can be formulated."[1] The despairing letters of the Spanish Admiral
+and his subordinates reveal how feeble was the reed upon which
+Spain had to depend for the preservation of her colonial empire.
+The four cruisers and two destroyers that sailed from the Cape
+Verde Islands on April 29 were Spain's total force available. The
+_Pelayo_ and the _Carlos V_, not yet ready, were the only ships of
+value left behind.
+
+[Footnote 1: Bermejo to Cervera, April 4, 1898.]
+
+On the American naval list, in addition to the main units already
+mentioned, there were six monitors of heavy armament but indifferent
+fighting value, a considerable force of small cruisers, four converted
+liners for scouts, and a large number of gunboats, converted yachts,
+etc., which proved useful in the Cuban blockade. Of these forces
+the majority were assembled in the Atlantic theater of war. The
+_Oregon_ was on the West Coast, and made her famous voyage of 14,700
+miles around Cape Horn in 79 days, at an average speed of 11.6
+knots, leaving Puget Sound on March 6 and touching at Barbados in
+the West Indies an May 18, just as the Spanish fleet was steaming
+across the Caribbean. The cruise effectively demonstrated the danger
+of a divided navy and the need of an Isthmian canal. Under Commodore
+Dewey in the Far East were two gunboats and four small cruisers,
+the best of them the fast and heavily armed flagship _Olympia_,
+of 5800 tons.
+
+_The Battle of Manila Bay_
+
+[Illustration: APPROACHES TO MANILA]
+
+With this latter force the first blow of the war was struck on May
+1 in Manila Bay. Dewey, largely through the influence of Assistant
+Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, had been appointed to the eastern
+command the autumn before. On reaching his station in January, he
+took his squadron to Hong Kong to be close to the scene of possible
+hostilities. On February 25 he received a despatch from Roosevelt,
+then Acting Secretary: "Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration
+of war Spain, your duty will be to see that Spanish squadron does
+not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the
+Philippine Islands." On April 25 came the inspiring order: "Proceed
+at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly
+against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use
+utmost endeavor." The Commodore had already purchased a collier and
+a supply ship for use in addition to the revenue cutter _McCulloch_,
+overhauled his vessels and given them a war coat of slate-gray, and
+made plans for a base at Mirs Bay, 30 miles distant in Chinese
+waters, where he would be less troubled by neutrality rules in time
+of war. On April 22 the _Baltimore_ arrived from San Francisco
+with much-needed ammunition. On the 27th Consul Williams joined
+with latest news of preparations at Manila, and that afternoon
+the squadron put to sea.
+
+On the morning of the 30th it was off Luzon, and two ships scouted
+Subig Bay, which the enemy had left only 24 hours before. At 12 that
+night Dewey took his squadron in column through the entrance to Manila
+Bay, just as he had steamed past the forts on the Mississippi with
+Farragut 35 years before. Only three shots were fired by the guns
+on shore. The thoroughness of Dewey's preparations, the rapidity
+of his movements up to this point, and his daring passage through a
+channel which he had reason to believe strongly defended by mines
+and shore batteries are the just titles of his fame. The entrance to
+Manila is indeed 10 miles wide and divided into separate channels by
+the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile. The less frequented
+channel chosen was, as Dewey rightly judged, too deep for mining
+except by experts. Yet the Spanish had news of his approach the
+day before; they had 17 guns, including 6 modern rifles, on the
+islands guarding the entrance; they had plenty of gunboats that
+might have been fitted out as torpedo launches for night attack.
+It does not detract from the American officer's accomplishment
+that he drew no false picture of the obstacles with which he had
+to deal.
+
+At daybreak next morning, having covered slowly the 24 miles from
+the mouth of the bay up to Manila, the American ships advanced
+past the city to attack the Spanish flotilla drawn up under the
+Cavite batteries 6 miles beyond. Here was what an American officer
+described as "a collection of old tubs scarcely fit to be called
+men-of-war." The most serviceable was Admiral Montojo's flagship
+_Reina Cristina_, an unarmored cruiser of 3500 tons; the remaining
+half dozen were older ships of both wood and iron, some of them
+not able to get under way. They mounted 31 guns above 4-inch to
+the Americans' 53. More serious in prospect, though not in reality,
+was the danger from shore batteries and mines. The United States
+vessels approached in column, led by the _Olympia_, which opened
+fire at 5.40. In the words of Admiral Dewey's report, "The squadron
+maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5000
+to 2000 yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel
+to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but
+generally ineffective. Three runs were made from the eastward and
+three from the westward, so that both broadsides were brought to
+bear." One torpedo launch which dashed out was sunk and another
+driven ashore. The _Cristina_ moved out as if to ram, but staggered
+back under the _Olympia's_ concentrated fire. At 7.35, owing to a
+mistaken report that only 15 rounds of ammunition were left for the
+5-inch guns, the American squadron retired temporarily, but renewed
+action at 11.16 and ended it an hour later, when the batteries were
+silenced and "every enemy ship sunk, burned or deserted."
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898]
+
+As reported by Admiral Montojo, the Spanish lost 381 men. The American
+ships were hit only 15 times and had 7 men slightly injured. Volume
+and accuracy of gunfire won the day. Somewhat extravagant language
+has been used in describing the battle, which, whatever the perils
+that might naturally have been expected, was a most one-sided affair.
+But it is less easy to overpraise Admiral Dewey's energetic and
+aggressive handling of the entire campaign.
+
+Manila thereafter lay helpless under the guns of the squadron,
+and upon the arrival and landing of troops surrendered on August
+13, after a merely formal defense. In the interim, Spain sent out
+a relief force under Admiral Camara consisting of the _Pelaya,
+Carlos V_ and other smaller units, before encountering which Dewey
+planned to leave Manila and await the arrival of two monitors then
+on their way from San Francisco. After getting through the Suez
+Canal, Camara was brought back (July 8) by an American threat against
+the coast of Spain.
+
+Soon after the battle a number of foreign warships congregated
+at Manila, including 5 German ships under Admiral von Diedrichs,
+a force superior to Dewey's, and apparently bent on learning by
+persistent contravention all the rules of a blockaded port. The
+message finally sent to the German Admiral is reticently described
+by Dewey himself, but is said to have been to the effect that, if
+the German admiral wanted a fight, "he could have it right now."
+On the day of the surrender of Manila the British and the Japanese
+ships in the harbor took a position between the American and the
+German squadrons. This was just after the seizure of Kiao-chau,
+at a time when Germany was vigorously pushing out for "a place in
+the sun." But for the American commander's quiet yet firm stand,
+with British support, the United States might have encountered
+more serious complications in taking over 127,000 square miles of
+archipelago in the eastern world, with important trade interests,
+a lively insurrection, and a population of 7 million.
+
+_The Santiago Campaign_
+
+In the Atlantic, where it was the American policy not to carry
+their offensive beyond Spain's West Indies possessions, events
+moved more slowly. Rear Admiral Sicard, in command of the North
+Atlantic squadron based on Key West, was retired in March for physical
+disability and succeeded by William T. Sampson, who stepped up
+naturally from senior captain in the squadron and was already
+distinguished for executive ability and knowledge of ordnance. Sampson's
+first proposal was, in the event of hostilities, a bombardment of
+Havana, a plan approved by all his captains and showing a confidence
+inspired perhaps by coastal operations in the Civil War; but this
+was properly vetoed by the Department on the ground that no ships
+should be risked against shore defenses until they had struck at
+the enemy's naval force and secured control of the sea. An earlier
+memorandum from Secretary Long, outlining plans for a blockade
+of Cuba, had been based on suggestions from Rear Admiral (then
+Captain) Mahan,[1] and his strategic insight may have guided this
+decision. On April 22, Sampson, now acting rear admiral, placed
+his force off Havana and established a close blockade over 100
+miles on the northern coast.
+
+[Footnote 1: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 19.]
+
+The problem for American strategy was now Cervera's "fleet in
+being,"--inferior in force but a menace until destroyed or put out
+of action--which, as before stated, left the Cape Verde Islands
+on April 29, for a destination unknown. A bombardment of cities on
+the American coast or a raid on the North Atlantic trade routes
+was within the realm of possibilities. Difficulties of coaling
+and an inveterate tendency to leave the initiative to the enemy
+decided the Spanish against such a project. But its bare possibility
+set the whole east coast in a panic, which has been much ridiculed,
+but which arose naturally enough from a complete lack of instruction
+in naval matters and from lack of a sensible control of the press.
+The result was an unfortunate division of the fleet. A so-called
+Flying squadron under Commodore Schley, consisting of the _Brooklyn,
+Massachusetts, Texas,_ and 3 small cruisers, was held at Hampton
+Roads; whereas, if not thus employed, these ships might have blockaded
+the south side of Cuba from the beginning of the war. A northern
+patrol squadron, of vessels not of much use for this or any other
+purpose, was also organized to guard the coast from Hampton Roads
+north.
+
+On May 4, with Cervera still at large, Sampson lifted his guard of
+Havana--unwisely in the opinion of Mahan--and took his best ships,
+the _New York, Indiana, Iowa,_ and two monitors, to reconnoiter San
+Juan, Porto Rico, where it was thought the missing fleet might
+first appear. Just as he was bombarding San Juan, on the morning
+of May 12, the Navy Department received a cable from Martinique
+announcing Cervera's arrival there. Havana and Cienfuegos (on the
+south side of Cuba and connected with Havana by rail) were considered
+the only two ports where the Spanish fleet could be of value to
+the forces on the island; and from these two ports both American
+squadrons were at this time a thousand miles away. Schley hastened
+southward, left Key West on the 19th, and was off Cienfuegos by
+daylight on the 21st. It was fairly quick work; but had the Spanish
+fleet moved thither at its usual speed of 6 knots from its last
+stopping-place, it would have got there first by at least 12 hours.
+The Spanish admiral, finding no coal at Martinique, had left a
+crippled destroyer there and moved on to the Dutch island of Curaçao,
+where on the 14th and 15th he secured with difficulty about 500
+tons of fuel. Thence, in all anxiety, he made straight for the
+nearest possible refuge, Santiago, where he put in at daybreak on
+the 19th and was soon receiving congratulations on the completion
+of a successful cruise.
+
+[Illustration: WEST INDIES
+
+Movements in the Santiago campaign.]
+
+By the next day Sampson, having hurried back from San Juan and
+coaled, was again in force off Havana. There he received news of
+Cervera's arrival in Santiago. Since Havana could not be uncovered,
+he sent instructions to Schley--at first discretionary, and then,
+as the reports were confirmed, more imperative--to blockade the
+eastern port. Though the commander of the Flying Squadron received
+the latter orders on the 23d, he had seen smoke in Cienfuegos harbor
+and still believed he had Cervera cornered there. Accordingly he
+delayed until evening of the next day. Then, after reaching Santiago,
+he cabled on the 27th that he was returning to Key West to coal,
+though he had a collier with him and stringent orders to the contrary;
+and it was not until the 29th that he actually established the
+Santiago Blockade. Sampson, his superior in command (though not
+his senior in the captains' list), later declared his conduct at
+this time "reprehensible"[1]--possibly too harsh a term, for the
+circumstances tried judgment and leadership in the extreme. Cervera
+found Santiago destitute of facilities for refitting. Yet the fact
+remains that he had 10 days in which to coal and get away. "We
+cannot," writes Admiral Mahan, "expect ever again to have an enemy
+so inept as Spain showed herself to be."[1*]
+
+[Footnote 1: Letter to Secretary, July 10, 1898, SAMPSON-SCHLEY
+DOCUMENTS, p. 136: "Had the commodore left his station at that
+time he probably would have been court-martialed, so plain was
+his duty.... This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from
+his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him
+ample justice on this occasion." A court of inquiry later decided
+that Commodore Schley's service up to June 1 was characterized
+by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise."]
+
+[Footnote 1*: LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, p. 157.]
+
+The "bottling up" of Cervera cleared the situation, and the navy
+could now concentrate on a task still difficult but well defined.
+Sampson brought his force to Santiago on June 1, and assumed immediate
+command. A close blockade was instituted such as against adequate
+torpedo and mine defenses would have been highly dangerous even
+at that day. Three picket launches were placed about a mile off
+shore, three small vessels a mile further out, and beyond these
+the 5 or 6 major units, under steam and headed toward the entrance
+in a carefully planned disposition to meet any attempt at escape.
+At night a battleship stood in and played its searchlight directly
+on the mouth of the channel. The latter was six miles in length,
+with difficult turns, and at the narrowest point only 300 feet
+wide. Lieut. Hobson's gallant effort on June 3 to sink the collier
+_Merrimac_ across the channel had made its navigation even more
+difficult, though the vessel did not lie athwart-stream. Mine barriers
+and batteries on the high hills at the harbor mouth prevented forcing
+the channel, but the guns were mostly of ancient type and failed to
+keep the ships at a distance. On the other hand, bombardments from
+the latter did little more than to afford useful target practice.
+
+The despatch of troops to Santiago was at once decided upon, and
+the subsequent campaign, if it could be fully studied, would afford
+interesting lessons in combined operations. On June 22, 16,000 men
+under General Shafter landed at Daiquiri, 15 miles east of Santiago,
+in 52 boats provided by the fleet, though the War Department had
+previously stated that the general would "land his own troops."[2]
+"It was done in a scramble," writes Col. Roosevelt; and there was
+great difficulty in getting the skippers of army transports to bring
+their vessels within reasonable distance of the shore. Since the sole
+object of the campaign was to get at and destroy the enemy fleet,
+the navy fully expected and understood that the army would make its
+first aim to advance along the coast and capture the batteries at
+the entrance, so that the mines could be lifted and the harbor
+forced. Army authorities declare this would have involved division
+of forces on both sides of the channel and impossibilities of
+transportation due to lack of roads. But these difficulties applied
+also in a measure to the defenders, and might perhaps have been
+surmounted by full use of naval aid.
+
+[Footnote 2: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 182.]
+
+Instead, the army set out with some confidence to capture the city
+itself. El Caney and San Juan Hill were seized on July 2 after
+a bloody struggle in which the Spanish stuck to their defenses
+heroically and inflicted 1600 casualties. By their own figures the
+Spanish on this day had only 1700 men engaged, though there were
+36,500 Spanish troops in the province and 12,000 near at hand. In
+considerable discouragement, Shafter now spoke of withdrawal, and
+urged Sampson "immediately to force the entrance"[1]--in spite of
+the fact that the main purpose in sending troops had been to avoid
+this very measure. In view of threatening foreign complications
+and the impossibility of replacing battleships, it was imperative
+not to risk them against mines.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, p. 190.]
+
+Food conditions were serious in Santiago, but Cervera was absolutely
+determined not to assume responsibility for taking his fleet out to
+what he regarded as certain slaughter. A night sortie, with ships
+issuing one by one out of an intricate channel into the glare of
+searchlights, he declared more difficult than one by day. Fortunately
+for the Americans, in view of the situation ashore, the decision was
+taken out of his hands, and Governor General Blanco from Havana
+peremptorily ordered him to put to sea. The time of his exit, Sunday
+morning, July 3, was luckily chosen, for Sampson, in the _New York_,
+was 10 miles to eastward on his way to a conference with Shafter,
+and the _Massachusetts_ was at Guantanamo for coal. The flagship
+_Maria Teresa_ led out at 9.35, followed 10 minutes later by the
+_Vizcaya_, and then by the _Colon, Oquendo_, and the destroyers
+_Furor_ and _Pluton_, each turning westward at top speed.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898]
+
+Simultaneously the big blockaders crowded toward them and opened a
+heavy fire, while stokers shoveled desperately below to get up steam.
+To the surprise of other vessels, Schley's ship, the _Brooklyn_,
+after heading towards the entrance, swung round, not with the enemy,
+but to starboard, just sliding past the _Texas'_ bow. This much
+discussed maneuver Schley afterward explained as made to avoid
+blanketing the fire of the rest of the squadron. The _Oregon_,
+which throughout the blockade had kept plenty of steam, "rushed
+past the _Iowa_," in the words of Captain Robley Evans, "like an
+express train," in a cloud of smoke lighted by vicious flashes from
+her guns. In ten minutes the _Maria Teresa_ turned for shore, hit
+by 30 projectiles, her decks, encumbered with woodwork, bursting
+into masses of flame. The concentration upon her at the beginning
+had shifted to the _Oquendo_ in the rear, which ran ashore with
+guns silenced 5 minutes after the leader.
+
+Shortly before 11, the _Vizcaya_, with a torpedo ready in one of
+her bow tubes, turned towards the _Brooklyn_, which had kept in
+the lead of the American ships. A shell hitting squarely in the
+_Vizcaya's_ bow caused a heavy explosion and she sheered away, the
+guns of the _Brooklyn, Oregon_, and _Iowa_ bearing on her as she
+ran towards the beach. The _Colon_, with a trial speed of 20 knots,
+and 6 miles ahead of the _Brooklyn_ and _Oregon_, appeared to
+stand a good chance of getting finally away. The _New York_, rushing
+back toward the battle, was still well astern. But the _Colon's_
+speed, which had averaged 13.7 knots, slackened as her fire-room
+force played out; and shortly after 1 p.m. she ran shoreward, opened
+her Kingston valves, and went down after surrender. She had been
+hit only 6 times.
+
+In the first stage of the fight the little yacht _Gloucester_,
+under Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, had dashed pluckily upon
+the two destroyers, which were also under fire from the secondary
+batteries of the big ships. The _Furor_ was sunk and the _Plutón_
+driven ashore.
+
+There is hardly a record in naval history of such complete destruction.
+Of 2300 Spaniards, 1800 were rescued as prisoners from the burning
+wrecks or from the Cuban guerillas on shore, 350 met their death,
+and the rest escaped towards Santiago. The American loss consisted
+of one man killed and one wounded on the _Brooklyn_. This ship,
+which owing to its leading position had been the chief enemy target,
+received 20 hits from shells or fragments, and the other vessels
+altogether about as many more. An examination of the half-sunken
+and fire-scarred Spanish hulks showed 42 hits out of 1300 rounds
+from the American main batteries, or 3.2 per cent, and 73 from
+secondary batteries. Probably these figures should be doubled to
+give the actual number, but even so they revealed the need of
+improvement in gunnery.
+
+Sampson was right when he stated earlier in the campaign that the
+destruction of the Spanish fleet would end the war. Santiago surrendered
+a fortnight later without further fighting. An expeditionary force
+under General Miles made an easy conquest of Puerto Rico. On August
+12, a protocol of peace was signed, by the terms of which the United
+States took over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (upon payment
+of 20 million dollars), and Cuba became independent under American
+protection. The war greatly strengthened the position of the United
+States in the Caribbean, and gave her new interests and responsibilities
+in the Pacific. In the possession of distant dependencies the nation
+found a new motive for increased naval protection and for more
+active concern in international affairs.
+
+2. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
+
+At the time when the United States acquired the Philippines, the
+Far East was a storm center of international disturbance. Russia,
+with the support of Germany and France, had, as already noted,
+combined to prevent Japan from fully exploiting her victory over
+China. The latter country, however, had every appearance of a melon
+ripe for cutting; and under guise of security for loans, indemnity
+for injuries, railroad and treaty-port concessions, and special
+spheres of influence, each European nation endeavored to mark out
+its prospective share. Russia, in return for protecting China against
+Japan, gained a short-cut for her Siberian Railway across Northern
+Manchuria, with rail and mining concessions in that province and
+prospects of getting hold of both Port Arthur and Kiao-chau. But,
+at an opportune moment for Germany, two German missionaries were
+murdered in 1897 by Chinese bandits. Germany at once seized Kiao-chau,
+and in March, 1898, extorted a 99-year lease of the port, with
+exclusive development privileges throughout the peninsula of Shantung.
+"The German Michael," as Kaiser Wilhelm said at a banquet on the
+departure of his fleet to the East, had "firmly planted his shield
+upon Chinese soil"; and "the gospel of His Majesty's hallowed person,"
+as Admiral Prince Heinrich asserted in reply, "was to be preached
+to every one who will hear it and also to those who do not wish
+to hear." "Our establishment on the coast of China," writes
+ex-Chancellor van Bülow, "was in direct and immediate connection
+with the progress of the fleet, and a first step into the field
+of world politics... giving us _a place in the sun_ in Eastern
+Asia."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: From London _Spectator_, Dec. 26, 1897, quoted in
+Morse, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, Vol. III,
+p. 108.]
+
+[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR]
+
+Thus forestalled at Kiao-chau, Russia at once pushed through a
+25-year lease of Port Arthur, and proceeded to strengthen it as
+a fortified port and naval base. England, though preoccupied with
+the Boer War, took Wei-hai-wai as a precautionary measure, "for as
+long a time as Port Arthur shall remain a possession of Russia."[1]
+France secured a new base in southern China on Kwang-chau Bay, and
+Italy tried likewise but failed. Aroused by the foreign menace,
+the feeling of the Chinese masses burst forth in the summer of 1900
+in the massacres and uprisings known as the Boxer Rebellion. In
+the combined expedition to relieve the legations at Peking Japanese
+troops displayed superior deftness, discipline, and endurance,
+and gained confidence in their ability to cope with the armies of
+European powers.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, III, 118.]
+
+In the period following, Germany in Shantung and Russia in Manchuria
+pursued steadily their policy of exploitation. Against it, the
+American Secretary of State John Hay advanced the policy of the
+_Open Door_, "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
+entity... and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and
+impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."[1] To this
+the powers gave merely lip-service, realizing that her fixed policy
+of isolation would restrain the United States from either diplomatic
+combinations or force. "The open hand," wrote Hay in discouragement,
+"will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinese as the
+raised club,"[2] nor was it so efficacious in dealing with other
+nations concerned. Japan, however, had strained every energy to
+build up her army and navy for a conflict that seemed inevitable,
+and was ready to back her opposition to European advances by force
+if need be. In 1902 she protected herself against a combination of
+foes by defensive alliance with England. She demanded that Russia
+take her troops out of Manchuria and recognize Japanese predominance
+in Korea. Russia hoped to forestall hostilities until she could
+further strengthen her army and fleet in the East, but when the
+transfer of ships reached the danger point, Japan declared war,
+February 8, 1904, and struck viciously that same night.
+
+[Footnote 1: NOTE TO THE EUROPEAN POWERS, July 3, 1900.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Thayer, LIFE OF HAY, II, 369.]
+
+As in the Spanish-American War, control of the sea was vital, since
+Japan must depend upon it to move her troops to the continental
+theater of war. Nor could she hold her army passive while awaiting
+the issue of a struggle for sea control. Delay would put a greater
+relative strain on her finances, and give Russia, handicapped by
+long communications over the single-track Siberian Railway, a better
+chance to mass in the East her troops and supplies. Japan's plan
+was therefore to strike hard for naval advantage, but to begin
+at once, in any event, the movement of troops overseas. At the
+outbreak of war her fleet of 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers,
+with light cruiser and destroyer flotillas, was assembled at Sasebo
+near the Straits of Tsushima, thoroughly organized for fighting
+and imbued with the spirit of war. Japan had an appreciable naval
+superiority, but was handicapped by the task of protecting her
+transports and by the necessity--which she felt keenly--of avoiding
+losses in battle which would leave her helpless upon the possible
+advent of Russia's Baltic reserves.
+
+Russia's main naval strength in the East consisted of 7 battleships
+and 3 armored cruisers, presenting a combined broadside of 100
+guns against Japan's 124. The support of the Black Sea fleet was
+denied by the attitude of England, which would prevent violation
+of the agreement restricting it from passing the Dardanelles. The
+Baltic fleet, however, was an important though distant reserve
+force, a detachment from which was actually in the Red Sea on its
+way east at the outbreak of war.
+
+Just as clearly as it was Japan's policy to force the fighting on
+land, so it should have been Russia's to prevent Japan's movement
+of troops by aggressive action at sea. This called for concentration
+of force and concentration of purpose. But neither was evident in
+the Russian plan of campaign, which betrayed confusion of thought
+and a traditional leaning toward the defensive--acceptance on the
+one hand of what has been called "fortress fleet" doctrine, that
+fleets exist to protect bases and can serve this purpose by being
+shut up in them; and on the other hand of exaggerated "fleet in
+being" theory, that the mere presence of the Russian fleet, though
+inactive, would prevent Japan's use of the sea. Thus in October,
+1903, Witjeft, chief of the Port Arthur naval staff, declared that
+a landing of Japanese troops either in the Liao-tung or the Korean
+Gulf was "impossible so long as our fleet is not destroyed." Just
+as Russia's total force was divided between east and west, so her
+eastern force was divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with
+the Japanese in central position between. Three armored cruisers
+were in the northern port, and 7 battleships in the other; and all
+Russia's efforts after war broke out were vainly directed toward
+remedying this faulty disposition before it began. The whole Russian
+fleet in the East, moreover, was, it is said, badly demoralized and
+unready for war, owing chiefly to bureaucratic corruption and to
+the fact that not merely its strategical direction but its actual
+command was vested in the Viceroy, Alexieff, with headquarters on
+shore.
+
+_Operations Around Port Arthur_
+
+On January 3, 1904, Japan presented practically an ultimatum; on
+February 6 broke off diplomatic relations; on February 8 declared
+war; and on the same night--just as the Czar was discussing with
+his council what should be done--she delivered her first blow. By
+extraordinary laxity, though the diplomatic rupture was known,
+the Port Arthur squadron remained in the outer anchorage, "with
+all lights burning, without torpedo nets out, and without any guard
+vessels."[1] Ten Japanese destroyers attacked at close quarters,
+fired 18 torpedoes, and put the battleship _Tsarevitch_ and two
+cruisers out of action for two months. It was only poor torpedo
+work, apparently, that saved the whole fleet from destruction. A
+Russian light cruiser left isolated at Chemulpa was destroyed the
+next day. The transportation of troops to Korea and Southern Manchuria
+was at once begun. Though not locked in by close blockade, and not
+seriously injured by the frequent Japanese raids, bombardments,
+and efforts to block the harbor entrance, the Port Arthur squadron
+made no move to interfere.
+
+[Footnote 1: Semenoff, RASPLATA, p. 45.]
+
+Both fleets suffered from mines. Vice Admiral Makaroff, Russia's
+foremost naval leader, who took command at Port Arthur in March,
+went down with the _Petropavlosk_ on April 13, when his ship struck
+a mine laid by the Japanese. On May 14, on the other hand, the
+Russian mine-layer _Amur_ slipped out in a fog, spread her mines
+in the usual path of Japanese vessels off the port, and thus on
+the same day sank two of their best ships, the _Hatsuse_ and
+_Yashima_. Mining, mine-sweeping, an uneventful Russian sortie
+an June 23, progress of Japanese land forces down the peninsula
+and close investment of Port Arthur--this was the course of events
+down to the final effort of the Russian squadron on August 10.
+
+[Illustration: HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR]
+
+By this time Japanese siege guns were actually reaching ships in
+the harbor. Action of any kind, especially if it involved some
+injury to the enemy navy, was better than staying to be shot to
+pieces from the shore. Yet Makaroff's successor, Witjeft, painfully
+and consciously unequal to his responsibilities, still opposed
+an exit, and left port only upon imperative orders from above.
+Scarcely was the fleet an hour outside when Togo appeared on the
+scene. The forces in the Battle of August 10 consisted of 6 Russian
+battleships and 4 cruisers, against 6 Japanese armored vessels and
+9 cruisers; the combined large-caliber broadsides of the armored
+ships being 73 to 52, and of the cruisers 55 to 21, in favor of
+Togo's squadron. In spite of this superiority in armament, and of
+fully a knot in speed, Togo hesitated to close to decisive range.
+Five hours or more of complicated maneuvering ensued, during which
+both squadrons kept at "long bowls," now passing each other, now
+defiling across van or rear, without marked advantage for either
+side.
+
+At last, at 5.40 p.m., the Japanese got in a lucky blow. Two 12-inch
+shells struck the flagship _Tsarevitch_, killing Admiral Witjeft,
+jamming the helm to starboard, and thus serving to throw the whole
+Russian line into confusion. Togo now closed to 3000 yards, but
+growing darkness enabled his quarry to escape. The battle in fact
+was less one-sided than the later engagement at Tsushima. On both
+sides the percentage of hits was low, about 1% for the Russians
+and 6 or 7% for their opponents. Togo's flagship _Mikasa_ was hit
+30 times and lost 125 men; the total Japanese loss was about half
+that of the enemy--236 to 478.
+
+Much might still have been gained, in view of the future coming of
+the Baltic fleet, had the Russians still persisted in pressing onward
+for Vladivostok; but owing to loss of their leader and ignorance of
+the general plan, they scattered. The cruiser _Novik_ was caught and
+sunk, another cruiser was interned at Shanghai, a third at Saigon,
+and the _Tsarevitch_ at Kiao-chau. The rest, including 5 of the 6
+battleships, fled back into the Port Arthur death-trap. Largely in
+order to complete their destruction, the Japanese sacrificed 60,000
+men in desperate assaults on the fortress, which surrendered January
+2, 1905. As at Santiago, the necessity of saving battleships, less
+easily replaced, led the Japanese to the cheaper expenditure of
+men.
+
+On news of the Port Arthur sortie, the Vladivostok squadron, which
+hitherto had made only a few more or less futile raids on Japanese
+shipping, advanced toward Tsushima Straits, and met there at dawn
+of August 14 a slightly superior force of 4 cruisers under Kamimura.
+The better shooting of the Japanese soon drove the slowest Russian
+ship, the _Rurik_, out of line; the other two, after a plucky fight,
+managed to get away, with hulls and funnels riddled by enemy shells.
+
+The complete annulment of Russia's eastern fleet in this first
+stage of hostilities had enabled Japan to profit fully by her easier
+communications to the scene of war. Its final destruction with the
+fall of Port Arthur gave assurance of victory. The decisive battle
+of Mukden was fought in March, 1905. Close to their bases, trained
+to the last degree, inspired by success, the Japanese navy could
+now face with confidence the approach of Russia's last fleet.
+
+_Rojdestvensky's Cruise_
+
+After a series of accidents and delays, the Baltic fleet under
+Admiral Rojdestvensky--8 battleships, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and
+numerous auxiliaries--left Libau Oct. 18, 1904, on its 18,000-mile
+cruise. Off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, the ships fired into
+English trawlers under the impression that they were enemy torpedo
+craft, and thus nearly stirred England to war. Off Tangier some of
+the lighter vessels separated to pass by way of Suez, and a third
+division from Russia followed a little later by the same route.
+Hamburg-American colliers helped Rojdestvensky solve his logistical
+problem on the long voyage round Africa, and German authorities
+stretched neutrality rules upon his arrival in Wahlfish Bay, for
+the engrossment of Russia in eastern adventures was cheerfully
+encouraged by the neighbor on her southern frontier. France also
+did her best to be of service to the fleet of her ally, though
+she had "paired off" with England to remain neutral in the war.
+
+With the reunion of the Russian divisions at Nossi Bé, Madagascar,
+January 9, 1905, came news of the fall of Port Arthur. The home
+government now concluded to despatch the fag-ends of its navy,
+though Rojdestvensky would have preferred to push ahead without
+waiting for such "superfluous encumbrances" to join. Ships, as
+his staff officer Semenoff afterward wrote, were needed, but not
+"old flatirons and galoshes"; guns, but not "holes surrounded by
+iron."[1] After a tedious 10 weeks' delay in tropical waters, the
+fleet moved on to French Indo-China, where, after another month
+of waiting, the last division under Nebogatoff finally joined--a
+slow old battleship, 3 coast defense ironclads, and a cruiser.
+Upon these, Rojdestvensky's officers vented their vocabulary of
+invective, in which "war junk" and "auto-sinkers" were favorite
+terms.
+
+[Footnote 1: RASPLATA, p. 426.]
+
+Having already accomplished almost the impossible, the armada of
+50 units on May 14 set forth on the last stage of its extraordinary
+cruise. Of three possible routes to Vladivostok--through the Tsugaru
+Strait between Nippon and Yezo, through the Strait of La Perouse
+north of Yezo, or through the Straits of Tsushima--the first was
+ruled out as too difficult of navigation; the second, because it
+would involve coaling off the coast of Japan. Tsushima remained.
+To avoid torpedo attack, the Russian admiral planned to pass the
+straits by day, and fully expected battle. But the hope lingered
+in his mind that fog or heavy weather might enable him to pass
+unscathed. He had been informed that owing to traffic conditions
+on the Siberian railway, he could get nothing at Vladivostok in
+the way of supplies. Hence, as a compromise measure which weakened
+fighting efficiency, he took along 3 auxiliary steamers, a repair
+ship, 2 tugs, and 2 hospital ships, the rest of the train on May
+25 entering Shanghai; and he so filled the bunkers and piled even
+the decks with fuel, according to Nebogatoff's later testimony,
+that they went into action burdened with coal for 3,000 miles.[2]
+
+[Footnote 2: Mahan, NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 412.]
+
+[Illustration: ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCT. 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905]
+
+The main Russian fighting force entered the battle in three divisions
+of 4 ships each: (1) the _Suvaroff_ (flagship), _Alexander III,
+Borodino_ and _Orel_, each a new battleship of about 13,600 tons;
+(2) the _Ossliabya_, a slightly smaller battleship, and three
+armored cruisers; (3) Nebogatoff's division as given above, with the
+exception of the cruiser. Then there was a squadron of 4 smaller
+cruisers, 4 other cruisers as scouts, and 9 destroyers. The Japanese
+engaged in two main divisions of 6 ships each (4 battleships and
+8 armored cruisers), backed by four light cruiser divisions of 4
+ships each. The Russian line had the advantage in heavy ordnance,
+as will appear from the following table, but this was more than
+compensated for by the enemy's superiority in 8-inch guns and
+quick-firers, which covered the Russians with an overwhelming rain
+of shells. Of guns in broadside, the Japanese ships-of-the-line
+had 127 to 98; and the cruisers 89 to 43.
+
+--------------------------------------------------
+       |       |   MAIN BATTERIES    |   Q.F.
+       |       |---------------------|------------
+       | Ships | 12" | 10" | 9" | 8" |  6" | 4·7"
+-------|-------|-----|-----|----|----|-----|------
+Japan  |   12  | 16  |  1  |    | 30 | 160 |
+Russia |   12  | 26  | 15  |  4 |  3 |  90 |  20
+
+On the basis of these figures, and the 50% superiority of the Japanese
+in speed, the issue could hardly be in doubt. Admiral Togo, moreover,
+had commanded his fleet in peace and war for 8 years, and had veteran
+subordinates on whom he could depend to lead their divisions
+independently yet in coordination with the general plan. Constant
+training and target practice had brought his crews to a high degree
+of skill. The Japanese shells were also superior, with fuses that
+detonated their charges on the slightest contact with an explosive
+force like that of mines. Between the enemy and their base, the
+Japanese could wait quietly in home waters, while the Russian fleet
+was worn out by its eight months' cruise. At best, the latter was
+a heterogeneous assemblage of new ships hastily completed and old
+ships indifferently put in repair, which since Nebogatoff joined
+had had but one opportunity for maneuvers and had operated as a
+unit for only 13 days.
+
+On the night of May 26-27, as the Russian ships approached Tsushima
+through mist and darkness, half the officers and men were at their
+posts, while the rest slept beside the guns. Fragments of wireless
+messages--"Last night" ... "nothing" ... "eleven lights" ... "but
+not in line"--revealed enemy patrols in the waters beyond. Semenoff
+on the _Suvaroff_ describes vividly "the tall, somewhat bent figure
+of the Admiral on the side of the bridge, the wrinkled face of
+the man at the wheel stooping over the compass, the guns' crews
+chilled at their posts." In the brightly lighted engine-rooms,
+"life and movement was visible on all sides; men were nimbly running
+up and down ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and buzzing
+of voices; orders were being transmitted loudly; but, on looking
+more intently, the tension and anxiety--that same peculiar frame
+of mind so noticeable on deck--could also be observed."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, p. 28.]
+
+_The Battle of Tsushima_
+
+At dawn (4.45) the Japanese scout _Sinano Maru_, which for an hour
+or more had been following in the darkness, made them out clearly
+and communicated the intelligence at once to Togo in his base at
+Masampho Bay, on the Korean side of the straits, and to the cruiser
+divisions off the Tsushima Islands. This was apparently the first
+definite news that Togo had received for several days, and the fact
+suggests that his scouting arrangements were not above criticism,
+for it took fast steaming to get to the straits by noon. Cruiser
+divisions were soon circling towards the Russians through the mist
+and darting as swiftly away, first the 5th and 6th under Takeomi
+and Togo (son of the admiral), then the 3d under Dewa, all reporting
+the movements of the enemy fleet and shepherding it till the final
+action began. Troubled by their activity, Rojdestvensky made several
+shifts of formation, first placing his 1st and 2d divisions in
+one long column ahead of the 3d, then at 11.20 throwing the 1st
+division again to starboard, while the cruisers protected the
+auxiliaries which were steaming between the lines in the rear.
+
+This was the disposition when, shortly after one o'clock, the Japanese
+main divisions appeared to northward about 7 miles distant, steaming
+on a westerly course across the enemy's bows. Since morning Togo
+had covered a distance of 90 miles. From his signal yards fluttered
+the stirring message: "The fate of the empire depends upon to-day's
+battle. Let every man do his utmost." Ordering all his cruisers to
+circle to the Russian rear, and striking himself for their left
+flank, which at the moment was the weaker, Togo first turned southward
+as if to pass on opposite courses, and then at about two o'clock
+led his two divisions around to east-northeast, so as to "cross
+the T" upon the head of the enemy line.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905
+
+_Japanese_
+  I Division (Togo)        II Division (Kamimura)
+     Mikasa, B.S.              Idzumo
+     Shikishima, B.S.          Iwate
+     Asahi, B.S.               Adzumo
+     Fuji, B.S.                Asama
+     Nisshin, A.C.             Tokiwa
+     Kasuga                    Yakumo
+
+_Russians_
+  I Division               II Division
+     Suvaroff                  Ossliabya (flag)
+     Alexander III
+     Borodino             III Division
+     Orel]
+
+Just as Togo's flagship _Mikasa_ straightened on her new course,
+nearly north of the _Suvaroff_, and 6400 yards distant, the _Suvaroff_
+opened fire. It has been suggested that at this critical moment the
+Russian admiral should have closed with the enemy, or, leading
+his ships on a northwesterly course, laid his starboard broadsides
+on the knuckle formed by the Japanese turn. But the position of
+the enemy cruisers and destroyers, and worry over his transports,
+guided his movements. Moreover, he had not yet completed an awkwardly
+executed maneuver to get his ships back into single column with
+the 1st division ahead. The _Ossliabya_ and other ships of the
+2d division were thrown into confusion, and forced to slow down
+and even stop engines. Under these difficulties, the _Suvaroff_
+sheered more to eastward. As they completed their turn the Japanese
+secured a "capping" position and could concentrate on the leading
+ships of both the 1st and the 2d Russian divisions, 4 ships on
+the _Suvaroff_ and 7 on the _Ossliabya_. Under this terrible fire
+the _Ossliabya_ went down, the first modern battleship (in the
+narrow sense of the word) ever sunk by gunfire, and the _Suvaroff_
+a few moments later fell out of line, torn by shells, her forward
+funnel down, and steering gear jammed. "She was so battered," wrote
+a Japanese observer, "that scarcely any one would have taken her
+for a ship."
+
+With an advantage in speed of 15 knots to 9, the Japanese drew
+ahead. The _Alexander_, followed by other Russian ships in much
+confusion, about three o'clock made an effort to pass northward
+across the enemy rear, but they were countered by the Japanese first
+division turning west together and the 2d division in succession at
+3.10. The first and decisive phase of the action thus ended. Both
+fleets eventually resumed easterly and then southerly courses,
+for considerable periods completely lost to each other in smoke
+and haze.
+
+Plunging through heavy seas from the southwest, the Japanese cruisers
+had in the meantime punished the Russian rear less severely than
+might have been expected. Two transports went down in flames, two
+cruisers were badly damaged, and the high-sided ex-German liner
+_Ural_ was punctured with shells. On the other hand, Dewa's flagship
+_Kasagi_ was driven to port with a bad hole under water, and Toga's
+old ship _Naniwa Kan_ had to cease action for repairs. Hits and
+losses in fact were considerable in both the main and the cruiser
+divisions of the Japanese, their total casualties numbering 465.
+Late in the afternoon the Russian destroyer _Buiny_ came up to
+the wreck of the _Suvaroff_, and lurched alongside long enough for
+Rojdestvensky, wounded and almost unconscious, to be practically
+thrown on board. He was captured with the destroyer next day. In
+spite of her injuries, the _Suvaroff_ held off a swarm of cruisers
+and destroyers until at last torpedoed at 7.20 p. m.
+
+The Russian battleships had meanwhile described a large circle to
+southward, and at 5 p. m. were again steaming north, accompanied
+by some of their cruisers and train. Attacked once more between
+6 and 7 o'clock, and almost incapable of defense, the _Alexander
+III_ and _Borodino_ went down, making 4 ships lost out of the 5 new
+vessels that had formed the backbone of Rojdestvensky's forces. In
+the gathering darkness. Nebogatoff collected the survivors and
+staggered northward.
+
+Of slight value in the day engagement, 21 Japanese destroyers,
+with about 40 torpedo boats which had sheltered under Tsushima
+Island, now darted after the fleeing foe. In the fog and heavy
+weather they were almost as great a menace to each other as to
+the enemy. Russian ships without searchlights escaped harm. Of
+three or perhaps four Russian vessels struck, all but the _Navarin_
+stayed afloat until the next day. Admiral Custance estimates 8 hits,
+or 9% of the torpedoes fired. There were at least 6 collisions
+among the flotillas, and 4 boats destroyed.
+
+On the morning of the 28th the remains of the Russian fleet were
+scattered over the sea. Nebagatoff with 4 battleships and 2 cruisers
+surrendered at 10.30. Of the 37 ships all told that entered Tsushima
+Straits, only the following escaped: the cruisers _Oleg, Aurora_,
+and _Jemschug_ reached Manila on June 3; a tug and a supply ship
+entered Shanghai, and another transport with plenty of coal went
+clear to Madagascar; only the fast cruiser _Almaz_ and two
+destroyers made Vladivostok.
+
+Among the lessons to be drawn from Tsushima, one of the clearest is
+the weakening effect of divided purpose. With all honor to Admiral
+Rojdestvensky for his courage and persistence during his cruise,
+it is evident that at the end he allowed the supply problem to
+interfere with his preparations for battle, and that he fought
+"with one eye on Vladivostok." It is evident also that only by a
+long period of training and operating as a unit can a collection
+of ships and men be welded into an effective fighting force. Torpedo
+results throughout the war, whether due to faulty materials or
+unskilled employment, were not such as to increase the reliance upon
+this weapon. The gun retained its supremacy; and the demonstrated
+advantage conferred by speed and heavy armament in long range fighting
+was reflected in the "all-big-gun" _Dreadnought_ of 1906 and the
+battle cruisers of 1908.
+
+Immediately after the Russian navy had been swept out of existence,
+President Roosevelt offered to mediate, and received favorable replies
+from the warring nations. By the treaty signed at Portsmouth, New
+Hampshire, on September 5, 1905, Russia withdrew from Manchuria
+in favor of China, recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea
+(annexed by Japan in 1910), and surrendered to Japan her privileges
+in Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. In lieu of indemnity,
+Japan after a long deadlock was induced by pressure on the part
+of England and the United States to accept that portion of the
+island of Saghalien south of the parallel of 50°. Thus the war
+thwarted Russia's policy of aggressive imperialism in the East,
+and established Japan firmly on the mainland at China's front door.
+At the same time, by the military débâcle of Russia, it dangerously
+disturbed the balance of power in Europe, upon which the safety
+of that continent had long been made precariously to depend.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+_Spanish-American War_
+
+NOTES ON THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (a series of publications issued
+  by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department, 1900).
+SAMPSON-SCHLEY OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE U. S. SENATE, Gov't
+  Printing Office, 1899.
+THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN, H. W. Wilson, 1900.
+WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, W. A. M. Goode, 1899.
+A HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, R. H. Tetherington, 1900.
+
+_Russo-Japanese War_
+
+INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, 3 vols., H. B.
+  Morse, 1918.
+THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA (1906), RASPLATA (1910), Captain Vladimir
+  Semenoff.
+JAPANESE OFFICIAL HISTORY, translated in U. S. Naval Institute
+  Proceedings, July-August, September-October, 1914.
+THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, Admiral Reginald Custance, 1912.
+THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, Captain N. Klado, 1905.
+OFFICIAL BRITISH HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 3 vols., 1910.
+THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE, Debaters' Handbook Series,
+  N. Y., 1916 (with bibliography).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+THE WORLD WAR: THE FIRST YEAR (1914-1915)
+
+The Russo-Japanese war greatly weakened Russia's position in Europe,
+and left the Dual Alliance of France and Russia overweighted by the
+military strength of the Teutonic Empires, Germany and Austria,
+whether or not Italy should adhere to the Triple Alliance with
+these nations. To Great Britain, such a disturbance of the European
+balance was ever a matter of grave concern, and an abandonment
+of her policy of isolation was in this instance virtually forced
+upon her by Germany's rivalry in her own special sphere of commerce
+and sea power.
+
+The disturbing effect of Germany's naval growth during the two
+decades prior to 1914 affords in fact an excellent illustration
+of the influence of naval strength in peace as well as in war.
+Under Bismarck Germany had pushed vigorously though tardily into
+the colonial field, securing vast areas of rather doubtful value
+in East and West Africa, and the Bismarck Archipelago, Marshall
+Islands, and part of New Guinea in the Pacific. With the accession
+of William II in 1888 and the dropping of the pilot, Bismarck,
+two years later, she embarked definitely upon her quest for world
+power. The young Kaiser read eagerly Mahan's _Influence of Sea
+Power Upon History_ (1890), distributed it among the ships of his
+still embryonic navy, and fed his ambition on the doctrines of
+this epoch-making work.
+
+Naval development found further stimulus and justification in the
+rapid economic growth of Germany. In 1912 her industrial production
+attained a value of three billion dollars, as compared with slightly
+over four billion for England and seven billion for the United
+States. Since 1893 her merchant marine had tripled in size and
+taken second place to that of England with a total of over five
+million tons. During the same period she surpassed France and the
+United States in volume of foreign commerce, and in this respect
+also reached a position second to Great Britain, with a more rapid
+rate of increase. An emigration of 220,000 a year in the early
+eighties was cut down to 22,000 in 1900.[1] To assure markets for
+her manufactures, and continued growth in population and industry,
+Germany felt that she must strive to extend her political power.
+
+[Footnote 1: Figures from Priest, GERMANY SINCE 1840, p. 150 ff.]
+
+Though Germany's commercial expansion met slight opposition even
+in areas under British control, it undoubtedly justified measures
+of political and naval protection; and it was this motive that was
+advanced in the preface to the German Naval Bill of 1900, which
+declared that, "To protect her sea trade and colonies ... Germany
+must have a fleet so strong that a war, even with the greatest naval
+power, would involve such risks as to jeopardize the position of that
+power."[2] Furthermore, Germany's quest for colonies and points of
+vantage such as Kiao-chau, her scheme for a Berlin-Bagdad railroad
+with domination of the territories on the route, had parallel in
+the activities of other nations. Unfortunately, however, Germany's
+ambitions grew even more rapidly than her commerce, until her true
+aim appeared to be destruction of rivals and domination of the
+world.
+
+[Footnote 2: Hurd and Castle, GERMAN SEA POWER, Appendix II.]
+
+The seizure of Kiao-chau in 1897-98 coincided with the appointment
+of Admiral von Tirpitz as Imperial Minister of Marine. Under his
+administration, the Naval Bill of 1900, passed in a heat of anglophobia
+aroused by the Boer War, doubled the program of 1898, and contained
+ingenious provisions by which the Reichstag was bound to steady
+increases covering a long period of years, and by which the Navy
+Department was empowered to replace worthless old craft, after 20
+or 25 years' service, with new ships of the largest size. As the
+armament race grew keener, this act was amended in the direction
+of further increases, but its program was never cut down.
+
+International crises and realignments marked the growing tension of
+these years. In 1905 England extended for ten years her understanding
+with Japan. By the _Entente Cordiale_ with France in 1904 and a
+later settlement of outstanding difficulties with Russia, she also
+practically changed the Dual Alliance into a Triple Entente, though
+without positively binding herself to assistance in war. To the
+agreement of 1904 by which England and France assured each other
+a free hand in Egypt and Morocco, respectively, the Kaiser raised
+strenuous objections, and forced the resignation of the anglophile
+French Foreign Minister, Delcassé; but at the Algeciras Convention
+of 1906, assembled to settle the Morocco question, Germany and
+Austria stood virtually alone. Even the American delegates, sent
+by President Roosevelt at the Kaiser's invitation, voted generally
+with the Western Powers. When Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina
+in 1909, the Kaiser shook the mailed fist to better effect than at
+Algeciras, with the result that Russia had to accept this extension
+of Austro-German influence in the Balkan sphere. Still again two years
+later, when the German cruiser _Panther_ made moves to establish a
+base at Agadir on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Europe approached
+the verge of war; but Germany found the financial situation against
+her, backed down, and eventually took a strip of land on the Congo
+in liquidation of her Morocco claims.
+
+For all her resolute saber-rattling in these years, Germany found
+herself checkmated in almost every move. The Monroe Doctrine, for
+which the United States showed willingness to fight in the Venezuela
+affair of 1902, balked her schemes in the New World. In the Far
+East she faced Japan; in Africa, British sea power. A "_Drang nach
+Osten_," through the Balkans and Turkey toward Asia Minor, offered
+on the whole the best promise; and it was in this quarter that
+Austria's violent demands upon Serbia aroused Russia and precipitated
+the World War.
+
+Great Britain's foreign agreements, already noted, had as a primary
+aim the concentration of her fleet in home waters. Naval predominance
+in the Far East she turned over to Japan; in the western Atlantic,
+to the United States (at least by acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine
+and surrender of treaty rights to share in the construction of the
+Panama Canal); and in the Mediterranean, to France, though England
+still kept a strong cruiser force in this field. The old policy of
+showing the flag all over the world was abandoned, 160 old ships
+were sent to the scrap heap as unable "either to fight or to run
+away," and 88% of the fleet was concentrated at home, so quietly
+that it "was found out only by accident by Admiral Mahan."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Admiral Fisher, MEMORIES, p. 185.]
+
+These and other changes were carried out under the energetic régime
+of Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910. The British
+_Dreadnought_ of 1906, completed in 10 months, and the battle cruisers
+of 1908--_Indefatigable, Invincible_ and _Indomitable_--came as
+an unpleasant surprise to Germany, necessitating construction of
+similar types and enlargement of the Kiel Canal. Reforms in naval
+gunnery urged by Admiral Sir Percy Scott were taken up, and plans
+were made for new bases in the Humber, in the Forth at Rosyth, and
+in the Orkneys, necessitated by the shift of front from the Channel
+to the North Sea. But against the technical skill, painstaking
+organization, and definitely aggressive purpose of Germany, even more
+radical measures were needed to put the tradition-ridden British
+navy in readiness for war.
+
+Naval preparedness was vital, for the conflict was fundamentally,
+like the Napoleonic Wars, a struggle between land power predominant
+on the Continent and naval power supreme on the seas. As compared
+with France in the earlier struggle, Germany was more dependent
+on foreign commerce, and in a long war would feel more keenly the
+pressure of blockade. On the other hand, while the naval preponderance
+of England and her allies was probably greater than 100 years before,
+England had to throw larger armies into the field and more of her
+shipping into naval service, and found her commerce not augmented
+but cut down.
+
+Indeed, Germany was not without advantage in the naval war. As
+she fully expected, her direct sea trade was soon shut off, and
+her shipping was driven to cover or destroyed. But Germany was
+perhaps 80% self-supporting, was well supplied with minerals and
+munitions, and could count on trade through neutral states on her
+frontiers. Her shallow, well-protected North Sea coast-line gave
+her immunity from naval attack and opportunity to choose the moment
+in which to throw her utmost strength into a sortie. So long as her
+fleet remained intact, it controlled the Baltic by virtue of an
+interior line through the Kiel Canal, thus providing a strangle hold
+on Russia and free access to northern neutrals. Only by dangerous
+division of forces, or by leaving the road to England and the Atlantic
+open, could the British fleet enter the Baltic Sea. England it is
+true had a superior navy (perhaps less superior than was commonly
+thought), and a position of singular advantage between Germany and
+the overseas world. But for her the maintenance of naval superiority
+was absolutely essential. An effective interference with her sea
+communications would quickly put her out of the war.
+
+The importance (for Germany as well as for England) of preserving
+their main fighting fleets, may explain the wariness with which
+they were employed. Instead of risking them desperately, both sides
+turned to commerce warfare--the Western Powers resorting to blockade
+and the Germans to submarines. Each of these forms of warfare played
+a highly important part in the war, and the submarine campaign in
+particular, calling for new methods and new instruments, seems
+almost to have monopolized the naval genius and energies of the
+two groups of belligerents. It may be noted, however, that but
+for the cover given by the High Seas Fleet, the submarine campaign
+could hardly have been undertaken; and but for the Grand Fleet,
+it would have been unnecessary.
+
+The naval strength of the various belligerents in July, 1914, appears
+in the table on the following page.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: From table prepared by U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence,
+July 1, 1916.]
+
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
+               | Great |Ger-| U.S. |      |     |      |     |
+               |Britain|many|(1916)|France|Japan|Russia|Italy|Austria
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Dreadnoughts   |   20  | 13 |  12  |   4  |   2 |  ..  |   3 |   3
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Pre-dreadn'ts  |   40  | 20 |  21  |  18  |  13 |   7  |   8 |   6
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Battle Cruisers|    9  |  4 |  ..  |  ..  |   2 |  ..  |  .. |  ..
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Armored Cr's   |   34  |  9 |  10  |  20  |  13 |   6  |   9 |   2
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Cruisers       |   74  | 41 |  14  |   9  |  13 |   9  |   6 |   5
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Destroyers     |  167  |130 |  54  |  84  |  50 |  91  |  36 |  18
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Submarines     |   78  | 30 |  44  |  64  |  13 |  30  |  19 |   6
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Owing to new construction, these figures underwent rapid change.
+Thus England added 4 dreadnoughts (2 built for Turkey) in August,
+1914; the battle cruiser _Tiger_ in November; the dreadnought _Canada_
+and 5 _Queen Elizabeths_ in 1915; and 5 _Royal Sovereigns_ in
+1915-1916. In comparisons, full account is not always taken of
+the naval support of England's allies; it is true, however, that
+the necessity of protecting coasts, troop convoys, and commerce
+prevented her from throwing her full strength into the North Sea.
+Her capital ships were in two main divisions--the 1st or Grand
+Fleet in the Orkneys, and the 2d fleet, consisting at first of
+16 pre-dreadnoughts, in the Channel. Admiral Jellico[1] gives the
+strength of the Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, on
+August 4, 1914, as follows:
+
+[Footnote 1: THE GRAND FLEET, p. 31.]
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+       |       | Pre-  |        |        |          |     |
+       |Dread- |Dread- | Battle | Light  |Destroyers| Air-|Cruisers
+       |noughts|noughts|cruisers|cruisers|          |ships|
+-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-----|---------
+British|   20  |   8   |    4   |   12   |    42    |  .. |    9
+German |   13  |  16   |    3   |   15   |    88    |   1 |    2
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Of submarines, according to the same authority, England had 17 of
+the D and E classes fit for distant operations, and 37 fit only for
+coast defense, while Germany had 28 U boats, all but two or three
+of which were able to cruise overseas. The British admiral's account
+of the inferiority of the British navy in submarines, aircraft,
+mines, destroyers, director firing (installed in only 8 ships in
+1914), armor-piercing shells, and protection of bases, seems to
+justify the caution of British operations, but is a severe indictment
+of the manner in which money appropriated for the navy was used.
+
+To open a war with England by surprise naval attack was no doubt
+an element in German plans; but in 1914 this was negatived by the
+forewarning of events on the Continent, by Germany's persistent delusion
+that England would stay neutral, and by the timely mobilization of
+the British fleet. This had been announced the winter before as
+a practical exercise, was carried out according to schedule from
+July 16 to July 23 (the date of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia),
+and was then extended until July 29, at which date the Grand Fleet
+sailed for Scapa Flow.
+
+At midnight of August 4 the British ultimatum to Germany expired
+and hostilities began. During the same night the Grand Fleet swept
+the northern exit of the North Sea to prevent the escape of enemy
+raiders, only one of which, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, actually
+reached the Atlantic in this first stage of the war. On a similar
+sweep further south, the Harwich light cruiser and destroyer force
+under Commodore Tyrwhitt sank by gunfire the mine layer _Königin
+Luise_, which a trawler had reported "throwing things overboard";
+but the next morning, August 6, the cruiser _Amphion_, returning
+near the same position, was destroyed by two mines laid by her
+victim of the day before. On the same date five cables were cut
+leading from Germany overseas. From August 10 to 23 all British
+forces were busy covering the transit of the first troops sent to
+the Continent. Such, in brief summary, and omitting more distant
+activities for the present, were the opening naval events of the
+war.
+
+_The Heligoland Bight Action_
+
+On the morning of August 28 occurred a lively action in Heligoland
+Bight, which cost Germany 3 light cruisers and a destroyer, and
+seemed to promise further aggressive action off the German shores.
+The British plan called for a destroyer and light cruiser sweep
+southward to a point about 12 miles west of Heligoland, and thence
+westward, with submarines disposed off Heligoland as decoys, the
+object being to cut off German destroyers and patrols. Commodore
+Tyrwhitt's force which was to execute the raid consisted of the
+1st and 3rd flotillas of 16 destroyers each, led by the new light
+cruiser _Arethusa_, flagship (28.5 knots, two 6", six 4" guns),
+and the _Fearless_ (25-4 knots, ten 4" guns). These were to be
+supported about 50 miles to westward by two battle cruisers from
+the Humber. This supporting force was at the last moment joined
+by three battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty and 6 cruisers under
+Commodore Goodenough from the Grand Fleet; but news of the accession
+never reached Commodore Keyes of the British submarines, who was
+hence puzzled later by the appearance of Goodenough's cruisers
+on the scene.
+
+[Illustration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, AUG. 28, 1914]
+
+The Germans, it appears, had got wind of the enemy plan, and arranged
+a somewhat similar counter-stroke. As Commodore Tyrwhitt's flotillas
+swept southward, they engaged and chased 10 German destroyers straight
+down upon Heligoland. Here the _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_ were
+sharply engaged with two German light cruisers, the _Stettin_, and
+the _Frauenlob_ (ten 4.1" guns each), until actually in sight of
+the island. Both sides suffered, the _Frauenlob_ withdrawing to
+Wilhelmshaven with 50 casualties, and the _Arethusa_ having her
+speed cut down and nearly every gun put temporarily out of
+commission.
+
+Whipping around to westward, the flotillas caught the German destroyer
+_V 187_, which at 9.10, after an obstinate resistance, was reduced to
+a complete wreck enveloped in smoke and steam. As British destroyers
+picked up survivors, they were driven off by the _Stettin_; but two
+boats with British crews and German prisoners were rescued later by
+the British submarine _E 4_, which had been lurking nearby.
+
+Extraordinary confusion now developed from the fact that Commodore
+Keyes in his submarine flotilla leader _Lurcher_ sighted through
+the mist two of Goodenough's cruisers (which had chased a destroyer
+eastward), and reported them as enemies. The call was picked up
+by Goodenough himself, who brought his remaining four ships to
+Keyes' assistance; but when these appeared, Keyes thought that
+he had to deal with four enemies more! Tyrwhitt was also drawn
+backward by the alarm. Luckily the situation was cleared up without
+serious consequences.
+
+German cruisers, darting out of the Ems and the Jade, were now
+entering the fray. At 10.55 the _Fearless_ and the _Arethusa_ with
+their flotillas were attacked by the _Stralsund_, which under a
+heavy fire made off toward Heligoland. Then at 11.15 the _Stettin_
+engaged once more, and five minutes later the _Mainz_. Just as
+this last ship was being finished up by destroyer attack, and the
+_Stettin_ and two fresh cruisers, _Köln_ and _Ariadne_, were
+rushing to her assistance, Beatty's five battle cruisers appeared
+to westward and rose swiftly out of the haze.
+
+Admiral Beatty's opportune dash into action at this time, from
+his position 40 miles away, was in response to an urgent call from
+Tyrwhitt at 11.15, coupled with the fact that, as the Admiral states
+in his report, "The flotillas had advanced only 2 miles since 8
+a.m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases." "Our high
+speed," the report continues, "made submarine attack difficult,
+and the smoothness of the sea made their detection fairly easy. I
+considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie
+except by a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in
+time, provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid."
+
+The _Stettin_ broke backward just in the nick of time. The _Köln_
+flagship of the German commodore, was soon staggering off in a
+blaze, and was later sunk with her total complement of 380 officers
+and men. The _Ariadne_, steaming at high speed across the bows of
+the British flagship _Lion_, was put out of action by two well-placed
+salvos. At 1.10 the _Lion_ gave the general signal "Retire."
+
+[Illustration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, 12:30-1:40
+From 20 to 40 miles slightly S. of W. from Heligoland.]
+
+Though the German cruisers had fought hard and with remarkable
+accuracy of fire, their movements had been tardy and not well concerted.
+The British losses amounted altogether to only 33 killed and 40
+wounded; while the enemy lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners
+over 1000 men. Very satisfactory, from the British standpoint, was
+the effect of the victory upon their own and upon enemy morale.
+
+Encouragement of this kind was desirable, for German submarines
+and mines were already beginning to take their toll. Off the Forth
+on September 5, a single torpedo sank the light cruiser _Pathfinder_
+with nearly all hands. This loss was avenged when a week later the
+_E 9_, under Lieut. Commander Max Harton, struck down the German
+cruiser _Hela_ within 6 miles of Heligoland. But on September 22,
+at 6.30 a.m., a single old-type German craft, the _U 9_, dealt a
+staggering blow. With a total of 6 torpedoes Commander Weddigen sank
+first the _Aboukir_, and then in quick succession the _Hogue_
+and the _Cressy_, both dead in the water at the work of rescue.
+The loss of these rather antiquated vessels was less serious than
+that of over 1400 trained officers and men. A shock to British
+traditions came with the new order that ships must abandon injured
+consorts and make all speed away.
+
+In the bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, which at the outbreak of
+war were totally unprotected against submarines and thought to
+be beyond their reach, the Grand Fleet felt less secure than when
+cruising on the open sea. Safer refuges were sought temporarily
+on the west coast of Scotland and at Lough Swilly in the north
+of Ireland, but even off this latter base on October 27, the big
+dreadnought _Audacious_ was sunk by mines laid by the German auxiliary
+cruiser _Berlin_. In view of the impending Turkish crisis, the loss
+was not admitted by the Admiralty, though since pictures of the
+sinking ship had actually been taken by passengers on the White
+Star liner _Olympic_, it could not long remain concealed. Mines and
+submarines had seemingly put the British navy on the defensive,
+even if consolation could be drawn from the fact that troops and
+supplies were crossing safely to France, the enemy had been held
+up at the Marne, the German surface fleet was passive, and the
+blockade was closing down.
+
+_Escape of the "Göben" and the "Breslau"_
+
+In distant waters Germany at the outbreak of the war had only ten
+cruisers--_Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Nürnberg_, and _Leipzig_
+in the Pacific, _Königsberg_ on the east coast of Africa,
+_Karlsruhe_ and _Dresden_ in the West Indies, and _Göben_
+and _Breslau_ in the Mediterranean. Within six months' time,
+these, together with a few auxiliary cruisers fitted out abroad,
+were either destroyed or forced to intern in neutral ports. Modern
+wireless communication, difficulties of coaling and supply, and
+the overwhelming naval strength of the Allies made the task of
+surface raiders far more difficult than in previous wars. They
+were nevertheless skillfully handled, and, operating in the wide
+ocean areas, created a troublesome problem for the Western Powers.
+
+The battle cruiser _Göben_ and the light cruiser _Breslau_
+alone, operating under Admiral Souchon in Mediterranean waters,
+accomplished ultimate results which would have easily justified
+the sacrifice of ten times the number of ships lost by Germany in
+distant seas. To hunt down these two vessels, and at the same time
+contain the Austrian Navy, the Entente had in the Mediterranean
+not only the bulk of the French fleet but also 3 battle cruisers, 4
+armored cruisers, and 4 light cruisers of Great Britain. Early on
+August 4, as he was about to bombard the French bases of Bona and
+Philippeville in Algiers, Admiral Souchon received wireless orders
+to make for the Dardanelles. Germany and England were then on the
+very verge of war. Knowing the British ships to be concentrated near
+Malta, and actually passing the _Indomitable_ and the _Invincible_ in
+sullen silence as he turned eastward, the German commander decided
+to put in at Messina, Sicily.
+
+At the end of the 24 hours granted in this port, the prospects
+for the German ships appeared so desperate that the officers, it
+is said, made their final testaments before again putting to sea.
+Slipping eastward through the Straits of Messina at twilight of
+the 6th, they were sighted by the British scout _Gloucester_, which
+stuck close at their heels all that night and until 4.40 p.m. the
+next day. Then, under orders to turn back, and after boldly engaging
+the _Breslau_ to check the flight, Captain Kelly of the _Gloucester_
+gave up the pursuit as the enemy rounded the Morea and entered
+the Greek Archipelago.
+
+The escape thus apparently so easy was the outcome of lack of
+coördination between French and British, slow and poor information
+from the British Admiralty, and questionable disposition of the
+British forces on the basis of information actually at hand. Prior
+to hostilities, it was perhaps unavoidable that the British commander,
+Admiral Milne, should be ignorant of French plans; but even on August
+5 and 6 he still kept all his battle cruisers west and north of
+Sicily to protect the French troop transports, though by this time
+he might have felt assured that the French fleet was at sea. At
+the time of the escape Admiral Troubridge with 4 armored cruisers
+and a destroyer force barred the Adriatic; though he caught the
+_Gloucester's_ calls, he was justified in not moving far from his
+station without orders, in view of his inferior strength and speed.
+Not until August 10 did British forces enter the Ægean; and at
+5 p.m. that day the two German ships steamed uninvited up the
+Dardanelles. Since the Turkish situation was still somewhat dubious,
+Admiral Souchon had been ordered to delay his entrance; but on
+the 10th, hearing British wireless signals steadily approaching
+his position in the Greek islands, he took the decision into his
+own hands. Germany had "captured Turkey," as an Allied diplomat
+remarked upon seeing the ships in the Golden Horn.
+
+In this affair the British, it is true, had many preoccupations--the
+hostile Austrian fleet, the doubtful neutrality of Italy, the French
+troop movement; the safety of Egypt and Suez. Yet the Admiralty were
+well aware that the German Ambassador von Wangenheim was dominant
+in Turkish councils and that the Turkish army was mobilized under
+German officers. It seems strange, therefore, that an escape into
+Constantinople was, in the words of the British Official History,
+"the only one that had not entered into our calculations." The whole
+affair illustrates the immense value political information may have
+in guiding naval strategy. The German ships, though ostensibly
+"sold" to the Turks, retained their German personnel. Admiral Souchon
+assumed command of the Turkish Navy, and by an attack on Russian
+ships in the Black Sea later succeeded in precipitating Turkey's
+entrance into the war, with its long train of evil consequences
+for the Western Powers.
+
+_Coronel and the Falkland Islands_
+
+In the Pacific the German cruisers were at first widely scattered,
+the _Emden_ at Kiao-chau, the _Leipzig_ on the west coast of
+Mexico, the _Nürnberg_ at San Francisco, and the armored cruisers
+_Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ under Admiral von Spee in the Caroline
+Islands. The two ships at the latter point, after being joined by
+the _Nürnberg_, set out on a leisurely cruise for South America,
+where, in view of Japan's entry into the war, the German Admiral may
+have felt that he would secure a clearer field of operations and,
+with the aid of German-Americans, better facilities for supplies.
+After wrecking on their way the British wireless and cable station at
+Fanning Island, and looking into Samoa for stray British cruisers,
+the trio of ships were joined at Easter Island on October 14 by the
+_Leipzig_ and also by the _Dresden_, which had fled thither from the
+West Indies.
+
+The concentration thus resulting seems of doubtful wisdom, for,
+scattered over the trade routes, the cruisers would have brought
+about greater enemy dispersion and greater injury to commerce; and,
+as the later course of the war was to show, the loss of merchant
+tonnage was even more serious for the Entente than loss of fighting
+ships. It seems evident, however, that Admiral van Spee was not
+attracted by the tame task of commerce destroying, but wished to
+try his gunnery, highly developed in the calm waters of the Far
+East, against enemy men-of-war.
+
+In its present strength and position, the German "fleet in being"
+constituted a serious menace, for to assemble an adequate force
+against it on either side of Cape Horn would mean to leave the
+other side dangerously exposed. It was with a keen realization of
+this dilemma that Admiral Cradock in the British armored cruiser
+_Good Hope_ left the Falklands on October 22 to join the _Monmouth,
+Glasgow_, and auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_ in a sweep along the west
+coast. The old battleship _Canopus_, with 12-inch guns, but only 12
+knots cruising speed, was properly judged too slow to keep with the
+squadron. It is difficult to say whether the failure to send Cradock
+reënforcements at this time from either the Atlantic or the Pacific
+was justified by the preoccupations in those fields. Needless to
+say, there was no hesitation, _after_ Coronel, in hurrying ships to
+the scene. On November 1, when the Admiralty Board was reorganized
+with Admiral Fisher in his old place as First Sea Lord, orders
+at once went out sending the _Defense_ to Cradock and enjoining
+him not to fight without the _Canopus_. But these orders he never
+received.
+
+The composition of the two squadrons now approaching each other
+off the Chilean coast was as follows:
+
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+   Name      |      Type       |Displace-| Belt |       Guns         |Speed
+             |                 |  ment   |armor |                    |
+-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
+Scharnhorst  |Armored cruiser  |  11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6"        | 23.5
+Gneisenau    |Armored cruiser  |  11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6"        | 23.5
+Leipzig      |Protected cruiser|   3,250 |none  |10-4"               | 23
+Nürnberg     |Light cruiser    |   3,450 |none  |10-4"               | 24
+Dresden      |Light cruiser    |   3,600 |none  |10-4"               | 24
+-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
+Good Hope    |Armored cruiser  |  14,000 |6-inch|2-9.2", 16-6", 14-3"| 24
+Monmouth     |Armored cruiser  |   9,800 |4-inch|14-6", 8-3"         | 24
+Glasgow      |Light cruiser    |   4,800 |none  |2-6", 10-4"         | 26.5
+-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
+Canopus      |                 |         |      |                    |
+(not engaged)|Coast defense    |  12,950 |6-inch|4-35 cal. 12", 12-6"| 16.5
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Without the _Canopus_, the British had perhaps a slight advantage
+in squadron speed, but only the two 9.2-inch guns of the _Good
+Hope_ could match the sixteen 8.2-inch guns of the Germans. Each
+side had information of the other's strength; but on the afternoon
+of November 1, the date of the Battle of Coronel, each supposed
+that only one enemy cruiser was in the immediate vicinity. Hence
+there was mutual surprise when the two squadrons, spread widely
+on opposite courses, came in contact at 4.40 p. m.
+
+While concentrating and forming his squadron, Admiral Cradock must
+have pondered whether he should fight or retreat. The _Canopus_ he
+knew was laboring northward 250 miles away. It was highly doubtful
+whether he could bring the enemy into action later with his slow
+battleship in line. His orders were to "search and protect trade."
+"Safety," we are told, "was a word he hardly knew." But his best
+justification lay in the enemy's menace to commerce and in the
+comment of Nelson upon a similar situation, "By the time the enemy
+has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no more harm that year."
+It was perhaps with this thought that Admiral Cradock signaled to
+the _Canopus_, "I am going to fight the enemy now."
+
+At about 6 p.m. the two columns were 18,000 yards distant on southerly
+converging courses. The British, to westward and slightly ahead, tried
+to force the action before sunset, when they would be silhouetted
+against the afterglow. Their speed at this time, however, seems
+to have been held up by the auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_, which
+later retreated southwestward, and their efforts to close were
+thwarted by the enemy's turning slightly away. Admiral von Spee
+in fact secured every advantage of position, between the British
+and the neutral coast, on the side away from the sun, and on such
+a course that the heavy seas from east of south struck the British
+ships on their engaged bows, showering the batteries with spray
+and rendering useless the lower deck guns.
+
+At 7 o'clock the German ships opened fire at 11,260 yards. The
+third salvo from the _Scharnhorst_ disabled the _Good Hope's_
+forward 9.2-inch gun. The _Monmouth's_ forecastle was soon on fire.
+It seems probable indeed that most of the injury to the British was
+inflicted by accurate shooting in this first stage of the action.
+On account of the gathering darkness, Admiral von Spee allowed the
+range to be closed to about 5500 yards, guiding his aim at first
+by the blaze on the Monmouth, and then for a time ceasing fire.
+Shortly before 8 o'clock a huge column of flame shooting up between
+the stacks of the _Good Hope_ marked her end. The _Monmouth_
+sheered away to westward and then northward with a heavy list that
+prevented the use of her port guns. An hour later, at 9.25, with
+her flag still flying defiantly, she was sunk by the _Nürnberg_
+at point blank range. The _Glasgow_, which had fought throughout
+the action, but had suffered little from the fire of the German
+light cruisers, escaped in the darkness.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOV. 1, 1914
+
+From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.]
+
+"It is difficult," writes an American officer, "to find fault with
+the tactics of Admiral van Spee; he appears to have maneuvered so
+as to secure the advantage of light, wind, and sea, and to have
+suited himself as regards the range."[1] The _Scharnhorst_ was hit
+twice, the _Gneisenau_ four times, and the German casualties
+were only two men wounded.
+
+[Footnote 1: Commander C. C. Gill, NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, p. 51.]
+
+[Illustration: ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS]
+
+This stinging blow and the resultant danger aroused the new Board
+of Admiralty to energetic moves. Entering the Atlantic, the German
+squadron might scatter upon the trade routes or support the rebellion
+in South Africa. Again, it might double westward or northward in the
+Pacific, or pass in groups of three, as permitted by American rules,
+through the Panama Canal into the West Indies. Concerted measures
+were taken against these possibilities. Despite the weakening of the
+Grand Fleet, the battle cruisers _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_
+under Admiral Sturdee, former Chief of Admiralty Staff, sailed on
+November 11 for the Falkland Islands. Their destination was kept
+a close secret, for had the slightest inkling of their mission
+reached German ears it would at once have been communicated to von
+Spee.
+
+After the battle, the German admiral moved slowly southward, coaling
+from chartered vessels and prizes; and it was not until December
+1 that he rounded the Horn. Even now, had he moved directly upon
+the Falklands, he would have encountered only the _Canopus_, but he
+again delayed several days to take coal from a prize. On December
+7 the British battle cruisers and other ships picked up in passage
+arrived at the island base and at once began to coal.
+
+Their coming was not a moment too soon. At 7.30 the next morning,
+while coaling was still in progress and fires were drawn in the
+_Bristol_, the signal station on the neck of land south of the harbor
+reported two strange vessels, which proved to be the _Gneisenau_ and
+the _Nürnberg_, approaching from the southward. As they eased down
+to demolish the wireless station, the _Canopus_ opened on them at
+about 11,000 yards by indirect fire. The two ships swerved off,
+and at 9.40, perceiving the dense clouds of smoke over the harbor
+and what appeared to be tripod masts, they fell back on their main
+force.
+
+Hull down, and with about 15 miles' start, the Germans, had they
+scattered at this time might, most of them at least, have escaped,
+as they certainly would have if their approach had been made more
+cautiously and at a later period in the day. The British ships
+were now out, with the fast _Glasgow_ well in the lead. In the
+chase that followed, Admiral van Spee checked speed somewhat to
+keep his squadron together. Though Admiral Sturdee for a time did
+the same, he was able at 12.50 to open on the rear ship _Leipzig_
+at 16,000 yards. At 1.20 the German light cruisers scattered to
+southwestward, followed by the _Cornwall, Kent_, and _Glasgow_.
+The 26-knot _Bristol_, had she been able to work up steam in time,
+would have been invaluable in this pursuit; she was sent instead
+to destroy three enemy colliers or transports reported off the
+islands.
+
+Between the larger ships the action continued at long range, for
+the superior speed of the battle cruisers enabled Admiral Sturdee
+to choose his distance, and his proper concern was to demolish the
+enemy with his own ships unscathed. At 2.05 he turned 8 points
+to starboard to clear the smoke blown down from the northwest and
+reduce the range, which had increased to 16,000 yards. Admiral
+von Spee also turned southward, and the stern chase was renewed
+without firing until 2.45. At this point both sides turned to port,
+the Germans now slightly in the rear and working in to 12,500 yards
+to use their 5.9-inch guns.
+
+At 3.15 the British came completely about to avoid the smoke, and
+the Germans also turned, a little later, as if to cross their bows.
+(See diagram.) The _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, though fighting
+gamely, were now beaten ships, the latter with upper works a "shambles
+of torn and twisted iron," and holes in her sides through which could
+be seen the red glow of flames. She turned on her beam-ends at 4.17
+and sank with every man an board. At 6 o'clock, after a fight of
+extraordinary persistence, the _Gneisenau_ opened her sea-cocks and
+went down. All her 8-inch ammunition had been expended, and 600 of
+her 850 men were disabled or killed. Some 200 were saved.
+
+Against ships with 12-inch guns and four times their weight of
+broadside the _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ made a creditable
+record of over 20 hits. The British, however, suffered no casualties
+or material injury. While Admiral Sturdee's tactics are thus justified,
+the prolongation of the battle left him no time to join in the light
+cruiser chase, and even opened the possibility, in the rain squalls
+of the late afternoon, that one of the armored cruisers might get
+away. In spite of a calm sea and excellent visibility during most
+of the action, the gunnery of the battle cruisers appears to have
+been less accurate at long range than in the later engagement off
+the Dogger Bank.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, DEC. 8, 1914
+
+From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.
+
+                   _British Squadron_
+  _Name          Type               Guns         Speed_
+Invincible   Battle Cruiser     8--12", 16--4"    26.5
+Inflexible   Battle Cruiser     8--12", 16--4"    26.5
+Carnarvon    Armored Cruiser    4--7.5", 6--6"    23.0
+Cornwall     Armored Cruiser   14--6"             23.5
+Kent         Armored Cruiser   14--6"             23.0
+Bristol      Scout Cruiser      2--6", 10--4"     26.5
+Glasgow      Scout Cruiser      2--6", 10--4"     26.5
+Canopus      Coast Defense      4--12", 12--6"    16.5
+
+                   _German Squadron_
+Scharnhorst  Armored Cruiser    8--8.2", 6--6"    23.5
+Gneisenau    Armored Cruiser    8--8.2", 6--6"    23.5
+Leipzig      Protected Cruiser  10--4"            23.0
+Nürnberg     Scout Cruiser      10--4"            24.0
+Dresden      Scout Cruiser      10--4"            24.0]
+
+Following similar tactics, the _Glasgow_ and _Cornwall_ overtook
+and finally silenced the _Leipzig_ at 7 p.m., four hours after
+the _Glasgow_ had first opened fire. Defiant to the last, like
+the _Monmouth_ at Coronel, and with her ammunition gone, she sank
+at 9.25, carrying down all but 18 of her officers and crew. The
+_Kent_, stoking all her woodwork to increase steam, attained at
+5 o'clock a position 12,000 yards from the _Nürnberg_, when the
+latter opened fire. At this late hour a long range action was out
+of the question. As the _Nürnberg_ slowed down with two of her
+boilers burst, the _Kent_ closed to 3000 yards and at 7.30 finished
+off her smaller opponent. The _Dresden_, making well above her
+schedule speed of 24 knots, had disappeared to southwestward early
+in the afternoon. Her escape entailed a long search, until, on
+March 14, 1915, she was destroyed by the _Kent_ and _Glasgow_
+off Juan Fernandez, where she had taken refuge for repairs.
+
+_Cruise of the "Emden"_
+
+Among the German cruisers other than those of Admiral van Spee's
+squadron, the exploits of the _Emden_ are best known, and reminiscent
+of the _Alabama's_ famous cruise in the American Civil War. It
+may be noted, however, as indicative of changed conditions, that
+the _Emden's_ depredations covered only two months instead of two
+years. A 3600 ton ship with a speed of 25 knots, the _Emden_ left
+Kiao-chau on August 6, met von Spee's cruisers in the Ladrones
+on the 12th, and on September 10 appeared most unexpectedly on
+the west side of the Bay of Bengal. Here she sank five British
+merchantmen, all following the customary route with lights aglow.
+On the 18th she was off the Rangoon River, and 6 days later across
+the bay at Madras, where she set ablaze two tanks of the Burma Oil
+Company with half a million gallons of kerosene. From September 26
+to 29 she was at the junction of trade routes west of Ceylon, and
+again, after an overhaul in the Chagos Archipelago to southward,
+spent October 16-19 in the same profitable field. Like most raiders,
+she planned to operate in one locality not more than three or four
+days, and then, avoiding all vessels on her course, strike suddenly
+elsewhere. During this period, British, Japanese, French, and Russian
+cruisers--the Germans assert there were 19 at one time--followed
+her trail.
+
+The most daring adventure of Captain von Müller, the _Emden's_
+skipper, was now carried out in the harbor of Penang, on the west
+side of the Malay Peninsula. With an additional false funnel to
+imitate British county-class cruisers, the _Emden_ at daybreak
+of October 28 passed the picket-boat off the harbor unchallenged,
+destroyed the Russian cruiser _Jemtchug_ by gunfire and two torpedoes,
+and, after sinking the French destroyer _Mousquet_ outside, got
+safely away. The Russian commander was afterward condemned for
+letting his ship lie at anchor with open lights, with only an anchor
+watch, and with strangers at liberty to visit her.
+
+Steaming southward, the raider made her next and last appearance
+on the morning of November 9 off the British cable and wireless
+station on the Cocos Islands. As she approached, word was promptly
+cabled to London, Adelaide, and Singapore, and--more profitably--was
+wirelessed to an Australian troop convoy then only 45 miles away. The
+_Emden_ caught the message, but nevertheless sent a party ashore,
+and was standing outside when the armored cruiser _Sydney_ came
+charging up. Against the _Emden's_ ten 4.1-inch guns, the _Sydney_
+had eight 6-inch guns, and she was at least 4 knots faster. Outranged
+and outdone in speed, the German ship was soon driven ashore in a
+sinking condition, with a funnel down and steering gear disabled.
+During her two months' activity thus ended, the _Emden_ had made
+21 captures, destroying ships and cargoes to the value of over
+$10,000,000.
+
+The other German cruisers were also short-lived. The _Karlsrühe_,
+after arming the liner _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ off the Bahamas (August
+6) and narrowly escaping the _Suffolk_ and the _Bristol_ by
+superior speed, operated with great success on the South American
+trade routes. Her disappearance--long a mystery to the Allies--was
+due to an internal explosion, just as she was about to crown her
+exploits by a raid on the island of Barbados. The _Königsberg_,
+on the east coast of Africa, surprised and sank the British light
+cruiser _Pegasus_ while the latter lay at Mombasa, Zanzibar, making
+repairs. She was later bottled up in the Rufigi River (October
+30) and finally destroyed there (July 11, 1915) by indirect fire
+from monitors, "spotted" by airplanes.
+
+[Illustration: THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPT. 1-NOV. 9, 1914]
+
+Of the auxiliary cruisers, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_ was
+sunk by the _Highflyer_ (August 26), and the _Cap Trafalgar_
+went down after a hard fight with the _Carmania_ (September 14).
+The _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_, which had entered the Atlantic with
+von Spee, interned at Newport News, Virginia, in March, 1915, and
+was followed thither a month later by the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_.
+
+The results of this surface warfare upon commerce amounted to 69
+merchant vessels, totaling 280,000 tons. With more strict concentration
+upon commerce destruction, and further preparations for using German
+liners as auxiliaries, the campaign might have been prolonged and made
+somewhat more effective. But for the same purpose the superiority
+of the submarine was soon demonstrated. To take the later surface
+raiders: the _Wolf_ sank or captured 20 ships in 15 months at sea;
+the _Seeadler_, 23 in 7 months; the _Möwe_ 15 in 2 months. But
+many a submarine in one month made a better record than these.
+The opening of Germany's submarine campaign, to be treated later,
+was formally announced by her blockade proclamation of February
+4, 1915.
+
+_The Dogger Bank Action_
+
+The strategic value of the battle cruiser, as a means of throwing
+strength quickly into distant fields, was brought out in the campaign
+against von Spee. As an outcome of German raids on the east coast of
+England, its tactical qualities, against units of equal strength,
+were soon put to a sharper trial. Aside from mere _Schrecklichkeit_--a
+desire to carry the terrors of war to English soil--these raids had
+the legitimate military objects of helping distant cruisers by
+holding British ships in home waters, of delaying troop movements
+to France, and of creating a popular clamor that might force a
+dislocation or division of the Grand Fleet. The first incursion,
+on November 3, inflicted trifling damage; the second, on December
+16, was marked by the bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and
+Whitby, in which 99 civilians were killed and 500 wounded. The
+third, on January 24 following, brought on the Dogger Bank action,
+the first encounter between battle cruisers, and one of the two
+capital ship actions of the war.
+
+At dawn on this date, the _Derfflinger, Seydlitz_ (flagship of
+Admiral von Hipper), _Moltke_, and armored cruiser _Blücher_,
+with 4 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas, were moving
+westward about midway in the North Sea on a line between Heligoland
+and the scene of their former raids. Five battle cruisers under
+Admiral Beatty were at the same time approaching a rendezvous with
+the Harwich Force for one of their periodical sweeps in the southern
+area. The Harwich Force first came in contact with the enemy about
+7 a.m. Fortunately for the Germans, they had already been warned
+of Beatty's approach by one of their light cruisers, and had just
+turned back at high speed when the British battle cruisers made
+them out to southeastward 14 miles away. The forces opposed were
+as follows:
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+           | Dis- |     |       | Best |           |Dis-  |     |       | Best
+British    |place-|Armor|  Guns |recent|German     |place-|Armor| Guns  |recent
+           | ment |     |       |speed*|           |ment  |     |       |speed
+-----------|------|-----|-------|------|-----------|------|-----|-------|------
+Lion       |26,350|  9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Derfflinger|26,180| 13" | 8 12" | 30
+Tiger      |28,500|  9" |8 13.5"| 32   |Seydlitz   |24,610| 11" |10 11" | 29
+Princess   |28,350|  9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Moltke     |22,640| 11" |10 11" | 28.4
+  Royal    |      |     |       |      |           |      |     |       |
+New Zealand|18,800|  8" |8 12"  | 29   |Blücher    |15,550|  6" |12 8.2"| 25.3
+Indomitable|17,250|  7" |8 12"  | 28.7 |           |      |     |       |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+[Footnote *: Jane's FIGHTING SHIPS, 1914.]
+
+[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA]
+
+Settling at once to a stern chase, the British ships increased
+speed to 28.5 knots; while the Germans, handicapped by the slower
+_Blücher_, were held down to 25. At 8.52 the _Lion_ was within
+20,000 yards of the _Blücher_, and, after deliberate ranging shots,
+scored her first hit at 9.09. As the range further decreased, the
+_Tiger_ opened on the rear ship, and the _Lion_ shifted to the
+third in line at 18,000 yards. The enemy returned the fire at
+9.14. Thus the action continued, both squadrons in lines of
+bearing, and Beatty's ships engaged as a rule with their opposites
+in the enemy order.
+
+[Illustration: DOGGER BANK ACTION, JAN. 24, 1915]
+
+At 9.45 the German armored cruiser had suffered severely, and ships
+ahead also showed the effects of the heavier enemy fire. Under
+cover of a thick smoke screen from destroyers on their starboard
+bow, and a subsequent destroyer attack, the Germans now shifted
+course away from the enemy and the rear ships hauled out on the
+port quarter of their leader to increase the range. The British
+cruisers, according to Admiral Beatty's report, "were ordered to
+form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed."
+An hour later the _Blücher_ staggered away to northward. Badly
+crippled, she was assigned by Beatty to the _Indomitable_, and was
+sunk at 12.37. At 10.54 submarines were reported on the British
+starboard bows.
+
+Just after 11 the flagship _Lion_, having received two hits under
+water which burst a feed tank and thus put the port engine out of
+commission, turned northward out of the line. Though the injury
+was spoken of as the result of a "chance shot," the _Lion_ had been
+hit 15 times. About an hour later Admiral Beatty hoisted his flag
+in the _Princess Royal_, but during the remainder of the battle Rear
+Admiral Moore in the _Tiger_ had command. Judging from the fact
+that the _Tiger_ was hit only 8 times in the entire action
+and the _Princess Royal_ and the _New Zealand_ not at all, there
+seems to have been little effort at this time to press the attack.
+The British lost touch at 11.50, and turned back at noon.
+
+In the lively discussion aroused by the battle, the question was
+raised why the _Blücher_ was included in the German line. Any encounter
+that developed on such an excursion was almost certain to be with
+superior forces, against which the armored cruiser would be of
+slight value. In a retreat, the "lame duck" would slow down the
+whole squadron, or else must be left behind.
+
+During the first hour of the battle, the British gained about three
+knots, and brought the range to 17,500 yards. The range after 9.45
+is not given, but was certainly not lowered in a corresponding
+degree. This may have been due to increased speed on the part of
+the German leaders, or to the interference of German destroyers,
+which now figured for the first time as important factors in day
+action. Two of these attacks were delivered, one at 9.40 and another
+about an hour later, and though repulsed by British flotillas,
+they both caused interference with the British course and fire.
+
+The injury to the _Lion_, in the words of Admiral Beatty, "undoubtedly
+deprived us of a greater victory." The British wireless caught
+calls from Hipper to the High Seas Fleet, which (though this seems
+strange at the time of a battle cruiser sortie) is declared by
+the Germans to have been beyond reach at Kiel.[1] Worried by the
+danger to the _Lion_ in case of retreat before superior forces, and
+in the belief that he was being led into submarine traps and mine
+fields, Admiral Moore gave up the chase. The distance to Heligoland
+was still at least 70 miles; the German ships were badly injured;
+the course since 9.45 had been more to the northward; the Grand
+Fleet was rapidly approaching the scene. The element of caution,
+seen again in the Jutland battle 15 months later, seems to have
+prevented pressing the engagement to more decisive results.
+
+[Footnote 1: Capt. Persius, _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 10,
+1919.]
+
+The conditions of flight and pursuit obtaining at the Dogger Bank
+emphasized the importance of speed and long range fire. Owing to
+the fact that they had twice the angle of elevation (30 degrees),
+the German 11-inch and 12-inch guns were not outranged by the British
+13.5-inch guns; and at 17,000 yards their projectiles had no greater
+angle of fall. The chief superiority of the larger ordnance therefore
+lay in their heavier bursting charges and greater striking energy,
+12,800 foot-tons to 8,900 foot-tons. According to a German report,
+the first salvo that hit the _Seydlitz_ knocked out both after-turrets
+and annihilated their crews; and the ship was saved only by flooding
+the magazines.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Admiral van Scheer, quoted in _Naval and Military Record_,
+London, March 24, 1920.]
+
+_The Dardanelles Campaign_
+
+Throughout the war a difference of opinion existed in Allied councils
+as to whether it was better to concentrate all efforts in the western
+sphere of operations, or to assail the Central Powers in the Near
+East as well, where the accession of Turkey (and later of Bulgaria)
+threatened to put the resources of all southeastern Europe under
+Teutonic control, and even opened a gateway into Asia. Such a division
+of effort was suggested not only by the necessity of protecting the
+Suez Canal, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, but by the difficulty of breaking
+the stalemate on the western front, and by the opportunity that
+would be offered of utilizing Allied control of sea communications.
+Furthermore, the Allies had a margin of predreadnoughts and cruisers
+ready for action and of no obvious value elsewhere.
+
+On November 3, 1914, three days after Turkey entered the war, an
+Allied naval force that had been watching off the Dardanelles engaged
+the outer forts in a 10-minute bombardment, of no significance
+save perhaps as a warning to the Turks of trouble later on. In the
+same month the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Winston
+Churchill, proposed an attack on the Straits as "an ideal method
+of defending Egypt"; but it was not seriously considered until, on
+January 2, Russia sent an urgent appeal for a diversion to relieve
+her forces in the Caucasus. Lord Kitchener, the British Minister
+of War, answered favorably, but, feeling that he had no troops
+to spare, turned the solution over to the Navy.
+
+From the first the decision was influenced by political considerations.
+Russia needed assurance of Allied solidarity--and it is significant
+that in February Lord Grey announced that England no longer opposed
+Russia's ambition to control Constantinople. Nine-tenths of Russia's
+exports were blocked by the closing of the Straits; their reopening
+would afford not only access to her vast stores of foodstuffs,
+but an entry--infinitely more convenient than Vladivostok or
+Archangel--for munitions and essential supplies. The Balkan States
+were wavering. In Turkey there was a strong neutral or pro-Ally
+sentiment. Victory would give an enormous material advantage, help
+Russia in the impending German drive on her southwestern frontier,
+and bolster Allied prestige throughout the eastern world.
+
+Faced with the problem, the Admiralty sent an inquiry to Admiral
+Carden, in command on the scene, as to the practicability of forcing
+the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone, assuming that old ships
+would be employed, and "that the importance of the results would
+justify severe loss." He replied on January 5: "I do not think the
+Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended
+operations with a large number of ships." In answer to further
+inquiries, accompanied by not altogether warranted assurance from
+the First Lord that "High authorities here concur in your opinion,"
+Admiral Carden outlined four successive operations:
+
+(a) The destruction of defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles.
+
+(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defenses up to
+and including Cephez Point battery N8.
+
+[Illustration: THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE]
+
+(c) Destruction of defenses of the Narrows.
+
+(d) Sweeping of a dear channel through the mine-field and advance
+through the Narrows; followed by a reduction of the forts further
+up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.
+
+This plan was presented at a meeting of the British War Council
+on January 13. It may be noted at this point that the War Council,
+though composed of 7 members of the Cabinet, was at this time dominated
+by a triumvirate--the Premier (Mr. Asquith), the Minister of War
+(General Kitchener), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr.
+Churchill); and in this triumvirate, despite the fact that England's
+strength was primarily naval, the head of the War Office played a
+leading rôle. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher) and one or two
+other military experts attended the Council meetings, but they were
+not members, and their function, at least as they saw it, was "to
+open their mouths when told to." Staff organizations existed also
+at both the War Office and the Admiralty, at the latter consisting
+of the First Lord, First Sea Lord and three other officers not
+on the Admiralty Board. The working of this improvised and not
+altogether ideal machinery for the supreme task of conducting the
+war is interestingly revealed in the report[1] of the commission
+subsequently, appointed to investigate the Dardanelles Campaign.
+
+[Footnote 1: British ANNUAL REGISTER, 1918, Appendix, pp. 24 ff.,
+from which quotations here are taken.]
+
+"Mr. Churchill," according to this report, "appears to have advocated
+the attack by ships alone before the War Council on a certain amount
+of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion." Encouraged by his
+sanguine and aggressive spirit, the Council decided that "the Admiralty
+should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and
+take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."
+In view of the fact that the operation as then conceived was to be
+purely naval, the word "take" suggests an initial misconception
+of what the navy could do. The support for the decision, especially
+from the naval experts, was chiefly on the assumption that if Admiral
+Carden's first operation were unpromising, the whole plan might
+be dropped.
+
+Admiral Fisher's misgivings as to the wisdom of the enterprise
+soon increased, owing primarily to his desire to employ the full
+naval strength in the home field. He did not believe that "cutting
+off the enemy's big toe in the East was better than stabbing him
+to the heart." He had begun the construction of 612 new vessels
+ranging from "hush-hush" ships of 33 knots and 20-inch guns to
+200 motor-boats, and he wished to strike for access to the Baltic,
+with a threat of invasion on Germany's Baltic coast. The validity
+of his objections to the Dardanelles plan appears to depend on the
+practicability of this alternative, which was not attempted later
+in the war. The First Lord and the First Sea Lord presented their
+difference of opinion to the Premier, but it appears that there was
+no ill feeling; Admiral Fisher later writes that "Churchill had
+courage and imagination--he was a war man."
+
+At a Council meeting on January 28, when the decision was made
+definite, Admiral Fisher was not asked for an opinion and expressed
+none. (The Investigation Commission declare that the naval experts
+should have been asked, and should have expressed their views whether
+asked or not.) But there was a dramatic moment when, after rising as
+if to leave the Council, he was quickly followed by Lord Kitchener,
+who pointed out that all the others were in favor of the plan, and
+induced him once more to take his seat. After the decision, Mr.
+Churchill testifies, "I never looked back. We had left the region
+of discussion and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The
+matter had now passed into the domain of action."
+
+To turn to the scene of operations, there were now assembled at
+the Dardanelles 10 British and 4 French predreadnoughts, together
+with the new battleship _Queen Elizabeth_, the battle cruiser
+_Inflexible_, and many cruisers and torpedo craft. On February
+19, 1915, again on February 25-26, and on March 1-7, this force
+bombarded the outer forts at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr and the
+batteries 10 miles further up at Cephez Point. These were in part
+silenced and demolished by landing parties. Bad weather, however,
+interfered with operations, and there was also some shortage of
+ammunition. The batteries, and especially the mobile artillery of
+the Turks, still greatly hampered the work of mine sweeping, which
+at terrible hazards was carried on at night within the Straits.
+
+In the meantime the Government, to quote General Callwell, the
+Director of Military Operations, had "drifted into a big military
+attack." But the despatch from England of the 29th Division, which
+was to join the forces available in Egypt, was delayed; owing to
+Lord Kitchener's concern about the western situation, from Feb. 22
+to March 16--an unfortunate loss of time. By March 17, however, the
+troops from Egypt and most of the French contingent were assembled
+at the island of Lemnos, and General Sir Ian Hamilton had arrived
+to take command. His instructions included the statement that
+"employment of military forces on any large scale at this juncture
+is only contemplated in the event of the fleet failing to get through
+after every effort has been exhausted. Having entered on the project
+of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning the
+scheme."
+
+On March 11 the First Lord sent to Admiral Carden a despatch asking
+whether the time had not arrived when "you will have to press hard
+for a decision," and adding: "Every well-conceived action for forcing
+a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive
+our support." The Admiral replied concurring, but expressing the
+opinion that "in order to insure my communication line immediately
+fleet enters Sea of Marmora, military operations should be opened
+at once." On March 16 he resigned owing to ill health, and his
+second in command, Admiral de Robeck, succeeded, with the feeling
+that he had orders to force the Straits.
+
+The attack of March 18 was the crucial and, as it proved, the final
+action of the purely naval campaign. At this time the mines had
+been swept as far up as Cephez Point, and a clear channel opened
+for some distance beyond. During the morning the _Queen Elizabeth_
+and 5 other ships bombarded the Narrows forts at 14,000 yards.
+Then at 12.22 the French predreadnoughts _Suffren, Gaulois,
+Charlemagne_, and _Bouvet_ approached to about 9000 yards and by
+1.25 had for the time being silenced the batteries of the Narrows.
+Six British battleships now advanced (2.36) to relieve the French.
+In the maneuvering and withdrawal, the _Biouvet_ was sunk by a
+drifting mine[1] with a loss of over 600 men, and the _Gaulois_
+was hit twice under water and had to be beached on an island
+outside the Straits. About 4 o'clock the _Irresistible_ also
+ran foul of a mine and was run ashore on the Asiatic side, where
+most of her men were taken off under fire. The _Ocean_, after going
+to her assistance, struck a mine and went down about 6 o'clock.
+Not more than 40 per cent. of the injuries sustained in the action
+were attributable to gunfire, the rest to mines sent adrift from
+the Narrows. Of the 16 capital ships engaged, three were sunk,
+one had to be beached, and some of the others were hardly ready
+for continuing the action next day.
+
+[Footnote 1: It is stated that an ingenious device caused these
+mines to sink after a certain time and come back on an under-current
+that flows _up_ the Dardanelles, and then rise at the Narrows for
+recovery. This may have enabled the Turks to keep up their presumably
+limited supply of mines; but how well the automatic control worked
+is not known.]
+
+[Illustration: DARDANELLES DEFENSES]
+
+There is some military support for the opinion that if, on the
+18th or at some more suitable time, the fleet had acted in the
+spirit of Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!" and,
+protected by dummy ships, bumpers, or whatever other devices naval
+ingenuity could devise, had steamed up to and through the Narrows
+in column, it would not have suffered much more severely than during
+the complicated maneuvering below. Of such an attack General von
+der Goltz, in command of the Turkish army, said that, "Although
+he thought it was almost impossible to force the Dardanelles, if
+the English thought it an important move in the general war, they
+could by sacrificing ten ships force the entrance, and do it very
+fast, and be up in Marmora within 10 hours from the time they forced
+it."[l] Admiral Fisher estimated that the loss would be 12 ships.
+
+[Footnote 1: Repeated by Baron van Wangenheim to Ambassador Morgenthau,
+prior to the attack of March 18, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY,
+_World's Work_, September, 1918. See also Col. F. N. Maude, Royal
+Engineers, _Contemporary Review_, June, 1915.]
+
+After such deductions, there would be no great surplus to deal with
+the _Göben_, which would fight desperately, and with the defenses of
+Constantinople. Indeed, such losses would seem absolutely prohibitive,
+if viewed only from the narrow standpoint of the force engaged,
+and without taking into fullest account the limited value of the
+older ships and the fact that the Government was fully committed
+to a prosecution of the campaign. It is of course easy to see that
+victory purchased by the loss of 10 predreadnoughts and 10,000 men
+would be cheap, as compared with the sacrifice of over 100,000
+men killed and wounded and 10,000 invalided in the later campaign
+on land.
+
+General Callwell has pointed out that the naval commanders were
+properly worried about what would happen after they got through
+the Straits, if the Sublime Porte should not promptly "throw up
+the sponge." "The communications would have remained closed to
+colliers and small craft by movable armament, if not also by mines.
+Forcing the pass would in fact have resembled bursting through a
+swing door. Sailors and soldiers alike have an instinctive horror
+of a trap, and they are in the habit of looking behind them as
+well as before them."[1] But according to Ambassador Morgenthau,
+who was probably in a better position than any one else to form
+an opinion, "The whole Ottoman State on the 18th day of March,
+1915, was on the brink of dissolution." The Turkish Government
+was divided into factions and restive under German domination, and
+there was thus an excellent prospect that it would have capitulated
+under the guns of the Allied fleet. If not, then there might have
+been nothing left for the latter but to try to get back the way
+it came.
+
+[Footnote 1: NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, March, 1919, p. 486.]
+
+Feeling in Constantinople during the month from February 19th to
+March 19th has already been suggested; it was nervous in the extreme.
+Neither Turks nor Germans felt assured that the Dardanelles could
+withstand British naval power. Plans were made for a general exit
+to Asia Minor, and there was a conviction that in a few days Allied
+ships would be in the Golden Horn. At the forts, if we may believe
+evidence not as yet definitely disproved, affairs were still more
+desperate. The guns, though manned largely by Germans, were not of
+the latest type, and for a month had been engaged in almost daily
+bombardment. Ammunition was running short. "Fort Hamadié, the most
+powerful defense on the Asiatic side, had just 17 armor-piercing
+projectiles left, while at Killid-ul-Bahr, the main defense on
+the European side, there were precisely 10."[2] To this evidence
+may be added the statement of Enver Pasha: "If the English had
+only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles
+they could have got to Constantinople, but their delay enabled us
+to fortify the peninsula, and in 6 weeks' time we had taken down
+there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."
+
+[Footnote 2: AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY, _World's Work_, September,
+1918, p. 433, corroborating the statement of the correspondent G.
+A. Schreiner, in FROM BERLIN TO BAGDAD.]
+
+If Mr. Churchill was chiefly responsible for undertaking the campaign,
+he was not responsible for the delay after March 18. "It never
+occurred to me," he states, "that we should not go on." Admiral
+de Robeck in his first despatches appeared to share this view. On
+March 26, however, he telegraphed: "The check on March 18 is not,
+in my opinion, decisive, but on March 22 I met General Hamilton and
+heard his views, and I now think that, to obtain important results
+and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation
+will be essential." This despatch, Mr. Churchill says, "involved a
+complete change of plan and was a vital decision. I regretted it
+very much. I believed then, as I believe now, that we were separated
+by very little from complete success." He proposed that the Admiral
+should be directed to renew the attack; but the First Sea Lord did
+not agree, nor did Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, nor Admiral Sir Henry
+Jackson. So it was decided to wait for the army, and some satire
+has been directed at Mr. Churchill and those other "acknowledged
+experts in the technicalities of amphibious warfare," Mr. Balfour
+and Mr. Asquith, who were inclined to share his views. The verdict
+of the Dardanelles Commission was that, "Had the attack been renewed
+within a day or two there is no reason to suppose that the proportion
+of casualties would have been less; and, if so, even had the second
+attack succeeded, a very weak force would have been left for subsequent
+naval operations."
+
+Once decided upon, it was highly essential that the combined operation
+should begin without further delay. But it was now found that the
+army transports had been loaded, so to speak, up-side-down, with
+guns and munitions buried under tents and supplies. Sending them
+back to Alexandria for reloading involved a six weeks' delay, though
+Lord Kitchener wired, "I think you had better know at once that
+I regard such postponement as far too long." The landing on the
+tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was nearest the forts in
+the Straits and said to be the only feasible place, actually began
+on April 25, and was achieved under the guns of the fleet, and by
+almost unexampled feats of heroism by boats' crews and the first
+parties on shore.
+
+Henceforth the navy played a subordinate though not insignificant
+part in the campaign. "By our navy we went there and were kept
+there," writes Mr. John Masefield in _Gallipoli_, "and by our navy
+we came away. During the nine months of our hold on the peninsula
+over 300,000 men were brought by the navy from places three, four,
+or even six thousand miles away. During the operations some half
+of these were removed by our navy, as sick and wounded, to ports
+from 800 to 3000 miles away. Every day, for 11 months, ships of
+our navy moved up and down the Gallipoli coast bombarding the Turk
+positions. Every day during the operations our navy kept our armies
+in food, drink and supplies. Every day, in all that time, if weather
+permitted, ships of our navy cruised in the Narrows and off
+Constantinople, and the seaplanes of our navy raided and scouted
+within the Turk lines."
+
+On May 12 the predreadnought _Goliath_ was torpedoed by a Turkish
+destroyer; and on May 25-26 the German submarine _U 23_, which
+had made the long voyage by way of Gibraltar, sank the _Triumph_
+and the _Majestic_. It was upon a forewarning of this attack that
+Admiral Fisher, according to his own statement, resigned as a protest
+against the retention of the _Queen Elizabeth_ and other capital
+units in this unpromising field. British and French submarines, on
+the other hand, worked their way into the Sea of Marmora, entered
+the harbor of Constantinople, and inflicted heavy losses, including
+two Turkish battleships, 8 transports, and 197 supply vessels.
+
+So almost unprecedented were the problems of a naval attack on the
+Dardanelles that it appears rash to condemn either the initiation
+or the conduct of an operation that ended in failure when seemingly
+on the verge of success. Clearly, the campaign was handicapped
+by lack of unanimous support and whole-hearted faith on the part
+of authorities at home. It was not thoroughly thought out at the
+start, and was subjected to trying delays. No advantage was ever
+taken of the invaluable factor of surprise. Even so, it was not
+wholly barren of results. It undoubtedly relieved Russia, kept
+Bulgaria neutral for at least five months, and immobilized 300,000
+Turks, according to Lord Kitchener's estimate, for nine months'
+time. Nevertheless, the final failure was a tremendous blow to
+Allied prestige. Upon the withdrawal, in January of 1916, some
+of the troops were transferred to Salonika; and it is noteworthy
+that in Macedonia, as at Gallipoli, the army was dependent on the
+navy for the transport of troops, munitions, and in fact virtually
+everything needed in the campaign.
+
+Aside from the Dardanelles failure, the naval situation at the end
+of 1915 was such as to give assurance to the Western Powers. They
+had converted potential control of the sea into actual control, save
+in limited areas on the enemies' sea frontiers. Germany had lost
+her cruisers and her colonies, and her shipping had been destroyed
+or driven from the seas. Though losses from submarines averaged
+150,000 tons a month in 1915, they had not yet caused genuine alarm.
+The German fleet was still a menace, but, in spite of attrition
+warfare, the Grand Fleet was decidedly stronger than in 1914.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+BRITISH OFFICIAL NAVAL HISTORY, Sir Julian Corbett, London, 1920.
+THE GRAND FLEET, Admiral Jellicoe, London, 1918.
+THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, Arthur H. Pollen, London, 1919.
+MY MEMOIRS, Admiral van Tirpitz, 1919.
+THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral van
+  Scheer, 1920.
+U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, WAR NOTES, 1914-1918.
+LES ENSEIGNEMENTS MARITIMES DE LA GUERRE ANTI-GERMANIQUE,
+  Admiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919.
+IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, Captain Romeo Bernotti,
+  Leghorn, 1920.
+NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, Commander C. C. Gill, New York, 1918.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+
+There was only one action between the British Grand Fleet and the
+German High Seas Fleet in the World War, the battle of Jutland.
+This was indecisive, but even in a history with the limits of this
+book it deserves a chapter of its own. In the magnitude of the
+forces engaged, a magnitude less in numbers of ships--great as
+that was--than in the enormous destructive power concentrated in
+those ships, it was by far the greatest naval battle in history.
+Moreover, this was the one fleet battle fought with the weapons
+of to-day. Any discussion of modern tactics, therefore, must be
+based for some time to come on an analysis of Jutland. Finally, the
+indecisiveness of the action has resulted in a controversy among
+naval critics that is likely to continue indefinitely. Meanwhile
+the debatable points are rich in interest and suggestion.
+
+In earlier wars the nation with a more powerful fleet blockaded
+the ports of the enemy. In this war the sea mine, the submarine,
+the aircraft and the long-range gun of coast defenses made the
+old-fashioned close blockade impossible. Such blockade as could
+be maintained under modern conditions had to be "distant." The
+British made a base in the Orkneys, Scapa Flow, which had central
+position with relation to a possible sortie of the German fleet
+toward either the North Atlantic or the Channel. The intervening
+space of North Sea was patrolled by a scouting force of light vessels
+of various sorts and periodical sweeps by the Grand Fleet. On May
+30, 1916, the Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, set out from
+its base at Scapa Flow for one of these patrolling cruises. On
+the same day Vice Admiral Beatty left his base at Rosyth (in the
+Firth of Forth) with his advance force of battle cruisers and
+battleships, under orders to join Jellicoe at sea. On the following
+day the High Seas Fleet took the sea and the two great forces came
+together in battle.
+
+It is not certain why the German fleet should have been cruising
+at this time. Having declined to offer battle in the summer of
+1914, on account of the British superiority of force, the High
+Command could hardly have contemplated attacking in 1916 when the
+odds were much heavier. From statements published by German officers
+since the war, the objects seem to have been, first, to prevent a
+suspected attempt to force an entrance into the Baltic; secondly,
+to fall upon Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron, during its frequent
+patrolling cruises, when it was detached from the main force; and,
+thirdly, to destroy the British trading fleets which were conducting
+an important volume of commerce from the ports of Norway with England
+and Russia. It is not easy to see, however, why the High Seas Fleet
+should be sent out on a mere commerce destroying raid. The Germans
+had been out twice before, since April 1st of that year, and probably
+it was considered good policy to send the fleet to sea every now
+and then for the moral effect. The people could not relish the idea
+of their navy being condemned to inaction in their own harbors,
+and there was bad feeling over the fact that the government had
+just yielded to President Wilson's protest on ruthless submarine
+warfare. A victory over Beatty's battle cruisers, or some other
+detached unit of the British fleet, would have been very opportune
+in bracing German morale. At the same time Admiral von Scheer had
+probably reckoned on being able to avoid battle with the Grand
+Fleet by means of a swift retreat under cover of smoke screens
+and torpedo attacks. Certainly the odds were too heavy to permit
+of any other policy on his part.
+
+_The First Phase_
+
+[Illustration: CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
+
+(After diagram by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval
+Institute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)
+
+Forces:
+     24 Dreadnought Battleships
+      3 Battle Cruisers
+     12 Light Cruisers
+      8 Armored Cruisers
+     51 Destroyers
+  Note: One destroyer accompanied each armored cruiser.]
+
+At 2 p. m. of the 31st of May, 1916, the British main fleet, under
+Admiral Jellicoe, was in Latitude 57° 57' N., Longitude 3° 45'
+E. (off the coast of Norway), holding a south-easterly course.
+It consisted of 24 battleships formed in a line of six divisions
+screened by destroyers and light cruisers, as indicated in the
+accompanying diagram. Sixteen miles ahead of the battle fleet was
+the First Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Arbuthnot and the
+Second Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Heath; these consisted of
+four armored cruisers each. They were spread out at intervals of six
+miles, with the _Hampshire_ six miles astern of the _Minotaur_
+to serve as link ship for signals to and from the main fleet. Four
+miles ahead was the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron of three ships
+under Rear Admiral Hood. These were steaming in column, screened by
+four destroyers and two light cruisers (_Chester_ and _Canterbury_).
+The diagram on p. 388 shows the complete formation of the Battle
+Fleet and Cruiser Squadrons, under Admiral Jellicoe's personal
+command. It is interesting as an example of the extreme complexity
+of fleet formation under modern conditions, especially when it is
+realized that the whole fleet was proceeding on its base course
+by zigzagging.
+
+[Illustration: BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION, 2 P. M.
+
+(After diagrams by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval
+Institute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)]
+
+Seventy-seven miles to the southward Vice Admiral Beatty, commanding
+the scouting force, was heading on a northeasterly course. His force
+was spread out in scouting formation. The First Battle Cruiser
+Squadron of four ships, headed by the flagship _Lion_, was flanked
+three miles to the eastward by the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron of
+two ships, and five miles to the north by the Fifth Battle Squadron,
+consisting of four of the finest battleships in the fleet, 25-knot
+_Queen Elizabeths_, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. Each of these
+squadrons had its screen of destroyers and light cruisers. Eight miles
+to the south the First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons
+were spread out in line at five-mile intervals. The formation is
+made clear by the accompanying diagram.
+
+At the same hour, 2 p. m., Vice Admiral Hipper, with the German
+scouting force, was heading north about 15 to 20 miles to the southeast
+of Beatty. Hipper commanded the First Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+consisting of the _Lützow_ (flag), _Derflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke_,
+and _Van der Tann_, accompanied by a screening force of four or
+five light cruisers and about 15 destroyers. Fifty miles south
+of this advance force was the main body of the High Seas Fleet under
+Vice Admiral von Scheer. It consisted of three battle squadrons
+arranged apparently in one long column of 22 ships escorted by
+a screen of 62 destroyers, eight or ten light cruisers, and the
+one remaining armored cruiser in the German navy, the _Roon_.
+
+Thus the stage was set and the characters disposed for the great
+naval drama of that day.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLE CRUISER: THE DERFFLINGER
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships, 1918_
+
+Normal displacement, 26,600 to 28,000 tons.
+
+Length (waterline), 689 to 700 feet. Beam, 95 to 96 feet. Mean draught,
+27-1/2 feet.
+
+Guns:                                    Some (4.7 inch?) anti-aircraft
+   8--1.2 inch, 50 cal. (A5)               2 machine
+  14--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in M. & H.       Torpedo tubes (21.7 inch):
+            but only                        2 or 4 submerged (broadside)
+  12--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in D.               1 submerged (bow)
+ (1.2 or less--3.4 inch, 22 pdr. ?)]
+
+At 2.20 the light cruiser _Galatea_ (v. diagram), which lay farthest
+to the east of Beatty's force, reported two German light cruisers
+engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Beatty thereupon changed
+course toward Horn Reef Lightship in order to cut them off from
+their base, his light cruisers of the first and third divisions
+spreading out as a screen to the eastward. It would be interesting
+to know why, at this point, he did not draw in his battleships and
+thus concentrate his force, for when he did establish contact with
+the Germans, Evan-Thomas's squadron was too far away for effective
+support. Ten minutes later Hipper got word of British light cruisers
+and destroyers sighted to the westward and, changing course to
+northwest, he headed for them at high speed. At 2.45 Beatty sent
+out a seaplane from the _Engadine_ to ascertain the enemy's position.
+This is the first instance in naval history of a fleet scouting by
+means of aircraft. The airplane came close enough to the enemy
+to draw the fire of four light cruisers, and returning reported
+their position. Meanwhile the _Galatea_ had reported heavy smoke
+"as from a fleet."
+
+At the first report from the _Galatea_, which had been intercepted
+on the flagship, _Iron Duke_, Jellicoe ordered full speed, and
+despatched ahead the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Hood,
+to cut off the escape of the Germans to the Skagerrak, as Beatty
+was then heading to cut them off from their bases to the south.
+Admiral Scheer, also, on getting report of the English cruisers,
+quickened the speed of his main fleet.
+
+At 3.30 Beatty and Hipper discovered each other's battle cruiser
+forces. Hipper turned about and headed on a southerly course to lead
+the British toward the advancing main fleet. Beatty also turned,
+forming his battle cruisers on a line of bearing to clear the smoke,
+and the two forces approached each other on converging courses as
+indicated in the diagram.
+
+At this point it is worth while to compare the two battle cruiser
+forces:[1]
+
+              BRITISH                            GERMAN
+                   Displace-                          Displace-
+Name          Armor   ment    Guns   Name        Armor   ment    Guns
+Queen Mary      9"  26,350  8 13.5"  Lützow       13"  26,180   8 12"
+Lion            9"  26,350  8 13.5"  Derfflinger  13"  26,180   8 12"
+Tiger           9"  28,500  8 13.5"  Seydlitz     11"  24,610  10 11"
+Princess Royal  9"  28,350  8 13.5"  Moltke       11"  22,640  10 11"
+Indefatigable   8"  18,800  8 12"    VonderTann   10"  19,100     11"
+New Zealand     8"  18,800  8 12"
+                   -------                            -------
+                   145,150                            118,710
+
+[Footnote 1: Table from Lieut. Comdr. H. H. Frost, U. S. N., _U.
+S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, Nov., 1919, p. 850.]
+
+A glance shows the superiority of the British in guns and the German
+superiority in armor. The British had six ships to the German five,
+and if the four new battleships of Evan-Thomas's division could
+be effectively brought into action, the British superiority in
+force would be reckoned as considerably more than two to one. These
+battleships had 13" armor, eight 15" guns each, and a speed of 25
+knots. They were the most powerful ships afloat.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER: THE LION
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1918
+
+Normal displacement, 26,350 tons. Full load, 29,700.
+Length (w. l.). 675 feet. Beam, 88-1/2, feet.
+
+Mean draught, 27-2/3 feet. Max. draught, 31-2/3 feet.
+Length over all, 700 feet. Length, p. p., 660 feet.
+
+Guns:                                    (P. R. 2--2 pdr. pom-pom)
+   8--13.5 inch (M. V.). Dir. Con.       5 M. G. (1 landing)
+  16--4 inch, 50 cal, Dir. Con.        Torpedo tubes (21 inch):
+   2--3 inch (anti-aircraft)             2 submerged (broadside)
+   4--3 pdr.]
+
+In speed, Beatty had a marked advantage. He could make 29 knots with
+all six of his cruisers and 32 knots with his four best,--_Queen
+Mary, Tiger, Lion_, and _Princess Royal_. Hipper's squadron
+could make but 28 knots, though the _Lützow_ and _Derfflinger_
+were probably capable of 30.
+
+At 3.48 British and German battle cruisers opened fire. According
+to Beatty's report the range at this moment was 18,500 yards. Beatty
+then turned to starboard, assuming a course nearly parallel to
+that of Hipper. Almost immediately, three minutes after the first
+salvo, the _Lion_, the _Tiger_, and the _Princess Royal_ were
+hit by shells. In these opening minutes the fire of the Germans
+seems to have been fast and astonishingly accurate. The _Lion_
+was hit repeatedly, and at four o'clock the roof of one of her
+turrets was blown off. It is said that the presence of mind and
+heroic self-sacrifice of an officer saved the ship from the fate
+that subsequently overwhelmed two of her consorts. By this time
+the range had decreased to 16,000 yards (British reckoning) and
+Beatty shifted his course more to the south to confuse the enemy's
+fire control. Apparently this move did not succeed in its purpose
+for at 4.06 a salvo struck the _Indefatigable_ on a line with her
+after turret, and exploded a magazine. As she staggered out of
+column and began sinking, another salvo smashed into her forward
+decks and she rolled over and sank like a stone.
+
+About this time the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action, but
+it was not able to do effective service. The range was extreme,
+about 20,000 yards, and being some distance astern of the battle
+cruisers, on account of its inferior speed, it had to contend with
+the battle smoke of the squadron ahead as well as the gradually
+thickening atmospheric conditions. In addition the Germans frequently
+laid smoke screens and zigzagged. Evan-Thomas's division never saw
+more than two enemy ships at a time.
+
+The shift of course taken by Beatty at four o'clock, accompanied
+possibly by a corresponding shift of Hipper, opened the range so
+far in a few minutes that fire slackened on both sides. Beatty
+then swung to port in order to close to effective range. At 4.15
+twelve of his destroyers, acting on the general order to attack
+when conditions were favorable, dashed out toward the German line.
+At the same instant German destroyers, to the number of fifteen
+accompanied by the light cruiser _Regensburg_, advanced toward
+the British line, both forces maneuvering to get on the bows of
+the opposing battle cruisers. For this purpose the British flotilla
+was better placed because their battle cruisers were well ahead of
+the Germans. The German destroyers, therefore, concentrated their
+efforts on the battleship division, which turned away to avoid
+the torpedoes. In numbers the advantage lay with the Germans, and a
+fiercely contested action took place between the lines conducted with
+superb gallantry on both sides. The Germans succeeded in breaking up
+the British attack at a cost of two destroyers. Two of the British
+destroyers also were rendered unmanageable and sank later when the
+High Seas Fleet arrived on the scene.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, FIRST PHASE
+
+Action Between Battle Cruiser Forces.]
+
+Meanwhile, at 4.26, just before the destroyers clashed, a salvo
+struck the _Queen Mary_, blew up a magazine, and she disappeared
+with practically all on board. Thus the second of Beatty's battle
+cruisers was sent to the bottom with tragic suddenness.
+
+At 4.38, Commodore Goodenough, commanding the Second Light Cruiser
+Squadron, who was scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported
+that the German battle fleet was in sight steering north, and gave
+its position. Beatty at once called in his destroyers and turned
+his ships in succession, sixteen points to starboard, ordering
+Evan-Thomas to turn similarly. Thus the capital ships turned right
+about on the opposite course, the battleships following the cruisers
+as before, and all heading for the main fleet which was then about
+fifty miles away to the north. Commodore Goodenough at this point
+used his initiative in commendable fashion. Without orders he kept
+on to the south to establish contact with the German battle fleet
+and hung on its flanks near enough to report its position to the
+commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire, but handled his
+frail ships so skillfully as to escape serious loss. At the same
+time the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect
+in the British system of communication made his reports of bearing
+seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a
+difficulty for the commander in chief, who, fifty miles away, was
+trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet.
+
+_The Second Phase_
+
+The northward run of the British advance force and the German advance
+force, followed by their main fleet, was uneventful. The situation
+was at this stage exactly reversed. Beatty was endeavoring to lead
+the German forces into the guns of the Grand Fleet, while ostensibly
+he was attempting to escape from a superior force, much as Hipper
+had been doing with relation to Scheer during the first phase.
+Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers continued to engage the
+five German battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards, assisted
+by the two leading ships of Evan-Thomas's Battle Squadron. The
+other two battleships engaged the head of the advancing German
+battle fleet at the extreme range of 19,000 yards as often as they
+could make out their enemy. The visibility grew worse and apparently
+neither side scored on the other.
+
+As the British main fleet was reported somewhat to the east of
+Beatty's position, he bore toward that quarter; and Hipper, to avoid
+being "T-d" by his enemy, turned to the eastward correspondingly. The
+mistiness increased to such a degree that shortly after five o'clock
+Beatty lost sight of the enemy's battle cruisers and ceased fire for
+half an hour. Between 5.40 and six o'clock, however, conditions were
+better and firing was opened again by the British ships, apparently
+with good effect. Meanwhile clashes had already taken place between
+the light cruiser _Chester_, attached to the Third Battle Squadron
+of the main fleet, and the light cruisers of the enemy, which were
+far in advance of their battle cruisers.
+
+_The Third Phase_
+
+We have already noted that as soon as Jellicoe learned of the presence
+of the enemy he ordered Hood, with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+to cut off the German retreat to the Skagerrak and to support Beatty.
+Hood's course had taken him well to the east of where the action
+was in progress. At 5.40 he saw the flashes of guns far to the
+northwest, and immediately changed course in that direction. Fifteen
+minutes later he was able to open fire on German light cruisers,
+with his four destroyers darting ahead to attack with torpedoes.
+These light cruisers, which had just driven off the _Chester_ with
+heavy losses, discharged torpedoes at Hood's battle cruisers and
+turned away. The latter shifted helm to avoid them and narrowly
+missed being hit. One torpedo indeed passed under the _Invincible_.
+
+At this point another group of four German light cruisers appeared
+and Hood's destroyers advanced to attack them. The fire of the
+cruisers damaged two destroyers though not before one of them,
+the _Shark_, had torpedoed the German cruiser _Rostock_. The
+_Shark_ herself was in turn torpedoed and sunk by a German
+destroyer. At about the same time action had begun between the
+ships of the armored cruiser squadron under Arbuthnot and another
+squadron of German light cruisers.
+
+A moment later (at 5.56) Beatty sighted the leaders of the Grand
+Fleet and knew that contact with his support was established. At
+once he changed course to about due east and put on full speed
+in order to head off the German line, and by taking position to
+the eastward, allow the battle fleet to form line astern of his
+battle cruisers. Such an overwhelming force was now concentrated
+on the German light cruisers that they turned back. Of their number
+the _Wiesbaden_ had been disabled by a concentration of fire and
+the _Rostock_ torpedoed. Hipper then made a turn of 180° with his
+battle cruisers in order to get back to the support of the battleships
+which he had left far to the rear. Then he turned round again, and
+continued to lead the German advance. All this time he seems to
+have had no suspicion that the Grand Fleet was in the neighborhood.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLESHIP: THE IRON DUKE
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919
+
+Normal displacement, 25,000 tons. Full load, 28,800.
+Length (o. a.), 622-3/4 feet. Beam, 89-1/2 feet.
+
+Mean draught, 28-1/2, feet. Max. draught, 32-3/4 feet.
+Length (p. p.), 580 feet
+
+Guns:                                 5 M. G.
+  10--13.5 inch (M. V.), Dir. Con.    (1 landing)
+  12--6 inch, 50 cal., Dir. Con.    Torpedo tubes (21 inch):
+   2--3 inch (anti-aircraft)          4 submerged (broadside)
+   4--3 pdr.]
+
+As Beatty dashed across the front of the approaching battle fleet
+he sighted Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron ahead of him and
+signaled him to take station ahead. Accordingly Hood countermarched
+and led Beatty's line in the _Invincible_. Evan-Thomas was by this
+time so far in the rear of the speedier battle cruisers that he
+was unable to follow with Beatty, and in order to avoid confusion
+with the oncoming battle fleet he turned left 90° in order to form
+astern of the Sixth Battle Division, by this move, however, leaving
+Beatty's cruisers unsupported. Meanwhile the armored cruisers of
+Arbuthnot were already under fire from Hipper's squadron and suffering
+severely. At 6.16 the _Defense_, the flagship of the squadron, blew
+up; the _Warrior_ was badly disabled, and the _Black Prince_ was
+so crippled as to be sunk during the night action. As Evan-Thomas
+made his turn, one of his battleships, the _Warspite_, was struck
+by a shell that jammed her steering gear in such a way as to send
+her head on toward the Germans. She served to shield the _Warrior_
+from destruction, but suffered thirty hits from heavy projectiles
+before she was brought under control and taken out of action.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MAY 31, 1916
+
+2nd and 3rd phases]
+
+Between six and 6.15 Jellicoe received bearings from Vice Admiral
+Burney (of the Sixth Battle Division), Evan-Thomas, and Beatty
+which enabled him for the first time to plot accurately the position
+of the German battle fleet. This information revealed the fact
+that previous plotting based on bearings coming from Goodenough
+and others was seriously wrong. The Germans were twelve miles to
+the west of where they were supposed to be. Jellicoe then formed
+line of battle, not on the starboard wing, which was nearest the
+head of the German advance, but on the port wing, which was farthest
+away, and speed was reduced to 14 knots in order to enable the
+battle cruisers to take station at the head of the line. Indeed
+some of the ships in the rear or sixth division had to stop their
+engines to avoid collision during deployment. By this time the
+ships of the sixth division began to come under the shells of the
+German battle fleet and they returned the fire. By half past six
+all sixteen of the German dreadnoughts were firing at the British
+lines, the slow predreadnoughts being so far to the rear as to
+be unable to take part. The battleship fire, however, neither at
+this point nor later showed the extraordinary accuracy displayed
+by the battle cruisers at the beginning, but this may possibly
+be attributed to the gathering mistiness that hung over the sea,
+darkened by the low-lying smoke from the host of ships.
+
+As soon as Scheer realized that he had not only run right into the
+arms of the Grand Fleet, but lay in the worst tactical position
+imaginable with an overwhelming force concentrated on the head
+of his line, he turned away to escape. The battle cruisers (at
+6.30) swung away sharply from east to south, the ships turning
+in succession. Meanwhile the torpedo flotillas tried to cover the
+turn by a gallant attack on the British battle line. At the same
+time smoke screens also were laid to cover the retirement. The
+_Invincible_, Hood's flagship, which was leading the British line,
+was at this juncture struck by a shell that penetrated her armor
+and exploded a magazine. The ship instantly broke in two and went
+to the bottom, and only four officers and two men were saved. Almost
+at the same instant the German battle cruiser _Lützow_, Hipper's
+flagship, was so badly disabled by shells and torpedo that she
+fell out of line helpless. Hipper managed, however, to board a
+destroyer and two hours later succeeded in shifting his flag to
+the _Moltke_.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLESHIP: THE KOENIG
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919
+
+Normal displacement, 25,800 tons. Length (waterline), 573 feet.
+Beam, 96-3/4 feet. Mean draught, 27-1/4 feet. Length (over all),
+580 feet.
+
+Guns:                             2 machine.
+  10--12 inch, 45 cal.          Torpedo tubes (19.7 inch):
+  14--5.9 inch, .50 cal.          4 (broadside) submerged.
+ (10 or 4--3.4 inch, 22 pdr.?)    1 (bow) submerged.
+ (2 anti-aircraft?)]
+
+At 6.35 Scheer performed a difficult maneuver that the fleet had
+practiced for just the situation that existed at this time. He
+wheeled his battleships simultaneously to starboard, forming line
+again on a westerly course. Twenty minutes later, finding that he
+was no longer under fire from the Grand Fleet, he repeated the
+maneuver, the ships turning again to starboard and forming line
+ahead again on an easterly, then southerly course. These changes of
+course were made under cover of smoke screens and were not observed
+by the British.
+
+By this time the Grand Fleet had formed line of battle on a
+southeasterly course and by 7.10 its leaders were concentrating
+their fire on the head of the German line, which was now caught
+under an overwhelming superiority of force. Unfortunately for the
+Germans the visibility conditions at this time were worse for them
+than for their enemy, for while the British ships were nearly or
+quite invisible, the Germans every now and then stood silhouetted
+against the western sky. The British fire at this time was heavy
+and accurate. The German fleet seemed marked for destruction.
+
+For Scheer it was now imperative to withdraw if he could. Accordingly
+at this juncture he sent out a flotilla of destroyers in a desperate
+effort to cover the retreat of his fleet. They fired a number of
+torpedoes at the English battle line, and retired with the loss
+of one boat. Their stroke succeeded, for Jellicoe turned his whole
+line of battleships away to avoid the torpedoes. Beatty, holding
+his course at the head of the line, signaled Admiral Jerram of
+the _King George V_ to follow astern, but he was evidently bound
+to the orders of his commander in chief. For the second time that
+day Beatty was left unsupported in his fight at the head of the
+line.
+
+Meanwhile Scheer's capital ships had simultaneously wheeled away
+in line to the westward under cover of the torpedo attacks and
+smoke screens made by the destroyers. This was the third time within
+an hour that they had effected this maneuver, and the skill with
+which the battleships managed these turns in line under a rain of
+fire speaks well for German seamanship. Meanwhile, to rëenforce
+the covering movement made by the destroyers, Scheer sent out his
+battle cruisers in a sortie against Beatty, who was pressing hard
+on the head of the German line. The following account from Commander
+von Hase of the _Derfflinger_, which led this sortie, is interesting
+not only for its description of what occurred at this time but
+also as a picture of a personal experience of the terrific fire
+that the battle cruisers of both sides had to sustain throughout
+the greater part of the engagement. It was on them that the brunt
+of the fighting fell. The narrative is quoted from the pages of
+the _Naval and Military Record_:
+
+"By now our Commander-in-Chief had realized the danger threatening
+our fleet, the van of which was enclosed in a semicircle by the
+hostile fleet. We were, in fact, absolutely 'in the soup' (in absoluten
+Wurstkessel)! There was only one way to get clear of this tactically
+disadvantageous position: to turn the whole fleet about and steer on
+an opposite course. First to evade this dangerous encirclement. But
+the maneuver must be unobserved and executed without interference.
+The battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats must cover the movement of the
+fleet. At about[1] 9.12 the Commander-in-Chief made the signal to
+alter course, and almost simultaneously made by W/T [wireless] the
+historic signal to the battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats: 'Charge the
+enemy!' (Ran an den Feind!) Without turning a hair the captain ordered
+'Full speed ahead, course south-east.' Followed by the _Seydlitz,
+Molke_, and _Von der Tann_, we steamed at first south-east, then,
+from 9.15 onward, directly towards the head of the enemy's line.
+
+[Footnote 1: There was a difference of two hours in time between
+the German and the English standard.]
+
+"And now an infernal fire was opened on us, especially on the
+_Derfflinger_, as leading ship. Several ships were concentrating
+their fire upon us. I selected a target and fired as rapidly as
+possible. The range closed from 12,000 to 8,000 meters, and still
+we steamed full speed ahead into this inferno of fire, presenting
+a splendid target to the enemy, while he himself was very difficult
+to see. Salvo after salvo fell in our immediate vicinity, and shell
+after shell struck our ship. They were the most exciting minutes.
+I could no longer communicate with Lt. von Stosch (who was in the
+foretop control), as the telephone and voice-pipes had been shot
+away, so I had to rely an my own observations to direct the fire.
+At 9.13, previous to which all four 12 in. turrets were in action,
+a serious catastrophe occurred. A 15 in. shell penetrated the armor
+of No. 3 turret and exploded inside. The gallant turret captain, Lt.
+von Boltenstern, had both his legs torn off, and with him perished
+practically the entire guns' crew. The explosion ignited three
+cartridges, flames from which reached the working chamber, where
+eight more cartridges were set on fire, and passed down to the
+magazine, igniting still more cartridges. They burned fiercely,
+the flames roaring high above the turret--but they burned only,
+they did not explode--as our enemy's cartridges had done--and that
+saved the ship! Still, the effect of the burning cartridges was
+catastrophic; the flames killed everything within their reach.
+Of the 78 men of the turret crew only five escaped, some badly
+wounded, by crawling out through the holes for expelling empty
+cartridge cases. The remaining 73 men died instantly. A few seconds
+after this catastrophe another disaster befell us. A 15 in. shell
+pierced the shield of No. 4 turret and burst inside, causing frightful
+destruction. With the exception of one man, who was blown out of
+the turret hatch by the blast of air, the entire crew, including
+all the men in the magazines and shell-rooms, 80 souls in all,
+were instantly killed. All the cartridges which had been taken out
+of their metal cases were ignited, so that flames were now shooting
+sky-high from both the after turrets....
+
+"The enemy's shooting was splendid. Shell after shell crashed into
+us, and my heart stood still as I thought of what must be happening
+inside the ship. My thoughts were rudely disturbed. Suddenly it
+was to us as if the world had come to an end. A terrific roar, a
+mighty explosion, and then darkness fell upon us. We shook under
+a tremendous blow, which lifted the conning-tower bodily off its
+base, to which it sank back vibrating. A heavy shell had struck
+the gunnery control station about 20 inches from me. The shell
+burst, but did not penetrate because it had hit the thick armor at
+an angle, but huge pieces of plating were torn away.... We found,
+however, that all the artillery connections were undamaged. Splinters
+had penetrated the lookout slits of the conning-tower, wounding
+several people inside. The explosion had forced open the door,
+which jammed, and two men were unable to move it. But help from an
+unexpected quarter was at hand. Again we heard a terrific roar and
+crash, and with the noise of a thunderbolt a 15 in. shell exploded
+beneath the bridge. The blast of air swept away everything that was
+not firmly riveted down, and the chart-house disappeared bodily.
+But the astounding thing was that this same air pressure closed
+the door of the conning-tower! The Englishman was polite; having
+first opened the door, he carefully shut it again for us. I searched
+with my glass for the enemy, but, although the salvos were still
+falling about us, we could see practically nothing of him; all
+that was really visible were the huge, golden-red flames from the
+muzzles of his guns.... Without much hope of hurting the enemy I
+fired salvo after salvo from the forward turrets. I could feel
+how our shooting was calming the nerves of the crew. Had we not
+fired at this moment the whole ship's company would have been
+overpowered by a great despair, for everyone knew that a few minutes
+more of this would finish us. But so long as we fired things could
+not be so bad with us. The medium guns fired also, but only two
+of the six 5.9's on one side were still in action. The fourth gun
+was split from end to end by a burst in the muzzle, and the third
+was shot to pieces...."
+
+The battle-cruisers were recalled just in time--so it would appear--to
+save them from annihilation, and Com. von Hase proceeds:
+
+"All hands were now busy quelling the fires. Thick clouds of yellow
+gas still poured from both after turrets, but the flooding of the
+magazines soon got rid of this. None of us had believed that a
+ship could stand so many heavy hits. Some twenty 15 in. hits were
+counted after the battle, and about the same number of bad hits
+from smaller calibers. The _Lützow_ was out of sight (she sank
+later), but the _Seydlitz, Moltke_, and _Von der Tann_ were
+still with us. They, too, had been badly punished, the _Seydlitz_
+worst of all. Flames still roared from one of her turrets, and
+all the other ships were burning. The bow of the _Seydlitz_ was
+deep in the water. Every battle-cruiser had suffered severe
+casualties.... But the death charge had achieved its purpose by
+covering the retreat of the battle fleet.... Our ship was very
+heavily battered, and in many places the compartments were mere
+heaps of débris. But vital parts were not hit, and, thanks to the
+strong armor, the engines, boilers, steering gear, and nearly all
+auxiliaries were undamaged. For a long time the engine-room was
+filled with noxious fumes, necessitating the use of gas masks.
+The entire ship was littered with thousands of large and small
+shell splinters, among which we found two practically undamaged
+15 in. shell caps, which were later used in the wardroom as wine
+coolers. The belt armour was pierced several times, but either
+the leaks were stopped or the inflow of water was localized in
+small compartments. In Wilhelmshaven we buried our dead, nearly
+200 in all."
+
+By 8 o'clock the German battleships had vanished, with the British
+steering westward by divisions in pursuit. But never again did
+the two battle fleets regain touch with each other. Occasional
+contact with an enemy vessel was made by other units of Jellicoe's
+force. About 8.20 another destroyer attack was threatened, and
+again Jellicoe swerved away, at the same time, however, sending
+the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and two destroyer flotillas,
+which succeeded in breaking up the attempt. At 8.30 he reformed
+his fleet in column and continued on a southwesterly course until
+9 o'clock.
+
+_Fourth Phase_
+
+As darkness came on, Jellicoe, declining to risk his ships under
+conditions most favorable to torpedo attack, arranged his battleships
+in four squadrons a mile apart, with destroyer flotillas five miles
+astern, and sent a mine-layer to lay a mine field in the neighborhood
+of the Vyl lightship, covering the route over which the Germans
+were expected to pass if they attempted to get home via the Horn
+Reef. He then headed southeast. Beatty also drew off from pursuit
+with his battle cruisers. Jellicoe's plan was to avoid a general
+night action, but to hold such a position as to compel the Germans
+to fight again the following morning in order to reach their bases.
+During the night (between ten and 2.35) there were several sharp
+conflicts, mainly between the destroyers and light cruisers of
+the opposing fleets, with considerable loss on both sides. On the
+British side, two armored cruisers, _Black Prince_ and _Warrior_,
+went down--both crippled by damages sustained during the day--and
+five destroyers. Six others were severely damaged. On the German
+side, the battle cruiser _Lützow_ sank as a result of her injuries,
+the predreadnought battleship _Pommern_ was blown up by a torpedo,
+three light cruisers were sunk, and four or five other ships suffered
+from torpedo or mine.
+
+The contacts made by British destroyers and cruisers confirm the
+accounts of the Germans as to the course of their fleet during
+the night. About nine o'clock Scheer changed course sharply from
+west to southeast and cut through the rear of the British fleet.
+At dawn, about 2.40, he was twenty miles to eastward of Jellicoe on
+the road to Wilhelmshaven. At noon the greater part of the German
+fleet was safe in port. Some of the lighter ships, to escape the
+assaults of the British destroyers during the night, headed north
+and got home by way of the Skagerrak and the Kiel Canal.
+
+Jellicoe had avoided a night pursuit for the sake of fighting on
+better terms the next morning, but at dawn he found his destroyers
+scattered far and wide. Judging it unwise to pursue the High Seas
+Fleet without a screening force, and discovering by directional
+wireless that it was already south of Horn Reef and in the neighborhood
+of the mine fields, he gave up the idea of renewing the engagement
+and turned north. He spent the forenoon in sweeping the scene of
+the previous day's fighting, collecting his dispersed units, and
+then returned to his bases.
+
+The claim of victory, which was promptly and loudly made by the
+German press, is absurd enough. After the Grand Fleet arrived there
+could be only one thought for the Germans and that was a fighting
+retreat. Nevertheless, they had every reason to be proud of what
+they had done. They had met a force superior by a ratio of about 8
+to 5 and had escaped after inflicting nearly twice as much damage
+as they had sustained. These losses may be compared by means of
+the following table[1]:
+
+BRITISH, Three Battle Cruisers,  QUEEN MARY     26,350 tons
+                                 INDEFATIGABLE  18,800  "
+                                 INVINCIBLE     17,250  "
+
+         Three Armored Cruisers, DEFENSE        14,600  "
+                                 WARRIOR        13,550  "
+                                 BLACK PRINCE   13,350  "
+
+         Eight Destroyers,       TIPPERARY       1,430  "
+                                 NESTOR            890  "
+                                 NOMAD             890  "
+                                 TURBULENT       1,100  "
+                                 FORTUNE           965  "
+                                 ARDENT            935  "
+                                 SHARK             935  "
+                                 SPARROWHAWK       935  "
+                                               ------------
+                                 Total         111,980 tons
+
+GERMANS, One Battle Cruiser      LUETZOW        26,180 tons
+         One Pre-dreadnought,    POMMERN        13,200  "
+         Four Light Cruisers,    WIESBADEN       5,400  "
+                                 ELBING          4,500  "
+                                 ROSTOCK         4,900  "
+                                 FRAUENLOB       2,700  "
+
+         Five Destroyers,        V-4               570  "
+                                 V-48              750  "
+                                 V-27              640  "
+                                 V-29              640  "
+                                 S-33              700  "
+                                               ------------
+                                 Total          60,180 tons
+
+Personnel, killed and wounded: BRITISH, about 6,600: GERMANS, 3,076.
+
+[Footnote 1: Figures in these tables taken from Lieut. Comdr. H.
+H. Frost, U. S. N., _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, Jan.,
+1920, p. 84.]
+
+With all allowance for the poor visibility conditions and the deepening
+twilight, it must be admitted also that Scheer handled his ships
+with great skill. Caught in a noose by an overwhelming force, he
+disentangled himself by means of the torpedo attacks of his destroyer
+flotillas and turned away under cover of their smoke screens. After
+nightfall he boldly cut through the rear of the British fleet in
+battle line, and reached his base in safety with the great bulk
+of his ships. Meanwhile at practically all stages of the fighting
+German gunnery was both rapid and accurate, the seamanship was
+admirable, and there was no lack of courage of the highest order.
+
+As to material, Admiral Jellicoe notes the superiority of the German
+fleet in range-finding devices, searchlights, smoke screens, a star
+shell--unknown to the British and invaluable for night fighting--and
+in the armor piercing quality of the shells. Moreover the Germans
+were completely equipped with systems of director firing, while
+the British were not. According to Admiral Sir Percy Scott,[1]
+"at the Battle of Jutland ... the commander in chief had only six
+ships of his fleet completely fitted with director firing ... he
+had not a single cruiser in the fleet fitted for director firing."
+
+[Footnote 1: FIFTY YEARS IN THE ROYAL NAVY, p. 278.]
+
+The greatest superiority of all probably lay in the structural
+features of the newer German ships. For some years prior to the
+war Admiral von Tirpitz had devoted himself to the problem of under
+water protection, to localize the effect of torpedo and mine on
+the hull of a ship. To quote the words of von Tirpitz:[2]
+
+[Footnote 2: MY MEMOIRS, Vol. I, p. 171.]
+
+"We built a section of a modern ship by itself and carried out
+experimental explosions on it with torpedo heads, carefully testing
+the result every time. We tested the possibility of weakening the
+force of the explosion by letting the explosive gases burst in
+empty compartments without meeting any resistance. We ascertained
+the most suitable steel for the different structural parts, and
+found further that the effect of the explosion was nullified if
+we compelled it to pulverize coal in any considerable quantity.
+This resulted in a special arrangement of the coal bunkers. We
+were then able to meet the force of the explosion ... by a strong,
+carefully constructed steel wall which finally secured the safety
+of the interior of the ship."
+
+The only German armored ship that succumbed to the blow of a single
+torpedo was the _Pommern_, an old vessel, built before the fruits
+of these experiments were embodied in the German fleet. The labor
+of von Tirpitz was well justified by the results, as may be seen
+by the instantaneous fashion in which the three British battle
+cruisers went to the bottom, compared with the ability of the German
+battle cruisers to stand terrific pounding and yet stay afloat and
+keep going. According to the testimony of a German officer,[1] the
+_Lützow_ was literally shot to pieces in the battle and even then
+it took three torpedoes to settle her. Actually she was sunk by
+opening her seacocks to prevent her possible capture. The remarkable
+ability of the battle cruiser _Göben_, in Turkish waters, to survive
+shell, mines, and torpedo, bears the same testimony, as does the
+_Mainz_, which, in the action of the Heligoland Bight had to be
+sunk by one of her own officers, as in the case of the _Lützow_.
+It is possible that Jellicoe assumed an inferiority of the British
+armor piercing shell because of this power of the German ships to
+stay afloat. But photographs published after the armistice showed
+that British shells penetrated the 11-inch turret armor of the
+_Seydlitz_ and the 13-inch of the _Derfflinger_ with frightful
+effect. The difference was in the fact that they did not succeed
+in sinking those ships, which, after all is the chief object of a
+shell, and this must be attributed to better under-water construction.
+
+[Footnote 1: Quoted in _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 24, 1919,
+p. 822.]
+
+The only criticism it seems possible to suggest on Scheer's tactics
+is the unwariness of his pursuit, which might so easily have led
+to the total destruction of the German fleet. Strangely enough,
+although a Zeppelin hovered over the British fleet at dawn of the
+day after the battle, no aircraft of any kind scouted ahead of the
+Germans the day before. In pursuing Beatty, Scheer had to take
+a chance, well aware that if the Grand Fleet were within reach,
+Beatty's wireless would bring it upon him. But Scheer was evidently
+perfectly willing to risk the encounter. Such criticism as arose in
+Germany--from Captain Persius, for example--centered on "Tirpitz's
+faulty constructional methods"; which, in the light of the facts
+of the battle would seem to be the very last thing to hit upon.
+
+As for types and weapons it is clear that the armored cruisers
+served only as good targets and death traps. The British would
+have been better off if every armored cruiser had been left at
+home. The dominating feature of the story is the influence of the
+torpedo on Jellicoe's tactics. It is fair to say that it was the
+Parthian tactics of the German destroyer, both actual and potential,
+that saved the High Seas Fleet and robbed the British of a greater
+Trafalgar. At every crisis in the battle it was either what the
+German destroyer did or might do that governed the British commander's
+maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather
+than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers
+might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost
+all contact with their enemy for the rest of the battle, it was
+because of a destroyer attack. At this time eleven destroyers
+accomplished the feat of driving 27 dreadnoughts from the field!
+Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril
+of destroyer attacks under cover of darkness, and finally Jellicoe
+decided not to risk an action the following morning because his
+capital ships had no screening forces against the torpedo of the
+enemy. It is worth noting in this connection that although the
+Admiralty were aware of the battle in progress, they held back the
+Harwich force of destroyers and light cruisers which would have
+proved a welcome reënforcement in pursuing the retreating fleet.
+The reason for this decision has never been published.
+
+In connection with the important part played by the German destroyers
+at Jutland it is worth remarking that before the war it was the
+Admiralty doctrine that destroyers could not operate successfully
+by day, and they were accordingly painted black for night service.
+The German destroyers were painted gray. After Jutland the British
+flotillas also were painted the battleship gray.
+
+Naturally the failure of the superior fleet to crush the inferior one
+aroused a storm of criticism, the most severe emanating from English
+naval writers. The sum and substance is the charge of overcaution
+on the part of the British Commander in Chief. It is held that
+Jellicoe should have formed his battle line on his starboard instead
+of his port wing, thus turning toward the enemy and concentrating
+on the head of their column at once. Forming on the port division
+caused the battle fleet to swerve away from the enemy and open
+the range just at the critical moment of contact, leaving Beatty
+unsupported in his dash across the head of the enemy's line. It
+is said that the latter even sent a signal to the _Marlborough_
+for the battleships to fall in astern of him, and the failure to
+do so made his maneuver fruitless. Apparently this message was
+not transmitted to the flagship at the time. In answer Jellicoe
+explains in great detail that the preliminary reports received
+from Goodenough and others as to the position of the High Seas
+Fleet were so meager and conflicting that he could not form line
+of battle earlier than he did, and secondly that deploying on the
+starboard division at the moment of sighting the enemy would have
+thrown the entire battle fleet into confusion, blanketed their
+fire, and created a dangerous opening for torpedo attack from the
+destroyers at the head of the German column. On this point Scheer
+agrees with the critics. Deploying on the starboard division instead
+of the port, he says, "would have greatly impeded our movements and
+rendered a fresh attack on the enemy's line extremely difficult."
+
+The second point of criticism rested on the turning away of the
+battleships at the critical point of the torpedo attack at 7.20,
+under cover of which the German battleships wheeled to westward and
+disappeared. Jellicoe's reply is that if he had swung to starboard,
+turning toward the enemy, he would have headed into streams of
+approaching torpedoes under conditions of mist and smoke that were
+ideal for torpedo attack, and if he had maintained position in line
+ahead he would have courted heavy losses. In connection with this
+turn he calls attention to the fact that British light cruisers and
+destroyers could not be used to deliver a counter attack because,
+on account of the rapid changes of course and formation made by the
+battlefleet, they had been unable to reach their proper station
+in the van.
+
+Thirdly, if conditions for night battle were too risky why did
+the Grand Fleet fail to keep sufficient touch with the enemy by
+means of its light flotillas so as to be informed of his movements
+and prevent his escape? There were frequent contacts during that
+short night, and the Germans were sighted steering southeast. The
+attacks made by British destroyers certainly threw the German line
+into confusion, and some of the light vessels were driven to the
+north, reaching German bases by way of the Baltic. Nevertheless
+the fleet succeeded in cutting through without serious loss. To
+this there seems to be no answer.
+
+Lastly, to the query why Jellicoe did not seek another action in
+the morning, as originally intended, he replies that he discovered
+by directional wireless that the Germans were already safe between
+the mine fields and the coast, and that he could not safely proceed
+without his screening force of destroyers and light cruisers, which,
+after their night operations, were widely scattered. From German
+accounts, however, we find no mention of a shelter behind mine
+fields, but astonishment at the fact that they were permitted to go
+on their way unmolested. Morning found the two fleets only twenty
+miles apart, and the Germans had a half day's steaming before they
+could reach port. They were in no condition to fight. The battleship
+_Ostfriesland_ had struck a mine and had to be towed. The battle
+cruiser _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to keep her from sinking, and
+other units were limping along with their gun decks almost awash.
+
+Certainly the tactics of Jellicoe do not suggest those of Blake,
+Hawke, or Nelson. They do not fit Farragut's motto--borrowed from
+Danton[1]--"l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace," or
+Napoleon's "frappez vite, frappez fort." War, as has been observed
+before, cannot be waged without taking risks. The British had a
+heavy margin to gamble on. As it happened, 23 out of the entire 28
+battleships came out of the fight without so much as a scratch on
+their paint; and, after deployment, only one out of the battle line
+of 27 dreadnoughts received a single hit. This was the _Colossus_,
+which had four men wounded by a shell.
+
+[Footnote 1: And borrowed by Danton from Cicero.]
+
+The touchstone of naval excellence is Nelson. As Mahan has so ably
+pointed out, while weapons change principles remain. Dewey, in
+deciding to take the chances involved in a night entry of Manila
+Bay did so in answer to his own question, "What would Farragut
+do?" Hence in considering Jutland one may take a broader view than
+merely a criticism of tactics. In a word, does the whole conduct
+of the affair reveal the method and spirit of Nelson?
+
+At Trafalgar there was no need for a deployment after the enemy
+was sighted because in the words of the famous Memorandum, "the
+order of sailing is to be the order of battle." The tactics to
+be followed when the French appeared had been carefully explained
+by Nelson to his commanders. No signal was needed--except the fine
+touch of inspiration in "England expects every man to do his duty."
+In brief, the British fleet had been so thoroughly indoctrinated,
+and the plan was so simple, that there was no room for hesitation,
+uncertainty, or dependence on the flagship for orders at the last
+minute. It is hard to see evidence of any such indoctrination of
+the Grand Fleet before Jutland.
+
+Again, Nelson was, by example and precept, constantly insisting
+on the initiative of the subordinate. "The Second in Command will
+... have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon
+the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
+destroyed.... Captains are to look to their particular line as
+their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor
+perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his
+ship alongside that of an enemy." At Jutland, despite the urgent
+signals of Beatty at two critical moments, neither Burney of the
+sixth division nor Jerram of the first felt free to act independently
+of the orders of the Commander in Chief. The latter tried, as Nelson
+emphatically did not, to control from the flagship every movement
+of the entire fleet.
+
+Further, if naval history has taught anything it has established
+a point so closely related to the responsibility and initiative
+of the subordinate as to be almost a part of it; namely, a great
+fleet that fights in a single rigid line ahead never achieves a
+decisive victory. Blake, Tromp, and de Ruyter fought with squadrons,
+expecting--indeed demanding--initiative on the part of their flag
+officers. That was the period when great and decisive victories
+were won. The close of the 17th century produced the "Fighting
+Instructions," requiring the unbroken line ahead, and there followed
+a hundred years of indecisive battles and bungled opportunities. Then
+Nelson came and revived the untrammeled tactics of the days of Blake
+with the added glory of his own genius. It appears that at Jutland
+the battleships were held to a rigid unit of fleet formation as in
+the days of the Duke of York or Admiral Graves. And concentration
+with a long line of dreadnoughts is no more possible to-day than
+it was with a similar line of two-decked sailing ships a century
+and a half ago.
+
+Finally, in the matter of spirit, the considerations that swayed
+the movements of the Grand Fleet at all stages were apparently
+those of what the enemy might do instead of what might be done
+to the enemy, the very antithesis of the spirit of Nelson. It is
+no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander in Chief
+that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his ships.
+The existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the
+Allied cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging
+on its use. But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the
+British fleet exist merely to maintain a numerical preponderance
+over its enemy or to crush that enemy--whatever the cost? If the
+battle of Jutland receives the stamp of approval as the best that
+could have been done, then the British or the American officer of
+the future will know that he is expected primarily to "play safe."
+But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or Nelson, the
+men who made the traditions of the Service and forged the anchors
+of the British Empire.
+
+Thus the great battle turned out to be indecisive; in fact, it
+elated the Germans with a feeling of success and depressed the
+British with a keen sense of failure. Nevertheless, the control of
+the sea remained in the hands of the English, and never again did
+the High Seas Fleet risk another encounter. The relative positions
+at sea of the two adversaries therefore remained unaltered.
+
+On the other hand, if the British had destroyed the German fleet
+the victory would have been priceless. As Jervis remarked at Cape
+St. Vincent, "A victory is very essential to England at this hour."
+The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in Allied prospects. The Verdun
+offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the
+Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians
+had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation
+of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic
+suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of the
+war. Without a German battle fleet, the British could have forced
+the fighting almost to the very harbors of the German coast--bottling
+up every exit by a barrage of mines. The blockade, therefore, could
+have been drawn close to the coast defenses. Moreover, with the High
+Seas Fleet gone, the British fleet could have entered and taken
+possession of the Baltic, which throughout the war remained a German
+lake. By this move England would have threatened the German Baltic
+coast with invasion and extended her blockade in a highly important
+locality, cutting off the trade between Sweden and Germany. She
+would also have come to the relief of Russia, which was suffering
+terrible losses from the lack of munitions. Indeed it would have
+saved that ally from the collapse that withdrew her from the war.
+With no German "fleet in being" great numbers of workers in English
+industry and vast quantities of supplies might have been transferred
+to the support of the army. The threat of invasion would have been
+removed, and the large army that was kept in England right up to
+the crisis of March, 1918,[1] would have been free to reenforce
+the army at the front. Finally, without the personnel of the German
+fleet there could have been no ruthless submarine campaign the year
+after, such as actually came so near to winning the war. Thus,
+while the German claim to a triumph that drove the British from
+the seas is ridiculous, it is equally so to argue, as the First
+Lord of the Admiralty did, that there was no need of a British
+victory at Jutland, that all the fruits of victory were gained as
+it was. The subsequent history of the war tells a different tale.
+
+[Footnote 1: A quarter of a million men were sent from England at
+this time.]
+
+REFERENCES
+
+THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916, Admiral Viscount Lord Jellicoe of
+  Scapa, 1919.
+THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral
+  von Scheer, 1920.
+THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Commander Carlyon Bellairs, M. P., 1920.
+THE NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919, Earl Brassey.
+A DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Lieut. Commander H.
+  H. Frost, U. S. N., in U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, vol.
+  45, pp. 1829 ff, 2019 ff; vol. 46, pp. 61 ff.
+THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, A. H. Pollen, 1919.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: COMMERCE WARFARE
+
+Interdiction of enemy trade has always been the great weapon of
+sea power; and hence, though mines, submarines, and the menace
+of the High Seas Fleet itself made a close blockade of the German
+coast impossible, Great Britain in the World War steadily extended
+her efforts to cut off Germany's intercourse with the overseas
+world. Germany, on the other hand, while unwilling or unable to
+take the risks of a contest for surface control of the sea, waged
+cruiser warfare on British and Allied commerce, first by surface
+vessels, and, when these were destroyed, by submarines. In the
+policies adopted by each belligerent there is an evident analogy to
+the British blockade and the French commerce destroying campaigns
+of the Napoleonic Wars. And just as in the earlier conflict British
+sea power impelled Napoleon to a ruinous struggle for the domination
+of Europe, so in the World War, though in a somewhat different
+fashion, the blockade worked disaster for Germany.
+
+"The consequences of the blockade," writes the German General von
+Freytag-Loringhoven, "showed themselves at once. Although we succeeded
+in establishing our war economics by our internal strength, yet
+the unfavorable state of the world economic situation was felt by
+us throughout the war. That alone explains why our enemies found
+ever fresh possibilities of resistance, because the sea stood open
+to them, and why victories which would otherwise have been absolutely
+decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not bring us
+nearer peace."
+
+For each group of belligerents, indeed, the enemy's commerce warfare
+assumed a vital significance. "No German success on land," declares
+the conservative British Annual Register for 1919, "could have
+ruined or even very gravely injured the English-speaking powers.
+The success of the submarine campaign, on the other hand, would
+have left the United States isolated and have placed the Berlin
+Government in a position to dominate most of the rest of the world."
+"The war is won for us," declared General von Hindenburg on July 2,
+1917, "if we can withstand the enemy attacks until the submarine
+has done its work."
+
+Commerce warfare at once involves a third party, the neutral; and
+it therefore appears desirable, before tracing the progress of
+this warfare, to outline briefly the principles of international
+law which, by a slow and tortuous process, have grown up defining
+the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents in naval war.
+_Blockade_ is among the most fundamental of these rights accorded
+to the belligerent, upon the conditions that the blockade shall be
+limited to enemy ports or coasts, confined within specified limits,
+and made so effective as to create evident danger to traffic. It
+assumes control of the sea by the blockading navy, and, before the
+days of mines and submarines, it was enforced by a cordon of ships
+off the enemy coast. A blockade stops direct trade or intercourse
+of any kind.
+
+Whether or not a blockade is established, a belligerent has the
+right to attempt the prevention of _trade in contraband_. A neutral
+nation is under no obligation whatever to restrain its citizens from
+engaging in this trade. In preventing it, however, a belligerent
+warship may stop, visit, and search any merchant vessel on the
+high seas. If examination of the ship's papers and search show
+fraud, contraband cargo, offense in respect to blockade, enemy
+ownership or service, the vessel may be taken as a prize, subject
+to adjudication in the belligerent's prize courts. The right of
+merchant vessels to carry defensive armament is well established;
+but resistance justifies destruction. Under certain circumstances
+prizes may be destroyed at sea, after removal of the ship's papers
+and full provision for the safety of passengers and crew.
+
+The Declaration of London,[1] drawn up in 1909, was an attempt to
+restate and secure general acceptance of these principles, with
+notable modifications. Lists were drawn up of _absolute_ contraband
+(munitions, etc., adapted obviously if not exclusively for use in
+war), _conditional_ contraband (including foodstuffs, clothing,
+rolling stock, etc., susceptible of use in war but having non-warlike
+uses as well), and free goods (including raw cotton and wool, hides,
+and ores). The most significant provision of the Declaration was that
+the doctrine of _continuous voyage_ should apply only to absolute
+contraband. This doctrine, established by Great Britain in the
+French wars and expanded by the United States in the American Civil
+War, holds that the ultimate enemy destination of a cargo determines
+its character, regardless of transshipment in a neutral port and
+subsequent carriage by sea or land. The Declaration of London was
+never ratified by Great Britain, and was observed for only a brief
+period in the first months of the war. Had it been ratified and
+observed, Germany would have been free to import all necessary
+supplies, other than munitions, through neutral states on her frontiers.
+
+[Footnote 1: Printed in full in INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS of the
+U. S. Naval War College, 1910, p. 169 ff.]
+
+_The Blockade of Germany_
+
+Unable to establish a close blockade, and not venturing at once to
+advance the idea of a "long range" blockade, England was nevertheless
+able to impose severe restrictions upon Germany by extending the
+lists of contraband, applying the doctrine of continuous voyage
+to both absolute and conditional contraband, and throwing upon the
+owners of cargoes the burden of proof as to destination. Cotton
+still for a time entered Germany, and some exports were permitted.
+But on March 1, 1915, in retaliation for Germany's declaration
+of a "war area" around the British Isles, Great Britain asserted
+her purpose to establish what amounted to a complete embargo on
+German trade, holding herself free, in the words of Premier Asquith,
+"to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed
+enemy destination, ownership, or origin." In a note of protest on
+March 30, the United States virtually recognized the legitimacy of a
+long-range blockade--an innovation of seemingly wide possibilities--and
+confined its objections to British interference with lawful trade
+between neutrals, amounting in effect to a blockade of neutral
+ports.
+
+As a matter of fact, in spite of British efforts, there had been an
+immense increase of indirect trade with Germany through neutrals.
+While American exports to Germany in 1915 were $154,000,000 less
+than in 1913, and in fact practically ceased altogether, American
+exports to Holland and the Scandinavian states increased by
+$158,000,000. This trade continued up to the time when the United
+States entered the war, after which all the restrictions which
+England had employed were given a sharper application. By a simple
+process of substitution, European neutrals had been able to import
+commodities for home use, and export their own products to Germany.
+Now, in order to secure supplies at all, they were forced to sign
+agreements which put them on rations and gave the Western Powers
+complete control of their exports to Germany.
+
+The effect of the Allied blockade upon Germany is suggested by the
+accompanying chart. In the later stages of the war it created a
+dearth of important raw materials, crippled war industries, brought
+the country to the verge of starvation, and caused a marked lowering
+of national efficiency and morale.
+
+Germany protested vigorously to the United States for allowing
+her foodstuffs to be shut out of Germany while at the same time
+shipping to England vast quantities of munitions. Throughout the
+controversy, however, Great Britain profited by the fact that while
+her methods caused only financial injury to neutrals, those employed
+by Germany destroyed or imperiled human lives.
+
+_The Submarine Campaign_
+
+[Illustration: From _The Blockade of Germany_, Alonzo E. Taylor,
+WORLD'S WORK, Oct. 1919.
+
+EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY
+
+Decreased supply of commodities in successive years of the war.]
+
+The German submarine campaign may be dated from February 18, 1915,
+when Germany, citing as a precedent Great Britain's establishment
+of a military area in the North Sea, proclaimed a _war zone_ "in
+the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole
+English Channel," within which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk
+without assurance of safety to passengers or crew. Furthermore, as
+a means of keeping neutrals out of British waters, Germany declared
+she would assume no responsibility for destruction of neutral ships
+within this zone. What this meant was to all intents and purposes a
+"paper" submarine blockade of the British Isles. Its illegitimacy
+arose from the fact that it was conducted surreptitiously over a
+vast area, and was only in the slightest degree effective, causing
+a destruction each month of less than one percent of the traffic.
+Had it been restricted to narrow limits, it would have been still
+less effective, owing to the facility of countermeasures in a small
+area.
+
+Determined, however, upon a spectacular demonstration of its
+possibilities, Germany first published danger notices in American
+newspapers, and then, on May 7, 1915, sank the unarmed Cunard liner
+_Lusitania_ off the Irish coast, with a loss of 1198 lives, including
+102 Americans. In spite of divided American sentiment and a strong
+desire for peace, this act came little short of bringing the United
+States into the war. Having already declared its intention to hold
+Germany to "strict accountability," the United States Government
+now stated that a second offense would be regarded as "deliberately
+unfriendly," and after a lengthy interchange of notes secured the
+pledge that "liners will not be sunk without warning and without
+safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do
+not try to escape or offer resistance." Violations of this pledge,
+further controversies, and increased friction with neutrals marked the
+next year or more, during which, however, sinkings did not greatly
+exceed the level of about 150,000 tons a month already attained.
+
+During this period Allied countermeasures were chiefly of a defensive
+character, including patrol of coastal areas, diversion of traffic
+from customary routes, and arming of merchantmen. This last measure,
+making surface approach and preliminary warning a highly dangerous
+procedure for the submarine, led Germany to the announcement that,
+after March 1, 1916, all armed merchant vessels would be torpedoed
+without warning. But how were U-boat commanders to distinguish
+between enemy and neutral vessels? Between vessels with or without
+guns? The difficulty brings out clearly the fact that while the
+submarines made good pirates, they were hampered in warfare on
+legitimate lines.
+
+Germany redoubled U-boat activities to lend strength to her peace
+proposals at the close of 1916, and when these failed she decided
+to disregard altogether the cobwebs of legalism that had hitherto
+hindered her submarine war. On February 1, 1917, she declared
+unrestricted warfare in an immense barred zone within limits extending
+from the Dutch coast through the middle of the North Sea to the
+Faroe Islands and thence west and south to Cape Finisterre, and
+including also the entire Mediterranean east of Spain. An American
+ship was to be allowed to enter and leave Falmauth once a week,
+and there was a crooked lane leading to Greece.
+
+[Illustration: GERMAN BARRED ZONES
+
+British mined area and North Sea mine barrage.]
+
+In thus announcing her intention to sink all ships on sight in
+European waters, Germany burned her bridges behind her. She staked
+everything on this move. Fully anticipating the hostility of the
+United States, she hoped to win the war before that country could
+complete its preparations and give effective support to the Allies.
+General von Hindenburg's statement has already been quoted. It meant
+that the army was to assume the defensive, while the navy carried
+out its attack on Allied communications. Admiral von Capelle, head
+of the German Admiralty, declared that America's aid would be
+"absolutely negligible." "My personal view," he added, "is that
+the U-boat will bring peace within six months."
+
+As it turned out, Germany's disregard of neutral rights in 1917,
+like the violation of Belgium in 1914, reacted upon her and proved
+the salvation of the Western Powers. After the defection of Russia,
+France was in imperative need of men. Great Britain needed ships.
+Neither of these needs could have been supplied save by America's
+throwing her utmost energies into active participation in the war.
+This was precisely the result of the proclamation of Feb. 1, 1917.
+The United States at once broke off diplomatic relations, armed
+her merchant vessels in March, and on April 6 declared a state
+of war.
+
+Having traced the development of submarine warfare to this critical
+period, we may now turn to the methods and weapons employed by
+both sides at a time when victory or defeat hinged on the outcome
+of the war at sea.
+
+Germany's submarine construction and losses appear in the following
+table from official German sources, the columns showing first the
+total number built up to the date given, next the total losses to
+date, and finally the remainder with which Germany started out
+at the beginning of each year.
+
+After 1916 Germany devoted the facilities of her shipyards entirely
+to submarine construction, and demoralized the surface fleet to
+secure personnel. Of the entire number built, not more than a score
+were over 850 tons. The U C boats were small mine-layers about 160
+feet in length, with not more than two weeks' cruising period.
+The U B'g were of various sizes, mostly small, and some of them
+were built in sections for transportation by rail. The U boats
+proper, which constituted the largest and most important class,
+had a speed of about 16 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged,
+and could remain at sea for a period of 5 or 6 weeks, the duration
+of the cruise depending chiefly upon the supply of torpedoes. In
+addition there were a half dozen large submarine merchantmen of
+the type of the _Deutschland_, which made two voyages to America
+in 1916; and a similar number of big cruisers of 2000 tons or more
+were completed in 1918, mounting two 6-inch guns and capable of
+remaining at sea for several months. The 372 boats built totaled
+209,000 tons and had a personnel of over 11,000 officers and men.
+There were seldom more than 20 or 30 submarines in active operation
+at one time. One third of the total number were always in port,
+and the remainder in training.
+
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+            | Boats |        |         Remainder
+            | built | Losses |(On Jan. 1 of year following)
+------------|-------|--------|-----------------------------
+End of 1914 |   31  |     5  |             26
+       1915 |   93  |    25  |             68
+       1916 |  188  |    50  |            138
+       1917 |  291  |   122  |            169
+       1918 |  372  |   202  |            170
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+
+It is evident from her limited supply of submarines at the outbreak
+of war that Germany did not contemplate their use as commerce
+destroyers. To the Allied navies also, in spite of warnings from
+a few more far-sighted officers, their use for this purpose came
+as a complete surprise. New methods had to be devised, new weapons
+invented, new types of ship built and old ones put to uses for which
+they were not intended--in short, a whole new system of warfare
+inaugurated amidst the preoccupations of war. As usual in such
+circumstances, the navy taking the aggressive with a new weapon
+gained a temporary ascendancy, until effective counter-measures
+could be contrived. It is easy to say that all this should have
+been foreseen and provided for, but it is a question to what extent
+preparations could profitably have been made before Germany began her
+campaign. It has already been pointed out in the chapter preceding
+that, had the German fleet been destroyed at Jutland, subsequent
+operations on the German coast might have made the submarine campaign
+impossible, and preparations unnecessary.
+
+[Illustration: U 71-80 OCEAN-GOING MINE-LAYERS
+
+U B 48-149
+
+U C 80 CLASS OF MINE-LAYERS
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES U 30 TO U 39
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM ABOUT U 51 to U 70
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM U 19 TO U 28
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM ABOUT U 30 UP TO U 39
+
+U 151-157 (OCEAN-GOING)
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES OF GERMAN SUBMARINES]
+
+_Anti-Submarine Tactics_
+
+Of the general categories of anti-submarine tactics,--detection,
+evasion, and destruction--it was naturally those of evasion that
+were first employed. Among these may be included suspension of
+sailings upon warning of a submarine in the vicinity, diversion
+of traffic from customary routes, camouflage, and zigzag courses
+to prevent the enemy from securing favorable position and aim.
+The first method was effective only at the expense of a severe
+reduction of traffic, amounting in the critical months of 1917
+to 40 per cent of a total stoppage. The second sometimes actually
+aided the submarine, for in confined areas such as the Mediterranean
+it was likely to discover the new route and reap a rich harvest.
+Camouflage was discarded as of slight value; but shifts of course were
+employed to advantage by both merchant and naval vessels throughout
+the war.
+
+Methods of detection depended on both sight and sound. Efficient
+lookout systems on shipboard, with men assigned to different sectors
+so as to cover the entire horizon, made it possible frequently
+to detect a periscope or torpedo wake in time to change course,
+bring guns to bear, and escape destruction. According to a British
+Admiralty estimate, in case a submarine were sighted the chances
+of escape were seven to three, but otherwise only one to four.
+Aircraft of all kinds proved of great value in detecting the presence
+of U-boats, as well as in attacking them. Hydrophones and other
+listening devices, though at first more highly perfected by the
+enemy, were so developed during the war as to enable patrol vessels
+to discover the presence and even determine the course and speed of
+a submerged foe. Along with these devices, a system of information
+was organized which, drawing information from a wide variety of
+sources, enabled Allied authorities to trace the cruise of a U-boat,
+anticipate its arrival in a given locality, and prophesy the duration
+of its stay.
+
+Among methods of destruction, the mounting of guns on merchantmen
+was chiefly valuable, as already suggested, because of its effect
+in forcing submarines to resort to illegal and barbarous methods
+of warfare. Hitherto, submarines had been accustomed to operate an
+the surface, board vessels, and sink them by bombs or gunfire. Visit
+and search, essential in order to avoid injury to neutrals, was now
+out of the question, for owing to the surface vulnerability of the
+submarine it might be sent to the bottom by a single well-directed
+shot. In brief, the guns on the merchant ship kept submarines beneath
+the surface, forced them to draw upon their limited and costly
+supply of torpedoes, and hindered them from securing good position
+and aim for torpedo attack.
+
+Much depended, of course, upon the range of the ship's guns and
+the size and experience of the gun-crews. When the United States
+began arming her ships in March, 1917, she was able to put enough
+trained men aboard to maintain lookouts and man guns both night
+and day. A dozen or more exciting duels ensued between ships and
+U-boats before the latter learned that such encounters did not
+repay the risks involved. On October 19, 1917, the steamer _J.
+L. Luckenbach_ had a four-hour running battle with a submarine in
+which the ship fired 202 rounds and the pursuer 225. The latter
+scored nine hits, but was at last driven off by the appearance of
+a destroyer. To cite another typical engagement, the _Navajo_, in
+the English Channel, July 4, 1917, was attacked first by torpedo
+and then by gunfire. The 27th shot from the ship hit the enemy's
+conning tower and caused two explosions. "Men who were on deck
+at the guns and had not jumped overboard ran aft. The submarine
+canted forward at an angle of almost 40 degrees, and the propeller
+could be plainly seen lashing the air."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: For more detailed narratives of this and other episodes
+of the submarine campaign, see Ralph D. Payne, THE FIGHTING FLEETS,
+1918.]
+
+In coastal waters where traffic converged, large forces of destroyers
+and other craft were employed for purposes of escort, mine sweeping,
+and patrol. Yet, save as a means of keeping the enemy under water
+and guarding merchant ships, these units had only a limited value
+owing to the difficulty of making contact with the enemy. During
+the later stages of the war destroyers depended chiefly upon the
+depth bomb, an invention of the British navy, which by means of
+the so-called "Y guns" could be dropped in large numbers around
+the supposed location of the enemy. It was in this way that the
+United States Destroyers _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_, while engaged
+as convoy escorts, sank the _U-58_ and captured its crew.
+
+The "mystery" or "Q" ships (well-armed vessels disguised as harmless
+merchantmen) were of slight efficacy after submarines gave up surface
+attack. In fact, it was the submarine itself which, contrary to all
+pre-war theories, proved the most effective type of naval craft against
+its own kind. Whereas fuel economy compelled German submarines to
+spend as much time as possible on the surface, the Allied under-water
+boats, operating near their bases, could cruise awash or submerged
+and were thus able to creep up on the enemy and attack unawares.
+According to Admiral Sims, Allied destroyers, about 500 in all, were
+credited with the certain destruction of 34 enemy submarines; yachts,
+patrol craft, etc., over 3000 altogether, sank 31; whereas about 100
+Allied submarines sank probably 20.[1] Since 202 submarines were
+destroyed, this may be an underestimate of the results accomplished
+by each type, but it indicates relative efficiency. Submarines kept
+the enemy beneath the surface, led him to stay farther away from
+the coast, and also, owing to the disastrous consequences that might
+ensue from mistaken identity, prevented the U-boats from operating
+in pairs. The chief danger encountered by Allied submarines was from
+friendly surface vessels. On one occasion an American submarine,
+the AL-10, approaching a destroyer of the same service, was forced
+to dive and was then given a bombardment of depth charges. This
+bent plates, extinguished lights, and brought the submarine again
+to the surface, where fortunately she was identified in the nick
+of time. The two commanders had been roommates at Annapolis.
+
+[Footnote 1: THE VICTORY AT SEA, _World's Work_, May, 1920, p. 56.]
+
+_Work of the United States Navy_
+
+Having borne the brunt of the naval war for three years, the British
+navy welcomed the reënforcements which the United States was able
+to contribute, and shared to the utmost the experience already
+gained. On May 3, 1917, the first squadron of 6 American destroyers
+arrived at Queenstown, and was increased to 50 operating in European
+waters in November, and 70 at the time of the armistice. A flotilla
+of yachts, ill adapted as they were for such service, did hazardous
+duty as escorts in the Bay of Biscay; and a score of submarines
+crossed the Atlantic during the winter to operate off Ireland and
+in the Azores. Five dreadnoughts under Admiral Rodman from the U.
+S. Atlantic fleet became a part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow.
+
+Probably the most notable work of the American navy was in projects
+where American manufacturing resources and experience in large-scale
+undertakings could be brought to bear. In four months, from July
+to November, 1917, the United States Navy constructed an oil pipe
+line from the west to the east coast of Scotland, thus eliminating
+the long and dangerous northern circuit. Five 14-inch naval guns,
+on railway mountings, with a complete train of 16 cars for each gun,
+were equipped by the navy, manned entirely with naval personnel, and
+were in action in France from August, 1918, until the armistice,
+firing a total of 782 rounds on the German lines of communication,
+at ranges up to 30 miles.
+
+The American proposal of a mine barrage across the entrance to the
+North Sea from Scotland to Norway at first met with slight approval
+abroad, so unprecedented was the problem of laying a mine-field 230
+miles in length, from 15 to 30 miles in width, and extending at
+least 240 feet downward in waters the total depth of which was 400
+or more feet. Even the mine barrier at the Straits of Dover had
+proved ineffective owing to heavy tides, currents, and bad bottom
+conditions, until it was strengthened by Admiral Keyes in 1918. By
+employing a large type of mine perfected by the United States Naval
+Bureau of Ordnance, it was found possible, however, to reduce by
+one-third the number of mines and the amount of wire needed for the
+North Sea Barrage. The task was therefore undertaken, and completed
+in the summer of 1918. Out of a total of 70,000 mines, 56,570, or
+about 80 per cent, were planted by American vessels. The barrage
+when completed gave an enemy submarine about one chance in ten of
+getting through. According to reliable records, it accomplished
+the destruction or serious injury of 17 German submarines, and by
+its deterrent effect, must have practically closed the northern
+exit to both under-water and surface craft.
+
+[Illustration: OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA]
+
+_The Attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend_
+
+At the Channel exit of the North Sea, a vigorous blow at the German
+submarine nests on the Belgian coast was finally struck on April
+22-23, 1918, by the Dover Force under Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, in
+one of the most brilliant naval operations of the war. Of the two
+Belgian ports, Ostend and Zeebrugge, the latter was much more useful
+to the Germans because better protected, less exposed to batteries
+on the land front, and connected by a deeper canal with the main
+base 8 miles distant at Bruges. It was planned, however, to attack
+both ports, with the specific purpose of sinking 5 obsolete cruisers
+laden with concrete across the entrances to the canals. The operation
+required extensive reconstruction work on the vessels employed, a
+thorough course of training for personnel, suitable conditions of
+atmosphere, wind, and tide, and execution of complicated movements
+in accordance with a time schedule worked out to the minute.
+
+At Ostend the attack failed owing to a sudden shift of wind which
+blew the smoke screen laid by motor boats back upon the two block
+ships, and so confused their approach that they were stranded and
+blown up west of the entrance.
+
+At Zeebrugge, two of the three block ships, the _Iphigenia_ and
+the _Intrepid_, got past the heavy guns on the mole, through the
+protective nets, and into the canal, where they were sunk athwart
+the channel by the explosion of mines laid all along their keels.
+To facilitate their entrance, the cruiser _Vindictive_ (Commander
+Alfred Carpenter), fitted with a false deck and 18 brows or gangways
+for landing forces, had been brought up 25 minutes earlier--to
+be exact, at a minute past midnight--along the outer side of the
+high mole or breakwater enclosing the harbor. Here, in spite of a
+heavy swell and tide, she was held in position by the ex-ferryboat
+_Daffodill_, while some 300 or 400 bluejackets and marines swarmed
+ashore under a violent fire from batteries and machine guns and
+did considerable injury to the works on the mole. Fifteen minutes
+later, an old British submarine was run into a viaduct connecting
+the mole with the shore and there blown up, breaking a big gap in
+the viaduct. Strange to say, the _Vindictive_ and her auxiliaries,
+after lying more than an hour in this dangerous position, succeeded
+in taking aboard all survivors from the landing party and getting
+safely away. Motor launches also rescued the crews of the blockships
+and the men--all of them wounded--from the submarine. One British
+destroyer and two motor boats were sunk, and the casualties were
+176 killed, 412 wounded, and 49 missing. For a considerable period
+thereafter, all the larger German torpedo craft remained cooped
+up at Bruges, and the Zeebrugge blockships still obstructed the
+channel at the end of the war.
+
+[Illustration: ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND BRITISH
+BLOCKSHIPS]
+
+_The Convoy System_
+
+Of all the anti-submarine measures employed, prior to the North
+Sea Barrage and the Zeebrugge attack, the adoption of the convoy
+system was undoubtedly the most effective in checking the loss
+of tonnage at the height of the submarine campaign. Familiar as
+a means of commerce protection in previous naval wars, the late
+adoption of the convoy system in the World War occasioned very
+general surprise. It was felt by naval authorities, however, that
+great delay would be incurred in assembling vessels, and in restricting
+the speed of all ships of a convoy to that of the slowest unit.
+Merchant captains believed themselves unequal to the task of keeping
+station at night in close order, with all lights out and frequent
+changes of course, and they thought that the resultant injuries
+would be almost as great as from submarines. Furthermore, so long
+as a large number of neutral vessels were at sea, it appeared a
+very doubtful expedient to segregate merchant vessels of belligerent
+nationality and thus distinguish them as legitimate prey.
+
+[Illustration: BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS DESTROYED
+BY GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES
+
+(Figures in thousands of gross tons)
+
+The accompanying chart shows the merchant shipping captured or
+destroyed by Germany in the course of the war. After 1914 the losses
+were inflicted almost entirely by submarines, either by mine laying
+or by torpedoes. According to a British Admiralty statement of
+Dec. 5, 1919, the total loss during the war was 14,820,000 gross
+tons, of which 8,918,000 was British, and 5,918,000 was Allied
+or neutral. The United States lost 354,450 tons. During the same
+period the world's ship construction amounted to 10,850,000 tons,
+and enemy shipping captured and eventually put into Allied service
+totalled 2,393,000 tons, so that the net loss at the close of the
+war was about 1,600,000 tons.]
+
+But in April, 1917, the situation was indeed desperate. The losses
+had become so heavy that of every 100 ships leaving England it was
+estimated that 25 never returned.[1] The American commander in
+European waters, Admiral Sims, reports Admiral Jellicoe as saying
+at this time, "They will win unless we can stop these losses--and
+stop them soon."[2] Definitely adopted in May following, the convoy
+system was in general operation before the end of the summer, with
+a notable decline of sinkings in both the Mediterranean and the
+Atlantic. The following table, based on figures from the Naval
+Annual for 1919, indicates the number of vessels sunk for each
+submarine destroyed. It shows the decreased effectiveness of submarine
+operations after September 1, 1917, which is taken as the date
+when the convoy system had come into full use, and brings out the
+crescendo of losses in 1917.
+
+[Footnote 1: Brassey's NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _World's Work_, Sept., 1919.]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+              |Vessels sunk|           |
+              |     per    | Total No. |
+              |  submarine |   sunk    |
+              |  destroyed |           |
+--------------|------------|-----------|---------------------------------
+Aug. 1, 1914- |    10.4    |           |69 ships sunk, almost entirely by
+Feb., 1915    |            |           |  surface cruisers.
+              |            |           |
+Feb. 1, 1915- |     48     |    544    |Half by torpedo; 148 without
+Feb. 1, 1917  |            |(two years)| warning; 3,066 lives lost.
+              |            |           |
+Feb. 1, 1917- |     67     |    736    |572 by torpedo; 595 (69%) with
+Sept. 1, 1917 |            |(7 months) | out warning.
+              |            |           |
+Sept. 1, 1917-|    20.2    |    548    |448 (82%) without warning.
+April 1, 1918 |            |(7 months) |
+              |            |           |
+April 1, 1918-|     12     |    252    |239 (91%) without warning.
+Nov. 1, 1918  |            |(7 months) |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+From July 26, 1917, to October 26, 1918, 90,000 vessels were convoyed,
+with a total loss from the convoys of 436, or less than half of one
+per cent. The convoy system forced submarines to expose themselves
+to the attacks of destroyer escorts, or else to work close in shore
+to set upon vessels after the dispersion of the convoy. But when
+working close to the coast they were exposed to Allied patrols
+and submarines.
+
+Testifying before a German investigation committee, Captain Bartenbach,
+of the V-boat section of the German Admiralty, gave the chief perils
+encountered by his boats as follows: (1) mines, (2) Allied submarines,
+which "destroyed a whole series of our boats," (3) aircraft of all
+types, (4) armed merchantmen, (5) hydrophones and listening devices.
+Admiral Capelle in his testimony referred to the weakening of their
+efforts due to "indifferent material and second-rate crews."
+
+_Transport Work_
+
+Dependent in large measure upon the anti-submarine campaign for
+its safety and success, yet in itself an immense achievement, the
+transport of over 2,000,000 American troops to France must be regarded
+as one of the major naval operations of the war. Of these forces
+48% were carried in British, and 43% in American transports. About
+83% of the convoy work was under the protection of American naval
+vessels.
+
+The transportation work of the British navy, covering a longer
+period, was, of course, on a far greater scale. Speaking in Parliament
+on October 29, 1917, Premier Lloyd George indicated the extent of
+this service as follows: "Since the beginning of the war the navy
+has insured the safe transportation to the British and Allied armies
+of 13,000,000 men, 12,000,000 horses, 25,000,000 tons of explosives
+and supplies, and 51,000,000 tons of coal and oil. The loss of
+men out of the whole 13,000,000 was 3500, of which only 2700 were
+lost through the action of the enemy. Altogether 130,000,000 tons
+have been transported by British ships." These figures, covering but
+three years of the war, are of significance chiefly as indicating
+the immense transportation problems of the British and Allied navies
+and the use made of sea communications.
+
+These three main Allied naval operations--the blockade of Germany,
+the anti-submarine campaign, and the transportation of American
+troops to France--were unquestionably decisive factors in the war.
+Failure in any one of them would have meant victory for Germany. The
+peace of Europe, it is true, could be achieved only by overcoming
+Germany's military power on land. A breakdown there, with German
+domination of the Continent, would have created a situation which
+it is difficult to envisage, and which very probably would have
+meant a peace of compromise and humiliation for England and America.
+It is obvious, however, that, but for the blockade, Germany could
+have prolonged the war; but for American reënforcements, France
+would have been overrun; but for the conquest of the submarine,
+Great Britain would have been forced to surrender.
+
+In the spring of 1918 Germany massed her troops on the western
+front and began her final effort to break the Allied lines and
+force a decision. With supreme command for the first time completely
+centralized under Marshal Foch, and with the support of American
+armies, the Allies were able to hold up the enemy drives, and on
+July 18 begin the forward movement which pushed the Germans back
+upon their frontiers. Yet when the armistice was signed on November
+11, the German armies still maintained cohesion, with an unbroken
+line on foreign soil. Surrender was made inevitable by internal
+breakdown and revolution, the first open manifestations of which
+appeared among the sailors of the idle High Seas Fleet at Kiel.
+
+On November 21, 1918, this fleet, designed as the great instrument
+for conquest of world empire, and in its prime perhaps as efficient
+a war force as was ever set afloat, steamed silently through two
+long lines of British and Allied battleships assembled off the
+Firth of Forth, and the German flags at the mainmasts went down
+at sunset for the last time.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+BRASSEY'S NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919.
+THE VICTORY AT SEA, Vice-Admiral W. S. Sims, U. S. N., 1920.
+ANNUAL REPORT of the U. S Secretary of the Navy, 1918
+THE DOVER PATROL, 1915-1917, Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, R. N.,
+  1919.
+ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND DISPATCHES, ed. by C. Sanford Terry, 1919.
+LAYING THE NORTH SEA MINE BARRAGE, Captain R. R. Belknap,
+  U. S. N., U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan.-Feb., 1920.
+AMERICAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN THE WORLD WAR, by Prof.
+  C. S. Alden, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. June-July, 1920.
+For more popular treatment see also SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE,
+  Sir Henry Newbolt, 1919; THE FIGHTING FLEETS, Ralph
+  D. Payne, 1918; THE U-BOAT HUNTERS, James B. Connolly, 1918;
+  SEA WARFARE, Rudyard Kipling, 1917; etc.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+The brief survey of sea power in the preceding chapters has shown
+that the ocean has been the highway for the march of civilization and
+empire. Crete in its day became a great island power and distributed
+throughout the Mediterranean the wealth and the arts of its own
+culture and that of Egypt. In turn, Phœnicia held sway on the inland
+sea, and though creating little, she seized upon and developed the
+material and intellectual resources of her neighbors, and carried
+them not only to the corners of the Mediterranean, but far out
+on the unknown sea. Later when Phœnicia was subject to Persia,
+Athens by her triremes saved the growing civilization of Greece,
+and during a brief period of glory planted the seeds of Greek,
+as opposed to Asiatic culture, on the islands and coasts of the
+Ægean. After Athens, Carthage inherited the trident, and in turn
+fell before the energy of a land power, Rome. And as the Roman
+Empire grew to include practically all of the known world, every
+waterway, river and ocean, served to spread Roman law, engineering,
+and ideals of practical efficiency, at the same time bringing back
+to the heart of the Empire not only the products of the colonies,
+but such impalpable treasures as the art, literature, and philosophy
+of Greece. This was the story of the sea in antiquity.
+
+After the dissolution of the Roman empire, as Christian peoples
+were struggling in blood and darkness, a great menace came from
+Arabia, the Saracen invasion, which was checked successfully and
+repeatedly by the navy of Constantinople. To this, primarily, is
+due the preservation of the Christian ideal in the world. Later, the
+cities of Italy began to reëstablish sea commerce, which had been
+for centuries interrupted by pirates. Venice gained the ascendancy,
+and Venetian ships carried the Crusading armies during the centuries
+when western peoples went eastward to fight for the Cross and brought
+back new ideas they had learned from the Infidels. Then there arose
+a new Mohammedan threat, the Turk, determined like the earlier
+Saracen to conquer the world for the Crescent. Constantinople,
+betrayed by Christian nations, fell, Christian peoples of the Levant
+were made subject to the Turk, and thereafter till our day the
+Ægean was a Turkish lake. About the same time a new Mohammedan sea
+power arose in the Moors of the African coast, and for a century
+and more the Mediterranean was a no-man's land between the rival
+peoples and the rival religions.
+
+Meanwhile the trade with the East by caravan routes to the Arabian
+Gulf had been stopped by the presence of the Turk. To reach the
+old markets, therefore, new routes had to be found and there came
+the great era of discovery. The new world was only an accidental
+discovery in a search for the westward route to Asia. The claims of
+Spain to this new region called forth her fleets of trading ships.
+But the lure of the West attracted the energies of the English
+also, and England and Spain clashed. As Spain became more and more
+dependent on her western colonies for income, and yet failed to
+establish her ascendancy over the Atlantic routes, she declined
+in favor of her enemies, England and Holland. The latter country,
+being dependent on the sea for sustenance, early captured a large
+part of the world's carrying trade, especially in the Mediterranean
+and the East. Her rich profits excited the envy and rivalry of the
+English, and in consequence, after three hard-fought naval wars,
+the scepter of the sea passed to England. The subsequent wars between
+England and France served only to strengthen England's control of
+trade routes and extend her colonial possessions; with one notable
+exception, when France, denying to her rival the control of the sea
+at a critical juncture in the American Revolution, deprived her
+of her richest and most extensive colony. It was primarily England
+with her navy that broke the power of Napoleon in the subsequent
+conflict, and throughout a century of peace the spread of English
+speech and institutions has extended to the uttermost parts of
+the world. One power in our day challenged Britain's control of
+the sea--now even more essential to her security than it was in
+the 17th century to that of Holland--and the World War was the
+consequence.
+
+In all this story it is interesting to note that insularity in
+position is the reverse of insularity in fact. Crete touched the
+far shores of the Mediterranean because she was an island and her
+people were forced upon the sea. Similarly, Phœnicia, driven to
+sea by mountains and desert at her back, spread her sails beyond
+the Pillars of Hercules. And England, hemmed in by the Atlantic,
+has carried her goods and her language to every nook and cranny of
+the earth. Thus the ocean has served less to separate than to bring
+together. As a common highway it has not only excited quarrels, but
+established common interests between nations. Special agreements
+governing the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, navigation
+regulations and the like, have long since brought nations together in
+peace on a common ground. It has also gone far to create international
+law for the problems of war. Rules governing blockade, contraband,
+and neutral rights have been agreed upon long since. But, as every
+war has proved, international law has needed a higher authority to
+enforce its rules in the teeth of a powerful belligerent. To remedy
+this defect is one of the purposes of a League of Nations.
+
+Such has been the significance of the sea. The nations who have
+used it have made history and have laid the rest of the world under
+their dominion intellectually, commercially, and politically. Indeed,
+the story of the sea is the history of civilization.
+
+At the conclusion of this survey, it is appropriate to pause and
+summarize what is meant by the term "sea power." It is a catch
+phrase, made famous by Mahan and glibly used ever since. What does
+sea power mean? What are its elements?
+
+Obviously it means, in brief, a nation's ability to enforce its will
+upon the sea. This means a navy superior to those of its enemies.
+But it means also strategic bases equipped for supplying a fleet
+for battle or offering refuge in defeat. To these bases there must
+run lines of communication guarded from interruption by the enemy.
+Imagine, for instance, the Suez or the Panama Canal held by a hostile
+force, or a battlefleet cut off from its fuel supply of coal or
+oil.
+
+The relation of shipping to sea power is not what it was in earlier
+days. Merchantmen are indeed still useful in war for transport
+and auxiliary service, but it is no longer true that men in the
+merchant service are trained for man-of-war service. The difference
+between them has widened as the battleship of to-day differs from
+a merchantman of to-day. Nor can a merchantship be transformed
+into a cruiser, as in the American navy of a hundred years ago.
+The place of shipping in sea power is therefore subsidiary. In
+fact, unless a nation can control the sea, the amount of its wealth
+dispersed in merchantmen is just so much loss in time of war.
+
+The major element in sea power is the fleet, but possession of
+the largest navy is no guarantee of victory or even of control
+of the sea. Size is important, but it is an interesting fact that
+most of the great victories in naval history have been won by a
+smaller fleet over a larger. The effectiveness of a great navy
+depends first on its quality, secondly, on how it is handled, and
+thirdly, on its power of reaching the enemy's communications.
+
+The quality of a navy is two-fold, material and personal. In material,
+the great problem of modern days is to keep abreast of the time. The
+danger to a navy lies in conservatism and bureaucratic control. There
+is always the chance that a weaker power may defeat the stronger, not
+by using the old weapons, but by devising some new weapon that will
+render the old ones obsolete. The trouble with the professional man
+in any walk of life has always been that he sticks to the traditional
+ways. In consequence he lays himself open to the amateur, who,
+caring nothing about tradition, beats him with something novel.
+The inventions that have revolutionized naval warfare have come
+from men outside the naval profession. Thus the Romans, unable to
+match the Carthaginians in seamanship, made that seamanship of no
+value by their invention of the corvus. Greek fire not only saved
+the insignificant fleets of the Eastern Empire, but annihilated the
+huge armadas of Saracen and Slav. If the South in our Civil War
+had possessed the necessary resources, her ironclad rams would
+have made an end of the Union navy and of the war. In our own time
+the German submarine came within an ace of winning the war despite
+all the Allied dreadnoughts, because its potentialities had not
+been realized and no counter measures devised. A navy that drops
+behind is lost.
+
+The personal side is a matter of training and morale. The material
+part is of no value unless it is operated by skill and by the will
+to win. Slackness or inexperience or lack of heart in officers
+or men--any of these may bring ruin. Napoleon once spoke of the
+Russian army as brave, but as "an army without a soul." A navy
+must have a soul. Unfortunately, the tendency in recent years has
+been to emphasize the material and the mechanical at the expense of
+the intellectual and spiritual. With all the enormous development
+of the ships and weapons, it must be remembered that the man is,
+and always will be, greater than the machine.
+
+As to handling the navy, first of all the War Staff and the commander
+in chief must solve the strategic problem correctly. The fate of
+the Spanish Armada in the 16th Century and that of the Russian
+navy at the beginning of the 20th are eloquent of the effect of
+bad strategy on a powerful fleet. Secondly, the commander in chief
+must be possessed of the right fighting doctrine--the spirit of the
+offensive. In all ages the naval commander who sought to achieve
+his purpose by avoiding battle went to disaster. The true objective
+must be, now as always, _the destruction of the enemy's fleet_.
+
+Such are the material and the spiritual essentials of sea power.
+The phrase has become so popular that a superior fleet has been
+widely accepted as a talisman in war. The idea is that a nation
+with sea power must win. But with all the tremendous "influence of
+sea power on history," the student must not be misled into thinking
+that sea power is invincible. The Athenian navy went to ruin under
+the catapults of Syracuse whose navy was insignificant. Carthage, the
+sea power, succumbed to a land power, Rome. In modern times France,
+with a navy second to England's, fell in ruin before Prussia, which
+had practically no navy at all. And in the World War it required
+the entry of a new ally, the United States, to save the Entente
+from defeat at the hands of land power, despite an overwhelming
+superiority on the sea.
+
+The significance of sea power is _communications_. Just so far
+as sea control affects lines of communications vital to either
+belligerent, so far does it affect the war. To a sea empire like
+the British, sea control is essential as a measure of defense.
+If an enemy controls the sea the empire will fall apart like a
+house of cards, and the British Isles will be speedily starved
+into submission. It is another thing, however, to make the navy
+a sword as well as a shield. Whenever the British navy could cut
+the communications of the enemy, as in the case of the wars with
+Spain and Holland, it was terribly effective. When it fought a
+nation like Russia in the Crimean War, it hardly touched the sources
+of Russian supplies, because these came by the interior land
+communications. So also the French navy in 1870 could not touch
+a single important line of German communications and its effect
+therefore was negligible. If in 1914 Russia, for example, had been
+neutral, no Allied naval superiority could have saved France from
+destruction by the combined armies of Germany and Austria, just
+as the Grand Fleet was powerless to check the conquest or deny
+the possession of Belgium. It must be borne in mind that a land
+power has the advantages of central position and interior lines, and
+the interior lines of to-day are those of rail and motor transport,
+offering facilities for a rapid concentration on any front.
+
+Of course, modern life and modern warfare are so complex that few
+nations are able to live and wage war entirely on their own resources;
+important communications extend across the sea. In this respect
+the United States is singularly fortunate. With the exception of
+rubber, every essential is produced in our country, and the sea
+power that would attempt to strangle the United States by a blockade
+on two coasts would find it unprofitable even if it were practicable.
+A hostile navy would have to land armies to strike directly at the
+manufacturing cities near the seaboard in order to affect our
+communications. In brief, sea power is decisive just so far as
+it cuts the enemy's communications.
+
+Finally in considering sea power we should note the importance
+of coördinating naval policies with national. The character of a
+navy and the size of a navy depend on what policy a nation expects
+to stand for. It is the business of a navy to stand behind a nation's
+will. For Great Britain, circumstances of position have long made
+her policy consistent, without regard to change of party. She had
+to dominate the sea to insure the safety of the empire. With the
+United States, the situation has been different. The nation has
+not been conscious of any foreign policy, with the single exception
+of the Monroe Doctrine. And even this has changed in character
+since it was first enunciated.
+
+At the present day, for example, how far does the United States
+purpose to go in the Monroe Doctrine? Shall we attempt to police
+the smaller South and Central American nations? Shall we make the
+Caribbean an area under our naval control? What is to be our policy
+toward Mexico? How far are we willing to go to sustain the Open Door
+policy in the Far East? Are we determined to resist the immigration
+of Asiatics? Are we bound to hold against conquest our outlying
+possessions,--the Philippines, Guam, Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska?
+Shall we play a "lone hand" among nations, or join an international
+league? Until there is some answer to these questions of foreign
+policy, our naval program is based on nothing definite. In short,
+the naval policy of a nation should spring from its national policy.
+
+On that national policy must be based not only the types of ships
+built and their numbers, but also the number and locale of the
+naval bases and the entire strategic plan. In the past there has
+been too little mutual understanding between the American navy and
+the American people. The navy--the Service, as it is appropriately
+called--is the trained servant of the republic. It is only fair to
+ask that the republic make clear what it expects that servant to
+do. But before a national policy is accepted, it must be thought
+out to its logical conclusion by both the popular leaders and naval
+advisers. As Mahan has said, "the naval officer must be a statesman
+as well as a seaman." Is the policy accepted going to conflict
+with that of another nation; if so, are we prepared to accept the
+consequences?
+
+The recent history of Germany is a striking example of the effect
+of a naval policy on international relations. The closing decade
+of the 19th century found Great Britain still following the policy
+of "splendid isolation," with France and Russia her traditional
+enemies. Her relations with Germany were friendly, as they always
+had been. At the close of the century, the Kaiser, inspired by
+Mahan's "_Influence of Sea Power on History,_" launched the policy
+of a big navy. First, he argued, German commerce was growing with
+astonishing rapidity. It was necessary, according to Mahan, to have
+a strong navy to protect a great carrying trade. This von Tirpitz[1]
+emphasizes, though he never makes clear just what precise danger
+threatened the German trading fleets, provided Germany maintained a
+policy of friendly relations with England. Secondly, Germany found
+herself with no outlet for expansion. The best colonial fields had
+already been appropriated by other countries, chiefly England. To
+back up German claims to new territory or trading concessions, it
+was necessary to have a strong navy. All this was strictly by the
+book, and it is characteristic of the German mind that it faithfully
+followed the text. "_Unsere Zukunft_," cried the Kaiser, "_liegt
+auf dem Wasser!_" But what was implied in this proposal? A great
+navy increasing rapidly to the point of rivaling that of England
+could be regarded by that country only as a pistol leveled at her
+head. England would be at the mercy of any power that could defeat
+her navy. And this policy coupled with the demand for "a place in
+the sun," threatened the rich colonies that lay under the British
+flag. It could not be taken otherwise.
+
+[Footnote 1: MY MEMOIRS, Chap. xv and _passim._]
+
+These implications began to bear fruit after their kind. In the
+place of friendliness on the part of the English,--a friendliness
+uninterrupted by war, and based on the blood of their royal family
+and the comradeship in arms against France in the days of Louis
+XIV, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon--there developed a growing
+hostility. In vain missions were sent by the British Government
+to promote a better understanding, for the Germans declined to
+accept either a "naval holiday" or a position of perpetual naval
+inferiority. In consequence, England abandoned her policy of isolation,
+and came to an understanding with her ancient enemies, Russia and
+France. Thus Germany arrayed against herself all the resources of
+the British Empire and in this act signed her own death warrant.
+
+A final word as to the future of sea power. The influence of modern
+inventions is bound to affect the significance of the sea in the
+future. Oceans have practically dwindled away as national barriers.
+Wireless and the speed of the modern steamship have reduced the
+oceans to ponds. "Splendid isolation" is now impossible. Modern
+artillery placed at Calais, for instance, could shell London and
+cover the transportation of troops in the teeth of a fleet. Aircraft
+cross land and sea with equal ease. The submersible has come to
+stay. Indeed, it looks as if the navy of the future will tend first
+to the submersible types and later abandon the sea for the air,
+and the "illimitable pathways of the sea" will yield to still more
+illimitable pathways of the sky. The consequence is bound to be a
+closer knitting of the peoples of the world through the conquering
+of distance by time.
+
+This bringing together breeds war quite as easily as peace, and
+the progress of invention makes wars more frightful. The closely
+knit economic structure of Europe did not prevent the greatest
+war in history and there is little hope for the idea that wars
+can never occur again. The older causes of war lay in pressure
+of population, the temptation of better lands, racial hatreds or
+ambitions, religious fanaticism, dynastic aims, and imperialism.
+Some of these remain. The chief modern source of trouble is trade
+rivalry, with which imperialism is closely interwoven and trade
+rivalry makes enemies of old friends. There is, therefore, a place
+for navies still.
+
+At present there are two great naval powers, Great Britain and
+the United States. A race in naval armaments between the two would
+be criminal folly, and could lead to only one disastrous end. The
+immediate way toward guaranteeing freedom of the seas is a closer
+entente between the two English-speaking peoples, whose common
+ground extends beyond their speech to institutions and ideals of
+justice and liberty. The fine spirit of cöoperation produced by
+the World War should be perpetuated in peace for the purpose of
+maintaining peace. In his memoirs van Tirpitz mourns the fact that
+now "Anglo-Saxondom" controls the world. There is small danger that
+where public opinion rules, the two peoples will loot the world
+to their own advantage. On the other hand, there is every prospect
+that, for the immediate future, sea power in their hands can be made
+the most potent influence toward peace, and the preservation of
+that inheritance of civilization which has been slowly accumulated
+and spread throughout the world by those peoples of every age who
+have been the pathfinders on the seas.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+A.
+
+Abercromby, British general
+Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy, British cruisers, loss of
+Aboukir Bay, battle of, _see_ Nile
+Actium, campaign of; battle of
+Ægospotami, battle of
+Agrippa, Roman admiral
+Aircraft, in World War
+Albuquerque, Portuguese viceroy
+Alfred, king of England
+Algeciras Convention
+Ali Pasha, Turkish admiral
+Allemand, French admiral
+Almeida, Portuguese leader
+Amboyna
+Amiens, treaty of
+Amsterdam
+Anthony, Roman general, at Actium
+Antwerp
+Arabs, at war with Eastern Empire; as traders; ships of
+Arbuthnot, British admiral
+Ariabignes, Persian admiral
+Aristides
+Armada, _see_ Spanish Armada
+Armed Neutrality, league of
+Armor
+Armstrong, Sir William
+Athens, _see_ Greece
+_Audacious_, British ship
+August 10, battle of
+Austerlitz battle of
+Austria, in Napoleonic Wars; at war with Italy; in Triple Alliance;
+  in World War
+
+B.
+
+Bacon, Roger
+Bagdad Railway
+Bantry Bay, action in; attempted landing in
+Barbarigo, Venetian admiral
+Barbarossa, Turkish admiral
+Barham, First Lord of Admiralty
+Bart, Jean, French naval leader
+Battle cruiser, _see_ Ships of War
+Beachy Head, battle of
+Beatty, British admiral, at Heligoland Bight; at Dogger Bank; at Jutland
+Berlin Decree
+Bismarck
+Blake, British admiral
+Blockade, in American Civil War; in World War
+Boisot, Dutch admiral
+Bonaparte, _see_ Napoleon
+Bossu, Spanish admiral
+Boxer Rebellion
+Boyne, battle of
+Bragadino, Venetian general
+Breda, peace of
+Bridport, British admiral
+Brill, capture of
+Brueys, French admiral
+Burney, British admiral
+Bushnell, David
+
+C.
+
+Cabot, John
+Cadiz, founded; British expeditions to; blockaded by Blake; blockaded
+  by Jervis; Allied fleet in
+Calder, British admiral; in action with Villeneuve
+Camara, Spanish admiral
+Camperdown, battle of
+Canidius, Roman general
+Carden, British admiral
+Carpenter, Alfred, British commander
+Carthage, founded; at war with Greece; in Punic Wars
+Cervantes
+Cervera, Spanish admiral; in Santiago campaign
+Ceylon
+Champlain, battle of Lake
+Charlemagne
+Charles II of England
+Charles V of Spain
+Charleston, attack on
+Chatham, raided by Dutch
+Chauncey, U. S. commodore
+China, in ancient times; first ships to; at war with Japan; in disruption
+Chios, battle of
+Churchill, Winston
+Cinque Ports
+Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, in Actium campaign
+Clerk, John
+Collingwood, British admiral; at Trafalgar
+Colonna, admiral of Papal States
+Colport, British admiral
+Columbus; voyages of
+Commerce, of Phoenicians; under Roman Empire; with the East; in northern
+  Europe; in modern times
+Commerce Warfare, in Dutch War of Independence; in Napoleonic Wars;
+  in War of 1812; in World War,
+Communications, in warfare
+Compass, introduction of
+Condalmiero, Venetian admiral
+Conflans, French admiral
+Constantinople, founded; attacked by Arabs; attacked by Russians;
+  sacked by Crusaders; captured by Turks; in World War
+Continental System
+Continuous Voyage, doctrine of
+Contraband
+Convoy, System in World War
+Cook, Captain James
+Copenhagen, battle of
+Corinthian Gulf, battle of
+Cornwallis, British admiral
+Coronel, battle of
+Corsica
+Corunna, Armada sails from; attacked by Drake; Allied fleet in
+Corvi
+Cradock, British admiral, at Coronel
+Crete
+Cromwell, Oliver
+Custozza, battle of
+Cyprus
+
+D.
+
+Da Gama, Vasco
+Dardanelles, German squadron enters; campaign of
+Darius, king of Persia
+De Grasse, French admiral, at Virginia Capes; at Saints' Passage
+De Guichen, French admiral
+Denmark, in Copenhagen campaign
+De Ruyter, Dutch admiral
+D'Estaing, French admiral
+Destroyer, _see_ Ships of War
+Dewa, Japanese admiral
+Dewey, U. S. admiral, at Manila
+De Witt, Dutch admiral
+Diaz, Bartolomeo
+Diedrichs, German admiral
+Director fire
+Dirkzoon, Dutch admiral
+Diu, battle of
+Dogger Bank, Russian fleet off; action off
+Don Juan of Austria, at Lepanto
+Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral
+Doria, Gian Andrea, Genoese admiral
+Dragut, Turkish commander
+Drake, Sir Francis, British admiral, voyages of; in Armada campaign;
+  last years of
+Dreadnought, _see_ Ships of War
+Drepanum, battle of
+Duguay-Trouin, French commander
+Duilius, Roman consul
+Dumanoir, French admiral
+Duncan, British admiral, at Camperdown
+Dungeness, battle of
+
+E.
+
+East Indies Companies, British and Dutch
+Ecnomus, battle of
+Egypt, early ships of; Napoleon in
+Elizabeth, queen of England
+_Emden_, German cruiser; cruise of
+England, early naval history of; at war with Spain; at war with
+  Holland; at war with France; plans for invasion of.
+  _See_ Great Britain
+Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia
+Ericsson, John
+Erie, battle of Lake
+Eurybiades, Spartan commander
+Evan-Thomas, British admiral
+Evertsen, Dutch admiral
+
+F.
+
+Falkland Islands, battle of
+Farragut, U. S. admiral
+Fighting Instructions, of British Navy
+Fireships
+First of June, battle of
+Fisher, British admiral
+Fisher, Fort, capture of
+Fleet in Being
+Foch, French general
+Foley, British captain
+Four Days' Battle, in Dutch Wars
+France, at war with England in 18th century; in Napoleonic Wars; in
+  Far East; aids Russia; in World War
+Francis I, of France
+Frobisher, Martin
+Fulton, Robert; his submarine
+
+G.
+
+Gabbard, battle of
+_Galleon of Venice_, Venetian ship
+Galley, galleon, galleas, _see_ Ships of War
+Gallipoli Peninsula, operations on; _see_ Dardanelles
+Ganteaume, French admiral
+Genoa; at war with Venice
+Germany, early commerce under Hausa; unification of; in Far East;
+  aids Russia; growth of; in World War.
+Gibraltar, captured by British; blockaded
+_Göben_, German battle cruiser, escape of
+Goodenough, British naval officer, at Heligoland Bight; at Jutland
+Grand Fleet, British; strength of; at Jutland
+Graves, British admiral
+Gravina, Spanish admiral
+Great Britain, in Napoleonic Wars; in War of 1812; in World War.
+  _See_ England.
+Greece; at war with Persia; in Peloponnesian War
+Greek fire
+Grenville, Sir Richard
+Guns, gunpowder, _see_ Ordnance
+Gunfleet, battle of
+
+H.
+
+Hampton Roads, battle of
+Hannibal
+Hanseatic League
+Hase, German naval officer, quoted
+Hawke, British admiral
+Hawkins, John
+Heath, British admiral
+Heimskirck, Jacob van, Dutch seaman
+Heligoland; battle of
+Heligoland Bight, battle of
+Hellespont
+Henry, Prince, the Navigator
+Henry VIII, of England
+Herbert, Lord Torrington, British admiral
+Hermæa, battle of
+High Seas Fleet, of Germany; strength of; at Jutland; surrender of
+Hindenberg, German general
+Hipper, German admiral, at Dogger Bank; at Jutland
+Hobson, U. S. naval officer
+Hoche, French general
+Holland, _see_ Netherlands
+Holland, John P.
+Hood, British admiral, at Virginia Capes; at Saints' Passage,
+Hood, British rear-admiral, at Jutland
+Horton, Max, British commander
+Hotham, British admiral
+Howard, Thomas, of Effingham
+Howe, British admiral; at First of June
+Hudson, Henry
+Hughes, British admiral
+
+I.
+
+Interior Lines, defined
+Italy, at war with Austria; in World War
+Ito, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu
+
+J.
+
+Jamaica, captured by British
+Janissaries
+Japan, at war with China; at war with Russia
+Jellicoe, British admiral; at Jutland
+Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, British admiral; character of; at Cape
+  St. Vincent
+Jones, Paul, American naval officer
+Juan, _see_ Don Juan
+Jutland, battle of
+
+K.
+
+Kamimura, Japanese admiral
+_Karlsrühe_, German cruiser
+Keith, British admiral
+Kentish Knock, battle of
+Keyes, British naval officer
+Kiao-chau, seized by Germany
+Kiel Canal
+Kitchener, British general
+_Königsberg_, German cruiser
+Korea
+
+L.
+
+Lake, Simon
+La Hogue, battle of
+La Touche Tréville, French admiral
+Lepanto, campaign of; battle of
+Lepidus, Roman general
+Leyden, siege of
+Lowestoft, battle of
+London, Declaration of
+Louis XIV of France
+_Lusitania_, loss of
+
+M.
+
+McGiffin, American naval officer, at the Yalu
+Macdonough, U. S. commodore
+Magellan, Portuguese navigator
+Mahan, American naval officer, quoted; in Spanish-American War
+_Maine_, U. S. battleship
+Makaroff, Russian admiral
+Malta; siege of
+Manila, battle of
+Marathon, battle of
+Mardonius
+Martel, Charles
+Mary Queen of Scots
+Matelieff, de Jonge, Dutch seaman
+Medina Sidonia, Duke of
+_Merrimac_, Confederate ram; in action with _Monitor_
+Milne, British admiral
+Mine barrage, in North Sea
+Missiessy, French admiral
+Mohammed
+Mohammedans, _see_ Arabs
+_Monitor_, U. S. ironclad-292
+Monk, British admiral
+Monroe Doctrine
+Montojo, Spanish admiral
+Moore, British admiral
+Muaviah, Emir of Syria
+Mukden, battle of
+Müller, German naval officer
+Muza, Mohammedan general
+Mycale, battle of
+Mylæ, battle of
+
+N.
+
+Napoleon, quoted; in Italy; in Egypt; plans northern coalition;
+  attempts invasion of England; instructs Villeneuve; adopts
+  continental system
+Naupaktis, battle of
+Navarino, battle of
+Navigation, progress in
+Navigation Acts
+Navy, British, administration of; under Commonwealth; training of
+  officers for; at Restoration; in 18th century; in French
+  Revolutionary Wars; mutiny in; in War of 1812; size of, in World
+  War. _See_ England, Great
+  Britain.
+  French, in 18th century; in French Revolution. _See_ France.
+  United States, in War of 1812; in Civil War; in World War.
+  _See_ United States
+Nebogatoff, Russian admiral
+Nelson, Horatio, British admiral; in Mediterranean; at Cape St.
+  Vincent; at the Nile; at Copenhagen; in the Channel; in Trafalgar
+  campaign and battle
+Netherlands, at war with Hansa; commerce of; at war with Spain; at
+  war with England; in War of American Revolution; in Napoleonic Wars,
+New York, taken by British; held by Howe
+Nicosia, siege of
+Nile, campaign of; battle of
+Nore, mutiny at
+North Sea Mine Barrage, _see_ Mine Barrage
+
+
+O.
+
+Octavius, Roman emperor, at Actium
+Ontario, campaign on Lake
+Open Door Policy
+Oquendo, Spanish naval officer
+Ordnance, early types of; introduced on ships; at Armada;
+  breech-loading; rifled; long range
+_Oregon_, U. S. battleship, cruise of; at Santiago
+
+P.
+
+Panama Canal
+Parker, British Admiral, at Copenhagen-258
+Parma, Duke of
+Peloponnesian War
+Penn, British admiral
+Perry, U. S. Commodore
+Persano, Italian admiral, at Lissa
+Persia, conquers Phœnicia; at war with Greece
+Pharselis, battle of
+Philip II, of Spain
+Phœnicia, commerce and colonies of; at Salamis
+Phormio, Greek admiral
+Platea, battle of
+Port Arthur; given to Japan; seized by Russia; operations around; fall of
+Portland, battle of
+Portsmouth, Treaty of
+Portugal, commerce and colonies of; decline of
+Prevesa, battle of
+Prussia, in Northern Coalition; at war with Austria
+Ptolemy
+
+Q.
+
+"Q-ships"
+Quiberon Bay, battle of
+
+R.
+
+Raleigh, Sir Walter
+Recalde, Spanish naval officer
+Renaissance
+_Revenge_, Drake's flagship; last fight of
+Robeck, British admiral, at Dardanelles
+Rodman, U. S. admiral
+Rodney, British admiral; at Saints' Passage
+Rojdestvensky, Russian admiral, cruise of; at Tsushima
+Rome, in Punic Wars; in Actium campaign; wars of Eastern Empire
+Rooke, British admiral
+Roosevelt, Theodore
+Rosyth, British base
+Rupert, Prince
+Russia, in Napoleonic Wars; in Far East;
+  at war with Japan, in World War
+Ruyter. _See_ De Ruyter
+
+S.
+
+Saint Andrée, Jean Bon
+St. Vincent, battle of Cape
+St. Vincent, Earl of. _See_ Jervis
+Saints' Passage, battle of
+Salamis, battle of; campaign of
+Salonika
+Sampson, U. S. admiral, in Santiago campaign
+San Juan de Ulna, fight at
+Santa Cruz, Spanish admiral
+Santiago, battle of
+Saracens. _See_ Arabs
+Scapa Flow, British base
+Scheer, German admiral, at Jutland
+Scheldt River; battle in; blockaded by Dutch
+Scheveningen, battle of
+Schley, U. S. naval officer, in Santiago campaign
+Schoonevelt, battle of
+Scott, Sir Percy, British admiral
+Sea Beggars
+Sea Power, preserves Greece; England's gains by; in Napoleonic Wars;
+  in World War; influence of; elements of
+Selim the Drunkard, Sultan of Turkey
+Semenoff, Russian naval officer
+Seymour, British admiral, at Armada
+Shafter, U. S. general
+Shimonoseki, Treaty of
+Ships of War, "round" and "long"; trireme; penteconter; liburna;
+  galley; dromon; galleas; junk; Viking craft; galleon; two and
+  three-deckers; steam; submarine; destroyer; battle cruiser;
+  dreadnought
+Sicily; in Punic Wars
+Sims, U. S. admiral
+Sinope, bombardment of
+Sirocco. Turkish admiral
+Sluis, battle of
+Solebay, battle of
+Soliman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey
+Souchon, German admiral
+Spain, at war with Turks; discoveries of; at war with Dutch; at war
+  with England; in Napoleonic Wars; at war with United States
+Spanish Armada
+Sparta. _See_ Greece.
+Spee, German admiral
+Steam navigation, beginnings of
+Sturdee, British admiral
+Submarine, early types of; in World War
+Suez Canal
+Suffren, French admiral
+Syracuse, at war with Athens
+
+T.
+
+Tactics, of galleys; after use of sails and guns; in Dutch wars; in
+  18th century; after use of armor; influenced by Lissa; at Jutland;
+  in submarine warfare
+Takeomi, Japanese naval officer
+Tegetthoff, Austrian admiral, at Lissa
+Teneriffe, attacked by Blake
+Terschelling, raided by English
+Texel, battle of
+Themistocles
+Theophanes
+Thermopylæ, battle of
+Ting, Chinese admiral, at the Yalu
+Tirpitz, German admiral
+Togo, Japanese admiral; at battle of 10th of August; at Tsushima
+Togo, Japanese squadron commander
+Tordesillas, Treaty of
+Torpedoes, origin of name; Whitehead; in Russo-Japanese war,
+Torrington, Earl of. _See_ Herbert
+Toscanelli, Paul
+Toulon, French base
+Tourville, French admiral
+Trafalgar, battle of
+Transport service, in World War
+Triple Alliance
+Tromp, Cornelius, Dutch admiral
+Tromp, Martin, Dutch admiral
+Troubridge, British naval officer
+Tsuboi, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu
+Tsushima, battle of
+Tunis; captured by Spanish; attacked by Blake
+Turkey, rise of; at war with Venice and Spain; in World War
+Tyrwhitt, British naval officer
+
+U.
+
+Ulm, battle of
+Uluch Ali, Turkish leader; in Lepanto campaign
+United States, in American Revolution; in War of 1812; in Civil War;
+  in Spanish-American War; in World War; naval problems of. _See_ Navy
+
+V.
+
+Valdes, Pedro de, Spanish naval officer
+Valdes, Pedrode, Spanish naval officer
+Vandals
+Veniero, Venetian admiral
+_Vengeur du Peuple_, French ship
+Venice, early history of; commerce of; at war with Turks; ships of
+Vikings
+Villaret de Joyeuse, French admiral, at First of June
+Villeneuve, French admiral; at the Nile; in Trafalgar campaign and battle
+Virginia Capes, battle of
+
+W.
+
+Wangenheim, Baron von
+Wei-hai-wei
+William II, German emperor
+William III of England
+William, Prince of Orange
+Wilson, Woodrow, President of United States
+Winter, Dutch admiral
+Witjeft, Russian admiral
+
+X.-Y.-Z.
+
+Xerxes
+"Y-guns"
+Yalu, battle of
+York, Duke of, afterward James II of England
+Zama, battle of
+Zeebrugge, attack on
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF SEA POWER***
+
+
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+<body>
+<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, A History of Sea Power, by William Oliver
+Stevens and Allan Westcott</h1>
+<pre>
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre>
+<p>Title: A History of Sea Power</p>
+<p>Author: William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott</p>
+<p>Release Date: March 10, 2008  [eBook #24797]</p>
+<p>Language: English</p>
+<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p>
+<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF SEA POWER***</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h3>E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall</h3>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full">
+
+<h1>A HISTORY OF SEA POWER</h1>
+
+<p class="sm_center">BY</p>
+
+<p class="author">WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS</p>
+
+<p class="sm_center">AND</p>
+
+<p class="author">ALLAN WESTCOTT</p>
+
+<p class="sm_center">
+PROFESSORS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
+</p>
+
+<p class="sm_center" style="margin: 3em;">
+WITH MAPS, DIAGRAMS,<br>AND ILLUSTRATIONS
+</p>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p class="center">
+NEW YORK<br>
+GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
+</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_v"><span class="page">Page v</span></a>
+PREFACE</h2>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This volume has been called into being by the absence of any brief
+work covering the evolution and influence of sea power from the
+beginnings to the present time. In a survey at once so comprehensive
+and so short, only the high points of naval history can be touched.
+Yet it is the hope of the authors that they have not, for that
+reason, slighted the significance of the story. Naval history is
+more than a sequence of battles. Sea power has always been a vital
+force in the rise and fall of nations and in the evolution of
+civilization. It is this significance, this larger, related point
+of view, which the authors have tried to make clear in recounting
+the story of the sea. In regard to naval principles, also, this
+general survey should reveal those unchanging truths of warfare
+which have been demonstrated from Salamis to Jutland. The tendency
+of our modern era of mechanical development has been to forget the
+value of history. It is true that the 16" gun is a great advance
+over the 32-pounder of Trafalgar, but it is equally true that the
+naval officer of to-day must still sit at the feet of Nelson.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The authors would acknowledge their indebtedness to Professor F.
+Wells Williams of Yale, and to the Classical Departments of Harvard
+and the University of Chicago for valuable aid in bibliography.
+Thanks are due also to Commander C. C. Gill, U. S. N., Captain T. G.
+Frothingam, U. S. N. R., Dr. C. Alphonso Smith, and to colleagues of
+the Department of English at the Naval Academy for helpful criticism.
+As to the "References" at the conclusion of each chapter, it <a
+name="page_vi"><span class="page">Page vi</span></a> should be said
+that they are merely references, not bibliographies. The titles
+are recommended to the reader who may wish to study a period in
+greater detail, and who would prefer a short list to a complete
+bibliography.
+</p>
+
+<p class="bquote">
+<span class="sc">William Oliver Stevens</span><br>
+<span class="sc">Allan Westcott</span>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+United States Naval Academy,<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp; <i>June</i>, 1920.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_vii"><span class="page">Page vii</span></a>
+CONTENTS</h2>
+
+<table>
+ <tr><td class="right"><span class="sc">chapter</span></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">I&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_15"><span class="sc">The
+         Beginnings of Navies</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">II&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Athens as a Sea
+         Power:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td>&nbsp;</td><td style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td>1. <a href="#page_27"><span class="sc">The Persian
+         War</span></a></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td>2. <a href="#page_39"><span class="sc">The Peloponnesian
+         War</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">III&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The Sea Power of
+         Rome:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td>1. <a href="#page_49"><span class="sc">The Punic
+         Wars</span></a></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td>2. <a href="#page_61"><span class="sc">The Imperial
+         Navy</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">IV&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The Navies of the Middle
+         Ages:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_71"><span class="sc">The Eastern
+         Empire</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">V&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The Navies of the Middle
+         Ages</span> [<i>Continued</i>]</td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_87"><span class="sc">Venice and the
+         Turk</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">VI&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Opening the Ocean
+         Routes:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td>1. <a href="#page_110"><span class="sc">Portugal and the New
+         Route to India</span></a></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td>2. <a href="#page_121"><span class="sc">Spain and the New
+         World</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">VII&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Sea Power in the
+         North:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_130"><span class="sc">Holland's Struggle for
+         Independence</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">VIII&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_145"><span class="sc">England and
+         the Armada</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">IX&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Rise of English Sea
+         Power:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_168"><span class="sc">Wars with the
+         Dutch</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">X&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Rise of English Sea
+         Power</span> [<i>continued</i>]:</td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_193"><span class="sc">Wars with France to the
+         French Revolution</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XI&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Napoleonic Wars:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_222"><span class="sc">The First of June and
+         Camperdown</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XII&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Napoleonic Wars</span>
+         [<i>Continued</i>]:</td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_238"><span class="sc">The Rise of
+         Nelson</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XIII&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Napoleonic Wars</span>
+         [<i>Concluded</i>]:</td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_261"><span class="sc">Trafalgar and
+         After</span></a><a name="page_viii"><span class="page">Page
+         viii</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XIV&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">Revolution in Naval
+         Warfare:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_286"><span class="sc">Hampton Roads and
+         Lissa</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XV&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_312"><span class="sc">Rivalry for
+         World Power</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XVI&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The World War:</span></td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_345"><span class="sc">The First
+         Year</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XVII&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The World War</span>
+         [<i>Continued</i>]:</td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_386"><span class="sc">The Battle of
+         Jutland</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XVIII&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><span class="sc">The World War</span>
+         [<i>Concluded</i>]:</td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td><a href="#page_419"><span class="sc">Commerce
+         Warfare</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">XIX&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_441"><span class="sc">
+         Conclusion</span></a></td></tr>
+
+ <tr><td class="right">&nbsp;</td>
+     <td colspan="2"><a href="#page_451"><span class="sc">
+         Index</span></a></td></tr>
+
+</table>
+
+<h2><a name="page_ix"><span class="page">Page ix</span></a>
+MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS</h2>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_16">Egyptian Ship</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_18">Scene of Ancient Sea Power</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_21">Greek War Galley</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_22">Greek Merchant Ship</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_29">Route of Xerxes' Fleet to Battle of Salamis</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_30">Scene of Preliminary Naval Operations, Campaign
+  of Salamis</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_34">The Battle of Salamis, 480 B. C.</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_40">The Athenian Empire at its Height&mdash;About
+  450 B. C.</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_41">Scene of Phormio's Campaign</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_42">Battle of the Corinthian Gulf, 429 B. C.</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_50">Scene of the Punic Wars</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_54">Roman Formation at Ecnomus</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_55">Carthaginian Tactics at the Battle of Ecnomus,
+  256 B. C.</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_58">Points of Interest in the First Punic War</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_65">Scene of Battle of Actium, 31 B. C.</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_73">The Saracen Empire at its Height, About 715 A.
+  D.</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_75">Europe's Eastern Frontier</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_77">Constantinople and Vicinity</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_88">Theater of Operations, Venice and the Turk</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_93">16th Century Galley</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_106">Battle of Lepanto, October 7, 1571</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_111">Cross-Staff</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_113">The Known and Unknown World in 1450</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_114">Portuguese Voyages and Possessions</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_124">Flagship of Columbus</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_126">Chart of A. D. 1589</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_136">The Netherlands in the 16th Century</a>
+  <a name="page_x"><span class="page">Page x</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_147">Galleon</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_159">Cruise of the Spanish Armada</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_160">Original "Eagle" Formation of the Armada</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_161">The Course of the Armada up the Channel</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_171">Scene of the Principal Naval Actions of the 17th
+ Century Between England and Holland and England and France</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_174">The Battle of Portland, February 18, 1653</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_186">The Thames Estuary</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_194">Three-Decked Ship of the Line, 18th Century</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_205">The West Indies</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_208">Scene of the Yorktown Campaign</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_209">Battle of the Virginia Capes, September 5,
+  1781</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_214">Battle of the Saints' Passage, April 12,
+  1782</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_231">Battle of the First of June, 1794</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_235">Battle of Camperdown, October 11, 1797</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_242">Battle of Cape St. Vincent, February 14, 1797</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_244">The Nile Campaign, May-August, 1798</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_249">Coast Map&mdash;From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth
+  of the Nile</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_250">Battle of the Nile</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_256">Battle of Copenhagen</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_264">Position of British and Enemy Ships, March,
+  1805</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_268">Nelson's Pursuit of Villeneuve</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_271">Nelson's Victory</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_274">Battle of Trafalgar, October 21, 1805</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_278">Trafalgar, About 12:30</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_288">Early Ironclads</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_294">Bushnell's Turtle</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_295">Fulton's Nautilus</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_301">Battle of Lissa, July 20, 1866</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_307">Battle of the Yalu, September 17, 1894</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_316">Approaches to Manila</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_318">Battle of Manila, May 1, 1898</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_322">West Indies&mdash;Movements in Santiago
+  Campaign</a>
+  <a name="page_xi"><span class="page">Page xi</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_326">Battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_328">Theater of Operations, Russo-Japanese War</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_333">Harbor of Port Arthur</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_336">Rojdestvensky's Cruise, October 18, 1904-May 27,
+  1905</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_340">Battle of Tsushima, May 27, 1905</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_352">Heligoland Bight Action</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_354">Heligoland Bight Action, Final Phase,
+  12:30-1:40</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_361">Battle of Coronel, November 1, 1914</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_362">Admiral Von Spee's Movements</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_364">Battle of Falkland Islands, December 8,
+  1914</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_368">The Cruise of the Emden, September 1-November
+  9, 1914</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_371">Theater of Operations, in the North Sea</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_372">Dogger Bank Action, January 24, 1915</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_376">The Approaches to Constantinople</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_380">Dardanelles Defenses</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_388">Cruising Formation of the British Battle
+  Fleet</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_389">Beatty's Cruising Formation</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_390">Type of German Battle Cruiser: The
+  Derflinger</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_393">Type of British Battle Cruiser: The Lion</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_395">Battle of Jutland: First Phase</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_399">Type of British Battleship: The Iron Duke</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_400">Battle of Jutland: Second and Third Phases</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_402">Type of German Battleship: the Koenig</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_423">Effects of the Blockade of Germany</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_425">German Barred Zones</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_428">Ocean-Going Types of German Submarines</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_433">Ostend-Zeebrugge Area</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_435">Zeebrugge Harbor with German Defenses and British
+  Blockships</a></p>
+
+<p class="list_sc">
+<a href="#page_436">British, Allied and Neutral Merchant Ships
+  Destroyed by German Raiders, Submarines and Mines</a></p>
+
+<p class="bigtitle">
+<a name="page_13"><span class="page">Page 13</span></a>
+A HISTORY OF SEA POWER</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_15"><span class="page">Page 15</span></a>
+CHAPTER I</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Civilization and sea power arose from the Mediterranean, and the
+progress of recent archeological research has shown that civilizations
+and empires had been reared in the Mediterranean on sea power long
+before the dawn of history. Since the records of Egypt are far
+better preserved than those of any other nation of antiquity, and
+the discovery of the Rosetta stone has made it possible to read
+them, we know most about the beginnings of civilization in Egypt.
+We know, for instance, that an Egyptian king some 2000 years before
+Christ possessed a fleet of 400 fighting ships. But it appears
+now that long before this time the island of Crete was a great
+naval and commercial power, that in the earliest dynasties of Egypt
+Cretan fleets were carrying on a commerce with the Nile valley.
+Indeed, the Cretans may have taught the Egyptians something of the
+art of building sea-going ships for trade and war.[1] At all events,
+Crete may be regarded as the first great sea power of history, an
+island empire like Great Britain to-day, extending its influence
+from Sicily to Palestine and dominating the eastern Mediterranean
+for many centuries. From recent excavations of the ancient capital
+we get an interesting light on the old Greek legends of the Minotaur
+and <a name="page_16"><span class="page">Page 16</span></a> the
+Labyrinth, going back to the time when the island kingdom levied
+tribute, human as well as monetary, on its subject cities throughout
+the &AElig;gean.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: It is interesting to note that the earliest empires,
+Assyria and Egypt, were not naval powers, because they arose in rich
+river valleys abundantly capable of sustaining their inhabitants.
+They did not need to command the sea.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On this sea power Crete reared an astonishingly advanced civilization.
+Until recent times, for instance, the Ph&oelig;nicians had been credited
+with the invention of the alphabet. We know now that 1000 years
+before the Ph&oelig;nicians began to write the Cretans had evolved a
+system of written characters&mdash;as yet undeciphered&mdash;and a
+decimal system for numbers. A correspondingly high stage of excellence
+had been reached in engineering, architecture, and the fine arts,
+and even in decay Crete left to Greece the tradition of mastery
+in laws and government.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 578px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig001.png" width="578" height="248" alt="Fig. 1">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right">From Torr, <i>Ancient Ships</i>.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">EGYPTIAN SHIP</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The power of Crete was already in its decline centuries before the
+Trojan War, but during a thousand years it had spread its own and
+Egyptian culture over the shores of the &AElig;gean. The destruction
+of the island empire in about 1400 B.C. apparently was due to some
+great disaster that destroyed her fleet and left her open to invasion
+by a conquering race&mdash;probably the Greeks&mdash;who ravaged
+her cities by sword and fire. On account of her commanding position
+in the Mediterranean, Crete might again have risen to sea power
+but for the endless civil wars that marked her subsequent history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The successor to Crete as mistress of the sea was Ph&oelig;nicia. The
+Ph&oelig;nicians, oddly enough, were a Semitic people, a <a
+name="page_17"><span class="page">Page 17</span></a> nomadic race
+with no traditions of the sea whatever. When, however, they migrated
+to the coast and settled, they found themselves in a narrow strip
+of coast between a range of mountains and the sea. The city of Tyre
+itself was erected on an island. Consequently these descendants of
+herdsmen were compelled to find their livelihood upon the sea&mdash;as
+were the Venetians and the Dutch in later ages&mdash;and for several
+hundred years they maintained their control of the ocean highways.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Ph&oelig;nicians were not literary, scientific, or artistic; they
+were commercial. Everything they did was with an eye to business.
+They explored the Mediterranean and beyond for the sake of tapping
+new sources of wealth, they planted colonies for the sake of having
+trading posts on their routes, and they developed fighting ships for
+the sake of preserving their trade monopolies. Moreover, Ph&oelig;nicia
+lay at the end of the Asiatic caravan routes. Hence Ph&oelig;nician ships
+received the wealth of the Nile valley and Mesopotamia and distributed
+it along the shores of the Mediterranean. Ph&oelig;nician ships also
+uncovered the wealth of Spain and the North African coast, and,
+venturing into the Atlantic, drew metals from the British Isles.
+According to Herodotus, a Ph&oelig;nician squadron circumnavigated
+Africa at the beginning of the seventh century before Christ,
+completing the voyage in three years. We should know far more now of
+the extent of the explorations made by these master mariners of
+antiquity were it not for the fact that they kept their trade routes
+secret as far as possible in order to preserve their trade monopoly.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In developing and organizing these trade routes the Ph&oelig;nicians
+planted colonies on the islands of the Mediterranean,&mdash;Sicily,
+Sardinia, Corsica, and Malta. They held both shores of the Straits
+of Gibraltar, and on the Atlantic shores of Spain established posts
+at Cadiz and Tarshish, the latter commonly supposed to have been
+situated just north of Cadiz at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River.
+Cadiz was their distributing point for the metals of northern Spain
+and the British Isles. The most famous colony was Carthage, situated
+<a name="page_18"><span class="page">Page 18</span></a> near the
+present city of Tunis. Carthage was founded during the first half
+of the ninth century before Christ, and on the decay of the parent
+state became in turn mistress of the western Mediterranean, holding
+sway until crushed by Rome in the Punic Wars.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the methods of the Ph&oelig;nicians and their colonists in
+establishing trade with primitive peoples, we get an interesting
+picture from Herodotus,[1] who describes how the Carthaginians
+conducted business with barbarous tribes on the northern coast of
+Africa.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">History</span>, translated by Geo.
+Rawlinson, vol. III, p. 144.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 599px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig002.png" width="599" height="313" alt="Fig. 2">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"When they (the Carthaginian traders) arrive, forthwith they unload
+their wares, and having disposed them in orderly fashion on the
+beach, leave them, and returning aboard their ships, raise a great
+smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, came dawn to the shore,
+and laying out to view so much gold as they think the wares to be
+worth, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come
+ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it up and
+go their way; but if it does not seem sufficient they go aboard
+their ships once more and wait patiently. Then the others approach
+and add to the gold till the Carthaginians are satisfied. Neither
+party deals unfairly with the other; for the Carthaginians <a
+name="page_19"><span class="page">Page 19</span></a> never touch
+the gold till it comes up to the estimated value of their goods,
+nor do the natives ever carry off the goads till the gold has been
+taken away."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In addition to the enormous profits of the carrying trade the
+Ph&oelig;nicians had a practical monopoly of the famous "Tyrian dyes,"
+which were in great demand throughout the known world. These dyes were
+obtained from two kinds of shellfish together with an alkali prepared
+from seaweed. Ph&oelig;nicians were also pioneers in the art of making
+glass. It is not hard to understand, therefore, how Ph&oelig;nicia grew
+so extraordinarily rich as to rouse the envy of neighboring rulers,
+and to maintain themselves the traders of Tyre and Sidon had to
+develop fighting fleets as well as trading fleets.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Early in Egyptian history the distinction was made between the
+"round" ships of commerce and the "long" ships of war. The round
+ship, as the name suggests, was built for cargo capacity rather
+than for speed. It depended on sail, with the oars as auxiliaries.
+The long ship was designed for speed, depending on oars and using
+sail only as auxiliary. And while the round ship was of deep draft
+and rode to anchor, the shallow flat-bottomed long ships were drawn
+up on shore. The Ph&oelig;nicians took the Egyptian and Cretan models
+and improved them. They lowered the bows of the fighting ships,
+added to the blunt ram a beak near the water's edge, and strung
+the shields of the fighting men along the bulwarks to protect the
+rowers. To increase the driving force and the speed, they added a
+second and then a third bank of oars, thus producing the "bireme" and
+the "trireme." These were the types they handed down to the Greeks,
+and in fact there was little advance made beyond the Ph&oelig;nician
+war galley during all the subsequent centuries of the Age of the Oar.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+About the beginning of the seventh century before Christ the
+Ph&oelig;nicians had reached the summit of their power on the seas.
+Their extraordinary wealth tempted the king of Assyria, in 725 B.C.,
+to cross the mountain barrier with a great army. He had no difficulty
+in overrunning the country, but the inhabitants fled to their colonies.
+The great city of <a name="page_20"><span class="page">Page
+20</span></a> Tyre, being on an island, defied the invader, and finally
+the Assyrian king gave up and withdrew to his own country. Having
+realized at great cost that he could not subdue the Ph&oelig;nicians
+without a navy, he set about finding one. By means of bribes and threats
+he managed to seduce three Ph&oelig;nician cities to his side. These
+furnished him sixty ships officered by Ph&oelig;nicians, but manned by
+Assyrian crews.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With this fleet an attack was made on Tyre, but such was the contempt
+felt by the Tyrians for their enemy that they held only twelve ships
+for defense. These twelve went out against the sixty, utterly routed
+them, and took 500 prisoners. For five years longer the Assyrian king
+maintained a siege of Tyre from the mainland, attempting to keep the
+city from its source of fresh water, but as the Tyrians had free
+command of the sea, they had no difficulty in getting supplies of all
+kinds from their colonies. At the end of five years the Assyrians again
+returned home, defeated by the Ph&oelig;nician control of the sea.
+When, twenty years later, Ph&oelig;nicia was subjugated by Assyria,
+it was due to the lack of union among the scattered cities and
+colonies of the great sea empire. Widely separated, governed by their
+own princes, the individual colonies had too little sense of loyalty
+for the mother country. Each had its own fleets and its own interests;
+in consequence an Assyrian fleet was able to destroy the Ph&oelig;nician
+fleets in detail. From this point till the rise of Athens as a sea
+power, the fleets of Ph&oelig;nicia still controlled the sea, but they
+served the plans of conquest of alien rulers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As a dependency of Persia, Ph&oelig;nicia enabled Cambyses to conquer
+Egypt. However, when the Ph&oelig;nician fleet was ordered to subjugate
+Carthage, already a strong power in the west, the Ph&oelig;nicians refused
+on the ground of the kinship between Carthage and Ph&oelig;nicia. And
+the help of Ph&oelig;nicia was so essential to the Persian monarch that
+he countermanded the order. Indeed the relation of Ph&oelig;nicia to
+Persia amounted to something more nearly like that of an ally than
+a conquered province, for it was to the interests of Persia to
+keep the Ph&oelig;nicians happy and loyal.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When, in 498 B.C., the Greeks of Asia and the neighboring <a
+name="page_21"><span class="page">Page 21</span></a> islands revolted,
+it was due chiefly to the loyalty of the Ph&oelig;nicians that the Persian
+empire was saved. Thereafter, the Persian yoke was fastened on the
+Asiatic Greeks, and any prospect of a Greek civilization developing
+on the eastern shore of the &AElig;gean was destroyed.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 567px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig003.png" width="567" height="365" alt="Fig. 3">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right">From Torr, <i>Ancient Ships</i>.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">GREEK WAR GALLEY</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But on the western shore lay flourishing Greek cities still independent
+of Persian rule. Moreover, the coastal towns like Corinth and Athens
+were developing considerable power on the sea, and it was evident
+that unless European Greece were subdued it would stand as a barrier
+between Persia and the western Mediterranean. Darius perceived the
+situation and prepared to destroy these Greek states before they
+should become too formidable. The story of this effort, ending at
+Salamis and Platea, and breaking for all time the power of Persia,
+belongs in the subsequent chapter that narrates the rise and fall
+of Athens as a sea power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this point, it is worth pausing to consider in detail the war
+galley which the Ph&oelig;nicians had developed and which they handed
+down to the Greeks at this turning point in the world's history.
+The bireme and the trireme were adopted <a name="page_22"><span
+class="page">Page 22</span></a> by the Greeks, apparently without
+alteration, save that at Salamis the Greek galleys were said to have
+been more strongly built and to have presented a lower freeboard
+than those of the Ph&oelig;nicians. A hundred years later, about 330
+B.C., the Greeks developed the four-banked ship, and Alexander of
+Macedon is said to have maintained on the Euphrates a squadron of
+seven-banked ships. In the following century the Macedonians had
+ships of sixteen banks of oars, and this was probably the limit
+for sea-going ships in antiquity. These multiple banked ships must
+have been most unhandy, for a reversal of policy set in till about
+the beginning of the Christian era the Romans had gone back to
+two-banked ships. In medieval times war galleys reverted to a single
+row of oars on each side, but required four or five men to every
+oar.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 634px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig004.png" width="634" height="426" alt="Fig. 4">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right">From Torr, <i>Ancient Ships</i>.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">GREEK MERCHANT SHIP</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the time of the Persian war the trireme was the standard type of
+warship, as it had been for the hundred years before, and continued to
+be during the hundred years <a name="page_23"><span class="page">Page
+23</span></a> that followed. In fact, the name trireme was used
+loosely for all ships of war whether they had two banks of oars
+or three. But the fleets that fought in the Persian war and in
+the Peloponnesian war were composed of three-banked ships, and
+fortunately we have in the records of the Athenian dockyards accurate
+information as to structural detail.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Athenian trireme was about 150 feet in length with a beam of 20
+feet. The beam was therefore only 2/15 of the length. (A merchant
+ship of the same period was about 180 feet long with a beam of 1/4
+its length.) The trireme was fitted with one mast and square sail,
+the latter being used only when the wind was fair, as auxiliary
+to the oars, especially when it needed to retire from battle. In
+fact, the phrase "hoist the sail" came to be used colloquially
+like our "turn tail" as a term for running away.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The triremes carried two sails, usually made of linen, a larger
+one used in cruising and a smaller one for emergency in battle.
+Before action it was customary to stow the larger sail on shore,
+and the mast itself was lowered to prevent its snapping under the
+shock of ramming.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The forward part of the trireme was constructed with a view to
+effectiveness in ramming. Massive catheads projected far enough to
+rip away the upper works of an enemy, while the bronze beak at the
+waterline drove into her hull. This beak, or ram, was constructed
+of a core of timber heavily sheathed with bronze, presenting three
+teeth. Although the ram was the prime weapon of the ship, it often
+became so badly wrenched in collision as to start the whole forward
+part of the vessel leaking.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The rowers were seated on benches fitted into a rectangular structure
+inside the hull. These benches were so compactly adjusted that
+the naval architects allowed only two feet of freeboard for every
+bank of oars. Thus the Roman quinquiremes of the Punic wars stood
+only about ten feet above water. The covering of this rectangular
+structure formed a sort of hurricane deck, standing about three
+feet above the gangway that ran around the ship at about the level
+of the bulwarks. This gangway and upper deck formed the platform <a
+name="page_24"><span class="page">Page 24</span></a> for the fighting
+men in battle. Sometimes the open space between the hurricane deck
+and the gangway was fenced in with shields or screens to protect the
+rowers of the uppermost bank of oars from the arrows and javelins
+of the enemy.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The complement of a trireme amounted to about 200 men. The captain,
+or "trierarch," commanded implicit obedience. Under him were a
+sailing master, various petty officers, sailors, soldiers or marines,
+and oarsmen.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The trireme expanded in later centuries to the quinquereme: upper
+works were added and a second mast, but in essentials it was the
+same type of war vessel that dominated the Mediterranean for three
+thousand years&mdash;an oar driven craft that attempted to disable
+its enemy by ramming or breaking away the oars. After contact the
+fighting was of a hand to hand character such as prevailed in battles
+on land. These characteristics were as true of the galley of Lepanto
+(1571 A.D.) as of the trireme of Salamis (480 B.C.). Of the three
+cardinal virtues of the fighting ship, mobility, seaworthiness,
+and ability to keep the sea, or cruising radius, the oar-driven
+type possessed only the first. It was fast, it could hold position
+accurately, it could spin about almost on its own axis, but it was
+so frail that it had to run for shelter before a moderate wind
+and sea. In consequence naval operations were limited to the summer
+months. As to its cargo capacity, it was so small that it was unable
+to carry provisions to sustain its own crew for more than a few
+days. As a rule the trireme was beached at night, with the crew
+sleeping on shore, and as far as possible the meals were cooked
+and eaten on shore. In the battle of &AElig;gospotami (405 B.C.),
+for example, the Spartans fell upon the Athenians when their ships
+were drawn up on the beach and the crews were cooking their dinner.
+Moreover, the factors of speed and distance were both limited by
+the physical fatigue of the oarsmen. In the language of to-day,
+therefore, the oar-driven man-of-war had a small "cruising radius."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This dependence on the land and this sensitiveness to weather are
+important facts in ancient naval history. It is fair to say that
+storms did far more to destroy fleets and naval <a name="page_25"><span
+class="page">Page 25</span></a> expeditions than battles during
+the entire age of the oar. The opposite extreme was reached in
+Nelson's day. His lumbering ships of the line made wretched speed
+and straggling formations, but they were able to weather a hurricane
+and to keep the sea for an indefinite length of time.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As a final word on the beginnings of navies, emphasis should be
+laid on the enormous importance of these early mariners, such as
+the Cretans and the Ph&oelig;nicians, as builders of civilization. The
+venturesome explorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port
+not only opened up a new source of wealth but also established a
+reciprocal relation that quickened civilization at both ends of
+his route. The cargo ships that left the Nile delta distributed the
+arts of Egypt as well as its wheat, and the richest civilization of
+the ancient world, that of Greece, rose on foundation stones brought
+from Egypt, Assyria, and Ph&oelig;nicia. It may be said of Ph&oelig;nicia
+herself that she built-up her advanced culture on ideas borrowed almost
+wholly from her customers. But control of the seas for trade involved
+control of the seas for war, and behind the merchantman stood the
+trireme. It is significant and appropriate that a Ph&oelig;nician coin
+that has come down to us bears the relief of a ship of war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In contrast with these early sea explorers and sea fighters stand
+the peoples of China and India. Having reached a high state of
+culture at an early period, they nevertheless, sought no contact
+with the world outside and became stagnant for thousands of years.
+Indeed, among the Hindus the crossing of the sea was a crime to be
+expiated only by the most agonizing penance. Hence these peoples
+of Asia, the most numerous in the world, exercised no influence
+on the development of civilization compared with a mere handful
+of people in Crete or the island city of Tyre. And for the same
+reason China and India ceased to progress and became for centuries
+mere backwaters of history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is worth noting also that the Mediterranean, leading westwards
+from the early developed nations of Asia Minor and Egypt, opened
+a westward course to the advance of discovery and colonization,
+and this trend continued as the Pillars of <a name="page_26"><span
+class="page">Page 26</span></a> Hercules led to the Atlantic and
+eventually to the new world. For every nation that bordered the
+Mediterranean illimitable highways opened out for expansion, provided
+it possessed the stamina and the skill to win them. And in those days
+they were practically the only highways. Frail as the early ships
+were and great as were the perils they had to face, communications
+by water were far centuries faster and safer than communications
+by land. Hence civilization followed the path of the sea. Even in
+these early beginnings it is easy to see that sea-borne commerce
+leads to the founding of colonies and the formation of an empire
+whose parts are linked together by trade routes, and finally, that
+the preservation of such an empire depends an the naval control
+of sea. This was as true of Crete and Ph&oelig;nicia as it was later
+true of Venice, Holland, and England.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Sea Kings of Crete</span>, J. Baikie, 1910.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Ph&oelig;nicia</span>, Story of the Nations Series,
+  George Rawlinson, 1895.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Sailing Ship</span>, E. Keble Chatterton, 1909.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Ships and Their Ways of Other Days</span>, E. Keble
+  Chatterton, 1913.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Ancient Ships</span>, Cecil Torr, 1894.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Archeologie Navale</span>, Auguste Jal, 1840.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Prehistoric Naval Architecture of the North of
+  Europe</span>, G. H. Buhmer, in Report of the U. S. National Museum,
+  1893. This article contains a complete bibliography on the subject
+  of ancient ships.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Sea Power and Freedom</span> (chap. 2), Gerard Fiennes,
+  1918.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_27"><span class="page">Page 27</span></a>
+CHAPTER II</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">ATHENS AS A SEA POWER</p>
+
+<p class="center">1. THE PERSIAN WAR</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In determining to crush the independence of the Greek cities of
+the west, Darius was influenced not only by the desire to destroy
+a dangerous rival on the sea and an obstacle to further advances
+by the Persian empire, but also to tighten his hold on the Greek
+colonies of Asia Minor. Helped by the Ph&oelig;nician fleet and the
+treachery of the Lesbians and Samians, he had succeeded in putting
+down a formidable rebellion in 500 B.C. In this rebellion the Asiatic
+Greeks had received help from their Athenian brethren on the other
+side of the &AElig;gean; indeed just so long as Greek independence
+flourished anywhere there would always be the threat of revolt
+in the Greek colonies of Persia. Darius perceived rightly that
+the prestige and the future power of his empire depended on his
+conquering Greece.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 492 he dispatched Mardonius with an army of invasion to subdue
+Attica and Eretria, and at the same time sent forth a great fleet
+to conquer the independent island communities of the &AElig;gean.
+Mardonius succeeded in overcoming the tribes of Thrace and Macedonia,
+but the fleet, after taking the island of Thasus, was struck by a
+storm that wrecked three hundred triremes with a loss of 20,000
+lives. As the broken remnants of the fleet returned to Asia, leaving
+Mardonius with no sea communications, and harassed by increasing
+opposition, he was compelled to retreat also. In 490 Darius sent out
+another army under Mardonius, this time embarking it on a fleet of
+600 triremes which succeeded in arriving safely at the coast of Attica
+in the bay of Marathon. While the army was <a name="page_28"><span
+class="page">Page 28</span></a> disembarking it was attacked by
+Miltiades and utterly defeated. The second expedition, therefore,
+came to nothing. But Marathon can hardly be called a decisive battle
+because it merely postponed the invasion; it affected in no way
+the communications of the Persians and it did not weaken seriously
+their military resources.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The great savior of Greece at this crisis was the Athenian,
+Themistocles. He foresaw the renewed efforts of the Persian king
+to destroy Greece, and realized also that the most vital point in
+the coming conflict would be the control of the sea. Accordingly
+he urged upon the Athenians the necessity of building a powerful
+fleet. In this policy he was aided by one of those futile wars
+so characteristic of Greek history, a war between Athens and the
+island of &AElig;gina. In order to overcome the &AElig;ginetans,
+who had a large fleet, the Athenians were compelled to build a
+larger one, and by the time this purpose was accomplished rumors
+came that the Persian king was getting ready another invasion of
+Greece.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Campaign of Salamis</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The third attempt was undertaken ten years after the second, in
+the year 480, under Xerxes, the successor to Darius. This time the
+very immensity of the forces employed was to overcome all opposition
+and all misfortunes. An army, variously estimated at from one to
+five million men, crossed the Hellespont on a bridge of boats to
+invade the peninsula from the north, while a fleet of 1200 triremes
+was assembled to insure the command of the sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Against the unlimited resources of the Persian empire and the unity
+of plan represented by Xerxes and his generals, the Greeks had
+little to offer. They possessed the two advantages of the defensive,
+knowledge of the terrain and interior lines,[1] but their resources
+were small and their spirit divided. <a name="page_29"><span
+class="page">Page 29</span></a> Greece in those days was, as was
+later said of Italy, "merely a geographical expression." The various
+cities were mutually jealous and hostile, and it took a great common
+danger to bring them even into a semblance of co&ouml;peration.
+Even during this desperate crisis the cities of western Greece,
+counting themselves reasonably safe from invasion, declined to
+send a ship or a man for the common cause.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: "'Interior Lines' conveys the meaning that from a
+central position one can assemble more rapidly on either of two
+opposite fronts than the enemy can, and therefore utilize force
+more effectively." NAVAL STRATEGY, A. T. Mahan, p. 32.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 601px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig005.png" width="601" height="432" alt="Fig. 5">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">ROUTE OF XERXES' FLEET TO BATTLE OF
+  SALAMIS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Persian army advanced without opposition as far as the pass
+of Thermopyl&aelig;, which guarded the only road into the rest
+of Greece. Twelve days after the army had started on its march
+the great fleet crossed the &AElig;gean to establish contact with
+the army and bring supplies. The army was checked by the valor of
+Leonidas, and the Persian fleet was intercepted by a Greek fleet
+which stood guard over the channel leading to the Gulf of Lamia,
+thus protecting the sea flank of Leonidas. The Persian fleet, after
+crossing the open sea safely, made its base at Sepias preparatory
+to the attack on the Greek fleet. The latter numbered only about
+<a name="page_30"><span class="page">Page 30</span></a> 380 vessels
+to some 1200 of their enemy and the prospects for the Persian cause
+looked bright indeed. But as the very number of the Persian ships made
+it impossible to beach all of them for the night a large proportion
+of them were anchored, lying in eight lines, prows toward the sea.
+At dawn a northeast gale fell upon them, and, according to the
+Greek accounts, wrecked 400 triremes, together with an uncounted
+number of transports. Meanwhile the Greek ships had taken refuge
+under the lee of the island of Eub&oelig;a, and the news of the
+Persian disaster was signaled to them by the watchers on the heights.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 446px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig006.png" width="446" height="372" alt="Fig. 6">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF PRELIMINARY NAVAL OPERATIONS,
+ CAMPAIGN OF SALAMIS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As soon as the weather moderated the Greeks returned to their position
+in the straits near Artemisium, and during the next three days the
+two fleets fought stubbornly but without advantage to either side.
+During the second day a southerly gale caught a flying squadron
+of some 200 triremes, that had been dispatched round the island of
+Eub&oelig;a to catch the Greeks in the rear, and not one of the Persian
+ships survived. The Greek rear guard squadron of fifty brought
+the welcome news to the main fleet and served as a much needed <a
+name="page_31"><span class="page">Page 31</span></a> re&euml;nforcement.
+Although the Persian armada had lost about half its force in three
+days by storms, the odds were still so heavily against the Greeks
+that they found themselves in constant peril of having their flanks
+turned in this open sea fighting.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the afternoon of the third day the pass of Thermopy&aelig; was
+forced, thanks to the treachery of a Greek and the contemptible
+policy of the Spartan government which steadily refused the plea
+of Leonidas for re&euml;nforcements. With Thermopy&aelig; taken
+there was no further reason for the Greek fleet to try to hold the
+straits north of Eub&oelig;a, and during the night it retired
+unobserved. The following day the Persian fleet advanced and brought
+to the army the supplies which it sorely needed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With the fall of Thermopy&aelig; and the contact established between
+his army and his fleet, Xerxes found his route open for the invasion
+of Attica. Since there was no possibility of opposing him on land,
+the population of the province was removed and Athens left to its
+fate. Themistocles, who was in command of the Athenian division of
+the Greek fleet, now urged the assembling of the fleet at Salamis,
+partly to cover the withdrawal of the Athenians and partly to assist
+in the defense of the Isthmus of Corinth, which was to be the next
+stand of the Greeks. The advice was adopted and the fleet assembled
+off the town of Salamis. Athenian refugees had crowded into the town
+and from the heights above they watched the smoke of their burning
+city. Their own future and the future of Athenian civilization hung
+on the long lines of triremes drawn up on the shore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A glance at the map of the region of Salamis shows the advantages
+offered by the position for the defensive. The fighting off Artemisium
+had shown the peril of attacking a greatly superior force in the open
+because of the danger of being outflanked. In the narrow straits
+between Salamis and the mainland the Greek line of battle would
+rest its flanks on the opposite shores. But it is one thing to
+choose a position and another to get the enemy to accept battle in
+that position. If the Persians ignored the Greek fleet and moved
+<a name="page_32"><span class="page">Page 32</span></a> to the
+Isthmus, the Greeks would be caught in an awkward predicament. To
+regain touch with the Greek army, the fleet would be then compelled
+to come out of the straits and fight at a disadvantage in the open.
+There was only one chance of defeating the Persian fleet and that
+was to make it fight in the narrow waters of the strait where numbers
+would not count so heavily. Everything depended on bringing this
+to pass.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nor could the Greeks wait indefinitely for the Persians. Already
+the incorrigible jealousies of rival cities had almost reached the
+point of disintegrating the fleet. Although the commander in chief
+was the Spartan general Eurybiades, the whole Spartan contingent
+was on the point of deserting in a body to its own coasts. The
+situation was saved by Themistocles. Having wrung from his allies
+a reluctant consent to stop at Salamis temporarily to cover the
+withdrawal of the Athenian populace, the story is that he secretly
+dispatched a messenger to Xerxes to say that if he would attack
+at once he could crush the entire naval forces of the Greeks at a
+blow, but if he delayed the Greeks would scatter. Acting on this
+advice, Xerxes landed troops on the island of Psyttaleia, dispatched
+a squadron to block the western outlet of Salamis Straits, and
+proceeded to move the main body of his fleet to attack the Greeks
+by way of the eastern channel. The preparations were made during
+the night and were not completed till dawn of the day of battle,
+September 20, 480 B.C.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The debates in the allied fleet came to an end with the appearance
+of the Persians. The shrewd plan of Themistocles had succeeded.
+The Greeks would have to fight with their backs to the wall, but
+they would fight with better chance of success than under any other
+circumstances.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Greek force consisted of about 380 vessels. Of these, Athens
+contributed 180, Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnesus were
+represented by 89 and the remainder were made up of squadrons from
+the island states. Some of these island contingents contained a
+type of ship different from the triremes, the penteconter. This
+was a galley with only one bank of <a name="page_33"><span
+class="page">Page 33</span></a> oars, but these were long sweeps,
+each manned by five oarsmen. The penteconter was an early prototype
+of the galley of the Christian era.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Persians had been reduced by this time to about 600 ships,
+although there had been numerous re&euml;nforcements since the
+disaster at Cape Sepias. The fleet was "Persian" only in name,
+for, except for bands of Persian archers on some of the ships, it
+was composed of elements levied from each of the subject nations
+that followed the sea. Indeed Persia is a curious example in history
+of a nation with a purely artificial sea power, for its navy was
+composed of aliens entirely. Thus the squadron that was sent to
+blockade the western end of the straits was Egyptian, the right
+wing of the fleet as it advanced to the attack was composed of
+Ph&oelig;nicians, and the center and left was made up of Cyprians,
+Cilicians, Samothracians, and Ionians, the latter only recently in
+rebellion against Persia and at that time welcoming help from Athens
+in a cause in which Athens herself was now involved. Apparently
+there was no compunction felt on this account, for the Ionians
+distinguished themselves by gallant fighting against their Greek
+brethren. Nevertheless, it is not hard to imagine difficulties
+involved in the task of making a unit of such an assortment of
+peoples. The fleet was commanded by a Persian, Prince Ariabignes,
+brother of Xerxes.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At daybreak the Persian triremes drew up in three lines on each
+side of the island of Psyttaleia and advanced into the straits.
+But the narrowing waters of the channel made it necessary to reduce
+the front and bear to the left. Consequently all formation was
+lost, and the Persian triremes poured into the narrows "in a
+stream,"&mdash;to quote the phrase of the tragedian &AElig;schylus,
+who fought on an Athenian trireme in this battle and describes it
+in one of his plays.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Facing the invader was a smaller array of ships but a better ordered
+line of battle. On the Greek left was the Athenian division opposing
+the advancing triremes of Ph&oelig;nicia; on the right was the Spartan
+division facing the Greeks of Asia Minor. The two fleets rushed toward
+each other, but just before contact the Persians found themselves
+embarrassed <a name="page_34"><span class="page">Page 34</span></a>
+by their very number of ships. As may be seen by the map, they had
+an awkward turn to make in entering the narrows. At this point,
+just opposite the peninsula of Salamis, the straits are only about
+2000 yards wide, making it impossible for more than 80 or 90 triremes
+to advance abreast. As a result the Ph&oelig;nician wing of the line
+was extended considerably in advance of the rest, forced ahead
+by the pressure of ships behind. Although, as a matter of fact,
+the Spartan wing also was somewhat in advance of the rest of the
+Greek line, the first shock of battle came between the Ph&oelig;nicians
+and the Athenians.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 637px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig007.png" width="637" height="416" alt="Fig. 7">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right">After Grundy, <i>The Great Persian
+ War.</i></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, 480 B. C.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">
+ <table><tr><td class="left"><ol>
+  <li>The Original Position</li>
+  <li>The Advance</li>
+  <li>The Contact</li>
+ </ol></td></tr></table>
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This initial advantage offered by an exposed wing was immediately
+seized upon. While the Athenians bore the frontal attack, the
+&AElig;ginetans on their right fell upon the Ph&oelig;nicians' flank.
+This double attack on the Persian right wing eventually proved
+the turning point of the battle. The Ph&oelig;nicians, however, had the
+reputation of being the foremost sea <a name="page_35"><span
+class="page">Page 35</span></a> fighters in the world, and they
+bore themselves well. Similarly the Asiatic Greeks proved themselves
+foemen worthy of their brethren from the Peloponnesus, and the
+fight was maintained with great ferocity all along the line. The
+inhabitants of Athens who had been removed to Salamis blackened
+the shores on one side of the Strait, as anxious watchers of the
+tremendous spectacle. Opposite them on the slope of Mt. &AElig;galeos
+sat Xerxes himself, surrounded by his staff, a less anxious spectator
+but no less interested in the outcome.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+About seven o'clock a fresh westerly wind arose, as it does at
+this day in that region, and as it did some years later during a
+battle won by an Athenian admiral in the Gulf of Corinth.[1] This
+wind blows every morning with considerable violence for about two
+hours; and in this battle it must have tended to make the bows of
+the Persian ships pay off&mdash;thus exposing their sides to the
+Greek rams&mdash;and drift back upon the galleys that were crowding
+forward from the rear in the attempt to get into the battle.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: The Battle of the Corinthian Gulf: v. p. 43]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Greeks pressed their advantage, using their rams to sink an
+adversary or disable her by cutting away her oars. Where the
+m&ecirc;l&eacute;e was too close for such tactics they tried to
+take their enemy by boarding. On every Greek trireme was a specially
+organized boarding party consisting of 36 men&mdash;18 marines, 14
+heavily armed soldiers, and four bowmen; and the Greeks seem to
+have been superior to their enemy at close quarters. On the Persian
+side the superiority lay in their archers and javelin throwers.
+Toward the end of the battle, for instance, a Samothracian trireme
+performed a remarkable feat. Having been disabled by an &AElig;ginetan
+ship, the Samothracian cleared the decks of her assailant with
+arrows and javelins and took possession. Although the invaders
+seem to have fought with the greatest courage and determination,
+the disadvantage of confusion at the outset of the battle, augmented
+by the head wind, told decisively against them. They were unable
+to take advantage of their superiority in ships on account of the
+narrowness of the channel, <a name="page_36"><span class="page">Page
+36</span></a> and indeed found that the very multitude of their
+ships only added to their difficulties.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The retreat began with the flower of the Persian fleet, the
+Ph&oelig;nician division. Caught at the opening of the battle with
+the Athenians in front and the &AElig;ginetans on the left flank,
+they were never able to extricate themselves, although they fought
+stubbornly. The foremost ships, many in a disabled condition, began
+to retreat; others backed water to make way for them; the rearmost
+finding it impossible to reach the battle at all, withdrew out of the
+straits; and soon the retreat became general. As the Ph&oelig;nicians
+withdrew, the Athenians and the &AElig;ginetans fell upon the center
+of the Persian line, and the rout became general with the Greeks in
+full pursuit. The latter pressed their enemy as far as the island of
+Psyttaleia, thus cutting off the Persian force on the island from
+their communications. Whereupon Aristides, the Athenian, led a
+force in boats from Salamis to the island and put to death every
+man of the Persian garrison. The Persian ships fled to their base
+at Phaleron, while the Greeks returned to their base at Salamis.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The battle of Salamis was won, but at the moment neither side realized
+its decisive character. The Greeks had lost 40 ships; the Persians
+had lost over 200 sunk, and an indeterminate number captured.
+Nevertheless, the latter could probably have mustered a considerable
+force for another attack&mdash;which the Greeks expected&mdash;if their
+morale had not been so badly shaken. Their commander, Ariabignes, was
+among the killed, and there was no one else capable of reorganizing
+the shattered forces. Xerxes, fearing for the safety of his bridge
+over the Hellespont, gave orders for his ships to retire thither to
+protect it, and the very night after the battle found the remains
+of the Persian fleet in full flight across the &AElig;gean.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The news reached the Greeks at noon of the following day and they
+set out in pursuit, but having gone as far as Andros without coming
+up with the enemy, they paused for a council of war. The Athenians
+urged the policy of going on and destroying the bridge over the
+Hellespont, but they were <a name="page_37"><span class="page">Page
+37</span></a> voted down by their allies, who preferred to leave
+well enough alone.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is customary to speak of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis
+as due to their superior physique and fighting qualities. This
+superiority may be claimed for the Greek soldiers at Marathon and
+Plat&aelig;, where the Persian army was actually Persian. The Asiatic
+soldier, forced into service and flogged into battle, was indeed
+no match for the virile and warlike Greek. But at Salamis it was
+literally a case of Greek meeting Greek, except in the case of
+the Ph&oelig;nicians&mdash;who had the reputation of being the finest
+seafighters in the world&mdash;and it is not easy to see how the
+battle was won by sheer physical prowess. There is no evidence to
+show any lack of either courage or fighting ability on the Persian
+side. The decisive feature of the battle was the fatal exposure
+of the Ph&oelig;nician wing at the very outset. However, it is worth
+noting that the invaders had been maneuvering all night and were
+tired&mdash;especially the oarsmen&mdash;when called upon to enter
+battle against an enemy that was fresh. In that respect there was
+undoubtedly some advantage to the Greeks, but it can hardly have
+been of prime importance.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The immediate results of the victory at Salamis were soon apparent.
+The all-conquering Persian army suddenly found itself in a critical
+situation. Cut off from its supplies by sea, it had to retreat or
+starve, for the country which it occupied was incapable of furnishing
+supplies for a host so enormous. Xerxes left an army of occupation
+in Thessaly consisting of 300,000 men under Mardonius, but the
+rest were ordered to get back to Persia as best they could. A
+panic-stricken rout to the Hellespont began, and for the next
+forty-five days a great host, that had never been even opposed in
+battle, went to pieces under famine, disease, and the guerilla warfare
+of the inhabitants of the country it traversed, and it was only a
+broken and demoralized remnant of the great army that survived to
+see the Hellespont. This great military disaster was due entirely
+to the fact that Salamis had deprived Xerxes of the command of
+the sea. Indeed, if the advice of Themistodes had been taken and
+the Greek fleet had proceeded to the <a name="page_38"><span
+class="page">Page 38</span></a> Hellespont and held the position,
+not even a remnant of the retreating army would have survived. It
+happened that the bridge had been carried away by storms and the
+army had to be ferried over by the ships of the beaten and demoralized
+Persian fleet, an operation which would have been impossible in
+the face of the victorious Greeks.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Xerxes still held to the idea of conquering Greece; but the chance
+was gone. Mardonius, it is true, remained in Thessaly with an army,
+but it was no longer an army of millions. The Greeks assembled an
+army of about 100,000 men and in the battle of Plat&aelig;a the
+following year utterly defeated it. On the same day the Greeks
+destroyed what was left of the Persian fleet in the battle of Mycale,
+on the coast of Asia Minor. This, strictly speaking, was not a
+naval battle at all, for the Persians had drawn their ships up on
+shore and built a stockade around them. The Greeks landed their
+crews, took the stockade by storm and burnt the ships. These later
+victories were the direct consequences of the earlier victory of
+Salamis.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Another phase of the Persian plan of conquering the Greeks must not
+be overlooked. Xerxes had stirred up Carthage to undertake a naval
+and military expedition against the Greeks of Sicily, in order that
+all the independent Greek states might be crushed simultaneously.
+Again the weather came to the rescue, for the greater part of the
+Carthaginian fleet was wrecked by storms. The survivors of the
+expedition laid siege to the city of Himera, but were eventually
+driven back to their ships in rout with the loss of their general.
+Thus the Greek civilization of Sicily was saved at the same time
+as that of Athens.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+East and west, therefore, the grandiose plan of the Persian despot
+fell in ruin, and with it fell the prestige and the power of the
+empire. The Ionians revolted and joined Athens as allies, and the
+control of the &AElig;gean passed from Persia to Athens. With this
+loss of sea power began the decline of Persia as a world power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The significance of this astounding defeat of the greatest military and
+naval power of the time lies in the fact that <a name="page_39"><span
+class="page">Page 39</span></a> European, or more particularly
+Greek, civilization was spared to develop its own individuality.
+Had Xerxes succeeded, the paralyzing r&eacute;gime of an Asiatic
+despotism would have stifled the genius of the Greek people.
+Self-government would never have had its beginnings in Greece, and a
+subjugated Athens would never have produced the "Age of Pericles."
+In the two generations following Salamis, Athens made a greater
+original contribution to literature, philosophy, science, and art
+than any other nation in any two centuries of its existence.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For the fact that this priceless heritage was left to later ages
+the world is indebted chiefly to the Greeks who fought at Salamis.
+The night before that battle the cause of Greece seemed doomed
+beyond hope. The day after, the invaders began a retreat that ended
+forever their hopes of conquest. This amazing change of fortune was
+due to the fact that the success of the Persian invasion depended
+on the control of the sea. Hence the Greeks, though unable to muster
+an army large enough to meet the Persian host on land, defeated
+it disastrously by winning a victory on the sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+2. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After Salamis, Athens rose to a commanding position among the Greek
+states. Her period of supremacy was brief, lasting less than 75
+years, but while it endured it rested on her triremes. In the middle
+of the fifth century she had 100,000 men in her navy, practically
+as many as Great Britain in her fleet before 1914. Although the
+period of Athenian supremacy was short-lived, it is interesting
+because it produced a great naval genius, Phormio, and because
+it wrecked itself as Persian sea power had done, in an attempt at
+foreign conquest.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Scarcely had the Persian invasion come to an end when bickering broke
+out among the various Greek states, much of it directed against Athens.
+She had small difficulty, however, in maintaining her ascendancy in
+northern Greece on account of her superiority on the sea, and it
+was during the half century after Salamis that Athens arose to her
+splendid <a name="page_40"><span class="page">Page 40</span></a>
+climax as the intellectual and artistic center of the world.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 602px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig008.png" width="602" height="429" alt="Fig. 8">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right">After Shepherd's <i>Historical
+  Atlas.</i></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT&mdash;ABOUT
+  450 B.C.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 431 began the Peloponnesian War. Its immediate cause was the
+help given by Athens to Corcyra (Corfu) in a war against Corinth.
+Corinth called on Sparta for help, and in consequence northern and
+southern Greece were locked in a mortal struggle. The Athenians
+had a naval base at Naupaktis on the Gulf of Corinth, and in 429,
+two years after war broke out, the Athenian Phormio found himself
+supplied with only twenty triremes with which to maintain control
+of that important waterway. At the same time Sparta was setting in
+motion a large land and water expedition with the object of sweeping
+Athenian influence from all of western Greece and of obtaining
+control of the Gulf of Corinth. A fleet from Corinth was to join
+another at Leukas, one of the Ionian Islands, and then proceed to
+operate on the northern coast of the gulf while an army invaded
+the province.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 604px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig009.png" width="604" height="281" alt="Fig. 9">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF PHORMIO'S CAMPAIGNS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As it happened, the army moved off without waiting for <a
+name="page_41"><span class="page">Page 41</span></a> the
+co&ouml;peration of the fleet and eventually went to pieces in an
+ineffectual siege of an inland city. When the fleet started out
+from Corinth it numbered 47 triremes. As this was more than twice
+the number possessed by Phormio, the Corinthian admiral evidently
+counted on being secure from attack. Accordingly he used some of his
+triremes as transports and started on his journey without taking
+the precaution to train his oarsmen or practice maneuvers. But
+as he skirted along the southern coast he was surprised to see
+the Athenian ships moving in a parallel course as if on the alert
+for an opportunity to attack. When the Corinthian ships bore up
+from Patr&aelig; to cross to the &AElig;tolian shore, the Athenian
+column steered directly toward them. At this threat the Corinthian
+fleet turned away and put in at Rhium, a point near the narrowest
+part of the strait, in order to make the crossing under cover of
+night. The Corinthian admiral made the same fatal mistake committed
+by the commander of the Spanish Armada 2000 years later in a similar
+undertaking, that of trying to avoid an enemy on the sea rather than
+fight him before carrying out an invasion of the enemy's coast.
+This ignominious conduct on the part of the Corinthian admiral was
+partly due to the fact that he was encumbered with his transports,
+but chiefly to the fact that he knew that in fighting qualities
+his <a name="page_42"><span class="page">Page 42</span></a> men
+were no match for the Athenians. The latter had no peers on the
+sea at that time. Since Salamis they had progressed far in naval
+science and efficiency and were filled with the confidence that
+comes from knowledge and experience.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 385px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig010.png" width="385" height="384" alt="Fig. 10">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF, 429 B.
+  C.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Corinthian Formation and Circling Tactics
+  of Phormio.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+All night Phormio watched his enemy and at dawn surprised him in
+mid-crossing. On seeing Phormio advance to the attack, the Corinthian
+drew up his squadron in a defensive position, ranging his vessels
+in concentric circles, bows outward, like the spokes of a wheel.
+In the center of this formation he placed his transports, together
+with five of his largest triremes to assist at any threatened spot.
+The formation suggests a leader of infantry rather than an admiral;
+moreover, it revealed a fatal readiness to give up the offensive
+to an enemy force less than half his own.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At any rate there was no lack of decision on the part of Phormio. He
+advanced rapidly in line ahead formation, closed in near the enemy's
+prows as if he intended to strike at any moment and circled round
+the line. The Corinthian <a name="page_43"><span class="page">Page
+43</span></a> triremes, having no headway and manned by inexperienced
+rowers, began crowding back on one another as they tried to keep
+in position for the expected attack. Then the same early morning
+wind that had embarrassed the Persian ships at Salamis sprang up
+and added to the confusion of fouling ships and clashing oar blades.
+Choosing his opening, Phormio flew the signal for attack and rammed
+one of the flagships of the Corinthian fleet. The Athenians fell
+upon their enemy and almost at the first blow routed the entire
+Corinthian force. In addition to those triremes that were sunk
+outright, twelve remained as prizes with their full complement
+of crews, and the rest scattered in flight. Phormio returned in
+triumph to Naupaktis with the loss of scarcely a man.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+So humiliating a defeat had to be avenged, and Sparta organized
+a new expedition. This time a fleet of 77 triremes was collected.
+Meanwhile Phormio had sent to Athens the news of his victory together
+with an urgent plea for re&euml;nforcements. Unfortunately the great
+Pericles was dying and the government had fallen into weak and
+unscrupulous hands. Consequently while 20 triremes were ordered to
+the support of Phormio, political intrigue succeeded in diverting
+this squadron to carry out a futile expedition to Crete, and Phormio
+was left to contest the control of the gulf against a fleet of 77
+with nothing more than his original twenty.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is interesting to observe what strategy Phormio adopted in this
+difficult situation. In the campaign of Salamis, Themistocles chose
+the narrow waters of the strait as the safest position for a fleet
+outnumbered by the enemy, because of the protection offered to the
+flanks by the opposite shores. But Phormio, commanding a fleet about
+one-fourth that of his adversary, chose the open sea. Apparently
+his decision was based on the fact that the superiority of the
+Athenian ship lay in its greater speed and skill in maneuvering.
+Unable to cope with his adversary in full force, he might by his
+superior mobility beat him in detail. Accordingly, he boldly took
+the open sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For about a week the two fleets lay within sight of each <a
+name="page_44"><span class="page">Page 44</span></a> other, with
+Phormio trying to draw his enemy out of the narrows into open water
+and his adversary attempting to crowd him into a corner against
+the share. Finally the Peloponnesian, realizing that Phormio would
+have to defend his base, and hoping to force him to fight at a
+disadvantage, moved upon Naupaktis. As this port was undefended,
+Phormio was compelled to return thither.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Peloponnesian fleet advanced in line of four abreast with the
+Spartan admiral and the twenty Spartan triremes&mdash;the best in
+the fleet&mdash;in the lead. At the signal from the admiral the
+column swung "left into line" and bore down in line abreast upon the
+Athenians who were ranging along the shore in line ahead. The object
+of the maneuver was to cut the Athenians off from the port and crowd
+them upon the shore. The latter, however, developed such a burst of
+speed that eleven of the twenty succeeded in reaching Naupaktis;
+the remaining nine drove ashore and their crews escaped. Apparently
+the victory of the Spartan was as complete as it was easy. But while
+the rest of the fleet busied itself with the deserted Athenian
+triremes on the share, the Spartan squadron continued in the pursuit
+of the eleven Athenian ships that were heading for Naupaktis. Ten
+of the eleven reached port and drew up in a position of defense.
+The eleventh, less speedy than the rest, was being overhauled by
+the Spartan flagship which was pushing the pursuit far in advance
+of the rest of the squadron. The captain of the Athenian ship, seeing
+this situation, determined on a bold stroke. Instead of pushing on
+into the harbor he pulled round a merchant ship that lay anchored
+at the mouth, and rammed his pursuer amidships, disabling her at
+a blow. The Spartan admiral promptly killed himself and the rest
+of the ship's company were too panic stricken to resist.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this disaster the rest of the Spartan squadron hesitated, dropped
+oars or ran into shallow water. Seeing his opportunity, Phormio
+dashed out of the harbor with his ten triremes and fell upon the
+Spartans. In spite of the ridiculous disparity of forces, this
+handful of Athenian ships pressed their attack so gallantly that
+they destroyed the Spartan <a name="page_45"><span class="page">Page
+45</span></a> advance wing and then, catching the rest of the fleet
+in disorder, routed the main body as well. By nightfall Phormio
+had rescued eight of the nine Athenian triremes that had fallen
+into the hands of the enemy and sent the scattered remnants of the
+Peloponnesian fleet in full flight towards Corinth. This battle
+of Naupaktis remains one of the most brilliant naval victories in
+history, a victory won against overwhelming odds by quick decision
+and superb audacity.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Only a half century separates Salamis from the battle of the Corinthian
+Gulf and the battle of Naupaktis, but during that period there had
+been a great advance in naval science.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As far as naval tactics are concerned, Salamis was merely a fight
+between two mobs of ships, except that when opportunity offered,
+a vessel used her ram. Otherwise the only difference from land
+fighting was the fact that the combatants stood on floating platforms.
+But in the Peloponnesian war we see not only the birth of naval
+tactics but a very high development, especially as revealed in
+these two victories of Phormio.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With the development of a naval science rose also a naval profession.
+At Salamis Themistocles was a politician and Eurybiades was a soldier;
+it happened that they were made fleet commanders for the emergency.
+Phormio was a naval officer by profession, and he won by genius
+combined with superior efficiency in the personnel under his command.
+In his courage, resourcefulness, in the spirit he inspired, and
+the high pitch of skill he developed among his officers and men,
+he is an ideal type for every later age. Little is known of his
+life and character beyond the story of these two exploits, but
+they are sufficient to give him the name of the first great admiral
+of history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+His exploits illustrate, too, at the very outset of naval history,
+the vital truth that the man counts more than the machine. In these
+later days, when the tendency is to measure naval power merely
+by counting dreadnoughts, and to settle all hypothetical combats
+by the proportion of strength at a given point on the game board,
+it is well to remember that the most overwhelming victories have
+been won by the skill <a name="page_46"><span class="page">Page
+46</span></a> and audacity of a great leader, which overcame odds
+that would be reckoned by the experts as insuperable.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Peloponnesian war dragged on with varying fortunes for ten
+years. The Athenians were regularly successful on the sea and
+unsuccessful on land. They seem to have laid an unwise dependence
+on their navy for a state situated on the mainland with land
+communications open to the enemy. They attempted to make an island
+of their state by withdrawing into the city of Athens the entire
+population of Attica, leaving open to the invader the rest of the
+province. The repeated ravaging of Attica by Peloponnesian armies
+weakened both the resources and the morale of the Athenians, and
+the crowding of the inhabitants into the city resulted in frightful
+mortality from the plague. At the same time the naval expeditions
+sent out to harry the coast of the Peloponnesus accomplished nothing
+of real advantage.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 421 a truce was agreed upon between Athens and Sparta, which
+was to last fifty years. Both sides were sorely weakened by the
+protracted struggle and neither had gained any real advantage over
+the other. Without waiting to recuperate from the losses of the
+war, Athens embarked in 415 on an ambitious plan of conquering
+Syracuse, and gaining all of Sicily as an Athenian colony. In the
+event of success Athens would have a western outpost for the eventual
+control of the Mediterranean, as she already had an eastern outpost
+in Ionia, which gave her control of the &AElig;gean.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the light of the event it is customary to refer to this expedition
+as the climax of folly, and yet it is clear that if the commander
+in chief had not wasted time in interminable delays the Athenians
+might easily have won their objective. At first the Syracusans felt
+hopeless because of the large army and fleet dispatched against
+them, and the great naval prestige of their enemy, but as delay
+succeeded delay, assistance arrived from Corinth and Sparta, and
+the besieged citizens took heart. The siege dragged on for the
+greater part of two years, with the offensive gradually slipping
+from the Athenians to the Syracusans, till finally the invaders
+found their troops besieged on shore and their ships bottled up in
+<a name="page_47"><span class="page">Page 47</span></a> the harbor
+by a line of galleys anchored across the entrance. The Syracusans
+knew that they were no match for the Athenians on the open sea, but
+with a fleet crowded into a harbor with no room for maneuvering,
+the problem was not essentially different from that of fighting
+on land. They built a fleet of ships with specially strengthened
+bows for ramming and erected catapults for throwing heavy stones
+on the decks of the enemy. Meanwhile, the Athenian ships had
+deteriorated from lack of opportunity to refit and their crews
+had been heavily reduced by disease. In a pitched battle between
+the two fleets in the harbor, the Athenians were worsted. Shortly
+after as the Athenians were attempting to break through the barrier
+and escape, they were again attacked by the Syracusans. There was
+no room for maneuvering; the Athenian ships were jammed together
+in a mass in which all advantage of numbers was lost. Moreover,
+against the deadly rain of huge stones the Athenians had no defense
+whatever.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The result was an overwhelming victory for the Syracusans. Out
+of 110 triremes the Athenians lost fifty. The besieging army went
+to pieces in attempting a retreat across the island, and the whole
+expedition came to a tragic end. This defeat of the Athenian fleet
+in the harbor of Syracuse was the ruin of Athens. When the news
+reached Greece, many of her dependencies revolted, the Peloponnesian
+war had broken out anew, and she had no strength left to hold her
+own. The deathblow was given when a Spartan admiral destroyed all
+that was left of the Athenian navy at &AElig;gospotami in the year
+405. Thereafter Athens was merely a conquered province, permitted
+to keep a fleet of only twelve ships, and watched by a garrison
+of Spartan soldiers in the citadel.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The downfall of Athenian sea power at Syracuse may be compared
+with the downfall of Persian sea power at Salamis. Just as the
+latter prevented the spread of an Asiatic form of civilization
+in Europe and gave Greek civilization a chance to develop, so the
+former put an end to the extension of a strong Hellenic power in
+Italy and left opportunity for the rise of the civilization of
+Rome.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_48"><span class="page">Page 48</span></a>
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of Greece</span>, Ernst Curtius, 1874.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of Greece</span>, George Grote, 1856.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Great Persian War</span>, G. B. Grundy, 1901.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Persian Wars</span>, Herodotus, ed.
+and transl. by Geo. Rawlinson, 1862.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Peloponnesian War</span>, Thucydides,
+ed. and transl. by Jowett.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_49"><span class="page">Page 49</span></a>
+CHAPTER III</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE SEA POWER OF ROME
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+1. THE PUNIC WARS
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When peoples have migrated in the past, they have frequently changed
+their habits to conform to new topographical surroundings. We have
+seen that the Ph&oelig;nicians, originally a nomadic people, became a
+seafaring race because of the conditions of the country they settled
+in; and on the other hand, at a later period, the Vikings who overran
+Normandy or Britain forsook the sea and became farmers. The popular
+idea that a race follows the sea because of an "instinct in the blood
+of the race" has little to stand on. When, however, the colonists from
+Ph&oelig;nicia settled Carthage and founded an empire, they continued
+the traditions of their ancestors and built up their power on a
+foundation of ships. This was due to the conditions&mdash;topographical
+and geographical&mdash;which surrounded them, and which were much
+like those of the mother country. Carthage possessed the finest
+harbor on the coast of Africa, situated in the middle of the
+Mediterranean, where all the trade routes crossed. To counteract
+these attractions of the sea there was nothing but the arid and
+mountainous character of the interior. It was inevitable, therefore,
+that the Carthaginians, like their ancestors, should build an empire
+of the sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As early as the sixth century B.C. Carthage had established her
+power so securely in the western Mediterranean as to be able to
+set down definite limits beyond which Rome agreed not to go. Thus
+the opening sentence of a treaty between the two nations in 509
+B. C. ran as follows:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and
+their allies there shall be peace and alliance upon the <a
+name="page_50"><span class="page">Page 50</span></a> conditions
+that neither the Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the
+Fair Promontory[1] unless compelled by bad weather or an enemy;
+and in case they are forced beyond it they shall not be allowed
+to take or purchase anything except what is barely necessary for
+refitting their vessels or for sacrifice, and they shall depart
+within five days."[2]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: A cape on the African coast about due north from
+Carthage.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">General History</span>, Polybius,
+Bk. III, chap. 3.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A second and a third treaty emphasized even mare strongly the
+Carthaginian dictatorship over the Mediterranean.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 375px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig011.png" width="375" height="403" alt="Fig. 11">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It was inevitable, therefore, that as Rome expanded her interests
+should come in collision with those of Carthage. The immediate
+causes of the Punic wars are of no consequence for our purpose;
+the two powers had rival interests in Sicily, and the clash of
+these brought on the war in the year 264 B.C. There followed a
+mortal struggle between Rome and Carthage that extended through
+three distinct wars and a period of aver a hundred years.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When the two nations faced each other in arms, Carthage <a
+name="page_51"><span class="page">Page 51</span></a> had the advantage
+of prestige and the greatest navy in the world. Her weaknesses lay
+in the strife of political factions and the mercenary character
+of her forces. Her officers were usually Carthaginians, but it was
+considered beneath the dignity of a Carthaginian to be a private.
+The rank and file, therefore, were either hired or pressed into
+service from the subject provinces. In the case of Xanthippus,
+who defeated Regulus in the first Punic war, even the commanding
+officer was a Spartan mercenary. These troops would do well so
+long as campaigns promised plunder but would became disaffected
+if things went wrong.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Romans, on the other hand, had only a small navy and no naval
+experience; their strength lay in their legionaries. And in further
+contrast with their enemy they had none but Romans in their forces,
+or allies who were proud of fighting on the side of Rome. Consequently
+they fought in the spirit of intense patriotism which could stand
+the moral strain of defeat and even disaster. On land there was
+no better fighter than the Roman soldier. At sea, however, all
+the advantage lay with the Carthaginian, and it soon became clear
+that if the Romans were to succeed they would have to learn to
+fight on water.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For the first three years Carthaginian fleets raided the coasts of
+Sicily and Italy with impunity. Finally, in desperation, Rome set
+about the creation of a fleet, and the story is that a Carthaginian
+quinquereme that had been wrecked an the coast was taken as a model,
+and while the ships were building, rowers were trained in rowing
+machines set up an shore. The first contact with the enemy was not
+encouraging. The new fleet, which was constructed in two months,
+consisted of 100 quinqueremes and 30 triremes. Seventeen of these
+while on a trial cruise were blockaded in the harbor of Messina
+by twenty Carthaginian ships, and the Roman commander was obliged
+to surrender after his crews had landed and escaped.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The next encounter was a different story. The Romans, realizing their
+ignorance of naval tactics and their superiority in land fighting,
+determined to make the next naval battle as nearly as possible like
+an engagement of infantry. Accordingly <a name="page_52"><span
+class="page">Page 52</span></a> the ships were fitted with boarding
+gangways with a huge hooked spike at the end, like the beak of a
+crow, which gave them their name, "corvi" or "crows."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: The following is the description in Polybius of what
+they were like and how they were worked.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"They [the Romans] erected on the prow of every vessel a round pillar
+of wood, of about twelve feet in height, and of three palms breadth
+in diameter, with a pulley at the top. To this pillar was fitted a
+kind of stage, eighteen feet in length and four feet broad, which
+was made ladder-wise, of strong timbers laid across, and cramped
+together with iron: the pillar being received into an oblong square,
+which was opened for that purpose, at the distance of six feet
+within the end of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways
+was a parapet, which reached just above the knee. At the farthest
+end of this stage or ladder was a bar of iron, whose shape was
+somewhat like a pestle; but it was sharpened at the bottom, or
+lower point; and on the top of it was a ring. The whole appearance
+of this machine very much resembled those that are used in grinding
+corn. To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, by which, with
+the help of the pulley that was at the top of the pillar, they
+hoisted up the machines, and, as the vessels of the enemy came near,
+let them fall upon them, sometimes on their prow, and sometimes
+on their sides, as occasion best served. As the machine fell, it
+struck into the decks of the enemy, and held them fast. In this
+situation, if the two vessels happened to lie side by side, the
+Romans leaped on board from all parts of their ships at once. But
+in case that they were joined only by the prow, they then entered
+two and two along the machine; the two foremost extending their
+bucklers right before them to ward off the strokes that were aimed
+against them in front; while those that followed rested the boss
+of their bucklers upon the top of the parapet on either side, and
+thus covered both their flanks." GENERAL HISTORY, Book 1.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Armed with this new device, the Consul Duilius took the Roman fleet
+to sea to meet an advancing Carthaginian fleet and encountered it
+off the port of Myl&aelig; (260 B.C.). The Carthaginians had such
+contempt for their enemy that they advanced in irregular order,
+permitting thirty of their ships to begin the battle unsupported
+by the rest of the fleet. One after the other the Carthaginian
+quinqueremes were grappled and stormed, for once the great <i>corvus</i>
+crashed down on a deck all the arts of seamanship were useless.
+Before the day was over the Carthaginians had lost 14 ships sunk
+and 31 captured, a total of half their fleet, and the rest had
+fled in disorder towards Carthage.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The unexpected had happened, as it so frequently does in history.
+The amateurs had beaten the professionals, not by trying to achieve
+the same efficiency but by inventing something new that would make
+that efficiency useless. Thus, as <a name="page_53"><span
+class="page">Page 53</span></a> we nave seen, the Syracusans, who
+were no match for the Athenians in the open sea, destroyed the sea
+power of Athens by bottling up her fleet in a harbor and bombarding
+it with catapults. It is an instance such as we shall see recurring
+throughout naval history, in which the power of a great fleet is
+largely or completely neutralized by a new or device in the hands
+of the nation with the smaller navy.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The significance of Myl&aelig; lay in the fact that a new naval
+power had arisen, that henceforth Rome must be reckoned with on
+the sea. The victory served to encourage the Romans to enlarge
+their navy, and with it to press the war into the enemy's territory.
+Soon after Myl&aelig; they gained possession of the greater part
+of Sicily, and in the year 256 they dispatched a fleet to carry
+the offensive into Africa. This Roman fleet of 330 ships met, just
+off Ecnomus, on the southern coast of Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet
+of 350, and a great battle took place, interesting for the grand
+scale on which it was fought and the tactics employed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Romans, an seeing their enemy, assumed a formation hitherto
+unknown in tactics at sea. Their first and second squadrons formed
+the sides of an acute-angled triangle; the third squadron formed
+the base of the triangle, towing the transports, and the fourth
+squadron brought up the rear, covering the transports. The whole
+formed a compact wedge, pushing forward like a great spear head
+to pierce the enemy's line.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Admirable as this formation was, the Carthaginians were no less
+skillful in their tactics for destroying it. Instead of keeping
+an unbroken line to receive the attack, they stationed their left
+wing at same distance from the center so as to overlap the Roman
+right, and their right wing in column ahead, so as to overlap the
+Roman left. As the Romans advanced, the Carthaginian center purposely
+gave way, drawing the advance wings of their enemy away from the
+transports and the two squadrons in the rear. Then they faced about
+and attacked. Meanwhile the two Carthaginian squadrons on the flanks
+swung round the Roman wedge, the left wing engaging the Roman third
+squadron, which was hampered by the transports,<a name="page_54"><span
+class="page">Page 54</span></a> and driving it toward the shore. At
+the same time the Carthaginian right wing attacked the fourth, or
+reserve, squadron from the rear and drove it into the open sea. Thus
+the battle went on in three distinct engagements, each separated by
+considerable distance from the others. The outcome is thus narrated
+by Polybius:
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 458px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig012.png" width="458" height="415" alt="Fig. 12">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Because in each of these divisions the strength of the combatants
+was nearly equal, the success was also for some time equal. But
+in the progress of the action the affair was brought at last to
+a decision: a different one, perhaps, from what might reasonably
+have been expected in such circumstances. For the Roman squadron
+that had begun the engagement gained so full a victory, that Amilcar
+[the Carthaginian commander] was forced to fly, and the consul
+Manlius brought away the vessels that were taken.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"The other consul, having now perceived the danger in which the
+triarii[1] and the transports were involved, hastened to their
+assistance with the second squadron, which was still entire. The
+triarii, having received these succors, when they were<a
+name="page_55"><span class="page">Page 55</span></a> Just upon
+the point of yielding, again resumed their courage, and renewed
+the fight with vigor: so that the enemy, being surrounded on every
+side in a manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at once
+both in the front and rear were at last constrained to steer away
+to sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: The rear guard, or fourth squadron.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"About this time Manlius also, returning from the engagement, observed
+that the ships of the third squadron were forced in close to the
+shore, and there blocked up by the left division of the Carthaginian
+fleet. He joined his forces, therefore, with those of the other
+consul, who had now placed the transports and triarii in security,
+and hastened to assist these vessels, which were so invested by the
+enemy that they seemed to suffer a kind of siege. And, indeed, they
+must have all been long before destroyed if the Carthaginians, through
+apprehension of the <i>corvi</i>, had not still kept themselves at
+distance, and declined a close engagement. But the consuls, having
+now advanced together, surround the enemy, and take fifty of their
+ships with all the men. The rest, being few in number, steered
+close along the shore, and saved themselves by flight.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 456px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig013.png" width="456" height="333" alt="Fig. 13">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS,
+256 B.C.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Such were the circumstances of this engagement; in which the victory
+at last was wholly on the side of the Romans. Twenty-four of their
+ships were sunk in the action, and more than thirty of the
+Carthaginians. No vessel of the Romans <a name="page_56"><span
+class="page">Page 56</span></a> fell into the hands of the enemy;
+but sixty-four of the Carthaginians were taken with their men."[2]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Polybius's <span class="sc">General History</span>,
+Book I, Chap. 2.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The battle of Ecnomus had no such decisive effect on history as
+the battle of Salamis, but it was on a far greater scale and it
+reveals an enormous advance in tactics. Three hundred thousand
+men, rowers and warriors, were engaged, and nearly 700 ships. Up
+to the battle of Actium, two centuries later, Ecnomus remained
+the greatest naval action in history. Moreover, the tactics of the
+rival fleets show a high degree of discipline and efficiency. The
+Carthaginian plan of dividing their enemy's force and defeating it
+by a concentrated attack on his transport division, was skillfully
+carried out and came perilously near succeeding. Had the first
+and second squadrons of the Carthaginians been able to carry out
+their part of the plan and "contain" the corresponding advance
+squadrons of the Romans, the result would have been an overwhelming
+victory for Carthage, involving not only the destruction of the
+Roman fleet but also the capture of the Roman army of invasion.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This victory left open the way for the advance into Africa. The
+Romans had landed and marched almost to the gates of Carthage when
+the army was destroyed by the skill of a Spartan, Xanthippus, and
+Regulus, the Consul in command, was captured. This astonishing
+catastrophe inflicted on the Roman legionaries was due to the use
+of elephants, and offers a curious parallel to the effect of the
+<i>corvi</i> on the Carthaginian sailors. Such was the terror inspired
+by these animals that the Roman soldier would not stand before them
+until a year or two later, in Sicily, the Consul Cecilius showed
+how they could not only be repulsed but turned back on their own
+army by the use of javelins and arrows.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nothing daunted by the loss of their army, Rome dispatched a fleet
+of 350 ships to Africa to carry off the remnants of the defeated
+army that were besieged in the city of Aspis. They were met by
+a hastily organized Carthaginian fleet off the promontory of
+Herm&aelig;a in a brief action in which <a name="page_57"><span
+class="page">Page 57</span></a> the Romans were overwhelmingly
+victorious. The latter took 114 vessels with their crews. The Roman
+expedition continued on its course to Africa, rescued the besieged
+troops and turned back in high feather toward Sicily. The Consuls
+in command had been warned by the pilots not to attempt to skirt
+the southern coast of Sicily at that season of the year, but the
+warning was disregarded. Suddenly, as the fleet was approaching the
+shore it was overwhelmed by a great gale, and out of 464 vessels
+only eighty survived.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Frightful as this loss was in ships and men, Rome proceeded at
+once to build another fleet, to the number of 250, which, with
+characteristic energy, was made ready for service in three months.
+This force also, after an ineffectual raid on the African coast,
+fell victim to a storm on the way home with the loss of 150 ships.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Unwilling to relinquish the mastery of the sea that had been won
+by an uninterrupted series of victories, Rome sent another fleet
+to attack a Carthaginian force lying in the harbor of Drepanum.
+As the Romans approached, the Carthaginians went out to meet them,
+and so maneuvered as to force them to fight with an enemy in front
+and the rocks and shoals of the coast in their rear. The Roman ships
+were never able to extricate themselves from this predicament,
+and the greater part were either taken or wrecked on the coast.
+The Consul in command managed to escape with about thirty of his
+vessels, but 93 were taken with their crews. This is the single
+instance of a pitched battle between Roman and Carthaginian fleets
+in which the victory went to Carthage, a victory due entirely to
+better seamanship. The immediate result of this success was the
+destruction of the Roman squadron lying in the port of Lilyb&aelig;um
+which was assisting the troops in the siege of that town.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Still another Roman fleet that had the temerity to anchor in an
+exposed position was destroyed by a storm. "For so complete was
+the destruction," writes Polybius, "that scarcely a single plank
+remained entire."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Stunned by these disasters, the government at Rome gave up the idea
+of contesting any further the command of the <a name="page_58"><span
+class="page">Page 58</span></a> sea. The citizens, how ever, were not
+willing to submit, and displayed a magnificent spirit of patriotism
+in this the darkest period of the war. Individuals of means, or
+groups of individuals, pledged each a quinquereme, fully equipped,
+for a new fleet, asking reimbursement from the government only in
+case of victory. By these private efforts a force of 200 quinqueremes
+was constructed. At this time, as at the very beginning, the model
+for the Roman ships was a prize taken from the enemy.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 560px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig014.png" width="560" height="401" alt="Fig. 14">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC
+  WAR</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile the Carthaginians, confident that the Romans were finally
+driven from the sea, had allowed their own fleet to disintegrate.
+Accordingly when the astonishing news reached them that the Romans
+were again abroad they were compelled to fill their ships with
+raw levies of troops and inexperienced rowers and sailors. And,
+since the Carthaginian troops who were besieging the city of Eryx
+in Sicily were in need of supplies, a large number of transports
+were sent with the fleet. The Carthaginian commander planned to
+make a landing unobserved, leave his transports, exchange his raw
+crews for some of the veterans before Eryx and then give battle
+to the Roman fleet.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_59"><span class="page">Page 59</span></a> This program
+failed because of the initiative of the Roman Consul commanding
+the new fleet. Having got word of the coming of the Carthaginians
+and divining their plan, he braved an unfavorable wind and a rough
+sea for the sake of forcing an action before they could establish
+contact with their army. Accordingly he sought out his enemy and
+met him (in the year 241 B.C.) off the island of &AElig;gusa, near
+Lilyb&aelig;um. Almost at the first onset the Romans won an
+overwhelming victory, capturing seventy and sinking fifty of the
+Carthaginian force.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This final desperate effort of Rome was decisive. The Carthaginians
+had no navy left, and their armies in Sicily were cut off from
+all communications with their base. Accordingly ambassadors went
+to Rome to sue for peace, and the great struggle that had lasted
+without intermission for twenty-four years and reduced both parties
+to the point of exhaustion, ended with a triumph for Rome through
+a victory on the sea. By the treaty of peace Carthage was obliged
+to pay a heavy indemnity and yield all claim to Sicily.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Whatever historical moral may be drawn from the story of the first
+Punic war, the fact remains that a nation of landsmen met the greatest
+maritime power in the world and defeated it on its own element. In
+every naval battle save one the Romans were victors. It is true,
+however, that in the single defeat off Drepanum and in the dreadful
+disasters inflicted by storms, Rome lost through lack of knowledge
+of wind and sea. No great naval genius stands above the rest, to
+whom the final success can be attributed. Rome won simply through
+the better fighting qualities of her rank and file and the stamina
+of her citizens. To quote the phrase of a British writer,[1] Rome
+showed the superior "fitness to win."
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Fred Jane, <span class="sc">Heresies of Sea Power</span>,
+<i>passim</i>.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Second Punic War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the first Punic war the prize was an island, Sicily. Naturally,
+therefore, the fighting was primarily naval. The second Punic war
+(218-202 B.C.) was essentially a war on land. <a name="page_60"><span
+class="page">Page 60</span></a> Carthage, driven from Sicily, turned
+to Spain and made the southern part of the peninsula her province.
+Using this as his base, Hannibal marched overland, crossed the
+Alps, and invaded Italy from the north. Had he followed up his
+unbroken series of victories by marching on the capital instead
+of going into winter quarters at Capua, it is possible that Rome
+might have been destroyed and all subsequent history radically
+changed. The Romans had no general who could measure up to the genius
+of Hannibal, but their spirit was unbroken even by the slaughter of
+Cann&aelig;, and their allies remained loyal. Moreover, Carthage,
+thanks to factional quarrels and personal jealousies, was deaf to
+all the requests sent by Hannibal for re&euml;nforcements when
+he needed them most. In the end, Scipio, after having driven the
+Carthaginians out of Spain, dislodged Hannibal from Italy by carrying
+an invasion into Africa. At the battle of Zama the Romans defeated
+Hannibal and won the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is difficult to see any significant use of sea power in this
+second Punic war. Neither side seemed to realize what might be
+done in cutting the communications of the other, and both sides
+seemed to be able to use the sea at will. Of course due allowance
+must be made for the limitations of naval activity. The quinquereme
+was too frail to attempt a blockade or to patrol the sea lanes in
+all seasons. Nevertheless both sides used the sea for the transport
+of troops and the conveying of intelligence, and neither side made
+any determined effort to establish a real control of the sea.[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: For a distinguished opinion to the contrary, v. Mahan,
+<span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon History</span>, 14
+ff. In this view, however, Mahan is not supported by Mommsen (vol.
+II, p. 100). See also Jane, <span class="sc">Heresies of Sea
+Power</span>, 60 ff.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Third Punic War</i> (149-146 B.C.)
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The third Punic war has no naval interest. Rome, not satisfied with
+defeating her rival in the two previous wars, took a convenient
+pretext to invade Carthage and destroy every vestige of the city.
+With this the great maritime empire came to an end, and Rome became
+supreme in the Mediterranean.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_61"><span class="page">Page 61</span></a>
+2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY; THE CAMPAIGN OF ACTIUM
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After the fall of Carthage no rival appeared to contest the sovereignty
+of Rome upon the sea. The next great naval battle was waged between
+two rival factions of Rome herself at the time when the republic
+had fallen and the empire was about to be reared on its ruins. This
+was the battle of Actium, one of the most decisive in the world's
+history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The rivalry between Antony and Octavius as to who should control
+the destinies of Rome was the immediate cause of the conflict.
+In the parceling out of spoil from the civil wars following the
+murder of C&aelig;sar, Octavius had taken the West, Lepidus the
+African provinces, and Antony the East. Octavius soon ousted Lepidus
+and then turned to settle the issue of mastery with Antony. In
+this he had motives of revenge as well as ambition. Antony had
+robbed him of his inheritance from C&aelig;sar, and divorced his
+wife, the sister of Octavius, in favor of Cleopatra, with whom he
+had become completely infatuated. In this quarrel the people of
+Rome were inclined to support Octavius, because of their indignation
+over a reported declaration made by Antony to the effect that he
+intended to make Alexandria rather than Rome the capital of the
+empire and rule East and West from the Nile rather than the Tiber.
+Both sides began preparations for the conflict. Antony possessed
+the bulk of the Roman navy and the Roman legions of the eastern
+provinces. To his fleet he added squadrons of Egyptian and
+Ph&oelig;nician vessels of war, and to his army he brought large
+bodies of troops from the subject provinces of the East. In addition
+he spent great sums of money by means of his agents in Rome to arouse
+disaffection against Octavius. At the outset he acted with energy and
+caused his antagonist the gravest anxiety. It was clear also that
+Antony intended to take the offensive. He established winter quarters
+at Patras, on the Gulf of Corinth, during the winter of 32-31 B.C.,
+billeting his army in various towns on the west coast of Greece,
+and keeping it supplied by grain ships from Alexandria. His fleet
+he anchored in the Ambracian Gulf, a <a name="page_62"><span
+class="page">Page 62</span></a> landlocked bay, thirty miles wide,
+lying north of the Gulf of Corinth; it is known to-day as the Gulf
+of Arta.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Octavius, however, was equally determined not to yield the offensive
+to his adversary, and boldly collected ships and troops for a movement
+in force against Antony's position. His troops were also Roman
+legionaries, experienced in war, but his fleet was considerably
+less in numbers and the individual ships much smaller than the
+quinqueremes and octiremes of Antony. The ships of Octavius were
+mostly biremes and triremes. These disadvantages, however, were
+offset by the fact that his admiral, Agrippa, was an experienced
+sea-fighter, having won a victory near Myl&aelig; during the civil
+wars, and by the other fact that the crews under him, recruited
+from the Dalmatian coast, were hardy, seafaring men. These were
+called Liburni, and the type of ship they used was known as the
+<i>Liburna</i>. This was a two-banked galley, but the term was
+already becoming current for any light man of war, irrespective
+of the number of banks of oars. In contrast with these Liburni,
+who divided their days between fishing and piracy and knew all
+the tricks of fighting at sea, the crews of Antony's great fleet
+were in many cases landsmen who had been suddenly impressed into
+service.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As soon as Antony had moved his force to western Greece he seemed
+paralyzed by indecision and made no move to avail himself of his
+advantageous position to strike. He had plenty of money, while
+his adversary was at his wit's end to find even credit. He had
+the admiration of his soldiers, who had followed him through many
+a campaign to victory, while Octavius had no popularity with his
+troops, most of whom were reluctant to fight against their old
+comrades in arms. And finally, Antony had a preponderating fleet
+with which he could command the sea and compel his opponent to
+fight on the defensive in Italian territory. All these advantages
+he allowed to slip away.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the winter of 32-31 one-third of Antony's crews perished
+from lack of proper supplies and the gaps were filled by slaves,
+mule-drivers, and plowmen&mdash;any one whom his captains could seize
+and impress from the surrounding country. <a name="page_63"><span
+class="page">Page 63</span></a> The following spring Agrippa made a
+feint to the south by capturing Methone at the southern tip of the
+Peloponnesus, thus threatening the wheat squadrons from Egypt on
+which Antony depended. Next came the news that Octavius had landed
+an army in Epirus and was marching south. Then Antony realized that
+his adversary was aiming to destroy the fleet in the Ambracian
+Gulf and hastened thither. He arrived with a squadron ahead of his
+troops, at almost the same instant as Octavius, and if Octavius
+had had the courage to attack the tired and disorganized crews of
+Antony's squadron, Antony would have been lost. But by dressing
+his crews in the armor of legionaries and drawing up his ships in
+a position for fighting, with oars suspended, he "bluffed" his
+enemy into thinking that he had the support of his troops. When
+the latter arrived Antony established a great camp on Cape Actium,
+which closes the southern side of the Gulf, and fortified the entrance
+on that side.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thereafter for months the two forces faced each other on opposite
+sides of the Gulf, neither side risking more than insignificant
+skirmishes. During this time Octavius had free use of the sea for
+his supplies, while the heavier fleet of Antony lay idle in harbor.
+Nevertheless, Octavius did not dare to risk all on a land battle, and
+conducted his campaign in a characteristically timid and vacillating
+manner which should have made it easy for Antony to take the aggressive
+and win. But the famous lieutenant of Julius C&aelig;sar was no
+longer the man who used to win the devotion of his soldiers by
+his courage and audacity. He was broken by debauchery and torn
+this way and that by two violently hostile parties in his own camp.
+One party, called the Roman, wanted him to come to an understanding
+with Octavius, or beat him in battle, and go to Rome as the restorer
+of the republic. The other party, the Egyptian, was Cleopatra and
+her following. Cleopatra was interested in holding Antony to Egypt,
+to consolidate through him a strong Egyptian empire, and she was
+not at all interested in the restoration of Roman liberties. In
+Antony's desire to please Cleopatra and his attempt to deceive
+his Roman friends into thinking that he was working for their <a
+name="page_64"><span class="page">Page 64</span></a> aims, may be
+seen the explanation of the utter lack of strategy or consistent
+plan in his entire campaign against Octavius.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the beginning of July Antony apparently proposed a naval battle.
+Instantly the suspicions of the Roman party were awakened. They
+cried out that Antony was evidently going back to Egypt without
+having won the decisive battle against Octavius on land, which
+would really break the enemy's power, and without paying any heed
+to the political problems at Rome. Such a furor was raised between
+the two parties that Antony abandoned his plan and made a feint
+toward the land battle in Epirus that the Romans wanted. Meanwhile
+two of his adherents, one a Roman, the other a king from Asia Minor,
+exasperated by the insolence of Cleopatra, deserted to Octavius.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+August came and went without action or change in the situation.
+Meanwhile as Antony's camp had been placed in a pestilential spot
+for midsummer heat, he suffered great losses from disease. By this
+time Cleopatra was interested in nothing but a return to Egypt.
+Accordingly she persuaded Antony to order a naval battle without
+asking anybody's advice, and he set the date August 29 for the
+sally of his fleet. The Romans were amazed and protested, but in
+vain. Preparations went on in such a way as to make it clear to the
+observing that what Antony was planning was not so much a battle
+as a return to Egypt. Vessels which he did not need outside for
+battle he ordered burned, although such ships would usually be kept
+as reserves to make up losses in fighting. Moreover, he astonished
+the captains by ordering them to take out into action the big sails
+which were always left ashore before a battle. Nor did his explanation
+that they would be needed in pursuit satisfy them. It appeared also
+that he was employing trusted slaves at night to load the Egyptian
+galleys with all of Cleopatra's treasure. Two more Roman leaders,
+satisfied as to Antony's real intention, deserted to Octavius and
+informed him of Antony's plans.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile a heavy storm had made it impossible to attempt the action
+on August 29 or several days after. On the 2d of September (31
+B.C.) the sea became smooth again. Octavius <a name="page_65"><span
+class="page">Page 65</span></a> and Agrippa drew out their fleet
+into open water, about three-quarters of a mile from the mouth of
+the gulf, forming line in three divisions. They waited till nearly
+noon before Antony's fleet began to make its expected appearance to
+offer battle. This also was formed in three divisions corresponding
+to those of their enemy. The Egyptian division of sixty ships under
+Cleopatra took up a safe position in the rear of the center.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 505px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig015.png" width="483" height="505" alt="Fig. 15">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B.C.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+There was a striking contrast in the types of ships in the opposing
+ranks. The galleys of Octavius were low in the water, and nimble in
+their handling; those of Antony were bulky and high, with five to
+ten banks of oars, and their natural unhandiness was made worse by
+a device intended to protect them against ramming. This consisted
+of a kind of boom of heavy timbers rigged out on all sides of the
+hull. In addition to the higher sides these ships supported towers
+and citadels <a name="page_66"><span class="page">Page 66</span></a>
+built upon their decks, equipped with every form of the artillery
+of that day, especially catapults capable of hurling heavy stones
+upon the enemy's deck.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Against such formidable floating castles, the light ships of Agrippa
+and Octavius could adopt only skirmishing tactics. They rushed in
+where they could shear away the oar blades of an enemy without
+getting caught by the great grappling irons swung out from his
+decks. They kept clear of the heavy stones from the catapults through
+superior speed and ability to maneuver quickly, but they were unable
+to strike their ponderous adversaries any vital blow. On the other
+hand the great hulks of Antony were unable to close with them,
+and though the air was filled with a storm of arrows, stones and
+javelins, neither side was able to strike decisively at the other.
+As at Salamis the opposite shores were lined with the opposing
+armies, and every small success was hailed by shouts from a hundred
+thousand throats on the one side and long drawn murmurs of dismay
+from an equal host on the other.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In these waters a north wind springs up every afternoon&mdash;a
+fact that Antony and Cleopatra had counted on&mdash;and as soon
+as the breeze shifted the royal galley of Cleopatra spread its
+crimson sail and, followed by the entire Egyptian division, sailed
+through the lines and headed south. Antony immediately left his
+flagship, boarded a quinquereme and followed. This contemptible
+desertion of the commander in chief was not generally known in
+his fleet; as for the disappearance of the Egyptian squadron, it
+was doubtless regarded as a good riddance. The battle, therefore,
+went on as stubbornly as ever.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Late in the afternoon Agrippa, despairing of harming his enemy
+by ordinary tactics, achieved considerable success by the use of
+javelins wrapped in burning tow, and fire rafts that were set drifting
+upon the clumsy hulks which could not get out of their way. By this
+means a number of Antony's ships were destroyed, but the contest
+remained indecisive. At sunset Antony's fleet retired in some disorder
+to their anchorage <a name="page_67"><span class="page">Page
+67</span></a> in the gulf. Octavius attempted no pursuit but kept
+the sea all night, fearing a surprise attack or an attempted flight
+from the gulf.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile a flying wing of Octavius's fleet had been sent in pursuit
+of Antony and Cleopatra, who escaped only after a rear guard action
+had been fought in which two of Cleopatra's ships were captured.
+The fugitives put ashore at Cape T&aelig;narus, to enable Antony
+to send a message to his general, Canidius, ordering him to take
+his army through Macedonia into Asia. Then the flight was resumed
+to Alexandria.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the morning of the 3d Octavius sent a message to the enemy's
+camp announcing the fact of Antony's desertion and calling on the
+fleet and army to surrender. The Roman soldiers were unwilling to
+believe that their commander had been guilty of desertion, and
+were confident that he had been summoned away on important business
+connected with the campaign. Their general, however, did not dare
+convey to them Antony's orders because they would betray the truth
+and provoke mutiny. Consequently he did nothing. Certain Roman
+senators and eastern princes saw the light and quietly went over
+to the camp of Octavius. Several days of inaction followed, during
+which the desertions continued and the rumor of Antony's flight
+found increasing belief. On the seventh day, Canidius, who found
+himself in a hopeless dilemma, also went over to Octavius. This
+desertion by the commander settled the rest of the force. A few
+scattered into Macedonia, but the great bulk of the army and all
+that was left of the fleet surrendered. Nineteen legions and more
+than ten thousand cavalry thus came over to Octavius and took service
+under him. This was the real victory of Actium. In the words of
+the Italian historian Ferrero, "it was a victory gained without
+fighting, and Antony was defeated in this supreme struggle, not
+by the valor of his adversary or by his own defective strategy
+or tactics, but by the hopeless inconsistency of his double-faced
+policy, which, while professing to be republican and Roman, was
+actually Egyptian and monarchical."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_68"><span class="page">Page 68</span></a> The story
+of the naval battle of Actium is a baffling problem to reconstruct
+on account of the wide divergence in the accounts. For instance,
+the actual number of ships engaged is a matter of choice between
+the extremes of 200 to 500 on a side. And the consequences were so
+important to Octavius and to Rome that the accounts were naturally
+adorned afterwards with the most glowing colors. Every poet who lived
+by the bounty of Augustus in later years naturally felt inspired to
+pay tribute to it in verse. But the actual naval battle seems to
+have been of an indecisive character. For that matter, even after
+the wholesale surrender of Antony's Roman army and fleet, neither
+Anthony nor Octavius realized the importance of what had happened.
+Antony had recovered from worse disasters before, and felt secure
+in Alexandria. Octavius at first followed up his advantage with
+timid and uncertain steps. Only after the way was made easy by the
+hasty submission of the Asiatic princes and the wave of popularity
+and enthusiasm that was raised in Rome by the news of the victory,
+did Octavius press the issue to Egypt itself. There the war came
+to an end with the suicide of both Antony and Cleopatra.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As in the case of the indecisive naval battle off the capes of
+the Chesapeake, which led directly to the surrender of Cornwallis,
+an action indecisive in character may be most decisive in results.
+Actium may not have been a pronounced naval victory but it had
+tremendous consequences. As at Salamis, East and West met for the
+supremacy of the western world, and the East was beaten back. It
+is not likely that the Egyptian or the Syrian would have dominated
+the genius of the western world for any length of time, but the
+defeat of Octavius would have meant a hybrid empire which would
+have fallen to pieces like the empire of Alexander, leaving western
+Europe split into a number of petty states. On the other hand,
+Octavius was enabled to build on the consequences of Actium the
+great outlines of the Roman empire, the influence of which on the
+civilized world to-day is still incalculable. When he left Rome to
+fight Antony, the government was bankrupt and the people torn with
+faction. When he returned <a name="page_69"><span class="page">Page
+69</span></a> he brought the vast treasure of Egypt and found a people
+united to support him. Actium, therefore, is properly taken as the
+significant date for the beginning of the Roman empire. Octavius
+took the name of his grand-uncle C&aelig;sar, the title of Augustus,
+and as "Imperator" became the first of the Roman emperors.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The relation of the battle of Actium to this portentous change
+in the fortunes of Octavius was formally recognized by him on the
+scene where it took place. Nicopolis, the City of Victory, was
+founded upon the site of his camp, with the beaks of the captured
+ships as trophies adorning its forum. The little temple of Apollo on
+the point of Actium he rebuilt on an imposing scale and instituted
+there in honor of his victory the "Actian games," which were held
+thereafter for two hundred years.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After the battle of Actium and the establishment of a powerful
+Roman empire without a rival in the world, there follows a long
+period in which the Mediterranean, and indeed all the waterways
+known to the civilized nations, belonged without challenge to the
+galleys of Rome. Naval stations were established to assist in the
+one activity left to ships of war, the pursuit of pirates, but
+otherwise there was little or nothing to do. And during this long
+period, indeed, down to the Middle Ages, practically nothing is
+known of the development in naval types until the emergence of the
+low, one- or two-banked galley of the wars between the Christian
+and the Mohammedan. The first definite description we have of warships
+after the period of Actium comes at the end of the ninth century.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+There was some futile naval fighting against the Vandals in the days
+when Rome was crumbling. Finally, by a curious freak of history,
+Genseric the Vandal took a fleet out from Carthage against Rome,
+and swept the Mediterranean. In the year 455, some six centuries
+after Rome had wreaked her vengeance on Carthage, this Vandal fleet
+anchored unopposed in the Tiber and landed an army that sacked the
+imperial <a name="page_70"><span class="page">Page 70</span></a>
+city, which had been for so long a period mistress of the world,
+and had given her name to a great civilization.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the four centuries in which the <i>Pax Romana</i> rested
+upon the world, it is easy to conceive of the enormous importance
+to history and civilization of having sea and river, the known
+world over, an undisputed highway for the fleets of Rome. Along
+these routes, even more than along the military roads, traveled
+the institutions, the arts, the language, the literature, the laws,
+of one of the greatest civilizations in history. And ruthless as
+was the destruction of Vandal and Goth in the city itself and in
+the peninsula, they could not destroy the heritage that had been
+spread from Britain to the Black Sea and from the Elbe to the upper
+waters of the Nile.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of Rome</span>, Theodor Mommsen, tr. by
+  W. P. Dickson, 1867.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">General History</span>, Polybius, transl. by
+  Hampton, 1823.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Romans Under the Empire</span>,
+  Chas. Merivale (vol. III.), 1866.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Greatness and Decline of Rome</span>, G.
+  Ferrero, tr. by A. E. Zemmern, 1909.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">&Eacute;tudes sur l'Histoire Militaire et Maritime
+  des Grecs et des Romains</span>, Paul Serre, 1888.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Fleets of the First Punic War</span>, W. W. Tarn,
+  in <i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>, 1907.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Heresies of Sea Power</span> (pp. 40-71), Fred
+  Jane, 1906.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power on History</span> (pp. 15
+  ff.), A. T. Mahan, 1889.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+For a complete bibliography of Roman sea power, v.
+  <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power on the Roman
+  Republic</span> (Doctoral Dissertation), F. W. Clark, 1915.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_71"><span class="page">Page 71</span></a>
+CHAPTER IV</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES: THE EASTERN EMPIRE
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The thousand years following the collapse of the Roman empire, a
+period generally referred to as the Middle Ages, are characterized
+by a series of barbarian invasions. Angles, Saxons, Goths, Visigoths,
+Huns, Vandals, Vikings, Slavs, Arabs, and Turks poured over the
+broken barriers of the empire and threatened to extinguish the last
+spark of western and Christian civilization. Out of this welter
+of invasions and the anarchy of petty kingdoms arose finally the
+powerful nations that perpetuated the inheritance from Athens,
+Rome, and Jerusalem, and developed on this foundation the newer
+institutions of political and intellectual freedom that have made
+western civilization mistress of the world. For this triumph of
+West over East, of Christianity over barbarism, we have to thank
+partly the courage and genius of great warriors and statesmen who
+arose here and there, like Alfred of England and Martel of France,
+but chiefly the Eastern Empire, with its capital at Constantinople,
+which stood through this entire epoch as the one great bulwark against
+which the invasions dashed in vain. In this story of defense, the
+Christian fleets won more than one Salamis, as we shall see in
+the course of this chapter.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the year 328 A.D. the Emperor Constantine the Great moved his
+capital to Byzantium and named it "New Rome." In honor of its founder,
+however, the name was changed soon to "Constantinople," which it
+has retained ever since. It may seem strange that after so many
+glorious centuries Rome should have been deprived of the honor
+of being the center of the great empire which bore its own name,
+but in the fourth <a name="page_72"><span class="page">Page
+72</span></a> century the city itself had no real significance.
+All power rested in the person of the Emperor himself, and wherever
+he went became for the time being the capital for all practical
+purposes. At this time the empire was already on the defensive and
+the danger lay in the east. Constantine needed a capital nearer
+the scene of future campaigns, nearer his weakest frontier, the
+Danube, and nearer the center of the empire. Byzantium not only
+served these purposes but also possessed natural advantages of a
+very high order. It was situated where Europe and Asia meet, it
+commanded the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean,
+and it was a natural citadel. Whoever captured the city must needs
+be powerful by land and sea. Under the emperor's direction the new
+capital was greatly enlarged and protected by a system of massive
+walls. Behind these walls the city stood fast for over a thousand
+years against wave after wave of barbarian invasion.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the wars with the Persians, the Vandals, and the Huns nothing
+need be said here, for they do not involve the operations of fleets.
+The city was safe so long as no enemy appeared with the power to
+hold the sea. That power appeared in the seventh century when the
+Arabs, or "Saracens," as they were called in Europe, swept westward
+and northward in the first great Mohammedan invasion.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Most migrations are to be explained by the pressure of enemies,
+or the lack of food and pasturage in the countries left behind,
+or the discovery of better living conditions in the neighboring
+countries. But the impulse behind the two tremendous assaults of
+Islam upon Europe seems to have been religious fanaticism of a
+character and extent unmatched in history. The founder of the Faith,
+Mohammed, taught from 622 to 632. He succeeded in imbuing his followers
+with the passion of winning the world to the knowledge of Allah
+and Mohammed his prophet. The unbeliever was to be offered the
+alternatives of conversion or death, and the believer who fell in
+the holy wars would be instantly transported to Paradise. Men who
+actually believe that they will be sent to a blissful immortality
+after death are the most terrible soldiers <a name="page_73"><span
+class="page">Page 73</span></a> to face, for they would as readily
+die as live. In fact Cromwell's "Ironsides" of a later day owed
+their invincibility to very much the same spirit. At all events, by
+the time of Mohammed's death all Arabia had been converted to his
+faith and, fired with zeal, turned to conquer the world. Hitherto
+the tribes of Arabia were scattered and disorganized, and Arabia
+as a country meant nothing to the outside world. Now under the
+leadership of the Prophet it had become a driving force of tremendous
+power. Mohammedan armies swept over Syria into Persia. In 637,
+only five years after Mohammed's death, Jerusalem surrendered,
+and shortly afterwards Egypt was conquered. Early in the eighth
+century the Arabs ruled from the Indus on the east, and the Caucasus
+on the north, to the shores of the Atlantic on the west. Their
+empire curved westward along the coast of northern Africa, through
+Spain, like one of their own scimitars, threatening all Christendom.
+Indeed, the Arab invasion stands unparalleled in history for its
+rapidity and extent.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 642px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig016.png" width="642" height="324" alt="Fig. 16">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE SARACEN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, ABOUT
+  715 A.D.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The one great obstacle in the way was the Christian, or Roman,
+empire with its center at Constantinople. Muaviah, the Emir of
+Syria, was the first to perceive that nothing could be done against
+the empire until the Arabs had wrested from it the command of the
+sea. Accordingly he set about building <a name="page_74"><span
+class="page">Page 74</span></a> a great naval armament. In 649
+this fleet made an attack on Cyprus but was defeated. The following
+year, however, it took an important island, Aradus, off the coast
+of Syria, once a stronghold of the Ph&oelig;nicians, and sacked it with
+savage barbarity. An expedition sent from Constantinople to recover
+Alexandria was met by this fleet and routed. This first naval victory
+over the Christians gave the Saracens unbounded confidence in their
+ability to fight on the sea. They sailed into the &AElig;gean, took
+Rhodes, plundered Cos, and returned loaded with booty. Muaviah,
+elated with these successes, planned a great combined land and
+water expedition against the Christian capital.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this point it is worth pausing to consider what the fighting
+ship of this period was like. As we have seen in the preceding
+chapter the Roman navy sank into complete decay. At the end of the
+fourth century there was practically no imperial navy in existence.
+The conquest of the Vandals by Belisarius in the sixth century
+involved the creation of a fleet, but when that task was over the
+navy again disappeared until the appearance of the Arabs compelled
+the building of a new imperial fleet. The small provincial squadrons
+then used to patrol the coasts were by no means adequate to meet
+the crisis.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The warships of this period were called "dromons," a term that
+persists even in the time of the Turkish invasion eight centuries
+later. The word means "fast sailers" or "racers." The dromon was
+not the low galley of the later Middle Ages but a two-banked ship,
+probably quite as large as the Roman quinquereme, carrying a complement
+of about 300 men. Amidships was built a heavy castle or redoubt of
+timbers, pierced with loopholes for archery. On the forecastle
+rose a kind of turret, possibly revolving, from which, after Greek
+fire was invented, the tubes or primitive cannon projected the
+substance on the decks of the enemy. The dromon had two masts, lateen
+rigged, and between thirty and forty oars to a side.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+There were two classes of dromons, graded according to size, and a
+third class of ship known as the "pamphylian," which was apparently
+of a cruiser type, less cumbered with <a name="page_75"><span
+class="page">Page 75</span></a> superstructure. In addition there
+were small scout and dispatch boats of various shapes and sizes.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Both Christian and Saracen fought with these kinds of warships.
+Apparently the Arabs simply copied the vessels they found already
+in use by their enemies, and added no new device of their own.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 627px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig017.png" width="627" height="624" alt="Fig. 17">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">EUROPE'S EASTERN FRONTIER</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 655 Muaviah started his great double invasion against Constantinople.
+He sent his fleet into the &AElig;gean, while he himself with an
+army tried to force the passes of the Taurus mountains. Before the
+Arab fleet had gone far it met the Christian fleet, commanded by
+the Emperor himself, off the town of Phaselis on the southwestern
+coast of Asia Minor. A great battle followed. The Christian emperor,
+Constantine II, distinguished himself by personal courage throughout
+the action, but the day went sorely against the Christians. At
+last the flagship was captured and he himself survived only by
+leaping into a vessel that came to his rescue while his men <a
+name="page_76"><span class="page">Page 76</span></a> fought to
+cover his escape. It was a terrible defeat, for 20,000 Christians
+had been killed and the remnants of their fleet were in full retreat.
+But the Saracens had bought their victory at such a price that they
+were themselves in no condition to profit by it, and the naval
+expedition went no further. Meanwhile Muaviah had not succeeded
+in forcing the Taurus with his army, so that the grand assault
+came to nothing after all.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The following year the murder of the Caliph brought on a civil
+war among the Saracens, in consequence of which Muaviah arranged
+a truce with Constantine. The latter was thus enabled to turn his
+attention to the beating back of the Slavs in the east and the
+recovery of imperial possessions in the west, notably the city
+and province of Carthage. During the last of these campaigns he
+was killed by a slave.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The death of this energetic and able ruler seemed to Muaviah the
+opportunity to begin fresh operations against the Christian empire.
+Three great armies invaded the territory of the Cross. One plundered
+Syracuse, another seized and fortified a post that threatened the
+existence of Carthage, a third pushed to the shores of the Sea of
+Marmora. These were, however, only preliminary to the grand assault
+on the capital itself.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 673 a great Arab armada forced the Hellespont and captured Cyzicus.
+With this as a base, the fleet landed an army on the northern shore
+of the Sea of Marmora. By these means Constantinople was invested
+by land and sea. But the great walls proved impregnable against
+the attacks of the army, and the Christian fleet, sheltered in
+the Golden Horn, was able to sally out from time to time and make
+successful raids on detachments of the Saracen ships. This state
+of affairs continued for six months, after which Muaviah retired
+with his army to Cyzicus, leaving a strong naval guard to hold
+the straits.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The next spring Muaviah again landed his army on the European side and
+besieged the city for several months. The second year's operations were
+no more successful than the <a name="page_77"><span class="page">Page
+77</span></a> first, and again the Arab force retired to Cyzicus
+for the winter.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Arab commander was determined to stick it out until he had
+forced the surrender of the city by sheer exhaustion, but his plan
+had a fatal error. During the winter months the land blockade was
+abandoned, with the result that supplies for the next year's siege
+were readily collected for the beleaguered city. Emperor and citizens
+alike rose to the emergency with a spirit of devotion that burned
+brighter with every year of the siege. Meanwhile the Christians
+of the outlying provinces of Syria and Africa were also fighting
+stubbornly and with considerable success against the enemy. The
+year 676 passed without any material change in the situation.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 415px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig018.png" width="415" height="352" alt="Fig. 18">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the siege a Syrian architect named Callinicus is said to
+have come to Constantinople with a preparation of his own invention,
+"Greek fire," which he offered the Emperor for use against the Saracen.
+This, according to one historian, "was a semi-liquid substance,
+composed of sulphur, pitch, dissolved niter, and petroleum boiled
+together and mixed with certain less important and more obscure
+substances.... When ejected it caught the woodwork which it fell
+and set it so thoroughly on fire that there was no possibility
+of extinguishing the conflagration. It could only be put out, it
+is said, by pouring vinegar, wine, or sand upon it."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Art of War</span>, Oman, p. 546.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Constantine IV, the Emperor, was quick to see the possibilities
+of the innovation and equipped his dromons with projecting brass
+tubes for squirting the substance upon the enemy's ships. These
+are sometimes referred to as "siphons," but it is not clear just
+how they were operated. One writer[2] is of <a name="page_78"><span
+class="page">Page 78</span></a> the opinion that something of the
+secret of gunpowder had been obtained from the East and that the
+substance was actually projected by a charge of gunpowder; in short,
+that these "siphons" were primitive cannon. In addition to these
+tubes other means were prepared for throwing the fire. Earthenware
+jars containing it were to be flung by hand or arbalist, and darts
+and arrows were wrapped with tow soaked in the substance.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">The Byzantine Empire</span>, Foord,
+p. 139.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Christian fleet was no match for the Saracen in numbers, but
+Constantine pinned his faith on the new invention. Accordingly,
+during the fourth year of the siege, 677, he boldly led his fleet
+to the attack. We have no details of this battle beyond the fact
+that the Greek fire struck such terror by its destructive effect that
+the Saracens were utterly defeated. This unexpected blow completed
+the growing demoralization of the besiegers. The army returned to
+the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and the survivors of the fleet
+turned homewards. Constantine followed up his victory with splendid
+energy. He landed troops on the Asiatic shore, pursued the retreating
+Arabs and drove the shattered remnant of their army back into Syria.
+The fleet was overtaken by a storm in the &AElig;gean and suffered
+heavily. Before the ships could reassemble, the Christians were
+upon them and almost nothing was left of the great Saracen armada.
+Thus the second great assault on Constantinople was shattered by
+the most staggering disaster that had ever befallen the cause of
+Islam.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Christian empire once more stood supreme, and that supremacy
+was attested by the terms of peace which the defeated Muaviah was
+glad to accept. There was to be a truce of thirty years, during
+which the Christian emperor was to receive an annual tribute of
+3000 pounds of gold, fifty Arab horses and fifty slaves.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is unfortunate that there was no Herodotus to tell the details
+of this victory, for it was tremendously important to European
+civilization. Western Europe was then a welter of barbarism and
+anarchy, and if Constantinople had fallen, in all probability the
+last vestige of Roman civilization would have been destroyed. Moreover,
+the battle is of special <a name="page_79"><span class="page">Page
+79</span></a> interest from a tactical point of view because it was
+won by a new device, Greek fire, which was the most destructive
+naval weapon up to the time when gunpowder and artillery took its
+place. Indeed this substance may be said to have saved Christian
+civilization for several centuries, for the secret of its composition
+was carefully preserved at Constantinople and the Arabs never recovered
+from their fear of it.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The victory did not, however, mark the crisis of the struggle.
+In the half century that followed, Constantinople suffered from
+weak or imbecile emperors while the Caliphate gained ground under
+able rulers and generals. In the first fifteen years of the eighth
+century the Saracens reached the climax of their power. Under a
+great general, Muza, they conquered Spain and spread into southern
+France. It was he who conceived the grandiose plan of conquering
+Christendom by a simultaneous attack from the west and from the
+east, converging at the city of Rome. One army was to advance from
+Asia Minor and take Constantinople; another was to cross the Pyrenees
+and overrun the territory of the Franks. Had the enterprise been
+started at the time proposed there could have been little opposition
+in the west, for the Franks were then busy fighting each other,
+but luckily Muza fell into disgrace with the Caliph at this time
+and his great project was undertaken by less able hands and on
+a piecemeal plan.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The eastern line of invasion was undertaken first in the year 717.
+A fleet of warships and transports to the number of 1800 sailed
+to the Hellespont, carrying about 80,000 troops, while a great
+army collected at Tarsus and marched overland toward the same
+destination. Meanwhile two more fleets were being prepared in the
+ports of Africa and Egypt, and a third army was being collected
+to re&euml;nforce the first expedition. This army was to be under
+the personal command of the Caliph himself. The third attack on
+the Christian capital was intended to be the supreme effort.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Fortunately, the ruler of Constantinople at this hour of peril
+was a man of ability and energy, Leo III; but the empire had sunk
+so low as a result of the misrule of his predecessors that his
+authority scarcely extended beyond the shores <a name="page_80"><span
+class="page">Page 80</span></a> of the Sea of Marmora, and his
+resources were at a low ebb. The navy on which so much depended
+was brought to a high point of efficiency, but it was so inferior
+in numbers to the Saracen armada that he dared not attempt even
+a defense of the Dardanelles.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For the Arabs all went well at first. Unopposed they transported a
+part of their army to the European shore, moved toward Constantinople
+and invested it by land and sea. One detachment was sent to cover
+Adrianople, which was occupied by a Christian garrison; the rest
+of the force concentrated on the capital itself.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile the Christian fleet lay anchored in the shelter of the
+Golden Horn, protected by a boom of chains and logs. As the Saracen
+ships came up to occupy the straits above the city they fell into
+confusion in trying to stem the rapid current. Seeing his opportunity,
+the emperor ordered the boom opened, and leading the way in his
+flagship, he fell upon the huddle of Saracen vessels in the channel.
+The latter could make little resistance, and before the main body of
+the fleet could work up to the rescue, the Christians had destroyed
+twenty and taken a number of prizes back to the Horn. Again Greek
+fire had proved its deadly efficacy. Elated with this success,
+Leo ordered the boom opened wide and, lying in battle order at
+the mouth of the Horn, he challenged the Arab fleet to attack. But
+such was the terror inspired by Greek fire that the Grand Vizier,
+in spite of his enormous superiority in numbers, declined to close.
+Instead he withdrew his dromons out of the Bosphorus and thereafter
+followed the less risky policy of a blockade. This initial success
+of the Christian fleet had the important effect of leaving open
+the sea route to the Black Sea, through which supplies could still
+reach the beleaguered city.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Arabs then sat down to wear out the defenders by a protracted
+siege on land and sea. In the spring of 718 the new army and the two
+new fleets arrived on the scene. One of the latter succeeded, probably
+by night, in passing through the Bosphorus and closing the last inlet
+to the city. The situation for the defenders became desperate. Many
+<a name="page_81"><span class="page">Page 81</span></a> of the
+men serving on these new fleets, however, were Christians. These
+took every opportunity to desert, and gave important information to
+the emperor as to the disposition of the Arab ships. Acting on
+this knowledge, Leo took his fleet out from the shelter of the
+boom and moved up the straits against the African and Egyptian
+squadrons that were blockading the northern exit. The deserters
+guided him to where these squadrons lay, at anchor and unprepared
+for action. What followed was a massacre rather than a battle. The
+Christian members of the crews deserted wholesale and turned upon
+their Moslem officers. Ship after ship was rammed by the Christian
+dromons or set on fire by the terrible substance which every Arab
+regarded with superstitious dread. Some were driven ashore, others
+captured, many more sunk or burnt to the water's edge. Of a total
+of nearly 800 vessels practically nothing was left.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Leo followed up this spectacular naval victory by transporting
+a force from the garrison of the city to the opposite shore of
+the Bosphorus, attacking the army encamped there and driving it
+in rout. Meanwhile the Bulgarian chieftain had responded to Leo's
+appeal and, relieving the siege of Adrianople, beat back the Saracen
+army at that point with great slaughter. The fugitives of that army
+served to throw into panic the troops encamped round the walls
+of Constantinople, already demoralized by disease, the death of
+their leaders, and the annihilation of the African and Egyptian
+fleets in the Bosphorus.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The great retreat began. The Arab soldiers started back through
+Asia Minor, but only 30,000 out of the original force of 180,000
+lived to reach Tarsus. The fleet set sail for the &AElig;gean,
+and as in the similar retreat of a half century before, the Arabs
+were overwhelmed by a storm with terrible losses. The Christian
+ships picked off many survivors, and the Christians of the islands
+destroyed others that sought shelter in any port. It is said that
+out of the original armada of 1800 vessels only five returned to
+Syria! Thus the third and supreme effort of the Saracen ended in
+one of the greatest military disasters in history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_82"><span class="page">Page 82</span></a> The service
+of the Christian fleet in the salvation of the empire at this time
+is thus summarized by a historian:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"The fleet won most of the credit for the fine defense; it invariably
+fought with admirable readiness and discipline, and was handled in
+the most masterful manner. It checked the establishment of a naval
+blockade at the very outset, and broke it when it was temporarily
+formed in 718; it enabled the army to operate at will on either
+shore of the Bosphorus, and it followed up the retreating Saracens
+and completed the ruin of the great armament."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Byzantine Empire</span>, Foard,
+p. 170.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The winning stroke in this campaign was the tremendous naval victory
+at the mouth of the Bosphorus, and this, even more emphatically
+than Constantine's victory in 677, deserves to be called another
+Salamis. Not only did it save the Christian empire but it checked
+the Caliphate at the summit of its power and started it on its
+decline. Not for thirty years afterwards was the Saracen able to
+put any considerable fleet upon the sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It was ten years after the Arab defeat at Constantinople that the
+armies of the west began the other part of Muza's project&mdash;the
+conquest of the Franks. By this time the Frankish power was united
+and able to present a powerful defense. In six bitterly contested
+battles between Tours and Poitiers in 732 Charles Martel defeated
+the Arabs in a campaign that may well be called the Marathon, or
+better, the Plat&aelig;a, of the Middle Ages, for it completed
+the work done by the imperial navy at Constantinople. From this
+time forward the power of the Saracen began to ebb by land and
+sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As it ebbed, the new cities of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice began to
+capture the trade and hold the control of the sea that once had
+been Saracen, until the Christian control was so well established
+as to make possible the Crusades. Later, as we shall see, a second
+invasion of Mohammedans, the Turks, ably assisted by the descendants
+of the Arabs who conquered Spain, once more threatened to control
+the Mediterranean for the cause of Islam. But the Persian Gulf
+and the Indian Ocean, which fell into the hands of the Arabs as
+soon as they took to <a name="page_83"><span class="page">Page
+83</span></a> the water, remained in Arab hands down to the times
+of the Portuguese. In those waters, because they were cut off from
+the Mediterranean, the Saracen had no competitor. As early as the
+eighth century Ceylon was an Arab trading base, and when the Portuguese
+explorers arrived at the end of the 15th century they found the
+Arabs still dominating the water routes of India and Asia, holding
+as they had held for seven centuries a monopoly of the commerce
+of the east.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the Mediterranean during the struggle between Christian and
+Saracen a recent English writer makes the following suggestive comment:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"The function of the Mediterranean has thus undergone a change.
+In early times it had been a barrier; later, under the Ph&oelig;nicians,
+it became a highway, and to the Greeks a defense. We find that the
+Romans made it a basis for sea power and subdued all the lands
+on its margin. With the weakening of Rome came a weakening of sea
+power. The Barbary states and Spain became Saracen only because
+the naval power of the eastern empire was not strong enough to hold
+the whole sea, but neither was the Saracen able to gain supreme
+control. Thus the conditions were the same as in the earlier days
+of the conflict between Rome and Carthage: the Mediterranean became
+a moat separating the rivals, though first one and then the other
+had somewhat more control. The islands became alternately Saracen
+and Christian. Crete and Sicily were held for centuries before
+they were regained by a Christian power."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Geography and World Power</span>,
+Fairgrieve, p. 125.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The victory of 718 saved Constantinople from any further peril
+from the Arabs, but it was again in grave peril, two centuries
+later, when a sudden invasion of Russians in great force threatened
+to accomplish at a stroke what the Saracens had failed to do in three
+great expeditions. The King of Kiev, one of the race of Vikings
+that had fought their way into southern Russia, collected a huge
+number of ships, variously estimated from one to ten thousand,
+and suddenly appeared <a name="page_84"><span class="page">Page
+84</span></a> in the Bosphorus. Probably there were not more than
+1500 of these vessels all told and they must have been small compared
+with the Christian dromons; nevertheless they presented an appalling
+danger at that moment. The Christian fleet was watching Crete, the
+army was in the east winning back territory from the Arabs, and
+Constantinople lay almost defenseless. The great walls could be
+depended an to hold off a barbarian army, but a fleet was needed
+to hold the waterways; otherwise the city was doomed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Horn lay a few antiquated dromons and a few others still on
+the stocks. To Theophanes the Patrician was given this nucleus of
+a squadron with which to beat back the Russians. Desperate and even
+hopeless as the situation appeared, he went to work with the greatest
+energy, patching up the old ships, and hurrying the completion of
+the new. Meanwhile the invaders sent raiding parties ashore that
+harried the unprotected country districts with every refinement
+of cruelty. In order to make each ship count as much as possible
+as an offensive unit, Theaphanes made an innovation by fitting out
+Greek fire tubes on the broadsides as well as in the bows. This
+may be noted as the first appearance of the broadside armament
+idea, which had to wait six hundred years more before it became
+finally established.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When the new ships had been completed and the old ones made serviceable,
+Theophanes had exactly fifteen men of war. With this handful of
+vessels, some hardly fit to take the sea, he set out from the Horn
+and boldly attacked the Russian fleet that blocked the entrance to
+the strait. Never was there a more forlorn hope. Certainly neither
+the citizens on the walls nor the men on the ships had any expectation
+of a return.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+What followed would be incredible were it not a matter of history.
+These fifteen ships were immediately swallowed up by the huge fleet
+of the enemy, but under the superb leadership of Theophanes each
+one fought with the fury of desperation. They had one hope, the
+weapon that had twice before saved the city, Greek fire. The Russians
+swarmed alongside only to find their ships taking fire with a flame
+that water would not quench. Contempt of their feeble enemy changed
+soon <a name="page_85"><span class="page">Page 85</span></a> to
+a wild terror. There was but one impulse, to get out of reach of
+the Christians, and the ships struggled to escape. Soon the whole
+Russian fleet was in wild flight with the gallant fifteen in hot
+pursuit. Some of these could make but slow headway because of their
+unseaworthiness, but when all was over the Russians are said to have
+lost two-thirds of their entire force. The invaders who had been
+left on shore were then swept into the sea by re&euml;nforcements
+that had arrived at Constantinople, and not a vestige was left
+of the Russian invasion. Once more Greek fire and the Christian
+navy had saved the empire; and for sheer audacity, crowned with a
+victory of such magnitude, the feat of Theophanes stands unrivaled
+in history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From the tenth century on, Constantinople began to find her rivalries
+in the west. The coronation of Charlemagne in 800 had marked the
+final separation of the eastern and the western empire. As noted
+above, the passing of the Saracens gave opportunity for the growth
+of commercial city-states like Genoa, Pisa and Venice, and their
+interests clashed not only with one another but also with those
+of Constantinople.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The climax came in 1204 when Venice succeeded in diverting the
+Fourth Crusade to an expedition of vengeance for herself, first
+against the city of Zara and then against Constantinople. This
+time the Eastern Empire had no fleet ready for defense and the
+Venetian galleys filled the waters under the city walls. Many of
+these galleys were fitted with a kind of flying bridge, a long
+yard that extended from the mast to the top of the wall and stout
+enough to bear a file of men that scrambled by this means to the
+parapets. After many bloody repulses the city was finally captured,
+and there followed a sack that for utter barbarity outdid anything
+ever perpetrated by Arab or Turk. Thus the city that for nearly a
+thousand years had saved Christian civilization was, by a hideous
+irony of fate, taken and sacked by a Crusading army.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When the second Mohammedan invasion threatened Europe, Constantinople,
+weak on land and impotent by sea, and deserted by the Christian
+nations of the west, was unable to <a name="page_86"><span
+class="page">Page 86</span></a> put up a strong resistance. At
+last, in 1453, it was captured by the Turks, and became thereafter
+the capital of the Moslem power. Great as this catastrophe was,
+it cannot compare with what would have happened if the city had
+fallen to the Saracen, the Hun, or the Russian during the dark
+centuries when the nations of the west were scarcely in embryo.
+In the 15th century they were strong enough to take up the sword
+that Constantinople had dropped and draw the line beyond which
+the Turk was not permitted to go.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Although it has been the fashion since Gibbon to sneer at the Eastern
+Empire, it must be remembered with respect as the last treasure
+house of the inheritance bequeathed by Rome and Greece during the
+dark centuries of barbarian and Saracen. Even in its ruin it sent its
+fugitives westward with the manuscripts of a language and literature
+then little known, the Greek, and thereby added greatly to the
+growing impetus of the Renaissance. It is significant also that
+during its thousand years of life, as long as it kept its hold on
+the sea it stood firm. When it yielded that, its empire dwindled
+to a mere city fortress whose doom was assured long before it fell.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Cambridge Medieval History</span>, Vol. II., 1913.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The History of the Saracens</span>, E. Gibbon &amp; S.
+  Ockley.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman
+  Empire</span>, Edward Gibbon, ed. by J. B. Bury.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Byzantine Empire</span>, E. A. Foord, 1911.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Military and Religious Life in the Middle Ages</span>,
+  Paul Lacroix, 1874.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Later Roman Empire</span>, J. B. Bury,
+  1889.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Eastern Roman Empire</span>, J. B.
+  Bury, 1912.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_87"><span class="page">Page 87</span></a>
+CHAPTER V</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES [<i>Continued</i>]: VENICE AND THE
+TURK
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The city-state of Venice owed its origin to the very same barbarian
+invasions that wrecked the old established cities of the Italian
+peninsula. Fugitives from these towns in northern Italy and the
+outlying country districts fled to the islets and lagoons for shelter
+from the Hun, the Goth, and the Lombard. As the sea was the Venetians'
+barrier from the invader, so also it had to be their source of
+livelihood, and step by step through the centuries they built up
+their commerce until they practically controlled the Mediterranean,
+for trade or for war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As early as 991 a Doge of Venice made a treaty with the Saracens
+inaugurating a policy held thereafter by Venice till the time of
+Lepanto; namely, to trade with Mohammedans rather than fight them.
+The supreme passion of Venice was to make money, as it had been of
+ancient Ph&oelig;nicia, and to this was subordinated every consideration
+of race, nationality, and religion. The first important step was
+the conquest of the Dalmatian pirates at the beginning of the 11th
+century. This meant the Venetian control of the Adriatic. When the
+Crusades began, the sea routes to the Holy Land were in the hands
+of the Venetians; indeed it was this fact that made the Crusades
+possible. As the carrying and convoying agent of the Crusaders,
+Venice developed greatly in wealth and power. With direct access to
+the Brenner Pass, she became a rich distributing center for Eastern
+goods to northern Europe. In all important Levantine cities there
+was a Venetian quarter, Venetians had special trading privileges,
+and many seaports and islands came directly under Venetian rule.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 827px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig019.png" width="827" height="531" alt="Fig. 19">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">
+<a name="page_88"><span class="page">Page 88</span></a>
+THEATER OF OPERATIONS, VENICE AND THE TURK</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This rapid expansion naturally roused the jealousy of others. In
+1171 Venice fought an unsuccessful war with Constantinople, and
+yet continued to grow in wealth and power. In 1204, as we have
+seen, Venice avenged herself by diverting the Fourth Crusade to
+the siege and sack of her eastern rival. As the reward of that
+nefarious exploit Venice received the greater part of the eastern
+empire, and became the dominating power in the Mediterranean. During
+the 13th and 14th centuries, however, she was compelled to fight
+with her rebellious colonies and her new rivals, Genoa and Padua.
+The wars with Genoa very nearly proved fatal to Venice, but just
+when matters seemed most desperate she was saved by a naval victory
+against a Genoese fleet in her own waters. In consequence of these
+wars between Venice and Genoa both were heavy losers in wealth and
+lives; Genoa never recovered from her defeat, but her rival showed
+amazing powers of recuperation. She extended her territory in Italy
+to include the important cities of Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, and
+Verona, and in 1488 acquired the island of Cyprus in the Levant. At
+this time the <a name="page_89"><span class="page">Page 89</span></a>
+Venetian state owned 3300 ships, manned by 36,000 men, and stood
+at the height of her power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Already, however, a new enemy had appeared who threatened not only
+Venice but all Europe. This was the Ottoman Turk. The Turks were
+not like the Arabs, members of the Indo-European family, but a
+race from the eastern borders of the Caspian Sea, a branch of the
+Mongolian stock. As these peoples moved south and west they came in
+contact with Mohammedanism and became ardent converts. Eventually
+they swept over Asia Minor, crossed the Dardanelles, took Adrianople,
+and pushed into Serbia. Thus, when Constantinople fell in 1453 it
+had been for some time a mere island of Christianity surrounded by
+Moslems. Indeed it was only the civil wars among the Turks themselves
+that held them back so long from the brilliant career of conquest
+that characterized the 15th and early 16th centuries, for these
+later followers of Mohammed had all the fanaticism of the Saracens.
+Before the fall of Constantinople and the transfer of the Turkish
+seat of government to that city, a corps of infantry was organized
+that became the terror of the Christian world&mdash;the Janissaries.
+By a grim irony of the Sultan, who created this body of troops, these
+men were exclusively of Christian parentage, taken as children either
+in the form of a human tribute levied on the Christian population
+of Constantinople, or as captives in the various expeditions in
+Christian territory. The Janissaries were brought up wholly to a
+military life, they were not permitted to marry, and their lives
+were devoted to fighting for the Crescent. For a long time they
+were invincible in the open field.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The first half of the 16th century saw the Turks in Persia, in the
+east, and at the gates of Vienna in the west. For a time they got
+a foothold in Italy by seizing Otranto. They had conquered Egypt
+and Syria, penetrated Persia, and in Arabia gained the support of
+the Arabs for the Turkish sultan as the successor to the Caliphs.
+Constantinople, therefore, became not only the political capital for
+the Turkish empire but the religious center of the whole Moslem world.
+Moreover, <a name="page_90"><span class="page">Page 90</span></a> the
+Arab states on the southern borders of the Mediterranean acknowledged
+the suzerainty of the Turkish ruler.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This fact was of great importance, for it enabled the Turks to
+become masters of the inland sea. In 1492 the greater part of the
+Moors&mdash;the descendants of the Arab conquerors of Spain&mdash;were
+expelled from the Peninsula by the conquest of Granada. This event
+was hailed with joy throughout Christendom, but it had an unexpected
+and terrible consequence. Flung back into northern Africa, and filled
+with hatred because of the persecution they had endured, these Moors
+embarked on a career of piracy directed against Christians. In
+making common cause with the Turks they supplied the fleets that
+the Turkish power needed to carry out its schemes of conquest.
+Apparently the Turks had never taken to salt water as the Arabs
+had done, but in these Moorish pirates they found fighters on the
+sea well worthy to stand comparison with their peerless fighters
+on land, the Janissaries. Between 1492 and 1580, the date of Ali's
+death, there was a period in which the Moorish corsairs were supreme.
+It produced three great leaders, each of whom in turn became the
+terror of the sea: Kheyr ed Din, known as Barbarossa, Dragut, and
+Ali. It is a curious fact that the first and third were of Christian
+parentage.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+So long as the Turk invaded Christian territory by land alone,
+the Venetians were unconcerned. They made what treaties they could
+for continuing their trade with communities that had fallen into
+the conquerors' hands. But when the Turk began to spread out by
+sea it was inevitable that he must clash with the Venetian, and so
+there was much fighting. Yet even after a successful naval campaign
+the emissary of Venice was obliged to come before the Sultan, cap
+in hand, to beg trading privileges in Turkish territory. Everything
+in Venetian policy was subordinated to the maintenance of sufficient
+friendly relations with the Turk to assure a commercial monopoly in
+the Levant. Although the Moslem peril grew more and more menacing,
+Venice remained unwilling to join in any united action for the
+common good of Europe.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of course Venice was not alone in this policy. In 1534 <a
+name="page_91"><span class="page">Page 91</span></a> Francis the
+First, for example, in order to humiliate his rival, Charles V,
+secretly sent word to Barbarossa of the plans being made against
+him. Indeed France showed no interest in combating the Turk even
+at the time when he was at the summit of his power. But Venice, as
+the dominating naval power, had the means of checking the Turkish
+invasion if she had chosen to do so. Instead she permitted the
+control of the Mediterranean to slip from her into the hands of
+the Moslems with scarcely a blow.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The leading part in the resistance to the Moslem sea power was
+taken by Spain under Charles V. He had, as admiral of the navy,
+Andrea Doria, the Genoese, the ablest seaman on the Christian side.
+Early in his career he had captured a notorious corsair; later
+in the service of Spain, he defeated the Turks at Patras (at the
+entrance to the Gulf of Corinth), and again at the Dardanelles.
+These successes threatened Turkish supremacy on the Mediterranean,
+and Sultan Soliman "the Magnificent," the ruler under whom the
+Turkish empire reached its zenith, summoned the Algerian corsair
+Barbarossa and gave him supreme command over all the fleets under
+the Moslem banner. At this time, 1533, Barbarossa was seventy-seven
+years old, but he had lost none of his fire or ability. On the
+occasion of being presented to the Sultan, he uttered a saying
+that might stand as the text for all the writings of Mahan: "Sire,
+he who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The following year Barbarossa set out from Constantinople with
+a powerful fleet and proceeded to ravage the coast of Italy. He
+sacked Reggio, burnt and massacred elsewhere on the coast without
+opposition, cast anchor at the mouth of the Tiber and if he had
+chosen could have sacked Rome and taken the Pope captive. He then
+returned to Constantinople with 11,000 Christian captives.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Charles V was roused by this display of corsair power and barbarity
+to collect a force that should put an end to such raids. Barbarossa
+had recently added Tunis to his personal domains, and the great
+expedition of ships and soldiers which the emperor assembled was
+directed against that city. Despite <a name="page_92"><span
+class="page">Page 92</span></a> the warning given by the King of
+France, Barbarossa was unable to oppose the Christian host with
+a force sufficiently strong to defend the city. The Christians
+captured it and the chieftain escaped only by a flight along the
+desert to the port of Bona where he had a few galleys in reserve.
+With these he made his way to Algiers before Andrea Doria could
+come up with him. The Christians celebrated the capture of Tunis by
+a massacre of some 30,000 inhabitants and returned home, thanking
+God that at last Barbarossa was done for. Indeed, with the loss
+of his fleet and his newly acquired province it seemed as if the
+great pirate was not likely to give much trouble, but the Christians
+had made the mistake of leaving the work only half done.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 1537, two years after the fall of Tunis, the Sultan declared war
+on Venice. The Turkish fleet, although led by the Sultan Soliman
+himself, was defeated by the Venetians off Corfu. Doria, in the
+service of Charles V, caught and burned ten richly laden Turkish
+merchant ships and then defeated a Turkish squadron. The prestige
+of the Crescent on the sea was badly weakened by these events,
+but suddenly Barbarossa appeared and raided the islands of the
+Archipelago and the coasts of the Adriatic with a savagery and
+sweep unmatched by anything in his long career. He arrived in the
+Golden Horn laden with booty, and delivered to his master, the
+Sultan, 18,000 captives.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This exploit changed the complexion of affairs. During the winter
+of 1537-1538 the naval yards of Constantinople were busy with the
+preparations for a new fleet which should take the offensive against
+the Venetians and the Christians generally. In the spring Barbarossa
+got out into the Archipelago and, raiding at will, swept up another
+batch of prisoners to serve as galley slaves for the new ships.
+Meanwhile the Mediterranean states nerved themselves for a final
+effort. Venice contributed 81 galleys, the Pope sent 36, and Spain,
+30. Later the Emperor sent 50 transports with 10,000 soldiers, and
+49 galleys, together with a number of large sailing ships. Venice
+also added 14 sailing ships of war, or "nefs," and Doria 22; these
+formed a special squadron. The Venetian <a name="page_93"><span
+class="page">Page 93</span></a> nefs were headed by Condalmiero in
+his flagship the <i>Galleon of Venice</i>, the most formidable
+warship in the Mediterranean, and the precursor of a revolution
+in naval architecture and naval tactics.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 837px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig020.png" width="837" height="509" alt="Fig. 20">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">16TH CENTURY GALLEY</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Although the sailing ship was coming more and more into favor because
+of the discoveries across the Atlantic, the galley was the man
+of war of this period. The dromons of the Eastern empire, with
+their stout build and two banks of oars, had given way to a long,
+narrow vessel with a single bank of oars which had been developed
+by men who lived on the shores of the sheltered lagoons of the
+Adriatic. The prime characteristic of this type was its mobility.
+For the pirate whose business it was to lie in wait and dash out
+on a merchantman, this quality of mobility&mdash;independence of
+wind and speed of movement&mdash;was of chief importance. Similarly,
+in order to combat the pirate it was necessary to possess the same
+characteristic. Of course, as in all the days of rowed ships, this
+freedom of movement was limited by the physical exhaustion of the
+rowers. In the ships of Greek and Roman days these men had some
+protection from the <a name="page_94"><span class="page">Page
+94</span></a> weapons of the enemy and from the weather, but in
+the 16th century galley, whether Turkish or Christian, they were
+chained naked to their benches day and night, with practically
+nothing to shelter them from the weather or from the weapons of
+an enemy. So frightful were the hardships of the life that the
+rowers were almost always captives, or felons who worked out their
+sentences on the rowers' bench. An important difference between
+the galley of this period and the earlier types of rowed ship is
+the fact that in the galley there was but one row of oars on a
+side, but these oars were very long and manned by four or five men
+apiece.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A typical galley was about 180 feet over all with a beam of 19
+feet and a depth of hold of about 7-1/2 feet. A single deck sloped
+from about the water line to a structure that ran fore and aft
+amidships, about six feet wide, which served as a gangway between
+forecastle and poop and gave access to the hold. The forecastle
+carried the main battery of guns, and was closed in below so as to
+provide quarters for the fighting men. The poop had a deck house
+and a smaller battery; this deck also was closed in, furnishing
+quarters for the officers. There were two or three masts, lateen
+rigged, adorned in peace or war with the greatest profusion of
+banners and streamers. Indeed huge sums of money were expended on
+the mere ornament of these war galleys, particularly in the elaborate
+carvings that adorned the stern and prow.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the conflict of Christian and Moslem, when Constantinople was
+the capital of Christendom, Greek fire on two critical occasions
+routed the Saracens. This substance was never understood in western
+Europe, and for centuries the secret was carefully preserved in
+the eastern capital. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
+it was used by the Moslem against the Christian, but the discovery
+of gunpowder soon made the earlier substance obsolete. In the 16th
+century cannon had already reached considerable dimensions, but in
+a naval battle between galleys these weapons were not used after
+the first volley or so. The tactics were little different from
+those of the day of the trireme, consisting <a name="page_95"><span
+class="page">Page 95</span></a> simply of ramming, and fighting
+at close quarters with arquebus, bows, pike, and sword.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Twenty feet from the bows of every galley projected her metal beak,
+and all her guns pointed forward; hence in the naval tactics of
+the period everything turned on a head-on attack. The battle line,
+therefore, was line abreast. For the same reasons a commander had
+to fear an attack on his flank, and he maneuvered usually to get
+at least one flank protected by the shore. The battle line in the
+days of the galley could be dressed as accurately as a file of
+soldiers, but the fighting was settled in a close m&ecirc;l&eacute;e
+in which all formation was lost from the moment of collision between
+the two fleets.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Campaign of Prevesa</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Such were the men of war and the tactics common to Christian and
+corsair during the 16th century. While the Christians were slowly
+collecting their armada, Barbarossa, with a force of 122 galleys,
+set out to catch his enemy in detail if he could. Pirate as he
+was, the old ruffian had a clear strategic grasp of what he might
+do with a force that was inferior to the fleet collecting against
+him. The Christians were to mobilize at Corfu. The Papal squadron
+had collected in the Gulf of Arta, and Barbarossa made for it. By
+sheer luck just before he arrived it had moved to the rendezvous.
+If he had followed it up immediately, he might have crushed both
+the Papal and Venetian contingents, because Doria and the Spanish
+fleet had not yet arrived; but apparently he felt uncertain as to
+just how far off these re&euml;nforcements were and therefore did
+not attempt the stroke. Instead, he took up a defensive position
+in the Gulf of Arta, exactly where Antony had collected his fleet
+before the battle of Actium.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In September (1538) the Christian fleet under Doria left Corfu and
+crossed to the Gulf. Barbarossa had drawn up his force in battle
+array inside the entrance, under the guns of the Turkish fortress
+at Prevesa. Since this entrance is obstructed by a bar with too
+little water for Doria's heavier ships, he lay outside. Thus the two
+fleets faced each other, <a name="page_96"><span class="page">Page
+96</span></a> each waiting for the other to make the next move. For
+the first time in their careers the greatest admiral on the Christian
+side was face to face with the greatest on the Moslem side. Both
+were old men, Doria over seventy and Barbarossa eighty-two. The
+stage was set for another decisive battle on the scene of Actium.
+The town of Prevesa stood on the site of Octavius's camp, and again
+East and West faced each other for the mastery of the sea. With
+the vastly greater strength of the Christian fleet, and the known
+skill of its leader, everything pointed to an overwhelming victory
+for the Cross. What followed is one of the most amazing stories
+in history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Having the interior lines and the smooth anchorage, Barbarossa
+had only to watch his enemy go to pieces in the open roadstead
+in trying to maintain a blockade. His officers, however, scorned
+such a policy, and, being appointees of the Sultan and far from
+subordinate in spirit to their chief, they were finally able to
+force his hand and compel him to offer battle to the Christians
+by leaving the security of the gulf and the fortress and going
+out into the open, exactly where Doria wanted him. Accordingly
+on the 27th of September, the Turkish fleet sailed out to offer
+battle. It happened that Doria had gone ten miles away to Sessola
+for anchorage, and the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> lay becalmed right
+in the path of the advancing fleet. Condalmiero sent word for help,
+and Doria ordered him to begin fighting, assuring him that he would
+soon be re&euml;nforced.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Turkish galleys, advancing in a crescent formation, soon enveloped
+the lonely ship. Her captain ordered his crew to lie down on her
+deck while he alone stood, in full armor, a target to the host of
+Moslems who pushed forward in their galleys anxious for the honor
+of capturing this great ship. Condalmiero ordered his gunners to
+hold their fire until the enemy were within arquebus range. Then
+the broadsides of the galleon blazed and the surrounding galleys
+crumpled and sank. A single shot weighing 120 pounds sank a galley
+with practically all on board. The signal to retreat was given
+and speedily obeyed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thereafter there were to be no more rushing tactics. Barbarossa
+<a name="page_97"><span class="page">Page 97</span></a> organized
+his galleys in squadrons of twenty, which advanced, one after the
+other, delivered their fire, and retired. All the rest of the day,
+from about noon till sunset, this strange conflict between the single
+galleon and the Turkish fleet went on. The ship was cumbered with her
+fallen spars; she had lost thirteen men killed and forty wounded.
+The losses would have been far greater but for the extraordinarily
+thick sides of the galleon. After sundown the Turkish fleet appeared
+to be drawing up in line for the last assault. On the <i>Galleon
+of Venice</i> there was no thought of surrender; the ammunition
+was almost spent and the men were exhausted with their tremendous
+efforts, but they stood at their posts determined to defend their
+ship to the last man.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Then, to their astonishment Barbarossa drew off, sending some of
+his galleys to pursue and cut off certain isolated Christian units,
+but leaving the field to the Venetian galleon. Meanwhile, during all
+that long, hot afternoon the great fleet of Andrea Doria, instead
+of pressing forward to the relief of the <i>Galleon of Venice</i>
+and crushing Barbarossa with its great superiority in numbers,
+was going through strange parade maneuvers about ten miles away.
+Doria's explanation was that he was trying to decoy Barbarossa
+out into deeper water where the guns of the nefs could be used,
+but there is no other conclusion to be reached than that Doria
+did not want to fight. Fortune that day offered him everything
+for an overwhelming victory, one that might have ranked with the
+decisive actions of the world's history, and he threw it away under
+circumstances peculiarly disgraceful and humiliating. Never did
+commander in chief so richly deserve to be shot on his own deck.
+The following day as a fair wind blew for Corfu, Doria spread sail
+and retired from the gulf, while Barbarossa, roaring with laughter,
+called on his men to witness the cowardice of this Christian admiral.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The victory lay with Barbarossa. With a greatly inferior force he
+had challenged Doria and attacked. Doria had not only declined the
+challenge but fled back to Corfu. No wonder the Sultan ordered the
+cities of his domain to be illuminated. Barbarossa's prizes included
+two galleys and five nefs, <a name="page_98"><span class="page">Page
+98</span></a> but he, too, had failed in an inexplicable fashion
+in drawing off from the assault on the <i>Galleon of Venice</i>
+at the end of the day's fighting. It is with her, with the gallant
+Condalmiero and his men, that all the honor of the day belongs.
+Nothing in the adventurous 16th century surpasses their splendid,
+disciplined valor on this occasion.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The astonishing powers of resistance and the deadly effect of the
+broadsides of the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> displayed in a long
+and successful fight against an entire fleet of galleys should
+have had the effect of making a revolution in naval architecture
+fifty years before that change actually occurred. But men of war
+of those days were built after the models of Venetian architects,
+and the latter clung doggedly to the galley. They overlooked the
+great defensive and offensive powers of the galleon displayed in
+this story and saw only the fact that she was becalmed and unable
+to move.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Doria's failure left conditions in the Mediterranean as bad as
+ever. Barbarossa died at the age of ninety, but one of the last
+acts of his life was to ransom a follower of his, Dragut, Pasha
+of Tripoli, who had served under him at Prevesa and, having been
+captured two years later, served four years as a galley slave on
+the ship of Gian Andrea Doria, the grandnephew and heir of Andrea
+Doria. Dragut soon assumed the leadership laid down by Barbarossa,
+his master, fighting first the elder Doria and then his namesake
+with great skill and audacity. For years the Knights of Malta had
+been a thorn in the side of the Moslems who roamed the sea, and
+in 1565 a gigantic effort was made by the Sultan, together with
+his tributaries from the Barbary states, to wipe out this naval
+stronghold. The siege that followed was distinguished by the most
+reckless courage and the most desperate fighting on both sides. It
+extended from May 18 to September 8, costing the Christians 8000
+and the Moslems 30,000 lives. In the midst of the siege Dragut
+himself was slain, and the conduct of the siege fell into less
+capable hands. Finally the Turks withdrew.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The death of Soliman the Magnificent, in 1566, brought to the head
+of the Turkish state a ruler known by the significant <a
+name="page_99"><span class="page">Page 99</span></a> name, Selim
+the Drunkard. Weak and debauched as he was, nevertheless he aspired
+to add to the Turkish dominions as his father had done. Accordingly,
+he informed Venice that she must evacuate Cyprus. Previous to this
+time Venice had succeeded, by means of heavy bribes to the Sultan's
+ministers, in keeping her hold on this important island, but this
+policy only tempted further arrogance on the part of the Turk.
+Further, the time was propitious for such a stroke because Venice
+was impoverished by bad harvests and the loss of her naval arsenal
+by fire, Spain was occupied in troubles with the Moors, and France,
+torn with civil war, wanted to keep peace with the Sultan at any
+price. During the terrible siege of Malta Venice had remained neutral;
+now that the danger came home to her she cried for help, and not
+unnaturally there were those who sneered at her in this crisis
+and bade her save herself.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Pope, however, had long been anxious to organize a league of
+Christian peoples to win back the Mediterranean to the Cross and draw
+a line beyond which the Crescent should never pass. In this plight
+of Venice he saw an opportunity, because hitherto the persistent
+neutrality or the unwillingness of the Venetians to fight the Turk to
+the finish had been one of the chief obstacles to concerted action.
+He therefore pledged his own resources to Venice and attempted
+to collect allies by the appeal to the Cross. The results were
+discouraging, but a force of Spanish, Papal, and Venetian galleys
+was finally collected and after endless delays dispatched to the
+scene in the summer of 1570.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile the Turks had been pressing their attack on Cyprus and
+were besieging the city of Nicosia. If the Christians had been
+moved by any united spirit they could have relieved Nicosia and
+struck a heavy blow at the Turkish fleet, which lay unready and
+stripped of its men in the harbor. But Gian Doria, who inherited
+from his great uncle his great dislike of Venetians, and who probably
+had secret instructions from his master, Philip II, to help as
+little as possible, succeeded in blocking any vigorous move on
+the part of the other commanders. Finally, after a heated quarrel,
+he sailed <a name="page_100"><span class="page">Page 100</span></a>
+back to Sicily with his entire fleet, and the rest followed. The
+allies had gone no nearer Cyprus than the port of Suda in Crete.
+The whole expedition, therefore, came to nothing.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In September Nicosia fell to the Turk, who then turned to the conquest
+of Famagusta, the last stronghold of the Venetians on the island.
+Bragadino, the commander of the besieged forces, fought against
+desperate odds with a courage and skill worthy of the best traditions
+of his native city, hoping to repulse the Turks until help could
+arrive. But Doria's defection in 1570 decided the fate of the city
+the following year. After fifty-five days of siege, with no resources
+left, Bragadino was compelled, on August 4, 1571, to accept an offer
+of surrender on honorable terms. The Turkish commander, enraged
+at the loss of 50,000 men, which Bragadino's stubborn defense had
+cost, no sooner had the Venetians in his power than he massacred
+officers and men and flayed their commander alive. This news did
+not reach the Christians, however, until their second expedition
+was almost at grips with the Turks at Lepanto.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Campaign of Lepanto</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Undismayed by the failure of his first attempt, Pope Pius had
+immediately gone to work to reorganize his Holy League. He had
+to overcome the mutual hatred and mistrust that lay between Spain
+and Venice, aggravated by the recent conduct of Doria, but neither
+the Pope nor Venice could do without the help of Spain. There was
+much bickering between the envoys in the Papal chambers, and it
+was not till February, 1571, that the terms of the new enterprise
+were agreed upon. By this contract no one of the powers represented
+was to make a separate peace with the Porte. The costs were divided
+into six parts, of which Spain undertook three, Venice, two, and
+the Pope, one. Don Juan, the illegitimate brother of Philip II, was
+to be commander in chief. Although only twenty-four, this prince
+had won a military reputation in suppressing the Moorish rebellion
+in Spain, and, having been recognized by Philip as a half brother,
+he had a princely rank that would <a name="page_101"><span
+class="page">Page 101</span></a> subordinate the claims of all the
+rival admirals. Finally, the rendezvous was appointed at Messina.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The aged Venetian admiral, Veniero, had been compelled by the situation
+in the east to divide his force into two parts, one at Crete, and
+the other under himself at Corfu. By the time he received orders
+to proceed to the rendezvous, he learned that Ali, the corsair
+king of Algiers, known better by his nickname of "Uluch" Ali, was
+operating at the mouth of the Adriatic with a large force. To reach
+Messina with his divided fleet, Veniero ran the risk of being caught
+by Ali and destroyed in detail, but the situation was so critical
+that he took the risk and succeeded in slipping past the corsair
+undiscovered. In permitting this escape, and in fact in allowing
+all the other units of the Christian fleet to assemble at Messina,
+Ali missed a golden opportunity to destroy the whole force before
+it ever collected. Instead, he continued his ravages on the coasts
+of the Adriatic, bent only on plunder. He carried his raids almost
+to the lagoons of Venice itself, and indeed might have attacked
+the city had he not been hampered by a shortage of men.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Although the Turks were having their own way, unopposed, and the
+situation was growing daily more critical, the Christian fleet was
+slow in assembling. For a whole month Veniero waited in Messina
+for the arrival of Don Juan and the Spanish squadrons. Philip,
+apparently, used one pretext after another to delay the prince,
+and once on his way Don Juan had to tarry at every stage of the
+journey to witness ceremonial f&ecirc;tes held in his honor. Philip
+acted in good faith as far as his preparations went, but he wanted
+to save his galleys for use against the Moors of the Barbary coast,
+which was nearer the ports of Spain, and was indifferent to the
+outcome of the quarrel between Venice and the Porte. Undoubtedly
+Doria and the other Spanish officers were fully informed of their
+royal master's desires in this expedition as in the one of the
+year before. They were to avoid battle if they could.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On August 25 Don Juan arrived at Messina and was joyously received
+by the city and the fleet. Nevertheless, it <a name="page_102"><span
+class="page">Page 102</span></a> was the 12th of September before
+the decision was finally reached to seek out the Turkish fleet and
+offer battle. Fortunately Don Juan was a high-spirited youth who
+shared none of his brother's half-heartedness; he went to work to
+organize the discordant elements under his command into as much of
+a unit as he could, and to imbue them with the idea of aggressive
+action. In this spirit he was seconded by thousands of young nobles
+and soldiers of fortune from Spain and Italy, who had flocked to his
+standard like the knight errants of the age of chivalry, burning
+to distinguish themselves against the infidel. Among these, oddly
+enough, was a young Spaniard, Cervantes, who was destined in later
+years to laugh chivalry out of Europe by his immortal "Don Quixote."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In order to knit together the three elements, Spanish, Venetian,
+and Papal, Don Juan so distributed their forces that no single
+squadron could claim to belong to any one nation. As the Venetian
+galleys lacked men, he put aboard them Spanish and Italian infantry.
+Before leaving Messina, he had given every commander written
+instructions as to his cruising station and his place in the battle
+line. The fighting formation was to consist of three squadrons of
+the line and one of reserve. The left wing was to be commanded
+by the Venetian Barbarigo; the center, by Don Juan himself, in
+the flagship <i>Real</i>, with Colonna, the Papal commander on
+his right and Veniero, the Venetian commander, on his left, in
+their respective flagships. The right wing was intrusted to Doria,
+and the reserve, amounting to about thirty galleys, was under the
+Spaniard, Santa Cruz. In front of each squadron of the line two
+Venetian galleasses were to take station in order to break up the
+formation of the Turkish advance. The total fighting force consisted
+of 202 galleys, six galleasses, and 28,000 infantrymen besides
+sailors and oarsmen.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Venetian galleasses deserve special mention because they attracted
+considerable attention by the part they subsequently played in the
+action. Sometimes the word was applied to any specially large galley,
+but these represented something different from anything in either
+Christian or Turkish <a name="page_103"><span class="page">Page
+103</span></a> fleets. They were an attempt to reach a combination
+of galleon and galley, possessing the bulk, strength, and heavy
+armament of the former, together with the oar propulsion of the
+latter to render them independent of the wind. But like most, if
+not all, compromise types, the galleass was short-lived. It was
+clumsy and slow, being neither one thing nor the other. Most of the
+time on the cruise these galleasses had to be towed in order to
+keep up with the rest of the fleet. It is interesting to note that,
+despite the example of the <i>Galleon of Venice</i> at Prevesa,
+there was not a single galleon in the whole force.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On September 16 the start from Messina was made. The fleet crossed
+to the opposite shore of the Adriatic, creeping along the coast and
+in the lee of the islands after the manner of oar driven vessels
+that were unable to face a fresh breeze or a moderate sea. Delayed
+by unfavorable winds, it was not till October 6 that it arrived
+at the group of rocky islets lying just north of the opening of
+the Gulf of Corinth, or Lepanto[1] where the Turkish fleet was
+known to be mobilized. Meanwhile trouble had broken out among the
+Christians. Serious fighting had taken place between Venetians and
+Spaniards, and Veniero, without referring the case to Don Juan,
+had hanged a Spanish soldier who had been impudent to him, thus
+enraging the commander in chief. In a word, the various elements
+were nearly at the point of fighting each other before the object
+of their crusade was even sighted.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Lepanto is the modern name of Naupaktis, the naval
+base of Athens in the gulf. It had been a Venetian stronghold,
+but fell to the Turks in 1499. The name Lepanto is given to both
+the town and the gulf.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At dawn of the 7th the lookout on the <i>Real</i> sighted the van
+of the Turkish fleet coming out to the attack, and this news had a
+salutary effect. Don Juan called a council of war, silenced those
+like Doria who still counseled avoiding battle, and then in a swift
+sailing vessel went through the fleet exhorting officers and men
+to do their utmost. The sacrament was then administered to all,
+the galley slaves freed from their chains, and the standard of
+the Holy League, the figure of the Crucified Savior, was raised
+to the truck of the flagship.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_104"><span class="page">Page 104</span></a> As the
+Christians streamed down from the straits to meet their enemy,
+they faced a serious peril. The Turks were advancing in full array
+aided by a wind at their backs; the same wind naturally was against
+the Christians, who had to toil at their oars with great labor
+to make headway. If the wind held there was every prospect that
+the Turks would be able to fall upon their enemy before Don Juan
+could form his line of battle. Fortunately, toward noon the wind
+shifted so as to help the Christians and retard the Turks. This
+shift just enabled most of the squadrons to fall into their appointed
+stations before the collision. Two of the galleasses, however,
+were not able to reach their posts in advance of the right wing
+before the m&ecirc;l&eacute;e began, and the right wing itself,
+though it had ample time to take position, kept on its course to the
+south, leaving the rest of the fleet behind. To Turk and Christian
+alike this move on the part of Doria meant treachery, for which
+Doria's previous conduct gave ample color, but there was no time
+to draw back or reorganize the line.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Turkish force, numbering 222 galleys, swept on to the attack,
+also in three divisions, stretched out in a wide crescent. The
+commander in chief, Ali Pasha, led the center, his right was commanded
+by Sirocco, the Viceroy of Egypt, and his left by "Uluch" Ali. This
+arrangement should have brought Ali, the greatest of the Moslem
+seafighters of his day, face to face with Doria, the most celebrated
+admiral in Christendom. The two opposing lines swung together with a
+furious plying of oars and a tumult of shouting. The four galleasses
+stationed well in front of the Christian battle line opened an
+effective fire at close quarters on the foremost Turkish galleys
+as they swept past. In trying to avoid the heavy artillery of these
+floating fortresses, the Turks fell into confusion, losing their
+battle array almost at the very moment of contact, and masking
+the fire of many of their ships. This was an important service
+to the credit of the galleasses, but as they were too unwieldy to
+maneuver readily they seem to have taken no further part in the
+action.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The first contact took place about noon between Barbarigo's and
+Sirocco's squadrons. The Venetian had planned to rest <a
+name="page_105"><span class="page">Page 105</span></a> his left
+flank so close to the shore as to prevent the Turks from enveloping
+it, but Sirocco, who knew the depth of water better, was able to
+pour a stream of galleys between the end of Barbarigo's line and
+the coast so that the Christians at this point found themselves
+attacked in front and rear. For a while it looked as if the Turks
+would win, but the Christians fought with the courage of despair.
+There was no semblance of line left; only a m&ecirc;l&eacute;e of
+ships laid so close to each other as to form almost a continuous
+platform over which the fighting raged hand to hand. Both the leaders
+fell. Barbarigo was mortally wounded, and Sirocco was killed when
+his flagship was stormed. The loss of the Egyptian flagship and
+commander seemed to decide the struggle at this point. The Christian
+slaves, freed from the rowers' benches, were supplied with arms
+and joined in the fighting with the fury of vengeance on their
+masters. A backward movement set in among the Turkish ships; then
+many headed for the shore to escape.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile, shortly after the Christian left had been engaged the
+two centers crashed together. Such was the force of the impact
+that the beak of Ali Pasha's galley drove as far as the fourth
+rowing bench of the <i>Real</i>. Instantly a fury of battle burst
+forth around the opposing flagships. Attack and counter attack
+between Spanish infantry and Turkish Janissaries swayed back and
+forth across from one galley to another amid a terrific uproar.
+Once the <i>Real</i> was nearly taken, but Colonna jammed the bows
+of his galley alongside and saved the situation by a counter attack.
+On the other side of the flagship Veniero was also at one time in
+grave peril but was saved by the timely assistance of his comrades.
+Though wounded in the leg, this veteran of seventy fought throughout
+the action as stoutly as the youngest soldier.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The prompt action of Colonna turned the tide in the center, for
+after clearing the Turks from the deck of the <i>Real</i>, the
+Christians, now re&euml;nforced, made a supreme effort that swept
+the length of Ali Pasha's galley and left the Turkish commander in
+chief among the slain. In fighting of this character no quarter
+was given; of the 400 men on the Turkish <a name="page_106"><span
+class="page">Page 106</span></a> flagship not one was spared. Don
+Juan immediately hoisted the banner of the League to the masthead
+of the captured ship. This sign of victory broke the spirit of
+the Turks and nerved the Christians to redoubled efforts. As on
+the left wing so in the center the offensive now passed to the
+allies. Thus after two hours' fighting the Turks were already beaten
+on left and center, though fighting still went on hotly in tangled
+and scattered groups of ships.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 443px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig021.png" width="443" height="512" alt="Fig. 21">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF LEPANTO, OCT. 7. 1571</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Formation of the two fleets just before
+  contact, about 11 a. m.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the Christian right, however, the situation was different. Doria
+had from the beginning left the right center "in the air" by sailing
+away to the south. He explained this singular conduct afterwards by
+saying that he noticed Ali moving seaward as if to try an enveloping
+movement round the Christians' southern flank, and therefore moved
+to head <a name="page_107"><span class="page">Page 107</span></a>
+him off. However plausible this may be, the explanation did not
+satisfy Doria's captains, who obeyed his signals with indignant
+rage. At all events Ali had a considerably larger force than Doria,
+and after the latter had drawn away so far as to create a wide
+gap between his own squadron and the center, Ali suddenly swung
+his galleys about in line and fell upon the exposed flank, leaving
+Doria too far away to interfere. The Algerian singled out a detached
+group of about fifteen galleys, among which was the flagship of
+the Knights of Malta. No Christian flag was so hated as the banner
+of this Order, and the Turks fell upon these ships with shouts
+of triumph. One after another was taken and it began to look as
+if Ali would soon roll up the entire flank and pluck victory from
+defeat.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But Santa Cruz, who was still laboring through the straits when
+the battle began, was now in a position to help. After an hour's
+fighting with all the advantage on Ali's side, Santa Cruz arrived
+with his reserve squadron and turned the scale. By this time, too,
+Doria managed to reach the scene with a part of his squadron. Thus
+Ali found himself outnumbered and in danger of capture. Signaling
+retreat, he collected a number of his galleys and, boldly steering
+through the field of battle, escaped to lay at the feet of the
+Sultan the captured flag of the Knights of Malta. Some thirty-five
+others of his force made their way safely back to Lepanto.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The fighting did not end till evening. By that time the Christians
+had taken 117 galleys and 20 galliots, and sunk or burnt some fifty
+other ships of various sorts. Ten thousand Turks were captured and
+many thousands of Christian slaves rescued. The Christians lost
+7500 men; the Turks, about 30,000. It was an overwhelming victory.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As far as the tactics go, Lepanto was, like Salamis, an infantry
+battle on floating platforms. It was fought and won by the picked
+infantrymen of Spain and Italy; the day of seamanship had not yet
+arrived. For the conduct of the most distinguished admiral on the
+Christian side, Gian Andrea Doria, little justification can be
+found. Even if we accept his excuse at its face value, the event
+proved his folly. <a name="page_108"><span class="page">Page
+108</span></a> It is strange that in this, the supreme victory
+of the Cross over the Crescent on the sea, a Doria should have
+tarnished his reputation so foully, even as his great-uncle Andrea
+had tarnished his in the battle of Prevesa. It seems as if in both, as
+Genoese, the hatred of Venice extinguished every other consideration
+of loyalty to Christendom.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+What were the consequences of Lepanto, and in what sense can it
+be called a decisive battle? The question at first seems baffling.
+Overwhelming as was the defeat of the Turks, Ali had another fleet
+ready the next spring and was soon ravaging the seas again. Twice
+there came an opportunity for the two fleets to meet for another
+battle, but Ali declined the challenge. After Lepanto he seemed
+unwilling, without a great superiority, to risk another close action
+and contented himself with a "fleet in being." In this new attitude
+toward the Christians lies the hint to the answer. The significance
+of Lepanto lies in its moral effect. Never before had the Turkish
+fleet been so decisively beaten in a pitched battle. The fame of
+Lepanto rang through Europe and broke the legend of Turkish
+invincibility on the sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The material results, it must be admitted, were worse than nothing
+at the time. In 1573 Don Juan was amazed and infuriated to learn
+that Venice, contrary to the terms of the Holy League, had secretly
+arranged a separate peace with the Sultan. The terms she accepted
+were those of a beaten combatant. Venice agreed to the loss of
+Cyprus, paid an indemnity of 300,000 ducats, trebled her tribute
+for the use of Zante as a trading post, and restored to the Turk
+all captures made on the Albanian and Dalmatian coast. Apparently
+the Venetian had to have his trade at any price, including honor.
+At this news Don Juan tore down the standard of the allies and
+raised the flag of Castile and Aragon. In two years and after a
+brilliant victory, the eternal Holy League, which was pledged to
+last forever, fell in pieces.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As for Venice, her ignoble policy brought her little benefit. She
+steadily declined thereafter as a commercial and naval power. Her
+old markets were in the grip of the Turk, and the new discoveries of
+ocean routes to the east&mdash;beyond the <a name="page_109"><span
+class="page">Page 109</span></a> reach of the Moslem,&mdash;diverted
+the course of trade away from the Mediterranean, which became,
+more and more, a mere backwater of the world's commerce. In fact,
+it was not until the cutting of the Suez Canal that the inland
+sea regained its old time importance.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the long unsuccessful struggle of Christian against the Turk
+Venice must bear the chief blame, for she had the means and the
+opportunity to conquer if she had chosen the better part. And yet
+the story of this chapter shows also that the rest of Christendom
+was not blameless. If Christians in the much extolled Age of Faith
+had shown as much unity of spirit as the Infidels, the rule of the
+Turk would not have paralyzed Greece, the Balkans, the islands
+of the &AElig;gean, and the coasts of Asia Minor for nearly five
+centuries.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">La Guerre de Chypre et la Bataille de
+  L&eacute;pante</span>, J. P. Jurien de la Gravi&egrave;re, 1888.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+By the same author, <span class="sc">Doria et Barberousse</span>,
+ 1886.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Reign of Philip the Second</span> (vol.
+  III.), W. H. Prescott, 1858.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean</span>, E. Hamilton
+  Currey. This contains a full bibliography.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Navy of Venice</span>, Alethea Wiel, 1910.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Eastern Question</span> (chap. V.), J. A. R.
+  Marriott, 1917.<p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Barbary Corsairs</span>, Story of the Nations Series,
+  Lane-Poole, 1890.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span> (Introduction), J. S.
+  Corbett, 1898.</p>
+
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Geography and World Power</span>, James Fairgrieve,
+  1917.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_110"><span class="page">Page 110</span></a>
+CHAPTER VI</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+OPENING THE OCEAN ROUTES
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+1. PORTUGAL AND THE NEW ROUTE TO INDIA
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From the days of the Ph&oelig;nicians to the close of the 15th century,
+all trade between Europe and Asia crossed the land barrier east of
+the Mediterranean. Delivered by Mohammedan vessels at the head of
+the Persian Gulf or the ports of the Red Sea, merchandise followed
+thence the caravan routes across Arabia or Egypt to the Mediterranean,
+quadrupling in value in the transit. Intercourse between East and
+West, active under the Romans, was again stimulated by the crusades
+and by Venetian traders, until in the 14th and the 15th centuries
+the dyes, spices, perfumes, cottons, muslins, silks, and jewels
+of the Orient were in demand throughout the western world. This
+assurance of a ready market and large profits, combined with the
+capture of Constantinople by the Turks (1453), their piratical
+attacks in the Mediterranean which continued unchecked until Lepanto,
+and their final barring of all trade routes through the Levant,
+revived among nations of western Europe the old legends of all-water
+routes to Asia, either around Africa or directly westward across
+the unknown sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With the opening of ocean routes and the discovery of America,
+a rivalry in world trade and colonial expansion set in which has
+continued increasingly down to the present time, forming a dominant
+element in the foreign policies of maritime nations and a primary
+motive for the possession and use of navies. The development of
+overseas trade, involving the factors of merchant shipping, navies,
+and control of the seas, is thus an integral part of the history
+of sea power. The great voyages of discovery are also not to be
+disregarded, <a name="page_111"><span class="page">Page 111</span></a>
+supplying as they did the basis for colonial claims, and illustrating
+at the same time the progress of nautical science and geographical
+knowledge.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 533px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig022.png" width="533" height="344" alt="Fig. 22">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">CROSS-STAFF</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The art of navigation, though still crude, had by the 15th century
+so advanced that the sailor was no longer compelled to skirt the
+shore, with only rare ventures across open stretches of sea. The
+use of the compass, originating in China, had been learned from the
+Arabs by the crusaders, and is first mentioned in Europe towards
+the close of the 12th century. An Italian in England, describing a
+visit to the philosopher Roger Bacon in 1258, writes as follows:
+"Among other things he showed me an ugly black stone called a magnet
+... upon which, if a needle be rubbed and afterward fastened to
+a straw so that it shall float upon the water, the needle will
+instantly turn toward the pole-star; though the night be never so
+dark, yet shall the mariner be able by the help of this needle to
+steer his course aright. But no master-mariner," he adds, "dares
+to use it lest he should fall under the imputation of being a
+magician."[1] By the end of the 13th century <a name="page_112"><span
+class="page">Page 112</span></a> the compass was coming into general
+use; and when Columbus sailed he had an instrument divided as in
+later times into 360 degrees and 32 points, as well as a quadrant,
+sea-astrolabe, and other nautical devices. The astrolabe, an instrument
+for determining latitude by measuring the altitude of the sun or
+other heavenly body, was suspended from the finger by a ring and
+held upright at noon till the shadow of the sun passed the sights.
+The cross-staff, more frequently used for the same purpose by sailors
+of the time, was a simpler affair less affected by the ship's roll;
+it was held with the lower end of the cross-piece level with the
+horizon and the upper adjusted to a point on a line between the
+eye of the observer and the sun at the zenith. By these various
+means the sailor could steer a fixed course and determine latitude.
+He had, however, as yet no trustworthy means of reckoning longitude
+and no accurate gauge of distance traveled. The log-line was not
+invented until the 17th century, and accurate chronometers for
+determining longitude did not come into use until still later. A
+common practice of navigators, adopted by Columbus, was to steer
+first north or south along the coast and then due west on the parallel
+thought to lead to the destination sought.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Dante's tutor Brunetto Latini, quoted in <span
+class="sc">The Discovery of America</span>, Fiske, Vol. I, p. 314.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 798px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig023.png" width="798" height="501" alt="Fig. 23">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WORLD IN 1450, SHOWING
+THE VOYAGES OF COLUMBUS, VASCO DE GAMA, MAGELLAN, AND DRAKE</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With the revival of classical learning in the Renaissance, geographical
+theories also became less wildly imaginative than in the medieval
+period, the charts of which, though beautifully colored and highly
+decorated with fauna and flora, show no such accurate knowledge
+even of the old world as do those of the great geographer Ptolemy,
+who lived a thousand years before. Ptolemy (200 A.D.), in company
+with the majority of learned men since Aristotle, had declared
+the earth to be round and had even estimated its circumference
+with substantial accuracy, though he had misled later students
+by picturing the Indian Ocean as completely surrounded by Africa,
+which he conceived to extend indefinitely southward and join Asia
+on the southeast, leaving no sea-route open from the Atlantic. There
+was another body of opinion of long standing, however, which outlined
+Africa much as it actually is. Friar Roger Bacon, whose interest
+in the compass has already been mentioned, collected statements of
+classical <a name="page_113"></a><a name="page_114"><span class="page">
+Page 114</span></a> authorities and other evidence to show that
+Asia could be reached by sailing directly westward, and that the
+distance was not great; and this material was published in Paris
+in a popular <i>Imago Mundi</i> of 1410. In general, the best
+geographical knowledge of the period, though it underestimated the
+distance from Europe westward to Asia and was completely ignorant
+of the vast continents lying between, gave support to the theories
+which the voyages of Diaz, Vasco da Gama, and Columbus magnificently
+proved true.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When the best sailors of the time were Italians, and when astronomical
+and other scientific knowledge of use in navigation was largely
+monopolized by Arabs and Jews, it seems strange that the isolated
+and hitherto insignificant country of Portugal should have taken,
+and for a century or more maintained primacy in the great epoch
+of geographical discovery. The fact is explained, not so much by
+her proximity to the African coast and the outlying islands in the
+Atlantic, as by the energetic and well-directed patronage which
+Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460) extended to voyages of
+exploration and to the development of every branch of nautical
+art. The third son of John the Great of Portugal, and a nephew on
+his mother's side of Henry IV of England, the prince in 1415 led
+an armada to the capture of Ceuta from the Moors, and thereafter,
+as governor of the conquered territory and of the southern province
+of Portugal, settled at Saigres near Cape St. Vincent. On this
+promontory, almost at the western verge of the known world, Henry
+founded a city, Villa do Iffante, erected an observatory on the
+cliff, and gathered round him the best sailors, geographers and
+astronomers of his age.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 967px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig024.png" width="967" height="504" alt="Fig. 24">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">PORTUGUESE VOYAGES AND POSSESSIONS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Under this intelligent stimulus, Portuguese navigators within a
+century rounded the Cape of Good Hope, opened the sea route to
+the Indies, discovered Brazil, circumnavigated the globe, and made
+Portugal the richest nation in Europe, with a great colonial empire
+and claims to dominion over half the seas of the world. Portuguese
+ships carried her flag from Labrador (which reveals its discoverers
+in its name) and Nova Zembla to the Malay Archipelago and Japan.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_115"><span class="page">Page 115</span></a>
+<a name="page_116"><span class="page">Page 116</span></a> It is
+characteristic of the crusading spirit of the age that Prince Henry's
+first ventures down the African coast were in pursuance of a vague
+plan to ascend one of the African rivers and unite with the legendary
+Christian monarch Prester John (Presbyter or Bishop John, whose realm
+was then supposed to be located in Abyssinia) in a campaign against
+the Turk. But crusading zeal changed to dreams of wealth when his
+ships returned from the Senegal coast between 1440 and 1445 with
+elephants' tusks, gold, and negro slaves. The Gold Coast was already
+reached; the fabled dangers of equatorial waters&mdash;serpent
+rocks, whirlpools, liquid sun's rays and boiling rivers&mdash;were
+soon proved unreal; and before 1480 the coast well beyond the Congo
+was known.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The continental limits of Africa to southward, long clearly surmised,
+were verified by the voyage of Bartolomeo Diaz, in 1487. Diaz rounded
+the cape, sailed northward some 200 miles, and then, troubled by food
+shortage and heavy weather, turned backward. But he had blazed the
+trail. The cape he called <i>Tormentoso</i> (tempestuous) was renamed
+by his sovereign, Jo&atilde;o II, Cape <i>Bon Esperanto</i>&mdash;the
+Cape of Goad Hope. The Florentine professor Politian wrote to
+congratulate the king upon opening to Christianity "new lands,
+new seas, new worlds, dragged from secular darkness into the light
+of day."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It was not until ten years later that Vasco da Gama set out to
+complete the work of Diaz and establish contact between east and
+west. The contour of the African coast was now so well understood
+and the art of navigation so advanced that Vasco could steer a
+direct course across the open sea from the Cape Verde Islands to
+the southern extremity of Africa, a distance of 3770 miles (more
+than a thousand miles greater than that of Columbus' voyage from
+the Canaries to the Bahamas), which he covered in one hundred days.
+After touching at Mozambique, he caught the steady monsoon winds
+for Calicut, on the western coast of the peninsula of India, then
+a great <i>entrep&ocirc;t</i> where Mohammedan and Chinese fleets
+met each year to exchange wares. Thwarted here by the intrigues of
+Mohammedan traders, who were quick to realize <a name="page_117"><span
+class="page">Page 117</span></a> the danger threatening their commercial
+monopoly, he moved on to Cannanore, a port further north along the
+coast, took cargo, and set sail for home, reaching the Azores in
+August of 1499, with 55 of his original complement of 148 men.
+They came back, in the picturesque words of the Admiral, "With
+the pumps in their hands and the Virgin Mary in their mouths,"
+completing a total voyage of 13,000 miles. The profits are said
+to have been sixty-fold.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The ease with which in the next two decades Portugal extended and
+consolidated her conquest of eastern trade is readily accounted
+for. She was dependent indeed solely upon sea communications, over
+a distance so great as to make the task seem almost impossible.
+But the craft of the east were frail in construction and built for
+commerce rather than for warfare. The Chinese junks that came to
+India are described as immense in size, with large cabins for the
+officers and their families, vegetable gardens growing on board,
+and crews of as many as a thousand men; but they had sails of matted
+reed that could not be lowered, and their timbers were loosely
+fastened together with pegs and withes. The Arab ships, according
+to Marco Polo, were also built without the use of nails. Like the
+Portuguese themselves, the Arab or Mohammedan merchants belonged
+to a race of alien invaders, little liked by the native princes
+who retained petty sovereignties along the coast. But the real
+secret of Portuguese success lay in the fact that their rivals were
+traders rather than fighters, who had enjoyed a peaceful monopoly for
+centuries, and who could expect little aid from their own countries
+harassed by the Turk. The Portuguese on the other hand inherited
+the traditions of Mediterranean seamanship and warfare, and, above
+all, were engaged in a great national enterprise, led by the best
+men in the land, with enthusiastic government support.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After Vasco's return, fleets were sent out each year, to open the
+Indian ports by either force or diplomacy, destroy Moslem merchant
+vessels, and establish factories and garrisons. In 1505 Francisco de
+Almeida set sail with the largest fleet as yet fitted out (sixteen ships
+and sixteen caravels), an <a name="page_118"><span class="page">Page
+118</span></a> appointment as Viceroy of Cochin, Cannanore, and
+Quilon, and supreme authority from the Cape to the Malay Peninsula.
+Almeida in the next four years defeated the Mohammedan traders,
+who with the aid of Egypt had by this time organized to protect
+themselves, in a series of naval engagements, culminating on February
+3, 1509, in the decisive battle of Diu.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Mir Hussain, Admiral of the Gran Soldan of Egypt and commander in
+chief of the Mohammedan fleet in this battle, anchored his main
+force of more than a hundred ships in the mouth of the channel
+between the island of Diu and the mainland, designing to fall back
+before the Portuguese attack towards the island, where he could
+secure the aid of shore batteries and a swarm of 300 or more foists
+and other small craft in the harbor. Almeida had only 19 ships
+and 1300 men, but against his vigorous attack the flimsy vessels
+of the east were of little value. The battle was fought at close
+quarters in the old Mediterranean style, with saber, cutlass, and
+culverin; ramming, grappling, and boarding. Before nightfall Almeida
+had won. This victory ensured Portugal's commercial control in
+the eastern seas.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Alfonso d'Albuquerque, greatest of the Portuguese conquistadores,
+succeeded Almeida in 1509. Establishing headquarters in a central
+position at Goa, he sent a fleet eastward to Malacca, where he set
+up a fort and factory, and later fitted out expeditions against
+Ormuz and Aden, the two strongholds protecting respectively the
+entrances to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The attack on Aden
+failed, but Ormuz fell in 1515. Albuquerque died in the same year
+and was buried in his capital at Goa. His successor opened trade and
+founded factories in Ceylon. In 1526 a trading post was established
+at Hugli, near the mouth of the Ganges. Ormuz became a center for the
+Persian trade, Malacca for trade with Java, Sumatra, and the Spice
+Islands. A Portuguese envoy, Fernam de Andrada, reached Canton in
+1517&mdash;in the first European ship to enter Chinese waters&mdash;and
+Pekin three years later. Another adventurer named Mendez Pinto spent
+years in China and in 1548 established a factory near Yokohama,
+Japan. Brazil, where a squadron under Cabral had touched <a
+name="page_119"><span class="page">Page 119</span></a> as early
+as 1502, was by 1550 a prosperous colony, and in later centuries
+a chief source of wealth. Mozambique, Mombassa, and Malindi, on
+the southeastern coast of Africa, were taken and fortified as
+intermediate bases to protect the route to Asia. The muslins of
+Bengal, the calicoes of Calicut, the spices from the islands, the
+pepper of Malabar, the teas and silks of China and Japan, now found
+their way by direct ocean passage to the Lisbon quays.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A few strips along the African coast, tenuously held by sufferance
+of the great powers, and bits of territory at Goa, Daman, and Diu
+in India, are the twentieth century remnants of Portugal's colonial
+empire. The greater part of it fell away between 1580 and 1640, when
+Portugal was under Spanish rule. But her own system of colonial
+administration, or rather exploitation, was if possible worse than
+Spain's. Her scanty resources of man power were exhausted in colonial
+warfare. The expulsion of Protestants and Jews deprived her of
+elements in her population that might have known how to utilize
+wealth from the colonies to build up home trade and industries.
+Her situation was too distant from the European markets; and the
+raw materials landed at Lisbon were transshipped in Dutch bottoms
+for Amsterdam and Antwerp, which became the true centers of
+manufacturing and exchange. Cervantes, in 1607, could still speak
+of Lisbon as the greatest city in Europe,[1] but her greatness was
+already decaying; and her fate was sealed when Philip of Spain
+closed her ports to Dutch shipping, and Dutch ships themselves
+set sail for the east.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Persiles and Sigismuda</span>, III, i.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But the period of Portugal's maritime ascendancy cannot be left
+without recording, even if in barest outline, the circumnavigation
+of the globe by Fern&atilde;o da Magalh&atilde;es, or Magellan, who,
+though he made this last voyage of his under the Spanish flag, was
+Portuguese by birth and had proved his courage and iron resolution
+under Almeida and Albuquerque in Portugal's eastern campaigns.
+Seeking a westward passage to the Spice Islands, the five vessels
+of 75 to 100 tons composing his squadron cleared the mouth of the
+Guadalquivir <a name="page_120"><span class="page">Page 120</span></a>
+on September 20, 1519. They established winter quarters in the last
+of March at Port St. Julian on the coast of Patagonia. Here, on
+Easter Sunday, three of his Spanish captains mutinied. Magellan
+promptly threw a boat's crew armed with cutlasses aboard one of
+the mutinous ships, killed the leader, and overcame the unruly
+element in the crew. The two other ships he forced to surrender
+within 24 hours. One of the guilty captains was beheaded and the
+other marooned on the coast when the expedition left in September.
+Five weeks were now spent in the labyrinths of the strait which has
+since borne the leader's name. "When the capitayne Magalianes,"
+so runs the contemporary English translation of the story of the
+voyage, "was past the strayght and sawe the way open to the other
+mayne sea, he was so gladde thereof that for joy the teares fell
+from his eyes."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+He had sworn he would go on if he had to eat the leather from the
+ships' yards. With three vessels&mdash;one had been shipwrecked in
+the preceding winter and the other deserted in the straits&mdash;they
+set out across the vast unknown expanse of the Pacific. "In three
+monethes and xx dayes they sailed foure thousande leagues in one
+goulfe by the sayde sea called Pacificum.... And havying in this
+tyme consumed all their bysket and other vyttayles, they fell into
+such necessitie that they were in forced to eate the pouder that
+remayned thereof being now full of woormes.... Theyre freshe water
+was also putryfyed and become yellow. They dyd eate skynnes and
+pieces of lether which were foulded about certeyne great ropes
+of the shyps." On March 6, 1521, they reached the Ladrones, and
+ten days later, the Philippines, even these islands having never
+before been visited by Europeans. Here the leader was killed in a
+conflict with the natives. One ship was now abandoned, and another
+was later captured by the Portuguese. Of the five ships that had
+left Spain with 280 men, a single vessel, "with tackle worn and
+weather-beaten yards," and 18 gaunt survivors reached home. "It
+has not," writes the historian John Fiske of this voyage, "the
+unique historic position of the first voyage of Columbus, which
+brought together two streams of human life that had been <a
+name="page_121"><span class="page">Page 121</span></a> disjoined
+since the glacial period. But as an achievement in ocean navigation
+that voyage of Columbus sinks into insignificance beside it.... When
+we consider the frailness of the ships, the immeasurable extent of
+the unknown, the mutinies that were prevented or quelled, and the
+hardships that were endured, we can have no hesitation in speaking
+of Magellan as the prince of navigators."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Discovery of America</span>, Vol.
+II, p. 210.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">2. SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is generally taken for granted that the great movement of the
+Renaissance, which spread through western Europe in the 15th and
+the 16th centuries, quickening men's interest in the world about
+them rather than the world to come, and inspiring them with an
+eagerness and a confident belief in their own power to explore
+its hidden secrets, was among the forces which brought about the
+great geographical discoveries of the period. Its influence in
+this direction is evident enough in England and elsewhere later on;
+but, judging by the difficulties of Columbus in securing support,
+it was not in his time potent with those in control of government
+policy and government funds. The Italian navigator John Cabot and
+his son Sebastian made their voyages from England in 1498 and 1500
+with very feeble support from Henry VII, though it was upon their
+discoveries that England later based her American claims. Even in
+Spain there seems to have been little eagerness to emulate the
+methods by which her neighbor Portugal had so rapidly risen to
+wealth and power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But the influence of revived classical information on geographical
+matters was keenly felt; and the idea of a direct westerly passage
+to India was suggested, not only by Portugal's monopoly of the Cape
+route, but by classical authority, generally accepted by the best
+geographers of the time. The <i>Imago Mundi</i> of 1410, already
+mentioned, embodying Roger Bacon's arguments that the Atlantic washed
+the shores of Asia and that the voyage thither was not long, was a
+book <a name="page_122"><span class="page">Page 122</span></a>
+carefully studied by Columbus. Paul Toscanelli, a Florentine physicist
+and astronomer, adopting and developing this theory, sent in 1474 to
+Alfonso V of Portugal a map of the world in which he demonstrated
+the possibilities of the western route. The distance round the earth
+at the equator he estimated almost exactly to be 24,780 statute miles,
+and in the latitude of Lisbon 19,500 miles; but he so exaggerated
+the extent of Europe and Asia as to reduce the distance between
+them by an Atlantic voyage to about 6500 miles, putting the east
+coast of China in about the longitude of Oregon. This distance he
+still further shortened by locating Cipango (Japan) far to the
+eastward of Asia, in about the latitude of the Canary Islands and
+distant from them only 3250 miles.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With all these opinions Columbus was familiar, for the list of his
+library and the annotations still preserved in his own handwriting,
+show that he was not an ignorant sailor, nor yet a wild visionary,
+but prepared by closest study for the task to which he gave his
+later years. His earlier career, on the other hand, had supplied
+him with abundant practical knowledge. Born in Genoa, a mother
+city of great seamen, probably in the year 1436, he had received
+a fair education in Latin, geography, astronomy, drafting, and
+other subjects useful to the master-mariner of those days. He had
+sailed the Mediterranean, and prior to his great adventure, had
+been as far north as Iceland, and on many voyages down the African
+coast. Following his brother Bartholomew, who was a map-maker in
+the Portuguese service, he came about 1470 to Lisbon, even then a
+center of geographical knowledge and maritime activity. Probably
+as early as this time the idea of a western voyage was in his mind.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Skepticism may account for Portugal's failure to listen to his
+proposals; and her interest was already centered in the route around
+Africa under her exclusive control. The tale of his years of search
+for assistance is well known. Indeed, while the fame of Columbus
+rests rightly enough upon his discovery of a new world, of whose
+existence he had never dreamed and which he never admitted in his
+lifetime, his greatness is best shown by his faith in his vision,
+and the <a name="page_123"><span class="page">Page 123</span></a>
+steadfast energy and fortitude with which he pushed towards its
+practical accomplishment, during years of vain supplication, and
+amid the trials of the voyage itself. He had actually left Granada,
+when Isabella of Spain at last agreed to support his venture. In
+the contract later drawn up he drove a good bargain, contingent
+always upon success; he was to be admiral and viceroy of islands
+and continents discovered and their surrounding waters, with control
+of trading privileges and a tenth part of the wealth of all kinds
+derived.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With the explorations of Columbus on his first and his three later
+voyages (in 1496, 1498, and 1502) we are less concerned than with
+the first voyage itself as an illustration of the problems and
+dangers faced by the navigator of the time, and with the effect of
+the discovery of the new world upon Spain's rise as a sea power.
+The three caravels in which he sailed were typical craft of the
+period. The <i>Santa Maria</i>, the largest, was like the other
+two, a single-decked, lateen-rigged, three-masted vessel, with a
+length of about 90 feet, beam of about 20 feet, and a maximum speed
+of perhaps 6-1/2 knots. She was of 100 tons burden and carried 52
+men. The <i>Pinta</i> was somewhat smaller. The <i>Ni&ntilde;a</i>
+(Baby) was a tiny, half-decked vessel of 40 tons. Heavily timbered
+and seaworthy enough, the three caravels were short provisioned
+and manned in part from the rakings of the Palos jail.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Leaving Palos August 3, 1492, Columbus went first to the Canaries,
+and thence turned his prow directly westward, believing that he
+was on the parallel that touched the northern end of Japan. By
+a reckoning even more optimistic than Toscanelli's, he estimated
+the distance thither to be only 2500 miles. Thence he would sail
+to Quinsay (Hang Chow), the ancient capital of China, and deliver
+the letter he carried to the Khan of Cathay. The northeast trade
+winds bore them steadily westward, raising in the minds of the
+already fear-stricken sailors the certainty that against these
+head winds they could never beat back. At last they entered the
+vast expanse of the Sargasso Sea, six times as large as France,
+where they lay for a week almost becalmed, amid tangled masses of
+floating seaweeds. To add to their perplexities, they had passed
+the line <a name="page_124"><span class="page">Page 124</span></a> of
+no variation, and the needle now swung to the left of the pole-star
+instead of the right. On the last day of the outward voyage they were
+2300 miles to the westward according to the information Columbus
+shared with his officers and men; according to his secret log they
+were 2700 miles from the Canaries, and well beyond the paint where he
+had expected to strike the islands of the Asiatic coast. The mutinous
+and panic-stricken spirit of his subordinates, the uncertainty of
+Columbus himself, turned to rejoicing when at 2:00 A.M. of Friday,
+October 12, a sailor on the <i>Pinta</i> sighted the little island
+of the Bahamas, which, since the time of the Vikings, was the first
+land sighted by white men in the new world.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 829px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig025.png" width="829" height="658" alt="Fig. 25">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">FLAGSHIP OF COLUMBUS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The three vessels cruised southward, in the belief, expressed by
+the name Indian which they gave the natives, that they were in the
+archipelago east of Asia. Skirting the northern coast of Cuba and
+Hayti, they sought for traces of gold, and <a name="page_125"><span
+class="page">Page 125</span></a> information as to the way to the
+mainland. The <i>Santa Maria</i> was wrecked on Christmas Day; the
+<i>Pinta</i> became separated; Columbus returned in the little
+<i>Nin&atilde;</i>, putting in first at the Tagus, and reaching
+Palos on March 15, 1493.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though his voyage gave no immediate prospect of immense profits,
+yet it was the general belief that he had reached Asia, and by a
+route three times as short as that by the Cape of Good Hope. The
+Spanish court celebrated his return with rejoicing. Appealing to
+the Pope, at this time the Spaniard Rodrigo Bargia, King Ferdinand
+lost no time in securing holy sanction for his gains. A Papal bull
+of May 3, 1493, conferred upon Spain title to all lands discovered
+or yet to be discovered in the western ocean. Another on the day
+following divided the claims of Spain and Portugal by a line running
+north and south "100 leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde
+Islands" (an obscure statement in view of the fact that the Cape
+Verdes lie considerably to the westward of the other group), and
+granted to Spain a monopoly of commerce in the waters "west and
+south" (again an obscure phrase) of this line, so that no other
+nation could trade without license from the power in control. This
+was the extraordinary Papal decree dividing the waters of the world.
+Small wander that the French king, Francis I, remarked that he
+refused to recognize the title of the claimants till they could
+produce the will of Father Adam, making them universal heirs; or
+that Elizabeth, when a century later England became interested
+in world trade, disputed a division contrary not only to common
+sense and treaties but to "the law of nations." The Papal decree,
+intended merely to settle the differences of the two Catholic states,
+gave rise to endless disputes and preposterous claims.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The treaty of Tordesillas (1494) between Spain and Portugal fixed
+the line of demarcation more definitely, 370 miles west of the
+Cape Verde Islands, giving Portugal the Brazilian coast, and by
+an additional clause it made illegitimate trade a crime punishable
+by death. Another agreement in 1529 extended the line around to
+the Eastern Hemisphere, 17 degrees east of the Moluccas, which, if
+Spain had abided by it, <a name="page_126"><span class="page">Page
+126</span></a> would have excluded her from the Philippines. After
+Portugal fell under Spanish rule in 1580, Spain could claim dominion
+over all the southern seas.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 646px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig026.png" width="646" height="385" alt="Fig. 26">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">CHART OF A.D. 1589</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Showing Papal line of Demarcation</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The enthusiasm and confident expectation with which Spain set out
+to exploit the discoveries of Columbus's first voyage changed to
+disappointment when subsequent explorations revealed lands of
+continental dimensions to be sure, but populated by ignorant savages,
+with no thoroughfare to the ancient civilization and wealth of
+the East, and no promise of a solid, lucrative commerce such as
+Portugal had gained. Mines were opened in the West Indies, but it
+was not until the conquest of Mexico by Cortez (1519-1521) laid open
+the accumulated wealth of seven centuries that Spain had definite
+assurance of the treasure which was to pour out of America in a
+steadily increasing stream. The first two vessels laden with Mexican
+treasure returned in 1523. Ten years later the exploration and
+conquest of Peru by Pizarro trebled the influx of silver and gold.
+The silver mines of Europe were abandoned. The Emperor Charles, as
+Francis I said, could <a name="page_127"><span class="page">Page
+127</span></a> fight his European campaigns on the wealth of the
+Indies alone.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But between Spain and her "sinews of war" lay 3000 miles of ocean.
+To hold the colonies themselves, to guard the plate fleets against
+French, Dutch, and English raiders, to protect her own coastline
+and maintain communications with her possessions in Italy and the
+Low Countries, to wage war against the Turk in the Mediterranean,
+Spain felt the need of a navy. Indeed, in view of these varied
+motives for maritime strength, it is surprising that Spain depended
+so largely on impressed merchant vessels, and had made only the
+beginnings of a royal navy at the time of the Grand Armada.[1]
+Not primarily a nation of traders or sailors, she had, by grudging
+assistance to the greatest of sea explorers, fallen into a rich
+colonial empire, to secure and make the most of which called for
+sea power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: "For the kings of England have for many years been at
+the charge to build and furnish a navy of powerful ships for their
+own defense, and for the wars only; whereas the French, the Spaniards,
+the Portugals, and the Hollanders (till of late) have had no proper
+fleet belonging to their princes or state." Sir Walter Raleigh,
+<span class="sc">A Discourse of the Invention of Ships.</span>]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is possible, however, to lay undue stress on the factor just
+mentioned in accounting for both the rise and the decay of Spain.
+Her ascendancy in Europe in the 16th century was due chiefly to
+the immense territories united with her under Charles the Fifth
+(1500-1558), who inherited Spain, Burgundy, and the Low Countries,
+and added Austria with her German and Italian provinces by his
+accession to the imperial throne. Under Charles's powerful leadership
+Spain became the greatest nation in Europe; but at the same time her
+resources in men and wealth were exhausted in the almost constant
+warfare of his long reign. The treasures of America flowed through
+the land like water, in the expressive figure of a German historian,
+"not fertilizing it but laying it waste, and leaving sharper dearth
+behind."[2] The revenues of the plate fleet were pledged to German
+or Genoese bankers even before they reached the country, and were
+expended in the purchase of foreign luxuries or in waging imperial
+wars, <a name="page_128"><span class="page">Page 128</span></a>
+rather than in the encouragement of home agriculture, trade, and
+industry. While the vast possessions of church and nobility escaped
+taxation, the people were burdened with levies on the movement
+and sale of commodities and on the common necessities of life.
+Prohibition of imports to keep gold in the country was ineffectual,
+for without the supplies brought in by Dutch merchantmen Spain would
+have starved, and Philip II often had to connive in violations
+of his own restrictions. Prohibition of exports to keep prices
+down was an equally Quixotic measure, the chief effect of which
+was to kill trade. Spain could not supply the needs of her own
+colonies, and in fact illustrates the truth that a nation cannot,
+in the end, profit greatly by colonies unless it develops industries
+to utilize their raw materials and supply their demands.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">Das Zeitalter der Fugger</span>, Vol.
+II, p. 150.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For some time before the Armada Spain was on the downward path,
+as a result of the conditions mentioned. On the other hand, while
+the Armada relieved England of a terrible danger and dashed Spain's
+hope of domination in the north, it was not of itself a fatal blow.
+The war still continued, with other Spanish expeditions organized on
+a grand scale, and ended in 1604, so far as England was concerned,
+with that country's renunciation of trade to the Indies and aid
+to the Dutch.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But even if Spain's rise and decline were not primarily a result
+of sea power, still, taking the term to include the extension of
+shipping and maritime trade as well as the employment of naval
+forces in strictly military operations, there are lessons to be
+drawn from the use or neglect of sea power by both sides in Spain's
+long drawn-out struggle with Holland and England.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>General</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Expansion of Europe</span>, a History of the
+  Foundations of the Modern World, by Prof. W. C. Abbot, 1918.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Story of Geographical Discovery</span>, J.
+  Jacobs, 1913.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Ships and Their Ways of Other Days</span>, E. Keble
+  Chatterton, 1906.
+  <a name="page_129"><span class="page">Page 129</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Dawn of Navigation</span>, Thomas G. Ford, U.
+  S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. XXXIII., 1-3.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Dawn of Modern Geography</span>, 2 vols., C.
+  Raymond Beazley, 1904.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Portugal</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Prince Henry the Navigator</span>, C. Raymond
+  Beazley, 1895.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Vasco da Gama and his Successors</span>, 1460-1580,
+  K. G. Jayne, 1910.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Rise of Portuguese Power in India</span>, R. S.
+  Whiteway, 1910.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Cambridge Modern History</span>, Vol. I., Ch. I.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of the Indian Navy</span>, Lieut. C. R. Low,
+  1877.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Spain</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Discovery of America</span>, John Fiske, 1893.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Spain in America</span>, E. G. Bourne, American
+  Nation Series, 1909.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Spain</span>, Martin Hume, Cam. Modern Hist. Series,
+  1898.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_130"><span class="page">Page 130</span></a>
+CHAPTER VII</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+SEA POWER IN THE NORTH: HOLLAND'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The first sea-farers in the storm-swept waters of the north, at
+least in historic times, were the Teutonic tribes along the North
+Sea and the Baltic. On land the Teutons held the Rhine and the
+Danube against the legions of Rome, spread later southward and
+westward, and founded modern European states out of the wreckage
+of the Roman Empire. On the sea, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes in the
+5th century began plundering the coasts of what is now England,
+and, after driving the Celts into mountain fastnesses, established
+themselves in permanent control.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Vikings</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+These Teutonic voyagers were followed toward the close of the 8th
+century by their Scandinavian kindred to the northward, the
+Vikings&mdash;superb fighting men and daring sea-rovers who harried
+the coasts of western Europe for the next 200 years. There were no
+navies to stop them. "These sea dragons," exclaimed Charlemagne,
+"will tear my kingdom asunder!" In England no king before Alfred
+had a navy; and Alfred was compelled to organize a strong sea force
+to bring the invaders to terms.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Elsewhere the Vikings met little opposition. Wherever they found
+lands that attracted them, they conquered and settled dawn. Thus
+Normandy came into being. They swept up the rivers, burning and looting
+where they pleased, from the Elbe to the Rhone. They carried their
+raids as far south as Sicily and the Mediterranean coast of Africa,
+and <a name="page_131"><span class="page">Page 131</span></a> as far
+north and west as Iceland, Greenland, and the American continent.
+In the east, by establishing a Viking colony at Nishni Novgorod,
+they laid the foundations of the Russian empire, and their leader,
+Rus, gave it his name. Following river courses, others penetrated
+inland as far as Constantinople, where, being bought off by the
+emperor, they took service as imperial guards.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Their extraordinary voyages were made in boats that resemble so
+closely Greek and Roman models&mdash;even Ph&oelig;nician, for that
+matter&mdash;as to suggest that the Vikings learned their ship-building
+from Mediterranean traders who forced their way into the Baltic
+in very early times. For example, the Viking method of making a
+rib in three parts is identical with the method of the Greeks and
+Romans. The chief points of difference are that Viking ships were
+sharp at both ends&mdash;like a canoe, were round-bottomed instead
+of flat, and had one steering oar instead of two. The typical Viking
+ship was only about 75 feet in length; but a royal vessel&mdash;the
+<i>Dragon</i> of the chief&mdash;sometimes attained a length of
+300 feet, with sixty pairs of oars.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+If the Vikings had had national organization under one head, they
+might well have laid the rest of Europe under tribute. In the 11th
+century, Cnut, a descendant of the Vikings, ruled in person over
+England, Denmark, and Norway. But their ocean folk-wanderings seem
+to have ended as suddenly as they began, and the effects were social
+rather than political. Where they settled, they brought a strain
+of the hardiest racial stock in Europe to blend with that of the
+conquered peoples.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Hanseatic League</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the Middle Ages, peaceful trading gradually gained the upper
+hand over piracy and conquest. From the Italian cities the wares of
+the south and the Orient came over the passes of the Alps and down
+the German rivers, where trading cities grew up to act as carriers
+of merchandise and civilization among the nations of the north. The
+merchant guilds of <a name="page_132"><span class="page">Page
+132</span></a> these cities, banded together in the Hanseatic League,
+for at least three centuries dominated the northern seas.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Perhaps the most extensive commercial combination ever formed for
+the control of sea trade, the Hanseatic League began with a treaty
+between L&uuml;beck and Hamburg in 1174, and at the height of its
+power in the 14th and 15th centuries it included from 60 to 80
+cities, of which L&uuml;beck, Cologne, Brunswick, and Danzig were
+among the chief. The league cleared northern waters of pirates, and
+used embargo and naval power to subdue rivals and promote trade.
+It established factories or trading stations from Nishni Novgorod
+to Bergen, London, and Bruges. From Russia it took cargoes of fats,
+tallows, wax, and wares brought into Russian markets from the east;
+from Scandinavia, iron and copper; from England, hides and wool; from
+Germany, fish, grain, beer, and manufactured goods of all kinds. The
+British pound sterling (&Ouml;sterling) and pound avoirdupois, in
+fact the whole British system of weights and coinage, are legacies
+from the German merchants who once had their headquarters in the
+Steelyard, London.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the early 15th century the league attempted to shut Dutch ships
+from the Baltic trade by restricting their cargoes to wares produced
+in their own country, and by coercing Denmark into granting the
+league special privileges on the route through the Sound. This
+policy, culminating in the destruction of the Dutch grain fleet
+in 1437, led to a naval struggle which extended over four years
+and ended in a truce by which the Dutch secured the freedom of the
+Baltic. It was a typical naval war for sea control and commercial
+advantage, in which the Dutch as a rule seem to have got the better,
+and in which the legend first made its appearance of a Dutch admiral
+sweeping the seas with a broom nailed to his mast.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From this time the power of the Hansa declined. This was partly
+because the free cities came more and more under the rule of German
+princes with no interest in, or knowledge of, commerce; partly
+because of rivalry arising from the union of the Scandinavian states
+(1397) and the growth of <a name="page_133"><span class="page">Page
+133</span></a> England, France, and the Low Countries to national
+strength and commercial independence; and partly also because of
+the decline of German fisheries when the herring suddenly shifted
+from the Baltic to the North Sea. Underlying these varied causes,
+however, and significant of the far-reaching effect of changing
+trade-routes upon the progress and prosperity of nations, was the
+fact that, when the Mediterranean trade route was closed by the
+Turks, and also the route through Russia by Ivan III, the German
+cities were side-tracked. Antwerp and Amsterdam were not only more
+centrally located for the distribution of trade, but also much
+nearer for Atlantic traffic&mdash;an advantage which Germany has
+ever since keenly envied.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Long before the rise of the Low Countries as a maritime power,
+Ghent and Bruges had enjoyed an early pre&euml;minence owing to
+their development of cloth manufacture, and the latter city as a
+terminus for the galleys of Venice and Genoa. After the silting
+up of the port of Bruges (1432), Antwerp grew in importance, and
+in the 16th century became the chief market and money center of
+Europe. Its inhabitants numbered about 100,000, with a floating
+population of upwards of 50,000 more. It contained the counting-houses
+of the great bankers of Europe&mdash;the Fuggers of Germany, the
+Pazzi of Florence, the Dorias of Genoa. Five thousand merchants
+were registered on the Bourse, as many as 500 ships often left
+the city in a single day, and two or three thousand more might be
+seen anchored in the Scheldt or lying along the quays.[1] Amsterdam
+by 1560 was second to Antwerp with a population of 40,000, and
+forged ahead after the sack of Antwerp by Spanish soldiers in 1576
+and the Dutch blockade of the Scheldt during the struggle with
+Spain.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Blok, <span class="sc">History of the People of the
+Netherlands</span>, Part II, Ch. XII.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This early prosperity of the Netherland cities may be attributed
+less to aggressive maritime activity than to their flourishing
+industries, their natural advantages as trading centers at the
+mouths of the Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse, and the privileges of
+self-government enjoyed by the middle classes under the House of
+Burgundy and even under Charles the <a name="page_134"><span
+class="page">Page 134</span></a> Fifth. Charles taxed them
+heavily&mdash;his revenues from the Low Countries in reality far
+exceeded the treasure he drew from America; but he was a Fleming
+born, spoke their language, and accorded them a large measure of
+political and religious freedom. The grievances which after his
+death led to the Dutch War of Independence, are almost personified
+in the son who succeeded him in 1555&mdash;Philip II, a Spaniard
+born and bred, who spoke no Flemish and left Brussels for the last
+time in 1573, dour, treacherous, distrustful, fanatical in religion;
+a tragic character, who, no doubt with great injustice to the Spanish,
+has somehow come to represent the character of Spain in his time.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Dutch Struggle for Freedom</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The causes of the long war in the Netherlands, which began in 1566
+and ended with their independence 43 years later, is best explained
+in terms of general principles rather than specific grievances.
+"A conflict in which the principle of Catholicism with unlimited
+royal autocracy as Spain recognized it, was opposed to toleration
+in the realm of religion, with a national government according
+to ancient principles and based on ancient privileges,"&mdash;so
+the Dutch historian Blok sums up the issues at stake. The Prince
+of Orange, just before he was cut down by an assassin, asserted
+in his famous <i>Defense</i> three fundamental principles: freedom
+to worship God; withdrawal of foreigners; and restoration of the
+charters, privileges, and liberties of the land. The Dutch fought
+for political, religious, and also for economic independence. England
+gave aid, not so much for religious motives as because she saw
+that her political safety and commercial prosperity hinged on the
+weakening of Spain.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Resembling our American Revolution in the character of the struggle
+as well as the issues at stake&mdash;though it was far more bloody
+and desperate&mdash;the Dutch War of Independence was fought mainly
+within the country itself, with the population divided, and the
+Spanish depending on land forces to maintain their rule; but, as in
+the American war, control of <a name="page_135"><span class="page">Page
+135</span></a> the sea was a vital factor. For munitions, supplies,
+gold, for the transport of the troops themselves, Spain had to depend
+primarily on the sea. It is true one could continue on Spanish
+territory from Genoa, which was Spain's watergate into Italy, across
+the Mont Cenis Pass, and through Savoy, Burgundy, Lorraine, and
+Luxembourg to Brussels, and it was by this route that Parma's splendid
+army of 10,000 "Blackbeards" came in 1577. But this was an arduous
+three months' march for troops and still more difficult for supplies.
+To cross France was as a rule impossible; when Don Juan of Austria
+went to Flanders for the brief period of leadership ended by his
+death of camp fever in 1578, he passed through French territory
+disguised as a Moorish slave. By the sea route, upon which Spain
+was after all largely dependent, and the complete control of which
+would have made her task infinitely easier, she was constantly
+exposed to Huguenot, Dutch, and English privateers. These gentry
+cared little whether or not their country was actually at war with
+Spain, but took their letters of marque, if they carried them,
+from any prince or ruler who would serve their turn.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With this opportunity to strike at Spanish communications, it will
+appear strange that the Dutch should not have immediately seized
+their advantage and made it decisive. One curious difficulty lay
+in the fact that throughout the war Dutch shipping actually carried
+the bulk of Spanish trade and drew from it immense profits. Even
+at the close of the century, while the war was still continuing,
+nine-tenths of Spain's foreign trade and five-sixths of her home
+trade was in foreign&mdash;and most of it in Dutch&mdash;hands.
+Hence any form of sea warfare was sure to injure Dutch trade. The
+Revolution, moreover, began slowly and feebly, with no well-thought-out
+plan of campaign, and could not at once fit out fully organized
+forces to cope with those of Spain. The Dutch early took to commerce
+warfare, but it was at first semi-piratical, and involved the
+destruction of ships of their own countrymen.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Sea Beggars&mdash;<i>Zee Geuzen</i> or <i>Gueux der
+Mer</i>&mdash;made their appearance shortly after the outbreak of
+rebellion. <a name="page_136"><span class="page">Page 136</span></a>
+<a name="page_137"><span class="page">Page 137</span></a> "<i>Vyve
+les geus par mer et par terre,</i>" wrote the patriot Count van
+Brederode as early as 1566. The term "beggar" is said to have
+arisen from a contemptuous remark by a Spanish courtier to
+Margaret of Parma, when the Dutch nobles presented their grievances
+in Brussels. Willingly accepting the name, the patriots applied it
+to their forces both by land and by sea. Letters of marque were
+first issued by Louis of Nassau, brother of William of Orange,
+and in 1569 there were 18 ships engaged, increased in the next
+year to 84. The bloody and licentious De la Marek, who wore his
+hair and beard unshorn till he had avenged the execution of his
+relative, Egmont, was a typical leader of still more wild and reckless
+crews. It was no uncommon practice to go over the rail of a merchant
+ship with pike and ax and kill every Spaniard on board. In 1569
+William of Orange appointed the Seigneur de Lumbres as admiral of
+the beggar fleet, and issued strict instructions to him to secure
+better order, avoid attacks on vessels of friendly and neutral
+states, enforce the articles of war, and carry a preacher on each
+ship. The booty was to be divided one-third to the Prince for the
+maintenance of the war, one-third to the captains to supply their
+vessels, and one-third to the crews, one-tenth of this last share
+going to the admiral in general command.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 534px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig027.png" width="534" height="797" alt="Fig. 27">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 16TH CENTURY</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The events of commerce warfare, though they often involve desperate
+adventures and hard fighting, are not individually impressive, and
+the effectiveness of this warfare is best measured by collective
+results. On one occasion, when a fleet of transports fell into the
+hands of patriot forces off Flushing in 1572, not only were 1000
+troops taken, but also 500,000 crowns of gold and a rich cargo,
+the proceeds of which, it is stated, were sufficient to carry on the
+whole war for a period of two years. Again it was fear of pirates
+(Huguenot in this case) that in December of 1568 drove a squadron
+of Spanish transports into Plymouth, England, with 450,000 ducats
+($960,000) aboard for the pay of Spanish troops. Elizabeth seized
+the money (on the ground that it was still the property of the
+Genoese bankers who had lent it and that she might as well borrow
+it as Philip), and minted <a name="page_138"><span class="page">Page
+138</span></a> it into English coin at a profit of &pound;3000. But
+Alva at Antwerp, with no money at all, was forced to the obnoxious
+"Hundreds" tax&mdash;requiring a payment of one per cent on all
+possessions, five per cent on all real estate transfers, and 10
+per cent every time a piece of merchandise was sold&mdash;a typical
+tax after the Spanish recipe, which, though not finally enforced
+to its full extent, aroused every Netherlander as a fatal blow at
+national prosperity. To return to the general effect of commerce
+destruction, it is estimated that Spain thus lost annually 3,000,000
+ducats ($6,400,000), a sum which of course meant vastly more then
+than now. When the Duke of Alva retired from command in 1578, the
+pay of Spanish troops was 6,500,000 ducats in arrears.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Among the exploits of organized naval forces, the earliest was the
+capture of Brill, by which, according to Motley, "the foundations
+of the Dutch republic were laid." Driven out of England by Elizabeth,
+who upon the representations of the Spanish ambassador ordered her
+subjects not to supply the Beggars with "meat, bread or beer,"
+a fleet of 25 vessels and 300 or 400 men left Dover towards the
+end of March, 1572, with the project of seizing a base on their
+own coast. On the afternoon of April 1, they appeared off the town
+of Brill, located on an island at the mouth of the Meuse. The
+magistrates and most of the inhabitants fled; and the Beggars battered
+down the gates, occupied the town, and put to death 13 monks and
+priests. When Spanish forces attempted to recapture the city, the
+defenders opened sluice gates to cut off the northern approach,
+and at the same time set fire to the boats which had carried the
+Spanish to the island. The Spanish, terrorized by both fire and
+water, waded through mud and slime to the northern shore. During
+the same week Flushing was taken, and before the end of June the
+Dutch were masters of nearly the entire Zealand coast.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the north the Spanish at first found an able naval leader in
+Admiral Bossu, himself a Hollander, who for a time kept the coast
+clear of Beggars. In October, 1573, however, 30 of his ships were
+beaten in the Zuyder Zee by 25 under Dirkzoon, who captured five of
+the Spanish vessels and scattered the rest <a name="page_139"><span
+class="page">Page 139</span></a> with the exception of the flagship.
+The latter, a 32-gun ship terrifyingly named the <i>Inquisition</i>
+and much stronger than any of the others on either side, held out
+from three o'clock in the afternoon until the next morning. Three
+patriot vessels closed in on her, attacking with the vicious weapons
+of the period&mdash;pitch, boiling oil, and molten lead. By morning
+the four combatants had drifted ashore in a tangled mass. When Bossu
+at last surrendered, 300 men, out of 382 in his ship's complement,
+were dead or disabled.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though not yet able to stand up against Spanish infantry, the Dutch
+in naval battles were usually successful. In the Scheldt, January
+29, 1574, 75 Spanish vessels were attacked by 64 Dutch under Admiral
+Boisot. After a single broadside, the two fleets grappled, and in
+a two-hour fight at close quarters eight of the Spanish ships were
+captured, seven destroyed, and 1200 Spaniards killed. The Spanish
+commander, Julian Romero, escaped through a port-hole, is said to
+have remarked afterwards, "I told you I was a land fighter and no
+sailor; give me a hundred fleets and I would fare no better."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In September following, Admiral Boisot brought some of his victorious
+ships and sailors to the relief of Leyden, whose inhabitants and
+garrison had been reduced by siege to the very last extremities.
+The campaign that followed was typical of this amphibious war.
+Boisot's force, with those already an the scene, numbered about
+2500, equipped with some 200 shallow-draft boats and row-barges
+mounting an average of ten guns each. Among them was the curious
+<i>Ark of Delft</i>, with shot-proof bulwarks and paddle-wheels
+turned by a crank. As a result of ruthless flooding of the country,
+ten of the fifteen miles between Leyden and the outer dyke were
+easily passed; but five miles from the city ran the Landscheidung
+or inner dyke, which was above water, and beyond this an intricate
+system of canals and flooded polders, with forts and villages held
+by a Spanish force four times as strong. The most savage fighting
+on decks, dykes, and bridges marked every step forward; the Dutch in
+their native element attacking with cutlass, boathook and harpoon,
+while the superior military discipline of the Spanish could not
+<a name="page_140"><span class="page">Page 140</span></a> come
+in play. But at least 20 inches of water were necessary to float
+the Dutch vessels, and it was not until October 3 that a spring
+tide and a heavy northwest gale made it possible to reach the city
+walls. In storm and darkness, terrified by the rising waters, the
+Spanish fled. The relief of the city marked a turning-point in
+the history of the revolt.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the six terrible years of Alva's rule in the Netherlands
+(1567-1573) the Dutch sea forces contributed heavily toward the
+maintenance of the war, assured control of the Holland and Zealand
+coasts, and more than once, as at Brill and Leyden, proved the
+salvation of the patriot cause. Holland and Zealand, the storm-centers
+of rebellion, were not again so devastated, though the war dragged
+on for many years, maintained by the indomitable spirit of William
+of Orange until his assassination in 1584, and afterward by the
+military skill of Maurice of Nassau and the aid of foreign powers.
+The seven provinces north of the Scheldt, separating from the Catholic
+states of the south, prospered in trade and industry as they shook
+themselves free from the stifling rule of Spain. By a twelve-year
+truce, finally ratified in 1609, they became "free states over
+which Spain makes no pretensions," though their independence was
+not fully recognized until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The
+war, while it ruined Antwerp, increased the prosperity of Holland
+and Zealand, which for at least twenty years before the truce were
+busily extending their trade to every part of the world.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Growth of Dutch Commerce</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The story of this expansion of commerce is a striking record. The
+grain and timber of the Baltic, the wines of France and Spain, the
+salt of the Cape Verde Islands, the costly wares of the east, came
+to the ports of the Meuse and Zuyder Zee. In 1590 the first Dutch
+traders entered the Mediterranean, securing, eight years later, the
+permission of the Sultan to engage in Constantinople trade. In 1594
+their ships reached the Gold Coast, and a year later four vessels
+visited Madagascar, Goa, Java, and the Moluccas or Spice Islands.
+<a name="page_141"><span class="page">Page 141</span></a> A rich
+Zealand merchant had a factory at Archangel and a regular trade
+into the White Sea. Seeking a reward of 25,000 florins offered
+by the States for the discovery of a northeast passage, Jacob van
+Heimskirck sailed into the Arctic and wintered in Nova Zembla;
+Henry Hudson, in quest of a route northwestward, explored the river
+and the bay that bear his name and died in the Polar Seas.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Statistics, while not very trustworthy and not enlightening unless
+compared with those for other nations, may give some idea of the
+preponderance of Dutch shipping. At the time of the truce she is
+said to have had 16,300 ships, about 10,000 of which were small
+vessels in the coasting trade. Of the larger, 3000 were in the
+Baltic trade, 2000 in the Spanish, 600 sailed to Italy, and the
+remainder to the Mediterranean, South America, the Far East, and
+Archangel. The significance of these figures may be made clearer by
+citing Colbert's estimate that at a later period (1664) there were
+20,000 ships in general European carrying trade, 16,000 of which
+were Dutch. Throughout the 17th century Dutch commerce continued to
+prosper, and did not reach its zenith until early in the century
+following.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the closing years of the 16th century several private companies
+were founded in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Zealand to engage in eastern
+trade. These were combined in 1602 into the United East Indies
+Company, which sent large fleets to the Orient each year, easily
+ousted the Portuguese from their bases on the coast and islands,
+and soon established almost a monopoly, leaving to England only a
+small share of trade with Persia and northwest India. The relative
+resources invested by English and Dutch in Eastern ventures is
+suggested by the fact that the British East Indies Company founded
+in 1600 had a capital of &pound;80,000, while the Dutch Company
+had &pound;316,000. By 1620 the shares of the Dutch company had
+increased to three times their original value, and they paid average
+dividends of 18 per cent for the next 200 years.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this Dutch conquest of eastern trade, like that of the Portuguese
+a century earlier, we have an illustration of what <a
+name="page_142"><span class="page">Page 142</span></a> has since
+been a guiding principle in the history of sea power&mdash;a national
+policy of commercial expansion sturdily backed by foreign policy and
+whenever necessary by naval force. The element of national policy
+is evident in the fact that Holland&mdash;and England until the
+accession of James I in 1603&mdash;preferred war rather than acceptance
+of Spanish pretensions to exclusive rights in the southern seas.
+The Dutch, like the Portuguese, saw clearly the need of political
+control. They made strongholds of their trading bases, and gave
+their companies power to oust competitors by force. As a concession
+to Spanish pride, the commerce clause in the Truce of 1609 was
+made intentionally unintelligible&mdash;but the Dutch interpreted
+it to suit themselves. As for the element of force, every squadron
+that sailed to the east was a semi-military expedition. The Dutch
+seaman was sailor, fighter, and trader combined. The merchant was
+truly, in the phrase of the age, a "merchant adventurer," lucky
+indeed and enriched if, after facing the perils of navigation in
+strange waters, the possible hostility of native rulers, and the
+still greater danger from European rivals, half his ships returned.
+The last statement is no hyperbole; of 9 ships sent to the East
+from Amsterdam in 1598, four came back, and just half of the 22
+sent out from the entire Netherlands.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From time to time, either to maintain the blockade of the Scheldt
+and assist in operations on the Flanders coast, or to protect their
+trade and strike a direct blow at Spain, the Dutch fitted out purely
+naval expeditions. One of the most effective, from the standpoint
+of actual fighting, was that led by van Heimskirck, already famous
+for Arctic exploration and exploits in the Far East. In 1607 he
+took 21 converted merchantmen and 4 transports to the Spanish coast
+to protect Dutch vessels from the east and the Mediterranean.
+Encountering off Gibraltar an enemy force of 11 large galleons
+and as many galleys under Alvarez d'Avila, a veteran of Lepanto,
+he destroyed half the Spanish force and drove the rest into port,
+killing about 2000 Spanish and coming out of the fight with the
+loss of only 100 men. Heimskirck concentrated upon the galleons and
+came to close action after <a name="page_143"><span class="page">Page
+143</span></a> the fashion which seems to have been characteristic
+of the Dutch in naval engagements throughout the war. "Hold your
+fire till you hear the crash," he cried, as he drove his prow into
+the enemy flagship; and the battle was won after a struggle yard-arm
+to yard-arm. Bath admirals were killed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Portugal, broken by the Spanish yoke, could offer little resistance
+in the Far East. In 1606 a Dutch fleet of 12 ships under Matelieff
+de Jonge laid siege to Malacca, and gave up the attempt only after
+destroying 10 galleons sent to relieve the town. Matelieff then
+sailed to the neighboring islands, and established the authority
+of the company at Bantam, Amboyna, Ternate, and other centers of
+trade.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Other fleets earlier and later promoted the interests of the company
+by the same means. English traders, with scanty government encouragement
+from the Stuart kings, were not as yet dangerous rivals. A conflict
+occurred with them in 1611 off Surat; and at Amboyna in 1623 the
+Dutch seized the English Company's men, tortured ten of them, and
+broke up the English base. For more than a century Holland remained
+supreme in the east; she has retained her colonial empire down to
+the 20th century; and she did not surrender her commercial primacy
+until exhausted by the combined attacks of England and France.
+Less successful than England in the development of colonies, she
+has stood out as the greatest of trading nations.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Vikings</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Viking Age</span>, H. F. Du Chaillu, 1889.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Hansa</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Hansa Towns</span>, H. Zimmerman, 1889.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of Commerce</span>, Clive Day, 1913
+  (bibliography).</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Civilization During the Middle Ages</span>, George
+  Burton Adams, 1918.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Cambridge Modern History</span>, Vols. I and II.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Dutch Sea Power</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic</span> (still the
+  best source in English for political and naval history of the period).
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<a name="page_144"><span class="page">Page 144</span></a>
+<span class="sc">History of the People of the Netherlands</span>, P.
+  J. Blok, trans. Ruth Putnam, 1898-1912.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">History of Commerce in Europe</span>, W. H. Gibbins,
+  1917.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Sea Beggars</span>, Dingman Versteg, 1901.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Some Exploits of the Old Dutch Navy</span>, Lieut. H.
+  H. Frost, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1919.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_145"><span class="page">Page 145</span></a>
+CHAPTER VIII</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By reason of England's insularity, it is an easy matter to find
+instances from even her early history of the salutary or fatal
+influence of sea power. Romans, Saxons, Danes swept down upon England
+from the sea. By building a fleet, King Alfred, said to have been
+the true father of the British navy, kept back the Danes. It was
+the dispersion of the English fleet by reason of the lateness of
+the season that enabled William the Conqueror, in the small open
+vessels interestingly pictured in the Bayeux tapestry, to win a
+footing on the English shore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But during the next three centuries, with little shipping and little
+trade save that carried on by the Hansa, with no enemy that dangerously
+threatened her by sea, England had neither the motives nor the
+national strength and unity to develop naval power. She claimed,
+it is true, dominion over the narrow waters between her and her
+possessions in France, and also over the "four seas" surrounding
+her; and as early as 1201 an ordinance was passed requiring vessels
+in these waters to lower sails ("vail the bonnet") and also to
+"lie by the lee" when so ordered by King's ships. But though these
+claims were revived in the 17th century against the Dutch, and
+though the requirement that foreign vessels strike their topsails
+to the British flag remained in the Admiralty Instructions until
+after Trafalgar, they were at this time enforced chiefly to rid the
+seas of pirates&mdash;the common enemies of nations. During this
+period there were a few "king's ships," the sovereign's personal
+property, forming a nucleus around which a naval force of fishing
+and merchant vessels could be assembled in time of war. The Cinque
+Ports, originally Dover, Sandwich, Hastings, Romney and Hythe, long
+enjoyed certain trading <a name="page_146"><span class="page">Page
+146</span></a> privileges in return for the agreement that when
+the king passed overseas they would "rigge up fiftie and seven
+ships" (according to a charter of Edward I) with 20 armed soldiers
+each, and maintain them for 15 days.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+An attack in 1217 by such a fleet, under the Governor of Dover
+Castle, affords perhaps the earliest instance of maneuvering for
+the weather-gage. The English came down from the windward and, as
+they scrambled aboard the enemy, threw quicklime into the Frenchmen's
+eyes. At Sluis, in 1340, to take another instance of early English
+naval warfare, Edward III defeated a large French fleet and a number
+of hired Genoese galleys lashed side by side in the little river
+Eede in Flanders. Edward came in with a fair wind and tide and fell
+upon the enemy as they lay aground at the stem and unmanageable.
+This victory gave control of the Channel for the transport of troops
+in the following campaign. But like most early naval combats, it
+was practically a land battle over decks, and, although sanguinary
+enough, it is from a naval stand paint interesting chiefly for
+such novelties as a scouting force of knights on horseback along
+the shore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The beginnings of a permanent and strong naval establishment, as
+distinct from merchant vessels owned by the king or in his service,
+must be dated, however, from the Tudors and the period of national
+rehabilitation following the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and
+the War of the Roses (1455-1485). One reason for this was that
+the employment of artillery on shipboard and the introduction of
+port-holes made it increasingly difficult to convert merchant craft
+into dependable men-of-war. Henry VIII took a keen interest in
+his navy, devoted the revenues of forfeited church property to
+its expansion, established the first Navy Board (1546), and is
+even credited with the adoption of sailing vessels as the major
+units of his fleet.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>From Oar to Sail</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The use of heavy ordnance, already mentioned, as well as the increasing
+size and efficiency of sail-craft that came with <a
+name="page_147"><span class="page">Page 147</span></a> the spread
+of ocean commerce and navigation, naturally pointed the way to this
+transition in warfare from oar to sail. The galley was at best
+a frail affair, cumbered with oars, benches and rowers, unable to
+carry heavy guns or withstand their fire. Once sailing vessels had
+attained reasonable maneuvering qualities, their superior strength
+and size, reduced number of non-combatant personnel, and increased
+seaworthiness and cruising radius gave them a tremendous superiority.
+That the change should have begun in the north rather than in the
+Mediterranean, where naval and military science had reached its
+highest development, must be attributed not only to the rougher
+weather conditions of the northern seas, and the difficulty of
+obtaining slaves as rowers, but also to the fact that the southern
+nations were more completely shackled by the traditions of galley
+warfare.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 532px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig028.png" width="532" height="398" alt="Fig. 28">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">GALLEON</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Yet for the new type it was the splendid trading vessels of Venice that
+supplied the design. For the Antwerp and London <a name="page_148"><span
+class="page">Page 148</span></a> trade, and in protection against
+the increasing danger from pirates, the Venetians had developed a
+compromise between the war-galley and the round-ship of commerce,
+a type with three masts and propelled at least primarily by sails,
+with a length about three times its beam and thus shorter and more
+seaworthy than the galley, but longer, lower and swifter than the
+clumsy round-ship. To this new type the names <i>galleass</i> and
+<i>galleon</i> were bath given, but in English and later usage
+<i>galleass</i> came to be applied to war vessels combining oar
+and sail, and <i>galleon</i> to either war or trading vessels of
+medium size and length and propelled by sail alone.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Spanish found the galleon useful in the Atlantic carrying trade,
+but, as shown at Lepanto, they retained the galley in warfare;
+whereas Henry VIII of England was probably the first definitely
+to favor sail for his men-of-war. An English navy list of 1545
+shows four clumsy old-fashioned "great-ships" of upwards of 1000
+tons, but second to these a dozen newer vessels of distinctly galleon
+lines, lower than the great-ships, flush-decked, and sail-driven.
+Though in engagements with French galleys during the campaign of
+1545 these were handicapped by calm weather, they seem to have
+held their own both in battle and in naval opinion. Of the royal
+ships at the opening of Elizabeth's reign (1558), there were 11
+large sailing vessels of 200 tans and upwards, and 10 smaller ones,
+but only two galleys, and these "of no continuance and not worth
+repair."[1] In comment on these figures, it should be added that
+there were half a hundred large ships available from the merchant
+service, and also that pinnaces and other small craft still combined
+oar and sail.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Corbett,
+Vol. I, p. 133.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In England the superiority of sail propulsion was soon definitely
+recognized, and discussion later centered on the relative merits of
+the medium-sized galleon and the big "great-ship." The characteristics
+of each are well set forth in a contemporary naval treatise by Sir
+William Monson: the former with "flush deck fore and aft, sunk
+and low in the water; the other lofty and high-charged, with a
+half-deck, forecastle, and copperidge-heads [athwortship bulkheads
+where light guns were <a name="page_149"><span class="page">Page
+149</span></a> mounted to command the space between decks]." The
+advantages of the first were that she was speedy and "a fast ship
+by the wind" so as to avoid boarding by the enemy, and could run in
+close and fire effective broadsides between wind and water without
+being touched; whereas the big ship was more terrifying, more
+commodious, stronger, and could carry more and heavier guns. Monson,
+like many a later expert, suspended judgment regarding the two types;
+but Sir Walter Raleigh came out strongly for the smaller design.
+"The greatest ships," he writes, "are the least serviceable....,
+less nimble, less maniable; 'Grande navi grande fatiga,' saith the
+Spaniard. A ship of 600 tons will carry as good ordnance as a ship
+of 1200 tons; and though the greater have double her number, the
+lesser will turn her broadsides twice before the greater can wind
+once." And elsewhere: "The high charging of ships makes them extreme
+leeward, makes them sink deep in the water, makes them labor, and
+makes them overset. Men may not expect the ease of many cabins
+and safety at once in sea-service."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Works</span>, Oxford ed. 1829, Vol.
+VIII, p. 338.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+These statements were made after the Armada; but the trend of English
+naval construction away from unwieldy ships such as used by the
+Spanish in the Armada, is clearly seen in vessels dating from
+1570-1580&mdash;the <i>Foresight, Bull,</i> and <i>Tiger</i> (rebuilt
+from galleasses), the <i>Swiftsure, Dreadnought, Revenge,</i> and
+others of names renowned in naval annals. These were all of about
+the dimensions of the <i>Revenge,</i> which was of 440 tons, 92
+feet over all, 32 feet beam, and 15 feet from deck to keel. That
+is to say, their length was not more than three times their beam,
+and their beam was about twice their depth in the hold&mdash;the
+characteristic proportions of the galleon type.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The progressiveness of English ship construction is highly significant,
+for to it may be attributed in large measure the Armada victory.
+Spain had made no such advances; in fact, until the decade of the
+Armada, she hardly had such a thing as a royal navy. The superiority
+of the English ships was generally recognized. An English naval
+writer in 1570 declared <a name="page_150"><span class="page">Page
+150</span></a> the ships of his nation so fine "none of any other
+region may seem comparable to them"; and a Spaniard some years
+later testified that his people regarded "one English ship worth
+four of theirs."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though not larger than frigates of Nelson's time, these ships were
+crowded with an even heavier armament, comprising guns of all sizes
+and of picturesque but bewildering nomenclature. According to
+Corbett,[1] the ordnance may be divided into four main classes
+based on caliber, the first two of the "long gun" and the other
+two of the carronade or mortar type.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Vol.
+I, p. 384.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+I. Cannon proper, from 16 to 28 caliber, of 8.5-inch bore and 12
+feet in length, firing 65-pound shot. The demi-cannon, which was
+the largest gun carried on ships of the time, was 6.5 inches by
+9 feet and fired 30-pound shot.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+II. Culverins, 28 to 34 caliber long guns, 5 inches by 12 feet,
+firing 17-pound shot. Demi-culverins were 9-pounders. Slings, bases,
+sakers, port-pieces, and fowlers belonged to this class.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+III. Perriers, from 6 to 8 caliber, firing stone-balls, shells,
+fire-balls, etc.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+IV. Mortars, of 1.5 caliber, including petards and murderers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The "great ordnance," or cannon, were muzzle-loading. The secondary
+armament, mounted in tops, cageworks, bulkheads, etc., were
+breech-loading; but these smaller pieces fell out of favor as time
+went on owing to reliance on long-range fire and rareness of boarding
+actions. Down to the middle of the 19th century there was no great
+improvement in ordnance, save in the way of better powder and boring.
+Even in Elizabeth's day the heaviest cannon had a range of three
+miles.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+These advances in ship design and armament were accompanied by
+some changes in naval administration. In 1546 the Navy Board was
+created, which continued to handle matters of what may be termed
+civil administration until its functions were taken over by the
+Board of Admiralty in the reorganization of 1832. The chief members
+of the Navy Board, the <a name="page_151"><span class="page">Page
+151</span></a> Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor of Ships, Surveyor
+of Ordnance, and Clerk of Ships, were in Elizabethan times usually
+experienced in sea affairs. To John Hawkins, Treasurer from 1578 to
+1595, belongs chief credit for the excellent condition of ships in
+his day. The Lord High Admiral, a member of the nobility, exercised at
+least nominal command of the fleet in peace and war. For vice admiral
+under him a man of practical experience was ordinarily chosen. On
+shipboard, the only "gentleman" officers were the captains; the
+rest&mdash;masters, master's mates, pilots, carpenters, boatswains,
+coxswains, and gunners&mdash;were, to quote a contemporary description,
+"mechanick men that had been bred up from swabbers." But owing
+to the small proportion of soldiers on board, the English ships
+were not like those of Spain, which were organized like a camp,
+with the soldier element supreme and the sailors "slaves to the
+rest."
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Political Situation</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The steps taken to build up the navy in the decade or more preceding
+the Armada were well justified by the political and religious strife
+in western Europe and the dangers which on all sides threatened the
+English realm. France, the Netherlands, and Scotland were torn by
+religious warfare. In England the party with open or secret Catholic
+sympathies was large, amounting to perhaps half the population,
+the strength of whose loyalty to Elizabeth it was difficult to
+gage. Since 1568 Elizabeth had held captive Mary Queen of Scots,
+driven out of her own country by the Presbyterian hierarchy, and
+a Catholic with hereditary claims to the English throne. Before
+her death, Philip of Spain had conspired with her to assassinate
+the heretic Elizabeth; after Mary's execution in 1587 he became
+heir to her claims and entered the more willingly upon the task
+of conquering England and restoring it to the faith. For years,
+in fact, there had been a state of undeclared hostility between
+England and Spain, and acts which, with sovereigns less cautious
+and astute than both Elizabeth and Philip, would have meant war.
+In 1585 Elizabeth formed an alliance <a name="page_152"><span
+class="page">Page 152</span></a> with the Netherlands, and sent
+her favorite, Leicester, there as governor-general, and Sir Philip
+Sidney as Governor of Flushing, which with two other "cautionary
+towns" she took as pledges of Dutch loyalty. The motives for this
+action are well stated in a paper drawn up by the English Privy
+Council in 1584, presenting a situation interesting in its analogy
+to that which faced the United States when it entered the World
+War:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"The conclusion of the whole was this: Although her Majesty should
+thereby enter into the war presently, yet were she better to do
+it now, while she may make the same out of her realm, having the
+help of the people of Holland, and before the King of Spain shall
+have consummated his conquest of those countries, whereby he shall
+be so provoked by pride, solicited by the Pope, and tempted by
+the Queen's own subjects, and shall be so strong by sea; and so
+free from all other actions and quarrels&mdash;yea, shall be so
+formidable to all the rest of Christendom, as that her Majesty
+shall no wise be able, with her own power, nor with the aid of
+any other, neither by land nor sea, to withstand his attempts,
+but shall be forced to give place to his insatiable malice, which
+is most terrible to be thought of, but miserable to suffer."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+These were the compelling reasons for England's entry into the
+war. The aid to Holland and the execution of Mary, on the other
+hand, were sufficient to explain Philip's attempted invasion. The
+grievance of Spain owing to the incursions of Hawkins and Drake
+into her American possessions, and England's desire to break Spain's
+commercial monopoly, were at the time relatively subordinate, though
+from a naval standpoint the voyages are interesting in themselves
+and important in the history of sea control and sea trade.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Hawkins and Drake</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+John Hawkins was a well-to-do ship-owner of Plymouth, and as already
+stated, Treasurer of the Royal Navy, with a contract for the upkeep
+of ships. His first venture to the Spanish Main was in 1562, when he
+kidnapped 300 negroes on <a name="page_153"><span class="page">Page
+153</span></a> the Portuguese coast of Africa and exchanged them
+at Hispanola (Haiti), for West Indian products, chartering two
+additional vessels to take his cargo home. Though he might have
+been put to death if caught by either Portugal or Spain, his profits
+were so handsome by the double exchange that he tried it again in
+1565, this time taking his "choice negroes at &pound;160 each" to
+Terra Firme, or the Spanish Main, including the coasts of Venezuela,
+Colombia, and the Isthmus. When the Spanish authorities, warned
+by their home government, made some show of resistance, Hawkins
+threatened bombardment, landed his men, and did business by force,
+the inhabitants conniving in a contraband trade very profitable
+to them.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On his third voyage he had six vessels, two of which, the <i>Jesus
+of Lubeck</i> and the <i>Minion</i>, were Queen's ships hired out
+for the voyage. The skipper of one of the smaller vessels, the
+<i>Judith</i>, was Francis Drake, a relative and prot&eacute;g&eacute;
+of the Hawkins family, and then a youth of twenty-two. On September
+16, 1567, after a series of encounters stormier than ever in the
+Spanish settlements, the squadron homeward bound was driven by
+bad weather into the port of Mexico City in San Juan de Ulua Bay.
+Here, having a decided superiority over the vessels in the harbor,
+Hawkins secured the privilege of mooring and refitting his ships
+inside the island that formed a natural breakwater, and mounted
+guns on the island itself. To his surprise next morning, he beheld
+in the offing 13 ships of Spain led by an armed galleon and having
+on board the newly appointed Mexican viceroy. Hawkins, though his
+guns commanded the entrance, took hostages and made some sort of
+agreement by which the Spanish ships were allowed to come in and
+moor alongside. But the situation was too tense to carry off without
+an explosion. Three days later the English were suddenly attacked
+on sea and shore. They at once leaped into their ships and cut
+their cables, but though they hammered the Spanish severely in the
+fight that followed, only two English vessels, the <i>Minion</i>
+and the <i>Judith</i>, escaped, the <i>Minion</i> so overcrowded
+that Hawkins had to drop 100 of his crew on the Mexican coast.
+Drake made straight for Plymouth, nursing a bitter grievance at
+the alleged breach of <a name="page_154"><span class="page">Page
+154</span></a> faith, and vowing vengeance on the whole Spanish
+race. "The case," as Drake's biographer, Thomas Fuller, says, "was
+clear in sea-divinity, and few are such infidels as not to believe
+doctrines which make for their own profit."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Holy State</span>, Bk. II, Ch.
+XXII.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the next three years, following the example of many a French
+Huguenot privateersman before him, and forsaking trade for semi-private
+reprisal (in that epoch a few degrees short of piracy), he made
+three voyages to the Spanish Indies. On the third, in 1572, he
+raided Nombre de Dios with fire and sword. Then, leaguing himself
+with the mixed-breed natives or cameroons, he waylaid a guarded
+mule-train bearing treasure across the Isthmus, securing 15 tons of
+silver which he buried, and as much gold as his men could stagger
+away under. It was on this foray that he first saw the Pacific
+from a height of the Cordilleras, and resolved to steer an English
+squadron into this hitherto unmolested Spanish sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The tale of Drake's voyage into the Pacific and circumnavigation
+of the globe is a piratical epic, the episodes of which, however,
+find some justification in the state of virtual though undeclared
+hostilities between England and Spain, in the Queen's secret sanction,
+and in Spain's own policy of ruthless spoliation in America. Starting
+at the close of 1577 with five small vessels, the squadron was reduced
+by shipwreck and desertion until only the flagship remained when Drake
+at last, on September 6 of the next year, achieved his midwinter
+passage of the Straits of Magellan and bore down, "like a visitation
+of God" as a Spaniard said, upon the weakly defended ports of the
+west coast. After ballasting his ship with silver from the rich
+Potosi mines, and rifling even the churches, he hastened onward in
+pursuit of a richly laden galleon nicknamed <i>Cacafuego</i>&mdash;a
+name discreetly translated <i>Spitfire</i>, but which, to repeat a
+joke that greatly amused Drake's men at the time, it was proposed
+to change to <i>Spitsilver</i>, for when overtaken and captured the
+vessel yielded 26 tons of silver, 13 chests of pieces of eight,
+and gold and jewels sufficient to swell the booty to half a million
+pounds sterling.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For 20 years the voyage across the northern Pacific had been <a
+name="page_155"><span class="page">Page 155</span></a> familiar to
+the Spanish, who had studied winds and currents, laid down routes,
+and made regular crossings. Having picked up charts and China pilots,
+and left the whole coast in panic fear, Drake sailed far to the
+northward, overhauled his ship in a bay above San Francisco, then
+struck across the Pacific, and at last rounded Good Hope and put
+into Plymouth in September of the third year. It suited Elizabeth's
+policy to countenance the voyage. She put the major part of the
+treasure into the Tower, took some trinkets herself, knighted Drake
+aboard the <i>Golden Hind</i>, and when the Spanish ambassador
+talked war she told him, in a quiet tone of voice, that she would
+throw him into a dungeon.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This red-bearded, short and thickset Devon skipper, bold of speech
+as of action, was now the most renowned sailor of England, with a
+name that inspired terror on every coast of Spain. It was inevitable,
+therefore, that when Elizabeth resolved upon open reprisals in
+1585, Drake should be chosen to lead another, and this time fully
+authorized, raid on the Spanish Indies. Here he sacked the cities
+of San Domingo and Carthagena, and, though he narrowly missed the
+plate fleet, brought home sufficient spoils for the individuals
+who backed the venture. In the year 1587 with 23 ships and orders
+permitting him to operate freely on Spain's home coasts, he first
+boldly entered Cadiz, in almost complete disregard of the puny
+galleys guarding the harbor, and destroyed some 37 vessels and
+their cargoes. Despite the horrified protests of his Vice Admiral
+Borough (an officer "of the old school" to be found in every epoch)
+at these violations of traditional methods, he then took up a position
+off Saigres where he could harry coastwise commerce, picked up the
+East Indiaman <i>San Felipe</i> with a cargo worth a million pounds
+in modern money, and even appeared off Lisbon to defy the Spanish
+Admiral Santa Cruz. Thus he "singed the King of Spain's beard," and
+set, in the words of a recent biographer, "what to this day may
+serve as the finest example of how a small, well-handled fleet,
+acting on a nicely timed offensive, may paralyze the mobilization
+of an overwhelming force."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Corbett,
+Vol. II, p. 108.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_156"><span class="page">Page 156</span></a>
+<i>The Grand Armada</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the time of this Cadiz expedition Spanish preparations for the
+invasion of England were already well under way, Philip being now
+convinced that by a blow at England all his aims might be
+secured&mdash;the subjugation of the Netherlands, the safety of
+Spanish America, the overthrow of Protestantism, possibly even
+his accession to the English throne. As the secret instructions
+to Medina Sidonia more modestly stated, it was at least believed
+that by a vigorous offensive and occupation of English territory
+England could be forced to cease her opposition to Spain. For this
+purpose every province of the empire was pressed for funds. Pope
+Sixtus VI contributed a million gold crowns, which he shrewdly
+made payable only when troops actually landed on English soil.
+Church and nobility were squeezed as never before. The Cortes on
+the eve of the voyage voted 8,000,000 ducats, secured by a tax on
+wine, meat, and oil, the common necessities of life, which was
+not lifted for more than two hundred years.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+To gain control of the Channel long enough to throw 40,000 troops
+ashore at Margate, and thereafter to meet and conquer the army of
+defense&mdash;such was the highly difficult objective, to assure
+the success of which Philip had been led to hope for a wholesale
+defection of English Catholics to the Spanish cause. Twenty thousand
+troops were to sail with the Armada; Alexander Farnese, Duke of
+Parma, was to add 17,000 veterans from Flanders and assume supreme
+command. With the Spanish infantry once landed, under the best
+general in Europe, it was not beyond reason that England might become
+a province of Spain.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+What Philip did not see clearly, what indeed could scarcely be
+foreseen from past experience, was that no movement of troops should
+be undertaken without first definitely accounting for the enemy
+fleet. The Spanish had not even an open base to sail to. With English
+vessels thronging the northern ports of the Channel, with 90 Dutch
+ships blockading the Scheldt and the shallows of the Flanders coast,
+it would be necessary to clear the Channel by a naval victory, and
+maintain <a name="page_157"><span class="page">Page 157</span></a>
+control until it was assured by victory on land. The leader first
+selected, Santa Cruz&mdash;a veteran of Lepanto&mdash;at least put
+naval considerations uppermost and laid plans on a grand scale,
+calling for 150 major ships and 100,000 men, 30,000 of them sailors.
+But with his death in 1587 the campaign was again thought of primarily
+from the army standpoint. The ships were conceived as so many
+transports, whose duty at most was to hold the English fleet at
+bay. Parma was to be supreme. To succeed Santa Cruz as naval leader,
+and in order, it is said, that the gray-haired autocrat Philip
+might still control from his cell in the Escorial, the Duke of
+Medina Sidonia was chosen&mdash;an amiable gentleman of high rank,
+but consciously ignorant of naval warfare, uncertain of purpose,
+and despondent almost from the start. Medina had an experienced
+Vice Admiral in Diego Flores de Valdes, whose professional advice
+he usually followed, and he had able squadron commanders in Recalde,
+Pedro de Valdes, Oquendo, and others; but such a commander-in-chief,
+unless a very genius in self-effacement, was enough to ruin a far
+more auspicious campaign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Delayed by the uncertain political situation in France, even more
+than by Drake's exploits off Cadiz, the Armada was at last, in
+May of 1588, ready to depart. The success of the Catholic party
+under the leadership of the Duke of Guise gave assurance of support
+rather than hostility on the French flank. There were altogether
+some 130 ships, the best of which were 10 war galleons of Portugal
+and 10 of the "Indian Guard" of Spain. These were supported by
+the Biscayan, Andalusian, Guipuscoan, and Levantine squadrons of
+about 10 armed merchantmen each, four splendid Neapolitan galleasses
+that gave a good account of themselves in action, and four galleys
+that were driven upon the French coast by storms and took no part
+in the battle&mdash;making a total (without the galleys) of about
+64 fighting ships. Then there were 35 or more pinnaces and small
+craft, and 23 <i>urcas</i> or storeships of little or no fighting
+value. The backbone of the force was the 60 galleons, large, top-lofty
+vessels, all but 20 of them from the merchant service, with towering
+poops and <a name="page_158"><span class="page">Page 158</span></a>
+forecastles that made them terrible to look upon but hard to handle.
+On board were 8,000 sailors and 19,000 troops.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Dispersed by a storm on their departure from Lisbon, the fleet
+again assembled at Corunna, their victuals already rotten, and
+their water foul and short. Medina Sidonia even now counseled
+abandonment; but religious faith, the fatalistic pride of Spain,
+and Philip's dogged fixity of purpose drove them on. Putting out
+of Corunna on July 22, and again buffeted by Biscay gales, they
+were sighted off the Lizard at daybreak of July 30, and a pinnace
+scudded into Plymouth with the alarm.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 448px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig029.png" width="448" height="764" alt="Fig. 29">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For England the moment of supreme crisis had come, Elizabeth's
+policy of paying for nothing that she might expect her subjects
+to contribute had left the royal navy short of what the situation
+called for, and the government seems also, even throughout the
+campaign, to have tied the admirals to the coast and kept them from
+distant adventures by limited supplies of munitions and food. But
+in the imminent danger, the nobility, both Catholic and Protestant,
+and every coastwise city, responded to the call for ships and men.
+Their loyalty was fatal to Philip's plan. The royal fleet of 25
+ships and a dozen pinnaces was re&euml;nforced until the total
+craft of all descriptions numbered 197, not more than 140 of which,
+however, may be said to have had a real share in the campaign. For
+a month or more a hundred sail had been mobilized at Plymouth,
+of which 69 were greatships and galleons. These were smaller in
+average tonnage than the Spanish ships, but more heavily armed, and
+manned by 10,000 capable seamen. Lord Henry Seymour, with Palmer
+and Sir William Winter under him, watched Parma at the Strait of
+Dover, with 20 ships and an equal number of galleys, barks and
+pinnaces. The Lord High Admiral, Thomas Howard of Effingham, a
+nobleman of 50 with some naval experience and of a family that had
+long held the office, commanded the western squadron, with Drake
+as Vice Admiral and John Hawkins as Rear Admiral. The <i>Ark</i>
+(800 tons), <i>Revenge</i> (500), and <i>Victory</i> (800) were
+their respective flagships. Martin Frobisher in the big 1100-ton
+<i>Triumph</i>, Lord Sheffield in the <i>White Bear</i> (1000), and
+Thomas Fenner in the <i>Nonpareil</i> (500) were included with the
+Admirals <a name="page_159"><span class="page">Page 159</span></a>
+<a name="page_160"><span class="page">Page 160</span></a> in
+Howard's inner council of war. "Howard," says Thomas Fuller,
+"was no deep-seaman, but he had skill enough to know those who
+had more skill than himself and to follow their instructions." As
+far as as possible for a commoner, Drake exercised command.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 659px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig030.png" width="659" height="403" alt="Fig. 30">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">From Pigafetta's <i>Discorso sopro
+ l'Ordinanza dell' Armata Catholico</i> (Corbett's <i>Drake</i>,
+ Vol. II, p. 213</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA,
+ PROBABLY ADOPTED WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS AND SHOWING THE INFLUENCE
+ OF GALLEY WARFARE</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the morning of the 31st the Armada swept slowly past Plymouth
+in what has been described as a broad crescent, but which, from a
+contemporary Italian description, seems to have been the "eagle"
+formation familiar to galley warfare, in line abreast with wide
+extended wings bent slightly forward, the main strength in center
+and guards in van and rear. Howard was just completing the arduous
+task of warping his ships out of the harbor. Had Medina attacked at
+once, as some of his subordinates advised, he might have compelled
+Howard to close action and won by superior numbers. But his orders
+suggested the advisability of avoiding battle till he had joined
+with Parma; and for the Duke this was enough. As the Armada continued
+its course, Howard fell in astern and to <a name="page_161"><span
+class="page">Page 161</span></a> windward, inflicting serious injuries
+to two ships of the enemy rear.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 817px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig031.png" width="817" height="389" alt="Fig. 31">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">From Hale's <i>Story of the Great
+ Armada.</i></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A week of desultory running battle ensued as the fleets moved slowly
+through the Channel; the English fighting "loose and large," and
+seeking to pick off stragglers, still fearful of a general action,
+but taking advantage of Channel flaws to close with the enemy and
+sheer as swiftly away; the Spanish on the defensive but able to
+avoid disaster by better concerted action and fleet control. Only
+two Spanish ships were actually lost, one of them Pedro de Valdes'
+flagship <i>Neustra Se&ntilde;ora del Rosario</i>, which had been
+injured in collision and surrendered to Drake without a struggle
+on the night of August 1, the other the big <i>San Salvador</i>
+of the Guipuscoan squadron, the whole after part of which had been
+torn up by an explosion after the fighting on the first day. But
+the Spanish inferiority had been clearly demonstrated and they had
+suffered far more in morale than in material injuries when on Sunday,
+August 7, they dropped anchor in Calais roads. The English, on their
+part, though flushed with confidence, had seen their weakness in
+organized tactics, and now divided their fleet into four squadrons,
+with the flag officers and Frobisher in command.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It betrays the fatuity of the Spanish leader, if not of the whole
+plan of campaign, that when thus practically driven to <a
+name="page_162"><span class="page">Page 162</span></a> refuge in
+a neutral port, Medina Sidonia thought his share of the task
+accomplished, and wrote urgent appeals to Parma to join or send
+aid, though the great general had not enough flat-boats and barges
+to float his army had he been so foolhardy as to embark, or the
+Dutch so benevolent as to let him go. But the English, now
+re&euml;nforced by Seymour's squadron, gave the Duke little time
+to ponder his next move. At midnight eight fire hulks, "spurting
+flames and their ordnance exploding," were borne by wind and tide
+full upon the crowded Spanish fleet. Fearful of <i>maquinas de
+minas</i> such as had wrought destruction a year before at the
+siege of Antwerp, the Spanish made no effort to grapple the peril
+but slipped or cut cables and in complete confusion beat off shore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At dawn the Spanish galleons, attempting with a veering wind from
+the southward and westward to form in order off Gravelines, were set
+upon in the closest approach to a general engagement that occurred
+in the campaign. While Howard and several of his ships were busy
+effecting the capture of a beached galleass, Drake led the attack
+in the <i>Revenge</i>, seeking to force the enemy to leeward and
+throw the whole body upon the shallows of the Flanders coast. With
+splendid discipline, the Spanish weather ships, the flagship <i>San
+Martin</i> among them, fought valiantly to cover the retreat. But
+it was an unequal struggle, the heavier and more rapid fire of the
+English doing fearful execution on decks crowded with men-at-arms.
+Such artillery combat was hitherto unheard of. Though warned of the
+new northern methods, the Spanish were obsessed by tradition; they
+were prepared for grappling and boarding, and could they have closed,
+their numbers and discipline would have told. Both sides suffered
+from short ammunition; but the Armada, with no fresh supplies, was
+undoubtedly in the worse case. "They fighting with their great
+ordnance," writes Medina Sidonia, "and we with harquebus fire and
+musketry, the distance being very small." Six-inch guns against
+bows and muskets tells the tale.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A slackening of the English pursuit at nightfall after eight hours'
+fighting, and an off-shore slant of wind at daybreak, prevented complete
+disaster. One large galleon sank and two <a name="page_163"><span
+class="page">Page 163</span></a> more stranded and were captured
+by the Dutch. These losses were not indeed fatal, but the remaining
+ships staggering away to leeward were little more than blood-drenched
+wrecks. Fifteen hundred had been killed and wounded in the day's
+action, and eleven ships and some eight thousand men sacrificed thus
+far in the campaign. The English, on the other hand, had suffered
+no serious ship injuries and the loss of not above 100 men. In the
+council held next day beyond the Straits of Dover, only a few of
+the Spanish leaders had stomach for further fighting; the rest
+preferred to brave the perils of a return around the Orkneys rather
+than face again these defenders of the narrow seas. Before a fair
+wind they stood northward, Drake still at their heels, though by
+reason of short supplies he left them at the Firth of Forth.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In October, fifty ships, with 10,000 starved and fever-stricken
+men, trailed into the Biscay ports of Spain. Torn by September
+gales, the rest of the Armada had been sunk or stranded on the rough
+coasts of Scotland and Ireland. "The wreckers of the Orkneys and the
+Faroes, the clansmen of the Scottish isles, the kernes of Donegal
+and Galway, all had their part in the work of murder and robbery.
+Eight thousand Spaniards perished between the Giant's Causeway and
+the Blaskets. On a strand near Sligo an English captain numbered
+eleven hundred corpses which had been cast up by the sea."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">History of the English People</span>,
+Green, Vol. II, p. 448.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Flavit Deus, et dissipati sunt"&mdash;"The Lord sent His wind, and
+scattered them." So ran the motto on the English medal of victory.
+But storms completed the destruction of a fleet already thoroughly
+defeated. Religious faith, courage, and discipline had availed
+little against superior ships, weapons, leadership, and nautical
+skill. "Till the King of Spain had war with us," an Englishman
+remarked, "he never knew what war by sea meant."[2] It might be
+said more accurately that the battle gave a new meaning to war
+by sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Monson, <span class="sc">Naval Tracts</span>,
+Purchas, Vol. III, p. 121.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From the standpoint of naval progress, the campaign demonstrated
+definitely the ascendancy of sail and artillery. For the old galley
+tactics a new system now had to be developed. Since <a
+name="page_164"><span class="page">Page 164</span></a> between
+sailing vessels head-on conflict was practically eliminated, and
+since guns mounted to fire ahead and astern were of little value
+save in flight or pursuit, the arrangement of guns in broadside
+soon became universal, and fleets fought in column, or "line ahead,"
+usually close-hauled on the same or opposite tacks. While these were
+lessons for the next generation, there is more permanent value in
+the truth, again illustrated, that fortune favors the belligerent
+quicker to forsake outworn methods and to develop skill in the use
+of new weapons. The Spanish defeat illustrates also the necessity
+of expert planning and guidance of a naval campaign, with naval
+counsels and requirements duly regarded; and the fatal effect of
+failure to concentrate attention on the enemy fleet. It is doubtful,
+however, whether it would have been better, as Drake urged, and as
+was actually attempted in the month before the Armada's arrival, if
+the English had shifted the war to the coast of Spain. The objections
+arise chiefly from the difficulties, in that age, of maintaining
+a large naval force far from its base, all of which the Spanish
+encountered in their northward cruise. It is noteworthy that, even
+after the brief Channel operations, an epidemic caused heavy mortality
+in the English fleet. Finally, the Armada is a classic example
+of the value of naval defense to an insular nation. In the often
+quoted words of Raleigh, "To entertain the enemy with their own
+beef in their bellies, before they eat of our Kentish capons, I
+take it to be the wisest way, to do which his Majesty after God
+will employ his good ships at sea."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Upon Spain, already tottering from inherent weakness, the Armada
+defeat had the effect of casting down her pride and confidence
+as leader of the Catholic world. Though it was not until three
+centuries later that she lost her last colonies, her hold on her
+vast empire was at once shaken by this blow at her sea control.
+While she maintained large fleets until after the Napoleonic Wars,
+she was never again truly formidable as a naval power. But the victory
+lifted England more than it crushed Spain, inspiring an intenser
+patriotism, an eagerness for colonial and commercial adventure, an
+exaltation of spirit <a name="page_165"><span class="page">Page
+165</span></a> manifested in the men of genius who crowned the
+Elizabethan age.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Last Years of the War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The war was not ended; and though Philip was restrained by the
+rise of Protestant power in France under Henry of Navarre, he was
+still able to gather his sea forces on almost as grand a scale. In
+the latter stages of the war the naval expeditions on both sides
+were either, like the Armada, for the purpose of landing armies on
+foreign soil, or raids on enemy ports, colonies and commerce. Thus
+Drake in 1589 set out with a force of 18,000 men, which attacked
+Corunna, moved thence upon Lisbon, and lost a third or more of
+its number in a fruitless campaign on land. Both Drake and the
+aged Hawkins, now his vice admiral, died in the winter of 1595-96
+during a last and this time ineffective foray upon the Spanish
+Main. Drake was buried off Puerto Bello, where legend has it his
+spirit still awaits England's call&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<p class="bquote">
+&nbsp; &nbsp; "Take my drum to England, hang et by the shore,<br>
+Strike et when your powder's running low.<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp; If the Dons sight Devon, I'll leave the port of Heaven,<br>
+An' drum them up the Channel as we drummed them long ago."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Drake's Drum</span>, Sir Henry Newbolt.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+We are still far from the period when sea control was thought of
+as important in itself, apart from land operations, or when fleets
+were kept in permanent readiness to take the sea. It is owing to
+this latter fact that we hear of large flotillas dispatched by
+each side even in the same year, yet not meeting in naval action.
+Thus in June of 1596 the Essex expedition, with 17 English and
+18 Dutch men-of-war and numerous auxiliaries, seized Cadiz and
+burned shipping to the value of 11,000,000 ducats. There was no
+naval opposition, though Philip in October of the same year had
+ready a hundred ships and 16,000 men, which were dispersed with
+the loss of a quarter of their strength in a gale off Finisterre.
+Storms also <a name="page_166"><span class="page">Page 166</span></a>
+scattered Philip's fleet in the next year; in 1598, Spanish transports
+landed 5,000 men at Calais; and England's fears were renewed in
+the year after that by news of over 100 vessels fitting out for
+the Channel, which, however, merely protected the plate fleet by
+a cruise to the Azores. As late as 1601, Spain landed 3500 troops
+in Ireland.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But if these major operations seem to have missed contact, there
+were many lively actions on a minor scale, the well-armed trading
+vessels of the north easily beating off the galley squadrons guarding
+Gibraltar and the routes past Spain. Among these lesser encounters, the
+famous "Last Fight of the Revenge," which occurred during operations
+of a small English squadron off the Azores in 1591, well illustrates
+the fighting spirit of the Elizabethan Englishman and the ineptitude
+which since the Armada seems to have marked the Spaniard at sea.
+In Drake's old flagship, attacked by 15 ships and surrounded by
+a Spanish fleet of 50 sail, a bellicose old sea-warrior named Sir
+Richard Grenville held out from nightfall until eleven the next
+day, and surrendered only after he had sunk three of the enemy,
+when his powder was gone, half his crew dead, the rest disabled,
+and his ship a sinking wreck. "Here die I, Richard Grenville," so
+we are given his last words, "with a joyful and a quiet mind, for
+that I have ended my life as a good soldier ought to do, who has
+fought for his country and his queen, his honor and his religion."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The naval activities mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraphs
+had no decisive effect upon the war, which ended, for England at
+least, with the death of Elizabeth in 1603 and the accession of James
+Stuart of Scotland to the English throne. James at once adopted a
+policy of <i>rapprochement</i> with Spain, which while it guaranteed
+peace during the 22 years of his reign, was by its renunciation of
+trade with the Indies, aid to the Dutch, and leadership of Protestant
+Europe, a sorry sequel to the victory of fifteen years before.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Armada nevertheless marks the decadence of Spanish sea power.
+With the next century begins a new epoch in naval warfare, an age
+of sail and artillery, in which Dutch, <a name="page_167"><span
+class="page">Page 167</span></a> English, and later French fleets
+contested for the sea mastery deemed essential to colonial empire
+and commercial prosperity.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Drake and the Tudor Navy</span>, Sir Julian Corbett,
+  2 vols., 1898.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Successors of Drake</span>, Sir Julian Corbett,
+  1900.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Story of the Great Armada</span>, J. R. Hale, no
+  date.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Armada Papers</span>, Sir John Knox Laughtun, 2 vols.,
+  Navy Records Society, 1894.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">La Armada Invencible</span>, Captain Fernandez Duro,
+  1884.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">A History of the Administration of the Royal
+  Navy</span>, 1509-1660, by M. Oppenheim, 1896.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">A History of the Royal Navy</span>, William Laird
+  Clowes, Vol. 1., 1897.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Growth of English Commerce and Industry</span>,
+  W. Cunningham, 1907.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Development of Tactics in the Tudor Navy</span>,
+  Capt. G. Goldingham, United Service Magazine, June, 1918.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_168"><span class="page">Page 168</span></a>
+CHAPTER IX</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER: WARS WITH THE DUTCH.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Dutch Wars of the 17th century the British navy may be said
+to have caught its stride in the march that made Britannia the
+unrivaled mistress of the seas. The defeat of the Armada was caused
+by other things besides the skill of the English, and the steady
+decline of Spain from that point was not due to that battle or to
+any energetic naval campaign undertaken by the English thereafter.
+In fact, save for the Cadiz expedition of 1596, in which the Dutch
+co&ouml;perated, England had a rather barren record after the Armada
+campaign down to the middle of the 17th century. During that period
+the Dutch seized the control of the seas for trade and war. They
+appropriated what was left of the Levantine trade in the Mediterranean,
+and contested the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies and the
+Spanish in the West. Indeed the Dutch were at this time freely
+acknowledged to be the greatest sea-faring people of Europe.[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: "Dutch exports reached a figure in the 17th century,
+which was not attained by the English until 1740. Even the Dutch
+fisheries, which employed over 2000 boats, were said to be more
+valuable than the manufactures of France and England combined."
+<span class="sc">A History of Commerce</span>, Clive Day, p. 194.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When the Commonwealth came into power in England the new government
+turned its attention to the navy, which had languished under the
+Stuarts. A great reform was accomplished in the bettering of the
+living conditions for the seamen. Their pay was increased, their
+share of prize money enlarged, and their food improved. At the
+same time, during the years 1648-51, the number of ships of the
+fleet was practically doubled, and the new vessels were the product
+of the <a name="page_169"><span class="page">Page 169</span></a>
+highest skill in design and honest work in construction. The turmoil
+between Roundhead and Royalist had naturally disorganized the officer
+personnel of the fleet. Prince Rupert, nephew of Charles I, had taken
+a squadron of seven Royalist ships to sea, hoping to organize, at
+the Scilly Islands or at Kinsdale in Ireland, bases for piratical
+raids on the commerce of England, and it was necessary to bring
+him up short. Moreover, Ireland was still rebellious, Barbados,
+the only British possession in the West Indies, was held for the
+King, and Virginia also was Royalist. To establish the rule of the
+Commonwealth Cromwell needed an efficient fleet and an energetic
+admiral.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For the latter he turned to a man who had won a military reputation
+in the Civil War second only to that of the great Oliver himself,
+Robert Blake, colonel of militia. Blake was chosen as one of three
+"generals at sea" in 1649. As far as is known he had never before
+set foot on a man of war; he was a scholarly man, who had spent ten
+years at Oxford, where he had cherished the ambition of becoming
+a professor of Greek. At the time of his appointment he was fifty
+years old, and his entire naval career was comprised in the seven
+or eight remaining years of his life, and yet he so bore himself
+in those years as to win a reputation that stands second only to
+that of Nelson among the sea-fighters of the English race.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Blake made short work of Rupert's cruising and destroyed the Royalist
+pretensions to Jersey and the Scillies. One of his rewards for
+the excellent service rendered was a position in the Council of
+State, in which capacity he did much toward the bettering of the
+condition of the sailors, which was one of the striking reforms
+of the Commonwealth. His test, however, came in the first Dutch
+War, in which he was pitted against Martin Tromp, then the leading
+naval figure of Europe.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the wars with Spain, English and Dutch had been allies, but
+the shift of circumstances brought the two Protestant nations into
+a series of fierce conflicts lasting throughout the latter half of
+the 17th century. The outcome of these was that England won the
+scepter of the sea which she has ever since held. The main cause
+of the war was the rivalry of the two <a name="page_170"><span
+class="page">Page 170</span></a> nations on the sea. There were
+various other specific reasons for bad feeling on both sides, as
+for instance a massacre by the Dutch of English traders at Amboyna
+in the East Indies, during the reign of James I, which still rankled
+because it had never been avenged. The English on their side insisted
+on a salute to their men of war from every ship that passed through
+the Channel, and claimed the rights to a tribute, of all herrings
+taken within 30 miles off the English coast.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Cromwell formulated the English demands in the Navigation Act of
+1651. The chief of these required that none but English ships should
+bring cargoes to England, save vessels of the country whence the
+cargoes came. This was frankly a direct blow at the Dutch carrying
+trade, one to which the Dutch could not yield without a struggle.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For this struggle the Netherlanders were ill prepared. The Dutch
+Republic was a federation of seven sovereign states, lacking a strong
+executive and torn by rival factions. Moreover, her geographical
+position was most vulnerable. Pressed by enemies on her land frontiers,
+she was compelled to maintain an army of 57,000 men in addition to
+her navy. As the resources of the country were wholly inadequate
+to support the population, her very life depended on the sea. For
+the Holland of the 17th century, as for the England of the 20th, the
+fleets of merchantmen were the life blood of the nation. Unfortunately
+for the Dutch, this life blood had to course either through the
+Channel or else round the north of Scotland. Either way was open
+to attacks by the British, who held the interior position. Further,
+the shallows of the coasts and bays made necessary a flat bottomed
+ship of war, lighter built than the English and less weatherly
+in deep water.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In contrast the British had a unity of government under the iron
+hand of Cromwell, they had the enormous advantage of position,
+they were self-sustaining, and their ships were larger, stouter
+and better in every respect than those of their enemies. Hence,
+although the Dutch entered the conflict with the naval prestige
+on their side, it is clear that the odds were decidedly against
+them.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_171"><span class="page">Page 171</span></a>
+<i>The First Dutch War</i>
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 516px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig032.png" width="516" height="423" alt="Fig. 32">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF
+ THE 17TH CENTURY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND
+ FRANCE</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The fighting did not wait for a declaration of war. Blake met Tromp,
+who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen, off Dover on May 19,
+1652. On coming up with him Blake fired guns demanding the required
+salute. Tromp replied with a broadside. Blake attacked with his
+flagship, well ahead of his own line, and fought for five hours with
+Tromp's flagship and several others. The English were outnumbered
+about three to one, and Blake might have been annihilated had not
+the English admiral, Bourne, brought his squadron out from Dover
+at the sound of the firing and fallen upon Tromp's flank. As the
+Dutch Admiral's main business was to get his convoy home, he fell
+back slowly toward the coast of France, <a name="page_172"><span
+class="page">Page 172</span></a> both sides maintaining a cannonade
+until they lost each other in the darkness. Apparently there was
+little attempt at formation after the first onset; it was close
+quarters fighting, and only the wild gunnery of the day saved both
+fleets from enormous losses. As it was, Blake's flagship was very
+severely hammered.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Following this action, Tromp reappeared with 100 ships, but failed
+to keep Blake from attacking and ruining the Dutch herring fisheries
+for that year. This mistake temporarily cost Tromp his command.
+He was superseded by DeWith, an able man and brave, but no match
+for Blake. On September 28, 1652, Blake met him off the "Kentish
+Knock" shoal at the mouth of the Thames. In order to keep the weather
+gage, which would enable him to attack at close quarters, Blake
+took the risk of grounding on the shoal. His own ship and a few
+others did ground for a time, but they served as a guide to the
+rest. In the ensuing action Blake succeeded in putting the Dutch
+between two fires and inflicting a severe defeat. Only darkness
+saved the Dutch from utter destruction.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The effect of this victory was to give the English Council of State
+a false impression of security. In vain Blake urged the upkeep of
+the fleet. Two months later, November 30, 1652, Tromp, now restored
+to command, suddenly appeared in the Channel with 80 ships and a
+convoy behind him. Blake had only 45 and these only partly manned,
+but he was no man to refuse a challenge and boldly sailed out to
+meet him. It is said that during the desperate struggle&mdash;the
+"battle of Dungeness"&mdash;Blake's flagship, supported by two
+others, fought for some time with twenty of the Dutch. As Blake had
+the weather gage and retained it, he was able to draw off finally
+and save his fleet from destruction. All the ships were badly knocked
+about and two fell into the hands of the enemy. Blake came back so
+depressed by his defeat that he offered to resign his command,
+but the Council of State would not hear of such a thing, handsomely
+admitted their responsibility for the weakness of the fleet, and set
+at work to refit. Meanwhile for the next three months the Channel
+was in Tromp's hands. <a name="page_173"><span class="page">Page
+173</span></a> This is the period when the legend describes him
+as hoisting a broom to his masthead.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By the middle of February the English had reorganized their fleet
+and Blake took the sea with another famous Roundhead soldier, Monk,
+as one of his divisional commanders. At this time Tromp lay off
+Land's End waiting for the Dutch merchant fleet which he expected
+to convoy to Holland. On the 18th the two forces sighted each other
+about 15 miles off Portland. Then followed the "Three Days' Battle,"
+or the battle of Portland, one of the most stubbornly contested
+fights in the war and its turning point.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In order to be sure to catch Tromp, Blake had extended his force
+of 70 or 80 ships in a cross Channel position. Under cover of a
+fog Tromp suddenly appeared and caught the English fleet divided.
+Less than half were collected under the immediate command of Blake,
+only about ten were in the actual vicinity of his flagship, and
+the rest were to eastward, especially Monk's division which he
+had carelessly permitted to drift to leeward four or five miles.
+As the wind was from the west and very light, Monk's position made
+it impossible for him to support his chief for some time. Tromp saw
+his opportunity to concentrate on the part of the English fleet
+nearest him, the handful of ships with Blake. The latter had the
+choice of either bearing up to make a junction with Monk and the
+others before accepting battle or of grappling with Tromp at once,
+trusting to his admirals to arrive in time to win a victory. It
+was characteristic of Blake that he chose the bolder course.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The fighting began early in the afternoon and was close and furious
+from the outset. Again Blake's ship was compelled to engage several
+Dutch, including Tromp's flagship. De Ruyter, the brilliant lieutenant
+of Tromp, attempted to cut Blake off from his supports on the north,
+and Evertsen steered between Blake and Penn's squadron on the south.
+(See diagram 1.) Blake's dozen ships might well have been surrounded
+and taken if his admirals had not known their business. Penn tacked
+right through Evertsen's squadron to come to the side of Blake, and
+Lawson foiled de Ruyter by bearing away till he <a name="page_174"><span
+class="page">Page 174</span></a> had enough southing to tack in the
+wake of Penn and fall upon Tromp's rear (diagram 2). Evertsen then
+attempted to get between Monk and the rest of the fleet and two hours
+after the fight in the center began Monk also was engaged. When the
+lee vessels of the "red" or center squadron came on the scene about
+four o'clock, they threatened to weather the <a name="page_175"><span
+class="page">Page 175</span></a> Dutch and put them between two
+fires. To avoid this and to protect his convoy, Tromp tacked his
+whole fleet together&mdash;an exceedingly difficult maneuver under
+the circumstances&mdash;and drew off to windward. Darkness stopped
+the fighting for that day. All night the two fleets sailed eastward
+watching each other's lights, and hastily patching up damages.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 558px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig033.png" width="558" height="658" alt="Fig. 33">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Based on diagram of Mahan's in Clowes,
+ <i>The Royal Navy</i>, Vol. II, p. 180-1.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEB. 18, 1653</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Morning discovered them off the Isle of Wight, with the English
+on the north side of the Channel. As Tromp's chief business was to
+save his convoy and as the English force was now united, he took
+a defensive position. He formed his own ships in a long crescent,
+with the outward curve toward his enemy, and in the lee of this
+line he placed his convoy. The wind was so light that the English
+were unable to attack until late. The fighting, though energetic,
+had not proved decisive when darkness fell.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The following day, the 20th, brought a fresh wind that enabled
+the English to overhaul the Dutch, who could not move faster than
+the heavily laden merchantmen, and force a close action. Blake
+tried to cut off Tromp from the north so as to block his road home.
+Vice Admiral Penn, leading the van, broke through the Dutch battle
+line and fell upon the convoy, but Blake was unable to reach far
+enough to head off his adversary before he rounded Cape Gris Nez
+under cover of darkness and found anchorage in Calais roads. That
+night, favored by the tide and thick weather, Tromp succeeded in
+carrying off the greater part of his convoy unobserved. Nevertheless
+he had left in Blake's hand some fifty merchantmen and a number
+of men of war variously estimated from five to eighteen. At the
+same time the English had suffered heavily in men and ships. On
+Blake's flagship alone it is said that 100 men had been killed
+and Blake and his second in command, Deane, were both wounded, the
+former seriously.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The result of this three days' action was to encourage the English
+to press the war with energy and take the offensive to the enemy's
+own coast. English crews had shown that they could fight with a
+spirit fully equal to that of the Dutch, and English ships and weight
+of broadside, as de Ruyter frankly declared to his government, were
+decidedly superior. The <a name="page_176"><span class="page">Page
+176</span></a> fact that the shallow waters of the Dutch coast
+made necessary a lighter draft man of war than that of the English
+proved a serious handicap to the Dutch in all their conflicts with
+the British. Both fleets were so badly shot up by this prolonged
+battle that there was a lull in operations until May.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In that month Tromp suddenly arrived off Dover and bombarded the
+defenses. The English quickly took the sea to hunt him down. As
+Blake was still incapacitated by his wound, the command was given
+to Monk. The latter, with a fleet of over a hundred ships, brought
+Tromp to action on June 2 (1653) in what is known as the "Battle
+of the Gabbard" after a shoal near the mouth of the Thames, where
+the action began. Tromp was this time not burdened with a convoy
+but his fleet was smaller in numbers than Monk's and, as he well
+knew, inferior in other elements of force. Accordingly, he adapted
+defensive tactics of a sort that was copied afterwards by the French
+as a fixed policy. He accepted battle to leeward, drawing off in a
+slanting line from his enemy with the idea of catching the English
+van as it advanced to the attack unsupported by the rest of the
+fleet, and crippling it so severely that the attack would not be
+pressed. As it turned out, a shift of the wind gave him the chance
+to fall heavily upon the English van, but a second shift gave back
+the weather gage to the English and the two fleets became fiercely
+engaged at close quarters. Blake, hearing the guns, left his sick
+bed and with his own available force of 18 ships sailed out to join
+battle. The sight of this fresh squadron flying Blake's flag, turned
+the fortune of battle decisively. The Dutch escaped destruction
+only by finding safety in the shallows of the Flemish coast, where
+the English ships could not follow.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After this defeat the Dutch were almost at the end of their resources
+and sued far peace, but Cromwell's ruthless demands amounted to
+a practical loss of independence, which even a bankrupt nation
+could not accept. Accordingly, every nerve was strained to build
+a fleet that might yet beat the English. The latter, for their
+part, were equally determined not to lose the fruits of their hard
+won victories. Since Blake's active <a name="page_177"><span
+class="page">Page 177</span></a> share in the battle of the Gabbard
+aggravated his wound so severely that he was carried ashore more
+nearly dead than alive, Monk retained actual command.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Monk attempted to maintain a close blockade of the Dutch coast
+and to prevent a junction between Tromp's main fleet at Flushing
+and a force of thirty ships at Amsterdam. In this, however, he was
+outgeneraled by Tromp, who succeeded in taking the sea with the
+greatest of all Dutch fleets, 120 men of war. The English and the
+Dutch speedily clashed in the last, and perhaps the most furiously
+contested, battle of the war, the "Battle of Scheveningen." The
+action began at six in the morning of July 30, 1653. Tromp had the
+weather gage, but Monk, instead of awaiting his onslaught, tacked
+towards him and actually cut through the Dutch line. Tromp countered
+by tacking also, in order to keep his windward position, and this
+maneuver was repeated three times by Tromp and Monk, and the two
+great fleets sailed in great zigzag courses down the Dutch coast a
+distance of forty miles, with bitter fighting going on at close
+range between the two lines. Early in the action the renowned Tromp
+was killed, but his flag was kept flying and there was no flinching
+on the part of his admirals. About one o'clock a shift of the wind
+gave the weather gage to the English. Some of the Dutch captains
+then showed the white feather and tried to escape. This compelled
+the retirement of DeWith, who had succeeded to the command, and
+who, as he retreated, fired on his own fugitives as well as on
+the English. As usual in those battles with the Dutch, the English
+had been forced to pay a high price for their victory. Their fleet
+was so shattered that they were obliged to lift the blockade and
+return home to refit. But for the Dutch it was the last effort.
+Again they sued for peace. Cromwell drove a hard bargain; he insisted
+on every claim England had ever made against the Netherlands before
+the war, but on this occasion he agreed to leave Holland her
+independence.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thus in less than two years the First Dutch War came to an end. In the
+words of Mr. Hannay,[1] the English historian, <a name="page_178"><span
+class="page">Page 178</span></a> its "importance as an epoch in
+the history of the English Navy can hardly be exaggerated. Though
+short, for it lasted barely twenty-two months, it was singularly
+fierce and full of battles. Yet its interest is not derived mainly
+from the mere amount of fighting but from the character of it. This
+was the first of our naval wars conducted by steady, continuous,
+coherent campaigns. Hitherto our operations on the sea had been
+of the nature of adventures by single ships and small squadrons,
+with here and there a great expedition sent out to capture some
+particular port or island."
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">A Short History of the Royal Navy</span>,
+Vol. I, p. 217.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As to the intensity of the fighting, it is worth noting that in this
+short period six great battles took place between fleets numbering
+as a rule from 70 to 120 ships on a side. By comparison it may be
+remarked that at Trafalgar the total British force numbered 27
+ships of the line and the Allies, 33. Nor were the men of war of
+Blake and Tromp the small types of an earlier day. In 1652 the
+ship of the line had become the unit of the fleet as truly as it
+was in 1805. It is true that Blake's ships were not the equal of
+Nelson's huge "first rates," because the "two-decker" was then
+the most powerful type. The first three-decker in the English navy
+was launched in the year of Blake's death, 1657. The fact remains,
+however, that these fleet actions of the Dutch Wars took place
+on a scale unmatched by any of the far better known engagements
+of the 18th or early 19th century.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A curious naval weapon survived from the day when Howard drove
+Medina Sidonia from Calais roads, the fireship, or "brander." This
+was used by both English and Dutch. Its usefulness, of course, was
+confined to the side that held the windward position, and even
+an opponent to leeward could usually, if he kept his head, send
+out boats to grapple and tow the brander out of harm's way. In the
+battle of Scheveningen, however, Dutch fireships cost the English
+two fine ships, together with a Dutch prize, and very nearly destroyed
+the old flagship of Blake, the <i>Triumph</i>. She was saved only
+by the extraordinary exertions of her captain, who received mortal
+injury from the flames he fought so courageously.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_179"><span class="page">Page 179</span></a> This
+First Dutch War is interesting in what it reveals of the advance
+in tactics. Tromp well deserves his title as the "Father of Naval
+Tactics," and he undoubtedly taught Blake and Monk a good deal by
+the rough schooling of battle, but they proved apt pupils. From
+even the brief summary of these great battles just given, it is
+evident that Dutch and English did not fight each other in helter
+skelter fashion. In fact, there is revealed a great advance in
+co&ouml;rdination over the work of the English in the campaign
+of the Armada. These fleets worked as units. This does not mean
+that they were not divided into squadrons. A force of 100 ships
+of the line required division and subdivision, and considerable
+freedom of movement was left to division and squadron commanders
+under the general direction of the commander in chief, but they
+were all working consciously together. Just as at Trafalgar Nelson
+formed his fleet in two lines (originally planned as three) and
+allowed his second in command a free hand in carrying out the task
+assigned him, so Tromp and Blake operated their fleets in
+squadrons&mdash;Tromp usually had five&mdash;and expected of their
+subordinates responsibility and initiative. All this is in striking
+contrast with the practice that paralyzed tactics in the latter
+17th and 18th centuries, which sacrificed everything to a rigid
+line of battle in column ahead, and required every movement to
+emanate from the commander in chief.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Although details about the great battles of the First Dutch War
+are scanty, there is enough recorded to show that both sides used
+the line ahead as the normal battle line. It is equally clear,
+however, that they repeatedly broke through each other's lines
+and aimed at concentration, or destroying in detail. These two
+related principles, which had to be rediscovered toward the end of
+the 18th century, were practiced by Tromp, de Ruyter, and Blake.
+Their work has not the advantage of being as near our day as the
+easy, one-sided victories over the demoralized French navy in the
+Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, but the day may come when the
+British will regard the age of Blake as the naval epoch of which
+they have the most reason to be proud. Then England met <a
+name="page_180"><span class="page">Page 180</span></a> the greatest
+seamen of the day led by one of the greatest admirals of history
+and won a bitterly fought contest by virtue of better ships and
+the spirit of Cromwell's "Ironsides."
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Porto Farina and Santa Cruz</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nor did the age of Blake end with the First Dutch War. As soon
+as the admiral was able to go aboard ship, Cromwell sent him with
+a squadron into the Mediterranean to enforce respect for the
+Commonwealth from the Italian governments and the Barbary states.
+He conducted his mission with eminent success. Although the Barbary
+pirates did not course the sea in great fleets as in the palmy
+days of Barbarossa, they were still a source of peril to Christian
+traders. Blake was received civilly by the Dey of Algiers but
+negotiations did not result satisfactorily. At Tunis he was openly
+flouted. The Pasha drew up his nine cruisers inside Porto Farina
+and defied the English admiral to do his worst. Blake left for a
+few days to gain the effect of surprise and replenish provisions.
+On April 4, 1655, he suddenly reappeared and stood in to the attack.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The harbor of Porto Farina was regarded as impregnable. The entrance
+was narrow and the shores lined with castles and batteries. As Blake
+foresaw, the wind that took him in would roll the battle smoke upon
+the enemy. In a short time he had silenced the fire of the forts
+and then sent boarding parties against the Tunisian ships, which
+were speedily taken and burnt. Then he took his squadron out again,
+having destroyed the entire Tunisian navy, shattered the forts, and
+suffered only a trifling loss. This exploit resounded throughout
+the Mediterranean. Algiers was quick to follow Tunis in yielding
+to Blake's demands. It is characteristic of this officer that he
+should have made the attack on Tunis entirely without orders from
+Cromwell, and it is equally characteristic of the latter that he
+was heartily pleased with the initiative of his admiral in carrying
+out the spirit rather than the letter of his instructions.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile Cromwell had been wavering between a war <a
+name="page_181"><span class="page">Page 181</span></a> against
+France or Spain. The need of a capture of money perhaps influenced
+him to turn against Spain, for this country still drew from her
+western colonies a tribute of gold and silver, which naturally
+would fall a prey to the power that controlled the sea. One month
+after Blake's exploit at Tunis, another English naval expedition set
+out to the West Indies to take Santo Domingo. Although Jamaica was
+seized and thereafter became an English possession, the expedition
+as a whole was a disgraceful failure, and the leaders, Penn and
+Venables, were promptly clapped by Cromwell into the Tower on their
+return. This stroke against Spain amounted to a declaration of
+war, and on Blake's return to England he was ordered to blockade
+Cadiz. One detachment of the plate fleet fell into the hands of his
+blockading ships and the silver ingots were dispatched to London.
+Blake continued his blockade in an open roadstead for six months,
+through autumn and winter, an unheard of thing in those days and
+exceedingly difficult. Blake was himself ill, his ships were not
+the copper-bottomed ones of a hundred years later, and there was
+not, as in later days, an English base at Gibraltar. But he never
+relaxed his vigilance.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In April (1657) he learned that another large plate fleet had arrived
+at Santa Cruz, Teneriffe. Immediately he sailed thither to take or
+destroy it. If Porto Farina had been regarded as safe from naval
+attack, Santa Cruz was far more so. A deep harbor, with a narrow,
+funnel entrance, and backed by mountains, it is liable to dead
+calms or squally bursts of wind from the land. In addition to its
+natural defenses it was heavily fortified. Blake, however, reckoned
+on coming in with a flowing tide and a sea breeze that, as at Porto
+Farina, would blow his smoke upon the defenses. He rightly guessed
+that if he sailed close enough under the castles at the harbor
+entrance their guns could not be sufficiently depressed to hit
+his ships, and as he saw the galleons and their escorts lined up
+along the shore he perceived also that they were masking the fire
+of their own shore batteries. For the most difficult part of his
+undertaking, the exit from the harbor, <a name="page_182"><span
+class="page">Page 182</span></a> he trusted to the ebbing tide
+with the chance of a shift in the wind in his favor.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Early on the morning of April 20th (1657) he sailed in. As he had
+judged, the fire of the forts did little damage. By eight o'clock
+the English ships were all at their appointed stations and fighting.
+During the entire day Blake continued his work of destruction till
+it was complete, and at dusk drifted out on the ebb. Some writers
+mention a favoring land breeze that helped to extricate the English,
+but according to Blake's own words, "the wind blew right into the
+bay." In spite of this head wind the ships that were crippled were
+warped or towed out and not one was lost. The English suffered
+in the entire action only 50 killed and 120 wounded, and repairs
+were so easily made that Blake returned to his blockading station
+at once.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This was the greatest of Blake's feats as it also was his last.
+All who heard of it&mdash;friend or enemy&mdash;pronounced it as
+without parallel in the history of ships. A few months later Blake
+was given leave to return home. He had long been a sick man, but
+his name alone was worth a fleet and Cromwell had not been able
+to spare him. As it happened, he did not live long enough to see
+England again. Cromwell, who knew the worth of his faithful admiral,
+gave him a funeral of royal dignity and interment in Westminster
+Abbey.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Blake never showed, perhaps, great strategic insight&mdash;Tromp
+and de Ruyter were his superiors there, as was also Nelson&mdash;but
+he, more than any other, won for England her mastery of the sea,
+and no other can boast his record of great victories. These he
+won partly by skill and forethought but chiefly by intrepidity. We
+can do no better than leave his fame in the words of the Royalist
+historian, Clarendon&mdash;a political enemy&mdash;who says: "He
+quickly made himself signal there (on the sea) and was the first
+man who declined the old track ... and disproved those rules that
+had long been in practice, to keep his ships and men out of danger,
+which had been held in former times a point of great ability and
+circumspection, as if the principal requisite in the captain of
+a ship had been to come home safe again. He was the first <a
+name="page_183"><span class="page">Page 183</span></a> man who
+brought ships to contemn castles on shore, which had been thought
+ever very formidable.... He was the first that infused that proportion
+of courage into the seamen by making them see what mighty things
+they could do if they were resolved, and taught them to fight in
+fire as well as on water. And though he hath been very well imitated
+and followed, he was the first that drew the copy of naval courage
+and bold resolute achievement."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The chaos that followed the death of the Protector resulted in Monk's
+bringing over the exiled Stuart king&mdash;Charles II. Thereafter
+Round Head and Royalist served together in the British navy. An
+important effect of the Restoration was organization of a means of
+training the future officers of the fleet. The Navy as a profession
+may be said to date from this time, in contrast with the practice of
+using merchant skippers and army officers, which had prevailed to
+so great a degree hitherto. Under the new system "young gentlemen"
+were sent to sea as "King's Letter Boys"&mdash;midshipmen&mdash;to
+learn the ways of the navy and to grow up in it as a preparation
+for command. This was an excellent reform but it resulted in making
+the navy the property of a social caste from that day to this,
+and it made promotion, for a century and more, largely subject to
+family influence.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Another effect of the Restoration was to break down the fighting
+efficiency of the fleet as it had been in the days of Blake. The
+veterans of the First Dutch War fought with their old time courage
+and discipline, but the newer elements did not show the same devotion
+and initiative. The effect on the material was still worse, for
+the fleet became a prey to the cynical dishonesty that Charles
+II inspired in every department of his government.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Second Dutch War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Five years after Charles II became king, England was involved in
+another war with the Netherlands. There was still bad feeling between
+the two peoples, and trading companies in the far east or west kept up
+a guerilla warfare which <a name="page_184"><span class="page">Page
+184</span></a> flooded both governments with complaints. The chief
+cause seems to have been the desire of the English Guinea Company
+to get rid of their Dutch competitors who persistently undersold
+them in the slave markets of the West Indies. Before there was any
+declaration of war an English squadron was sent out to attack the
+Dutch company's settlement on the West African coast. After this
+it crossed the Atlantic and took New Amsterdam, which thereafter
+became New York. The Dutch retaliated by sending out one of their
+squadrons to retake their African post and threaten the Atlantic
+colonies. In March, 1665, war was declared.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this conflict the relative strengths of the two navies were about
+the same as in the previous war. The Dutch had made improvements
+in their ships, but they still suffered from the lack of unity
+in organization and spirit. The first engagement was the battle
+of Lowestoft, on June 3, 1665. The English fleet was under the
+personal command of the Duke of York, later James II; the Dutch
+were led by de Ruyter. The two forces numbered from 80 to 100 ships
+each, and strung out as they were, must have extended over nearly
+ten miles of sea. The Duke of York formed his fleet in the pattern
+that he set by his own "Fighting Instructions," which governed the
+tactics of all navies thereafter for a hundred years, namely, the
+entire force drawn up in single line. This line bore down abreast
+toward the enemy until it reached gunshot, then swung into line
+ahead and sailed on a course parallel to that of the enemy. De
+Ruyter arranged his fleet accordingly, and the two long lines passed
+each other on opposite tacks three times, cannonading furiously
+at close range. This meant that the force was distributed evenly
+along the enemy's line and as against an evenly matched force these
+tactics could result, as a rule, only in mere inconclusive artillery
+duels which each side would claim as victories. In the battle of
+Lowestoft, however, several of the captains in the Dutch center
+flinched at the third passing and bore up to leeward, leaving a
+wide gap in de Ruyter's line. The English broke through at this
+point and hammered the weakened Dutch line in the center with a
+superior force. This was the decisive <a name="page_185"><span
+class="page">Page 185</span></a> point in the battle and de Ruyter
+was forced to retreat. The Dutch would have suffered even greater
+loss than they did had it not been for the masterly fashion in which
+Cornelius Tromp&mdash;son of the famous Martin Tromp&mdash;covered
+the retreat.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The defeat of the Dutch was due to the bad conduct of the captains
+in the center, four of whom were shot by order of de Ruyter and
+others dismissed from the service. It is interesting to note that
+while the first half of the battle was fought on the formal lines
+that were soon to be the cast iron rule of conduct for the British
+navy, and led to nothing conclusive; the second half was characterized
+by the breaking of the enemy's line, in the older style of Blake,
+and led to a pronounced victory.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this time Louis XIV had pledged himself to give aid to the
+Netherlands in case of attack by a third Power. But when the Dutch
+and his own ministers called on him to make good his promise he
+offered more promises and no fulfillment. The rumor of an approaching
+French squadron which was to make junction with de Ruyter, who had
+now been placed in command of the Dutch fleet, caused the English
+government to make the grave mistake of detaching Prince Rupert
+with 20 ships to look for the mythical French force. This division
+left Monk, who was again in command of the fleet, with only 57
+ships. Hearing that de Ruyter was anchored on the Flanders coast,
+Monk went out to find him. De Ruyter left his anchorage to meet the
+English, and on June 1, 1666, the two forces met in mid-Channel,
+between Dunkirk and the Downs. As the Dutch force heavily outnumbered
+him&mdash;nearly two to one&mdash;Monk might have been expected to
+avoid fighting, but he acted in the spirit of Blake. Having the
+windward position he decided that he could strike the advanced
+division under Tromp and maul it severely before the rest of the
+Dutch could succor it. Accordingly he boldly headed for the enemy's
+van. When Monk attacked he had only about 35 ships in hand, for the
+rest were straggling behind too far to help. Thus began the famous
+"Four Days' Battle," characterized by Mahan as "the most remarkable,
+in <a name="page_186"><span class="page">Page 186</span></a> some
+of its aspects that has ever been fought upon the ocean."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Influence of Sea Power upon
+History</span>, p. 125.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The fighting was close and furious and in its unparalleled duration
+numbers were bound to tell. On the third day Monk retreated to
+the Thames, but on being joined by Rupert's squadron immediately
+sallied forth to do battle again. On this day, June 4, the Dutch
+succeeded in cutting through his formation and putting him between
+two fires. Indeed Monk escaped destruction only by breaking through
+his ring of enemies and finding refuge in the Thames. The Dutch had
+won a great victory, for the English had lost some twenty ships
+and 5000 in killed and wounded. But Monk was right in feeling a
+sense of pride in the fight that he had made against great odds.
+The losses that he had inflicted were out of all proportion to the
+relative strength of the two forces. Unfortunately the new spirit
+that was coming into the navy of the Restoration was evidenced by
+the fact that a number of English captains, finding the action too
+hot for them, deserted their commander in chief. On the Dutch side
+de Ruyter's handling of his fleet was complicated by the conduct
+of Cornelius Tromp. This officer believed that he, not de Ruyter,
+should have been made commander of the Dutch fleet and in this
+action as in the next, acted with no regard for his chief's orders.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As a consequence of the Four Days' Battle, Dutchmen again controlled
+the Channel and closed the mouth of the Thames to trade. The English
+strained every nerve to create a fleet that should put an end to
+this humiliating and disastrous situation. The preparations were
+carried out with such speed that on July 22 (1666), Monk and Rupert
+anchored off the end of the Gunfleet shoal with a fleet of about
+80 ships of the line and frigates. On the 25th the English sighted
+de Ruyter, with a fleet slightly larger in numbers, in the broad
+part of the Thames estuary. Monk, forming his fleet in the long
+line ahead, sailed to the attack. The action that followed is called
+the "Battle of St. James's Day" or the "Gunfleet."
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 600px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig034.png" width="600" height="522" alt="Fig. 34">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE THAMES ESTUARY</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Whether or not Monk was influenced by his princely colleague <a
+name="page_187"><span class="page">Page 187</span></a> it is impossible
+to say, but the tactics of this engagement do not suggest the Monk
+of earlier battles. He followed the "Fighting Instructions" and
+in spite of them won a victory, but it might have been far more
+decisive. The English bore down in line abreast, then formed line
+ahead on reaching gunshot, the van, center, and rear, engaging
+respectively the Dutch van, center, and rear. In these line ahead
+attacks the rear usually straggled. Tromp, commanding the Dutch
+rear, saw his chance to attack Smith, commanding the English rear,
+before his squadron was in proper formation. Smith retreated, and
+Tromp, eager to win a victory all by himself, abandoned the rest of
+the Dutch fleet and pursued Smith. Thus the action broke into two
+widely separated parts. The <a name="page_188"><span class="page">Page
+188</span></a> English van and center succeeded in forcing the
+corresponding Dutch divisions to retreat, and if Monk had turned
+to the help of Smith he might have taken or destroyed all of the
+39 ships in Tromp's division. Instead, he and Rupert went careering
+on in pursuit of the enemy directly ahead of them. Eventually de
+Ruyter's ships found refuge in shallow water and then Monk turned
+to catch Tromp. But the latter proved too clever for his adversaries
+and slipped between them to an anchorage alongside of de Ruyter.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Although the victory was not nearly so decisive as it should have
+been with the opportunity offered, nevertheless it served the need
+of the hour. De Ruyter was no longer able to blockade the Thames and
+the Straits of Dover. And Monk, following up his success, carried
+the war to the enemy's coast, where he burned a merchant fleet
+of 160 vessels in the roadstead of the island of Terschelling,
+and destroyed one of the towns. Early in 1666 active operations
+on both sides dwindled down, and Charles, anxious to use naval
+appropriations for other purposes, allowed the fleet to fall into
+a condition of unreadiness for service. One of the least scandals in
+this corrupt age was the unwillingness or inability of the officials
+to pay the seamen their wages. In consequence large numbers of
+English prisoners in Holland actually preferred taking service
+in the Dutch navy rather than accepting exchange, on the ground
+that the Dutch government paid its men while their own did not.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Early in June, 1667, de Ruyter took advantage of the condition of
+the English fleet by inflicting perhaps the greatest humiliation on
+England that she has ever suffered. Entering the Thames unopposed,
+he was prevented from attacking London only by unfavorable wind and
+tide. He then turned his attention to the dockyards of Chatham and
+burnt or captured seven great ships of the line, besides numerous
+smaller craft, carried off the naval stores at Sheerness, and then
+for the next six weeks kept a blockade on the Thames and the eastern
+and southern coasts of England. This mortifying situation continued
+until the signing of the "Peace of Breda" concluded the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_189"><span class="page">Page 189</span></a>
+<i>The Third Dutch War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Less than five years later Charles again made war on the Netherlands.
+For this there was not the shadow of excuse, but Louis XIV saw
+fit to attack the Dutch, and Charles was ever his willing vassal.
+The English began hostilities without any declaration of war by
+a piratical attack on a Dutch convoy.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this juncture Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Attacked
+on her land frontiers by France, then the dominating military power,
+and on her sea frontiers by England, the strongest naval power, she
+seemed to have small chance to survive. But her people responded
+with a heroism worthy of her splendid history. They opened their
+dykes to check the armies of invasion and strained every nerve to
+equip a fleet large enough to cope with the combined navies of
+France and England. In this Third Dutch War four great naval battles
+were fought: that of Solebay, May 28, 1672, the two engagements
+off Schooneveldt, May 28 and June 4, 1673, and that of the Texel,
+August 11, 1673.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In all of these the honors go to the Dutch and their great admiral,
+de Ruyter. Since these actions did not restore the Netherlands to
+their old-time position or check the ascendancy of England, they
+need not be discussed individually here. The outstanding feature
+of the whole story is the surpassing skill and courage of de Ruyter
+in the face of overwhelming odds. In this war he showed the full
+stature of his genius as never before, and won his title as the
+greatest seaman of the 17th century. After his death one must wait
+till the day of Suffren and Nelson to find men worthy to rank with
+him.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this campaign de Ruyter showed his powers not only as a tactician
+but as a strategist. In the words of Mahan, the Dutch "made a strategic
+use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based
+their sea operations. To this they were forced by the desperate
+odds under which they were fighting; but they did not use their
+shoals as a mere shelter,&mdash;the <a name="page_190"><span
+class="page">Page 190</span></a> warfare they waged was the
+defensive-offensive. When the wind was fair for the allies to attack,
+de Ruyter kept under cover of his islands, or at least on ground
+where the enemy dared not follow; but when the wind served so that
+he might attack in his own way he turned and fell upon them."[1]
+That is, instead of accepting the tame r&ocirc;le of a "fleet in
+being" and hiding in a safe harbor, de Ruyter took and held the
+sea, always on the aggressive, always alert to catch his enemy
+in a position of divided forces or exposed flank and strike hard.
+His master, Martin Tromp, is regarded as the father of the line
+ahead formation for battle, but he undoubtedly taught de Ruyter
+its limitations as well as its advantages, and there is no trace
+of the stupid formalism of the Duke of York's regulations in de
+Ruyter's brilliant work.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon
+History</span>, p. 144.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this time he had no worthy opponent. As Monk was dead, the Duke of
+York had again assumed active command with Rupert as his lieutenant.
+Although the Duke was honestly devoted to the navy he was dull-witted,
+and in spite of the advantage of numbers and the dogged courage of
+officers and men which so often in English history has made up for
+stupid leadership, he was wholly unable to cope with de Ruyter's
+genius. As for the French navy, their ships were superb, the best
+in Europe, but their officers had no experience and apparently
+small desire for close fighting. At all events, despite the odds
+against him, de Ruyter defeated the allies in all four battles,
+prevented their landing an army of invasion, and broke up their
+attempt to blockade the coast.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The war was unpopular in England and as it met with ill success
+it became more so. After the battle of the Texel, in 1673, active
+operations died down to practically nothing, and at the beginning
+of the year England made peace. By this time Holland had managed to
+find other allies on the Continent&mdash;Spain and certain German
+states&mdash;and while she had to continue her struggle against Louis
+XIV by land she was relieved of the menace of her great enemy on the
+sea. Fifteen years later, by a curious freak of history, a Dutch
+<a name="page_191"><span class="page">Page 191</span></a> prince
+became King William III of England, and the two old enemies became
+united in alliance. But the Netherlands had exhausted themselves
+by their protracted struggle. They had saved their independence,
+but after the close of the 17th century they ceased to be a world
+power of any consequence.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The persistent enmity of the French king for the Dutch gained nothing
+for France but everything for England. Unwittingly he poured out his
+resources in money and men to the end that England should become
+the great colonial and maritime rival of France. As a part of her
+spoils England had gained New York and New Jersey, thus linking her
+northern and southern American colonies, and she had taken St. Helena
+as a base for her East Indies merchantmen. She had tightened her
+hold in India, and by repeatedly chastising the Barbary pirates had
+won immunity for her traders in the Mediterranean. At the beginning
+of the Second Dutch War Monk had said with brutal frankness, "What
+matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade
+which the Dutch have." This, the richest prize of all, fell from
+the hands of the Dutch into those of the English. During the long
+drawn war which went on after the English peace of 1674, while
+Holland with her allies fought against Louis XIV, the great bulk
+of the Dutch carrying trade passed from the Dutch to the English
+flag. The close of the 17th century, therefore, found England fairly
+started on her career as an ocean empire, unified by sea power. Her
+navy, despite the vices it had caught from the Stuart r&eacute;gime,
+had become firmly established as a permanent institution with a
+definite organization. By this time every party recognized its
+essential importance to England's future.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nevertheless, whatever satisfaction may be felt by men of English
+speech in this rapid growth of England's power and prestige as
+a result of the three wars with the Dutch, one cannot avoid the
+other side of the picture. A people small in numbers but great
+in energy and genius was hounded to the point of extinction by
+the greed of its powerful neighbors. <a name="page_192"><span
+class="page">Page 192</span></a> Peace-loving, asking merely to
+be let alone, the only crime of the Dutch was to excite the envy
+of the English and the French.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+See next chapter, <a href="#page_221">page 221</a>.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_193"><span class="page">Page 193</span></a>
+CHAPTER X</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER [<i>Continued</i>]. WARS WITH FRANCE TO
+THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The effect of the expulsion of James II from the throne of England
+coupled with the accession of the Dutch prince, William of Orange,
+was to make England change sides and take the leadership in the
+coalition opposed to Louis XIV. From this time on, for over 125
+years, England was involved in a series of wars with France. They
+began with the threat of Louis to dominate Europe and ended with
+the similar threat on the part of Napoleon. In all this conflict
+the sea power of England was a factor of paramount importance. Even
+when the fighting was continental rather than naval, the ability
+of Great Britain to cut France off from her overseas possessions
+resulted in the transfer of enormous tracts of territory to the
+British Empire. During the 18th century, the territorial extent
+of the expire grew by leaps and bounds, with the single important
+loss of the American colonies. And even this brought no positive
+advantage to France for it did not weaken her adversary's grip
+on the sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The War of the League of Augsburg</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The accession of William III was the signal for England's entry
+into the war of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) against France,
+and the effort of the French king to put James II back again upon
+the English throne. By this time the French navy had been so greatly
+strengthened that at the outset it outnumbered the combined fleets
+of the English and the Dutch. It boasted the only notable admiral of
+this period, <a name="page_194"><span class="page">Page 194</span></a>
+Tourville, but it missed every opportunity to do something decisive.
+It failed to keep William from landing in England with an army;
+it failed also to keep the English from landing and supplying an
+army in Ireland, where they raised the siege of Londonderry and won
+the decisive victory of the Boyne. On the other hand the British
+navy was handled with equal irresolution and blindness in strategy.
+It accomplished what it did in keeping communications open with
+Ireland through the mistakes of the French, and its leaders seemed
+to be equally unaware of the importance of winning definitely the
+control of the sea.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 549px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig035.png" width="549" height="379" alt="Fig. 35">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THREE-DECKED SHIP OF THE LINE, 18TH CENTURY</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+If the naval strategy on both sides was feeble the tactics were
+equally so. The contrast between the fighting of Blake, Monk, Tromp
+and de Ruyter and that of the admirals of this period is striking.
+For example, on May 1, 1689, the English admiral Herbert and the
+French admiral Ch&acirc;teaurenault fought an indecisive action
+in Bantry Bay, Ireland. After considerable powder had been shot
+away without the loss of a ship on either side, the French went
+back to protect their <a name="page_195"><span class="page">Page
+195</span></a> transports in the bay; Herbert also withdrew, and
+was made Earl of Torrington for his "victory." This same officer
+commanding a Dutch and English fleet encountered the French under
+Tourville off Beachy Head on the south coast of England (July 10,
+1690). It is true that Tourville's force was stronger, but Torrington
+acted with no enterprise and was thoroughly beaten. At the same
+time the French admiral showed lack of push in following up his
+victory, which might have been crushing. By this time the line
+ahead order of fighting had become a fetich on both sides. The
+most noted naval battle of this war is that of La Hogue (May 29,
+1692), which has been celebrated as a great British victory. In
+this action an allied fleet of 99 were opposed to a French fleet
+of 44 under Tourville. Tourville offered battle under such odds
+only because he had imperative orders from his king to fight the
+enemy. During the action the French did not lose a single ship, but
+in the four days' retreat the vessels became separated in trying
+to find shelter and fifteen were destroyed or taken. This was a
+severe blow to the the French navy but by no means decisive. The
+subsequent inactivity of the fleet was due to the demands of the
+war on land.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As the war became more and more a continental affair, Louis was
+compelled to utilize all his resources for his military campaigns.
+For this reason the splendid fleet with which he had begun the
+war gradually disappeared from the sea. Some of these men of war
+were lent to great privateersmen like Jean Bart and Du Guay Trouin,
+who took out powerful squadrons of from five to ten ships of the
+line, strong enough to overcome the naval escorts of a British
+convoy, and ravaged English commerce. In this matter of protecting
+shipping the naval strategy was as vacillating and blind as in
+everything else. Nevertheless no mere commerce destroying will
+serve to win the control of the sea, and despite the losses in
+trade and the low ebb to which English naval efficiency had sunk,
+the British flag still dominated the ocean routes while the greater
+part of the French fleet rotted in port.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this war of the League of Augsburg, Louis XIV was fighting
+practically all Europe, and the strain was too great <a
+name="page_196"><span class="page">Page 196</span></a> for a nation
+already weakened by a long series of wars. By the terms of peace
+which he found himself obliged to accept, he lost nearly everything
+that he had gained by conquest during his long reign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Wars of the Spanish and the Austrian Succession</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After a brief interval of peace war blazed out again over the question
+whether a French Bourbon should be king of Spain,&mdash;the War of
+the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. England's aim in this war was
+to acquire some of the Spanish colonies in America and to prevent
+any loss of trading privileges hitherto enjoyed by the English
+and the Dutch. But as it turned out nothing of importance was
+accomplished in the western hemisphere except by the terms of peace.
+The French and Spanish attempted no major operations by sea. But
+the English navy captured Minorca, with its important harbor of
+Port Mahon, and Rooke, with more initiative than he had ever shown
+before in his career, took Gibraltar (August 4, 1704). These two
+prizes made Great Britain for the first time a Mediterranean power,
+and the fact that she held the gateway to the inland sea was of
+great importance in subsequent naval history.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In addition to these captures the terms of peace (the Treaty of
+Utrecht) yielded to England from the French Newfoundland, the Hudson
+Bay territory, and Nova Scotia. All that the French had left on the
+eastern coast of Canada was Cape Breton Island, with Louisburg,
+which was the key to the St. Lawrence. As for commercial privileges,
+England had gained from the Portuguese, who had been allies in
+the war, a practical monopoly of their carrying trade; and from
+France she had taken the entire monopoly of the slave trade to
+the Spanish American colonies which had been formerly granted by
+Spain to France. Holland got nothing out of the war as affecting
+her interests at sea,&mdash;not even a trading post. Her alliance
+with Great Britain had become as some one has called it, that of
+"the giant and the dwarf." At the conclusion of the War of the
+Spanish Succession, to quote the words <a name="page_197"><span
+class="page">Page 197</span></a> of Mahan, "England was <i>the</i>
+sea power; there was no second."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this war as in the preceding, French privateersmen made great
+inroads on British commerce, and some of these privateering operations
+were conducted on a grand scale. For example, Du Guay Trouin took
+a squadron of six ships of the line and two frigates, together
+with 2000 troops, across the Atlantic and attacked Rio Janeiro.
+He had little difficulty in forcing its submission and extorting
+a ransom of $400,000. The activities of the privateers led to a
+clause in the treaty of peace requiring the French to destroy the
+fortifications of the port of Dunkirk, which was notorious as the
+nest of these corsairs.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748, was another of the
+dynastic quarrels of this age, with France and Spain arrayed against
+England. It has no naval interest for our purposes here. The peace
+of 1748, however, leaving things exactly as they were when the war
+began, settled none of the existing grudge between Great Britain
+and France. Eight years later, hostilities began again in the Seven
+Years' War, 1756-1763, in which Great Britain entered on the side
+of Prussia against a great coalition of Continental powers headed
+by France.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Seven Years' War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The naval interest of this war is centered in the year 1759, when
+France, having lost Louisburg on account of England's control of
+the sea, decided to concentrate naval and military forces on an
+invasion of England. Before the plans for this projected thrust
+were completed, Quebec also had fallen to the British. The attempted
+invasion of 1759 is not so well known as that of Napoleon in 1805,
+but it furnished the pattern that Napoleon copied and had a better
+chance of success than his. In brief, a small squadron under the
+famous privateer Thurot was to threaten the Scotch and Irish coasts,
+acting as a diversion to draw off the British fleet. Meanwhile
+the squadron at Toulon was to dodge the British off that port,
+pass the Straits and join Conflans, who had the main French <a
+name="page_198"><span class="page">Page 198</span></a> fleet at
+Brest. The united forces were then to cover the crossing of the
+troops in transports and flatboats to the English coast.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This plan was smashed by Admiral Hawke in one of the most daring
+feats in British naval annals. Thurot got away but did not divert
+any of the main force guarding the Channel. The Toulon fleet also
+eluded the English for a time but went to pieces outside the Straits
+largely on account of mismanagement on the part of its commander.
+The remnants were either captured or driven to shelter in neutral
+ports by the English squadron under Boscawen. On November 9, a
+heavy gale and the necessities of the fleet compelled Hawke to lift
+his blockade of Brest and take shelter in Torbay, after leaving
+four frigates to watch the port. On the 14th, Conflans, discovering
+that his enemy was gone, came out, with the absurd idea of covering
+the transportation of the French army before Hawke should appear
+again. That very day Hawke returned to renew the blockade, and
+learning that Conflans had been seen heading southeast, decided
+rightly that the French admiral was bound for Quiberon Bay to make
+an easy capture of a small British squadron there under Duff before
+beginning the transportation of the invading army.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For five days pursuer and pursued drifted in calms. On the 19th
+a stiff westerly gale enabled Hawke to overtake Conflans, who was
+obliged to shorten sail for fear of arriving at his destination in
+the darkness. The morning of the 20th found the fleets in sight
+of each other but scattered. All the forenoon the rival admirals
+made efforts to gather their units for battle. A frigate leading
+the British pursuit fired signal guns to warn Duff of the enemy's
+presence, and the latter, cutting his cables, was barely able to
+get out in time to escape the French fleet and join Hawke. Conflans
+then decided that the English were too strong for him, and abandoning
+his idea of offering battle, signaled a general retreat and led
+the way into Quiberon Bay.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Hawke instantly ordered pursuit. The importance of this signal can
+be realized only by taking into account the tremendous gale blowing
+and the exceedingly dangerous character <a name="page_199"><span
+class="page">Page 199</span></a> of the approach to Quiberon Bay,
+lined as it was with sunken rocks. Hawke had little knowledge of
+the channels but he reasoned that where a French ship could go
+an English one could follow, and the perils of the entry could
+not outweigh in his mind the importance of crushing the navy of
+France then and there. The small British superiority of numbers
+which Conflans feared was greatly aggravated by the conditions
+of his flight. The slower ships in his rear were crushed by the
+British in superior force and the English coming alongside the
+French on their lee side were able to use their heaviest batteries
+while the French, heeled over by the gale, had to keep their lowest
+tier of ports closed for fear of being sunk. One of their ships tried
+the experiment of opening this broadside and promptly foundered.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Darkness fell on a scene of wild confusion. Two of the British
+vessels were lost on a reef, but daylight revealed the fact that
+the French had scattered in all directions. Only five of their
+ships had been destroyed and one taken, but the organization and
+the morale were completely shattered. The idea of invasion thus
+came to a sudden end in Quiberon Bay. The daring and initiative
+of Hawke in defying weather and rocks in his pursuit of Conflans
+is the admirable and significant fact of this story, for the actual
+fighting amounted to little. It is the sort of thing that marked
+the spirit of the Dutch Wars and of Blake at Santa Cruz, and is
+strikingly different from the tame and stupid work of other admirals,
+English or French, in his own day.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Seven Years' War ended in terms of the deepest humiliation for
+France&mdash;a "Carthaginian peace." She was compelled to renounce
+to England all of Canada with the islands of the St. Lawrence, the
+Ohio valley and the entire area east of the Mississippi except
+New Orleans. Spain, which had entered the war on the side of France
+in 1761, gave up Florida in exchange for Havana, captured by the
+English, and in the West Indies several of the Lesser Antilles
+came under the British flag. It is hardly necessary to point out
+that the loss of these overseas possessions on such a tremendous
+scale was <a name="page_200"><span class="page">Page 200</span></a>
+due to the ability of the British navy to cut the communications
+between them and the mother country.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Naval administration in England at this time was corrupt, and the
+admirals, with the notable exception of Hawke, were lacking in
+enterprise; they were still slaves to the "Fighting Instructions."
+But in all these respects the French were far worse, and the British
+government never lost sight of the immense importance of sea power.
+Its strategy was sound.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The War of American Independence</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The peace of 1763 was so humiliating that every patriotic Frenchman
+longed for the opportunity of revenge. This offered itself in the
+revolt of the American colonies against the North Ministry in 1775.
+From the outset French neutrality as regards the American rebels
+was most benevolent; nothing could be more pleasing to France than
+to see her old enemy involved in difficulties with the richest and
+most populous of her colonies. For the first two or three years
+France gave aid surreptitiously, but after the capture of Burgoyne
+in 1777, she decided to enter the war openly and draw in allies
+as well. She succeeded in enlisting Spain in 1779 and Holland the
+year following. The entrance of the latter was of small military
+value, perhaps, but at all events France so manipulated the rebellion
+in the colonies as to bring on another great European war. In this
+conflict for the first time she had no enemies to fight on the
+Continent; hence she was free to throw her full force upon the
+sea, attacking British possessions in every quarter of the world.
+The War of the American Revolution became therefore a maritime war,
+the first since the conflicts with the Dutch in the 17th century.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+While Paul Jones was in Paris waiting for his promised command,
+he forwarded to the Minister of Marine a plan for a rapid descent
+in force on the American coast. If his plan had been followed and
+properly executed the war might have been ended in America at one
+blow. But this project died in the procrastination and red tape of
+the Ministry of Marine, and a subsequent proposal for an attack on
+Liverpool <a name="page_201"><span class="page">Page 201</span></a>
+dwindled into the mere commerce-destroying cruise which is memorable
+only for Jones's unparalleled fight with the <i>Serapis</i>. Eventually
+the navy of France was thrown into the balance to offset that of
+Great Britain, and it is largely to this fact that the United States
+owes its independence; men and munitions came freely from overseas
+and on one momentous occasion, the Battle of the Virginia Capes,
+the French navy performed its part decisively in action. But on
+a score of other occasions it failed pitiably on account of the
+lack of a comprehensive strategic plan and the want of energy and
+experience on the part of the commanding officers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is true that the French navy had made progress since the Seven
+Years' War. In 1778, it possessed 80 good line of battle ships.
+To this force, a year later, Spain was able to contribute nearly
+sixty. But England began the war with 150. Thus even if the French
+and Spanish personnel had been as well trained and as energetic
+as the British they would have had a superior force to contend
+with, particularly as the allied fleet was divided between the
+ports of Spain and France, and under dual command. But in efficiency
+the French and Spanish navies were vastly inferior to the British.
+Spanish efficiency may be dismissed at the outset as worthless. For
+the French officer the chief requisite was nobility of birth. The
+aristocracy of England furnished the officers for its service also,
+but in the French navy, considerations of social grade outweighed
+those of naval rank, a condition that never obtained in the British.
+In consequence, discipline&mdash;the principle of subordination
+animated by the spirit of team work&mdash;was conspicuously wanting
+in the French fleets. Individual captains were more concerned about
+their own prerogatives than about the success of the whole. This
+condition is illustrated by the conduct of the captains under Suffren
+in the Bay of Bengal, where the genius of the commander was always
+frustrated by the wilfulness of his subordinates. Finally in the
+matter of tactics the French were brought up on a fatally wrong
+theory, that of acting on the defensive, of avoiding decisive action,
+of saving a fleet rather than risking it for the sake of victory.
+Hence, though they were <a name="page_202"><span class="page">Page
+202</span></a> skilled in maneuvering, and ahead of the British in
+signaling, though their ships were as fine as any in the world,
+this fatal error of principle prevented their taking advantage of
+great opportunities and sent them to certain defeat in the end.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thus it is clear that the sea power of France and Spain was not
+formidable if the English had taken the proper course of strategy.
+This should have been to bottle up French and Spanish fleets in
+their own ports from Brest to Cadiz. Such a policy would have left
+enough ships to attend to the necessities of the army in America
+and the pursuit of French and American privateers, and accomplished
+the primary duty of preventing the arrival of French squadrons and
+French troops on the scene of war. Here the British government
+made its fatal mistake. Instead of concentrating on the coast of
+France and Spain, it tried to defend every outlying post where
+the flag might be threatened. Thus the superior English fleet was
+scattered all over the world, from Calcutta to Jamaica, while the
+French fleets came and went at will, sending troops and supplies
+to America and challenging the British control of the sea. Had the
+French navy been more efficient and energetic in its leadership
+France might have made her ancient enemy pay far more dearly for
+her strategic blunder. As it was, England lost her colonies in
+America.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Instead of the swift stroke on the American coast which Paul Jones
+had contemplated, a French fleet under d'Estaing arrived in the
+Delaware about five months after France had entered the war and
+after inexcusable delays on the way. In spite of the loss of precious
+time he had an opportunity to beat an inferior force under Howe
+at New York and seize that important British base, but his
+characteristic timidity kept him from doing anything there. From
+the American coast he went to the West Indies, where he bungled
+every opportunity of doing his duty. He allowed St. Lucia to fall
+into British hands and failed to capture Grenada. Turning north again,
+he made a futile attempt to retake Savannah, which had fallen to the
+English. Then at the end of 1779, at about the darkest hour of the
+American cause, he returned to France, leaving the colonists in the
+lurch. D'Estaing was by <a name="page_203"><span class="page">Page
+203</span></a> training an infantry officer, and his appointment to
+such an important naval command is eloquent of the effect of court
+influence in demoralizing the navy. "S'il avait &eacute;t&eacute;
+aussi marin que brave," was the generous remark of Suffren on this
+man. It is true that on shore, where he was at home, d'Estaing was
+personally fearless, but as commander of a fleet, where he was
+conscious of inexperience, he showed timidity that should have
+brought him to court martial.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In March, 1780, the French fleet in the West Indies was put under
+the command of de Guichen, a far abler man than d'Estaing, but
+similarly indoctrinated with the policy of staying on the defensive.
+His rival on the station was Rodney, a British officer of the old
+school, weakened by years and illness, but destined to make a name
+for himself by his great victory two years later. In many respects
+Rodney was a conservative, and in respect to an appetite for prize
+money he belonged to the 16th century, but his example went a long
+way to cure the British navy of the paralysis of the Fighting
+Instructions and bring back the close, decisive fighting methods
+of Blake and de Ruyter.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this same year in which Rodney took command of the West Indies
+station, a Scotch gentleman named Clerk published a pamphlet on
+naval tactics which attracted much attention. It is a striking
+commentary on the lack of interest in the theory of the profession
+that no British naval officer had ever written on the subject. This
+civilian, who had no military training or experience, worked out
+an analysis of the Fighting Instructions and came to the conclusion
+that the whole conception of naval tactics therein contained was
+wrong, that decisive actions could be fought only by concentrating
+superior forces on inferior. One can imagine the derision heaped
+on the landlubber who presumed to teach admirals their business,
+but there was no dodging the force of his point. Of course the
+mathematical precision of his paper victories depended on the enemy's
+being passive while the attack was carried out, but fundamentally he
+was right. The history of the past hundred years showed the futility
+of an unbroken line ahead, with van, center, and rear attempting <a
+name="page_204"><span class="page">Page 204</span></a> to engage
+the corresponding divisions of the enemy. Decisive victories could
+be won only by close, concentrated fighting. It may be true, as
+the British naval officers asserted, that they were not influenced
+by Clerk's ideas, but the year in which his book appeared marks
+the beginning of the practice of his theory in naval warfare.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the time of the American Revolution the West Indies represented
+a debatable ground where British interests clashed with those of
+her enemies, France, Spain, and Holland. It was very rich in trade
+importance; in fact, about one fourth of all British commerce was
+concerned with the Caribbean. Moreover, it contained the rival
+bases for operations on the American coast. Hence it became the
+chief theater of naval activity. Rodney's business was to make the
+area definitely British in control, to protect British possessions
+and trade and to capture as much as possible of enemy possessions
+and trade. On arriving at his station in the spring of 1780, he
+sought de Guichen. The latter had shown small enterprise, having
+missed one opportunity to capture British transports and another
+to prevent the junction of Rodney's fleet with that of Parker who
+was awaiting him. Even when the junction was effected, the British
+total amounted to only 20 ships of the line to de Guichen's 22,
+and the French admiral might still have offered battle. Instead
+he followed the French strategy of his day, by lying at anchor
+at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting for the British to sail away
+and give him an opportunity to capture an island without having
+to fight for it.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Rodney promptly sought him out and set a watch of frigates off
+the port. When de Guichen came out on April 15 (1780) to attend
+to the convoying of troops, Rodney was immediately in pursuit,
+and on the 17th the two fleets were in contact. Early that morning
+the British admiral signaled his plan "to attack the enemy's rear,"
+because de Guichen's ships were strung out in extended order with
+a wide gap between rear and center. De Guichen, seeing his danger,
+wore together and closed the gap. This done, he again turned northward
+and the two fleets sailed on parallel courses but out of gunshot.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 799px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig036.png" width="799" height="490" alt="Fig. 36">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE WEST INDIES
+ <a name="page_205"><span class="page">Page 205</span></a></td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_206"><span class="page">Page 206</span></a> About
+eleven 0' clock, some four hours after his first signal, Rodney
+again signaled his intention to engage the enemy, and shortly before
+twelve he sent up the order, "for every ship to bear down and steer
+for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeable to the 21st article
+of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Rodney had intended to
+concentrate his ships against their <i>actual</i> opposites at the
+time,&mdash;the rear of the French line, which was still considerably
+drawn out; but the captain of the leading ship interpreted the
+order to mean the <i>numerical</i> opposites in the enemy's line,
+after the style of fighting provided for by the Instructions from
+time immemorial. Rodney's first signal informing the fleet that he
+intended to attack the enemy's rear meant nothing to his captain
+at this time. Accordingly he sailed away to engage the first ship
+in the French van, followed by the vessels immediately astern of
+him, and thus wrecked the plan of his commander in chief.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nothing could illustrate better the hold of the traditional style
+of fighting on the minds of naval officers than this blunder, though
+it is only fair to add that there was some excuse in the ambiguity
+Of the order. Rodney was infuriated and expressed himself with
+corresponding bitterness. He always regarded this battle as the one
+on which his fame should rest because of what it might have been
+if his subordinates had given him proper support. The interesting
+point lies in the fact that he designed to throw his whole force
+on an inferior part of the enemy's force&mdash;the principle of
+concentration. In a later and much more famous battle, as we shall
+see, Rodney departed still further from the traditional tactics
+by "breaking the line," his own as well as that of the French,
+and won a great victory.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile there occurred another operation not so creditable. Rodney
+had spent a large part of his life dodging creditors, and it was
+due to the generous loan of a French gentleman in Paris that he
+did not drag out the years of this war in the Bastille for debt.
+When Holland entered the war he saw an opportunity to make a fortune
+by seizing the island of St. Eustatius, which had been the chief
+depot in the West <a name="page_207"><span class="page">Page
+207</span></a> Indies for smuggling contraband into America. To this
+purpose he subordinated every other consideration. The island was
+an easy prize, but the quarrels and lawsuits over the distribution
+of the booty broke him down and sent him back to England at just
+the time when he was most needed in American waters, leaving Hood
+in acting command.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In March, 1781, de Grasse sailed from Brest with a fleet of 26
+ships of the line and a large convoy. Five of his battleships were
+detached for service in the East, under Suffren, of whom we shall
+hear more later. The rest proceeded to the Caribbean. On arriving
+at Martinique de Grasse had an excellent opportunity to beat Hood,
+who had an inferior force; but like his predecessors, d'Estaing and
+de Guichen, he was content to follow a defensive policy, excusing
+himself on the ground of not exposing his convoy. While at Cape
+Haitien he received messages from Rochambeau and Washington urging
+his co&ouml;peration with the campaign in America. To his credit
+be it said that on this occasion he acted promptly and skillfully,
+and the results were of great moment.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this time the British had subdued Georgia and South Carolina,
+and Cornwallis was attempting to carry the conquest through North
+Carolina. In order to keep in touch with his source of supplies
+the sea, however, he was compelled to fall back to Wilmington.
+From there, under orders from General Clinton, he marched north
+to Yorktown, Virginia, where he was joined by a small force of
+infantry. Washington and Rochambeau had agreed on the necessity
+of getting the co&ouml;peration of the West Indies fleet in an
+offensive directed either at Clinton in New York or at Cornwallis
+at Yorktown. Rochambeau preferred the latter alternative, because
+it involved fewer difficulties, and the message to de Grasse was
+accompanied by a private memorandum from him to the effect that he
+preferred the Chesapeake as the scene of operations. Accordingly
+de Grasse sent the messenger frigate back with word of his intention
+to go to Chesapeake Bay. He then made skillful arrangements for
+the transport of all available troops, and set sail with every
+ship <a name="page_208"><span class="page">Page 208</span></a> he
+could muster, steering by the less frequented Old Bahama Channel
+in order to screen his movement.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 517px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig037.png" width="517" height="392" alt="Fig. 37">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">SCENE OF THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On August 30 (1781) de Grasse anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just inside
+the Chesapeake Capes, with 28 ships of the line. The two British
+guard frigates were found stupidly at anchor inside the bay; one
+was taken and the other chased up the York river. De Grasse then
+landed the troops he had brought with him, and these made a welcome
+re&euml;nforcement to Lafayette, who was then opposing Cornwallis.
+At the same time Washington was marching south to join Lafayette,
+and word had been sent to the commander of a small French squadron
+at Newport to make junction with de Grasse, bringing the siege
+artillery necessary to the operations before Yorktown. Thus the
+available farces were converging on Cornwallis in superior strength,
+and his only route for supplies and re&euml;nforcements lay by sea.
+All depended on whether <a name="page_209"><span class="page">Page
+209</span></a> the British could succeed in forcing the entrance
+to Chesapeake Bay.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Hood, with 14 ships of the line, had followed on the trail of de
+Grasse, and as it happened looked into Chesapeake Bay just three
+days before the French admiral arrived. Finding no sign of the
+French, Hood sailed on to New York and joined Admiral Graves, who
+being senior, took command of the combined squadrons. As it was
+an open secret at that time that the allied operations would be
+directed at Cornwallis, Graves immediately sailed for the Capes,
+hoping on the way to intercept the Newport squadron which was known
+to be bound far the same destination. On reaching the Capes, September
+5, he found de Grasse guarding the entrance to the bay with 24 ships
+of the line, the remaining four having been detailed to block the
+mouths of the James and York rivers. To oppose this force Graves
+had only 19 ships of the line, but he did not hesitate to offer
+battle.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In de Grasse's mind there were two things to accomplish: first,
+to hold the bay, and secondly, to keep the British occupied far
+enough at sea to allow the Newport squadron to slip in. Of course
+he could have made sure of both objects and a great deal more by
+defeating the British fleet in a decisive action, but that was not
+the French naval doctrine. The entrance to the Chesapeake is ten
+miles wide but the main channel lies between the southern promontory
+and a shoal called the Middle Ground three miles north of it. The
+British stood for the channel during the morning and the French,
+taking advantage of the ebbing tide at noon, cleared the bay, forming
+line of battle as they went. As they had to make several tacks to
+clear Cape Henry, the ships issued in straggling order, offering
+an opportunity for attack which Graves did not appreciate. Instead
+he went about, heading east an a course parallel to that of de
+Grasse, and holding the windward position. When the two lines were
+nearly opposite each other the British admiral ware down to attack.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 607px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig038.png" width="607" height="433" alt="Fig. 38">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, SEPT. 5,
+ 1781</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">(After diagram in Mahan's <i>Major Operations
+ in the War of American Independence,</i> p. 180.)</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Graves's method followed the orthodox tradition exactly, and with
+the unvarying result. As the attacking fleet bore down in line ahead
+at an angle, the van of course came into <a name="page_210"><span
+class="page">Page 210</span></a> action first, unsupported for some
+time by the rest. As the signal for close action was repeated,
+this angle was made sharper, and in attempting to close up the line
+several ships got bunched in such a way as to mask their fire.
+Meanwhile the rear, the seven ships under Hood, still trailing
+along in line ahead, never got into the action at all. Graves had
+signaled for "close action," but Hood chose to believe that the
+order for line ahead still held until the signal was repeated,
+whereupon he bore down. As the French turned away at the same time,
+to keep their distance, Hood contributed nothing to the fighting
+of the day. At sunset the battle ended. The British had lost 90
+killed and 246 wounded; the French, a total of 200. Several of the
+British ships were badly damaged, one of which was in a sinking
+condition and had to be burned. The two fleets continued on an
+easterly course about three miles apart, and for five days more
+the two maneuvered without fighting. Graves was too much injured
+<a name="page_211"><span class="page">Page 211</span></a> by the
+first day's encounter to attack again and de Grasse was content
+to let him alone. Graves still had an opportunity to cut back and
+enter the bay, taking a position from which it would have been hard
+to dislodge him and effecting the main object of the expedition
+by holding the mouth of the Chesapeake. But this apparently did not
+occur to him. De Grasse, who had imperiled Washington's campaign
+by cruising so far from the entrance, finally returned on the 11th,
+and found that the Newport squadron had arrived safely the day
+before. When Graves saw that the French fleet was now increased
+to 36 line-of-battle ships, he gave up hope of winning the bay
+and returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis to his fate. A little
+over a month later, October 19, the latter surrendered, and with
+his sword passed the last hope of subduing the American revolution.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This battle of the Capes, or Lynnhaven, has never until recent
+times been given its true historical perspective, largely because
+in itself it was a rather tame affair. But as the historian Reich[1]
+observes, "battles, like men, are important not for their dramatic
+splendor but for their efficiency and consequences.... The battle
+off Cape Henry had ultimate effects infinitely more important than
+Waterloo." Certainly there never was a more striking example of
+the "influence of sea power" on a campaign. Just at the crisis of
+the American Revolution the French navy, by denying to the British
+their communications by sea, struck the decisive blow of the war.
+This was the French <i>revanche</i> for the humiliation of 1763.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Foundations of Modern Europe</span>,
+p. 24.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The British failure in this action was due to a dull commander
+in chief carrying out a blundering attack based on the Fighting
+Instructions. Blame must fall also on his second in command, Hood,
+who, though a brilliant officer, certainly failed to support his
+chief properly when there was an obvious thing to do. Perhaps if
+the personal relations between the two had been more cordial Hood
+would have taken the initiative. But in those days the initiative
+of a subordinate was not encouraged, and Hood chose to stand on
+his dignity.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Although the war was practically settled by the fall of <a
+name="page_212"><span class="page">Page 212</span></a> Yorktown,
+it required another year or so to die out. In this final year a
+famous naval battle was fought which went far toward establishing
+British predominance in the West Indies, and which revealed something
+radically different in naval tactics from the practice of the time.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the spring of 1782, Rodney was back in command of the West Indian
+station, succeeding Hood, who continued to serve as commander of a
+division. The British base was Gros Islet Bay in Santa Lucia. De Grasse
+was at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting to transport troops to Santo
+Domingo, where other troops and ships were collected. There, joining
+with a force of Spaniards from Cuba, he was to conduct a campaign
+against Jamaica. It was Rodney's business to break up this plan.
+During a period of preparation on both sides, re&euml;nforcements
+joined the rival fleets, that of the British amounting to enough to
+give Rodney a marked superiority in numbers. Moreover his ships
+were heavier, as he had five 3-deckers to the French one, and about
+200 more guns. The superiority of speed, as well, lay with Rodney
+because more of his ships had copper sheathing. A still further
+advantage lay in the fact that he was not burdened with the problem
+of protecting convoys and transports as was de Grasse. Thus, in the
+event of conflict, the advantages lay heavily with the British.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the morning of April 8, the English sentry frigate off Fort
+Royal noted that the French were coming out, and hastened with
+the news to Rodney at Santa Lucia. The latter put to sea at once.
+He judged rightly that de Grasse would steer for Santo Domingo, in
+order to get rid of his transports at their destination as soon
+as possible, and on the morning of the 9th he sighted the French
+off the west coast of the island of Dominica. On the approach of
+the English fleet, de Grasse signaled his transports to run to
+the northwest, while he took his fleet on a course for the channel
+between the islands of Dominica and Guadeloupe. As the British would
+be sure to pursue the fleet, this move would enable the convoy to
+escape.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The channel toward which de Grasse turned his fleet is <a
+name="page_213"><span class="page">Page 213</span></a> known as
+the Saints' Passage from a little group of islands, "les isles des
+Saintes," lying to the north of it. In the course of the pursuit,
+Hood, with the British van division of nine ships, had got ahead of
+the rest and offered a tempting opening for attack in superior force.
+If de Grasse had grasped his opportunity he might have inflicted a
+crushing blow on Rodney and upset the balance of superiority. But
+the lack of aggressiveness in the French doctrine was again fatal
+to French success. De Grasse merely sent his second in command to
+conduct a skirmish at long range&mdash;and thus threw his chance
+away.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The light winds and baffling calms kept both fleets idle for a day.
+On the 11th de Grasse tried to work his fleet through the channel
+on short tacks. Just as he had almost accomplished his purpose he
+discovered several of his vessels still so far to westward as to
+be in danger of capture. In order to rescue these he gave up the
+fruits of laborious beating against the head wind and returned.
+The following morning, April 12 (1782), discovered the two fleets
+to the west of the strait and so near that the French could no
+longer evade battle. The French came down on the port tack and the
+British stood toward them, with their admiral's signal flying to
+"engage to leeward." When the two lines converged to close range,
+the leading British ship shifted her course slightly so as to run
+parallel with that of the French, and the two fleets sailed past each
+other firing broadsides. So far the battle had followed traditional
+line-ahead pattern.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Just as the leading ship of the British came abreast of the rearmost
+of the French, the wind suddenly veered to the southward, checking
+the speed of the French ships and swinging their bows over toward
+the English line. At best a line of battle in the sailing ship
+days was an uneven straggling formation, and the effect of this
+flaw of wind, dead ahead, was to break up the French line into
+irregular groups separated by wide gaps. One of these opened up
+ahead as Rodney's flagship, the <i>Formidable</i>, forged past
+the French line. His fleet captain, Douglas, saw the opportunity
+and pleaded with Rodney to cut through the gap. "No," he replied,
+<a name="page_214"><span class="page">Page 214</span></a> "I will
+not break my line." Douglas insisted. A moment later, as the
+<i>Formidable</i> came abreast of the opening, the opportunity proved
+too tempting and Rodney gave his consent. His battle signal, "engage
+the enemy to leeward," was still flying, but the <i>Formidable</i>
+luffed up and swung through the French line followed by five others.
+The ship immediately ahead of the <i>Formidable</i> also cut through
+a gap, and the sixth astern of the flagship went through as well,
+followed by the entire British rear. As each vessel pierced the
+broken line she delivered a terrible fire with both broadsides at
+close range.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 603px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig039.png" width="603" height="537" alt="Fig. 39">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, APRIL 12,
+  1782</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">After diagram in Mahan's <i>Influence of Sea
+  Power Upon History</i>, p. 486.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The result of this maneuver was that the British fleet found <a
+name="page_215"><span class="page">Page 215</span></a> itself to
+windward of the French in three groups, while the French ships were
+scattered to leeward and trying to escape before the wind, leaving
+three dismasted hulks between the lines. An isolated group of six
+ships in the center, including de Grasse's <i>Ville de Paris</i>,
+offered a target for attack, but the wind was light and Rodney
+indolent in pursuit. Of these, one small vessel was overhauled
+and the French flagship was taken after a heroic defense, that
+lasted until sunset, against overwhelming odds. De Grasse's efforts
+to reform his fleet after his line was broken had met with failure,
+for the van fled to the southwest and the rear to the northwest,
+apparently making little effort to succor their commander in chief
+or retrieve the fortunes of the day.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Rodney received a peerage for this day's work but he certainly
+did not make the most of his victory. Apparently content with the
+five prizes he had taken, together with the person of de Grasse,
+he allowed the bulk of the French fleet to escape when he had it in
+his power to capture practically all. On this point his subordinate,
+Hood, expressed himself with great emphasis:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Why he (Rodney) should bring the fleet to because the <i>Ville de
+Paris</i> was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under
+easy sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy, in the
+night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled him
+to have taken almost every ship the next day.... Had I had the
+honor of commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the 12th, I may,
+without much imputation of vanity, say the flag of England should
+now have graced the sterns of <i>upwards</i> of twenty sail of
+the enemy's ships of the line."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Quoted by Mahan, <span class="sc">The Royal Navy</span>
+(Clowes), Vol. III, p. 535.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Sir Charles Douglas, who had been responsible for Rodney's breaking
+the line, warmly agreed with Hood's opinion on this point. Nevertheless,
+although the victory was not half of what it might have been in younger
+hands, it proved decisive enough to shatter the naval organization
+of the French in the West Indies. It stopped the projected campaign
+<a name="page_216"><span class="page">Page 216</span></a> against
+Jamaica and served to write better terms for England in the peace
+treaty of January 20, 1783.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Tactically this battle has become famous for the maneuver of "breaking
+the line," contrary to the express stipulations of the Fighting
+Instructions. Certainly the move was not premeditated. Rodney may
+well be said to have been pushed into making it, and two of his
+captains made the same move on their own initiative. Indeed it
+is quite likely that, after the event, too much has been made of
+this as a piece of deliberate tactics, for the sudden shift of
+wind had paid off the bows of the French ships so that they were
+probably heading athwart the course of the British line, and the
+British move was obviously the only thing to do. But the lesson of
+the battle was clear,&mdash;the decisive effect of close fighting and
+concentrated fire. In the words of Hannay, "It marked the beginning
+of that fierce and headlong yet well calculated style of sea fighting
+which led to Trafalgar and made England undisputed mistress of the
+sea."[1] It marked, therefore, the end of the Fighting Instructions,
+which had deadened the spirit as well as the tactics of the British
+navy for over a hundred years.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Rodney (<span class="sc">English Men of Action
+Series</span>), p. 213.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The tactical value of "breaking the line" is well summarized by
+Mahan in the following passage:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"The effect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle, depends
+upon several conditions. The essential idea is to divide the opposing
+force by penetrating through an interval found, or made, in it, and
+then to concentrate upon that one of the fractions which can be
+least easily helped by the other. In a column of ships this will
+usually be the rear. The compactness of the order attacked, the
+number of the ships cut off, the length of time during which they
+can be isolated and outnumbered, will all affect the results. A very
+great factor in the issue will be the moral effect, the confusion
+introduced into a line thus broken. Ships coming up toward the break
+are stopped, the rear doubles up, while the ships ahead continue
+their course. Such a moment is critical, and calls for instant action;
+but the men are rare who in an unforeseen emergency can see, and at
+once take the right course, especially <a name="page_217"><span
+class="page">Page 217</span></a> if, being subordinates, they incur
+responsibility. In such a scene of confusion the English, without
+presumption, hoped to profit by their better seamanship; for it
+is not only 'courage and devotion,' but skill, which then tells.
+All these effects of 'breaking the line' received illustration
+in Rodney's great battle in 1782."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Influence of Sea Power upon
+History</span>, pp. 380-381.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Before we leave the War of American Independence mention should
+be made of Commodore Suffren who, as we have seen, left de Grasse
+with five ships of the line to conduct a campaign in the Indian
+Ocean in the spring of 1781. His purpose was to shake the British
+hold on India, which had been fastened by the genius of Clive in
+the Seven Years' War. But the task given to Suffren was exceedingly
+difficult. His squadron was inadequate&mdash;for instance, he had
+only two frigates for scout and messenger duty&mdash;and he had
+no port that he could use as a base in Indian waters. To conduct
+any campaign at all he was compelled to live off his enemy and
+capture a base. These were risky prospects for naval operations
+several thousand miles from home, and for the faintest hope of
+success required an energy and initiative which had never before
+appeared in a French naval commander. In addition to these handicaps
+of circumstance Suffren soon discovered that he had to deal with
+incorrigible slackness and insubordination in his captains.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In spite of everything, however, Suffren achieved an amazing degree of
+success. He succeeded in living off the prizes taken from the British,
+and he took from them the port of Trincomalee for a base. He fought
+five battles off the coast of India against the British Vice Admiral
+Hughes, in only one of which was the latter the assailant, and in all
+of which Suffren bore off the honors. He was constantly hampered,
+however, by the inefficiency and insubordination of his captains. On
+four or five occasions, including an engagement at the Cape Verde
+Islands on his way to India, it was only this misconduct that saved
+the British from the crushing attack that <a name="page_218"><span
+class="page">Page 218</span></a> Suffren had planned. Unfortunately
+for him his victories were barren of result, for the terms of peace
+gave nothing in India to the French which they had not possessed
+before. As Trincomalee had belonged to the Dutch before the British
+captured it, this port was turned back to Holland.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nevertheless Suffren deserves to be remembered both for what he
+actually accomplished under grave difficulties and what he might
+have done had he been served by loyal and efficient subordinates.
+Among all the commanders of this war he stands preeminent for naval
+genius, and this eminence is all the more extraordinary when one
+realizes that his resourcefulness, tenacity, aggressiveness, his
+contempt of the formal, parade tactics of his day, were notoriously
+absent in the rest of the French service. Such was the admiration
+felt for him by his adversaries that after the end of the war,
+when the French squadron arrived at Cape Town on its way home and
+found the British squadron anchored there, all the British officers,
+from Hughes down, went aboard the French flagship to tender their
+homage.[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: "If ever a man lived who justified Napoleon's maxim
+that war is an affair not of men but of a man, it was he. It was
+by his personal merit that his squadron came to the very verge
+of winning a triumphant success. That he failed was due to the
+fact that the French Navy... was honeycombed by the intellectual
+and moral vices which were bringing France to the great
+Revolution&mdash;corruption, self-seeking, acrid class insolence,
+and skinless, morbid vanity."&mdash;<span class="sc">The Royal
+Navy</span>, David Hannay, II, 287.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Although the War of American Independence was unsuccessfully fought
+by Great Britain and she was compelled to recognize the independence
+of her rebellious colonies, she lost comparatively little else by the
+terms of peace. As we have seen, her hold in India was unchanged.
+The stubborn defense of Gibraltar throughout the war, aided by
+occasional timely relief by a British fleet, saved that stronghold
+for the English flag. To Spain England was forced to surrender
+Florida and Minorca. France got back all the West Indian islands
+she had lost, with the exception of Tobago, but gained nothing
+besides. The war therefore did not restore to France her colonial
+empire of former days or make any change in the relative overseas
+strength of the two nations. Despite the <a name="page_219"><span
+class="page">Page 219</span></a> blunders of the war no rival sea
+power challenged that of Great Britain at the conclusion of peace.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile, just before the war and during its early years, an English
+naval officer was laying the foundation for an enormous expansion
+of the British empire in the east. This was James Cook, a man who
+owed his commission in the navy and his subsequent fame to nothing
+in family or political influence, but to sheer genius. Of humble
+birth, he passed from the merchant service into the navy and rose
+by his extraordinary abilities to the rank of master. Later he
+was commissioned lieutenant and finally attained the rank of post
+captain.[1] Such rank was hardly adequate recognition of his great
+powers, but it was unusually high for a man who was not born a
+"gentleman."
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Full captain's rank, held only by a captain in command
+of a vessel of at least 20 guns.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the end of the Seven Years' War he distinguished himself, by
+his work in surveying and sounding an the coasts of Labrador and
+Newfoundland, as a man of science. In consequence, he was detailed
+to undertake expeditions for observing the transit of Venus and
+for discovering the southern continent which was supposed to exist
+in the neighborhood of the Antarctic circle. In the course of this
+work Cook practically established the geography of the southern half
+of the globe as we know it to-day. And by his skill and study of
+the subject he conquered the great enemy of exploring expeditions,
+scurvy. Thirty years before, another British naval officer, Anson,
+had taken a squadron into the Pacific and lost about three-fourths
+of his men from this disease. When the war of the American Revolution
+broke out, Cook was abroad on one of his expeditions, but the French
+and American governments issued orders to their captains not to
+molest him on account of his great service to the cause of scientific
+knowledge. Unfortunately he was killed by savages at the Sandwich
+Islands in 1779.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The bearing of his work on the British empire lies chiefly in his
+careful survey of the east coast of Australia, which he laid claim
+to in the name of King George, and the circumnavigation <a
+name="page_220"><span class="page">Page 220</span></a> of New Zealand,
+which later gave title to the British claim on those islands. Thus,
+while the American colonies in the west were winning their independence,
+another territory in the east, far more extensive, was being brought
+under British sway, destined in another century to become important
+dominions of the empire. The Dutch had a claim of priority in discovery
+through the early voyages of Tasman, but they attempted no colonization
+and Dutch sea power was too weak to make good a technical claim in
+the face of England's navy.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Finally, when the results of a century of wars between France and
+England are summarized, we find that France had lost all her great
+domain in America except a few small islands in the West Indies.
+In brief, it is due to British control of the sea during the 18th
+century that practically all of the continent north of the Rio
+Grande is English in speech, laws, and tradition.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This control of the sea exercised by England was not the gift of
+fortune. It was a prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in
+peace and hard fighting in war. France had the opportunity to wrest
+from England the control of the sea as England had won it from
+Holland, for France at the close of the 17th century dominated
+Europe. In population and in wealth she was superior to her rival.
+But the arrogance of her king kept her embroiled in futile wars on
+the Continent, with little energy left for the major issue, the
+conquest of the sea. Finally, when the war of American Independence
+left her a free hand to concentrate on her navy as against that of
+England, France lost through the fatal weakness of policy which
+corrupted all her officers with the single brilliant exception of
+Suffren. The French naval officer avoided battle on principle,
+and when he could not avoid it he accepted the defensive. To the
+credit of the English officer be it said that, as a rule, he sought
+the enemy and took the aggressive; he had the "fighting spirit."
+This difference between French and British commanders had as much
+to do with the ultimate triumph of England on the sea as anything
+else. It retrieved many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer
+hard hitting.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The history of the French navy points a moral applicable <a
+name="page_221"><span class="page">Page 221</span></a> to any service
+and any time. When a navy encourages the idea that ships must not
+be risked, that a decisive battle must be avoided because of what
+might happen in case of defeat, it is headed for the same fate
+that overwhelmed the French.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon History</span>, A. T.
+  Mahan, 1890.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">A Short History of the Royal Navy</span>, David
+  Hannay, 1909.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Royal Navy</span> (vols. II, III), W. L. Clowes
+  et al., 1903.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Admiral Blake</span>, English Men of Action Series,
+  David Hannay, 1909.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Rodney</span>, English Men of Action Series, David
+  Hannay, 1891.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Monk</span>, English Men of Action Series, Julian
+  Corbett, 1907.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">England in the Seven Years' War</span>, J. S.
+  Corbett, 1907.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Graves Papers</span>, F. E. Chadwick, 1916.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Studies in Naval History, Biographies</span>, J.
+  K. Laughton, 1887.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">From Howard to Nelson</span>, ed. by J. K. Laughton,
+  1899.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Major Operations in the War of American
+  Independence</span>, A. T. Mahan, 1913.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Sea Kings of Britain</span>, Geoffrey Callender, 1915.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_222"><span class="page">Page 222</span></a>
+CHAPTER XI</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE FIRST OF JUNE AND CAMPERDOWN
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Ten years after the War of American Independence, British sea power
+was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with France.
+This time it was with a France whose navy, demoralized by revolution,
+was less able to dispute sea control, but whose armies, organized
+into an aggressive, empire-building force by the genius of Napoleon,
+threatened to dominate Europe, shaking the old monarchies with
+dangerous radical doctrines, and bringing all Continental nations
+into the conflict either as enemies or as allies. The dismissal
+of the French envoy from England immediately after the execution
+of Louis XVI (Jan. 21, 1793) led the French Republic a week later
+to a declaration of war, which continued with but a single
+intermission&mdash;from October, 1801, to May, 1803&mdash;through
+the next 22 years.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The magnitude of events on land in this period, during which French
+armies fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew kingdoms, and
+remade the map of Europe, obscures the importance of the warfare
+on the sea. Yet it was Great Britain by virtue of her navy and
+insular position that remained Napoleon's least vulnerable and
+most obstinate opponent, forcing him to ever renewed and exhausting
+campaigns, reviving continental opposition, and supporting it with
+subsidies made possible by control of sea trade. In Napoleon's own
+words the effect of this pressure is well summarized: "To live without
+ships, without trade, without colonies, is to live as no Frenchman
+can consent to do." The Egyptian campaign, conceived as a thrust at
+British sources of wealth in the East, and defeated at the Nile;
+the organization of the <a name="page_223"><span class="page">Page
+223</span></a> northern neutrals against England, overthrown at
+Copenhagen; the direct invasion of the British Isles, repeatedly
+planned and thwarted at St. Vincent, Camperdown, and Trafalgar;
+the final and most nearly successful effort to ruin England by
+closing her continental markets and thus, in Napoleon's phrase,
+"defeating the sea by the land"&mdash;these were the successive
+measures by which he sought to shake the grip of sea power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The following narrative of these events is in three divisions:
+the first dealing with the earlier engagements of the First of
+June and Camperdown, fought by squadrons based on home ports; the
+second with the war in the Mediterranean and the rise of Nelson as
+seen in the campaigns of St. Vincent, the Nile, and Copenhagen;
+the third with the Trafalgar campaign and the commercial struggle
+to which the naval side of the war was later confined. The career
+of Nelson is given an emphasis justified by his primacy among naval
+leaders and the value of his example for later times.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The effect of land events in obscuring the naval side of the war,
+already mentioned, is explained not merely by their magnitude, but
+by the fact that, though Great Britain was more than once brought
+to the verge of ruin, this was a consequence not of the enemy's power
+on the sea, but of his victories on land. Furthermore, the slow
+process which ended in the downfall of Napoleon and the reduction of
+France to her old frontiers was accomplished, not so conspicuously
+by the economic pressure of sea power, as by the efforts of armies
+on battlefields from Russia to Spain. On the sea British supremacy
+was more firmly established, and the capacities of France and her
+allies were far less, than in preceding conflicts of the century.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The French Navy Demoralized</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The explanation of this weakness of the French navy involves an
+interesting but somewhat perplexing study of the influences which make
+for naval growth or decay. That its ineffectiveness was due largely
+to an inferior national <a name="page_224"><span class="page">Page
+224</span></a> instinct or genius for sea warfare, as compared
+with England, is discredited by the fact that the disparity was
+less obvious in previous wars; for, as Lord Clowes has insisted,
+England won no decisive naval victory against superior forces from
+the second Dutch War to the time of Nelson. The familiar theory
+that democracy ruined the French navy will be accepted nowadays
+only with some qualifications, especially when it is remembered
+that French troops equally affected by the downfall of caste rule
+were steadily defeating the armies of monarchical powers. It is true,
+however, that navies, as compared with armies, are more complicated
+and more easily disorganized machines, and that it would have taxed
+even Napoleonic genius to reorganize the French navy after the
+neglect, mutiny, and wholesale sweeping out of trained personnel
+to which it was subjected in the first furies of revolution. Whatever
+the merits of the officers of the old r&eacute;gime, selected as
+they were wholly from the aristocracy and dominated by the defensive
+policy of the French service, three-fourths of them were driven out
+by 1791, and replaced by officers from the merchant service, from
+subordinate ratings, and from the crews. Suspicion of aristocracy
+was accompanied in the navy by a more fatal suspicion of skill. In
+January, 1794, the regiments of marine infantry and artillery, as
+well as the corps of seamen-gunners, were abolished on the ground
+that no body of men should have "the exclusive privilege of fighting
+the enemy at sea," and their places were filled by battalions of
+the national guard. Figures show that as a result, French gunnery
+was far less efficient than in the preceding war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The strong forces that restored discipline in the army had more
+difficulty in reaching the navy; and Napoleon's gift for discovering
+ability and lifting it to command was marked by its absence in his
+choice of leaders for the fleets. Usually he fell back on pessimistic
+veterans of the old r&eacute;gime like Brueys, Missiessy, and
+Villeneuve. An exception, Allemand, showed by his cruise out of
+Rochefort in 1805 what youth, energy, and daring could accomplish
+even with inferior means. Considering the importance of leadership
+as a factor in success, we may well believe that, had a French
+Nelson, or even <a name="page_225"><span class="page">Page
+225</span></a> a Suffren, been discovered in this epoch, history
+would tell a different tale. If further reasons for the decadence
+of the navy are needed, they may be found in the extreme difficulty
+of securing naval stores and timber from the Baltic, and in the
+fact that, though France had nearly three times the population of
+the British Isles, her wealth, man-power, and genius were absorbed
+in the war on land.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Aside from repulsion at the violence of the French revolution and
+fear of its contagion, England had a concrete motive for war in
+the French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands and the Scheldt,
+the possession of which by an ambitious maritime nation England has
+always regarded as a menace to her safety and commercial prosperity.
+"This government," declared the British Ministry in December, 1792,
+"will never view with indifference that France shall make herself,
+directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries or general
+arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In prosecuting the war, Great Britain fought chiefly with her main
+weapon, the navy, leaving the land war to her allies. A contemporary
+critic remarked that she "worked with her navy and played with her
+army"; though the latter did useful service in colonial conquests
+and in Egypt, the two expeditionary forces to the Low Countries in
+1793 and 1799 were ill-managed and ineffective. The tasks of the
+fleet were to guard the British Isles from raids and invasion,
+to protect British commerce in all parts of the world, and, on
+the offensive, to seize enemy colonies, cut off enemy trade, and
+co&ouml;perate in the Mediterranean with allied armies. To accomplish
+these aims, which called for a wide dispersion of forces, the British
+naval superiority over France was barely adequate. According to
+the contemporary naval historian James, the strength of the two
+fleets at the outbreak of war was as follows:
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center_bb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">Ships of<br>the line</td>
+    <td class="center_bb" style="vertical-align: bottom;">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">Aggregate<br>broadsides</td></tr>
+<tr><td>British</td><td class="center">115</td>
+    <td class="center">8,718</td><td class="center">88,957</td></tr>
+<tr><td>French</td><td class="center">76</td>
+    <td class="center">6,002</td><td class="center">73,057</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_226"><span class="page">Page 226</span></a> Of her
+main fighting units, the ships-of-the-line, England could put into
+commission about 85, which as soon as possible were distributed
+in three main spheres of operation: in the Mediterranean and its
+western approaches, from 20 to 25; in the West Indies, from 10 to
+12; in home waters, from the North Sea to Cape Finisterre, from
+20 to 25, with a reserve of some 25 more in the home bases on the
+Channel. Though this distribution was naturally altered from time
+to time to meet changes in the situation, it gives at least an
+idea of the general disposition of the British forces throughout
+the war. France, with no suitable bases in the Channel, divided
+her fleet between the two main arsenals at Brest and Toulon, with
+minor squadrons at Rochefort and, during the Spanish alliance,
+in the ports of Spain.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Distant Operations</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the West Indies and other distant waters, France could offer
+but little effective resistance, and operations there may hence
+be dismissed briefly, but with emphasis on the benefit which naval
+control conferred upon British trade, the main guaranty of England's
+financial stability and power to keep up the war. Fully one-fifth
+of this trade was with the West Indies. Consequently, both to swell
+the volume of British commerce and protect it from privateering,
+the seizure of the French West Indian colonies&mdash;"filching the
+sugar islands," as Sheridan called it&mdash;was a very justifiable
+war measure, in spite of the scattering of forces involved. Hayti
+was lost to France as a result of the negro uprising under Toussaint
+l'Ouverture. Practically all the French Antilles changed hands
+twice in 1794, the failure of the British to hold them arising from
+a combination of yellow fever, inadequate forces of occupation,
+and lax blockade methods on the French coast, which permitted heavy
+re&euml;nforcements to leave France. General Abercromby, with 17,000
+men, finally took all but Guadaloupe in the next year. As Holland,
+Spain, and other nations came under French control, England seized
+their colonies likewise&mdash;the Dutch settlements at the Cape of
+Good Hope and Ceylon in 1795; the Moluccas and other Dutch islands
+in the East Indies <a name="page_227"><span class="page">Page
+227</span></a> in 1796; Trinidad (Spanish) in 1797; Cura&ccedil;ao
+(Dutch) in 1800; and the Swedish and Danish West Indies in 1801. By
+the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 all these except Trinidad and Ceylon
+were given back, and had to be retaken in the later period of the
+war, Guadaloupe remaining a privateers' nest until its final capture
+in 1810. Though French trade was ruined, it was impossible to stamp
+out privateering, which grew with the growth of British commerce
+which it preyed upon, and the extent of which is indicated by the
+estimate that in 1807 there were from 200 to 300 privateers on
+the coasts of Cuba and Hayti alone. As for the captured islands,
+Great Britain in 1815 retained only Malta, Heligoland, and the
+Ionian Islands in European waters; Cape Colony, Mauritius, and
+Ceylon on the route to the East; and in the Caribbean, Demerara
+on the coast, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and Tobago&mdash;some of them
+of little intrinsic value, but all useful outposts for an empire
+of the seas.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Channel and Bay of Biscay, the first year of war passed
+quietly. Lord Howe, commanding the British Channel fleet, had behind
+him a long, fine record as a disciplinarian and tactician; he had
+fought with Hawke at Quiberon Bay, protected New York and Rhode
+Island against d'Estaing in 1778, and later thrown relief into
+Gibraltar in the face of superior force. Now 68 years of age, he
+inclined to cautious, old-school methods, such as indeed marked
+activities on both land and sea at this time, before Napoleon had
+injected a new desperateness into war. Both before and after the
+"Glorious First of June" the watch on the French coast was merely
+nominal; small detachments were kept off Brest, but the main fleet
+rested in Portsmouth throughout the winter and took only occasional
+cruises during the remainder of the year.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Battle of the First of June</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though there had been no real blockade, the interruption of her
+commerce, the closure of her land frontiers, and the bad harvest
+of 1793, combined to bring France in the spring following to the
+verge of famine, and forced her to risk her <a name="page_228"><span
+class="page">Page 228</span></a> fleet in an effort to import supplies
+from overseas. On April 11 an immense flotilla of 120 grain vessels
+sailed from the Chesapeake under the escort of two ships-of-the-line,
+which were to be strengthened by the entire Brest fleet at a rendezvous
+300 miles west of Belleisle. Foodstuffs having already been declared
+subject to seizure by both belligerents, Howe was out on May 2
+to intercept the convoy. A big British merchant fleet also put
+to sea with him, to protect which he had to detach 8 of his 34
+ships, but with orders to 6 of these that they should rejoin his
+force on the 20th off Ushant. Looking into Brest on the 19th, Howe
+found the French battle fleet already at sea. Not waiting for the
+detachment, and thus losing its help in the battle that was to
+follow, he at once turned westward and began sweeping with his
+entire fleet the waters in which the convoy was expected to appear.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The French with 26 ships-of-the-line&mdash;and thus precisely equal
+to Howe in numbers&mdash;had left Brest two days before. The crews
+were largely landsmen; of the flag officers and captains, not one
+had been above the grade of lieutenant three years before, and
+nine of them had been merchant skippers with no naval experience
+whatever. On board were two delegates of the National Convention,
+whose double duties seem to have been to watch the officers and
+help them command. To take the place of experience there was
+revolutionary fervor, evidenced in the change of ship-names to
+such resounding appellations as <i>La Montagne, Patriote, Vengeur
+du Peuple, Tyrannicide</i>, and <i>Revolutionnaire</i>. There was
+also more confidence than was ever felt again by French sailors
+during the war. "Intentionally disregarding subtle evolutions,"
+said the delegate Jean Bon Saint Andree, "perhaps our sailors will
+think it more appropriate and effective to resort to the boarding
+tactics in which the French were always victorious, and thus astonish
+the world by new prodigies of valor." "If they had added to their
+courage a little training," said the same commissioner after the
+battle, "the day might have been ours."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The commander in chief, Villaret de Joyeuse, who had won his lieutenancy
+and the esteem of Suffren in the American war, <a name="page_229"><span
+class="page">Page 229</span></a> was no such scorner of wary tactics.
+Thus when the two fleets, more by accident than calculation on
+either side, came in contact on the morning of May 28, 1794, about
+400 miles west of Ushant, it would have been quite possible for
+him to have closed with the British, who were 10 miles to leeward
+in a fresh southerly wind. But his orders were not to fight unless
+it were essential to protect the convoy, and since this was thought
+to be close at hand, he first drew away to the eastward, with the
+British in pursuit.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The chase continued during the remainder of this day and the day
+following, with partial engagements and complicated maneuvering,
+the net result of which was that in the end Howe, in spite of the
+superior sailing qualities of the French ships, had kept in touch
+with them, driven his own vessels through their line to a windward
+position, and forced the withdrawal of four units, with the loss of
+but one of his own. Two days of thick weather followed, during which
+both fleets stood to the northwest in the same relative positions,
+the French, very fortunately indeed, securing a re&euml;nforcement
+of four fresh ships from detachments earlier at sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Now 26 French to 25 British, the two fleets on the morning of the
+final engagement were moving to westward on the still southerly wind,
+in two long, roughly parallel lines. Confident of the individual
+superiority of his ships, the British admiral had no wish for further
+maneuvering, in which his own captains had shown themselves none
+too reliable and the enemy commander not unskilled. Possibly also
+he feared the confusion of a complicated plan, for it was notorious
+(as may be verified by looking over his correspondence) that Howe
+had the greatest difficulty in making himself intelligible with
+tongue or pen. His orders were therefore to bear up together toward
+the enemy and attack ship to ship, without effort at concentration,
+and with but one noteworthy departure from the time-honored tactics
+in which he had been schooled. This was that the battle should be
+close and decisive. The instructions were that each ship should
+if possible break through the line astern of her chosen opponent,
+raking the ships on each side as she <a name="page_230"><span
+class="page">Page 230</span></a> went through, and continue the
+action to leeward, in position to cut off retreat. "I don't want
+the ships to be bilge to bilge," said Howe to the officers of his
+flagship, the <i>Queen Charlotte</i>, "but if you can lock the
+yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be the quicker decided."
+The approach was leisurely, nearly in line abreast, on a course
+slightly diagonal to that of the enemy. At 10 A. M. the <i>Queen
+Charlotte</i>, in the center of the British line, shoved past just
+under the stern of Villaret's flagship, the <i>Montagne</i>, raking
+her with a terrible broadside which is said to have struck down
+300 of her men. As was likely to result from the plan of attack,
+the ships in the van of the attacking force were more closely and
+promptly engaged than those of the rear; only six ships actually
+broke through, but there was hot fighting all along the line.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Famous among the struggles in the m&ecirc;l&eacute;e was the epic
+three-hour combat of the <i>Brunswick</i>, next astern of Howe, and
+the <i>Vengeur</i>, both 74's. With the British vessel's anchors
+hooked in her opponent's port forechannels, the two drifted away
+to leeward, the <i>Brunswick</i> by virtue of flexible rammers
+alone able to use her lower deck guns, which were given alternately
+extreme elevation and depression and sent shot tearing through the
+<i>Vengeur's</i> deck and hull; whereas the <i>Vengeur</i>, with
+a superior fire of carronades and musketry, swept the enemy's upper
+deck. When the antagonists wrenched apart, the <i>Brunswick</i> had
+lost 158 of her complement of 600 men. The <i>Vengeur</i> was slowly
+sinking and went down at 6 P. M., with a loss of 250 killed and
+wounded and 100 more drowned. "As we drew away," wrote a survivor,
+"we heard some of our comrades still offering prayers for the welfare
+of their country; the last cries of these unfortunates were, 'Vive
+la R&eacute;publique!' They died uttering them."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Out of the confusion, an hour after the battle had begun, Villaret
+was able to form a column of 16 ships to leeward, and though ten of
+his vessels lay helpless between the lines, three drifted or were
+towed down to him and escaped. Howe has been sharply criticized
+for letting these cripples get away; but the battered condition
+of his fleet and his own complete physical exhaustion led him to
+rest content with six prizes aside from the sunken <i>Vengeur</i>.
+The criticism has also been made that <a name="page_231"><span
+class="page">Page 231</span></a> he should have further exerted
+himself to secure a junction with the detachment on convoy duty,
+which on May 19 was returning and not far away. If he had at that
+time held his 32 ships between Brest and Rochefort, with scouts
+well distributed to westward, he would have been much more certain
+to intercept both Villaret's fleet and the convoy, which would have
+approached in company, and both of which, with the British searching
+in a body at sea, stood a good chance of escape. Howe's hope, no
+doubt, was to meet the convoy unguarded. The latter, protected by
+fog, actually crossed on May 30 the waters fought over on the 29th,
+and twelve days later safely reached the French coast. Robespierre
+had told Villaret that if the convoy were captured he should answer
+for it with his life. Hence the French admiral declared years later
+that the loss of his battleships troubled him relatively little.
+"While Howe amused himself refitting them, I saved the convoy,
+and I saved my head."
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 607px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig040.png" width="607" height="391" alt="Fig. 40">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1794</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Based on diagram in Mahan's <i>Influence of
+  Sea Power upon the French Revolution,</i> Vol. I, p. 136.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though the escape of the convoy enabled the French to <a
+name="page_232"><span class="page">Page 232</span></a> boast a
+"strategic victory," the First of June in reality established British
+prestige and proved a crushing blow to French morale. A British
+defeat, on the other hand, might have brought serious consequences,
+for within a year's time the Allied armies, including the British
+under the Duke of York, were driven out of Holland, the Batavian
+Republic was established in league with France (February, 1795),
+and both Spain and Prussia backed out of the war. Austria remained
+England's only active ally.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the remainder of 1794 and the year following only minor or
+indecisive encounters occurred in the northern theater of war, lack
+of funds and naval supplies hampering the recovery of the French
+fleet from the injuries inflicted by Howe. Ill health forcing the
+latter's retirement from sea duty, he was succeeded in the Channel by
+Lord Bridport, who continued his predecessor's easy-going methods
+until the advent of Jervis in 1798, instituted a more rigorous
+r&eacute;gime. It was not yet recognized that the wear and tear on
+ships and crews during sea duty was less serious than the injurious
+effect of long stays in port upon sea spirit and morale.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>French Projects of Invasion</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With their fleets passive, the French resorted vigorously to commerce
+warfare, and at the same time kept England constantly perturbed by
+rumors, grandiose plans, and actual undertakings of invasion. That
+these earlier efforts failed was due as much to ill luck and bad
+management as to the work of Bridport's fleet. Intended, moreover,
+primarily as diversions to keep England occupied at home and sicken
+her of the war, they did not altogether fail of their aim. Some
+of these projects verged on the ludicrous, as that of corraling
+a band of the criminals and royalist outlaws that infested France
+and dropping them on the English coast for a wild campaign of murder
+and pillage. Fifteen hundred of these <i>Chouans</i> were actually
+landed at Fishguard in February of 1798, but promptly surrendered, and
+France had to give good English prisoners in <a name="page_233"><span
+class="page">Page 233</span></a> exchange for them on the threat
+that they would be turned loose again on French soil.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Much more serious was General Hoche's expedition to Ireland of
+the winter before. Though Hoche wished to use for the purpose the
+army of over 100,000 with which he had subdued revolt in the
+Vend&eacute;e, the Government was willing to venture a force of
+only 15,000, which set sail from Brest, December 15, 1796, in 17
+ships-of-the-line, together with a large number of smaller war-vessels
+and transports. Heavy weather and bad leadership, helped along
+by British frigates with false signals, scattered the fleet on
+the first night out. It never again got together; and though a
+squadron with 6,000 soldiers on board was actually for a week or
+more in the destination, Bantry Bay, not a man was landed, and
+by the middle of January nearly all of the flotilla was back in
+France. The British squadron under Colport, which had been on the
+French coast at the time of the departure, had in the meanwhile
+been obliged to make port for supplies. Bridport with the main
+fleet left Portsmouth, 250 miles from the scene of operations, four
+days after news of the French departure. During the whole affair
+neither he nor Colport took a single prize.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Even so small a force c&ouml;operating with rebellion in Ireland
+might have proved a serious annoyance, though not a grave danger.
+Invasion on a grand scale, which Napoleon's victorious campaign in
+Italy and the peace with Austria (preliminaries at Loeben, April,
+1797) now made possible, was effectually forestalled by two decisive
+victories at sea. Bonaparte, who was to lead the invasion, did not
+minimize its difficulties. "To make a descent upon England without
+being master of the sea," he wrote at this time, "is the boldest
+and most difficult operation ever attempted." Yet the flotilla of
+small craft necessary was collected, army forces were designated,
+and in February of 1798 Bonaparte was at Dunkirk. All this served
+no doubt to screen the Egyptian preparations, which amid profound
+secrecy were already under way. The Egyptian campaign was an indirect
+blow at England; but the direct blow would certainly have been
+struck had not the naval engagements of Cape St. Vincent (February,
+1797) and <a name="page_234"><span class="page">Page 234</span></a>
+Camperdown (October, 1797) settled the question of mastery of the
+sea by removing the naval support of Spain and Holland on the right
+and left wings.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Battle of Camperdown</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Admiral Duncan's victory of Camperdown, here taken first as part
+of the events in northern waters, is noteworthy in that it was
+achieved not only against ever-dangerous opponents, but with a
+squadron which during the preceding May and June had been in the
+very midst of the most serious mutiny in the history of the British
+navy. In Bridport's fleet at Portsmouth this was not so much a
+mutiny as a well organized strike, the sailors it is true taking
+full control of the ships, and forcing the Admiralty and Parliament
+to grant their well justified demands for better treatment and better
+pay. Possibly a secret sympathy with their grievances explains the
+apparent helplessness of the officers. The men on their part went
+about the business quietly, and even rated some of their former
+officers as midshipmen, in special token of esteem. At the Nore,
+however, and in Duncan's squadron at Yarmouth, the mutiny was marked
+by bloodshed and taint of disloyalty, little surprising in view of
+the disaffected Irish, ex-criminals, impressed merchant sailors,
+and other unruly elements in the crews. In the end 18 men were
+put to death and many others sentenced.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Duncan faced the trouble with the courage but not the mingling of
+fair treatment and sharp justice which marked its suppression by
+that great master of discipline, Jervis, in the fleet off Spain.
+On his own ship and another, Duncan drew up the loyal marines under
+arms, spoke to the sailors, and won their allegiance, picking one
+troublesome spirit up bodily and shaking him over the side. But
+the rest of the squadron suddenly sailed off two days later to
+join the mutineers at the Nore, where all the ships were then in
+the hands of the crews. With his two faithful ships, Duncan made
+for the Texel, swearing that if the Dutch came out he would go
+down with colors flying. Fortunately he was rejoined before that
+event by the rest of his squadron, the mutinous ships having been
+<a name="page_235"><span class="page">Page 235</span></a> either
+retaken by the officers or voluntarily surrendered by the men.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 605px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig041.png" width="605" height="394" alt="Fig. 41">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN, OCTOBER 11, 1797,
+  ABOUT 12:30 P.M.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">British, 16 of the line; Dutch, 15 of the
+  line.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The whole affair, among the ships in Thames mouth, was over in a
+month's time, from mid-May to mid-June, so quickly that the enemy had
+little chance to seize the advantage. The Dutch, driven willy-nilly
+into alliance with France and not too eager to embark upon desperate
+adventures in the new cause, were nevertheless not restrained from
+action by any kind feeling for England, who had seized their ships
+and colonies and ruined their trade. When at last, during a brief
+withdrawal of Duncan, their fleet under Admiral de Winter attempted
+a cruise, it was in a run-down condition. Aside from small units,
+it consisted of 15 ships (4 of 74 guns, 5 of 68, 2 of 64, and 4
+under 60), against Duncan's stronger force of 16 (7 of 74, 7 of 64
+and 2 of 50). The Dutch ships were flat-bottomed and light-draft for
+navigation in their shallow coastal waters, and generally inferior
+to British vessels of similar rating, even though the latter were
+left-overs from the Channel Fleet.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the morning of the Battle of Camperdown, October 11, <a
+name="page_236"><span class="page">Page 236</span></a> 1797, the
+Dutch were streaming along their coast on a northwest wind bent
+on return into the Texel. Pressing forward in pursuit, Duncan when
+in striking distance determined to prevent the enemy's escape into
+shallow water by breaking through their line and attacking to leeward.
+The signal to this effect, however, was soon changed to "Close
+action," and only the two leading ships eventually broke through.
+The two British divisions&mdash;for they were still in cruising
+formation and strung out by the pursuit&mdash;came down before the
+wind. Onslow, the second in command, in the <i>Monarch</i>, struck
+the line first at 12:30 and engaged the Dutch <i>Jupiter</i>, fourth
+from the rear. Eighteen minutes later Duncan in the <i>Venerable</i>
+closed similarly to leeward of the <i>Staten Generaal</i>, and
+afterward the <i>Vrijheid</i>, in the Dutch van.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The two leaders were soon supported&mdash;though there was straggling
+on both sides; and the battle that ensued was the bloodiest and
+fiercest of this period of the war. The British lost 825 out of a
+total of 8221 officers and men,[1] more than half the loss occurring
+in the first four ships in action. The British ships were also
+severely injured by the gruelling broadsides during the onset,
+but finally took 11 prizes, all of them injured beyond repair.
+Though less carefully thought out and executed, the plan of the
+attack closely resembles that of Nelson at Trafalgar. The head-on
+approach seems not to have involved fatal risks against even such
+redoubtable opponents as the Dutch, and it insured decisive results.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: As compared with this loss of 10%, the casualties
+in Nelson's three chief battles were as follows: Nile, 896 out of
+7401, or 12.1%; Copenhagen, 941 out of 6892, or 13.75%; Trafalgar,
+1690 out of 17,256, or 9.73%.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Duncan's otherwise undistinguished career, and the somewhat unstudied
+methods of his one victory, may explain why he has not attained the
+fame which the energy displayed and results achieved would seem
+to deserve. "He was a valiant officer," writes his contemporary
+Jervis, "little versed in subtleties of tactics, by which he would
+have been quickly confused. When he saw the enemy, he ran down upon
+them, without thinking of a fixed order of battle. To conquer, he
+counted <a name="page_237"><span class="page">Page 237</span></a>
+on the bold example he gave his captains, and the event completely
+justified his hopes."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Whatever its tactical merits, the battle had the important strategic
+effect of putting the Dutch out of the war. The remnants of their fleet
+were destroyed in harbor during an otherwise profitless expedition
+into Holland led by the Duke of York in 1799. By this time, when
+naval requirements and expanding trade had exhausted England's
+supply of seamen, and forced her to relax her navigation laws,
+it is estimated that no less than 20,000 Dutch sailors had left
+their own idle ships and were serving on British traders and
+men-of-war.[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: For references, see end of Chapter XIII,
+<a href="#page_285">page 285</a>.]
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_238"><span class="page">Page 238</span></a>
+CHAPTER XII</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE NAPOLEONIC WARS [<i>Continued</i>]: THE RISE OF NELSON
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Mediterranean, where the protection of commerce, the fate
+of Italy and all southern Europe, and the exposed interests of
+France gave abundant motives for the presence of a British fleet,
+the course of naval events may be sufficiently indicated by following
+the work of Nelson, who came thither in 1793 in command of the
+<i>Agamemnon</i> (64) and remained until the withdrawal of the
+fleet at the close of 1796. Already marked within the service,
+in the words of his senior, Hood, as "an officer to be consulted
+on questions relative to naval tactics," Nelson was no doubt also
+marked as possessed of an uncomfortable activity and independence
+of mind. Singled out nevertheless for responsible detached service,
+he took a prominent part in the occupation of Corsica, where at
+the siege of Calvi he lost the sight of his right eye, and later
+commanded a small squadron supporting the left flank of the Austrian
+army on the Riviera.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In these latter operations, during 1795 and 1796, Nelson felt that
+much more might have been done. The Corniche coast route into Italy,
+the only one at first open to the French, was exposed at many points
+to fire from ships at sea, and much of the French army supplies as
+well as their heavy artillery had to be transported in boats along
+the coast. "The British fleet could have prevented the invasion
+of Italy," wrote Nelson five years later, "if our friend Hotham
+[who had succeeded Hood as commander in chief in the Mediterranean]
+had kept his fleet on that coast."[1] Hotham felt, perhaps rightly,
+that the necessity of watching the French ships at Toulon made this
+impossible. <a name="page_239"><span class="page">Page 239</span></a>
+But had the Toulon fleet been destroyed or effectually crippled at
+either of the two opportunities which offered in 1795, no such
+need would have existed; the British fleet would have dominated
+the Mediterranean, and exercised a controlling influence on the
+wavering sympathies of the Italian states and Spain. At the first
+of these opportunities, on the 13th and 14th of March, Hotham said
+they had done well enough in capturing two French ships-of-the-line.
+"Now," remarked Nelson, whose aggressive pursuit had led to the
+capture, "had we taken 10 sail and allowed the 11th to escape,
+when it had been possible to have got at her, I should not have
+called it well done." And again of the second encounter: "To say how
+much we wanted Lord Hood on the 13th of July, is to say, 'Will you
+have all the French fleet, or no action?'" History, and especially
+naval history, is full of might-have-beens. Aggressive action
+establishing naval predominance might have prevented Napoleon's
+brilliant invasion and conquest of Italy; Spain would then have
+steered clear of the French alliance; and the Egyptian campaign
+would have been impossible.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Dispatches</span>, June 6, 1800.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The succession of Sir John Jervis to the Mediterranean command
+in November, 1795, instituted at once a new order of things, in
+which inspiring leadership, strict discipline, and closest attention
+to the health of crews, up-keep vessels, and every detail of ship
+and fleet organization soon brought the naval forces under him
+to what has been judged the highest efficiency attained by any
+fleet during the war. Jervis had able subordinates&mdash;Nelson,
+Collingwood and Troubridge, to carry the list no further; but he
+may claim a kind of paternal share in molding the military character
+of these men.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Between Jervis and Nelson in particular there existed ever the
+warmest mutual confidence and admiration. Yet the contrast between
+them well illustrates the difference between all-round professional
+and administrative ability, possessed in high degree by the older
+leader, and supreme fighting genius, which, in spite of mental and
+moral qualities far inferior, has rightly won Nelson a more lasting
+fame. As a member of parliament before the war, as First Lord of the
+Admiralty from 1801 to 1803, and indeed in his sea commands, Jervis
+displayed a <a name="page_240"><span class="page">Page 240</span></a>
+breadth of judgment, a knowledge of the world, a mastery of details of
+administration, to which Nelson could not pretend. In the organization
+of the Toulon and the Brest blockades, and in the suppression of
+mutiny in 1797, Jervis better than Nelson illustrates conventional
+ideals of military discipline. When appointed to the Channel command
+in 1799 he at once adopted the system of keeping the bulk of the
+fleet constantly on the enemy coast "well within Ushant with an
+easterly wind." Captains were to be on deck when ships came about
+at whatever hour. In port there were no night boats and no night
+leave for officers. To one officer who ventured a protest Jervis
+wrote that he "ought not to delay one day his intention to retire."
+"May the discipline of the Mediterranean never be introduced in the
+Channel," was a toast on Jervis's appointment to the latter squadron.
+"May his next glass of wine choke the wretch," was the wish of an
+indignant officer's wife. Jervis may have been a martinet, but
+it was he, more than any other officer, who instilled into the
+British navy the spirit of war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Mediterranean, however, he arrived too late. There, as in
+the Atlantic, the French Directory after the experiments of 1794
+and 1795 had now abandoned the idea of risking their battleships;
+and while these still served effectively in port as a fleet in
+being, their crews were turned to commerce warfare or transport
+flotilla work for the army. Bonaparte's ragged heroes were driving
+the Austrians out of Italy. Sardinia made peace in May of 1796.
+Spain closed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French
+Republic in August, putting a fleet of 50 of the line (at least
+on paper) on Jervis's communications and making further tenure
+of the Mediterranean a dangerous business. By October, 26 Spanish
+ships had joined the 12 French then at Toulon. Even so, Jervis with
+his force of 22 might have hazarded action, if his subordinate Mann,
+with a detached squadron of 7 of these, had not fled to England.
+Assigning to Nelson the task of evacuating Corsica and later Elba,
+Jervis now took station outside the straits, where on February 13,
+1797, Nelson rejoined his chief, whose strength still consisted
+of 15 of the line.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_241"><span class="page">Page 241</span></a>
+<i>The Battle of Cape St. Vincent</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Spanish fleet, now 27, was at this time returning to Cadiz,
+as a first step toward a grand naval concentration in the north. A
+stiff Levanter having thrown the Spanish far beyond their destination,
+they were returning eastward when on February 14, 1797, the two
+fleets came in contact within sight of Cape St. Vincent. In view
+of the existing political situation, and the known inefficiency of
+the Spanish in sea fighting, Jervis decided to attack. "A victory,"
+he is said to have remarked, "is very essential to England at this
+hour."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As a fresh westerly wind blew away the morning fog, the Spanish
+were fully revealed to southward, running before the wind, badly
+scattered, with 7 ships far in advance and thus to leeward of the
+rest. After some preliminary pursuit, the British formed in a single
+column (Troubridge in the <i>Culloden</i> first, the flagship
+<i>Victory</i> seventh, and Nelson in the <i>Captain</i> third
+from the rear), and took a southerly course which would carry them
+between the two enemy groups. As soon as they found themselves
+thus separated, the Spanish weather division hauled their wind,
+opened fire, and ran to northward along the weather side of the
+British line; while the lee division at first also turned northward
+and made some effort to unite with the rest of their company by
+breaking through the enemy formation, but were thrown back by a
+heavy broadside from the <i>Victory</i>. Having accomplished his
+first purpose, Jervis had already, at about noon, hoisted the signal
+to "tack in succession," which meant that each ship should continue
+her course to the point where the <i>Culloden</i> came about and
+then follow her in pursuit of the enemy weather division. This
+critical and much discussed maneuver appears entirely justified.
+The British by tacking in succession kept their column still between
+the parts of the enemy, its rear covering the enemy lee division,
+and the whole formation still in perfect order and control, as it
+would not have been had the ships tacked simultaneously. Again, if
+the attack had been made on the small group to leeward, the Spanish
+weather division could easily have run <a name="page_242"><span
+class="page">Page 242</span></a><a name="page_243"></a> down into
+the action and thus brought their full strength to bear.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 531px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig042.png" width="531" height="802" alt="Fig. 42">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14,
+  1797</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BRITISH: 15 ships, 1232 guns. SPANISH:
+  27 ships, 2286 guns.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But against an enemy so superior in numbers more was needed to keep
+the situation in hand. Shortly before one o'clock, when several
+British vessels had already filled away on the new course, Nelson
+from his position well back in the column saw that the leading
+ships of the main enemy division were swinging off to eastward
+as if to escape around the British rear. Eager to get into the
+fighting, of which his present course gave little promise, and
+without waiting for orders, he wore out of the column, passed between
+the two ships next astern, and threw himself directly upon the three
+big three-deckers, including the flagship <i>Santisima Trindad</i>
+(130 guns), which headed the enemy line. Before the fighting was
+over, his ship was badly battered, "her foretopmast and wheel shot
+away, and not a sail, shroud or rope left";[1] but the <i>Culloden</i>
+and other van ships soon came up, and also Collingwood in the
+<i>Excellent</i> from the rear, after orders from Jervis for which
+Nelson had not waited. Out of the m&ecirc;l&eacute;e the British
+emerged with four prizes, Nelson himself having boarded the <i>San
+Nicolas</i> (80), cleared her decks, and with re&euml;nforcements
+from his own ship passed across her to receive the surrender of
+the <i>San Josef</i> (112). The swords of the vanquished Spanish,
+Nelson says, "I gave to William Fearney, one of my bargemen, who
+placed them with the greatest <i>sangfroid</i> under his arm."
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Nelson's <span class="sc">Dispatches</span>, Vol. II,
+p. 345.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For Nelson's initiative (which is the word for such actions when
+they end well) Jervis had only the warmest praise, and when his
+fleet captain, Calder, ventured a comment on the breach of orders,
+Jervis gave the tart answer, "Ay, and if ever you offend in the
+same way I promise you a forgiveness beforehand." Jervis was made
+Earl St. Vincent, and Nelson, who never hid his light under a bushel,
+shared at least in popular acclaim. It was not indeed a sweeping
+victory, and there is little doubt that had the British admiral
+so chosen, he might have done much more. But enough had been
+accomplished to discourage Spanish naval activities in the French
+cause for a long time to come. They were hopelessly outclassed; but
+in <a name="page_244"><span class="page">Page 244</span></a> their
+favor it should be borne in mind that their ships were miserably
+manned, the crews consisting of ignorant peasants of whom it is
+reported that they said prayers before going aloft, and with whom
+their best admiral, Mazzaredo, had refused to sail. Moreover, they
+were fighting half-heartedly, lacking the inspiration of a great
+national cause, without which victories are rarely won.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The defeat of the Spanish, as Jervis had foreseen, was timely.
+Mantua had just capitulated; British efforts to secure an honorable
+peace had failed; consols were at 51, and specie payments stopped
+by the Bank of England; Austria was on the verge of separate
+negotiations, the preliminaries of which were signed at Loeben on
+April 18; France, in the words of Bonaparte, could now "turn all
+her forces against England and oblige her to a prompt peace."[1]
+The news of St. Vincent was thus a ray of light on a very dark
+horizon. Its strategic value, along with the Battle of Camperdown,
+has already been made clear.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Correspondence</span>, III, 346.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The British fleet, after refitting at Lisbon, took up a blockade
+of the Spanish at Cadiz which continued through the next two years.
+Discontent and mutiny, which threatened with each fresh ship from
+home, was guarded against by strict discipline, careful attention to
+health and diet, and by minor enterprises which served as diversions,
+such as the bombardment of Cadiz and the unsuccessful attack on Santa
+Cruz in the Canary Islands, July 24-25, 1797, in which Nelson lost
+his right arm.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 813px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig043.png" width="813" height="430" alt="Fig. 43">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST 1798</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Battle of the Nile</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nelson's return to the Cadiz blockade in May, 1798, after months
+of suffering in England, was coincident with the gathering of a
+fresh storm cloud in the Mediterranean, though the direction in
+which it threatened was still completely concealed. While Sicily,
+Greece, Portugal and even Ireland were mentioned by the British
+Admiralty as possible French objectives, Egypt was apparently not
+thought of. Yet its strategic position between three continents
+remained as important as <a name="page_245"></a><a name="page_246">
+<span class="page">Page 246</span></a> in centuries past,
+controlling the trade of the Levant and threatening India by land
+or sea. "The time is not far distant," Bonaparte had already
+written, "when we shall feel that truly to destroy England we must
+take possession of Egypt." In point of fact the strength of England
+rested not merely on the wealth of the Indies, but on her merchant
+fleets, naval control, home products and manufactures, in short her
+whole industrial and commercial development, too strong to be
+struck down by a blow in this remote field. Still, if the continued
+absence of a British fleet from the Mediterranean could be counted
+on, the Egyptian campaign was the most effective move against her
+that offered at the time. It was well that the British Admiralty
+rose to the danger. Jervis, though he pointed out the risks involved,
+was directed to send Nelson with an advance squadron of 3 ships,
+later strengthened to 14, to watch the concentration of land and
+naval forces at Toulon. "The appearance of a British fleet in the
+Mediterranean," wrote the First Lord, Spencer, in urging the move,
+"is a condition on which the fate of Europe may be stated to depend."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Before a strong northwest wind the French armada on May 19 left
+Toulon&mdash;13 of the line, 13 smaller vessels, and a fleet of
+transports which when joined by contingents from Genoa, Corsica,
+and Civita Vecchia brought the total to 400 sail, crowded with over
+30,000 troops. Of the fighting fleet there is the usual tale of
+ships carelessly fitted out, one-third short-handed, and supplied
+with but two months' food&mdash;a tale which simply points the
+truth that the winning of naval campaigns begins months or years
+before.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The gale from which the French found shelter under Sardinia and
+Corsica fell later with full force on Nelson to the westward of
+the islands. His flagship the <i>Vanguard</i> lost her foremast
+and remaining topmasts, while at the same time his four frigates,
+so essential in the search that followed, were scattered and failed
+to rejoin. Having by extraordinary exertions refitted in Sardinia
+in the short space of four days, he was soon again off Toulon, but
+did not learn of the enemy's departure until May 31, and even then
+he got no clue as to <a name="page_247"><span class="page">Page
+247</span></a> where they had gone. Here he was joined on June 7
+by the promised re&euml;nforcements, bringing his squadron to 13
+74's and the <i>Leander</i> of 50 guns.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The ensuing search continued for two months, until August 1, the
+date of the Battle of the Nile. During this period, Nelson appears
+to best advantage; in the words of David Hannay, he was an "embodied
+flame of resolution, with none of the vulgar bluster that was to
+appear later."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Moving slowly southward, the French flotilla had spent ten days in
+the occupation of Malta&mdash;the surrender of which was chiefly
+due to French influence among the Knights of St. John who held
+the island&mdash;and departed on June 19 for their destination,
+following a circuitous route along the south side of Crete and
+thence to the African coast 70 miles west of Alexandria.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Learning off Cape Passaro on the 22d of the enemy's departure from
+Malta, Nelson made direct for Alexandria under fair wind and press
+of sail. He reached the port two days ahead of Bonaparte, and finding
+it empty, at once set out to retrace his course, his impetuous
+energy betraying him into what was undoubtedly a hasty move. The
+two fleets had been but 60 miles apart on the night of the 25th.
+Had they met, though Bonaparte had done his utmost by organization
+and drill to prepare for such an emergency, a French disaster would
+have been almost inevitable, and Napoleon, in the amusingly partisan
+words of Nelson's biographer Southey, "would have escaped those
+later crimes that have incarnadined his soul." Nelson had planned
+in case of such an encounter to detach three of his ships to attack
+the transports.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The trying month that now intervened, spent by the British fleet
+in a vain search along the northern coast of the Mediterranean,
+a brief stop at Syracuse for water and supplies, and return, was
+not wholly wasted, for during this time the commander in chief
+was in frequent consultation with his captains, securing their
+hearty support, and familiarizing them with his plans for action
+in whatever circumstances a meeting might occur. An interesting
+reference to this practice of Nelson's appears in a later
+characterization of him written by the <a name="page_248"><span
+class="page">Page 248</span></a> French Admiral D&eacute;cres to
+Napoleon. "His boastfulness," so the comment runs, "is only equalled
+by his ineptitude, but he has the saving quality of making no pretense
+to any other virtues than boldness and good nature, so that he is
+accessible to the counsels of those under him." As to who dominated
+these conferences and who profited by them we may form our own
+opinion. It was by such means that Nelson fostered a spirit of
+full co&ouml;peration and mutual confidence between himself and
+his subordinates which justified his affectionate phrase, "a band
+of brothers."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The result was seen at the Nile. If rapid action lost the chance
+of battle a month before, it did much to insure victory when the
+opportunity came, and it was made possible by each captain's full
+grasp of what was to be done. "Time is everything," to quote a
+familiar phrase of Nelson; "five minutes may spell the difference
+between victory and defeat." It was two in the afternoon when the
+British, after looking into Alexandria, first sighted the French
+fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, and it was just sundown when the
+leading ship <i>Goliath</i> rounded the <i>Guerrier's</i> bows. The
+battle was fought in darkness. In the face of a fleet protected by
+shoals and shore batteries, with no trustworthy charts or pilots,
+with ships still widely separated by their varying speeds, a less
+thoroughly drilled force under a less ardent leader would have
+felt the necessity of delaying action until the following day.
+Nelson never hesitated. His ships went into action in the order
+in which they reached the scene.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion
+which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the repeated letters
+from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor,
+in spite of repeated soundings which showed this course possible,
+the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of despondent inertia still
+lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.
+Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was
+known that their range did not cover the head of the French line. The
+frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely warning
+were at anchor in the bay. Numerous water <a name="page_249"><span
+class="page">Page 249</span></a> parties were on shore and with
+them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables from one vessel
+to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had been vaguely
+planned. At a hurried council it was proposed to put to sea, but
+this was given up for the sufficient reason that there was no time.
+The French were cleared for action only on the out-board side. Their
+admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a fear reasonable
+enough if his ships had been sailing before the wind at sea; but
+at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective and the wind
+blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van would be far
+more dangerous, since support could less easily be brought up from
+the rear.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 560px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig044.png" width="560" height="321" alt="Fig. 44">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">COAST MAP</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth of the
+  Nile</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It was on the head of the line that the attack came. Nelson had
+given the one signal that "his intention was to attack the van
+and center as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before
+developed." This plan called for doubling, two ships to the enemy's
+one. With a fair wind from the north-northwest Captain Foley in the
+<i>Goliath</i> at 6 p.m. reached the <i>Guerrier</i>, the headmost of
+the thirteen ships in the enemy line. Either by instant initiative,
+or more likely in accordance with previous plans in view of such an
+opportunity, he took his ship inside the line, his anchor dragging
+slightly so as to bring him up on the quarter of the second enemy
+vessel, the <i>Conqu&eacute;rant</i>. The <i>Zealous</i>, following
+closely, anchored on the <a name="page_250"><span class="page">Page
+250</span></a> bows of the <i>Guerrier</i>; the <i>Orion</i> engaged
+inside the fifth ship; the <i>Theseus</i> inside the third; and
+the <i>Audacious</i>, passing between the first two of the enemy,
+brought up on the <i>Conqu&eacute;rant's</i> bow. With these five
+engaged inside, Nelson in the <i>Vanguard</i> and the two ships
+following him engaged respectively outside the third, fourth and
+fifth of the enemy. Thus the concentration on the van was eight
+to five.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+About a half hour later the <i>Bellerophon</i> and the <i>Majestic</i>
+attacked respectively the big flagship <i>Orient</i> (110) in the
+center and the <i>Tonnant</i> (80) next astern, and against these
+superior antagonists suffered severely, losing in killed and wounded
+390 men divided about equally between them, which was nearly half the
+total loss of 896 and greater than the total at Cape St. Vincent.
+Both later drifted almost helpless down the line. The <i>Culloden</i>
+under Troubridge, a favorite of both Jervis and Nelson, had
+unfortunately grounded and stuck fast on Aboukir shoal; but the
+<i>Swiftsure</i> and the <i>Alexander</i> came up two hours after
+the battle had begun as a support to the ships in the centre, the
+<i>Swiftsure</i> engaging the <i>Orient</i>, and the <i>Alexander</i>
+the <i>Franklin</i> next ahead, while the smaller <i>Leander</i>
+skillfully chose a position where she could rake the two. By this
+time all five of the French van had surrendered; the <i>Orient</i>
+was in flames and blew up about 10 o'clock with the loss of all but
+70 men. Admiral Brueys, thrice wounded, died before the explosion.
+Of the four ships in the rear, only two, the <i>Guillaume Tell</i>
+under Admiral Villeneuve and the <i>G&eacute;n&eacute;reux</i>,
+were able to cut their cables next morning and get away. Nelson
+asserted that, had he not been incapacitated by a severe scalp
+wound in the action, even these would not have escaped. Of the
+rest, two were burned and nine captured. Among important naval
+victories, aside from such one-sided slaughters as those of our
+own Spanish war, it remains the most overwhelming in history.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 491px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig045.png" width="491" height="737" alt="Fig. 45">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE NILE</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The effect was immediate throughout Europe, attesting dearly the
+contemporary importance attached to sea control. "It was this battle,"
+writes Admiral de la Gravi&egrave;re, "which for two years delivered
+over the Mediterranean to the British and called thither the squadrons
+of Russia, which shut up our <a name="page_251"></a><a name="page_252">
+<span class="page">Page 252</span></a> army in the midst of a
+hostile people and led the Porte to declare against us, which put
+India beyond our reach and thrust France to the brink of ruin, for
+it rekindled the hardly extinct war with Austria and brought Suvaroff
+and the Austro-Russians to our very frontiers."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span>, II, 129.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The whole campaign affords an instance of an overseas expedition
+daringly undertaken in the face of a hostile fleet (though it should
+be remembered that the British were not in the Mediterranean when
+it was planned), reaching its destination by extraordinary good
+luck, and its possibilities then completely negatived by the
+re&euml;stablishment of enemy naval control. The efforts of the
+French army to extricate itself northward through Palestine were
+later thwarted partly by the squadron under Commodore Sidney Smith,
+which captured the siege guns sent to Acre by sea and aided the
+Turks in the defense of the fortress. In October of 1799 Bonaparte
+escaped to France in a frigate. French fleets afterwards made various
+futile efforts to succor the forces left in Egypt, which finally
+surrendered to an army under Abercromby, just too late to strengthen
+the British in the peace negotiations of October, 1801.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nelson's subsequent activities in command of naval forces in Italian
+waters need not detain us. Physically and nervously weakened from
+the effects of his wound and arduous campaign, he fell under the
+influence of Lady Hamilton and the wretched court of Naples, lent
+naval assistance to schemes of doubtful advantage to his country,
+and in June of 1800 incurred the displeasure of the Admiralty by
+direct disobedience of orders to send support to Minorca. He returned
+to England at the close of 1800 with the glory of his victory somewhat
+tarnished, and with blemishes on his private character which
+unfortunately, as will be seen, affected also his professional
+reputation.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Copenhagen Campaign</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Under the rapid scene-shifting of Napoleon, the political stage
+had by this time undergone another complete change from <a
+name="page_253"><span class="page">Page 253</span></a> that which
+followed the battle of the Nile. Partly at least as a consequence
+of that battle, the so-called Second Coalition had been formed by
+Great Britain, Russia, and Austria, the armies of the two latter
+powers, as already stated, carrying the war again to the French
+frontiers. It required only the presence of Bonaparte, in supreme
+control after the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> of the Eighteenth
+<i>Brumaire</i> (9 Nov., 1799), to turn the tide, rehabilitate the
+internal administration of France, and by the victories of Marengo
+in June and Hohenlinden in December of 1800 to force Austria once
+more to a separate peace. Paul I of Russia had already fallen out
+with his allies and withdrawn his armies and his great general,
+Suvaroff, a year before. Now, taken with a romantic admiration
+for Napoleon, and angry when the British, after retaking Malta,
+refused to turn it over to him as Grand Master of the Knights of
+St. John, he was easily manipulated by Napoleon into active support
+of the latter's next move against England.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This was the Armed Neutrality of 1800, the object of which, from
+the French standpoint, was to close to England the markets of the
+North, and combine against her the naval forces of the Baltic.
+Under French and Russian pressure, and in spite of the fact that
+all these northern nations stood to suffer in one way or another
+from rupture of trade relations with England, the coalition was
+accomplished in December, 1800; Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark
+pledging themselves to resist infringements of neutral rights,
+whether by extension of contraband lists, seizure of enemy goods
+under neutral flag, search of vessels guaranteed innocent by their
+naval escort, or by other methods familiar then as in later times.
+These were measures which England, aiming both to ruin the trade
+of France and to cut off her naval supplies, felt bound to insist
+upon as the belligerent privileges of sea power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+To overcome this new danger called for a mixture of force and diplomacy,
+which England supplied by sending to Denmark an envoy with a 48-hour
+ultimatum, and along with him 20 ships-of-the-line, which according
+to Nelson were "the best negotiators in Europe." The commander
+in chief of this <a name="page_254"><span class="page">Page
+254</span></a> squadron was Sir Hyde Parker, a hesitant and mediocre
+leader who could be trusted to do nothing (if that were necessary),
+and Nelson was made second in command. Influence, seniority, a clean
+record, and what-not, often lead to such choices, bad enough at
+any time but indefensible in time of war. Fortunately for England,
+when the reply of the Danish court showed that force was required,
+the two admirals virtually changed places with less friction than
+might have been expected, and Nelson "Lifted and carried on his
+shoulders the dead weight of his superior,"[1] throughout the ensuing
+campaign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Mahan, <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon
+French Revolution and Empire</span>, II, 52.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+When the envoy on March 23 returned to the fleet, then anchored in
+the Cattegat, he brought an alarming tale of Danish preparations,
+and an air of gloom pervaded the flagship when Nelson came aboard
+for a council of war. Copenhagen, it will be recalled, is situated
+on the eastern coast of Zealand, on the waterway called the Sound
+leading southward from the Cattegat to the Baltic. Directly in
+front of the city, a long shoal named the Middle Ground separates
+the Sound into two navigable channels, the one nearer Copenhagen
+known as the King's Deep (<i>Kongedyb</i>). The defenses of the
+Danish capital, so the envoy reported, were planned against attack
+from the northward. At this end of the line the formidable Trekroner
+Battery (68 guns), together with two ships-of-the-line and some
+smaller vessels, defended the narrow entrance to the harbor; while
+protecting the city to the southward, along the flats at the edge
+of the King's Deep, was drawn up an array of about 37 craft ranging
+from ships-of-the-line to mere scows, mounting a total of 628 guns,
+and supported at some distance by batteries on land. Filled with
+patriotic ardor, half the male population of the city had volunteered
+to support the forces manning these batteries afloat and ashore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nelson's plan for meeting these obstacles, as well as his view of
+the whole situation, as presented at the council, was embodied in
+a memorandum dated the following day, which well illustrates his
+grasp of a general strategic problem. The <a name="page_255"><span
+class="page">Page 255</span></a> Government's instructions, as well
+as Parker's preference, were apparently to wait in the Cattegat
+until the combined enemy forces should choose to come out and fight.
+Instead, the second in command advocated immediate action. "Not a
+moment," he wrote, "should be lost in attacking the enemy; they will
+every day and hour be stronger." The best course, in his opinion,
+would be to take the whole fleet at once into the Baltic against
+Russia, as a "home stroke," which if successful would bring down
+the coalition like a house of cards. If the Danes must first be
+dealt with, he proposed, instead of a direct attack, which would be
+"taking the bull by the horns," an attack from the rear. In order
+to do so, the fleet could get beyond the city either by passing
+through the Great Belt south of Zealand, or directly through the
+Sound. Another resultant advantage, in case the five Swedish sail of
+the line or the 14 Russian ships at Revel should take the offensive,
+would be that of central position, between the enemy divisions.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Supposing us through the Belt," the letter concludes, "with the
+wind northwesterly, would it not be possible to either go with
+the fleet or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one
+Bomb and two Fireships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron
+at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment,
+and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The
+measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion that the boldest
+measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous
+assertion of her force, directed with judgment."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Here was a striking plan of aggressive warfare, aimed at the heart of
+the coalition. The proposal to leave part of the fleet at Copenhagen
+was indeed a dangerous compromise, involving divided forces and
+threatened communications, but was perhaps justified by the known
+inefficiency of the Russians and the fact that the Danes were actually
+fought and defeated with a force no greater than the plan provided.
+In the end the more conservative course was adopted of settling with
+Denmark first. Keeping well to the eastern shore, the fleet on March
+30 passed into the Sound without injury <a name="page_256"><span
+class="page">Page 256</span></a> from the fire of the Kronenburg
+forts at its entrance, and anchored that evening near Copenhagen.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Three days later, on April 2, 1801, the attack was made as planned,
+from the southward end of the Middle Ground. Nelson in the
+<i>Elephant</i> commanded the fighting squadron, which consisted
+of seven 74's, three 64's and two of 50 guns, with 18 bomb vessels,
+sloops, and fireships. The rest of the ships, under Parker, were
+anchored at the other end of the shoal and 5 miles north of the
+city; it seems they were to have co&ouml;perated, but the south wind
+which Nelson needed made attack impossible for them. Against the
+Danish total of 696 guns on the ships and Trekroner fortification,
+Nelson's squadron had 1014, but three of his main units grounded
+during the approach and were of little service. There was no effort
+at concentration, the British when in position engaging the whole
+southern part of the Danish line. "Here," in the words of Nelson's later
+description, "was no maneuvering; it was downright fighting"&mdash;a
+hotly contested action against ships and shore batteries lasting
+from 10 a. m., when the <i>Elephant</i> led into position on the
+bow of Commodore Fischer's flagship <i>Dannebroge</i>, until about
+one.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the midst of the engagement, as Nelson restlessly paced the
+quarterdeck, he caught sight of the signal "Leave off action" flown
+from Sir Hyde's flagship. Instead of transmitting the signal to the
+vessels under him, Nelson kept his own for "Close action" hoisted.
+Colonel Stewart, who was on board at the time, continues the story
+as follows: "He also observed, I believe to Captain Foley, 'You
+know, Foley, I have only one eye&mdash;I have a right to be blind
+sometimes'; and then with an archness peculiar to his character,
+putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not
+see the signal.'" It was obeyed, however, by the light vessels under
+Captain Riou attacking the Trekroner battery, which were suffering
+severely, and which could also more easily effect a retreat.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 495px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig046.png" width="495" height="752" alt="Fig. 46">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, APRIL 2, 1801</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Shortly afterward the Danish fire began to slacken and several of
+the floating batteries surrendered, though before they could be
+taken they were frequently remanned by fresh <a name="page_257"></a>
+<a name="page_258"><span class="page">Page 258</span></a> forces
+from the shore. Enough had been accomplished; and to end a difficult
+situation&mdash;if not to extricate himself from it&mdash;Nelson
+sent the following summons addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen,
+the Danes": "Lord Nelson has orders to spare Denmark when no longer
+resisting; if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord
+Nelson will be obliged to set fire to the floating batteries he has
+taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who have
+defended them."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A truce followed, during which Nelson removed his ships. Next day
+he went ashore to open negotiations, while at the same time he
+brought bomb vessels into position to bombard the city. The cessation
+of hostilities was the more readily agreed to by the Danes owing
+to the fact that on the night before the battle they had received
+news, which they still kept concealed from the British, of the
+assassination of the Czar Paul. His successor, they knew, would be
+forced to adopt a policy more favorable to the true interests of
+Russian trade. The league in fact was on the verge of collapse. A
+fourteen weeks' armistice was signed with Denmark. On April 12 the
+fleet moved into the Baltic, and on May 5, Nelson having succeeded
+Parker in command, it went on to Revel, whence the Russian squadron
+had escaped through the ice to Kronstadt ten days before. On June
+17 a convention was signed with Russia and later accepted by the
+other northern states, by which Great Britain conceded that neutrals
+might engage in trade from one enemy port to another, with the
+important exception of <i>colonial</i> ports, and that naval stores
+should not be contraband; whereas Russia agreed that enemy goods
+under certain conditions might be seized in neutral ships, and
+that vessels under naval escort might be searched by ships-of-war.
+In the meantime, Nelson, realizing that active operations were
+over with, resigned his command.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the opinion of the French naval critic Gravi&egrave;re, the
+campaign thus ended constitutes in the eyes of seamen Nelson's
+best title to fame&mdash;"<i>son plus beau titre gloire.</i>"[1]
+Certainly it called forth the most varied talents&mdash;grasp of
+the political and <a name="page_259"><span class="page">Page
+259</span></a> strategical situation; tact and force of personality
+in dealing with an inert commander in chief; energy in overcoming
+not only military obstacles but the doubts and scruples of fellow
+officers; aggressiveness in battle; and skill in negotiations. In
+view of the Czar's murder&mdash;of which the British Government
+would seem to have had an inkling beforehand&mdash;it may be thought
+that less strenuous methods would have served. On the contrary,
+however, hundreds of British merchant vessels had been seized in
+northern ports, trade had been stopped, and the nation was threatened
+with a dangerous increment to her foes. Furthermore, after a brief
+interval of peace, Great Britain had to face ten years more of
+desperate warfare, during which nothing served her better than
+that at Copenhagen the northern neutrals had had a sharp taste
+of British naval power. Force was needed. That it was employed
+economically is shown by the fact that, when a renewal of peace
+between France and Russia in 1807 again threatened a northern
+confederation, Nelson's accomplishment with 12 ships was duplicated,
+but this time with 25 of the line, 40 frigates, 27,000 troops,
+the bombardment of Copenhagen, and a regular land campaign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span>, Vol. II,
+p. 43.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Upon Nelson's return to England, popular clamor practically forced
+his appointment to command the Channel defense flotilla against
+the French armies which were now once more concentrated on the
+northern coast. This service lasted for only a brief period until
+the signing of peace preliminaries in October, 1801.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the eight years of hostilities thus ended Great Britain, it
+is true, had been fighting largely on the defensive, but on a line
+of defense carried to the enemy's sea frontiers and comparable to
+siege lines about a city or fortress, which, when once established,
+thrust upon the enemy the problem of breaking through. The efforts
+of France to pierce this barrier, exerted in various directions
+and by various means, were, as we have seen, defeated by naval
+engagements, which insured to England the control of the sea. During
+this period, France lost altogether 55 ships-of-the-line, Holland 18,
+Spain 10, and Denmark 2, a total of 85, of which at least 50 were
+captured <a name="page_260"><span class="page">Page 260</span></a>
+by the enemy. Great Britain lost 20, but only 5 by capture. The
+British battle fleet at the close of hostilities had increased
+to 189 capital ships; that of France had shrunk to 45.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For purposes of commerce warfare the French navy had suffered the
+withdrawal of many of its smaller fighting vessels and large numbers
+of its best seamen, attracted into privateering by the better promise
+of profit and adventure. As a result of this warfare, about 3500
+British merchantmen were destroyed, an average of 500 a year,
+representing an annual loss of 2-1/2 per cent of all the ships of
+British register. But in the meantime the French merchant marine
+and commerce had been literally swept off the seas. In 1799 the
+Directory admitted there was "not a single merchant ship on the seas
+carrying the French flag." French imports from Asia, Africa, and
+America in 1800 amounted to only $300,000, and exports to $56,000,
+whereas England's total export and import trade had nearly doubled,
+from 44-1/2 million pounds sterling in 1792 to nearly 78 million in
+1800. It is true that, owing to the exigencies of war, the amount of
+British shipping employed in this trade actually fell off slightly,
+and that of neutrals increased from 13 to 34%. But the profits
+went chiefly to British merchants. England had become the great
+storehouse and carrier for the Continent, "Commerce," in the phrase
+engraved on the elder Pitt's monument, "being united with and made
+to flourish by war."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Figures on naval losses from Gravi&egrave;re, <span
+class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span>, Vol. II, ch. VII, and on commerce,
+from Mahan, <span class="sc">French Revolution and Empire</span>,
+Vol. II, ch. XVII.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+See end of Chapter XIII, <a href="#page_285">page 285</a>.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_261"><span class="page">Page 261</span></a>
+CHAPTER XIII</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE NAPOLEONIC WAR [<i>Concluded</i>]: TRAFALGAR AND AFTER
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The peace finally ratified at Amiens in March, 1802, failed to
+accomplish any of the purposes for which England had entered the
+war. France not only maintained her frontiers on the Scheldt and
+the Rhine, but still exercised a predominant influence in Holland
+and western Italy, and excluded British trade from territories
+under her control. Until French troops were withdrawn from Holland,
+as called for by the treaty, England refused to evacuate Malta.
+Bonaparte, who wished further breathing space to build up the French
+navy, tried vainly to postpone hostilities by threatening to invade
+England and exclude her from all continental markets. "It will be
+England," he declared, "that forces us to conquer Europe." The
+war reopened in May of 1803.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With no immediate danger on the Continent and with all the resources
+of a regenerated France at his command, Bonaparte now undertook the
+project of a descent upon England on such a scale as never before.
+Hazardous as he always realized the operation to be&mdash;it was a
+thousand to one chance, he told the British envoys, that he and
+his army would end at the bottom of the sea&mdash;he was definitely
+committed to it by his own threats and by the expectation of France
+that he would now annihilate her hereditary foe.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Napoleon's Plan of Invasion</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+An army of 130,000 men, with 400 guns and 20 days' supplies, was
+to embark from four ports close to Boulogne as a center, and cross
+the 36 miles of Channel to a favorable <a name="page_262"><span
+class="page">Page 262</span></a> stretch of coast between Dover and
+Hastings, distant from London some 70 miles. The transport flotilla,
+as finally planned, was to consist of 2000 or more small flat-bottomed
+sailing vessels with auxiliary oar propulsion-<i>chaloupes</i> and
+<i>bateaux canonni&egrave;res</i>, from 60 to 80 feet over all,
+not over 8 feet in draft, with from two to four guns and a capacity
+for 100 to 150 men. Large open boats (<i>p&eacute;niches</i>) were
+also to be used, and all available coast craft for transport of
+horses and supplies. Shipyards from the Scheldt to the Gironde were
+soon busy building the special flotilla, and as fast as they were
+finished they skirted the shores to the points of concentration under
+protection of coast batteries. Extensive harbor and defense works
+were undertaken at Boulogne and neighboring ports, and the 120 miles
+from the Scheldt to the Somme was soon bristling with artillery,
+in General Marmont's phrase, "a coast of iron and bronze."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The impression was spread abroad that the crossing was to be effected
+by stealth, in calm, fog, or the darkness of a long winter night,
+without the protection of a fleet. Almost from the first, however,
+Bonaparte seems to have had no such intention. The armament of the
+flotilla itself proved of slight value, and he was resolved to
+take no uncalled-for risks, on an unfamiliar element, with 100,000
+men. An essential condition, which greatly complicated the whole
+undertaking, became the concentration of naval forces in the Channel
+sufficient to secure temporary control. "Let us be masters of the
+Strait for 6 hours," Napoleon wrote to Latouche-Treville in command
+of the Toulon fleet, "and we shall be masters of the world." In
+less rhetorical moments he extended the necessary period to from
+two to fifteen days.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Up to the spring of 1804 neither army nor flotilla was fully ready,
+and thereafter the crossing was always definitely conditioned upon a
+naval concentration. But the whole plan called for swift execution.
+As time lapsed, difficulties multiplied. Harbors silted up, transports
+were wrecked by storms, British defense measures on land and sea grew
+more formidable, the Continental situation became more threatening.
+The Boulogne army thus became more and more&mdash;what Napoleon <a
+name="page_263"><span class="page">Page 263</span></a> perhaps
+falsely declared later it had always been&mdash;an army concentrated
+against Austria. To get a fleet into the Channel without a battle
+was almost impossible, and once in, its position would be dangerous
+in the extreme. Towards the end, in the opinion of the French student
+Colonel Desbri&egrave;re, Napoleon's chief motive in pressing for
+fleet co&ouml;peration was the belief that it would lead to a decisive
+naval action which, though a defeat, would shift from his own head
+the odium of failure.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Whether this theory is fully accepted or not, the fact remains that
+the only sure way of conquering England was by a naval contest.
+Her first and main defense was the British fleet, which, spread out
+to the limits of safety to watch French ships wherever harbored,
+guarded not only against a concentration in the Channel, but against
+incursions into other fields. The immediate defense of the coasts was
+intrusted to flotillas of armed boats, over 700 in all, distributed
+along the coast from Leith south-about to Glasgow, with 100 on the
+coast of Ireland. Naval men looked upon these as of slight value,
+a concession, according to Earl St. Vincent, to "the old women
+in and out" (of both sexes) at home. The distribution of the main
+battle squadrons varied, but in March, 1805, at the opening of the
+Trafalgar campaign they were stationed as follows: Boulogne and the
+Dutch forces were watched by Admiral Keith with 11 of the line and
+150 smaller units scattered from the Texel to the Channel Islands.
+The 21 French ships under Ganteaume at Brest, the strategic center,
+were closely blockaded by Cornwallis, whose force, by Admiralty
+orders, was not to fall below 18 of the line. A small squadron had
+been watching Missiessy's 5 ships at Rochefort and upon his escape
+in January had followed him to the West Indies. The 5 French and 10
+Spanish at Ferrol and the 6 or more ready for sea at Cadiz were held
+in check by forces barely adequate. In the Gulf of Lyons Nelson with
+13 ships had since May, 1803, stood outside the distant but dangerous
+station of Toulon. Owing to the remoteness from bases, a close and
+constant blockade was here impossible; <a name="page_264"></a><a
+name="page_265"><span class="page">Page 265</span></a> moreover,
+it was the policy to let the enemy get out in the hope of bringing
+him to action at sea.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 497px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig047.png" width="497" height="738" alt="Fig. 47">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH,
+  1805</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+To effect a concentration in the Channel in the face of these obstacles
+was the final aim of all Napoleon's varied naval combinations of 1804
+and 1805&mdash;combinations which impress one with the truth of
+Gravi&egrave;re's criticism that the Emperor lacked "<i>le sentiment
+exact des difficultes de la marine</i>," and especially, one should
+perhaps add, <i>de la marine fran&ccedil;aise</i>. The first plan, the
+simplest and, therefore, most promising, was that Latouche Treville
+with the Toulon fleet should evade Nelson and, after releasing ships
+on the way, enter the Channel with 16 of the line, while Cornwallis
+was kept occupied by Ganteaume. This was upset by the death of
+Latouche, France's ablest and most energetic admiral, in August
+of 1804, and by the accession, two months later, of Spain and the
+Spanish navy to the French cause. After many misgivings Napoleon
+chose Villeneuve to succeed at Toulon. Skilled in his profession,
+honest, and devoted, he was fatally lacking in self-confidence
+and energy to conquer difficulties. "It is sad," wrote an officer
+in the fleet, "to see that force which under Latouche was full of
+activity, now without faith in either their leader or themselves."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The final plan, though still subject to modifications, was for
+a concentration on a larger scale in the West Indies. Villeneuve
+was to go thither, picking up the Cadiz ships on the way, join
+the Rochefort squadron if it were still there, and wait 40 days
+for the Brest fleet. Upon its arrival the entire force of 40 ships
+was to move swiftly back to the Channel. It was assumed that the
+British squadrons, in alarm for the colonies, would in the meantime
+be scattered in pursuit.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Pursuit of Villeneuve</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Villeneuve put to sea in a rising gale on January 17, 1805, but
+was soon back in port with damaged ships, the only effect being
+to send Nelson clear to Egypt in search of him. A successful start
+was made on March 30. Refusing to wait for 5 Spanish vessels at
+Carthagena, Villeneuve with 11 sail reached Cadiz on April 9, picked
+up one French vessel and two Spanish <a name="page_266"><span
+class="page">Page 266</span></a> under Admiral Gravina, and leaving
+4 more to follow was off safely on the same night for the West
+Indies.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From Gibraltar to the Admiralty in London, Villeneuve's appearance
+in the Atlantic created a profound stir. His departure from Cadiz
+was known, but not whither he had gone. The five ships on the Cadiz
+blockade fell back at once to the Channel. A fast frigate from
+Gibraltar carried the warning to Calder off Ferrol and to the Brest
+blockade, whence it reached London on April 25. A convoy for Malta
+and Sicily with 6000 troops under Gen. Craig&mdash;a pledge which
+Russia called for before sending her own forces to southern
+Italy&mdash;was already a week on its way and might fall an easy
+victim. In consequence of an upheaval at the Admiralty, Lord Barham,
+a former naval officer now nearly 80 years of age, had just begun his
+memorable 9 months' administration as First Lord of the Admiralty
+and director of the naval war. Immediately a whole series of orders
+went out to the fleets to insure the safety of the troop ships,
+the maintenance of the Ferrol blockade, an eventual strengthening
+of forces outside the Channel, and the safety of the Antilles in
+case Villeneuve had gone there.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Where was Nelson? His scout frigates by bad judgment had lost Villeneuve
+on the night of March 31 east of Minorca, with no clue to his future
+course. Nelson took station between Sardinia and the African coast,
+resolved not to move till he "knew something positive." In the
+absence of information, the safety of Naples, Sicily, and Egypt
+was perhaps not merely an obsession on his part, but a proper
+professional concern; but it is strange that no inkling should
+have reached him from the Admiralty or elsewhere that a western
+movement from Toulon was the only one Napoleon now had in mind.
+It was April 18 before he received further news of the enemy, and
+not until May 5 was he able to get up to and through the Straits
+against steady head winds; even then he could not, as he said,
+"run to the West Indies without something beyond mere surmise."
+Definite reports from Cadiz that the enemy had gone thither reached
+him through an Admiral Campbell in the Portuguese service, and were
+confirmed by the fact that they had been seen nowhere to northward.
+On <a name="page_267"><span class="page">Page 267</span></a> the
+12th, leaving the <i>Royal Sovereign</i> (100) to strengthen the
+escort of Craig's convoy, which had now appeared, he set out westward
+with 10 ships in pursuit of the enemy's 18.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+He reached Barbados on June 4, only 21 days after Villeneuve's
+arrival at Martinique. The latter had found that the Rochefort
+squadron&mdash;as a result of faulty transmission of Napoleon's
+innumerable orders&mdash;was already back in Europe, and that the Brest
+squadron had not come. In fact, held tight in the grip of Cornwallis,
+it was destined never to leave port. But a re&euml;nforcement of
+2 ships had reached Villeneuve with orders to wait 35 days longer
+and in the meantime to harry the British colonies. Disgruntled and
+despondent, he had scarcely got troops aboard and started north
+on this mission when he learned that Nelson was hot on his trail.
+The troops were hastily thrown into frigates to protect the French
+colonies. Without other provision for their safety, and in disregard
+of orders, Villeneuve at once turned back for Europe, hoping the
+Emperor's schemes would still be set forward by his joining the
+ships at Ferrol.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nelson followed four days later, on June 13, steering for his old
+post in the Mediterranean, but at the same time despatching the
+fast brig <i>Curieux</i> to England with news of the French fleet's
+return. This vessel by great good fortune sighted Villeneuve in
+mid-ocean, inferred from his northerly position that he was bound
+for Ferrol, and reached Portsmouth on July 8. Barham at the Admiralty
+got the news the next morning, angry that he had not been routed out
+of bed on the arrival of the captain the night before. By 9 o'clock
+the same morning, orders were off to Calder on the Ferrol station
+in time so that on the 22d of July he encountered the enemy, still
+plowing slowly eastward, some 300 miles west of Cape Finisterre.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As a result of admirable communication work and swift administrative
+action the critic of Nelson at Cape St. Vincent now had a chance
+to rob the latter of his last victory and end the campaign then
+and there. His forces were adequate. Though he had only 14 ships
+to 20, his four three-deckers, according to the estimates of the
+time, were each worth <a name="page_268"></a><a name="page_269"><span
+class="page">Page 269</span></a> two of the enemy 74's, and on
+the other hand, the 6 Spanish ships with Villeneuve could hardly be
+counted for more than three. In the ensuing action, fought in foggy
+weather, two of the Spanish were captured and one of Calder's
+three-deckers was so injured that it had to be detached. The two
+fleets remained in contact for three days following, but neither
+took the aggressive. In a subsequent court martial Calder was
+reprimanded for "not having done his utmost to renew the said
+engagement and destroy every ship of the enemy."
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 765px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig048.png" width="765" height="463" alt="Fig. 48">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE,
+  MARCH-SEPTEMBER, 1805</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On July 27 the Allied fleet staggered into Vigo, and a week later,
+after dropping three ships and 1200 sick men, it moved around to
+Corunna and Ferrol. Instead of being shaken down and strengthened
+by the long cruise, it was, according to the commander's plaintive
+letters, in worse plight than when it left Toulon. Nevertheless,
+ten days later he was ready to leave port, with 29 units, 14 of them
+raw vessels from Ferrol, and 11 of them Spanish. If, as Napoleon
+said, France was not going to give up having a navy, something
+might still be done. His orders to Villeneuve were to proceed to
+Brest and thence to Boulogne. "I count," he ended, "on your zeal
+in my service, your love of your country, and your hatred of that
+nation which has oppressed us for 40 generations, and which a little
+preseverance on your part will now cause to r&euml;enter forever
+the ranks of petty powers."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Orders of 26 July, Desbri&egrave;re, <span
+class="sc">Projets</span>, Vol. V, p. 672.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Such were Villeneuve's instructions, the wisdom or sincerity of
+which it was scarcely his privilege to question (though it may
+be ours). In passing judgment on his failure to execute them it
+should be remembered that two months later, to avoid the personal
+disgrace of being superseded, he took his fleet out to more certain
+disaster than that which it now faced in striking northward from
+Corunna. "<i>Un poltron du t&ecirc;te et non de la c&oelig;ur</i>"[2]
+the French Admiral was handicapped throughout by a paralyzing sense
+of the things he could not do.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Gravi&egrave;re II, 136.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+If he had sailer northward he would have found the British fleet
+divided. Nelson, it is true, after returning to Cadiz had <a
+name="page_270"><span class="page">Page 270</span></a> fallen back
+from Gibraltar to the Channel, where he left his eleven ships with
+the Brest squadron in remarkable condition after more than two
+years at sea. Calder had also joined, bringing Cornwallis' total
+strength to 39. These stood between the 21 French at Brest and
+the 29 at Ferrol. But on August 16 Cornwallis divided his forces,
+keeping 18 (including 10 three-deckers) and sending Calder back to
+the Spanish coast with the rest. Napoleon called this a disgraceful
+blunder (<i>insigne b&ecirc;tise</i>), and Mahan adds, "This censure
+was just." Sir Julian Corbeh says it was a "master stroke... in all
+the campaign there is no movement&mdash;not even Nelson's chase of
+Villeneuve&mdash;that breathes more deeply the true spirit of war."
+According to Napoleon, Villeneuve might have "played prisoners'
+base with Calder's squadron and fallen upon Cornwallis, or with
+his 30 of the line have beaten Calder's 20 and obtained a decisive
+superiority."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+So perhaps a Napoleonic admiral. Villeneuve left Ferrol on August
+13 and sailed northwest on a heavy northeast wind till the 15th.
+Then, his fixed purpose merely strengthened by false news from a
+Danish merchantman of 25 British in the vicinity, he turned before
+the wind for Cadiz. As soon as he was safely inside, the British
+blockaders again closed around the port.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Battle of Trafalgar</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After twenty-five days in England, Nelson took command off Cadiz
+on September 28, eager for a final blow that would free England for
+aggressive war. There was talk of using bomb vessels, Congreve's
+rockets, and Francis's (Robert Fulton's) torpedoes to destroy the
+enemy in harbor, but it soon became known that Villeneuve would
+be forced to put to sea. On October 9, Nelson issued the famous
+Memorandum, or battle plan, embodying what he called "the Nelson
+touch," and received by his captains with an enthusiasm which the
+inspiration of the famous leader no doubt partly explains. This
+plan, which had been formulating itself in Nelson's mind as far
+back as the pursuit of the French fleet to the West Indies, may
+be regarded as the product of his ripest experience and <a
+name="page_271"><span class="page">Page 271</span></a> genius;
+the praise is perhaps not extravagant that "it seems to gather up
+and co&ouml;rdinate every tactical principle that has ever proved
+effective."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Corbett. <span class="sc">The Campaign of Trafalgar</span>,
+p. 349.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 597px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig049.png" width="597" height="482" alt="Fig. 49">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">NELSON'S VICTORY</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Built in 1765. 2162 tons.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though the full text of the Memorandum will repay careful study,
+its leading principles may be sufficiently indicated by summary.
+Assuming 40 British ships to 46 of the enemy (the proportions though
+not the numbers of the actual engagement), it provides first that
+"the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the
+fleet in two lines of 16 ships each, with an advanced squadron of
+8 of the fastest sailing two-decked ships." This made for speed
+and ease in maneuvering, and was based on the expressed belief
+that so many units could not be formed and controlled in the
+old-fashioned single line without fatal loss of time. The ships
+<a name="page_272"><span class="page">Page 272</span></a> would
+now come into action practically in cruising formation, which was
+commonly in two columns. The only noteworthy change contemplated
+was that the flagships of the first and second in command should
+shift from first to third place in their respective columns, and
+even this change was not carried out. Perhaps because the total
+force was smaller than anticipated, the advance squadron was merged
+with the two main divisions on the night before the battle, and
+need not be further regarded. Collingwood, the second in command,
+was given freedom of initiative by the provision that "after my
+intentions are made known to him he will have entire direction
+of his line."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The plan next provides, first for attack from to leeward, and second
+for attack from to windward. In either case, Collingwood's division
+was to bring a superior force to bear on 12 ships of the enemy rear,
+while Nelson would "cut two, three or four ships ahead of their
+center so far as to ensure getting at their commander in chief."
+"Something must be left to chance... but I look with confidence
+to a victory before the van of the enemy can succor their rear."
+And further, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship
+alongside that of an enemy."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the attack from the windward a very rough diagram is given, thus:
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 547px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig050.png" width="547" height="72" alt="Fig. 50">
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But aside from this diagram, the lines of which are not precisely
+straight or parallel in the original, and which can hardly be reconciled
+with the instructions in the text, there is no clear indication that
+the attack from the windward (as in the actual battle) was to be
+delivered in line abreast. What the text says is: "The divisions
+of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the
+enemy's center. The signal will most probably then be given for
+the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even
+steering sails, in <a name="page_273"><span class="page">Page
+273</span></a> order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's
+line and to cut through." Thus, if we assume a convergent approach
+in column, there was to be no slow deployment of the rear or leeward
+division into line abreast to make the attack of all its ships
+simultaneous; rather, in the words of a captain describing what
+really happened, they were simply to "scramble into action" at
+best speed. Nor is there any suggestion of a preliminary shift
+from line ahead in the case of Nelson's division. Though endless
+controversy has raged over the point, the prescribed approach seems
+to have been followed fairly closely in the battle.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The concentration upon the rear was not new; in fact, it had become
+almost conventional, and was fully anticipated by the enemy. More
+originality lay in the manner of "containing" the center and van.
+For this purpose, in the first place, the approach was to be at
+utmost speed, not under "battle canvas" but with all sail spread.
+In the second place, the advance of Nelson's division in column,
+led by the flagship, left its precise objective not fully disclosed
+to the enemy until the last moment, and open to change as advantage
+offered. It could and did threaten the van, and was finally directed
+upon the center when Villeneuve's presence there was revealed.
+Finally, the very serious danger of enemy concentration upon the head
+of the column was mitigated not only by the speed of the approach,
+but by the concentration there of three heavy three-deckers. The
+plan in general had in view a particular enemy, superior in numbers
+but weak in gunnery, slow in maneuver, and likely to avoid decisive
+action. It aimed primarily at rapidity of movement, but combined
+also the merits of concentration, simplicity, flexibility, and
+surprise.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this discussion of the scheme of the battle, around which interest
+chiefly centers, the actual events of the engagement have been
+in some measure anticipated, and may now be told more briefly.
+Driven to desperation by the goadings of Napoleon and the news
+that Admiral Rosily was approaching to supersede him, Villeneuve
+at last resolved to put to sea. "The intention of His Majesty,"
+so the Minister of Marine had written, "is to seek in the ranks,
+wherever they may be found, <a name="page_274"><span class="page">Page
+274</span></a> officers best suited for superior command, requiring
+above all a noble ambition, love of glory, decision of character, and
+unbounded courage. His Majesty wishes to destroy that circumspection
+which is the reproach of the navy; that defensive system which
+paralyzes our fleet and doubles the enemy's. He counts the loss
+of vessels nothing if lost with honor; he does not wish his fleet
+blockaded by an enemy inferior in strength; and if that is the
+situation at Cadiz he advises and orders you to attack."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Allied fleet worked out of Cadiz on the 19th of October and
+on the 20th tacked southward under squally westerly winds. On the
+21st, the day of the battle, the wind was still from the west, light
+and flawy, with a heavy swell and signs of approaching storm. At dawn
+the two fleets were visible to each other, Villeneuve about 9 miles
+northeast and to leeward of the British and standing southward from
+Cape Trafalgar. The French Admiral had formed his main battle line
+of 21 ships, French and Spanish intermingled, with the <i>Santisima
+Trinidad</i> (128) in the center and his flagship <i>Bucentaure</i>
+next; the remaining 12 under the Spanish Admiral Gravina constituted
+a separate squadron stationed to windward to counter an enemy
+concentration, which was especially expected upon the rear.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As the British advance already appeared to threaten this end of
+their line, the Allied fleet wore together about 9 o'clock, thus
+reversing their order, shifting their course northward, and opening
+Cadiz as a refuge. The maneuver, not completed until an hour later,
+left their line bowed in at the center, with a number of ships slightly
+to leeward, while Gravina's squadron mingled with and prolonged
+the rear in the new order.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 560px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig051.png" width="560" height="744" alt="Fig. 51">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCT. 21, 1805</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Position of ships about noon, when <i>Royal
+  Sovereign</i> opened fire.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">(From plan by Capt. T. H. Tizard, R.N.,
+  British Admiralty Report, 1913.)</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The change, though it aroused Nelson's fear lest his quarry should
+escape, facilitated his attack as planned, by exposing the enemy rear
+to Collingwood's division. As rapidly as the light airs permitted,
+the two British columns bore down, Nelson in the <i>Victory</i>
+(100) leading the windward division of 12 ships, closely followed
+by the heavy <i>Neptune</i> and <i>T&eacute;m&eacute;raire</i>,
+while Collingwood in the freshly coppered and refitted <i>Royal
+Sovereign</i> set a sharp pace for the 15 sail to leeward. Of the
+<a name="page_275"><span class="page">Page 275</span></a><a
+name="page_276"><span class="page">Page 276</span></a> forty
+ships Nelson had once counted on, some had not come from England,
+and a half dozen others were inside the straits for water. While the
+enemy were changing course, Collingwood had signaled his division
+to shift into a line of bearing, an order which, though rendered
+almost ineffective by his failure to slow down, served to throw the
+column off slightly and bring it more nearly parallel to the enemy
+rear. (See plan.) Both commanders clung to the lead and pushed ahead
+as if racing into the fray, thus effectually preventing deployment
+and leaving trailers far behind. Nelson went so far as to try to
+jockey his old friend out of first place by ordering the <i>Mars</i>
+to pass him, but Collingwood set his studding sails and kept his
+lead. Possibly it was then he made the remark that he wished Nelson
+would make no more signals, as they all knew what they had to do,
+rather than after Nelson's famous final message: "England expects
+that every man will do his duty."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Nelson, uncertain of Villeneuve's place in the line and anxious to
+prevent escape northward, steered for a gap ahead of the <i>Santisima
+Trinidad</i>, as if to threaten the van. But at 12:00 noon, as
+the first shots were fired at the <i>Royal Sovereign</i>, flags
+were broken from all ships, and Villeneuve's location revealed.
+Swinging to southward under heavy fire, the <i>Victory</i> passed
+under the stern of the <i>Bucentaure</i> and then crashed into
+the <i>Redoutable</i>, which had pushed close up to the flagship.
+The relative effectiveness of the gunnery in the two fleets is
+suggested by the fact that the <i>Victory</i> while coming in under
+the enemy's concentrated fire had only 50 killed and wounded, whereas
+the raking broadside she finally poured into the <i>Bucentaure's</i>
+stern is said to have swept down 400 men. Almost simultaneously with
+the leader, the <i>T&eacute;m&eacute;raire</i> and <i>Neptune</i>
+plunged into the line, the former closing with the <i>Bucentaure</i>
+and the latter with the <i>Santisima Trinidad</i> ahead. Other
+ships soon thrust into the terrific artillery combat which centered
+around the leaders in a confused mingling of friend and foe.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At about 12:10, nearly half an hour before the <i>Victory</i> penetrated
+the Allied line, the <i>Royal Sovereign</i> brought up on the leeward
+side of the <i>Santa Ana</i>, flagship of the Spanish <a
+name="page_277"><span class="page">Page 277</span></a> Admiral Alava,
+after raking both her and the <i>Fougueux</i> astern. The <i>Santa
+Ana</i> was thirteenth in the actual line, but, as Collingwood
+knew, there were 16, counting those to leeward, among the ships he
+had thus cut off for his division to subdue. As a combined effect
+of the light breeze and the manner of attack, it was an hour or
+more before the action was made general by the advent of British
+ships in the rear. All these suffered as they closed, but far less
+than those near the head of the line. Of the total British casualties
+fully a third fell upon the four leading ships&mdash;<i>Victory,
+T&eacute;m&eacute;raire, Royal Sovereign</i> and <i>Belleisle</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Not until about three o'clock were the shattered but victorious
+British in the center threatened by the return of the ten ships in
+the Allied van. Culpably slow, however hindered by lack of wind,
+several of these joined stragglers from Gravina's division to leeward;
+the <i>Intr&eacute;pide</i>, under her brave skipper Infernet,
+set an example all might well have followed by steering straight
+for the <i>Bucentaure</i>, and surrendered only to overwhelming
+odds; five others under Rear Admiral Dumanoir skirted to windward
+and escaped with the loss of one of their number, cut off by two
+British late-comers, <i>Spartiate</i> and <i>Minotaur</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Partial firing continued until 4:30, when a victory having been
+reported to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Nelson, he died of
+his wound." So reads the <i>Victory's</i> log. The flagship had
+been in deadly grapple with the <i>Redoutable</i>, whose complement,
+like that of many another French and Spanish ship in the action,
+showed that the decadence of their navies was not due to lack of
+fighting spirit in the rank and file. Nelson was mortally wounded
+by a musket shot from the mizzen-top soon after the ships closed.
+In his hour of supreme achievement death came not ungraciously,
+giving final assurance of the glory which no man ever faced death
+more eagerly to win.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the Allied fleet, four fled with Dumanoir, but were later engaged
+and captured by a British squadron near Corunna. Eleven badly battered
+survivors escaped into Cadiz. Of the 18 captured, 11 were wrecked or
+destroyed in the gales <a name="page_278"><span class="page">Page
+278</span></a> that swept the coast for several days after the
+battle; three were recaptured or turned back to their crews by the
+prize-masters, and only four eventually reached Gibraltar.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 417px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig052.png" width="417" height="663" alt="Fig. 52">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">From plan attached to report of Capt. Prigny,
+  Villeneuve's Chief of Staff (Deshri&egrave;re, <i>Trafalgar</i>,
+  App. p. 128.)</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Trafalgar victory did not indeed reduce France to terms, and it
+thus illustrates the limitations of naval power <a name="page_279"><span
+class="page">Page 279</span></a> against an enemy not primarily
+dependent upon the sea. But it freed England from further threat
+of invasion, clinched her naval predominance, and opened to her
+the prospect of taking a more aggressive part in the land war. Even
+this prospect was soon temporarily thrust into the background. On the
+very day of Trafalgar Napoleon's bulletins announced the surrender
+of 60,000 Austrians at Ulm, and the Battle of Austerlitz a month
+later crushed the Third Coalition. The small British contingents in
+Germany and southern Italy hastened back to their transports. It
+was only later, when France was approaching exhaustion, that British
+forces in the Spanish peninsula and elsewhere took a conspicuous
+part in the Continental war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Continental System</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+England's real offensive strength lay not in her armies but in her
+grip on Europe's intercourse with the rest of the world. And on
+the other hand, the only blow that Napoleon could still strike at
+his chief enemy was to shut her from the markets of Europe&mdash;to
+"defeat the sea by the land." This was the aim of his Continental
+System. It meant a test of endurance&mdash;whether he could force
+France and the rest of Europe to undergo the tremendous strain of
+commercial isolation for a sufficient period to reduce England
+to ruin.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Continental System came into being with Napoleon's famous Berlin
+Decree of November, 1806, which, declaring a "paper" blockade of the
+British Isles, put all trade with England under the ban. Under this
+decree and later supplementary measures, goods of British origin,
+whatever their subsequent ownership, were confiscated or destroyed
+wherever French agents could lay hands on them; and neutral vessels
+were seized and condemned for entering British ports, accepting
+British convoy, or even submitting to British search.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+England's chief retaliatory measure was the Orders in Council of
+November, 1807. Her object in these orders and later modifications
+was not to cut off trade with the Continent, but to control it to
+her own profit and the injury of the enemy&mdash;in short, "no
+trade except through England." The orders <a name="page_280"><span
+class="page">Page 280</span></a> aimed to compel the aid of neutrals
+by excluding neutral ships from the Continent unless they should
+first enter British ports, pay British dues, and (as would be an
+inevitable consequence) give covert assistance in carrying on British
+trade.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Continental System reached its greatest efficiency during the
+apog&eacute;e of Napoleon's power in 1809 and 1810. To check forbidden
+traffic, which continued on an enormous scale, he annexed Holland
+to his empire, and threw a triple cordon of French troops along
+Germany's sea frontier. As a result, in the critical year of 1811
+goods piled up in British warehouses, factories closed, bankruptcies
+doubled, and her financial system tottered.[1] But to bar the tide
+of commerce at every port from Trieste to Riga was like trying
+to stem the sea. At each leak in the barrier, sugar, coffee, and
+British manufactures poured in, and were paid for at triple or
+tenfold prices, not in exports, but in coin. Malta, the Channel
+Islands, and Heligoland (seized by England from Denmark in 1807)
+became centers of smuggling. The beginning of the end came when
+the Czar, tired of French dictation and a policy ruinous to his
+country, opened his ports, first to colonial products (December,
+1810), and a year later to all British wares. Six hundred vessels,
+brought under British convoy into the Baltic, docked at Libau,
+and caravans of wagons filled the roads leading east and south.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: In spite of this crisis, British trade showed progressive
+increase in each half decade from 1800 to 1815, and did not fall off
+again until the five years after the war. The figures (in millions
+of pounds sterling) follow: 1801-05, 61 million; 1806-10, 67 million;
+1811-15, 74 million; 1816-20, 60 million.&mdash;Day, <span
+class="sc">History of Commerce</span>, p. 355.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In June of 1812 Napoleon gathered his "army of twenty nations" for
+the fatal Russian campaign. Now that they had served their purpose,
+England on June 23 revoked her Orders in Council. The Continental
+System had failed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The War of 1812</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the same month, on June 18, the United States declared war on
+Great Britain. Up to 1807 her commerce and shipping, in the words
+of President Monroe, had "flourished beyond <a name="page_281"><span
+class="page">Page 281</span></a> example," as shown by the single
+fact that her re-export trade (in West Indies products) was greater
+in that year than ever again until 1915.[1] Later they had suffered
+from the coercion of both belligerents, and from her own futile
+countermeasures of embargo and non-intercourse. Her final declaration
+came tardily, if not indeed unwisely as a matter of practical policy,
+however abundantly justified by England's commercial restrictions
+and her seizure of American as well as British seamen on American
+ships. An additional motive, which had decisive weight with the
+dominant western faction in Congress, was the hope of gaining Canada
+or at least extending the northern frontier.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: United States exports rose from a value of 56 million
+dollars in 1803 to 108 million in 1807; then fell to 22 million in
+1808, and after rising to about 50 million before the war, went
+down to 6 million in 1814.&mdash;<i>Ibid.</i>, p 480.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A subordinate episode in the world conflict, the War of 1812 cannot
+be neglected in naval annals. The tiny American navy retrieved
+the failures of American land forces, and shook the British navy
+out of a notorious slackness in gunnery and discipline engendered
+by its easy victories against France and Spain.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In size the British Navy in 1812 was more formidable than at any
+earlier period of the general war. Transport work with expeditionary
+forces, blockade and patrol in European waters, and commerce protection
+from the China Sea to the Baltic had in September, 1812, increased
+the fleet to 686 vessels in active service, including 120 of the
+line and 145 frigates. There were 75 in all on American stations,
+against the total American Navy of 16, of which the best were the
+fine 44-gun frigates <i>Constitution, President</i> and <i>United
+States</i>. In the face of such odds, and especially as England's
+European preoccupations relaxed, the result was inevitable. After
+the first year of war, while a swarm of privateers and smaller war
+vessels still took heavy toll of British commerce, the frigates
+were blockaded in American ports and American commerce was destroyed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But before the blockade closed down, four frigate actions had been
+fought, three of them American victories. In each <a
+name="page_282"><span class="page">Page 282</span></a> instance, as
+will be seen from the accompanying table, the advantage in weight
+of broadside was with the victor. The American frigates were in fact
+triumphs of American shipbuilding, finer in lines, more strongly
+timbered, and more heavily gunned than British ships of their class.
+But that good gunnery and seamanship figured in the results is
+borne out by the fact that of the eight sloop actions fought during
+the war, with a closer approach to equality of strength, seven
+were American victories. The British carronades that had pounded
+French ships at close range proved useless against opponents that
+knew how to choose and hold their distance and could shoot straight
+with long 24'S.
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center_btrb">Ship[1]</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Commander</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Wt. of broadside</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Crew</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Casualties</td>
+    <td class="center_btb">Place and date</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Constitution[2]</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Hull</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">54</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">684</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">456</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">14</td>
+    <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">750 miles east of Boston,
+      Aug. 19, 1812.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Guerri&egrave;re&nbsp;(Brit.)</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Dacres</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">49</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">556</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">272</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">79</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">United States[2]</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Decatur</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">54</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">786</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">478</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">12</td>
+    <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">Off Canary Islands, Oct. 25.
+      1812.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Macedonian&nbsp;(Brit.)</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Carden</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">49</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">547</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">301</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">104</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Constitution[2]</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Bainbridge</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">52</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">654</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">475</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">34</td>
+    <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">Near Bahia, Dec. 29, 1812.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Java&nbsp;(Brit.)</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Lambert</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">49</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">576</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">426</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">150</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Chesapeake</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Broke</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">50</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">542</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">379</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">148</td>
+    <td class="left_bb" rowspan="2">Off Boston, June 1, 1813.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Shannon&nbsp;(Brit.)[2]</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Broke</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">52</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">550</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">330</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">83</td>
+</table>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: The figures are from Roosevelt's <span class="sc">Naval
+War of 1812</span>, in which 7% is deducted for the short weight
+of American shot.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Victorious.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"It seems," said a writer in the London <i>Times</i>, "that the
+Americans have some superior mode of firing." But when Broke with
+his crack crew in the <i>Shannon</i> beat the <i>Chesapeake</i>
+fresh out of port, he demonstrated, as had the Americans in other
+actions, that the superiority was primarily a matter of training
+and skill.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the Great Lakes America's naval efforts should have <a
+name="page_283"><span class="page">Page 283</span></a> centered,
+for here was her main objective and here she was on equal terms.
+Both sides were tremendously hampered in communications with their
+main sources of supply. But with an approach from the sea to Montreal,
+the British faced no more serious obstacle in the rapids of the St.
+Lawrence above than did the Americans on the long route up the
+Mohawk, over portages into Oneida Lake, and thence down the Oswego
+to Ontario, or else from eastern Pennsylvania over the mountains to
+Lake Erie. The wilderness waterways on both sides soon saw the
+strange spectacle of immense anchors, cables, cannon, and ship
+tackle of all kinds, as well as armies of sailors, shipwrights,
+and riggers, making their way to the new rival bases at Sackett's
+Harbor and Kingston, both near the foot of Lake Ontario.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the whole lake and river frontier, Ontario was of the most vital
+importance. A decisive American victory here, including the capture
+of Kingston, would cut enemy communications and settle the control
+of all western Canada. Kingston as an objective had the advantage
+over Montreal that it was beyond the direct reach of the British
+navy. The British, fully realizing the situation, made every effort
+to build up their naval forces on this lake, and gave Commodore Yeo,
+who was in command, strict orders to avoid action unless certain
+of success. On the other hand, the American commander, Chauncey,
+though an energetic organizer, made the mistake of assuming that his
+mission was also defensive. Hence when one fleet was strengthened by
+a new ship it went out and chased the other off the lake, but there
+was little fighting, both sides engaging in a grand shipbuilding
+rivalry and playing for a sure thing. Naval control remained unsettled
+and shifting throughout the war. It was fortunate, indeed, says
+the British historian, James, that the war ended when it did, or
+there would not have been room on the lake to maneuver the two
+fleets. The <i>St. Lawrence</i>, a 112-gun three-decker completed
+at Kingston in 1814, was at the time the largest man-of-war in
+the world.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Possibly a growing lukewarmness about the war, manifested on both sides,
+prevented more aggressive action. But it did <a name="page_284"><span
+class="page">Page 284</span></a> not prevent two brilliant American
+victories in the lesser theaters of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain.
+Perry's achievement on Lake Erie in building a superior flotilla
+in the face of all manner of obstacles was even greater than that
+of the victory itself. The result of the latter, won on September
+10, 1813, is summed up in his despatch: "We have met the enemy and
+they are ours&mdash;2 ships, 2 brigs, 1 schooner, and 1 sloop."
+It assured the safety of the northwestern frontier.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On Lake Champlain Macdonough's successful defense just a year later
+held up an invasion which, though it would not have been pushed
+very strenuously in any case, might have made our position less
+favorable for the peace negotiations then already under way. In
+this action, as in the one on Lake Erie, the total strength of each
+of the opposing flotillas, measured in weight of broadsides (1192
+pounds for the British against 1194 far the Americans), was about
+that of a single ship-of-the-line. But the number of units employed
+raised all the problems of a squadron engagement. Macdonough's
+shrewd choice of position in Plattsburg Bay, imposing upon the
+enemy a difficult approach under a raking fire, and his excellent
+handling of his ships in action, justify his selection as the ablest
+American naval leader developed by the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the outbreak of the American War, France and England had been
+engaged in a death grapple in which the rights of neutrals were
+trampled under foot. Napoleon, by his paper blockade and confiscations
+on any pretext, had been a more glaring offender. But America's
+quarrel was after all not with France, who needed American trade,
+but with England, a commercial rival, who could back her restrictions
+by naval power. Once France was out of the war, the United States
+found it easy to come to terms with England, whose commerce was
+suffering severely from American privateers.[1] At the close of the
+war the questions at issue when it began had <a name="page_285"><span
+class="page">Page 285</span></a> dropped into abeyance, and were
+not mentioned in the treaty terms.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: According to figures cited in Mahan's <span class="sc">War
+of 1812</span>, (Vol. II, p. 224), 22 American naval vessels took
+165 British prizes, and 526 privateers took 1344 prizes. In the
+absence of adequate motives on either side for prolonging the war,
+these losses, though not more severe than those inflicted by French
+cruisers, were decisive factors for peace.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The view taken of the aggressions of sea power in the Napoleonic
+Wars will depend largely on the view taken regarding the justice of
+the cause in which it fought. It saved the Continent from military
+conquest. It preserved the European balance of power, a balance
+which statesmen of that age deemed essential to the safety of Europe
+and the best interests of America and the rest of the world. On
+the other hand, but for the sacrifices of England's land allies,
+the Continental System would have forced her to make peace, though
+still undefeated at sea. Even if her territorial accessions were
+slight, England came out of the war undisputed "mistress of the
+seas" as she had never been before, and for nearly a century to come
+was without a dangerous rival in naval power and world commerce.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For general history of the period see: <span class="sc">Histories
+of the British Navy</span> by Clowes (Vols. V, VI, 1900) and Hannay
+(1909), Mahan's <span class="sc">Influence of Sea Power upon the
+French Revolution and Empire</span> (1892) and <span class="sc">War
+of 1812</span> (1905), Chevalier's <span class="sc">Histoire de la Marine
+Fran&ccedil;aise sous la Premi&egrave;re R&eacute;publique</span>
+(1886), Gravi&egrave;re's <span class="sc">Guerres Maritimes</span>
+(1885), Callender's <span class="sc">Sea Kings of Britain</span>
+(Vol. III, 1911), and Maltzahn's <span class="sc">Naval Warfare</span>
+(tr. Miller, 1908).
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Among biographies: Mahan's and Laughton's lives of Nelson, Anson's
+<span class="sc">Life of Jervis</span> (1913), Clark Russell's
+<span class="sc">Life of Collingwood</span> (1892), and briefer
+sketches in <span class="sc">From Howard to Nelson</span>, ed.
+Laughton (1899).
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For the Trafalgar campaign see:
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+British Admiralty blue-book on <span class="sc">The Tactics of
+Trafalgar</span> (with bibliography, 1913), Corbett's <span
+class="sc">Campaign of Trafalgar</span> (1910), Col. Desbri&egrave;re's
+<span class="sc">Projets et Tentatives de D&eacute;barquement aux Iles
+Britanniques</span> (1902) and <span class="sc">Campagne Maritime
+de Trafalgar</span> (1907).
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+See also Col. C. E. Callwell's <span class="sc">Military Operations
+and Maritime Preponderance</span> (1913), and Professor Clive Day's
+<span class="sc">History of Commerce</span> (revised edition, 1911,
+with bibliography).
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_286"><span class="page">Page 286</span></a>
+CHAPTER XIV</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE: HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the 19th century, from 1815 to 1898, naval power, though
+always an important factor in international relations, played in
+general a passive r&ocirc;le. The wars which marked the unification
+of Germany and Italy and the thrusting back of Turkey from the
+Balkans were fought chiefly on land. The navy of England, though
+never more constantly busy in protecting her far-flung empire, was
+not challenged to a genuine contest for mastery of the seas. In the
+Greek struggle for independence there were two naval engagements of
+some consequence&mdash;Chios (1822), where the Greeks with fireships
+destroyed a Turkish squadron and gained temporary control of the
+&AElig;gean, and Navarino (1827), in which a Turkish force consisting
+principally of frigates was wiped out by a fleet of the western
+powers. But both of these actions were one-sided, and showed nothing
+new in types or tactics. In the American Civil War control of the
+sea was important and even decisive, but was overwhelmingly in the
+hands of the North. Hence the chief naval interest of the period
+lies not so much in the fighting as in the revolutionary changes
+in ships, weapons, and tactics&mdash;changes which parallel the
+extraordinary scientific progress of the century; and the engagements
+may be studied now, as they were studied then, as testing and
+illustrating the new methods and materials of naval war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Changes in Ships and Weapons</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Down to the middle of the 19th century there had been only a slow and
+slight development in ships and weapons for a <a name="page_287"><span
+class="page">Page 287</span></a> period of nearly 300 years. A sailor
+of the Armada would soon have felt at home in a three-decker of
+1815. But he would have been helpless as a child in the fire-driven
+iron monsters that fought at Hampton Roads. The shift from sail to
+steam, from oak to iron, from shot to shell, and from muzzle-loading
+smoothbore to breech-loading rifle began about 1850; and progress
+thereafter was so swift that an up-to-date ship of each succeeding
+decade was capable of defeating a whole squadron of ten years before.
+Success came to depend on the adaptability and mechanical skill of
+personnel, as well as their courage and discipline, and also upon
+the progressive spirit of constructors and naval experts, faced
+with the most difficult problems, the wrong solution of which would
+mean the waste of millions of dollars and possible defeat in war.
+Every change had to overcome the spirit of conservatism inherent in
+military organizations, where seniority rules, errors are sanctified
+by age, and every innovation upsets cherished routine. Thus in the
+contract for Ericsson's <i>Monitor</i> it was stipulated that she
+should have masts, spars, and sails!
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The first successful steamboat for commerce was, as is well known,
+Robert Fulton's flat-bottomed side-wheeler <i>Clermont</i>, which
+in August, 1807, made the 150 miles from New York to Albany in 32
+hours. During the war of 1812 Fulton designed for coast defense
+a heavily timbered, double-ender floating battery, with a single
+paddle-wheel located inside amidships. On her trial trip in 1815
+this first steam man-of-war, the U. S. S. <i>Fulton</i>, carried
+26 guns and made over 6 knots, but she was then laid up and was
+destroyed a few years later by fire. Ericsson's successful application
+of the screw propeller in 1837 made steam propulsion more feasible
+for battleships by clearing the decks and eliminating the clumsy
+and exposed side-wheels. The first American screw warship was the
+U. S. S. <i>Princeton</i>, of 1843, but every ship in the American
+Navy at the outbreak of the Civil War had at least auxiliary sail
+rig. Though by 1850 England had 30 vessels with auxiliary steam, the
+<i>Devastation</i> of 1869 was the first in the British service to
+use steam exclusively. Long after this time old "floating museums"
+with sail rig and smoothbores were retained <a name="page_288"><span
+class="page">Page 288</span></a> in most navies for motives of
+economy, and even the first ships of the American "White Squadron"
+were encumbered with sails and spars.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 551px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig053.png" width="551" height="473" alt="Fig. 53">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">EARLY IRONCLADS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Progress in ordnance began about 1822, when explosive shells, hitherto
+used only in mortars, were first adopted for ordinary cannon with
+horizontal fire. At the time of the Crimean War shells were the
+usual ammunition for lower tier guns, and at Sinope in 1853 their
+smashing effect against wooden hulls was demonstrated when a Russian
+squadron destroyed some Turkish vessels which fired only solid
+shot. The great professional cry of the time, we are told, became
+"For God's sake, keep out the shell."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Custance, <span class="sc">The Ship of the Line in
+Battle</span>, p. 9.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 1851 Mini&eacute; rifles supplanted in the British army the old
+<a name="page_289"><span class="page">Page 289</span></a> smoothbore
+musket or "Brown Bess," with which at ranges above 200 yards it was
+difficult to hit a target 11 feet square. This change led quickly
+to the rifling of heavy ordnance as well. The first Armstrong rifles
+of 1858&mdash;named after their inventor, Sir William Armstrong,
+head of the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich&mdash;included guns up
+to 7-inch diameter of bore. The American navy, however, depended
+chiefly on smoothbores throughout the Civil War.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Breech-loading, which had been used centuries earlier, came in
+again with these first rifles, but after 1865 the British navy
+went back to muzzle-loading and stuck to it persistently for the
+next 15 years. By that time the breech-loading mechanism had been
+simplified, and its adoption became necessary to secure greater length
+of gun barrel, increased rapidity of fire, and better protection for
+gun-crews. About 1880 quick-fire guns of from 3 to 6 inches, firing
+12 or 15 shots a minute, were mounted in secondary batteries.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As already suggested, the necessity for armor arose from the smashing
+and splintering effect of shell against wooden targets and the
+penetrating power of rifled guns. To attack Russian forts in the
+Crimea, the French navy in 1855 built three steam-driven floating
+batteries, the <i>Tonnant, Lave</i>, and <i>D&eacute;vastation</i>,
+each protected by 4.3-inch plates and mounting 8 56-lb. guns. In
+the reduction of the Kinburn batteries, in October of the same
+year, these boats suffered little, but were helped out by an
+overwhelming fire from wooden ships, 630 guns against 81 in the
+forts.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The French armored ship <i>Gloire</i> of 1859 caused England serious
+worry about her naval supremacy, and led at once to H. M. S.
+<i>Warrior</i>, like the <i>Gloire</i>, full rigged with auxiliary
+steam. The <i>Warrior's</i> 4.5-inch armor, extending from 6 feet
+below the waterline to 16 feet above and covering about 42 per
+cent of the visible target, was proof against the weapons of the
+time. At this initial stage in armored construction, naval experts
+turned with intense interest to watch the work of ironclads against
+ships and forts in the American Civil War.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_290"><span class="page">Page 290</span></a>
+<i>The American Civil War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The naval activities of this war are too manifold to follow in
+detail. For four years the Union navy was kept constantly occupied
+with the tasks of blockading over 3000 miles of coast-line, running
+down enemy commerce destroyers, cooperating with the army in the
+capture of coast strongholds, and opening the Mississippi and other
+waterways leading into the heart of the Confederacy. To make the
+blockade effective and cut off the South from the rest of the world,
+the Federal Government unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of
+"continuous voyage," seizing and condemning neutral ships even when
+bound from England to Bermuda or the Bahamas, if their cargo was
+ultimately destined for Southern ports. The doctrine was declared
+inapplicable when the last leg of the journey was by land,[1] doubtless
+because there was little danger of heavy traffic across the Mexican
+frontier. Blockade runners continued to pour goods into the South
+until the fall of Fort Fisher in 1865; but as the blockade became
+more stringent, it crippled the finances of the Confederacy, shut
+out foodstuffs and munitions, and shortened, if it did not even
+have a decisive effect in winning the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Peterhoff Case, 1866 (5 Wall, 28).]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+To meet these measures the South was at first practically without
+naval resources, and had to turn at once to new methods of war.
+Its first move was to convert the steam frigate <i>Merrimac</i>,
+captured half-burned with the Norfolk Navy Yard, into an ironclad
+ram. A casemate of 4 inches of iron over 22 inches of wood, sloping
+35 degrees from the vertical, was extended over 178 feet, or about
+two-thirds of her hull. Beyond this structure the decks were awash.
+The <i>Merrimac</i> had an armament of 6 smoothbores and 4 rifles,
+two of the latter being pivot-guns at bow and stern, and a 1500-lb.
+cast-iron beak or ram. With her heavy load of guns and armor she
+drew 22 feet aft and could work up a speed of barely 5 knots.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Faced with this danger, the North hurriedly adopted Ericsson's plan
+for the <i>Monitor</i>,[2] which was contracted for on October 4, 1861,
+and launched after 100 days. Old marlin-spike <a name="page_291"><span
+class="page">Page 291</span></a> seamen pooh-poohed this "cheesebox
+on a raft." As a naval officer said, it might properly be worshiped
+by its designer, for it was an image of nothing in the heavens
+above, or the earth beneath, or the waters under the earth. It
+consisted of a revolving turret with 8-inch armor and two 11-inch
+smoothbore guns, set on a raft-like structure 142 feet in length by
+41-1/2 feet in beam, projecting at bow, stern, and sides beyond a
+flat-bottomed lower hull. Though unseaworthy, the <i>Monitor</i>
+maneuvered quickly and drew only 10-1/2 feet. She was first ordered
+to the Gulf, but on March 6 this destination was suddenly changed
+to the Chesapeake.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: So called by Ericsson because it would "admonish"
+the South, and also suggest to England "doubts as to the propriety
+of completing four steel-clad ships at three and one-half millions
+apiece."]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The South in fact won the race in construction and got its ship
+first into action by a margin of just half a day. At noon on March
+8, with the iron-workers still driving her last rivets, the
+<i>Merrimac</i> steamed out of Norfolk and advanced ponderously
+upon the three sail and two steam vessels then anchored in Hampton
+Roads.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Northern navy there had been much skepticism about the ironclad
+and no concerted plan to meet her attack. Under a rain of fire from
+the Union ships, and from share fortifications too distant to be
+effective, the <i>Merrimac</i> rammed and sank the sloop-of-war
+<i>Cumberland</i>, and then, after driving the frigate <i>Congress</i>
+aground, riddled her with shells. Towards nightfall the Confederate
+vessel moved dawn stream, to continue the slaughter next day.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+About 12 o'clock that night, after two days of terrible buffeting
+on the voyage down the coast, the little <i>Monitor</i> anchored on
+the scene lighted up by the burning wreck of the <i>Congress</i>.
+The first battle of ironclads began next morning at 8:30 and continued
+with slight intermission till noon. It ended in a triumph, not for
+either ship, but for armor over guns. The <i>Monitor</i> fired
+41 solid shot, 20 of which struck home, but merely cracked some
+of the <i>Merrimac's</i> outer plates. The <i>Monitor</i> was hit
+22 times by enemy shells. Neither craft was seriously harmed and
+not a man was killed on either side, though several were stunned or
+otherwise injured. Lieut. <a name="page_292"><span class="page">Page
+292</span></a> Worden, in command of the <i>Monitor</i>, was nearly
+blinded by a shell that smashed in the pilot house, a square iron
+structure then located not above the turret but on the forward
+deck.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The drawn battle was hailed as a Northern victory. Imagination
+had been drawing dire pictures of what the <i>Merrimac</i> might
+do. At a Cabinet meeting in Washington Sunday morning, March 9,
+Secretary of War Stanton declared: "The <i>Merrimac</i> will change
+the course of the war; she will destroy <i>seriatim</i> every naval
+vessel; she will lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution.
+I have no doubt that the enemy is at this minute on the way to
+Washington, and that we shall have a shell from one of her guns in
+the White House before we leave this room." The menace was somewhat
+exaggerated. With her submerged decks, feeble engines, and general
+awkwardness, the <i>Merrimac</i> could scarcely navigate in Hampton
+Roads. In the first day's fighting her beak was wrenched off and
+a leak started, two guns were put out of action, and her funnel
+and all other top-hamper were riddled. As was shown by Farragut in
+Mobile Bay, and again by Tegetthoff at Lissa, even wooden vessels,
+if in superior numbers, might do something against an ironclad in
+an aggressive m&ecirc;l&eacute;e.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Both the antagonists at Hampton Roads ended their careers before
+the close of 1862; the <i>Merrimac</i> was burned by her crew at
+the evacuation of Norfolk, and the <i>Monitor</i> was sunk under
+tow in a gale off Hatteras. But turret ships, monitors, and armored
+gunboats soon multiplied in the Union navy and did effective service
+against the defenses of Southern harbors and rivers. Under Farragut's
+energetic leadership, vessels both armored and unarmored passed with
+relatively slight injury the forts below New Orleans, at Vicksburg,
+and at the entrance to Mobile Bay. Even granting that the shore
+artillery was out of date and not very expertly served, it is well
+to realize that similar conditions may conceivably recur, and that
+the superiority of forts over ships is qualified by conditions
+of equipment and personnel.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Actually to destroy or capture shore batteries by naval force is
+another matter. As Ericsson said, "A single shot will sink <a
+name="page_293"><span class="page">Page 293</span></a> a ship,
+while 100 rounds cannot silence a fort."[1] Attacks of this kind
+against Fort McAllister and Charleston failed. At Charleston, April
+7, 1863, the ironclads faced a cross-fire from several forts, 47
+smoothbores and 17 rifles against 29 smoothbores and 4 rifles in
+the ships, and in waters full of obstructions and mines.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Wilson, <span class="sc">Ironclads in action</span>,
+Vol. I, p. 91.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The capture of Fort Fisher, commanding the main entrance to Wilmington,
+North Carolina, was accomplished in January, 1865, by the combined
+efforts of the army and navy. The fort, situated on a narrow neck
+of land between the Cape Fear River and the sea, had 20 guns on
+its land face and 24 on its sea face, 15 of them rifled. Against
+it were brought 5 ironclads with 18 guns, backed up by over 200
+guns in the rest of the fleet. After a storm of shot and shell
+for three successive days, rising at times to "drum-fire," the
+barrage was lifted at a signal and troops and sailors dashed forward
+from their positions on shore. Even after this preparation the
+capture cost 1000 men. As at Kinhurn in the Crimean War, the
+effectiveness of the naval forces was due less to protective armor
+than to volume of fire.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Submarines and Torpedoes</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the defense of Southern harbors, mines and torpedoes for the
+first time came into general use, and the submarine scored its
+first victim. Experiments with these devices had been going on
+for centuries, but were first brought close to practical success
+by David Bushnell, a Connecticut Yankee of the American Revolution.
+His tiny submarine, resembling a mud-turtle standing on its tail,
+embodied many features of modern underwater boats, including a
+primitive conning tower, screw propulsion (by foot power), a vertical
+screw to drive the craft down, and a detachable magazine with 150
+pounds of gunpowder. The <i>Turtle</i> paddled around and even
+under British men-of-war off New York and New London, but could
+not drive a spike through their copper bottoms to attach its mine.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Robert Fulton, probably the greatest genius in nautical invention,
+<a name="page_294"><span class="page">Page 294</span></a> carried
+the development of bath mines and submarines much further. His
+<i>Nautilus</i>, so-called because its collapsible sail resembled
+that of the familiar chambered nautilus, was surprisingly ahead of
+its time; it had a fish-like shape, screw propulsion (by a two-man
+hand winch), horizontal diving rudder, compressed air tank, water
+tank filled or emptied by a pump, and a torpedo[1] consisting of
+a detachable case of gunpowder. A lanyard ran from the torpedo
+through an eye in a spike, to be driven in the enemy hull, and
+thence to the submarine, which as it moved away brought the torpedo
+up taut against the spike and caused its explosion. Fulton interested
+Napoleon in his project, submerged frequently for an hour or more,
+and blew up a hulk in Brest harbor. But the greybeards in the French
+navy frowned on these novel methods, declaring them "immoral" and
+"contrary to the laws of war."
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: This name, coined by Fulton, was from the <i>torpedo
+electricus</i>, or cramp fish, which kills its victim by electric
+shock.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 550px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig054.png" width="550" height="226" alt="Fig. 54">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BUSHNELL'S TURTLE</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Later the British Government entered into negotiations with the
+inventor, and in October, 1804, used his mines in an unsuccessful
+attack an the French flotilla of invasion at Boulogne. Only one
+pinnace was sunk. Fulton still maintained that he could "sweep
+all military marines off the ocean."[2] But Trafalgar ended his
+chances. As the old Admiral Earl St. <a name="page_295"><span
+class="page">Page 295</span></a> Vincent remarked, "Pitt [the Prime
+Minister] would be the greatest fool that ever existed to encourage
+a mode of war which they who command the sea do not want and which
+if successful would deprive them of it." So Fulton took &pound;15,000
+and dropped his schemes.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Letter to Pitt, Jan. 6, 1806.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 549px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig055.png" width="549" height="498" alt="Fig. 55">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">FULTON'S NAUTILUS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Much cruder than the <i>Nautilus</i>, owing to their hurried
+construction, were the Confederate "Davids" of the Civil War. One
+of these launches, which ran only semi-submerged, drove a spar
+torpedo against the U. S. S. <i>New Ironsides</i> off Charleston, but
+it exploded on the rebound, too far away. The C. S. S. <i>Hunley</i>
+was a real submarine, and went down readily, but on five occasions
+it failed to emerge properly, and drowned in these experiments
+about 35 men. In August, 1864, running on the surface, it sank by
+torpedo the U. S. Corvette <i>Housatonic</i> <a name="page_296"><span
+class="page">Page 296</span></a> off Charleston, but went down
+in the suction of the larger vessel, carrying to death its last
+heroic crew.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By the end of the century, chiefly owing to the genius and patient
+efforts of two American inventors, John P. Holland and Simon Lake,
+the submarine was passing from the experimental to the practical
+stage. Its possibilities were increased by the Whitehead torpedo
+(named after its inventor, a British engineer established in Fiume,
+Austria), which came out in 1868 and was soon adopted in European
+navies. With gyroscopic stabilizing devices and a "warmer" for the
+compressed air of its engine, the torpedo attained before 1900
+a speed of 28 knots and a possible range of 1000 yards. Its first
+victim was the Chilean warship <i>Blanco</i>, sunk in 1891 at 50
+yards after two misses. Thornycroft in England first achieved speed
+for small vessels, and in 1873 began turning out torpedo boats.
+Destroyers came in twenty years later, and by the end of the century
+were making over 30 knots.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Long before this time the lessons of the Civil War had hastened the
+adoption of armor, the new ships ranging from high-sided vessels
+with guns in broadside, as in the past, to low freeboard craft
+influenced by the <i>Monitor</i> design, with a few large guns
+protected by revolving turrets or fixed barbettes, and with better
+provision for all-around fire. Ordnance improved in penetrating
+power, until the old wrought-iron armor had to be 20 inches thick
+and confined to waterline and batteries. Steel "facing" and the
+later plates of Krupp or Harveyized steel made it possible again
+to lighten and spread out the armor, and during the last decade
+of the century it steadily increased its ascendancy over the gun.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Battle of Lissa</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The adoption of armor meant sacrifice of armament, and a departure
+from Farragut's well-tried maxim, "The best protection against the
+enemy's fire is a well-sustained fire from your own guns." Thus
+the British <i>Dreadnought</i> of 1872 gave 35% of its displacement
+to armor and only 5% to armament. Invulnerability was secured at the
+expense of offensive power. <a name="page_297"><span class="page">Page
+297</span></a> That aggressive tactics and weapons retained all
+their old value in warfare was to receive timely illustration in
+the Battle of Lissa, fought in the year after the American war. The
+engagement illustrated also another of Farragut's pungent maxims
+to the effect that iron in the ships is less important than "iron in
+the men"&mdash;a saying especially true when, as with the Austrians
+at Lissa, the iron is in the chief in command.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In 1866 Italy and Prussia attacked Austria in concert, Italy having
+secured from Bismarck a pledge of Venetia in the event of victory.
+Though beaten at Custozza on June 24, the Italians did their part
+by keeping busy an Austrian army of 80,000. Moltke crushed the
+northern forces of the enemy at Sadowa on July 3, and within three
+weeks had reached the environs of Vienna and practically won the
+war. Lissa was fought on July 20, just 6 days before the armistice.
+This general political and military situation should be borne in
+mind as throwing some light on the peculiar Italian strategy in
+the Lissa campaign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Struggling Italy, her unification under the House of Piedmont as yet
+only partly achieved, had shown both foresight and energy in building
+up a fleet. Her available force on the day of Lissa consisted of 12
+armored ships and 16 wooden steam vessels of same fighting value.
+The ironclads included 7 armored frigates, the best of which were the
+two "kings," <i>Re d'Italia</i> and <i>Re di Portogallo</i>, built
+the year before in New York (rather badly, it is said), each armed
+with about 30 heavy rifles. Then there was the new single-turret
+ram <i>Affondatore</i>, or "Sinker," with two 300-pounder 10-inch
+rifles, which came in from England only the day before the battle.
+Some of the small protected corvettes and gunboats were of much less
+value, the <i>Palestro</i>, for instance, which suffered severely
+in the fight, having a thin sheet of armor over only two-fifths of
+her exposed hull.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Austrian fleet had the benefit of some war experience against
+Denmark in the North Sea two years before, but it was far inferior
+and less up-to-date, its armored ships consisting of 7 screw frigates
+armed chiefly with smoothbores. Of the <a name="page_298"><span
+class="page">Page 298</span></a> wooden ships, there were 7 screw
+frigates and corvettes, 9 gunboats and schooners, and 3 little
+side-wheelers&mdash;a total of 19. The following table indicates
+the relative strength:
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="left_btrb" rowspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Armored</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Wooden</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Small craft</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Total</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" colspan="2">Rifles</td>
+    <td class="center_btb" rowspan="2">Total w't of metal</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center_brb">No.</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">No.</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">No.</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">No.</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">No.</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Weight</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Austria</td>
+    <td class="center_br">7</td>
+    <td class="center_br">176</td>
+    <td class="center_br">7</td>
+    <td class="center_br">304</td>
+    <td class="center_br">12</td>
+    <td class="center_br">52</td>
+    <td class="center_br">22</td>
+    <td class="center_br">532</td>
+    <td class="center_br">121</td>
+    <td class="center_br">7,130</td>
+    <td class="center">23,538</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Italy</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">12</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">243</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">11</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">382</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">5</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">16</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">28</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">641</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">276</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">28,700</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">53,236</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thus in general terms the Italians were nearly twice as strong
+in main units, could fire twice as heavy a weight of metal from
+all their guns, and four times as heavy from their rifles. Even
+without the <i>Affondatore</i>, their advantage was practically
+as great as this from the beginning of the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With such a preponderance, it would seem as if Persano, the Italian
+commander in chief, could easily have executed his savage-sounding
+orders to "sweep the enemy from the Adriatic, and to attack and
+blockade them wherever found." He was dilatory, however, in assembling
+his fleet, negligent in practice and gun drill, and passive in his
+whole policy to a degree absolutely ruinous to morale. War was
+declared June 20, and had long been foreseen; yet it was June 25
+before he moved the bulk of his fleet from Taranto to Ancona in
+the Adriatic. Here on the 27th they were challenged by 13 Austrian
+ships, which lay off the port cleared for action for two hours, while
+Persano made no real move to fight. It is said that the Italian
+defeat at Custozza three days before had taken the heart out of
+him. On July 8 he put to sea for a brief three days' cruise and
+went through some maneuvers and signaling but no firing, though
+many of the guns were newly mounted and had never been tried by
+their crews.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this time Napoleon III of France had already undertaken mediation
+between the hostile powers. In spite of the orders of June 8, quoted
+above, which seem sufficiently definite, <a name="page_299"><span
+class="page">Page 299</span></a> and urgent orders to the same
+effect later, Persano was unwilling to take the offensive, and
+kept complaining of lack of clear instructions as to what he should
+do. He was later convicted of cowardice and negligence; but the
+campaign he finally undertook against Lissa was dangerous enough,
+and it seems possible that some secret political maneuvering was
+partly responsible for his earlier delay.[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: In July Persano wrote to the Deputy Boggio: "Leave the
+care of my reputation to me; I would rather be wrongly dishonored
+than rightly condemned. Patience will bring peace; I shall be called
+a traitor, but nevertheless Italy will have her fleet intact, and
+that of Austria will be rendered useless." Quoted in Bernotti,
+<span class="sc">Il Potere Marittimo Nella Grande Guerra</span>,
+p. 177.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is significant at least that the final proposal to make a descent
+upon the fortified island of Lissa came not from Persana but from
+the Minister of Marine. On July 15 the latter took up the project
+with the fleet chief of staff, d'Amico, and with Rear Admiral Vacca,
+but not until later with Persano. All agreed that the prospect
+of a truce allowed no time for a movement against Venice or the
+Austrian base at Pola, but that they should strike a swift stroke
+elsewhere. Lissa commanded the Dalmatian coast, was essential to
+naval control in the Adriatic, and was coveted by Italy then as
+in later times. It would be better than trying to crush the enemy
+fleet at the risk of her own if she could enter the peace conference
+with possession of Lissa a <i>fait accompli</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Undertaken in the face of an undefeated enemy fleet, this move has
+been justly condemned by naval strategists. But with a less alert
+opponent the coup might have succeeded. Tegetthoff, the Austrian
+commander, was not yet 41 years of age, but had been in active
+naval service since he was 18, and had led a squadron bravely in
+a fight with the Danes two years before off Heligoland. He had
+his heterogeneous array of fighting craft assembled at Pola at
+the outbreak of war. "Give me everything you have," he told the
+Admiralty when they asked him what ships he wanted; "I'll find
+some use for them." His crews were partly men of Slav and Italian
+stock from the Adriatic coast, including 600 from Venice; there
+is no reason for supposing them better than those of Persano. The
+influence <a name="page_300"><span class="page">Page 300</span></a>
+of their leader, however, inspired them with loyalty and fighting
+spirit, and their defiance of the Italians at Ancona on June 27
+increased their confidence. When successive cable messages from
+Lissa satisfied him that the Italian fleet was not attempting a
+diversion but was actually committed to an attack on the island,
+Tegetthoff set out thither on July 19 with his entire fighting
+force. His order of sailing was the order of battle. "Every captain
+knew the admiral's intention as well as the admiral himself did;
+every officer knew what had to be done, and every man had some
+idea of it, and above all knew that he had to fight."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Laughton, <span class="sc">Studies in Naval History</span>,
+Tegetthoff, p. 164.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the meantime the Italian drive on Lissa had gone ahead slowly.
+The island batteries were on commanding heights and manned by marines
+and artillerymen resolved to fight to the last ditch. During the
+second day's bombardment the <i>Affondatore</i> appeared, and also
+some additional troops needed to complete the landing force. Two-thirds
+of the guns on shore were silenced that day, and if the landing
+operations had been pushed, the island captured, and the fleet
+taken into the protected harbor of St. Giorgio, Tegetthoff would
+have had a harder problem to solve. But as the mist blew away with
+a southerly wind at 10 o'clock on the next day, July 20, the weary
+garrison on the heights of the island gave cheer after cheer as
+they saw the Austrian squadron plunging through the head seas at
+full speed from the northeastward, while the Italian ships hurriedly
+drew together north of the island to meet the blow.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Austrians advanced in three successive divisions, ironclads,
+wooden frigates, and finally the smaller vessels, each in a wedge-shaped
+formation (shown by the diagram), with the apex toward the enemy.
+The object was to drive through the Italian line if possible near
+the van and bring on a close scrimmage in which all ships could
+take part, ramming tactics could be employed, and the enemy would
+profit less by their superiority in armor and guns. Like Nelson's at
+Trafalgar, Tegetthoff's formation was one not likely to be imitated,
+but it was <a name="page_301"><span class="page">Page 301</span></a>
+at least simple and well understood, and against a passive resistance
+it gave the results planned.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 551px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig056.png" width="551" height="521" alt="Fig. 56">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"<i>Ecco i pescatori!</i>" (Here come the fishermen), cried Persana,
+with a scorn he was far from actually feeling. The Italians were
+in fact caught at a disadvantage. One of their best ships, the
+<i>Formidabile</i>, had been put <i>hors de combat</i> by the batteries
+on the day before. Another, coming in late from the west end of the
+island, took no part in the action. The wooden ships, owing to the
+cowardice of their commander, Albini, also kept out of the fight,
+though Persano signaled desperately to them to enter the engagement
+and "surround the enemy rear." With his remaining ironclads Persano
+formed three divisions <a name="page_302"><span class="page">Page
+302</span></a> of three ships each and swung across the enemy's
+bows in line ahead. Just at the critical moment, and for no very
+explicable motive, he shifted his flag from the <i>Re d'Italia</i>
+in the center to the <i>Affondatore</i>, which was steaming alone
+on the starboard side of the line. The change was not noted by all
+his ships, and thus caused confusion of orders. The delay involved
+also left a wider gap between van and center, and through this the
+Austrians plunged, Tegetthoff in his flagship <i>Erzherzog Ferdinand
+Max</i> leading the way.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Here orderly formation ended, and only the more striking episodes
+stand out in a desperate close combat, during which the black ships
+of Austria and the gray of Italy rammed or fired into each other
+amid a smother of smoke and spray. The Austrian left flank and rear
+held up the Italian van; the Austrian ironclads engaged the Italian
+center; and the wooden ships of the Austrian middle division, led by
+the 92-gun <i>Kaiser</i>, smashed into the Italian rear. Of all the
+Austrian ships, the big <i>Kaiser</i>, a relic of other days, saw
+the hardest fighting. Twice she avoided the <i>Affondatore's</i>
+ram, and she was struck by one of her 300-pound projectiles. Then
+the <i>Re di Portogallo</i> bore down, but Petz, the <i>Kaiser's</i>
+captain, rang for full speed ahead and steered for the ironclad,
+striking a glancing blow and scraping past her, while both ships
+poured in a heavy fire. The <i>Kaiser</i> soon afterward drew out
+of the action, her foremast and funnel down, and a bad blaze burning
+amidships. Altogether she fired 850 rounds in the action, or about
+one-fifth of the total fired by the Austrians, and she received
+80 hits, again one-fifth of the total. Of the 38 Austrians killed
+and 138 wounded in the battle, she lost respectively 24 and 75.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The <i>Kaiser's</i> combat, though more severe, was typical of what
+was going on elsewhere. The Italian gunboat <i>Palestro</i> was forced
+to withdraw to fight a fire that threatened her magazines. The <i>Re
+d'Italia</i>, which was at first supposed by the Austrians to be
+Persano's flagship, was a center of attack and had her steering gear
+disabled. As she could go only straight ahead or astern, the Austrian
+flagship seized the chance and rammed her squarely amidships at full
+speed, <a name="page_303"><span class="page">Page 303</span></a>
+crashing through her armor and opening an immense hole. The Italian
+gunboat heeled over to starboard, then back again, and in a few
+seconds went down, with a loss of 381 men.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This spectacular incident practically decided the battle. After an
+hour's fighting the two squadrons drew apart about noon, the Austrians
+finally entering St. Giorgio harbor and the Italians withdrawing
+to westward. During the retreat the fire on the <i>Palestro</i>
+reached her ammunition and she blew up with a loss of 231 of her
+crew. Except in the two vessels destroyed, the Italian losses were
+slight&mdash;8 killed and 40 wounded. But the armored ships were
+badly battered, and less than a month later the <i>Affondatore</i>
+sank in a squall in Ancona harbor, partly, it was thought, owing
+to injuries received at Lissa.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For a long time after this fight, an exaggerated view was held
+regarding the value of ramming, line abreast formation, and bow
+fire. Weapons condition tactics, and these tactics of Tegetthoff
+were suited to the means he had to work with. But they were not
+those which should have been adopted by his opponents; nor would
+they have been successful had the Italians brought their broadsides
+to bear on a parallel course and avoided a m&ecirc;l&eacute;e.
+What the whole campaign best illustrates&mdash;and the lesson has
+permanent interest&mdash;is how a passive and defensive policy,
+forced upon the Italian fleet by the incompetence of its admiral
+or otherwise, led to its demoralization and ultimate destruction.
+After a long period of inactivity, Persano weakened his force against
+shore defenses before he had disposed of the enemy fleet, and was
+then taken at a disadvantage. His passive strategy was reflected in
+his tactics. He engaged with only a part of his force, and without
+a definite plan; "A storm of signals swept over his squadron" as
+it went into action. What really decided the battle was not the
+difference in ships, crews, or weapons, but the difference in
+aggressiveness and ability of the two admirals in command.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_304"><span class="page">Page 304</span></a>
+<i>The Battle of the Yalu</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Twenty-eight years elapsed after Lissa before the next significant
+naval action, the Battle of the Yalu, between fleets of China and
+Japan. Yet the two engagements may well be taken together, since
+at the Yalu types and tactics were still transitional, and the
+initial situation at Lissa was duplicated&mdash;line abreast against
+line ahead. The result, however, was reversed, for the Japanese
+in line ahead took the initiative, used their superior speed to
+conduct the battle on their own terms, and won the day.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Trouble arose in the Far East over the dissolution of the decrepit
+monarchy of Korea, upon which both Japan and China cast covetous
+eyes. As nominal suzerain, China in the spring of 1894 sent 2000
+troops to Korea to suppress an insurrection, without observing
+certain treaty stipulations which required her to notify Japan. The
+latter nation despatched 5000 men to Chemulpo in June. Hostilities
+broke out on July 25, when four fast Japanese cruisers, including
+the <i>Naniwa Kan</i> under the future Admiral Togo, fell upon the
+Chinese cruiser <i>Tsi-yuen</i> and two smaller vessels, captured
+the latter and battered the cruiser badly before she got away, and
+then to complete the day's work sank a Chinese troop transport,
+saving only the European officers on board.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After this affair the Chinese Admiral Ting, a former cavalry officer
+but with some naval experience, favored taking the offensive, since
+control of the sea by China would at once decide the war. But the
+Chinese Foreign Council gave him orders not to cruise east of a
+line from Shantung to the mouth of the Yalu. Reverses on land soon
+forced him to give all his time to troop transportation, and this
+occupied both navies throughout the summer.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On September 16, the day before the Battle of the Yalu, the Chinese
+battleships escorted transports with 5000 troops to the mouth of
+the Yalu, and on the following morning they were anchored quietly
+outside the river. "For weeks," writes an American naval officer who
+was in command of one of the Chinese battleships, "we had anticipated
+an engagement, and <a name="page_305"><span class="page">Page
+305</span></a> had had daily exercise at general quarters, etc.,
+and little remained to be done.... The fleet went into action as
+well prepared as it was humanly possible for it to be with the same
+officers and men, handicapped as they were by official corruption
+and treachery ashore."[1] As the midday meal was in preparation,
+columns of black smoke appeared to southwestward. The squadron at
+once weighed anchor, cleared for action, and put on forced draft,
+while "dark-skinned men, with queues tightly coiled around their
+heads, and with arms bare to the elbow, clustered along the decks
+in groups at the guns, waiting to kill or be killed." Out of the
+smoke soon emerged 12 enemy cruisers which, with information of
+the Chinese movements, had entered the Gulf intent on battle.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Commander P. N. McGiffin, <span class="sc">The Battle
+of the Yalu</span>, <i>Century Magazine</i>, August, 1895, pp.
+585-604.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The forces about to engage included the best ships of both nations.
+There were 12 on each side, excluding 4 Chinese torpedo boats, and
+10 actually in each battle line. The main strength of the Chinese
+was concentrated in two second-class battleships, the <i>Ting-yuen</i>
+and the <i>Chen-yuen</i>, Stettin-built in 1882, each of 7430 tons,
+with 14-inch armor over half its length, four 12-inch Krupp guns in
+two barbettes, and 6-inch rifles at bow and stern. The two barbettes
+were <i>en echelon</i> (the starboard just ahead of the port), in
+such a way that while all four guns could fire dead ahead only two
+could bear on the port quarter or the starboard bow. These ships
+were designed for fighting head-on; and hence to use them to best
+advantage Admiral Ting formed his squadron in line abreast, with the
+<i>Ting-yuen</i> and <i>Chen-yuen</i> in the center. The rest of the
+line were a "scratch lot" of much smaller vessels&mdash;two armored
+cruisers (<i>Lai-yuen</i> and <i>King-yuen</i>) with 8 to 9-inch
+armored belts; three protected cruisers (<i>Tsi-yuen, Chi-yuen</i>,
+and <i>Kwang-ping</i>) with 2 to 4-inch armored decks; on the left
+flank the old corvette <i>Kwang-chia</i>; and opposite her two
+other "lame ducks" of only 1300 tons, the <i>Chao-yung</i> and
+<i>Yang-wei</i>. Ting had properly strengthened his center, but had
+left his flanks fatally weak. On board the flagship <i>Ting-yuen</i>
+was Major von Hannekin, China's military adviser, and an ex-petty
+<a name="page_306"><span class="page">Page 306</span></a> officer
+of the British navy named Nichols. Philo N. McGiffin, a graduate of
+the United States Naval Academy, commanded the <i>Chen-yuen</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Japanese advanced in column, or line ahead, in two divisions.
+The first, or "flying squadron," was led by Rear Admiral Tsuboi in
+the <i>Yoshino</i>, and consisted of four fast protected cruisers.
+Four similar ships, headed by Vice Admiral Ito in the <i>Matsushima</i>,
+formed the chief units of the main squadron, followed by the older
+and slower ironclads, <i>Fuso</i> and <i>Hiyei</i>. The little
+gunboat <i>Akagi</i> and the converted steamer <i>Saikio Maru</i>
+had orders not to engage, but nevertheless pushed in on the left
+of the line. Aside from their two battleships, the Chinese had
+nothing to compare with these eight new and well-armed cruisers,
+the slowest of which could make 17-1/2 knots.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In armament the Japanese also had a marked advantage, as the following
+table, from Wilsan's <i>Ironclads in Action</i>, will show:
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="left_btrb" rowspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb"><span class="sc">Ships</span></td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" colspan="3"><span class="sc">
+      Guns</span></td>
+    <td class="center_btb" colspan="2"><span class="sc">Shots
+      in 10 Minutes</span></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center_brb">Number</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">6-inch</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Large quick fire</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Small q. f. and machine</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">Number</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">Weight of metal</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">China</td>
+    <td class="center_br">12</td>
+    <td class="center_br">40</td>
+    <td class="center_br">2</td>
+    <td class="center_br">130</td>
+    <td class="center_br">33</td>
+    <td class="center">4,885</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Japan</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">10</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">34</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">66</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">154</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">185</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">11,706</td>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The smaller quick-fire and machine guns proved of slight value
+on either side, but the large Japanese quick-firers searched all
+unprotected parts of the enemy ships with a terrific storm of shells.
+After the experience of July 25, the Chinese had discarded much
+of their woodwork and top hamper, including boats, thin steel
+gun-shields, rails, needless rigging, etc., and used coal and sand
+bags an the upper decks; but the unarmored ships nevertheless suffered
+severely. From the table it is evident that the Japanese could
+pour in six times as great a volume of fire. The Chinese had a
+slight advantage in <a name="page_307"><span class="page">Page
+307</span></a> heavier guns, and their marksmanship, it is claimed,
+was equally accurate (possibly 10% hits on each side), but their
+ammunition was defective and consisted mostly of non-bursting
+projectiles. They had only 15 rounds of shell for each gun.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the approach the Japanese steered at first for the enemy
+center, thus concealing their precise objective, and then swung to
+port, with the aim of attacking on the weaker side of the Chinese
+battleships (owing to their barbette arrangement) and on the weaker
+flank of the line. In the meantime the Chinese steamed forward at
+about 6 knots and turned somewhat to keep head-on, thus forcing the
+Japanese to file across their bows. At 12.20 p.m. the <i>Chen-yuen</i>
+and <i>Ting-yuen</i> opened at 5800 yards on Tsuboi's squadron,
+which held its fire until at 3000 yards or closer it swung around
+the Chinese right wing.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The main squadron followed. Admiral Ito has been criticized for thus
+drawing his line across the enemy's advance, instead of attacking
+their left flank. But he was previously committed to the movement,
+and executed it rapidly and for the most part at long range. Had
+the Chinese pressed forward at best speed, Lissa might have been
+repeated. As it was, they cut off only the <i>Hiyei</i>. To avoid
+ramming, this old ironclad plunged boldly between the <i>Chen-yuen</i>
+and <i>Ting-yuen</i>. She was hit 22 times and had 56 killed and
+wounded, but managed to pull through.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Before this time the <i>Chao-yung</i> and <i>Yang-wei</i> on the
+right flank of the Chinese line had crumpled under a heavy cross-fire
+from the flying squadron. These ships had wooden cabins on deck
+outboard, and the whole superstructure soon became roaring masses
+of flames. Both dropped out of line and burned to the water's edge.
+The two ships on the opposite flank had seized an early opportunity
+to withdraw astern of the line, and were now off for Port Arthur
+under full steam, "followed," writes McGiffin, "by a string of
+Chinese anathemas from our men at the guns."
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 555px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig057.png" width="555" height="767" alt="Fig. 57">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPT. 17, 1894</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Japanese van turned to port and was thus for some
+<a name="page_308"><span class="page">Page 308</span></a><a
+name="page_309"><span class="page">Page 309</span></a> time out
+of action. The main division turned to starboard and circled the
+Chinese rear. Of the 6 Chinese ships left in the line, the four
+smaller seem now to have moved on to southward, while both Japanese
+divisions concentrated on the two battleships <i>Chen-yuen</i>
+and <i>Ting-yuen</i>. These did their best to keep head to the
+enemy, and stood up doggedly, returning slowly the fire of the
+circling cruisers. Tsuboi soon turned away to engage the lighter
+vessels. Finally, at 3.26, as the <i>Matsushima</i> closed to about
+2000 yards, the <i>Chen-yuen</i> hit her fairly with a last remaining
+12-inch shell. This one blow put Ito's flagship out of action,
+exploding some ammunition, killing or wounding 50 or more men, and
+starting a dangerous fire. The Japanese hauled off, while according
+to Chinese accounts the battleships actually followed, but at 4.30
+came again under a severe fire. About 5.30, when the Chinese were
+practically out of ammunition, Ito finally withdrew and recalled
+his van.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the other Chinese ships, the <i>Chi-yuen</i> made a desperate
+attempt to approach the Japanese van and went down at 3.30 with screws
+racing in the air. The <i>King-yuen</i>, already on fire, was shot to
+pieces and sunk an hour later by the <i>Yoshino's</i> quick-firers.
+As the sun went down, the <i>Lai-yuen</i> and <i>Kwang-ping</i>,
+with two ships from the river mouth, fell in behind the battleships
+and staggered off towards Port Arthur, unpursued. The losses on the
+two armored ships had been relatively slight&mdash;56 killed and
+wounded. The Japanese lost altogether 90 killed and 204 wounded,
+chiefly on the <i>Matsushima</i> and <i>Hiyei</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though China saved her best ships from the battle, her fighting
+spirit was done for. The battleships were later destroyed by Japanese
+torpedo operations after the fall of Wei-hai-wei. Her crews had on
+the whole fought bravely, handicapped as they were by their poor
+materials and lack of skill. For instance, when McGiffin called
+for volunteers to extinguish a fire on the <i>Chen-yuen's</i>
+forecastle, swept by enemy shells, "men responded heartily and
+went to what seemed to them certain death." It was at this time
+that the commander himself, leading the party, was knocked over
+by a <a name="page_310"><span class="page">Page 310</span></a>
+shell explosion and then barely escaped the blast of one of his
+own 12-inch guns by rolling through an open hatch and falling 8
+feet to a pile of d&eacute;bris below.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the way of lessons, aside from the obvious ones as to the value
+of training and expert leadership and the necessity of eliminating
+inflammables in ship construction, the battle revealed on the one
+hand the great resisting qualities of the armored ship, and on
+the other hand the offensive value of superior gunfire. Admiral
+Mahan said at the time that "The rapid fire gun has just now fairly
+established its position as the greatest offensive weapon in naval
+warfare."[1] Another authority has noted that, both at Lissa and
+the Yalu, "The winning fleet was worked in divisions, as was the
+British fleet in the Dutch wars and at Trafalgar, and the Japanese
+fleet afterwards at Tsushima." Remarking that experiments with
+this method were made by the British Channel Fleet in 1904, the
+writer continues: "The conception grew out of a study of Nelson's
+Memorandum. Its essence was to make the fleet flexible in the hands
+of the admiral, and to enable any part to be moved by the shortest
+line to the position where it was most required."[2]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Lessons from the Yalu Fight</span>,
+<i>Century Magazine</i>, August, 1895, p. 630.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Custance, <span class="sc">The Ship of the Line in
+Battle</span>, p. 103.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) which closed the war,
+Japan won Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Pescadores
+Islands and Formosa, and China's withdrawal from Korea. But just as
+she was about to lay hands on these generous fruits of victory,
+they were snatched out of her grasp by the European powers, which
+began exploiting China for themselves. Japan had to acquiesce and
+bide her time, using her war indemnity and foreign loans to build
+up her fleet. The Yalu thus not only marks the rise of Japan as
+a formidable force in international affairs, but brings us to a
+period of intensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far
+East and elsewhere which gave added significance to naval power
+and led to the war of 1914.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_311"><span class="page">Page 311</span></a>
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Aside from those already cited see:</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Robert Fulton, Engineer and Artist</span>, H. W.
+  Dickinson, 1913.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Story of the Guns</span>, J. E. Tennant,
+  1864.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The British Navy</span>, Sir Thomas Brassey,
+  1884.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Clowes' History of the Royal Navy</span>, Vol.
+  VII (p. 20, bibliography).</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Naval Development of the 19th Century</span>,
+  N. Barnaby, 1904.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Torpedo in Peace and War</span>, F. T.
+  Jane, 1898.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Submarine Warfare</span>, H. C. Fyfe, 1902.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Submarine in War and Peace</span>, Simon
+  Lake, 1918.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Four Modern Naval Campaigns</span>, Lissa, W. L.
+  Clowes, 1902.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Austro-Italian Naval War</span>, Journal of
+  the United Service Institution, Vol. XI, pp. 104ff.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_312"><span class="page">Page 312</span></a>
+CHAPTER XV</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Even more significant in its relation to sea power than the revolution
+in armaments during the 19th century was the extraordinary growth
+of ocean commerce. The total value of the world's import and export
+trade in 1800 amounted in round numbers to 1-1/2 billion dollars,
+in 1850 to 4 billion, and in 1900 to nearly 24 billion. In other
+words, during a period in which the population of the world was not
+more than tripled, its international exchange of commodities was
+increased 16-fold. This growth was of course made possible largely
+by progress in manufacturing, increased use of steam navigation,
+and vastly greater output of coal and iron.[1] At the end of the
+Napoleonic wars England was the only great commercial and industrial
+state. At the close of the century, though with her colonies she
+still controlled one-fourth of the world's foreign trade, she faced
+aggressive rivals in the field. The United States after her Civil
+War, and Germany after her unification and the Franco-Prussian
+War, had achieved an immense industrial development, opening up
+resources in coal and iron that made them formidable competitors.
+Germany in particular, a late comer in the colonial field, felt
+that her future lay upon the seas, as a means of securing access on
+favorable terms to world markets and raw materials. Other nations
+also realized that their continued growth and prosperity would depend
+upon commercial expansion. This might be accomplished in a measure
+by cheaper production and superior business organization, but could
+be greatly aided by political means&mdash;by colonial activity,
+by securing control <a name="page_313"><span class="page">Page
+313</span></a> or special privileges in unexploited areas and backward
+states, by building up a merchant fleet under the national flag.
+Obviously, since the seas join the continents and form the great
+highways of trade, this commercial and political expansion would
+give increased importance to naval power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Coal production increased during the century from
+11.6 million tons to 610 million, and pig iron from half a million
+tons to 37 million. Figures from Day, <span class="sc">History
+of Commerce</span>, Ch. XXVIII.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Admiral Mahan, an acute political observer as well as strategist,
+summed up the international situation in 1895 and again in 1897 as
+"an equilibrium on the [European] Continent, and, in connection
+with the calm thus resulting, an immense colonizing movement in
+which all the great powers were concerned."[1] Later, in 1911, he
+noted that colonial rivalries had again been superseded by rivalries
+within Europe, but pointed out that the European tension was itself
+largely the product of activities and ambitions in more distant
+spheres. In fact the international developments of recent times,
+whether in the form of colonial enterprises, armament competition,
+or actual warfare, find a common origin in economic and commercial
+interests. Commerce and quick communications have drawn the world
+into closer unity, yet by a kind of paradox have increased the
+possibilities of conflict. Both by their common origin and by their
+far-reaching consequences, it is thus possible to connect the story
+of naval events from the Spanish-American to the World War, and to
+gather them up under the general title, "rivalry for world power."
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+1. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+To this rivalry the United States could hardly hope or desire to
+remain always a passive spectator, yet, aside from trying to stabilize
+the western hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine, she cherished down
+to the year 1898 a policy of isolation from world affairs. During
+the first half of the 19th century, it is true, her interests were
+directed outward by a flourishing merchant marine. In 1860 the
+American merchant fleet of 2,500,000 tons was second only to Great
+Britain's and nearly equal to that of all other nations combined.
+But its decay had already begun, and continued rapidly. <a
+name="page_314"><span class="page">Page 314</span></a> The change
+from wood to iron construction enabled England to build cheaper
+ships; and American shipping suffered also from lack of government
+patronage, diversion of capital into mare profitable projects of
+Western development, and loss of a third of its tonnage by destruction
+or shift to foreign register during the Civil War. At the outbreak
+of that war 72 per cent of American exports were carried in American
+bottoms; only 9 per cent in 1913. Thus the United States had reached
+the unsatisfactory condition of a nation with a large and rapidly
+growing foreign commerce and an almost non-existent merchant marine.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Naval Strategy</span>, p. 104.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This was the situation when the nation was thrust suddenly and
+half unwillingly into the main stream of international events by
+the Spanish-American War. Though this war made the United States
+a world power, commercial or political aggrandizement played no
+part in her entry into the struggle. It arose solely from the
+intolerable conditions created by Spanish misrule in Cuba, and
+intensified by armed rebellion since 1895. Whatever slight hope or
+justification for non-intervention remained was destroyed by the
+blowing up of the <i>U. S. S. Maine</i> in Havana harbor, February
+15, 1898, with the loss of 260 of her complement of 354 officers
+and men. Thereafter the United States pushed her preparations for
+war; but the resolution of Congress, April 19, 1898, authorizing
+the President to begin hostilities expressly stated that the United
+States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba,
+and after its pacification would "leave the government and control
+of the island to its people."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It was at once recognized that the conflict would be primarily
+naval, and would be won by the nation that secured control of the
+sea. The paper strength of the two navies left little to choose,
+and led even competent critics like Admiral Colomb in England to
+prophesy a stalemate&mdash;a "desultory war." Against five new
+American battleships, the <i>Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon</i>
+and <i>Texas</i>, the first four of 10,000 tons, and the armored
+cruisers <i>Brooklyn</i> and <i>New York</i> of 9000 and 8000 tans,
+Spain could oppose the battleship <i>Pelayo</i>, a little better
+than the <i>Texas</i> and five armored cruisers, the <a
+name="page_315"><span class="page">Page 315</span></a> <i>Carlos
+V, Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo</i>, and <i>Vizcaya</i>,
+each of about 7000 tons, and the somewhat larger and very able former
+Italian cruiser <i>Cristobal Colon</i>. Figures and statistics,
+however, give no idea of the actual weakness of the Spanish navy,
+handicapped by shiftless naval administration, by dependence on
+foreign sources of supply, and by the incompetence and lack of
+training of personnel. Of the squadron that came to Cuba under
+Admiral Cervera, the <i>Colon</i> lacked two 10-inch guns for her
+barbettes, and the <i>Vizcaya</i> was so foul under water that with
+a trial speed of 18-1/2 knots she never made above 13&mdash;Cervera
+called her a "buoy." There was no settled plan of campaign; to
+Cervera's requests for instructions came the ministerial reply
+that "in these moments of international crisis no definite plans
+can be formulated."[1] The despairing letters of the Spanish Admiral
+and his subordinates reveal how feeble was the reed upon which
+Spain had to depend for the preservation of her colonial empire.
+The four cruisers and two destroyers that sailed from the Cape
+Verde Islands on April 29 were Spain's total force available. The
+<i>Pelayo</i> and the <i>Carlos V</i>, not yet ready, were the
+only ships of value left behind.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Bermejo to Cervera, April 4, 1898.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the American naval list, in addition to the main units already
+mentioned, there were six monitors of heavy armament but indifferent
+fighting value, a considerable force of small cruisers, four converted
+liners for scouts, and a large number of gunboats, converted yachts,
+etc., which proved useful in the Cuban blockade. Of these forces
+the majority were assembled in the Atlantic theater of war. The
+<i>Oregon</i> was on the West Coast, and made her famous voyage of
+14,700 miles around Cape Horn in 79 days, at an average speed of
+11.6 knots, leaving Puget Sound on March 6 and touching at Barbados
+in the West Indies an May 18, just as the Spanish fleet was steaming
+across the Caribbean. The cruise effectively demonstrated the danger
+of a divided navy and the need of an Isthmian canal. Under Commodore
+Dewey in the Far East were two gunboats and four small cruisers,
+the <a name="page_316"><span class="page">Page 316</span></a> best
+of them the fast and heavily armed flagship <i>Olympia</i>, of
+5800 tons.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Battle of Manila Bay</i>
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 541px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig058.png" width="541" height="369" alt="Fig. 58">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">APPROACHES TO MANILA</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With this latter force the first blow of the war was struck on May
+1 in Manila Bay. Dewey, largely through the influence of Assistant
+Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, had been appointed to the eastern
+command the autumn before. On reaching his station in January, he
+took his squadron to Hong Kong to be close to the scene of possible
+hostilities. On February 25 he received a despatch from Roosevelt,
+then Acting Secretary: "Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration
+of war Spain, your duty will be to see that Spanish squadron does
+not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the
+Philippine Islands." On April 25 came the inspiring order: "Proceed
+at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly
+against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use
+utmost endeavor." The <a name="page_317"><span class="page">Page
+317</span></a> Commodore had already purchased a collier and a supply
+ship for use in addition to the revenue cutter <i>McCulloch</i>,
+overhauled his vessels and given them a war coat of slate-gray, and
+made plans for a base at Mirs Bay, 30 miles distant in Chinese
+waters, where he would be less troubled by neutrality rules in
+time of war. On April 22 the <i>Baltimore</i> arrived from San
+Francisco with much-needed ammunition. On the 27th Consul Williams
+joined with latest news of preparations at Manila, and that afternoon
+the squadron put to sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the morning of the 30th it was off Luzon, and two ships scouted
+Subig Bay, which the enemy had left only 24 hours before. At 12 that
+night Dewey took his squadron in column through the entrance to Manila
+Bay, just as he had steamed past the forts on the Mississippi with
+Farragut 35 years before. Only three shots were fired by the guns
+on shore. The thoroughness of Dewey's preparations, the rapidity
+of his movements up to this point, and his daring passage through a
+channel which he had reason to believe strongly defended by mines
+and shore batteries are the just titles of his fame. The entrance to
+Manila is indeed 10 miles wide and divided into separate channels by
+the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile. The less frequented
+channel chosen was, as Dewey rightly judged, too deep for mining
+except by experts. Yet the Spanish had news of his approach the
+day before; they had 17 guns, including 6 modern rifles, on the
+islands guarding the entrance; they had plenty of gunboats that
+might have been fitted out as torpedo launches for night attack.
+It does not detract from the American officer's accomplishment
+that he drew no false picture of the obstacles with which he had
+to deal.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At daybreak next morning, having covered slowly the 24 miles from
+the mouth of the bay up to Manila, the American ships advanced past
+the city to attack the Spanish flotilla drawn up under the Cavite
+batteries 6 miles beyond. Here was what an American officer described
+as "a collection of old tubs scarcely fit to be called men-of-war."
+The most serviceable was Admiral Montojo's flagship <i>Reina
+Cristina</i>, an unarmored cruiser of 3500 tons; the remaining half
+dozen were <a name="page_318"><span class="page">Page
+318</span></a><a name="page_319"><span class="page">Page 319</span></a>
+older ships of both wood and iron, some of them not able to get
+under way. They mounted 31 guns above 4-inch to the Americans' 53.
+More serious in prospect, though not in reality, was the danger
+from shore batteries and mines. The United States vessels approached
+in column, led by the <i>Olympia</i>, which opened fire at 5.40.
+In the words of Admiral Dewey's report, "The squadron maintained
+a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5000 to 2000
+yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to that
+of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally
+ineffective. Three runs were made from the eastward and three from
+the westward, so that both broadsides were brought to bear." One
+torpedo launch which dashed out was sunk and another driven ashore.
+The <i>Cristina</i> moved out as if to ram, but staggered back
+under the <i>Olympia's</i> concentrated fire. At 7.35, owing to a
+mistaken report that only 15 rounds of ammunition were left for the
+5-inch guns, the American squadron retired temporarily, but renewed
+action at 11.16 and ended it an hour later, when the batteries were
+silenced and "every enemy ship sunk, burned or deserted."
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 493px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig059.png" width="493" height="737" alt="Fig. 59">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As reported by Admiral Montojo, the Spanish lost 381 men. The American
+ships were hit only 15 times and had 7 men slightly injured. Volume
+and accuracy of gunfire won the day. Somewhat extravagant language
+has been used in describing the battle, which, whatever the perils
+that might naturally have been expected, was a most one-sided affair.
+But it is less easy to overpraise Admiral Dewey's energetic and
+aggressive handling of the entire campaign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Manila thereafter lay helpless under the guns of the squadron,
+and upon the arrival and landing of troops surrendered on August
+13, after a merely formal defense. In the interim, Spain sent out
+a relief force under Admiral Camara consisting of the <i>Pelaya,
+Carlos V</i> and other smaller units, before encountering which
+Dewey planned to leave Manila and await the arrival of two monitors
+then on their way from San Francisco. After getting through the
+Suez Canal, Camara was brought back (July 8) by an American threat
+against the coast of Spain.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_320"><span class="page">Page 320</span></a> Soon
+after the battle a number of foreign warships congregated at Manila,
+including 5 German ships under Admiral von Diedrichs, a force superior
+to Dewey's, and apparently bent on learning by persistent contravention
+all the rules of a blockaded port. The message finally sent to the
+German Admiral is reticently described by Dewey himself, but is
+said to have been to the effect that, if the German admiral wanted
+a fight, "he could have it right now." On the day of the surrender
+of Manila the British and the Japanese ships in the harbor took
+a position between the American and the German squadrons. This
+was just after the seizure of Kiao-chau, at a time when Germany
+was vigorously pushing out for "a place in the sun." But for the
+American commander's quiet yet firm stand, with British support,
+the United States might have encountered more serious complications
+in taking over 127,000 square miles of archipelago in the eastern
+world, with important trade interests, a lively insurrection, and
+a population of 7 million.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Santiago Campaign</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Atlantic, where it was the American policy not to carry
+their offensive beyond Spain's West Indies possessions, events
+moved more slowly. Rear Admiral Sicard, in command of the North
+Atlantic squadron based on Key West, was retired in March for physical
+disability and succeeded by William T. Sampson, who stepped up
+naturally from senior captain in the squadron and was already
+distinguished for executive ability and knowledge of ordnance. Sampson's
+first proposal was, in the event of hostilities, a bombardment of
+Havana, a plan approved by all his captains and showing a confidence
+inspired perhaps by coastal operations in the Civil War; but this
+was properly vetoed by the Department on the ground that no ships
+should be risked against shore defenses until they had struck at
+the enemy's naval force and secured control of the sea. An earlier
+memorandum from Secretary Long, outlining plans for a blockade of
+Cuba, had been based <a name="page_321"><span class="page">Page
+321</span></a> on suggestions from Rear Admiral (then Captain)
+Mahan,[1] and his strategic insight may have guided this decision.
+On April 22, Sampson, now acting rear admiral, placed his force
+off Havana and established a close blockade over 100 miles on the
+northern coast.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Goode, <span class="sc">With Sampson Through the
+War</span>, p. 19.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The problem for American strategy was now Cervera's "fleet in
+being,"&mdash;inferior in force but a menace until destroyed or
+put out of action&mdash;which, as before stated, left the Cape
+Verde Islands on April 29, for a destination unknown. A bombardment
+of cities on the American coast or a raid on the North Atlantic
+trade routes was within the realm of possibilities. Difficulties
+of coaling and an inveterate tendency to leave the initiative to
+the enemy decided the Spanish against such a project. But its bare
+possibility set the whole east coast in a panic, which has been
+much ridiculed, but which arose naturally enough from a complete
+lack of instruction in naval matters and from lack of a sensible
+control of the press. The result was an unfortunate division of
+the fleet. A so-called Flying squadron under Commodore Schley,
+consisting of the <i>Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas,</i> and 3
+small cruisers, was held at Hampton Roads; whereas, if not thus
+employed, these ships might have blockaded the south side of Cuba
+from the beginning of the war. A northern patrol squadron, of vessels
+not of much use for this or any other purpose, was also organized
+to guard the coast from Hampton Roads north.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On May 4, with Cervera still at large, Sampson lifted his guard of
+Havana&mdash;unwisely in the opinion of Mahan&mdash;and took his
+best ships, the <i>New York, Indiana, Iowa,</i> and two monitors,
+to reconnoiter San Juan, Porto Rico, where it was thought the missing
+fleet might first appear. Just as he was bombarding San Juan, on
+the morning of May 12, the Navy Department received a cable from
+Martinique announcing Cervera's arrival there. Havana and Cienfuegos
+(on the south side of Cuba and connected with Havana by rail) were
+considered the only two ports where the Spanish fleet could be
+of value to the forces on the island; and from these two <a
+name="page_322"><span class="page">Page 322</span></a> ports both
+American squadrons were at this time a thousand miles away. Schley
+hastened southward, left Key West on the 19th, and was off Cienfuegos
+by daylight on the 21st. It was fairly quick work; but had the
+Spanish fleet moved thither at its usual speed of 6 knots from
+its last stopping-place, it would have got there first by at least
+12 hours. The Spanish admiral, finding no coal at Martinique, had
+left a crippled destroyer there and moved on to the Dutch island of
+Cura&ccedil;ao, where on the 14th and 15th he secured with difficulty
+about 500 tons of fuel. Thence, in all anxiety, he made straight for
+the nearest possible refuge, Santiago, where he put in at daybreak
+on the 19th and was soon receiving congratulations on the completion
+of a successful cruise.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 842px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig060.png" width="842" height="515" alt="Fig. 60">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">WEST INDIES</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Movements in the Santiago campaign.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By the next day Sampson, having hurried back from San Juan and
+coaled, was again in force off Havana. There he received news of
+Cervera's arrival in Santiago. Since Havana could not be uncovered,
+he sent instructions to Schley&mdash;at first discretionary, and then,
+as the reports were confirmed, more imperative&mdash;to blockade the
+eastern port. Though the commander of the Flying Squadron received
+the latter orders on the 23d, he had seen smoke in Cienfuegos harbor
+and still believed he had Cervera cornered there. Accordingly he
+delayed until evening of the next day. Then, after reaching Santiago,
+he cabled on the 27th that he was returning to Key West to coal,
+though he had a collier with him and stringent orders to the contrary;
+and it was not until the 29th that he actually established the
+Santiago Blockade. Sampson, his superior in command (though not
+his senior in the captains' list), later declared his conduct at
+this time "reprehensible"[1]&mdash;possibly too harsh a term, for
+the circumstances tried judgment and leadership in the extreme.
+Cervera found Santiago destitute of facilities for refitting. Yet
+the fact <a name="page_323"><span class="page">Page 323</span></a><a
+name="page_324"><span class="page">Page 324</span></a> remains that
+he had 10 days in which to coal and get away. "We cannot," writes
+Admiral Mahan, "expect ever again to have an enemy so inept as
+Spain showed herself to be."[1*]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Letter to Secretary, July 10, 1898, <span
+class="sc">Sampson-Schley Documents</span>, p. 136: "Had the commodore
+left his station at that time he probably would have been
+court-martialed, so plain was his duty.... This reprehensible conduct
+I cannot separate from his subsequent conduct, and for this reason
+I ask you to do him ample justice on this occasion." A court of
+inquiry later decided that Commodore Schley's service up to June
+1 was characterized by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of
+enterprise."]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1*: <span class="sc">Lessons of the War with Spain</span>,
+p. 157.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The "bottling up" of Cervera cleared the situation, and the navy
+could now concentrate on a task still difficult but well defined.
+Sampson brought his force to Santiago on June 1, and assumed immediate
+command. A close blockade was instituted such as against adequate
+torpedo and mine defenses would have been highly dangerous even
+at that day. Three picket launches were placed about a mile off
+shore, three small vessels a mile further out, and beyond these
+the 5 or 6 major units, under steam and headed toward the entrance
+in a carefully planned disposition to meet any attempt at escape.
+At night a battleship stood in and played its searchlight directly
+on the mouth of the channel. The latter was six miles in length,
+with difficult turns, and at the narrowest point only 300 feet
+wide. Lieut. Hobson's gallant effort on June 3 to sink the collier
+<i>Merrimac</i> across the channel had made its navigation even more
+difficult, though the vessel did not lie athwart-stream. Mine barriers
+and batteries on the high hills at the harbor mouth prevented forcing
+the channel, but the guns were mostly of ancient type and failed to
+keep the ships at a distance. On the other hand, bombardments from
+the latter did little more than to afford useful target practice.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The despatch of troops to Santiago was at once decided upon, and
+the subsequent campaign, if it could be fully studied, would afford
+interesting lessons in combined operations. On June 22, 16,000 men
+under General Shafter landed at Daiquiri, 15 miles east of Santiago,
+in 52 boats provided by the fleet, though the War Department had
+previously stated that the general would "land his own troops."[2]
+"It was done in a scramble," writes Col. Roosevelt; and there was
+great difficulty in getting the skippers of army transports to bring
+their vessels within reasonable distance of the shore. Since the sole
+object of the campaign was to get at and destroy the enemy fleet, the
+navy fully expected and understood that the <a name="page_325"><span
+class="page">Page 325</span></a> army would make its first aim to
+advance along the coast and capture the batteries at the entrance,
+so that the mines could be lifted and the harbor forced. Army
+authorities declare this would have involved division of forces
+on both sides of the channel and impossibilities of transportation
+due to lack of roads. But these difficulties applied also in a
+measure to the defenders, and might perhaps have been surmounted
+by full use of naval aid.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Goode, <span class="sc">With Sampson Through the
+War</span>, p. 182.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Instead, the army set out with some confidence to capture the city
+itself. El Caney and San Juan Hill were seized on July 2 after
+a bloody struggle in which the Spanish stuck to their defenses
+heroically and inflicted 1600 casualties. By their own figures the
+Spanish on this day had only 1700 men engaged, though there were
+36,500 Spanish troops in the province and 12,000 near at hand. In
+considerable discouragement, Shafter now spoke of withdrawal, and
+urged Sampson "immediately to force the entrance"[1]&mdash;in spite
+of the fact that the main purpose in sending troops had been to avoid
+this very measure. In view of threatening foreign complications and
+the impossibility of replacing battleships, it was imperative not
+to risk them against mines.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 190.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Food conditions were serious in Santiago, but Cervera was absolutely
+determined not to assume responsibility for taking his fleet out to
+what he regarded as certain slaughter. A night sortie, with ships
+issuing one by one out of an intricate channel into the glare of
+searchlights, he declared more difficult than one by day. Fortunately
+for the Americans, in view of the situation ashore, the decision was
+taken out of his hands, and Governor General Blanco from Havana
+peremptorily ordered him to put to sea. The time of his exit, Sunday
+morning, July 3, was luckily chosen, for Sampson, in the <i>New
+York</i>, was 10 miles to eastward on his way to a conference with
+Shafter, and the <i>Massachusetts</i> was at Guantanamo for coal.
+The flagship <i>Maria Teresa</i> led out at 9.35, followed 10 minutes
+later by the <i>Vizcaya</i>, and then by the <i>Colon, Oquendo</i>,
+and the destroyers <i>Furor</i> and <i>Pluton</i>, each turning
+westward at top speed.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 604px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig061.png" width="604" height="346" alt="Fig. 61">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898
+<a name="page_326"><span class="page">Page 326</span></a></td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Simultaneously the big blockaders crowded toward them and opened
+a heavy fire, while stokers shoveled desperately below to get up
+steam. To the surprise of other vessels, Schley's ship, the
+<i>Brooklyn</i>, after heading towards the entrance, swung round,
+not with the enemy, but to starboard, just sliding past the
+<i>Texas'</i> bow. This much discussed maneuver Schley afterward
+explained as made to avoid blanketing the fire of the rest of the
+squadron. The <i>Oregon</i>, which throughout the blockade had
+kept plenty of steam, "rushed past the <i>Iowa</i>," in the words
+of Captain Robley Evans, "like an express train," in a cloud of
+smoke lighted by vicious flashes from her guns. In ten minutes
+the <i>Maria Teresa</i> turned for shore, hit by 30 projectiles,
+her decks, encumbered with woodwork, bursting into masses of flame.
+The concentration upon her at the beginning had shifted to the
+<i>Oquendo</i> in the rear, which ran ashore with guns silenced
+5 minutes after the leader.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Shortly before 11, the <i>Vizcaya</i>, with a torpedo ready in one
+of her bow tubes, turned towards the <i>Brooklyn</i>, which had kept
+in the lead of the American ships. A shell hitting squarely in the
+<i>Vizcaya's</i> bow caused a heavy explosion and she sheered away,
+the guns of the <i>Brooklyn, Oregon</i>, and <a name="page_327"><span
+class="page">Page 327</span></a> <i>Iowa</i> bearing on her as she
+ran towards the beach. The <i>Colon</i>, with a trial speed of 20
+knots, and 6 miles ahead of the <i>Brooklyn</i> and <i>Oregon</i>,
+appeared to stand a good chance of getting finally away. The <i>New
+York</i>, rushing back toward the battle, was still well astern. But
+the <i>Colon's</i> speed, which had averaged 13.7 knots, slackened
+as her fire-room force played out; and shortly after 1 p.m. she
+ran shoreward, opened her Kingston valves, and went down after
+surrender. She had been hit only 6 times.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the first stage of the fight the little yacht <i>Gloucester</i>,
+under Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, had dashed pluckily upon
+the two destroyers, which were also under fire from the secondary
+batteries of the big ships. The <i>Furor</i> was sunk and the
+<i>Plut&oacute;n</i> driven ashore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+There is hardly a record in naval history of such complete destruction.
+Of 2300 Spaniards, 1800 were rescued as prisoners from the burning
+wrecks or from the Cuban guerillas on shore, 350 met their death,
+and the rest escaped towards Santiago. The American loss consisted
+of one man killed and one wounded on the <i>Brooklyn</i>. This ship,
+which owing to its leading position had been the chief enemy target,
+received 20 hits from shells or fragments, and the other vessels
+altogether about as many more. An examination of the half-sunken
+and fire-scarred Spanish hulks showed 42 hits out of 1300 rounds
+from the American main batteries, or 3.2 per cent, and 73 from
+secondary batteries. Probably these figures should be doubled to
+give the actual number, but even so they revealed the need of
+improvement in gunnery.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Sampson was right when he stated earlier in the campaign that the
+destruction of the Spanish fleet would end the war. Santiago surrendered
+a fortnight later without further fighting. An expeditionary force under
+General Miles made an easy conquest of Puerto Rico. On August 12, a
+protocol of peace was signed, by the terms of which the United States
+took over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (upon payment of 20
+million dollars), and Cuba became independent under American protection.
+The war greatly strengthened the position of the United States in
+the Caribbean, and gave <a name="page_328"><span class="page">Page
+328</span></a> her new interests and responsibilities in the Pacific.
+In the possession of distant dependencies the nation found a new
+motive for increased naval protection and for more active concern
+in international affairs.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+2. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the time when the United States acquired the Philippines, the
+Far East was a storm center of international disturbance. Russia,
+with the support of Germany and France, had, as already noted,
+combined to prevent Japan from fully exploiting her victory over
+China. The latter country, however, had every appearance of a melon
+ripe for cutting; and under guise of security for loans, indemnity
+for injuries, railroad and treaty-port concessions, and special
+spheres of influence, each European nation endeavored to mark out
+its prospective share. Russia, in return for protecting China against
+Japan, gained a short-cut for her Siberian Railway across Northern
+Manchuria, with rail and mining concessions in that province and
+prospects of getting hold of both Port Arthur and Kiao-chau. But, at
+an opportune moment for Germany, two German missionaries were murdered
+in 1897 by Chinese bandits. Germany at once seized Kiao-chau, and in
+March, 1898, extorted a 99-year lease of the port, with exclusive
+development privileges throughout the peninsula of Shantung. "The
+German Michael," as Kaiser Wilhelm said at a banquet on the departure
+of his fleet to the East, had "firmly planted his shield upon Chinese
+soil"; and "the gospel of His Majesty's hallowed person," as Admiral
+Prince Heinrich asserted in reply, "was to be preached to every one
+who will hear it and also to those who do not wish to hear." "Our
+establishment on the coast of China," writes ex-Chancellor van
+B&uuml;low, "was in direct and immediate connection with the progress
+of the fleet, and a first step into the field of world politics...
+giving us <i>a place in the sun</i> in Eastern Asia."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: From London <i>Spectator</i>, Dec. 26, 1897, quoted
+in Morse, <span class="sc">International Relations of the Chinese
+Empire</span>, Vol. III, p. 108.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 541px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig062.png" width="546" height="541" alt="Fig. 62">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thus forestalled at Kiao-chau, Russia at once pushed <a
+name="page_329"><span class="page">Page 329</span></a> through a
+25-year lease of Port Arthur, and proceeded to strengthen it as
+a fortified port and naval base. England, though preoccupied with
+the Boer War, took Wei-hai-wai as a precautionary measure, "for as
+long a time as Port Arthur shall remain a possession of Russia."[1]
+France secured a new base in southern China on Kwang-chau Bay, and
+Italy tried likewise but failed. Aroused by the foreign menace, the
+feeling of the Chinese masses burst forth in the summer of 1900 in the
+massacres and uprisings known as the Boxer Rebellion. In the combined
+expedition to relieve the legations at <a name="page_330"><span
+class="page">Page 330</span></a> Peking Japanese troops displayed
+superior deftness, discipline, and endurance, and gained confidence
+in their ability to cope with the armies of European powers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <i>Ibid.</i>, III, 118.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the period following, Germany in Shantung and Russia in Manchuria
+pursued steadily their policy of exploitation. Against it, the
+American Secretary of State John Hay advanced the policy of the
+<i>Open Door</i>, "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
+entity... and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and
+impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."[1] To this
+the powers gave merely lip-service, realizing that her fixed policy
+of isolation would restrain the United States from either diplomatic
+combinations or force. "The open hand," wrote Hay in discouragement,
+"will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinese as the
+raised club,"[2] nor was it so efficacious in dealing with other
+nations concerned. Japan, however, had strained every energy to
+build up her army and navy for a conflict that seemed inevitable,
+and was ready to back her opposition to European advances by force
+if need be. In 1902 she protected herself against a combination of
+foes by defensive alliance with England. She demanded that Russia
+take her troops out of Manchuria and recognize Japanese predominance
+in Korea. Russia hoped to forestall hostilities until she could
+further strengthen her army and fleet in the East, but when the
+transfer of ships reached the danger point, Japan declared war,
+February 8, 1904, and struck viciously that same night.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Note to the European Powers</span>,
+July 3, 1900.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Thayer, <span class="sc">Life of Hay</span>, II, 369.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As in the Spanish-American War, control of the sea was vital, since
+Japan must depend upon it to move her troops to the continental
+theater of war. Nor could she hold her army passive while awaiting
+the issue of a struggle for sea control. Delay would put a greater
+relative strain on her finances, and give Russia, handicapped by
+long communications over the single-track Siberian Railway, a better
+chance to mass in the East her troops and supplies. Japan's plan was
+therefore to strike hard for naval advantage, but to begin at once,
+in any <a name="page_331"><span class="page">Page 331</span></a>
+event, the movement of troops overseas. At the outbreak of war her
+fleet of 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers, with light cruiser
+and destroyer flotillas, was assembled at Sasebo near the Straits
+of Tsushima, thoroughly organized for fighting and imbued with
+the spirit of war. Japan had an appreciable naval superiority,
+but was handicapped by the task of protecting her transports and
+by the necessity&mdash;which she felt keenly&mdash;of avoiding
+losses in battle which would leave her helpless upon the possible
+advent of Russia's Baltic reserves.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Russia's main naval strength in the East consisted of 7 battleships
+and 3 armored cruisers, presenting a combined broadside of 100
+guns against Japan's 124. The support of the Black Sea fleet was
+denied by the attitude of England, which would prevent violation
+of the agreement restricting it from passing the Dardanelles. The
+Baltic fleet, however, was an important though distant reserve
+force, a detachment from which was actually in the Red Sea on its
+way east at the outbreak of war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Just as clearly as it was Japan's policy to force the fighting on
+land, so it should have been Russia's to prevent Japan's movement
+of troops by aggressive action at sea. This called for concentration
+of force and concentration of purpose. But neither was evident in
+the Russian plan of campaign, which betrayed confusion of thought
+and a traditional leaning toward the defensive&mdash;acceptance on
+the one hand of what has been called "fortress fleet" doctrine,
+that fleets exist to protect bases and can serve this purpose by
+being shut up in them; and on the other hand of exaggerated "fleet
+in being" theory, that the mere presence of the Russian fleet, though
+inactive, would prevent Japan's use of the sea. Thus in October,
+1903, Witjeft, chief of the Port Arthur naval staff, declared that
+a landing of Japanese troops either in the Liao-tung or the Korean
+Gulf was "impossible so long as our fleet is not destroyed." Just as
+Russia's total force was divided between east and west, so her
+eastern force was divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with
+the Japanese in central position between. Three armored cruisers
+were in <a name="page_332"><span class="page">Page 332</span></a>
+the northern port, and 7 battleships in the other; and all Russia's
+efforts after war broke out were vainly directed toward remedying
+this faulty disposition before it began. The whole Russian fleet in
+the East, moreover, was, it is said, badly demoralized and unready
+for war, owing chiefly to bureaucratic corruption and to the fact
+that not merely its strategical direction but its actual command
+was vested in the Viceroy, Alexieff, with headquarters on shore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Operations Around Port Arthur</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On January 3, 1904, Japan presented practically an ultimatum; on
+February 6 broke off diplomatic relations; on February 8 declared
+war; and on the same night&mdash;just as the Czar was discussing
+with his council what should be done&mdash;she delivered her first
+blow. By extraordinary laxity, though the diplomatic rupture was
+known, the Port Arthur squadron remained in the outer anchorage,
+"with all lights burning, without torpedo nets out, and without any
+guard vessels."[1] Ten Japanese destroyers attacked at close quarters,
+fired 18 torpedoes, and put the battleship <i>Tsarevitch</i> and two
+cruisers out of action for two months. It was only poor torpedo work,
+apparently, that saved the whole fleet from destruction. A Russian
+light cruiser left isolated at Chemulpa was destroyed the next day.
+The transportation of troops to Korea and Southern Manchuria was
+at once begun. Though not locked in by close blockade, and not
+seriously injured by the frequent Japanese raids, bombardments,
+and efforts to block the harbor entrance, the Port Arthur squadron
+made no move to interfere.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Semenoff, <span class="sc">Rasplata</span>, p. 45.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Both fleets suffered from mines. Vice Admiral Makaroff, Russia's
+foremost naval leader, who took command at Port Arthur in March,
+went down with the <i>Petropavlosk</i> on April 13, when his ship
+struck a mine laid by the Japanese. On May 14, on the other hand,
+the Russian mine-layer <i>Amur</i> slipped out in a fog, spread
+her mines in the usual path of Japanese vessels off the port, and
+thus on the same day sank <a name="page_333"><span class="page">Page
+333</span></a> two of their best ships, the <i>Hatsuse</i> and
+<i>Yashima</i>. Mining, mine-sweeping, an uneventful Russian sortie
+an June 23, progress of Japanese land forces down the peninsula
+and close investment of Port Arthur&mdash;this was the course of
+events down to the final effort of the Russian squadron on August
+10.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 602px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig063.png" width="602" height="463" alt="Fig. 63">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By this time Japanese siege guns were actually reaching ships in
+the harbor. Action of any kind, especially if it involved some
+injury to the enemy navy, was better than staying to be shot to
+pieces from the shore. Yet Makaroff's successor, Witjeft, painfully
+and consciously unequal to his responsibilities, still opposed
+an exit, and left port only upon imperative orders from above.
+Scarcely was the fleet an hour outside when Togo appeared on the
+scene. The forces in the Battle of August 10 consisted of 6 Russian
+battleships and 4 cruisers, against 6 Japanese armored vessels and
+9 cruisers; the combined large-caliber broadsides of the armored
+<a name="page_334"><span class="page">Page 334</span></a> ships
+being 73 to 52, and of the cruisers 55 to 21, in favor of Togo's
+squadron. In spite of this superiority in armament, and of fully
+a knot in speed, Togo hesitated to close to decisive range. Five
+hours or more of complicated maneuvering ensued, during which both
+squadrons kept at "long bowls," now passing each other, now defiling
+across van or rear, without marked advantage for either side.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At last, at 5.40 p.m., the Japanese got in a lucky blow. Two 12-inch
+shells struck the flagship <i>Tsarevitch</i>, killing Admiral Witjeft,
+jamming the helm to starboard, and thus serving to throw the whole
+Russian line into confusion. Togo now closed to 3000 yards, but
+growing darkness enabled his quarry to escape. The battle in fact
+was less one-sided than the later engagement at Tsushima. On both
+sides the percentage of hits was low, about 1% for the Russians
+and 6 or 7% for their opponents. Togo's flagship <i>Mikasa</i> was
+hit 30 times and lost 125 men; the total Japanese loss was about
+half that of the enemy&mdash;236 to 478.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Much might still have been gained, in view of the future coming of
+the Baltic fleet, had the Russians still persisted in pressing onward
+for Vladivostok; but owing to loss of their leader and ignorance of the
+general plan, they scattered. The cruiser <i>Novik</i> was caught and
+sunk, another cruiser was interned at Shanghai, a third at Saigon,
+and the <i>Tsarevitch</i> at Kiao-chau. The rest, including 5 of the
+6 battleships, fled back into the Port Arthur death-trap. Largely in
+order to complete their destruction, the Japanese sacrificed 60,000
+men in desperate assaults on the fortress, which surrendered January
+2, 1905. As at Santiago, the necessity of saving battleships, less
+easily replaced, led the Japanese to the cheaper expenditure of
+men.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On news of the Port Arthur sortie, the Vladivostok squadron, which
+hitherto had made only a few more or less futile raids on Japanese
+shipping, advanced toward Tsushima Straits, and met there at dawn
+of August 14 a slightly superior force of 4 cruisers under Kamimura.
+The better shooting of the Japanese soon drove the slowest Russian
+ship, the <i>Rurik</i>, out of line; the other two, after a plucky
+fight, <a name="page_335"><span class="page">Page 335</span></a>
+managed to get away, with hulls and funnels riddled by enemy shells.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The complete annulment of Russia's eastern fleet in this first
+stage of hostilities had enabled Japan to profit fully by her easier
+communications to the scene of war. Its final destruction with the
+fall of Port Arthur gave assurance of victory. The decisive battle
+of Mukden was fought in March, 1905. Close to their bases, trained
+to the last degree, inspired by success, the Japanese navy could
+now face with confidence the approach of Russia's last fleet.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Rojdestvensky's Cruise</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After a series of accidents and delays, the Baltic fleet under
+Admiral Rojdestvensky&mdash;8 battleships, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers,
+and numerous auxiliaries&mdash;left Libau Oct. 18, 1904, on its
+18,000-mile cruise. Off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, the ships
+fired into English trawlers under the impression that they were
+enemy torpedo craft, and thus nearly stirred England to war. Off
+Tangier some of the lighter vessels separated to pass by way of
+Suez, and a third division from Russia followed a little later
+by the same route. Hamburg-American colliers helped Rojdestvensky
+solve his logistical problem on the long voyage round Africa, and
+German authorities stretched neutrality rules upon his arrival in
+Wahlfish Bay, for the engrossment of Russia in eastern adventures
+was cheerfully encouraged by the neighbor on her southern frontier.
+France also did her best to be of service to the fleet of her ally,
+though she had "paired off" with England to remain neutral in the
+war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With the reunion of the Russian divisions at Nossi B&eacute;,
+Madagascar, January 9, 1905, came news of the fall of Port Arthur.
+The home government now concluded to despatch the fag-ends of its
+navy, though Rojdestvensky would have preferred to push ahead without
+waiting for such "superfluous encumbrances" to join. Ships, as his
+staff officer Semenoff afterward wrote, were needed, but not "old
+flatirons and <a name="page_336"><span class="page">Page 336</span></a>
+galoshes"; guns, but not "holes surrounded by iron."[1] After a
+tedious 10 weeks' delay in tropical waters, the fleet moved on
+to French Indo-China, where, after another month of waiting, the
+last division under Nebogatoff finally joined&mdash;a slow old
+battleship, 3 coast defense ironclads, and a cruiser. Upon these,
+Rojdestvensky's officers vented their vocabulary of invective, in
+which "war junk" and "auto-sinkers" were favorite terms.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Rasplata</span>, p. 426.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Having already accomplished almost the impossible, the armada of
+50 units on May 14 set forth on the last stage of its extraordinary
+cruise. Of three possible routes to Vladivostok&mdash;through the
+Tsugaru Strait between Nippon and Yezo, through the Strait of La
+Perouse north of Yezo, or through the Straits of Tsushima&mdash;the
+first was ruled out as too difficult of navigation; the second,
+because it would involve coaling off the coast of Japan. Tsushima
+remained. To avoid torpedo attack, the Russian admiral planned to
+pass the straits by day, and fully expected battle. But the hope
+lingered in his mind that fog or heavy weather might enable him to
+pass unscathed. He had been informed that owing to traffic conditions
+on the Siberian railway, he could get nothing at Vladivostok in the
+way of supplies. Hence, as a compromise measure which weakened
+fighting efficiency, he took along 3 auxiliary steamers, a repair
+ship, 2 tugs, and 2 hospital ships, the rest of the train on May
+25 entering Shanghai; and he so filled the bunkers and piled even
+the decks with fuel, according to Nebogatoff's later testimony,
+that they went into action burdened with coal for 3,000 miles.[2]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Mahan, <span class="sc">Naval Strategy</span>, p. 412.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 814px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig064.png" width="814" height="557" alt="Fig. 64">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCT. 18, 1904-MAY 27,
+  1905</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The main Russian fighting force entered the battle in three divisions
+of 4 ships each: (1) the <i>Suvaroff</i> (flagship), <i>Alexander
+III, Borodino</i> and <i>Orel</i>, each a new battleship of about
+13,600 tons; (2) the <i>Ossliabya</i>, a slightly smaller battleship,
+and three armored cruisers; (3) Nebogatoff's division as given above,
+with the exception of the cruiser. Then there was a squadron of
+4 smaller cruisers, 4 other cruisers as scouts, and 9 destroyers.
+The Japanese engaged in two main divisions of 6 ships each (4
+battleships and 8 armored cruisers), backed <a name="page_337"><span
+class="page">Page 337</span></a> <a name="page_338"><span
+class="page">Page 338</span></a> by four light cruiser divisions of
+4 ships each. The Russian line had the advantage in heavy ordnance,
+as will appear from the following table, but this was more than
+compensated for by the enemy's superiority in 8-inch guns and
+quick-firers, which covered the Russians with an overwhelming rain
+of shells. Of guns in broadside, the Japanese ships-of-the-line
+had 127 to 98; and the cruisers 89 to 43.
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center_btrb" rowspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" rowspan="2">Ships</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb" colspan="4"><span class="sc">
+      Main Batteries</span></td>
+    <td class="center_btb" colspan="2">Q.F.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center_brb">12&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">10&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">8&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">6&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">4&Prime;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Japan</td>
+    <td class="center_br">12</td>
+    <td class="center_br">16</td>
+    <td class="center_br">1</td>
+    <td class="center_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">30</td>
+    <td class="center_br">160</td>
+    <td class="center">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Russia</td>
+    <td class="center_br">12</td>
+    <td class="center_br">26</td>
+    <td class="center_br">15</td>
+    <td class="center_br">4</td>
+    <td class="center_br">3</td>
+    <td class="center_br">90</td>
+    <td class="center">20</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the basis of these figures, and the 50% superiority of the Japanese
+in speed, the issue could hardly be in doubt. Admiral Togo, moreover,
+had commanded his fleet in peace and war for 8 years, and had veteran
+subordinates on whom he could depend to lead their divisions
+independently yet in coordination with the general plan. Constant
+training and target practice had brought his crews to a high degree
+of skill. The Japanese shells were also superior, with fuses that
+detonated their charges on the slightest contact with an explosive
+force like that of mines. Between the enemy and their base, the
+Japanese could wait quietly in home waters, while the Russian fleet
+was worn out by its eight months' cruise. At best, the latter was
+a heterogeneous assemblage of new ships hastily completed and old
+ships indifferently put in repair, which since Nebogatoff joined
+had had but one opportunity for maneuvers and had operated as a
+unit for only 13 days.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the night of May 26-27, as the Russian ships approached Tsushima
+through mist and darkness, half the officers and men were at their
+posts, while the rest slept beside the guns. Fragments of wireless
+messages&mdash;"Last night" ... "nothing" ... "eleven lights" ... "but
+not in line"&mdash;revealed <a name="page_339"><span class="page">Page
+339</span></a> enemy patrols in the waters beyond. Semenoff on the
+<i>Suvaroff</i> describes vividly "the tall, somewhat bent figure
+of the Admiral on the side of the bridge, the wrinkled face of
+the man at the wheel stooping over the compass, the guns' crews
+chilled at their posts." In the brightly lighted engine-rooms, "life
+and movement was visible on all sides; men were nimbly running
+up and down ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and buzzing of
+voices; orders were being transmitted loudly; but, on looking more
+intently, the tension and anxiety&mdash;that same peculiar frame of
+mind so noticeable on deck&mdash;could also be observed."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Battle of Tsushima</span>, p.
+28.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Battle of Tsushima</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At dawn (4.45) the Japanese scout <i>Sinano Maru</i>, which for
+an hour or more had been following in the darkness, made them out
+clearly and communicated the intelligence at once to Togo in his
+base at Masampho Bay, on the Korean side of the straits, and to
+the cruiser divisions off the Tsushima Islands. This was apparently
+the first definite news that Togo had received for several days,
+and the fact suggests that his scouting arrangements were not above
+criticism, for it took fast steaming to get to the straits by noon.
+Cruiser divisions were soon circling towards the Russians through
+the mist and darting as swiftly away, first the 5th and 6th under
+Takeomi and Togo (son of the admiral), then the 3d under Dewa, all
+reporting the movements of the enemy fleet and shepherding it till
+the final action began. Troubled by their activity, Rojdestvensky
+made several shifts of formation, first placing his 1st and 2d
+divisions in one long column ahead of the 3d, then at 11.20 throwing
+the 1st division again to starboard, while the cruisers protected
+the auxiliaries which were steaming between the lines in the rear.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This was the disposition when, shortly after one o'clock, the Japanese
+main divisions appeared to northward about 7 miles distant, steaming
+on a westerly course across the enemy's bows. Since morning Togo
+had covered a distance of 90 miles. From <a name="page_340"><span
+class="page">Page 340</span></a> his signal yards fluttered the
+stirring message: "The fate of the empire depends upon to-day's
+battle. Let every man do his utmost." Ordering all his cruisers
+to circle to the Russian rear, and striking himself for their left
+flank, which at the moment was the weaker, Togo first turned southward
+as if to pass on opposite courses, and then at about two o'clock
+led his two divisions around to east-northeast, so as to "cross
+the T" upon the head of the enemy line.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 610px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig065.png" width="610" height="487" alt="Fig. 65">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<table style="width: 100%;">
+<tr><td colspan="6"><i>Japanese</i></td></tr>
+<tr><td rowspan="7" style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td colspan="2">I&nbsp;Division&nbsp;(Togo)</td>
+    <td rowspan="7" style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td colspan="2">II&nbsp;Division&nbsp;(Kamimura)</td></tr>
+<tr><td rowspan="6" style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>Mikasa, B.S.</td>
+    <td rowspan="6" style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>Idzumo</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Shikishima, B.S.</td><td>Iwate</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Asahi, B.S.</td><td>Adzumo</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Fuji, B.S.</td><td>Asama</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Nisshin, A.C.</td><td>Tokiwa</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Kasuga</td><td>Yakumo</td></tr>
+<tr><td colspan="6">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td colspan="6"><i>Russians</i></td></tr>
+<tr><td rowspan="5" style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td colspan="2">I&nbsp;Division</td>
+    <td rowspan="2" style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td colspan="2">II&nbsp;Division</td></tr>
+<tr><td rowspan="4" style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>Suvaroff</td>
+    <td style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>Ossliabya&nbsp;(flag)</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Alexander&nbsp;III</td><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Borodino</td>
+    <td style="width: 1em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td colspan="2">III&nbsp;Division</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Orel</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_341"><span class="page">Page 341</span></a> Just
+as Togo's flagship <i>Mikasa</i> straightened on her new course,
+nearly north of the <i>Suvaroff</i>, and 6400 yards distant, the
+<i>Suvaroff</i> opened fire. It has been suggested that at this
+critical moment the Russian admiral should have closed with the
+enemy, or, leading his ships on a northwesterly course, laid his
+starboard broadsides on the knuckle formed by the Japanese turn.
+But the position of the enemy cruisers and destroyers, and worry
+over his transports, guided his movements. Moreover, he had not
+yet completed an awkwardly executed maneuver to get his ships back
+into single column with the 1st division ahead. The <i>Ossliabya</i>
+and other ships of the 2d division were thrown into confusion, and
+forced to slow down and even stop engines. Under these difficulties,
+the <i>Suvaroff</i> sheered more to eastward. As they completed their
+turn the Japanese secured a "capping" position and could concentrate
+on the leading ships of both the 1st and the 2d Russian divisions,
+4 ships on the <i>Suvaroff</i> and 7 on the <i>Ossliabya</i>. Under
+this terrible fire the <i>Ossliabya</i> went down, the first modern
+battleship (in the narrow sense of the word) ever sunk by gunfire,
+and the <i>Suvaroff</i> a few moments later fell out of line, torn
+by shells, her forward funnel down, and steering gear jammed. "She
+was so battered," wrote a Japanese observer, "that scarcely any
+one would have taken her for a ship."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With an advantage in speed of 15 knots to 9, the Japanese drew
+ahead. The <i>Alexander</i>, followed by other Russian ships in
+much confusion, about three o'clock made an effort to pass northward
+across the enemy rear, but they were countered by the Japanese first
+division turning west together and the 2d division in succession at
+3.10. The first and decisive phase of the action thus ended. Both
+fleets eventually resumed easterly and then southerly courses,
+for considerable periods completely lost to each other in smoke
+and haze.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Plunging through heavy seas from the southwest, the Japanese cruisers
+had in the meantime punished the Russian rear less severely than
+might have been expected. Two transports went down in flames, two
+cruisers were badly damaged, and the high-sided ex-German liner
+<i>Ural</i> was punctured with shells. On the other hand, Dewa's
+flagship <i>Kasagi</i> was driven to port <a name="page_342"><span
+class="page">Page 342</span></a> with a bad hole under water, and
+Toga's old ship <i>Naniwa Kan</i> had to cease action for repairs.
+Hits and losses in fact were considerable in both the main and the
+cruiser divisions of the Japanese, their total casualties numbering
+465. Late in the afternoon the Russian destroyer <i>Buiny</i> came
+up to the wreck of the <i>Suvaroff</i>, and lurched alongside long
+enough for Rojdestvensky, wounded and almost unconscious, to be
+practically thrown on board. He was captured with the destroyer
+next day. In spite of her injuries, the <i>Suvaroff</i> held off
+a swarm of cruisers and destroyers until at last torpedoed at 7.20
+p. m.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Russian battleships had meanwhile described a large circle to
+southward, and at 5 p. m. were again steaming north, accompanied
+by some of their cruisers and train. Attacked once more between 6
+and 7 o'clock, and almost incapable of defense, the <i>Alexander
+III</i> and <i>Borodino</i> went down, making 4 ships lost out of
+the 5 new vessels that had formed the backbone of Rojdestvensky's
+forces. In the gathering darkness. Nebogatoff collected the survivors
+and staggered northward.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of slight value in the day engagement, 21 Japanese destroyers,
+with about 40 torpedo boats which had sheltered under Tsushima
+Island, now darted after the fleeing foe. In the fog and heavy
+weather they were almost as great a menace to each other as to the
+enemy. Russian ships without searchlights escaped harm. Of three
+or perhaps four Russian vessels struck, all but the <i>Navarin</i>
+stayed afloat until the next day. Admiral Custance estimates 8 hits,
+or 9% of the torpedoes fired. There were at least 6 collisions
+among the flotillas, and 4 boats destroyed.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the morning of the 28th the remains of the Russian fleet were
+scattered over the sea. Nebagatoff with 4 battleships and 2 cruisers
+surrendered at 10.30. Of the 37 ships all told that entered Tsushima
+Straits, only the following escaped: the cruisers <i>Oleg, Aurora</i>,
+and <i>Jemschug</i> reached Manila on June 3; a tug and a supply
+ship entered Shanghai, and another transport with plenty of coal
+went clear to Madagascar; only the fast cruiser <i>Almaz</i> and
+two destroyers made Vladivostok.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Among the lessons to be drawn from Tsushima, one of the <a
+name="page_343"><span class="page">Page 343</span></a> clearest is
+the weakening effect of divided purpose. With all honor to Admiral
+Rojdestvensky for his courage and persistence during his cruise,
+it is evident that at the end he allowed the supply problem to
+interfere with his preparations for battle, and that he fought
+"with one eye on Vladivostok." It is evident also that only by a
+long period of training and operating as a unit can a collection
+of ships and men be welded into an effective fighting force. Torpedo
+results throughout the war, whether due to faulty materials or
+unskilled employment, were not such as to increase the reliance upon
+this weapon. The gun retained its supremacy; and the demonstrated
+advantage conferred by speed and heavy armament in long range fighting
+was reflected in the "all-big-gun" <i>Dreadnought</i> of 1906 and
+the battle cruisers of 1908.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Immediately after the Russian navy had been swept out of existence,
+President Roosevelt offered to mediate, and received favorable replies
+from the warring nations. By the treaty signed at Portsmouth, New
+Hampshire, on September 5, 1905, Russia withdrew from Manchuria
+in favor of China, recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea
+(annexed by Japan in 1910), and surrendered to Japan her privileges
+in Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. In lieu of indemnity,
+Japan after a long deadlock was induced by pressure on the part
+of England and the United States to accept that portion of the
+island of Saghalien south of the parallel of 50&deg;. Thus the war
+thwarted Russia's policy of aggressive imperialism in the East,
+and established Japan firmly on the mainland at China's front door.
+At the same time, by the military d&eacute;b&acirc;cle of Russia,
+it dangerously disturbed the balance of power in Europe, upon which
+the safety of that continent had long been made precariously to
+depend.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Spanish-American War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Notes on the Spanish American War</span> (a series
+  of publications issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S.
+  Navy Department, 1900).</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<a name="page_344"><span class="page">Page 344</span></a>
+<span class="sc">Sampson-Schley Official Communications to the U. S.
+  Senate</span>, Gov't Printing Office, 1899.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Downfall of Spain</span>, H. W. Wilson, 1900.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">With Sampson Through the War</span>, W. A. M. Goode,
+  1899.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">A History of the Spanish-American War</span>, R. H.
+  Tetherington, 1900.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Russo-Japanese War</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">International Relations of the Chinese Empire</span>,
+  3 vols., H. B. Morse, 1918.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Battle of Tsushima</span> (1906),
+<span class="sc">Rasplata</span> (1910), Captain Vladimir Semenoff.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Japanese Official History</span>, translated in U. S.
+Naval Institute Proceedings, July-August, September-October, 1914.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Ship of the Line in Battle</span>, Admiral
+Reginald Custance, 1912.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War</span>,
+Captain N. Klado, 1905.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Official British History of the Russo-Japanese
+War</span>, 3 vols., 1910.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The American Merchant Marine</span>, Debaters'
+Handbook Series, N. Y., 1916 (with bibliography).</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_345"><span class="page">Page 345</span></a>
+CHAPTER XVI</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE WORLD WAR: THE FIRST YEAR (1914-1915)
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Russo-Japanese war greatly weakened Russia's position in Europe,
+and left the Dual Alliance of France and Russia overweighted by the
+military strength of the Teutonic Empires, Germany and Austria,
+whether or not Italy should adhere to the Triple Alliance with
+these nations. To Great Britain, such a disturbance of the European
+balance was ever a matter of grave concern, and an abandonment
+of her policy of isolation was in this instance virtually forced
+upon her by Germany's rivalry in her own special sphere of commerce
+and sea power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The disturbing effect of Germany's naval growth during the two
+decades prior to 1914 affords in fact an excellent illustration
+of the influence of naval strength in peace as well as in war.
+Under Bismarck Germany had pushed vigorously though tardily into
+the colonial field, securing vast areas of rather doubtful value
+in East and West Africa, and the Bismarck Archipelago, Marshall
+Islands, and part of New Guinea in the Pacific. With the accession
+of William II in 1888 and the dropping of the pilot, Bismarck,
+two years later, she embarked definitely upon her quest for world
+power. The young Kaiser read eagerly Mahan's <i>Influence of Sea
+Power Upon History</i> (1890), distributed it among the ships of
+his still embryonic navy, and fed his ambition on the doctrines
+of this epoch-making work.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Naval development found further stimulus and justification in the
+rapid economic growth of Germany. In 1912 her industrial production
+attained a value of three billion dollars, as compared with slightly
+over four billion for England and seven billion for the United
+States. Since 1893 her merchant marine had tripled in size and taken
+second place to that of England with a total of over five million
+tons. During the same <a name="page_346"><span class="page">Page
+346</span></a> period she surpassed France and the United States
+in volume of foreign commerce, and in this respect also reached a
+position second to Great Britain, with a more rapid rate of increase.
+An emigration of 220,000 a year in the early eighties was cut down
+to 22,000 in 1900.[1] To assure markets for her manufactures, and
+continued growth in population and industry, Germany felt that
+she must strive to extend her political power.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Figures from Priest, <span class="sc">Germany Since
+1840</span>, p. 150 ff.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though Germany's commercial expansion met slight opposition even
+in areas under British control, it undoubtedly justified measures
+of political and naval protection; and it was this motive that was
+advanced in the preface to the German Naval Bill of 1900, which
+declared that, "To protect her sea trade and colonies ... Germany
+must have a fleet so strong that a war, even with the greatest naval
+power, would involve such risks as to jeopardize the position of that
+power."[2] Furthermore, Germany's quest for colonies and points of
+vantage such as Kiao-chau, her scheme for a Berlin-Bagdad railroad
+with domination of the territories on the route, had parallel in
+the activities of other nations. Unfortunately, however, Germany's
+ambitions grew even more rapidly than her commerce, until her true
+aim appeared to be destruction of rivals and domination of the
+world.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: Hurd and Castle, <span class="sc">German Sea Power</span>,
+Appendix II.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The seizure of Kiao-chau in 1897-98 coincided with the appointment
+of Admiral von Tirpitz as Imperial Minister of Marine. Under his
+administration, the Naval Bill of 1900, passed in a heat of anglophobia
+aroused by the Boer War, doubled the program of 1898, and contained
+ingenious provisions by which the Reichstag was bound to steady
+increases covering a long period of years, and by which the Navy
+Department was empowered to replace worthless old craft, after 20
+or 25 years' service, with new ships of the largest size. As the
+armament race grew keener, this act was amended in the direction
+of further increases, but its program was never cut down.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+International crises and realignments marked the growing tension of
+these years. In 1905 England extended for ten <a name="page_347"><span
+class="page">Page 347</span></a> years her understanding with Japan. By
+the <i>Entente Cordiale</i> with France in 1904 and a later settlement
+of outstanding difficulties with Russia, she also practically changed
+the Dual Alliance into a Triple Entente, though without positively
+binding herself to assistance in war. To the agreement of 1904 by
+which England and France assured each other a free hand in Egypt and
+Morocco, respectively, the Kaiser raised strenuous objections, and
+forced the resignation of the anglophile French Foreign Minister,
+Delcass&eacute;; but at the Algeciras Convention of 1906, assembled
+to settle the Morocco question, Germany and Austria stood virtually
+alone. Even the American delegates, sent by President Roosevelt at
+the Kaiser's invitation, voted generally with the Western Powers.
+When Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909, the Kaiser
+shook the mailed fist to better effect than at Algeciras, with the
+result that Russia had to accept this extension of Austro-German
+influence in the Balkan sphere. Still again two years later, when
+the German cruiser <i>Panther</i> made moves to establish a base
+at Agadir on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Europe approached the
+verge of war; but Germany found the financial situation against
+her, backed down, and eventually took a strip of land on the Congo
+in liquidation of her Morocco claims.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For all her resolute saber-rattling in these years, Germany found
+herself checkmated in almost every move. The Monroe Doctrine, for
+which the United States showed willingness to fight in the Venezuela
+affair of 1902, balked her schemes in the New World. In the Far
+East she faced Japan; in Africa, British sea power. A "<i>Drang
+nach Osten</i>," through the Balkans and Turkey toward Asia Minor,
+offered on the whole the best promise; and it was in this quarter
+that Austria's violent demands upon Serbia aroused Russia and
+precipitated the World War.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Great Britain's foreign agreements, already noted, had as a primary
+aim the concentration of her fleet in home waters. Naval predominance
+in the Far East she turned over to Japan; in the western Atlantic,
+to the United States (at least by acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine
+and surrender of treaty <a name="page_348"><span class="page">Page
+348</span></a> rights to share in the construction of the Panama
+Canal); and in the Mediterranean, to France, though England still
+kept a strong cruiser force in this field. The old policy of showing
+the flag all over the world was abandoned, 160 old ships were sent
+to the scrap heap as unable "either to fight or to run away," and
+88% of the fleet was concentrated at home, so quietly that it "was
+found out only by accident by Admiral Mahan."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Admiral Fisher, <span class="sc">Memories</span>, p.
+185.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+These and other changes were carried out under the energetic
+r&eacute;gime of Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910.
+The British <i>Dreadnought</i> of 1906, completed in 10 months, and
+the battle cruisers of 1908&mdash;<i>Indefatigable, Invincible</i>
+and <i>Indomitable</i>&mdash;came as an unpleasant surprise to
+Germany, necessitating construction of similar types and enlargement
+of the Kiel Canal. Reforms in naval gunnery urged by Admiral Sir
+Percy Scott were taken up, and plans were made for new bases in the
+Humber, in the Forth at Rosyth, and in the Orkneys, necessitated by
+the shift of front from the Channel to the North Sea. But against the
+technical skill, painstaking organization, and definitely aggressive
+purpose of Germany, even more radical measures were needed to put
+the tradition-ridden British navy in readiness for war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Naval preparedness was vital, for the conflict was fundamentally,
+like the Napoleonic Wars, a struggle between land power predominant
+on the Continent and naval power supreme on the seas. As compared
+with France in the earlier struggle, Germany was more dependent
+on foreign commerce, and in a long war would feel more keenly the
+pressure of blockade. On the other hand, while the naval preponderance
+of England and her allies was probably greater than 100 years before,
+England had to throw larger armies into the field and more of her
+shipping into naval service, and found her commerce not augmented
+but cut down.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Indeed, Germany was not without advantage in the naval war. As she
+fully expected, her direct sea trade was soon shut off, and her
+shipping was driven to cover or destroyed. But Germany was perhaps
+80% self-supporting, was well supplied <a name="page_349"><span
+class="page">Page 349</span></a> with minerals and munitions, and
+could count on trade through neutral states on her frontiers. Her
+shallow, well-protected North Sea coast-line gave her immunity
+from naval attack and opportunity to choose the moment in which
+to throw her utmost strength into a sortie. So long as her fleet
+remained intact, it controlled the Baltic by virtue of an interior
+line through the Kiel Canal, thus providing a strangle hold on
+Russia and free access to northern neutrals. Only by dangerous
+division of forces, or by leaving the road to England and the Atlantic
+open, could the British fleet enter the Baltic Sea. England it is
+true had a superior navy (perhaps less superior than was commonly
+thought), and a position of singular advantage between Germany and
+the overseas world. But for her the maintenance of naval superiority
+was absolutely essential. An effective interference with her sea
+communications would quickly put her out of the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The importance (for Germany as well as for England) of preserving
+their main fighting fleets, may explain the wariness with which
+they were employed. Instead of risking them desperately, both sides
+turned to commerce warfare&mdash;the Western Powers resorting to
+blockade and the Germans to submarines. Each of these forms of
+warfare played a highly important part in the war, and the submarine
+campaign in particular, calling for new methods and new instruments,
+seems almost to have monopolized the naval genius and energies of
+the two groups of belligerents. It may be noted, however, that but
+for the cover given by the High Seas Fleet, the submarine campaign
+could hardly have been undertaken; and but for the Grand Fleet, it
+would have been unnecessary.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The naval strength of the various belligerents in July, 1914, appears
+in the table on the following page.[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: From table prepared by U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence,
+July 1, 1916.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center_btrb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Great Britain</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Ger- many</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">U.S. (1916)</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">France</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Japan</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Russia</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Italy</td>
+    <td class="center_btb">Austria</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Dreadnoughts</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">20</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">13</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">12</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">4</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">2</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">..</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">3</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">3</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Pre-dreadn'ts</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">40</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">20</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">21</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">18</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">13</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">7</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">8</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">6</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Battle&nbsp;Cruisers</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">9</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">4</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">..</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">..</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">2</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">..</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">..</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">..</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Armored&nbsp;Cr's</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">34</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">9</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">10</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">20</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">13</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">6</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">9</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">2</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Cruisers</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">74</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">41</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">14</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">9</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">13</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">9</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">6</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">5</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Destroyers</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">167</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">130</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">54</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">84</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">50</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">91</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">36</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">18</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Submarines</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">78</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">30</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">44</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">64</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">13</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">30</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">19</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">6</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Owing to new construction, these figures underwent rapid change.
+Thus England added 4 dreadnoughts (2 built for Turkey) in August,
+1914; the battle cruiser <i>Tiger</i> in November; the dreadnought
+<i>Canada</i> and 5 <i>Queen Elizabeths</i> in 1915; and 5 <i>Royal
+Sovereigns</i> in 1915-1916. In comparisons, full account is not
+always taken of the naval support of England's <a name="page_350"><span
+class="page">Page 350</span></a> allies; it is true, however, that
+the necessity of protecting coasts, troop convoys, and commerce
+prevented her from throwing her full strength into the North Sea.
+Her capital ships were in two main divisions&mdash;the 1st or Grand
+Fleet in the Orkneys, and the 2d fleet, consisting at first of 16
+pre-dreadnoughts, in the Channel. Admiral Jellico[1] gives the
+strength of the Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, on
+August 4, 1914, as follows:
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Grand Fleet</span>, p. 31.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center_btrb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Dread- noughts</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Pre- Dread- noughts</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Battle cruisers</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Light cruisers</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Destroyers</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Airships</td>
+    <td class="center_btb">Cruisers</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">British</td>
+    <td class="center_br">20</td>
+    <td class="center_br">8</td>
+    <td class="center_br">4</td>
+    <td class="center_br">12</td>
+    <td class="center_br">42</td>
+    <td class="center_br">..</td>
+    <td class="center">0</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">German</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">13</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">16</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">3</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">15</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">88</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">1</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">2</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of submarines, according to the same authority, England had 17 of
+the D and E classes fit for distant operations, and 37 fit only for
+coast defense, while Germany had 28 U boats, all but two or three of
+which were able to cruise overseas. The British admiral's account of
+the inferiority of the British navy in submarines, aircraft, mines,
+destroyers, director firing (installed in only 8 ships in 1914),
+armor-piercing shells, and <a name="page_351"><span class="page">Page
+351</span></a> protection of bases, seems to justify the caution
+of British operations, but is a severe indictment of the manner
+in which money appropriated for the navy was used.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+To open a war with England by surprise naval attack was no doubt
+an element in German plans; but in 1914 this was negatived by the
+forewarning of events on the Continent, by Germany's persistent delusion
+that England would stay neutral, and by the timely mobilization of
+the British fleet. This had been announced the winter before as
+a practical exercise, was carried out according to schedule from
+July 16 to July 23 (the date of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia),
+and was then extended until July 29, at which date the Grand Fleet
+sailed for Scapa Flow.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At midnight of August 4 the British ultimatum to Germany expired
+and hostilities began. During the same night the Grand Fleet swept
+the northern exit of the North Sea to prevent the escape of enemy
+raiders, only one of which, the <i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i>,
+actually reached the Atlantic in this first stage of the war. On a
+similar sweep further south, the Harwich light cruiser and destroyer
+force under Commodore Tyrwhitt sank by gunfire the mine layer
+<i>K&ouml;nigin Luise</i>, which a trawler had reported "throwing
+things overboard"; but the next morning, August 6, the cruiser
+<i>Amphion</i>, returning near the same position, was destroyed by
+two mines laid by her victim of the day before. On the same date
+five cables were cut leading from Germany overseas. From August
+10 to 23 all British forces were busy covering the transit of the
+first troops sent to the Continent. Such, in brief summary, and
+omitting more distant activities for the present, were the opening
+naval events of the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Heligoland Bight Action</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the morning of August 28 occurred a lively action in Heligoland
+Bight, which cost Germany 3 light cruisers and a destroyer, and
+seemed to promise further aggressive action off the German shores.
+The British plan called for a destroyer and light cruiser sweep
+southward to a point about 12 miles <a name="page_352"><span
+class="page">Page 352</span></a> west of Heligoland, and thence
+westward, with submarines disposed off Heligoland as decoys, the
+object being to cut off German destroyers and patrols. Commodore
+Tyrwhitt's force which was to execute the raid consisted of the
+1st and 3rd flotillas of 16 destroyers each, led by the new light
+cruiser <i>Arethusa</i>, flagship (28.5 knots, two 6", six 4" guns),
+and the <i>Fearless</i> (25-4 knots, ten 4" guns). These were to be
+supported about 50 miles to westward by two battle cruisers from
+the Humber. This supporting force was at the last moment joined
+by three battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty and 6 cruisers under
+Commodore Goodenough from the Grand Fleet; but news of the accession
+never reached Commodore Keyes of the British submarines, who was
+hence puzzled later by the appearance of Goodenough's cruisers
+on the scene.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 457px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig066.png" width="457" height="313" alt="Fig. 66">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, AUG. 28, 1914</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Germans, it appears, had got wind of the enemy plan, and arranged
+a somewhat similar counter-stroke. As Commodore Tyrwhitt's flotillas
+swept southward, they engaged and chased 10 German destroyers straight
+down upon Heligoland. Here the <i>Arethusa</i> and the <i>Fearless</i>
+were sharply engaged with two German light cruisers, the <i>Stettin</i>,
+and the <i>Frauenlob</i> (ten 4.1" guns each), until actually in sight
+of the island. Both sides suffered, the <i>Frauenlob</i> withdrawing
+to <a name="page_353"><span class="page">Page 353</span></a>
+Wilhelmshaven with 50 casualties, and the <i>Arethusa</i> having
+her speed cut down and nearly every gun put temporarily out of
+commission.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Whipping around to westward, the flotillas caught the German destroyer
+<i>V 187</i>, which at 9.10, after an obstinate resistance, was reduced
+to a complete wreck enveloped in smoke and steam. As British destroyers
+picked up survivors, they were driven off by the <i>Stettin</i>;
+but two boats with British crews and German prisoners were rescued
+later by the British submarine <i>E 4</i>, which had been lurking
+nearby.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Extraordinary confusion now developed from the fact that Commodore
+Keyes in his submarine flotilla leader <i>Lurcher</i> sighted through
+the mist two of Goodenough's cruisers (which had chased a destroyer
+eastward), and reported them as enemies. The call was picked up
+by Goodenough himself, who brought his remaining four ships to
+Keyes' assistance; but when these appeared, Keyes thought that
+he had to deal with four enemies more! Tyrwhitt was also drawn
+backward by the alarm. Luckily the situation was cleared up without
+serious consequences.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+German cruisers, darting out of the Ems and the Jade, were now entering
+the fray. At 10.55 the <i>Fearless</i> and the <i>Arethusa</i> with
+their flotillas were attacked by the <i>Stralsund</i>, which under a
+heavy fire made off toward Heligoland. Then at 11.15 the <i>Stettin</i>
+engaged once more, and five minutes later the <i>Mainz</i>. Just
+as this last ship was being finished up by destroyer attack, and
+the <i>Stettin</i> and two fresh cruisers, <i>K&ouml;ln</i> and
+<i>Ariadne</i>, were rushing to her assistance, Beatty's five battle
+cruisers appeared to westward and rose swiftly out of the haze.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Admiral Beatty's opportune dash into action at this time, from
+his position 40 miles away, was in response to an urgent call from
+Tyrwhitt at 11.15, coupled with the fact that, as the Admiral states
+in his report, "The flotillas had advanced only 2 miles since 8
+a.m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases." "Our high
+speed," the report continues, "made submarine attack difficult,
+and the smoothness of the <a name="page_354"><span class="page">Page
+354</span></a> sea made their detection fairly easy. I considered
+that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie except by a
+battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided
+our stroke was sufficiently rapid."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The <i>Stettin</i> broke backward just in the nick of time. The
+<i>K&ouml;ln</i> flagship of the German commodore, was soon staggering
+off in a blaze, and was later sunk with her total complement of
+380 officers and men. The <i>Ariadne</i>, steaming at high speed
+across the bows of the British flagship <i>Lion</i>, was put out
+of action by two well-placed salvos. At 1.10 the <i>Lion</i> gave
+the general signal "Retire."
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 555px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig067.png" width="555" height="349" alt="Fig. 67">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE,
+  12:30-1:40</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">From 20 to 40 miles slightly S. of W.
+  from Heligoland.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Though the German cruisers had fought hard and with remarkable
+accuracy of fire, their movements had been tardy and not well concerted.
+The British losses amounted altogether to only 33 killed and 40
+wounded; while the enemy lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners
+over 1000 men. Very satisfactory, from the British standpoint, was
+the effect of the victory upon their own and upon enemy morale.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Encouragement of this kind was desirable, for German submarines <a
+name="page_355"><span class="page">Page 355</span></a> and mines
+were already beginning to take their toll. Off the Forth on September
+5, a single torpedo sank the light cruiser <i>Pathfinder</i> with
+nearly all hands. This loss was avenged when a week later the <i>E
+9</i>, under Lieut. Commander Max Harton, struck down the German
+cruiser <i>Hela</i> within 6 miles of Heligoland. But on September
+22, at 6.30 a.m., a single old-type German craft, the <i>U 9</i>,
+dealt a staggering blow. With a total of 6 torpedoes Commander
+Weddigen sank first the <i>Aboukir</i>, and then in quick succession
+the <i>Hogue</i> and the <i>Cressy</i>, both dead in the water at
+the work of rescue. The loss of these rather antiquated vessels
+was less serious than that of over 1400 trained officers and men.
+A shock to British traditions came with the new order that ships
+must abandon injured consorts and make all speed away.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, which at the outbreak of
+war were totally unprotected against submarines and thought to
+be beyond their reach, the Grand Fleet felt less secure than when
+cruising on the open sea. Safer refuges were sought temporarily
+on the west coast of Scotland and at Lough Swilly in the north
+of Ireland, but even off this latter base on October 27, the big
+dreadnought <i>Audacious</i> was sunk by mines laid by the German
+auxiliary cruiser <i>Berlin</i>. In view of the impending Turkish
+crisis, the loss was not admitted by the Admiralty, though since
+pictures of the sinking ship had actually been taken by passengers
+on the White Star liner <i>Olympic</i>, it could not long remain
+concealed. Mines and submarines had seemingly put the British navy
+on the defensive, even if consolation could be drawn from the fact
+that troops and supplies were crossing safely to France, the enemy
+had been held up at the Marne, the German surface fleet was passive,
+and the blockade was closing down.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Escape of the "G&ouml;ben" and the "Breslau"</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In distant waters Germany at the outbreak of the war had only ten
+cruisers&mdash;<i>Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, N&uuml;rnberg</i>,
+and <i>Leipzig</i> in the Pacific, <i>K&ouml;nigsberg</i> on the east
+coast of Africa, <i>Karlsruhe</i> and <i>Dresden</i> in the West
+Indies, and <a name="page_356"><span class="page">Page 356</span></a>
+<i>G&ouml;ben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> in the Mediterranean. Within
+six months' time, these, together with a few auxiliary cruisers
+fitted out abroad, were either destroyed or forced to intern in
+neutral ports. Modern wireless communication, difficulties of coaling
+and supply, and the overwhelming naval strength of the Allies made
+the task of surface raiders far more difficult than in previous
+wars. They were nevertheless skillfully handled, and, operating in
+the wide ocean areas, created a troublesome problem for the Western
+Powers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The battle cruiser <i>G&ouml;ben</i> and the light cruiser
+<i>Breslau</i> alone, operating under Admiral Souchon in Mediterranean
+waters, accomplished ultimate results which would have easily justified
+the sacrifice of ten times the number of ships lost by Germany in
+distant seas. To hunt down these two vessels, and at the same time
+contain the Austrian Navy, the Entente had in the Mediterranean
+not only the bulk of the French fleet but also 3 battle cruisers,
+4 armored cruisers, and 4 light cruisers of Great Britain. Early
+on August 4, as he was about to bombard the French bases of Bona
+and Philippeville in Algiers, Admiral Souchon received wireless
+orders to make for the Dardanelles. Germany and England were then on
+the very verge of war. Knowing the British ships to be concentrated
+near Malta, and actually passing the <i>Indomitable</i> and the
+<i>Invincible</i> in sullen silence as he turned eastward, the
+German commander decided to put in at Messina, Sicily.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the end of the 24 hours granted in this port, the prospects
+for the German ships appeared so desperate that the officers, it
+is said, made their final testaments before again putting to sea.
+Slipping eastward through the Straits of Messina at twilight of
+the 6th, they were sighted by the British scout <i>Gloucester</i>,
+which stuck close at their heels all that night and until 4.40 p.m.
+the next day. Then, under orders to turn back, and after boldly
+engaging the <i>Breslau</i> to check the flight, Captain Kelly of
+the <i>Gloucester</i> gave up the pursuit as the enemy rounded
+the Morea and entered the Greek Archipelago.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The escape thus apparently so easy was the outcome of lack of
+co&ouml;rdination between French and British, slow and poor <a
+name="page_357"><span class="page">Page 357</span></a> information
+from the British Admiralty, and questionable disposition of the
+British forces on the basis of information actually at hand. Prior
+to hostilities, it was perhaps unavoidable that the British commander,
+Admiral Milne, should be ignorant of French plans; but even on August
+5 and 6 he still kept all his battle cruisers west and north of
+Sicily to protect the French troop transports, though by this time
+he might have felt assured that the French fleet was at sea. At
+the time of the escape Admiral Troubridge with 4 armored cruisers
+and a destroyer force barred the Adriatic; though he caught the
+<i>Gloucester's</i> calls, he was justified in not moving far from
+his station without orders, in view of his inferior strength and
+speed. Not until August 10 did British forces enter the &AElig;gean;
+and at 5 p.m. that day the two German ships steamed uninvited up
+the Dardanelles. Since the Turkish situation was still somewhat
+dubious, Admiral Souchon had been ordered to delay his entrance; but
+on the 10th, hearing British wireless signals steadily approaching
+his position in the Greek islands, he took the decision into his
+own hands. Germany had "captured Turkey," as an Allied diplomat
+remarked upon seeing the ships in the Golden Horn.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In this affair the British, it is true, had many
+preoccupations&mdash;the hostile Austrian fleet, the doubtful neutrality
+of Italy, the French troop movement; the safety of Egypt and Suez.
+Yet the Admiralty were well aware that the German Ambassador von
+Wangenheim was dominant in Turkish councils and that the Turkish army
+was mobilized under German officers. It seems strange, therefore,
+that an escape into Constantinople was, in the words of the British
+Official History, "the only one that had not entered into our
+calculations." The whole affair illustrates the immense value political
+information may have in guiding naval strategy. The German ships,
+though ostensibly "sold" to the Turks, retained their German personnel.
+Admiral Souchon assumed command of the Turkish Navy, and by an
+attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea later succeeded in
+precipitating Turkey's entrance into the war, with its long train
+of evil consequences for the Western Powers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_358"><span class="page">Page 358</span></a>
+<i>Coronel and the Falkland Islands</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the Pacific the German cruisers were at first widely scattered,
+the <i>Emden</i> at Kiao-chau, the <i>Leipzig</i> on the west coast
+of Mexico, the <i>N&uuml;rnberg</i> at San Francisco, and the armored
+cruisers <i>Gneisenau</i> and <i>Scharnhorst</i> under Admiral von
+Spee in the Caroline Islands. The two ships at the latter point,
+after being joined by the <i>N&uuml;rnberg</i>, set out on a leisurely
+cruise for South America, where, in view of Japan's entry into
+the war, the German Admiral may have felt that he would secure a
+clearer field of operations and, with the aid of German-Americans,
+better facilities for supplies. After wrecking on their way the
+British wireless and cable station at Fanning Island, and looking
+into Samoa for stray British cruisers, the trio of ships were joined
+at Easter Island on October 14 by the <i>Leipzig</i> and also by
+the <i>Dresden</i>, which had fled thither from the West Indies.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The concentration thus resulting seems of doubtful wisdom, for,
+scattered over the trade routes, the cruisers would have brought
+about greater enemy dispersion and greater injury to commerce; and,
+as the later course of the war was to show, the loss of merchant
+tonnage was even more serious for the Entente than loss of fighting
+ships. It seems evident, however, that Admiral van Spee was not
+attracted by the tame task of commerce destroying, but wished to
+try his gunnery, highly developed in the calm waters of the Far
+East, against enemy men-of-war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In its present strength and position, the German "fleet in being"
+constituted a serious menace, for to assemble an adequate force
+against it on either side of Cape Horn would mean to leave the
+other side dangerously exposed. It was with a keen realization of
+this dilemma that Admiral Cradock in the British armored cruiser
+<i>Good Hope</i> left the Falklands on October 22 to join the
+<i>Monmouth, Glasgow</i>, and auxiliary cruiser <i>Otranto</i> in
+a sweep along the west coast. The old battleship <i>Canopus</i>,
+with 12-inch guns, but only 12 knots cruising speed, was properly
+judged too slow to keep with the squadron. It is difficult to say
+whether the failure to send <a name="page_359"><span class="page">Page
+359</span></a> Cradock re&euml;nforcements at this time from either
+the Atlantic or the Pacific was justified by the preoccupations in
+those fields. Needless to say, there was no hesitation, <i>after</i>
+Coronel, in hurrying ships to the scene. On November 1, when the
+Admiralty Board was reorganized with Admiral Fisher in his old
+place as First Sea Lord, orders at once went out sending the
+<i>Defense</i> to Cradock and enjoining him not to fight without
+the <i>Canopus</i>. But these orders he never received.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The composition of the two squadrons now approaching each other
+off the Chilean coast was as follows:
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center_btrb">Name</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Type</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Displace-<br>ment</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Belt armor</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_btb">Speed</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Scharnhorst</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Armored&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_br">11,600</td>
+    <td class="left_br">6-inch</td>
+    <td class="left_br">8-8.2&Prime;,&nbsp;6-6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.5</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Gneisenau</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Armored&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_br">11,600</td>
+    <td class="left_br">6-inch</td>
+    <td class="left_br">8-8.2&Prime;,&nbsp;6-6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.5</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Leipzig</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Protected&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_br">3,250</td>
+    <td class="left_br">none</td>
+    <td class="left_br">10-4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">N&uuml;rnberg</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Light&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_br">3,450</td>
+    <td class="left_br">none</td>
+    <td class="left_br">10-4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>24</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Dresden</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Light&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">3,600</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">none</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">10-4&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_bb">24</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Good&nbsp;Hope</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Armored&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_br">14,000</td>
+    <td class="left_br">6-inch</td>
+    <td class="left_br">
+      2-9.2&Prime;,&nbsp;16-6&Prime;,&nbsp;14-3&Prime;</td>
+    <td>24</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Monmouth</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Armored&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_br">9,800</td>
+    <td class="left_br">4-inch</td>
+    <td class="left_br">14-6&Prime;,&nbsp;8-3&Prime;</td>
+    <td>24</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Glasgow</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Light&nbsp;cruiser</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">4,800</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">none</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">2-6&Prime;,&nbsp;10-4&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_bb">26.5</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Canopus (not&nbsp;engaged)</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">Coast&nbsp;defense</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">12,950</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">6-inch</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">4-35 cal. 12&Prime;,&nbsp;12-6&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_bb">16.5</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Without the <i>Canopus</i>, the British had perhaps a slight advantage
+in squadron speed, but only the two 9.2-inch guns of the <i>Good
+Hope</i> could match the sixteen 8.2-inch guns of the Germans. Each
+side had information of the other's strength; but on the afternoon
+of November 1, the date of the Battle of Coronel, each supposed
+that only one enemy cruiser was in the immediate vicinity. Hence
+there was mutual surprise when the two squadrons, spread widely
+on opposite courses, came in contact at 4.40 p. m.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+While concentrating and forming his squadron, Admiral Cradock must
+have pondered whether he should fight or retreat. The <i>Canopus</i>
+he knew was laboring northward 250 miles away. It was highly doubtful
+whether he could bring the enemy into action later with his slow
+battleship in line. His orders were to "search and protect trade."
+"Safety," we <a name="page_360"><span class="page">Page 360</span></a>
+are told, "was a word he hardly knew." But his best justification
+lay in the enemy's menace to commerce and in the comment of Nelson
+upon a similar situation, "By the time the enemy has beat our fleet
+soundly, they will do us no more harm that year." It was perhaps with
+this thought that Admiral Cradock signaled to the <i>Canopus</i>,
+"I am going to fight the enemy now."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At about 6 p.m. the two columns were 18,000 yards distant on southerly
+converging courses. The British, to westward and slightly ahead, tried
+to force the action before sunset, when they would be silhouetted
+against the afterglow. Their speed at this time, however, seems to
+have been held up by the auxiliary cruiser <i>Otranto</i>, which
+later retreated southwestward, and their efforts to close were
+thwarted by the enemy's turning slightly away. Admiral von Spee
+in fact secured every advantage of position, between the British
+and the neutral coast, on the side away from the sun, and on such
+a course that the heavy seas from east of south struck the British
+ships on their engaged bows, showering the batteries with spray
+and rendering useless the lower deck guns.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 7 o'clock the German ships opened fire at 11,260 yards. The third
+salvo from the <i>Scharnhorst</i> disabled the <i>Good Hope's</i>
+forward 9.2-inch gun. The <i>Monmouth's</i> forecastle was soon
+on fire. It seems probable indeed that most of the injury to the
+British was inflicted by accurate shooting in this first stage of
+the action. On account of the gathering darkness, Admiral von Spee
+allowed the range to be closed to about 5500 yards, guiding his aim
+at first by the blaze on the Monmouth, and then for a time ceasing
+fire. Shortly before 8 o'clock a huge column of flame shooting up
+between the stacks of the <i>Good Hope</i> marked her end. The
+<i>Monmouth</i> sheered away to westward and then northward with a
+heavy list that prevented the use of her port guns. An hour later,
+at 9.25, with her flag still flying defiantly, she was sunk by the
+<i>N&uuml;rnberg</i> at point blank range. The <i>Glasgow</i>,
+which had fought throughout the action, but had suffered little from
+the fire of the German light cruisers, escaped in the darkness.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 485px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig068.png" width="485" height="748" alt="Fig. 68">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right">From <i>Official British Naval History</i>,
+  Vol. I.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOV. 1, 1914</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"It is difficult," writes an American officer, "to find fault <a
+name="page_361"><span class="page">Page 361</span></a><a
+name="page_362"><span class="page">Page 362</span></a> with the
+tactics of Admiral van Spee; he appears to have maneuvered so as
+to secure the advantage of light, wind, and sea, and to have suited
+himself as regards the range."[1] The <i>Scharnhorst</i> was hit
+twice, the <i>Gneisenau</i> four times, and the German casualties
+were only two men wounded.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Commander C. C. Gill, <span class="sc">Naval Power
+in the War</span>, p. 51.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 419px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig069.png" width="419" height="508" alt="Fig. 69">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This stinging blow and the resultant danger aroused the new Board
+of Admiralty to energetic moves. Entering the Atlantic, the German
+squadron might scatter upon the trade routes or support the rebellion
+in South Africa. Again, it might double westward or northward in the
+Pacific, or pass in groups of three, as permitted by American rules,
+through the Panama Canal into the West Indies. Concerted measures <a
+name="page_363"><span class="page">Page 363</span></a> were taken
+against these possibilities. Despite the weakening of the Grand
+Fleet, the battle cruisers <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i>
+under Admiral Sturdee, former Chief of Admiralty Staff, sailed on
+November 11 for the Falkland Islands. Their destination was kept
+a close secret, for had the slightest inkling of their mission
+reached German ears it would at once have been communicated to von
+Spee.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After the battle, the German admiral moved slowly southward, coaling
+from chartered vessels and prizes; and it was not until December
+1 that he rounded the Horn. Even now, had he moved directly upon
+the Falklands, he would have encountered only the <i>Canopus</i>,
+but he again delayed several days to take coal from a prize. On
+December 7 the British battle cruisers and other ships picked up
+in passage arrived at the island base and at once began to coal.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Their coming was not a moment too soon. At 7.30 the next morning,
+while coaling was still in progress and fires were drawn in the
+<i>Bristol</i>, the signal station on the neck of land south of
+the harbor reported two strange vessels, which proved to be the
+<i>Gneisenau</i> and the <i>N&uuml;rnberg</i>, approaching from
+the southward. As they eased down to demolish the wireless station,
+the <i>Canopus</i> opened on them at about 11,000 yards by indirect
+fire. The two ships swerved off, and at 9.40, perceiving the dense
+clouds of smoke over the harbor and what appeared to be tripod
+masts, they fell back on their main force.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Hull down, and with about 15 miles' start, the Germans, had they
+scattered at this time might, most of them at least, have escaped,
+as they certainly would have if their approach had been made more
+cautiously and at a later period in the day. The British ships
+were now out, with the fast <i>Glasgow</i> well in the lead. In
+the chase that followed, Admiral van Spee checked speed somewhat
+to keep his squadron together. Though Admiral Sturdee for a time
+did the same, he was able at 12.50 to open on the rear ship
+<i>Leipzig</i> at 16,000 yards. At 1.20 the German light cruisers
+scattered to southwestward, followed by the <i>Cornwall, Kent</i>,
+and <i>Glasgow</i>. The 26-knot <i>Bristol</i>, had she been able to
+work up steam in time, would <a name="page_364"><span class="page">Page
+364</span></a> have been invaluable in this pursuit; she was sent
+instead to destroy three enemy colliers or transports reported
+off the islands.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Between the larger ships the action continued at long range, for
+the superior speed of the battle cruisers enabled Admiral Sturdee
+to choose his distance, and his proper concern was to demolish the
+enemy with his own ships unscathed. At 2.05 he turned 8 points
+to starboard to clear the smoke blown down from the northwest and
+reduce the range, which had increased to 16,000 yards. Admiral
+von Spee also turned southward, and the stern chase was renewed
+without firing until 2.45. At this point both sides turned to port,
+the Germans now slightly in the rear and working in to 12,500 yards
+to use their 5.9-inch guns.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 3.15 the British came completely about to avoid the smoke, and
+the Germans also turned, a little later, as if to cross their bows.
+(See diagram.) The <i>Gneisenau</i> and <i>Scharnhorst</i>, though
+fighting gamely, were now beaten ships, the latter with upper works
+a "shambles of torn and twisted iron," and holes in her sides through
+which could be seen the red glow of flames. She turned on her beam-ends
+at 4.17 and sank with every man an board. At 6 o'clock, after a
+fight of extraordinary persistence, the <i>Gneisenau</i> opened
+her sea-cocks and went down. All her 8-inch ammunition had been
+expended, and 600 of her 850 men were disabled or killed. Some
+200 were saved.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Against ships with 12-inch guns and four times their weight of
+broadside the <i>Gneisenau</i> and <i>Scharnhorst</i> made a creditable
+record of over 20 hits. The British, however, suffered no casualties or
+material injury. While Admiral Sturdee's tactics are thus justified,
+the prolongation of the battle left him no time to join in the light
+cruiser chase, and even opened the possibility, in the rain squalls
+of the late afternoon, that one of the armored cruisers might get
+away. In spite of a calm sea and excellent visibility during most
+of the action, the gunnery of the battle cruisers appears to have
+been less accurate at long range than in the later engagement off
+the Dogger Bank.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 559px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig070.png" width="559" height="608" alt="Fig. 70">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right">From <i>Official British Naval History</i>,
+  Vol. I.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, DEC. 8,
+  1914</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">
+ <table class="data" style="text-align: left;">
+ <tr><td class="center" colspan="4"><i>British&nbsp;Squadron</i></td></tr>
+ <tr><td class="center"><i>Name</i></td>
+    <td class="center"><i>Type</i></td>
+    <td class="center"><i>Guns</i></td>
+    <td class="center"><i>Speed</i></td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Invincible</td>
+    <td>Battle&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>8&ndash;12&Prime;,&nbsp;16&ndash;4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>26.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Inflexible</td>
+    <td>Battle&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>8&ndash;12&Prime;,&nbsp;16&ndash;4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>26.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Carnarvon</td>
+    <td>Armored&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>4&ndash;7.5&Prime;,&nbsp;6&ndash;6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.0</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Cornwall</td>
+    <td>Armored&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>14&ndash;6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Kent</td>
+    <td>Armored&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>14&ndash;6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.0</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Bristol</td>
+    <td>Scout&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>2&ndash;6&Prime;,&nbsp;10&ndash;4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>26.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Glasgow</td>
+    <td>Scout&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>2&ndash;6&Prime;,&nbsp;10&ndash;4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>26.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Canopus</td>
+    <td>Coast&nbsp;Defense</td>
+    <td>4&ndash;12&Prime;,&nbsp;12&ndash;6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>16.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td colspan="4">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+ <tr><td class="center" colspan="4"><i>German&nbsp;Squadron</i></td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Scharnhorst</td>
+    <td>Armored&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>8&ndash;8.2&Prime;,&nbsp;6&ndash;6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Gneisenau</td>
+    <td>Armored&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>8&ndash;8.2&Prime;,&nbsp;6&ndash;6&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.5</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>Leipzig</td>
+    <td>Protected&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>10&ndash;4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>23.0</td></tr>
+ <tr><td>N&uuml;rnberg</td>
+    <td>Scout&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>10&ndash;4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>24.0</td>
+ <tr><td>Dresden</td>
+    <td>Scout&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>10&ndash;4&Prime;</td>
+    <td>24.0</td></tr>
+ </table>
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Following similar tactics, the <i>Glasgow</i> and <i>Cornwall</i>
+overtook <a name="page_365"><span class="page">Page 365</span></a><a
+name="page_366"><span class="page">Page 366</span></a>
+and finally silenced the <i>Leipzig</i> at 7 p.m., four hours after
+the <i>Glasgow</i> had first opened fire. Defiant to the last, like
+the <i>Monmouth</i> at Coronel, and with her ammunition gone, she
+sank at 9.25, carrying down all but 18 of her officers and crew.
+The <i>Kent</i>, stoking all her woodwork to increase steam, attained
+at 5 o'clock a position 12,000 yards from the <i>N&uuml;rnberg</i>,
+when the latter opened fire. At this late hour a long range action
+was out of the question. As the <i>N&uuml;rnberg</i> slowed down
+with two of her boilers burst, the <i>Kent</i> closed to 3000 yards
+and at 7.30 finished off her smaller opponent. The <i>Dresden</i>,
+making well above her schedule speed of 24 knots, had disappeared
+to southwestward early in the afternoon. Her escape entailed a
+long search, until, on March 14, 1915, she was destroyed by the
+<i>Kent</i> and <i>Glasgow</i> off Juan Fernandez, where she had
+taken refuge for repairs.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Cruise of the "Emden"</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Among the German cruisers other than those of Admiral van Spee's
+squadron, the exploits of the <i>Emden</i> are best known, and
+reminiscent of the <i>Alabama's</i> famous cruise in the American
+Civil War. It may be noted, however, as indicative of changed
+conditions, that the <i>Emden's</i> depredations covered only two
+months instead of two years. A 3600 ton ship with a speed of 25
+knots, the <i>Emden</i> left Kiao-chau on August 6, met von Spee's
+cruisers in the Ladrones on the 12th, and on September 10 appeared
+most unexpectedly on the west side of the Bay of Bengal. Here she
+sank five British merchantmen, all following the customary route
+with lights aglow. On the 18th she was off the Rangoon River, and 6
+days later across the bay at Madras, where she set ablaze two tanks
+of the Burma Oil Company with half a million gallons of kerosene.
+From September 26 to 29 she was at the junction of trade routes west
+of Ceylon, and again, after an overhaul in the Chagos Archipelago to
+southward, spent October 16-19 in the same profitable field. Like
+most raiders, she planned to operate in one locality not more than
+three or four days, and then, avoiding all vessels on her course,
+strike <a name="page_367"><span class="page">Page 367</span></a>
+suddenly elsewhere. During this period, British, Japanese, French,
+and Russian cruisers&mdash;the Germans assert there were 19 at
+one time&mdash;followed her trail.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The most daring adventure of Captain von M&uuml;ller, the <i>Emden's</i>
+skipper, was now carried out in the harbor of Penang, on the west
+side of the Malay Peninsula. With an additional false funnel to
+imitate British county-class cruisers, the <i>Emden</i> at daybreak
+of October 28 passed the picket-boat off the harbor unchallenged,
+destroyed the Russian cruiser <i>Jemtchug</i> by gunfire and two
+torpedoes, and, after sinking the French destroyer <i>Mousquet</i>
+outside, got safely away. The Russian commander was afterward condemned
+for letting his ship lie at anchor with open lights, with only an
+anchor watch, and with strangers at liberty to visit her.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Steaming southward, the raider made her next and last appearance on
+the morning of November 9 off the British cable and wireless station
+on the Cocos Islands. As she approached, word was promptly cabled to
+London, Adelaide, and Singapore, and&mdash;more profitably&mdash;was
+wirelessed to an Australian troop convoy then only 45 miles away.
+The <i>Emden</i> caught the message, but nevertheless sent a party
+ashore, and was standing outside when the armored cruiser <i>Sydney</i>
+came charging up. Against the <i>Emden's</i> ten 4.1-inch guns,
+the <i>Sydney</i> had eight 6-inch guns, and she was at least 4
+knots faster. Outranged and outdone in speed, the German ship was
+soon driven ashore in a sinking condition, with a funnel down and
+steering gear disabled. During her two months' activity thus ended,
+the <i>Emden</i> had made 21 captures, destroying ships and cargoes
+to the value of over $10,000,000.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The other German cruisers were also short-lived. The
+<i>Karlsr&uuml;he</i>, after arming the liner <i>Kronprinz Wilhelm</i>
+off the Bahamas (August 6) and narrowly escaping the <i>Suffolk</i>
+and the <i>Bristol</i> by superior speed, operated with great success
+on the South American trade routes. Her disappearance&mdash;long a
+mystery to the Allies&mdash;was due to an internal explosion, just
+as she was about to crown her exploits by a raid on the island of
+Barbados. The <i>K&ouml;nigsberg</i>, on the east coast of Africa,
+surprised and sank the British light cruiser <i>Pegasus</i> <a
+name="page_368"><span class="page">Page 368</span></a><a
+name="page_369"><span class="page">Page 369</span></a> while the
+latter lay at Mombasa, Zanzibar, making repairs. She was later
+bottled up in the Rufigi River (October 30) and finally destroyed
+there (July 11, 1915) by indirect fire from monitors, "spotted"
+by airplanes.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 767px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig071.png" width="767" height="508" alt="Fig. 71">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPT. 1-NOV. 9,
+  1914</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the auxiliary cruisers, the <i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i>
+was sunk by the <i>Highflyer</i> (August 26), and the <i>Cap
+Trafalgar</i> went down after a hard fight with the <i>Carmania</i>
+(September 14). The <i>Prinz Eitel Friedrich</i>, which had entered
+the Atlantic with von Spee, interned at Newport News, Virginia,
+in March, 1915, and was followed thither a month later by the
+<i>Kronprinz Wilhelm</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The results of this surface warfare upon commerce amounted to 69
+merchant vessels, totaling 280,000 tons. With more strict concentration
+upon commerce destruction, and further preparations for using German
+liners as auxiliaries, the campaign might have been prolonged and made
+somewhat more effective. But for the same purpose the superiority
+of the submarine was soon demonstrated. To take the later surface
+raiders: the <i>Wolf</i> sank or captured 20 ships in 15 months
+at sea; the <i>Seeadler</i>, 23 in 7 months; the <i>M&ouml;we</i>
+15 in 2 months. But many a submarine in one month made a better
+record than these. The opening of Germany's submarine campaign, to
+be treated later, was formally announced by her blockade proclamation
+of February 4, 1915.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Dogger Bank Action</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The strategic value of the battle cruiser, as a means of throwing
+strength quickly into distant fields, was brought out in the campaign
+against von Spee. As an outcome of German raids on the east coast of
+England, its tactical qualities, against units of equal strength,
+were soon put to a sharper trial. Aside from mere
+<i>Schrecklichkeit</i>&mdash;a desire to carry the terrors of war
+to English soil&mdash;these raids had the legitimate military objects
+of helping distant cruisers by holding British ships in home waters,
+of delaying troop movements to France, and of creating a popular
+clamor that might force a dislocation or division of the Grand
+Fleet. The first incursion, on November <a name="page_370"><span
+class="page">Page 370</span></a> 3, inflicted trifling damage; the
+second, on December 16, was marked by the bombardment of Scarborough,
+Hartlepool, and Whitby, in which 99 civilians were killed and 500
+wounded. The third, on January 24 following, brought on the Dogger
+Bank action, the first encounter between battle cruisers, and one
+of the two capital ship actions of the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At dawn on this date, the <i>Derfflinger, Seydlitz</i> (flagship
+of Admiral von Hipper), <i>Moltke</i>, and armored cruiser
+<i>Bl&uuml;cher</i>, with 4 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas,
+were moving westward about midway in the North Sea on a line between
+Heligoland and the scene of their former raids. Five battle cruisers
+under Admiral Beatty were at the same time approaching a rendezvous
+with the Harwich Force for one of their periodical sweeps in the
+southern area. The Harwich Force first came in contact with the
+enemy about 7 a.m. Fortunately for the Germans, they had already
+been warned of Beatty's approach by one of their light cruisers,
+and had just turned back at high speed when the British battle
+cruisers made them out to southeastward 14 miles away. The forces
+opposed were as follows:
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center_btrb">British</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Displace-<br>ment</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Armor</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Best recent speed[*]</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">German</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Displace-<br>ment</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Armor</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Guns</td>
+    <td class="center_btb">Best recent speed</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Lion</td>
+    <td class="center_br">26,350</td>
+    <td class="center_br">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">8&nbsp;13.5&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">31.7</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Derfflinger</td>
+    <td class="center_br">26,180</td>
+    <td class="center_br">13&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">8&nbsp;12&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">30</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Tiger</td>
+    <td class="center_br">28,500</td>
+    <td class="center_br">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">8&nbsp;13.5&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">32</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Seydlitz</td>
+    <td class="center_br">24,610</td>
+    <td class="center_br">11&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">10&nbsp;11&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">29</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Princess&nbsp;Royal</td>
+    <td class="center_br">28,500</td>
+    <td class="center_br">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">8&nbsp;13.5&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">31.7</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Moltke</td>
+    <td class="center_br">22,640</td>
+    <td class="center_br">11&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">10&nbsp;11&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">28.4</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">New&nbsp;Zealand</td>
+    <td class="center_br">18,800</td>
+    <td class="center_br">8&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">8&nbsp;12&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">29</td>
+    <td class="left_br">Bl&uuml;cher</td>
+    <td class="center_br">15,550</td>
+    <td class="center_br">6&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_br">12&nbsp;8.2&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">25.4</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">Indomitable</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">17,250</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">7&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">8&nbsp;12&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">28.7</td>
+    <td class="left_brb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote *: Jane's <span class="sc">Fighting Ships</span>, 1914.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 637px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig072.png" width="637" height="496" alt="Fig. 72">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Settling at once to a stern chase, the British ships increased
+speed to 28.5 knots; while the Germans, handicapped by the slower
+<i>Bl&uuml;cher</i>, were held down to 25. At 8.52 the <i>Lion</i>
+was within 20,000 yards of the <i>Bl&uuml;cher</i>, and, after
+deliberate ranging shots, scored her first hit at 9.09. As the
+range further decreased, the <i>Tiger</i> opened on the rear ship,
+and the <i>Lion</i> shifted to the third in line at 18,000 yards.
+The enemy returned <a name="page_371"><span class="page">Page
+371</span></a><a name="page_372"><span class="page">Page
+372</span></a> the fire at 9.14. Thus the action continued, both
+squadrons in lines of bearing, and Beatty's ships engaged as a
+rule with their opposites in the enemy order.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 549px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig073.png" width="549" height="358" alt="Fig. 73">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">DOGGER BANK ACTION, JAN. 24, 1915</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 9.45 the German armored cruiser had suffered severely, and ships
+ahead also showed the effects of the heavier enemy fire. Under
+cover of a thick smoke screen from destroyers on their starboard
+bow, and a subsequent destroyer attack, the Germans now shifted
+course away from the enemy and the rear ships hauled out on the
+port quarter of their leader to increase the range. The British
+cruisers, according to Admiral Beatty's report, "were ordered to
+form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed."
+An hour later the <i>Bl&uuml;cher</i> staggered away to northward.
+Badly crippled, she was assigned by Beatty to the <i>Indomitable</i>,
+and was sunk at 12.37. At 10.54 submarines were reported on the
+British starboard bows.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Just after 11 the flagship <i>Lion</i>, having received two hits
+under water which burst a feed tank and thus put the port engine out
+of commission, turned northward out of the line. Though the injury
+was spoken of as the result of a "chance <a name="page_373"><span
+class="page">Page 373</span></a> shot," the <i>Lion</i> had been hit
+15 times. About an hour later Admiral Beatty hoisted his flag in
+the <i>Princess Royal</i>, but during the remainder of the battle
+Rear Admiral Moore in the <i>Tiger</i> had command. Judging from
+the fact that the <i>Tiger</i> was hit only 8 times in the entire
+action and the <i>Princess Royal</i> and the <i>New Zealand</i>
+not at all, there seems to have been little effort at this time
+to press the attack. The British lost touch at 11.50, and turned
+back at noon.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the lively discussion aroused by the battle, the question was
+raised why the <i>Bl&uuml;cher</i> was included in the German line.
+Any encounter that developed on such an excursion was almost certain
+to be with superior forces, against which the armored cruiser would
+be of slight value. In a retreat, the "lame duck" would slow down
+the whole squadron, or else must be left behind.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During the first hour of the battle, the British gained about three
+knots, and brought the range to 17,500 yards. The range after 9.45
+is not given, but was certainly not lowered in a corresponding
+degree. This may have been due to increased speed on the part of
+the German leaders, or to the interference of German destroyers,
+which now figured for the first time as important factors in day
+action. Two of these attacks were delivered, one at 9.40 and another
+about an hour later, and though repulsed by British flotillas,
+they both caused interference with the British course and fire.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The injury to the <i>Lion</i>, in the words of Admiral Beatty,
+"undoubtedly deprived us of a greater victory." The British wireless
+caught calls from Hipper to the High Seas Fleet, which (though this
+seems strange at the time of a battle cruiser sortie) is declared
+by the Germans to have been beyond reach at Kiel.[1] Worried by the
+danger to the <i>Lion</i> in case of retreat before superior forces,
+and in the belief that he was being led into submarine traps and mine
+fields, Admiral Moore gave up the chase. The distance to Heligoland
+was still at least 70 miles; the German ships were badly injured; the
+course since 9.45 had been more to the northward; the Grand Fleet
+was rapidly approaching the scene. The <a name="page_374"><span
+class="page">Page 374</span></a> element of caution, seen again
+in the Jutland battle 15 months later, seems to have prevented
+pressing the engagement to more decisive results.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Capt. Persius, <i>Naval and Military Record</i>, Dec.
+10, 1919.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The conditions of flight and pursuit obtaining at the Dogger Bank
+emphasized the importance of speed and long range fire. Owing to
+the fact that they had twice the angle of elevation (30 degrees),
+the German 11-inch and 12-inch guns were not outranged by the British
+13.5-inch guns; and at 17,000 yards their projectiles had no greater
+angle of fall. The chief superiority of the larger ordnance therefore
+lay in their heavier bursting charges and greater striking energy,
+12,800 foot-tons to 8,900 foot-tons. According to a German report,
+the first salvo that hit the <i>Seydlitz</i> knocked out both
+after-turrets and annihilated their crews; and the ship was saved
+only by flooding the magazines.[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Admiral van Scheer, quoted in <i>Naval and Military
+Record</i>, London, March 24, 1920.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Dardanelles Campaign</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Throughout the war a difference of opinion existed in Allied councils
+as to whether it was better to concentrate all efforts in the western
+sphere of operations, or to assail the Central Powers in the Near
+East as well, where the accession of Turkey (and later of Bulgaria)
+threatened to put the resources of all southeastern Europe under
+Teutonic control, and even opened a gateway into Asia. Such a division
+of effort was suggested not only by the necessity of protecting the
+Suez Canal, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, but by the difficulty of breaking
+the stalemate on the western front, and by the opportunity that
+would be offered of utilizing Allied control of sea communications.
+Furthermore, the Allies had a margin of predreadnoughts and cruisers
+ready for action and of no obvious value elsewhere.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On November 3, 1914, three days after Turkey entered the war, an
+Allied naval force that had been watching off the Dardanelles engaged
+the outer forts in a 10-minute bombardment, of no significance save
+perhaps as a warning to <a name="page_375"><span class="page">Page
+375</span></a> the Turks of trouble later on. In the same month the
+First Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, proposed
+an attack on the Straits as "an ideal method of defending Egypt";
+but it was not seriously considered until, on January 2, Russia
+sent an urgent appeal for a diversion to relieve her forces in the
+Caucasus. Lord Kitchener, the British Minister of War, answered
+favorably, but, feeling that he had no troops to spare, turned the
+solution over to the Navy.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From the first the decision was influenced by political considerations.
+Russia needed assurance of Allied solidarity&mdash;and it is significant
+that in February Lord Grey announced that England no longer opposed
+Russia's ambition to control Constantinople. Nine-tenths of Russia's
+exports were blocked by the closing of the Straits; their reopening
+would afford not only access to her vast stores of foodstuffs,
+but an entry&mdash;infinitely more convenient than Vladivostok or
+Archangel&mdash;for munitions and essential supplies. The Balkan
+States were wavering. In Turkey there was a strong neutral or pro-Ally
+sentiment. Victory would give an enormous material advantage, help
+Russia in the impending German drive on her southwestern frontier,
+and bolster Allied prestige throughout the eastern world.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Faced with the problem, the Admiralty sent an inquiry to Admiral
+Carden, in command on the scene, as to the practicability of forcing
+the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone, assuming that old ships
+would be employed, and "that the importance of the results would
+justify severe loss." He replied on January 5: "I do not think the
+Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended
+operations with a large number of ships." In answer to further
+inquiries, accompanied by not altogether warranted assurance from
+the First Lord that "High authorities here concur in your opinion,"
+Admiral Carden outlined four successive operations:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+(a) The destruction of defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defenses up to
+and including Cephez Point battery N8.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 796px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig074.png" width="796" height="482" alt="Fig. 74">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE
+  <a name="page_376"><span class="page">Page 376</span></a>
+  </td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_377"><span class="page">Page 377</span></a> (c)
+Destruction of defenses of the Narrows.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+(d) Sweeping of a dear channel through the mine-field and advance
+through the Narrows; followed by a reduction of the forts further
+up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This plan was presented at a meeting of the British War Council on
+January 13. It may be noted at this point that the War Council, though
+composed of 7 members of the Cabinet, was at this time dominated by
+a triumvirate&mdash;the Premier (Mr. Asquith), the Minister of
+War (General Kitchener), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr.
+Churchill); and in this triumvirate, despite the fact that England's
+strength was primarily naval, the head of the War Office played a
+leading r&ocirc;le. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher) and one or
+two other military experts attended the Council meetings, but they
+were not members, and their function, at least as they saw it, was
+"to open their mouths when told to." Staff organizations existed also
+at both the War Office and the Admiralty, at the latter consisting
+of the First Lord, First Sea Lord and three other officers not
+on the Admiralty Board. The working of this improvised and not
+altogether ideal machinery for the supreme task of conducting the
+war is interestingly revealed in the report[1] of the commission
+subsequently, appointed to investigate the Dardanelles Campaign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: British <span class="sc">Annual Register</span>, 1918,
+Appendix, pp. 24 ff., from which quotations here are taken.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"Mr. Churchill," according to this report, "appears to have advocated
+the attack by ships alone before the War Council on a certain amount
+of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion." Encouraged by his
+sanguine and aggressive spirit, the Council decided that "the Admiralty
+should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and
+take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."
+In view of the fact that the operation as then conceived was to be
+purely naval, the word "take" suggests an initial misconception
+of what the navy could do. The support for the decision, especially
+from the naval experts, was chiefly on the assumption that if Admiral
+Carden's first operation were unpromising, the whole plan might
+be dropped.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_378"><span class="page">Page 378</span></a> Admiral
+Fisher's misgivings as to the wisdom of the enterprise soon increased,
+owing primarily to his desire to employ the full naval strength in
+the home field. He did not believe that "cutting off the enemy's
+big toe in the East was better than stabbing him to the heart."
+He had begun the construction of 612 new vessels ranging from
+"hush-hush" ships of 33 knots and 20-inch guns to 200 motor-boats,
+and he wished to strike for access to the Baltic, with a threat of
+invasion on Germany's Baltic coast. The validity of his objections
+to the Dardanelles plan appears to depend on the practicability
+of this alternative, which was not attempted later in the war.
+The First Lord and the First Sea Lord presented their difference
+of opinion to the Premier, but it appears that there was no ill
+feeling; Admiral Fisher later writes that "Churchill had courage
+and imagination&mdash;he was a war man."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At a Council meeting on January 28, when the decision was made
+definite, Admiral Fisher was not asked for an opinion and expressed
+none. (The Investigation Commission declare that the naval experts
+should have been asked, and should have expressed their views whether
+asked or not.) But there was a dramatic moment when, after rising as
+if to leave the Council, he was quickly followed by Lord Kitchener,
+who pointed out that all the others were in favor of the plan, and
+induced him once more to take his seat. After the decision, Mr.
+Churchill testifies, "I never looked back. We had left the region
+of discussion and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The
+matter had now passed into the domain of action."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+To turn to the scene of operations, there were now assembled at
+the Dardanelles 10 British and 4 French predreadnoughts, together
+with the new battleship <i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, the battle cruiser
+<i>Inflexible</i>, and many cruisers and torpedo craft. On February
+19, 1915, again on February 25-26, and on March 1-7, this force
+bombarded the outer forts at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr and the
+batteries 10 miles further up at Cephez Point. These were in part
+silenced and demolished by landing parties. Bad weather, however,
+interfered with operations, and there was also some shortage of
+ammunition. <a name="page_379"><span class="page">Page 379</span></a>
+The batteries, and especially the mobile artillery of the Turks,
+still greatly hampered the work of mine sweeping, which at terrible
+hazards was carried on at night within the Straits.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the meantime the Government, to quote General Callwell, the
+Director of Military Operations, had "drifted into a big military
+attack." But the despatch from England of the 29th Division, which
+was to join the forces available in Egypt, was delayed; owing to
+Lord Kitchener's concern about the western situation, from Feb.
+22 to March 16&mdash;an unfortunate loss of time. By March 17,
+however, the troops from Egypt and most of the French contingent
+were assembled at the island of Lemnos, and General Sir Ian Hamilton
+had arrived to take command. His instructions included the statement
+that "employment of military forces on any large scale at this
+juncture is only contemplated in the event of the fleet failing to
+get through after every effort has been exhausted. Having entered
+on the project of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of
+abandoning the scheme."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On March 11 the First Lord sent to Admiral Carden a despatch asking
+whether the time had not arrived when "you will have to press hard
+for a decision," and adding: "Every well-conceived action for forcing
+a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive
+our support." The Admiral replied concurring, but expressing the
+opinion that "in order to insure my communication line immediately
+fleet enters Sea of Marmora, military operations should be opened
+at once." On March 16 he resigned owing to ill health, and his
+second in command, Admiral de Robeck, succeeded, with the feeling
+that he had orders to force the Straits.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The attack of March 18 was the crucial and, as it proved, the final
+action of the purely naval campaign. At this time the mines had been
+swept as far up as Cephez Point, and a clear channel opened for
+some distance beyond. During the morning the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i>
+and 5 other ships bombarded the Narrows forts at 14,000 yards.
+Then at 12.22 the French predreadnoughts <i>Suffren, Gaulois,
+Charlemagne</i>, and <i>Bouvet</i> approached to about 9000 yards
+and by 1.25 had for the time being silenced the batteries of the
+Narrows. Six British <a name="page_380"><span class="page">Page
+380</span></a> battleships now advanced (2.36) to relieve the French.
+In the maneuvering and withdrawal, the <i>Biouvet</i> was sunk by a
+drifting mine[1] with a loss of over 600 men, and the <i>Gaulois</i>
+was hit twice under water and had to be beached on an island <a
+name="page_381"><span class="page">Page 381</span></a> outside the
+Straits. About 4 o'clock the <i>Irresistible</i> also ran foul
+of a mine and was run ashore on the Asiatic side, where most of
+her men were taken off under fire. The <i>Ocean</i>, after going to
+her assistance, struck a mine and went down about 6 o'clock. Not
+more than 40 per cent. of the injuries sustained in the action
+were attributable to gunfire, the rest to mines sent adrift from
+the Narrows. Of the 16 capital ships engaged, three were sunk,
+one had to be beached, and some of the others were hardly ready
+for continuing the action next day.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: It is stated that an ingenious device caused these
+mines to sink after a certain time and come back on an under-current
+that flows <i>up</i> the Dardanelles, and then rise at the Narrows
+for recovery. This may have enabled the Turks to keep up their
+presumably limited supply of mines; but how well the automatic control
+worked is not known.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 551px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig075.png" width="551" height="631" alt="Fig. 75">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">DARDANELLES DEFENSES</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+There is some military support for the opinion that if, on the
+18th or at some more suitable time, the fleet had acted in the
+spirit of Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!" and,
+protected by dummy ships, bumpers, or whatever other devices naval
+ingenuity could devise, had steamed up to and through the Narrows
+in column, it would not have suffered much more severely than during
+the complicated maneuvering below. Of such an attack General von
+der Goltz, in command of the Turkish army, said that, "Although
+he thought it was almost impossible to force the Dardanelles, if
+the English thought it an important move in the general war, they
+could by sacrificing ten ships force the entrance, and do it very
+fast, and be up in Marmora within 10 hours from the time they forced
+it."[l] Admiral Fisher estimated that the loss would be 12 ships.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Repeated by Baron van Wangenheim to Ambassador Morgenthau,
+prior to the attack of March 18, <span class="sc">Ambassador
+Morgenthau's Story</span>, <i>World's Work</i>, September, 1918. See
+also Col. F. N. Maude, Royal Engineers, <i>Contemporary Review</i>,
+June, 1915.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After such deductions, there would be no great surplus to deal
+with the <i>G&ouml;ben</i>, which would fight desperately, and
+with the defenses of Constantinople. Indeed, such losses would seem
+absolutely prohibitive, if viewed only from the narrow standpoint
+of the force engaged, and without taking into fullest account the
+limited value of the older ships and the fact that the Government
+was fully committed to a prosecution of the campaign. It is of
+course easy to see that victory purchased by the loss of 10
+predreadnoughts and 10,000 men would be cheap, as compared with the
+sacrifice of over 100,000 <a name="page_382"><span class="page">Page
+382</span></a> men killed and wounded and 10,000 invalided in the
+later campaign on land.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+General Callwell has pointed out that the naval commanders were
+properly worried about what would happen after they got through
+the Straits, if the Sublime Porte should not promptly "throw up
+the sponge." "The communications would have remained closed to
+colliers and small craft by movable armament, if not also by mines.
+Forcing the pass would in fact have resembled bursting through a
+swing door. Sailors and soldiers alike have an instinctive horror
+of a trap, and they are in the habit of looking behind them as
+well as before them."[1] But according to Ambassador Morgenthau,
+who was probably in a better position than any one else to form
+an opinion, "The whole Ottoman State on the 18th day of March,
+1915, was on the brink of dissolution." The Turkish Government
+was divided into factions and restive under German domination, and
+there was thus an excellent prospect that it would have capitulated
+under the guns of the Allied fleet. If not, then there might have
+been nothing left for the latter but to try to get back the way
+it came.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Nineteenth Century and After</span>,
+March, 1919, p. 486.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Feeling in Constantinople during the month from February 19th to
+March 19th has already been suggested; it was nervous in the extreme.
+Neither Turks nor Germans felt assured that the Dardanelles could
+withstand British naval power. Plans were made for a general exit
+to Asia Minor, and there was a conviction that in a few days Allied
+ships would be in the Golden Horn. At the forts, if we may believe
+evidence not as yet definitely disproved, affairs were still more
+desperate. The guns, though manned largely by Germans, were not of
+the latest type, and for a month had been engaged in almost daily
+bombardment. Ammunition was running short. "Fort Hamadi&eacute;,
+the most powerful defense on the Asiatic side, had just 17
+armor-piercing projectiles left, while at Killid-ul-Bahr, the main
+defense on the European side, there were precisely 10."[2] To this
+evidence may be added the statement of <a name="page_383"><span
+class="page">Page 383</span></a> Enver Pasha: "If the English had
+only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles
+they could have got to Constantinople, but their delay enabled us
+to fortify the peninsula, and in 6 weeks' time we had taken down
+there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">Ambassador Morgenthau's Story</span>,
+<i>World's Work</i>, September, 1918, p. 433, corroborating the
+statement of the correspondent G. A. Schreiner, in <span class="sc">From
+Berlin to Bagdad</span>.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+If Mr. Churchill was chiefly responsible for undertaking the campaign,
+he was not responsible for the delay after March 18. "It never
+occurred to me," he states, "that we should not go on." Admiral
+de Robeck in his first despatches appeared to share this view. On
+March 26, however, he telegraphed: "The check on March 18 is not,
+in my opinion, decisive, but on March 22 I met General Hamilton and
+heard his views, and I now think that, to obtain important results
+and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation
+will be essential." This despatch, Mr. Churchill says, "involved a
+complete change of plan and was a vital decision. I regretted it
+very much. I believed then, as I believe now, that we were separated
+by very little from complete success." He proposed that the Admiral
+should be directed to renew the attack; but the First Sea Lord did
+not agree, nor did Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, nor Admiral Sir Henry
+Jackson. So it was decided to wait for the army, and some satire
+has been directed at Mr. Churchill and those other "acknowledged
+experts in the technicalities of amphibious warfare," Mr. Balfour
+and Mr. Asquith, who were inclined to share his views. The verdict
+of the Dardanelles Commission was that, "Had the attack been renewed
+within a day or two there is no reason to suppose that the proportion
+of casualties would have been less; and, if so, even had the second
+attack succeeded, a very weak force would have been left for subsequent
+naval operations."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Once decided upon, it was highly essential that the combined operation
+should begin without further delay. But it was now found that the
+army transports had been loaded, so to speak, up-side-down, with
+guns and munitions buried under tents and supplies. Sending them
+back to Alexandria for reloading involved a six weeks' delay, though
+Lord Kitchener wired, "I think you had better know at once that I
+regard <a name="page_384"><span class="page">Page 384</span></a>
+such postponement as far too long." The landing on the tip of the
+Gallipoli Peninsula, which was nearest the forts in the Straits
+and said to be the only feasible place, actually began on April
+25, and was achieved under the guns of the fleet, and by almost
+unexampled feats of heroism by boats' crews and the first parties
+on shore.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Henceforth the navy played a subordinate though not insignificant
+part in the campaign. "By our navy we went there and were kept
+there," writes Mr. John Masefield in <i>Gallipoli</i>, "and by
+our navy we came away. During the nine months of our hold on the
+peninsula over 300,000 men were brought by the navy from places
+three, four, or even six thousand miles away. During the operations
+some half of these were removed by our navy, as sick and wounded,
+to ports from 800 to 3000 miles away. Every day, for 11 months,
+ships of our navy moved up and down the Gallipoli coast bombarding
+the Turk positions. Every day during the operations our navy kept
+our armies in food, drink and supplies. Every day, in all that
+time, if weather permitted, ships of our navy cruised in the Narrows
+and off Constantinople, and the seaplanes of our navy raided and
+scouted within the Turk lines."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On May 12 the predreadnought <i>Goliath</i> was torpedoed by a Turkish
+destroyer; and on May 25-26 the German submarine <i>U 23</i>, which
+had made the long voyage by way of Gibraltar, sank the <i>Triumph</i>
+and the <i>Majestic</i>. It was upon a forewarning of this attack
+that Admiral Fisher, according to his own statement, resigned as
+a protest against the retention of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> and
+other capital units in this unpromising field. British and French
+submarines, on the other hand, worked their way into the Sea of
+Marmora, entered the harbor of Constantinople, and inflicted heavy
+losses, including two Turkish battleships, 8 transports, and 197
+supply vessels.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+So almost unprecedented were the problems of a naval attack on the
+Dardanelles that it appears rash to condemn either the initiation
+or the conduct of an operation that ended in failure when seemingly
+on the verge of success. Clearly, the campaign was handicapped
+by lack of unanimous support and whole-hearted faith on the part
+of authorities at home. It was <a name="page_385"><span
+class="page">Page 385</span></a> not thoroughly thought out at
+the start, and was subjected to trying delays. No advantage was
+ever taken of the invaluable factor of surprise. Even so, it was
+not wholly barren of results. It undoubtedly relieved Russia, kept
+Bulgaria neutral for at least five months, and immobilized 300,000
+Turks, according to Lord Kitchener's estimate, for nine months'
+time. Nevertheless, the final failure was a tremendous blow to
+Allied prestige. Upon the withdrawal, in January of 1916, some
+of the troops were transferred to Salonika; and it is noteworthy
+that in Macedonia, as at Gallipoli, the army was dependent on the
+navy for the transport of troops, munitions, and in fact virtually
+everything needed in the campaign.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Aside from the Dardanelles failure, the naval situation at the end
+of 1915 was such as to give assurance to the Western Powers. They
+had converted potential control of the sea into actual control, save
+in limited areas on the enemies' sea frontiers. Germany had lost
+her cruisers and her colonies, and her shipping had been destroyed
+or driven from the seas. Though losses from submarines averaged
+150,000 tons a month in 1915, they had not yet caused genuine alarm.
+The German fleet was still a menace, but, in spite of attrition
+warfare, the Grand Fleet was decidedly stronger than in 1914.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">British Official Naval History</span>, Sir Julian
+  Corbett, London, 1920.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Grand Fleet</span>, Admiral Jellicoe, London,
+  1918.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The British Navy in Battle</span>, Arthur H.
+  Pollen, London, 1919.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">My Memoirs</span>, Admiral van Tirpitz, 1919.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The German High Seas Fleet in the World War</span>,
+  Vice Admiral van Scheer, 1920.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, War Notes</span>,
+  1914-1918.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Les Enseignements Maritimes de la Guerre
+  Anti-Germanique</span>, Admiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Il Potere Marittimo Nella Grande Guerra</span>,
+  Captain Romeo Bernotti, Leghorn, 1920.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Naval Power in the War</span>, Commander C. C. Gill,
+  New York, 1918.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_386"><span class="page">Page 386</span></a>
+CHAPTER XVII</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE WORLD WAR [<i>Continued</i>]: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+There was only one action between the British Grand Fleet and the
+German High Seas Fleet in the World War, the battle of Jutland.
+This was indecisive, but even in a history with the limits of this
+book it deserves a chapter of its own. In the magnitude of the
+forces engaged, a magnitude less in numbers of ships&mdash;great as
+that was&mdash;than in the enormous destructive power concentrated
+in those ships, it was by far the greatest naval battle in history.
+Moreover, this was the one fleet battle fought with the weapons
+of to-day. Any discussion of modern tactics, therefore, must be
+based for some time to come on an analysis of Jutland. Finally, the
+indecisiveness of the action has resulted in a controversy among
+naval critics that is likely to continue indefinitely. Meanwhile
+the debatable points are rich in interest and suggestion.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In earlier wars the nation with a more powerful fleet blockaded
+the ports of the enemy. In this war the sea mine, the submarine,
+the aircraft and the long-range gun of coast defenses made the
+old-fashioned close blockade impossible. Such blockade as could
+be maintained under modern conditions had to be "distant." The
+British made a base in the Orkneys, Scapa Flow, which had central
+position with relation to a possible sortie of the German fleet
+toward either the North Atlantic or the Channel. The intervening
+space of North Sea was patrolled by a scouting force of light vessels
+of various sorts and periodical sweeps by the Grand Fleet. On May
+30, 1916, the Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, set out from
+its base at Scapa Flow for one of these patrolling cruises. On the
+same day Vice Admiral Beatty left his base <a name="page_387"><span
+class="page">Page 387</span></a> at Rosyth (in the Firth of Forth)
+with his advance force of battle cruisers and battleships, under
+orders to join Jellicoe at sea. On the following day the High Seas
+Fleet took the sea and the two great forces came together in battle.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is not certain why the German fleet should have been cruising
+at this time. Having declined to offer battle in the summer of
+1914, on account of the British superiority of force, the High
+Command could hardly have contemplated attacking in 1916 when the
+odds were much heavier. From statements published by German officers
+since the war, the objects seem to have been, first, to prevent a
+suspected attempt to force an entrance into the Baltic; secondly,
+to fall upon Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron, during its frequent
+patrolling cruises, when it was detached from the main force; and,
+thirdly, to destroy the British trading fleets which were conducting
+an important volume of commerce from the ports of Norway with England
+and Russia. It is not easy to see, however, why the High Seas Fleet
+should be sent out on a mere commerce destroying raid. The Germans
+had been out twice before, since April 1st of that year, and probably
+it was considered good policy to send the fleet to sea every now
+and then for the moral effect. The people could not relish the idea
+of their navy being condemned to inaction in their own harbors,
+and there was bad feeling over the fact that the government had
+just yielded to President Wilson's protest on ruthless submarine
+warfare. A victory over Beatty's battle cruisers, or some other
+detached unit of the British fleet, would have been very opportune
+in bracing German morale. At the same time Admiral von Scheer had
+probably reckoned on being able to avoid battle with the Grand
+Fleet by means of a swift retreat under cover of smoke screens
+and torpedo attacks. Certainly the odds were too heavy to permit
+of any other policy on his part.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The First Phase</i>
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 561px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig076.png" width="561" height="452" alt="Fig. 76">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE
+  FLEET</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">(After diagram by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost,
+  U.S.N., <i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov.,
+  1919.</i>)</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">
+ <table class="data" style="text-align: left;">
+  <tr><td>Forces:</td></tr>
+  <tr><td class="right">24</td><td>Dreadnought Battleships</td></tr>
+  <tr><td class="right">3</td><td>Battle Cruisers</td></tr>
+  <tr><td class="right">12</td><td>Light Cruisers</td></tr>
+  <tr><td class="right">8</td><td>Armored Cruisers</td></tr>
+  <tr><td class="right">51</td><td>Destroyers</td></tr>
+  <tr><td colspan="2">Note: One destroyer accompanied each armored
+    cruiser.</td></tr>
+ </table>
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 2 p. m. of the 31st of May, 1916, the British main fleet, under
+Admiral Jellicoe, was in Latitude 57&deg; 57' N., Longitude 3&deg;
+45' E. (off the coast of Norway), holding a south-easterly <a
+name="page_388"><span class="page">Page 388</span></a> course.
+It consisted of 24 battleships formed in a line of six divisions
+screened by destroyers and light cruisers, as indicated in the
+accompanying diagram. Sixteen miles ahead of the battle fleet was
+the First Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Arbuthnot and the
+Second Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Heath; these consisted
+of four armored cruisers each. They were spread out at intervals
+of six miles, with the <i>Hampshire</i> six miles astern of the
+<i>Minotaur</i> to serve as link ship for signals to and from the
+main fleet. Four miles ahead was the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron
+of three ships under Rear Admiral Hood. These were steaming in
+column, <a name="page_389"><span class="page">Page 389</span></a>
+screened by four destroyers and two light cruisers (<i>Chester</i>
+and <i>Canterbury</i>). The diagram on p. 388 shows the complete
+formation of the Battle Fleet and Cruiser Squadrons, under Admiral
+Jellicoe's personal command. It is interesting as an example of
+the extreme complexity of fleet formation under modern conditions,
+especially when it is realized that the whole fleet was proceeding
+on its base course by zigzagging.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 553px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig077.png" width="553" height="437" alt="Fig. 77">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION, 2 P. M.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">(After diagrams by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H.
+  Frost, U.S.N., <i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov.,
+  1919.</i>)</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Seventy-seven miles to the southward Vice Admiral Beatty, commanding
+the scouting force, was heading on a northeasterly course. His force
+was spread out in scouting formation. The First Battle Cruiser
+Squadron of four ships, headed by the flagship <i>Lion</i>, was
+flanked three miles to the eastward by the Second Battle Cruiser
+Squadron of two ships, and five miles to the north by the Fifth
+Battle Squadron, consisting of four of the finest battleships in
+the fleet, 25-knot <a name="page_390"><span class="page">Page
+390</span></a> <i>Queen Elizabeths</i>, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas.
+Each of these squadrons had its screen of destroyers and light
+cruisers. Eight miles to the south the First, Second, and Third Light
+Cruiser Squadrons were spread out in line at five-mile intervals.
+The formation is made clear by the accompanying diagram.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the same hour, 2 p. m., Vice Admiral Hipper, with the German
+scouting force, was heading north about 15 to 20 miles to the southeast
+of Beatty. Hipper commanded the First Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+consisting of the <i>L&uuml;tzow</i> (flag), <i>Derflinger, Seydlitz,
+Moltke</i>, and <i>Van der Tann</i>, accompanied by a screening
+force of four or five light cruisers and about 15 destroyers. Fifty
+miles south of this advance force was the main body of the High
+Seas Fleet under Vice Admiral von Scheer. It consisted of three
+battle squadrons arranged apparently in one long column of 22 ships
+escorted by a screen of 62 destroyers, eight or ten light cruisers,
+and the one remaining armored cruiser in the German navy, the
+<i>Roon</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thus the stage was set and the characters disposed for the great
+naval drama of that day.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 765px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig078.png" width="765" height="509" alt="Fig. 78">
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 2.20 the light cruiser <i>Galatea</i> (v. diagram), which lay
+farthest to the east of Beatty's force, reported two German light
+cruisers engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Beatty thereupon
+changed course toward Horn Reef Lightship in order to cut them
+off from their base, his light cruisers of the first and third
+divisions spreading out as a screen to the eastward. It would be
+interesting to know why, at this point, he did not draw in his
+battleships and thus concentrate his force, for when he did establish
+contact with the Germans, Evan-Thomas's squadron was too far away
+for effective support. Ten minutes later Hipper got word of British
+light cruisers and destroyers sighted to the westward and, changing
+course to northwest, he headed for them at high speed. At 2.45
+Beatty sent out a seaplane from the <i>Engadine</i> to ascertain
+the enemy's position. This is the first instance in naval history of
+a fleet scouting by means of aircraft. The airplane came close enough
+to the enemy to draw the fire of four light <a name="page_391"><span
+class="page">Page 391</span></a><a name="page_392"><span
+class="page">Page 392</span></a> cruisers, and returning reported
+their position. Meanwhile the <i>Galatea</i> had reported heavy
+smoke "as from a fleet."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the first report from the <i>Galatea</i>, which had been intercepted
+on the flagship, <i>Iron Duke</i>, Jellicoe ordered full speed, and
+despatched ahead the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Hood,
+to cut off the escape of the Germans to the Skagerrak, as Beatty
+was then heading to cut them off from their bases to the south.
+Admiral Scheer, also, on getting report of the English cruisers,
+quickened the speed of his main fleet.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 3.30 Beatty and Hipper discovered each other's battle cruiser
+forces. Hipper turned about and headed on a southerly course to lead
+the British toward the advancing main fleet. Beatty also turned,
+forming his battle cruisers on a line of bearing to clear the smoke,
+and the two forces approached each other on converging courses as
+indicated in the diagram.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this point it is worth while to compare the two battle cruiser
+forces:[1]
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="center" colspan="4">BRITISH</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center" colspan="4">GERMAN</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="btmctr">Name</td>
+    <td class="btmctr">Armor</td>
+    <td class="btmctr">Displace-<br>ment</td>
+    <td class="btmctr">Guns</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="btmctr">Name</td>
+    <td class="btmctr">Armor</td>
+    <td class="btmctr">Displace-<br>ment</td>
+    <td class="btmctr">Guns</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Queen&nbsp;Mary</td>
+    <td class="center">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">26,350</td>
+    <td>8&nbsp;13.5&Prime;</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>L&uuml;tzow</td>
+    <td class="center">13&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">26,180</td>
+    <td class="right">8&nbsp;12&Prime;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Lion</td>
+    <td class="center">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">26,350</td>
+    <td>8&nbsp;13.5&Prime;</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>Derfflinger</td>
+    <td class="center">13&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">26,180</td>
+    <td class="right">8&nbsp;12&Prime;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Tiger</td>
+    <td class="center">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">28,500</td>
+    <td>8&nbsp;13.5&Prime;</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>Seydlitz</td>
+    <td class="center">11&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">24,610</td>
+    <td class="right">10&nbsp;11&Prime;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Princess&nbsp;Royal</td>
+    <td class="center">9&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">28,350</td>
+    <td>8&nbsp;13.5&Prime;</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>Moltke</td>
+    <td class="center">11&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">22,640</td>
+    <td class="right">10&nbsp;11&Prime;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Indefatigable</td>
+    <td class="center">8&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">18,800</td>
+    <td>8&nbsp;12&Prime;</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>VonderTann</td>
+    <td class="center">10&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center">19,100</td>
+    <td class="right">11&Prime;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>New&nbsp;Zealand</td>
+    <td class="center">8&Prime;</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">18,800</td>
+    <td>8&nbsp;12&Prime;</td>
+    <td style="width: 2em;">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_bb">&nbsp</td>
+    <td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center">145,150</td>
+    <td colspan="4">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center">118,710</td>
+    <td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Table from Lieut. Comdr. H. H. Frost, U. S. N., <i>U.
+S. Naval Institute Proceedings</i>, Nov., 1919, p. 850.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A glance shows the superiority of the British in guns and the German
+superiority in armor. The British had six ships to the German five,
+and if the four new battleships of Evan-Thomas's division could
+be effectively brought into action, the British superiority in
+force would be reckoned as considerably more than two to one. These
+battleships had 13" armor, eight 15" guns each, and a speed of 25
+knots. They were the most powerful ships afloat.
+<a name="page_393"><span class="page">Page 393</span></a>
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 757px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig079.png" width="757" height="479" alt="Fig. 79">
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In speed, Beatty had a marked advantage. He could make 29 knots with all
+six of his cruisers and 32 knots with his four <a name="page_394"><span
+class="page">Page 394</span></a> best,&mdash;<i>Queen Mary, Tiger,
+Lion</i>, and <i>Princess Royal</i>. Hipper's squadron could make
+but 28 knots, though the <i>L&uuml;tzow</i> and <i>Derfflinger</i>
+were probably capable of 30.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 3.48 British and German battle cruisers opened fire. According
+to Beatty's report the range at this moment was 18,500 yards. Beatty
+then turned to starboard, assuming a course nearly parallel to that
+of Hipper. Almost immediately, three minutes after the first salvo,
+the <i>Lion</i>, the <i>Tiger</i>, and the <i>Princess Royal</i> were
+hit by shells. In these opening minutes the fire of the Germans
+seems to have been fast and astonishingly accurate. The <i>Lion</i>
+was hit repeatedly, and at four o'clock the roof of one of her
+turrets was blown off. It is said that the presence of mind and
+heroic self-sacrifice of an officer saved the ship from the fate
+that subsequently overwhelmed two of her consorts. By this time
+the range had decreased to 16,000 yards (British reckoning) and
+Beatty shifted his course more to the south to confuse the enemy's
+fire control. Apparently this move did not succeed in its purpose
+for at 4.06 a salvo struck the <i>Indefatigable</i> on a line with
+her after turret, and exploded a magazine. As she staggered out of
+column and began sinking, another salvo smashed into her forward
+decks and she rolled over and sank like a stone.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+About this time the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action, but
+it was not able to do effective service. The range was extreme,
+about 20,000 yards, and being some distance astern of the battle
+cruisers, on account of its inferior speed, it had to contend with
+the battle smoke of the squadron ahead as well as the gradually
+thickening atmospheric conditions. In addition the Germans frequently
+laid smoke screens and zigzagged. Evan-Thomas's division never saw
+more than two enemy ships at a time.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The shift of course taken by Beatty at four o'clock, accompanied
+possibly by a corresponding shift of Hipper, opened the range so
+far in a few minutes that fire slackened on both sides. Beatty
+then swung to port in order to close to effective range. At 4.15
+twelve of his destroyers, acting on the general order to attack
+when conditions were favorable, dashed out toward the German line.
+At the same instant German destroyers, <a name="page_395"><span
+class="page">Page 395</span></a> to the number of fifteen accompanied
+by the light cruiser <i>Regensburg</i>, advanced toward the British
+line, both forces maneuvering to get on the bows of the opposing
+battle cruisers. For this purpose the British flotilla was better
+placed because their battle cruisers were well ahead of the Germans.
+The German destroyers, therefore, concentrated their efforts on the
+battleship division, which turned away to avoid the torpedoes. In
+numbers the advantage lay with the Germans, and a fiercely contested
+action took place between the lines conducted with superb gallantry
+on both sides. The Germans succeeded in breaking up the British
+attack at a cost of two destroyers. Two of the British destroyers
+also were rendered unmanageable and sank later when the High Seas
+Fleet arrived on the scene.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 403px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig080.png" width="403" height="459" alt="Fig. 80">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF JUTLAND, FIRST PHASE</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Action Between Battle Cruiser
+  Forces.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_396"><span class="page">Page 396</span></a> Meanwhile,
+at 4.26, just before the destroyers clashed, a salvo struck the
+<i>Queen Mary</i>, blew up a magazine, and she disappeared with
+practically all on board. Thus the second of Beatty's battle cruisers
+was sent to the bottom with tragic suddenness.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 4.38, Commodore Goodenough, commanding the Second Light Cruiser
+Squadron, who was scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported
+that the German battle fleet was in sight steering north, and gave
+its position. Beatty at once called in his destroyers and turned
+his ships in succession, sixteen points to starboard, ordering
+Evan-Thomas to turn similarly. Thus the capital ships turned right
+about on the opposite course, the battleships following the cruisers
+as before, and all heading for the main fleet which was then about
+fifty miles away to the north. Commodore Goodenough at this point
+used his initiative in commendable fashion. Without orders he kept
+on to the south to establish contact with the German battle fleet
+and hung on its flanks near enough to report its position to the
+commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire, but handled his
+frail ships so skillfully as to escape serious loss. At the same
+time the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect
+in the British system of communication made his reports of bearing
+seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a
+difficulty for the commander in chief, who, fifty miles away, was
+trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Second Phase</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The northward run of the British advance force and the German advance
+force, followed by their main fleet, was uneventful. The situation
+was at this stage exactly reversed. Beatty was endeavoring to lead
+the German forces into the guns of the Grand Fleet, while ostensibly
+he was attempting to escape from a superior force, much as Hipper
+had been doing with relation to Scheer during the first phase.
+Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers continued to engage the
+five German battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards, assisted
+<a name="page_397"><span class="page">Page 397</span></a> by the
+two leading ships of Evan-Thomas's Battle Squadron. The other two
+battleships engaged the head of the advancing German battle fleet
+at the extreme range of 19,000 yards as often as they could make
+out their enemy. The visibility grew worse and apparently neither
+side scored on the other.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As the British main fleet was reported somewhat to the east of
+Beatty's position, he bore toward that quarter; and Hipper, to avoid
+being "T-d" by his enemy, turned to the eastward correspondingly. The
+mistiness increased to such a degree that shortly after five o'clock
+Beatty lost sight of the enemy's battle cruisers and ceased fire for
+half an hour. Between 5.40 and six o'clock, however, conditions were
+better and firing was opened again by the British ships, apparently
+with good effect. Meanwhile clashes had already taken place between
+the light cruiser <i>Chester</i>, attached to the Third Battle
+Squadron of the main fleet, and the light cruisers of the enemy,
+which were far in advance of their battle cruisers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Third Phase</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+We have already noted that as soon as Jellicoe learned of the presence
+of the enemy he ordered Hood, with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+to cut off the German retreat to the Skagerrak and to support Beatty.
+Hood's course had taken him well to the east of where the action was
+in progress. At 5.40 he saw the flashes of guns far to the northwest,
+and immediately changed course in that direction. Fifteen minutes
+later he was able to open fire on German light cruisers, with his
+four destroyers darting ahead to attack with torpedoes. These light
+cruisers, which had just driven off the <i>Chester</i> with heavy
+losses, discharged torpedoes at Hood's battle cruisers and turned
+away. The latter shifted helm to avoid them and narrowly missed being
+hit. One torpedo indeed passed under the <i>Invincible</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At this point another group of four German light cruisers appeared
+and Hood's destroyers advanced to attack them. The fire of the
+cruisers damaged two destroyers though not before one of them, the
+<i>Shark</i>, had torpedoed the German <a name="page_398"><span
+class="page">Page 398</span></a> cruiser <i>Rostock</i>. The
+<i>Shark</i> herself was in turn torpedoed and sunk by a German
+destroyer. At about the same time action had begun between the
+ships of the armored cruiser squadron under Arbuthnot and another
+squadron of German light cruisers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A moment later (at 5.56) Beatty sighted the leaders of the Grand
+Fleet and knew that contact with his support was established. At
+once he changed course to about due east and put on full speed
+in order to head off the German line, and by taking position to
+the eastward, allow the battle fleet to form line astern of his
+battle cruisers. Such an overwhelming force was now concentrated
+on the German light cruisers that they turned back. Of their number
+the <i>Wiesbaden</i> had been disabled by a concentration of fire
+and the <i>Rostock</i> torpedoed. Hipper then made a turn of 180&deg;
+with his battle cruisers in order to get back to the support of
+the battleships which he had left far to the rear. Then he turned
+round again, and continued to lead the German advance. All this
+time he seems to have had no suspicion that the Grand Fleet was
+in the neighborhood.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 767px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig081.png" width="767" height="505" alt="Fig. 81">
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As Beatty dashed across the front of the approaching battle fleet
+he sighted Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron ahead of him and
+signaled him to take station ahead. Accordingly Hood countermarched
+and led Beatty's line in the <i>Invincible</i>. Evan-Thomas was
+by this time so far in the rear of the speedier battle cruisers
+that he was unable to follow with Beatty, and in order to avoid
+confusion with the oncoming battle fleet he turned left 90&deg; in
+order to form astern of the Sixth Battle Division, by this move,
+however, leaving Beatty's cruisers unsupported. Meanwhile the armored
+cruisers of Arbuthnot were already under fire from Hipper's squadron
+and suffering severely. At 6.16 the <i>Defense</i>, the flagship of
+the squadron, blew up; the <i>Warrior</i> was badly disabled, and
+the <i>Black Prince</i> was so crippled as to be sunk during the night
+action. As Evan-Thomas made his turn, one of his battleships, the
+<i>Warspite</i>, was struck by a shell that jammed her steering gear
+in such a way as to send her head on toward the Germans. She served to
+shield the <i>Warrior</i> from destruction, <a name="page_399"></a>
+<a name="page_400"></a><a name="page_401"><span class="page">Page
+401</span></a> but suffered thirty hits from heavy projectiles
+before she was brought under control and taken out of action.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 545px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig082.png" width="545" height="741" alt="Fig. 82">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MAY 31, 1916</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">2nd and 3rd phases</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Between six and 6.15 Jellicoe received bearings from Vice Admiral
+Burney (of the Sixth Battle Division), Evan-Thomas, and Beatty
+which enabled him for the first time to plot accurately the position
+of the German battle fleet. This information revealed the fact
+that previous plotting based on bearings coming from Goodenough
+and others was seriously wrong. The Germans were twelve miles to
+the west of where they were supposed to be. Jellicoe then formed
+line of battle, not on the starboard wing, which was nearest the
+head of the German advance, but on the port wing, which was farthest
+away, and speed was reduced to 14 knots in order to enable the
+battle cruisers to take station at the head of the line. Indeed
+some of the ships in the rear or sixth division had to stop their
+engines to avoid collision during deployment. By this time the
+ships of the sixth division began to come under the shells of the
+German battle fleet and they returned the fire. By half past six
+all sixteen of the German dreadnoughts were firing at the British
+lines, the slow predreadnoughts being so far to the rear as to
+be unable to take part. The battleship fire, however, neither at
+this point nor later showed the extraordinary accuracy displayed
+by the battle cruisers at the beginning, but this may possibly
+be attributed to the gathering mistiness that hung over the sea,
+darkened by the low-lying smoke from the host of ships.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As soon as Scheer realized that he had not only run right into the
+arms of the Grand Fleet, but lay in the worst tactical position
+imaginable with an overwhelming force concentrated on the head
+of his line, he turned away to escape. The battle cruisers (at
+6.30) swung away sharply from east to south, the ships turning
+in succession. Meanwhile the torpedo flotillas tried to cover the
+turn by a gallant attack on the British battle line. At the same
+time smoke screens also were laid to cover the retirement. The
+<i>Invincible</i>, Hood's flagship, which was leading the British
+line, was at this juncture struck by a shell that penetrated her
+armor and exploded a magazine. The ship instantly broke in two and
+went to the bottom, and <a name="page_402"></a><a name="page_403">
+<span class="page">Page 403</span></a> only four officers and two
+men were saved. Almost at the same instant the German battle
+cruiser <i>L&uuml;tzow</i>, Hipper's flagship, was so badly
+disabled by shells and torpedo that she fell out of line helpless.
+Hipper managed, however, to board a destroyer and two hours later
+succeeded in shifting his flag to the <i>Moltke</i>.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 770px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig083.png" width="770" height="523" alt="Fig. 83">
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At 6.35 Scheer performed a difficult maneuver that the fleet had
+practiced for just the situation that existed at this time. He
+wheeled his battleships simultaneously to starboard, forming line
+again on a westerly course. Twenty minutes later, finding that he
+was no longer under fire from the Grand Fleet, he repeated the
+maneuver, the ships turning again to starboard and forming line
+ahead again on an easterly, then southerly course. These changes of
+course were made under cover of smoke screens and were not observed
+by the British.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By this time the Grand Fleet had formed line of battle on a
+southeasterly course and by 7.10 its leaders were concentrating
+their fire on the head of the German line, which was now caught
+under an overwhelming superiority of force. Unfortunately for the
+Germans the visibility conditions at this time were worse for them
+than for their enemy, for while the British ships were nearly or
+quite invisible, the Germans every now and then stood silhouetted
+against the western sky. The British fire at this time was heavy
+and accurate. The German fleet seemed marked for destruction.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+For Scheer it was now imperative to withdraw if he could. Accordingly
+at this juncture he sent out a flotilla of destroyers in a desperate
+effort to cover the retreat of his fleet. They fired a number of
+torpedoes at the English battle line, and retired with the loss
+of one boat. Their stroke succeeded, for Jellicoe turned his whole
+line of battleships away to avoid the torpedoes. Beatty, holding
+his course at the head of the line, signaled Admiral Jerram of
+the <i>King George V</i> to follow astern, but he was evidently
+bound to the orders of his commander in chief. For the second time
+<a name="page_404"><span class="page">Page 404</span></a> that
+day Beatty was left unsupported in his fight at the head of the
+line.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile Scheer's capital ships had simultaneously wheeled away
+in line to the westward under cover of the torpedo attacks and
+smoke screens made by the destroyers. This was the third time within
+an hour that they had effected this maneuver, and the skill with
+which the battleships managed these turns in line under a rain of
+fire speaks well for German seamanship. Meanwhile, to r&euml;enforce
+the covering movement made by the destroyers, Scheer sent out his
+battle cruisers in a sortie against Beatty, who was pressing hard
+on the head of the German line. The following account from Commander
+von Hase of the <i>Derfflinger</i>, which led this sortie, is
+interesting not only for its description of what occurred at this
+time but also as a picture of a personal experience of the terrific
+fire that the battle cruisers of both sides had to sustain throughout
+the greater part of the engagement. It was on them that the brunt
+of the fighting fell. The narrative is quoted from the pages of
+the <i>Naval and Military Record</i>:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"By now our Commander-in-Chief had realized the danger threatening
+our fleet, the van of which was enclosed in a semicircle by the
+hostile fleet. We were, in fact, absolutely 'in the soup' (in absoluten
+Wurstkessel)! There was only one way to get clear of this tactically
+disadvantageous position: to turn the whole fleet about and steer on
+an opposite course. First to evade this dangerous encirclement. But
+the maneuver must be unobserved and executed without interference.
+The battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats must cover the movement of the
+fleet. At about[1] 9.12 the Commander-in-Chief made the signal to
+alter course, and almost simultaneously made by W/T [wireless] the
+historic signal to the battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats: 'Charge
+the enemy!' (Ran an den Feind!) Without turning a hair the captain
+ordered 'Full speed ahead, course south-east.' Followed by the
+<i>Seydlitz, Molke</i>, and <i>Von der Tann</i>, we steamed at
+first south-east, then, from 9.15 onward, directly towards the head
+of the enemy's line.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: There was a difference of two hours in time between
+the German and the English standard.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"And now an infernal fire was opened on us, especially <a
+name="page_405"><span class="page">Page 405</span></a> on the
+<i>Derfflinger</i>, as leading ship. Several ships were concentrating
+their fire upon us. I selected a target and fired as rapidly as
+possible. The range closed from 12,000 to 8,000 meters, and still
+we steamed full speed ahead into this inferno of fire, presenting
+a splendid target to the enemy, while he himself was very difficult
+to see. Salvo after salvo fell in our immediate vicinity, and shell
+after shell struck our ship. They were the most exciting minutes.
+I could no longer communicate with Lt. von Stosch (who was in the
+foretop control), as the telephone and voice-pipes had been shot
+away, so I had to rely an my own observations to direct the fire.
+At 9.13, previous to which all four 12 in. turrets were in action,
+a serious catastrophe occurred. A 15 in. shell penetrated the armor
+of No. 3 turret and exploded inside. The gallant turret captain, Lt.
+von Boltenstern, had both his legs torn off, and with him perished
+practically the entire guns' crew. The explosion ignited three
+cartridges, flames from which reached the working chamber, where
+eight more cartridges were set on fire, and passed down to the
+magazine, igniting still more cartridges. They burned fiercely,
+the flames roaring high above the turret&mdash;but they burned
+only, they did not explode&mdash;as our enemy's cartridges had
+done&mdash;and that saved the ship! Still, the effect of the burning
+cartridges was catastrophic; the flames killed everything within
+their reach. Of the 78 men of the turret crew only five escaped,
+some badly wounded, by crawling out through the holes for expelling
+empty cartridge cases. The remaining 73 men died instantly. A few
+seconds after this catastrophe another disaster befell us. A 15
+in. shell pierced the shield of No. 4 turret and burst inside,
+causing frightful destruction. With the exception of one man, who
+was blown out of the turret hatch by the blast of air, the entire
+crew, including all the men in the magazines and shell-rooms, 80
+souls in all, were instantly killed. All the cartridges which had
+been taken out of their metal cases were ignited, so that flames
+were now shooting sky-high from both the after turrets....
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"The enemy's shooting was splendid. Shell after shell crashed into
+us, and my heart stood still as I thought of what must be happening
+inside the ship. My thoughts were rudely disturbed. Suddenly it
+was to us as if the world had come to an end. A terrific roar,
+a mighty explosion, and then darkness <a name="page_406"><span
+class="page">Page 406</span></a> fell upon us. We shook under a
+tremendous blow, which lifted the conning-tower bodily off its
+base, to which it sank back vibrating. A heavy shell had struck
+the gunnery control station about 20 inches from me. The shell
+burst, but did not penetrate because it had hit the thick armor at
+an angle, but huge pieces of plating were torn away.... We found,
+however, that all the artillery connections were undamaged. Splinters
+had penetrated the lookout slits of the conning-tower, wounding
+several people inside. The explosion had forced open the door,
+which jammed, and two men were unable to move it. But help from an
+unexpected quarter was at hand. Again we heard a terrific roar and
+crash, and with the noise of a thunderbolt a 15 in. shell exploded
+beneath the bridge. The blast of air swept away everything that was
+not firmly riveted down, and the chart-house disappeared bodily.
+But the astounding thing was that this same air pressure closed
+the door of the conning-tower! The Englishman was polite; having
+first opened the door, he carefully shut it again for us. I searched
+with my glass for the enemy, but, although the salvos were still
+falling about us, we could see practically nothing of him; all
+that was really visible were the huge, golden-red flames from the
+muzzles of his guns.... Without much hope of hurting the enemy I
+fired salvo after salvo from the forward turrets. I could feel
+how our shooting was calming the nerves of the crew. Had we not
+fired at this moment the whole ship's company would have been
+overpowered by a great despair, for everyone knew that a few minutes
+more of this would finish us. But so long as we fired things could
+not be so bad with us. The medium guns fired also, but only two
+of the six 5.9's on one side were still in action. The fourth gun
+was split from end to end by a burst in the muzzle, and the third
+was shot to pieces...."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The battle-cruisers were recalled just in time&mdash;so it would
+appear&mdash;to save them from annihilation, and Com. von Hase
+proceeds:
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"All hands were now busy quelling the fires. Thick clouds of yellow
+gas still poured from both after turrets, but the flooding of the
+magazines soon got rid of this. None of us had believed that a
+ship could stand so many heavy hits. Some twenty 15 in. hits were
+counted after the battle, and about the same number of bad hits from
+smaller calibers. The <i>L&uuml;tzow</i> <a name="page_407"><span
+class="page">Page 407</span></a> was out of sight (she sank later),
+but the <i>Seydlitz, Moltke</i>, and <i>Von der Tann</i> were still
+with us. They, too, had been badly punished, the <i>Seydlitz</i>
+worst of all. Flames still roared from one of her turrets, and
+all the other ships were burning. The bow of the <i>Seydlitz</i>
+was deep in the water. Every battle-cruiser had suffered severe
+casualties.... But the death charge had achieved its purpose by
+covering the retreat of the battle fleet.... Our ship was very
+heavily battered, and in many places the compartments were mere
+heaps of d&eacute;bris. But vital parts were not hit, and, thanks
+to the strong armor, the engines, boilers, steering gear, and nearly
+all auxiliaries were undamaged. For a long time the engine-room
+was filled with noxious fumes, necessitating the use of gas masks.
+The entire ship was littered with thousands of large and small
+shell splinters, among which we found two practically undamaged
+15 in. shell caps, which were later used in the wardroom as wine
+coolers. The belt armour was pierced several times, but either
+the leaks were stopped or the inflow of water was localized in
+small compartments. In Wilhelmshaven we buried our dead, nearly
+200 in all."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+By 8 o'clock the German battleships had vanished, with the British
+steering westward by divisions in pursuit. But never again did
+the two battle fleets regain touch with each other. Occasional
+contact with an enemy vessel was made by other units of Jellicoe's
+force. About 8.20 another destroyer attack was threatened, and
+again Jellicoe swerved away, at the same time, however, sending
+the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and two destroyer flotillas,
+which succeeded in breaking up the attempt. At 8.30 he reformed
+his fleet in column and continued on a southwesterly course until
+9 o'clock.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Fourth Phase</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As darkness came on, Jellicoe, declining to risk his ships under
+conditions most favorable to torpedo attack, arranged his battleships
+in four squadrons a mile apart, with destroyer flotillas five miles
+astern, and sent a mine-layer to lay a mine field in the neighborhood
+of the Vyl lightship, covering the route over which the Germans were
+expected to pass if they <a name="page_408"><span class="page">Page
+408</span></a> attempted to get home via the Horn Reef. He then
+headed southeast. Beatty also drew off from pursuit with his battle
+cruisers. Jellicoe's plan was to avoid a general night action, but
+to hold such a position as to compel the Germans to fight again
+the following morning in order to reach their bases. During the
+night (between ten and 2.35) there were several sharp conflicts,
+mainly between the destroyers and light cruisers of the opposing
+fleets, with considerable loss on both sides. On the British side,
+two armored cruisers, <i>Black Prince</i> and <i>Warrior</i>, went
+down&mdash;both crippled by damages sustained during the day&mdash;and
+five destroyers. Six others were severely damaged. On the German
+side, the battle cruiser <i>L&uuml;tzow</i> sank as a result of
+her injuries, the predreadnought battleship <i>Pommern</i> was
+blown up by a torpedo, three light cruisers were sunk, and four
+or five other ships suffered from torpedo or mine.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The contacts made by British destroyers and cruisers confirm the
+accounts of the Germans as to the course of their fleet during
+the night. About nine o'clock Scheer changed course sharply from
+west to southeast and cut through the rear of the British fleet.
+At dawn, about 2.40, he was twenty miles to eastward of Jellicoe on
+the road to Wilhelmshaven. At noon the greater part of the German
+fleet was safe in port. Some of the lighter ships, to escape the
+assaults of the British destroyers during the night, headed north
+and got home by way of the Skagerrak and the Kiel Canal.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Jellicoe had avoided a night pursuit for the sake of fighting on
+better terms the next morning, but at dawn he found his destroyers
+scattered far and wide. Judging it unwise to pursue the High Seas
+Fleet without a screening force, and discovering by directional
+wireless that it was already south of Horn Reef and in the neighborhood
+of the mine fields, he gave up the idea of renewing the engagement
+and turned north. He spent the forenoon in sweeping the scene of
+the previous day's fighting, collecting his dispersed units, and
+then returned to his bases.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The claim of victory, which was promptly and loudly made by the
+German press, is absurd enough. After the Grand Fleet arrived there
+could be only one thought for the Germans <a name="page_409"><span
+class="page">Page 409</span></a> and that was a fighting retreat.
+Nevertheless, they had every reason to be proud of what they had
+done. They had met a force superior by a ratio of about 8 to 5
+and had escaped after inflicting nearly twice as much damage as
+they had sustained. These losses may be compared by means of the
+following table[1]:
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="top" rowspan="17">BRITISH,</td>
+    <td class="top" rowspan="4">Three&nbsp;Battle&nbsp;Cruisers,</td>
+    <td>QUEEN&nbsp;MARY</td>
+    <td class="right">26,350</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr>
+<tr><td>INDEFATIGABLE</td>
+    <td class="right">18,800</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>INVINCIBLE</td>
+    <td class="right">17,250</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td colspan="3">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td class="top" rowspan="4">Three&nbsp;Armored&nbsp;Cruisers,</td>
+    <td>DEFENSE</td>
+    <td class="right">14,600</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>WARRIOR</td>
+    <td class="right">13,550</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>BLACK&nbsp;PRINCE</td>
+    <td class="right">13,550</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td colspan="3">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td class="top" rowspan="9">Eight&nbsp;Destroyers,</td>
+    <td>TIPPERARY</td>
+    <td class="right">1,430</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>NESTOR</td>
+    <td class="right">890</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>NOMAD</td>
+    <td class="right">890</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>TURBULENT</td>
+    <td class="right">1,100</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>FORTUNE</td>
+    <td class="right">965</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>ARDENT</td>
+    <td class="right">935</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>SHARK</td>
+    <td class="right">935</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>SPARROWHAWK</td>
+    <td class="right_bb">935</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Total</td>
+    <td class="right">111,980</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr>
+<tr><td colspan="5">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="top" rowspan="13">GERMANS,</td>
+    <td>One&nbsp;Battle&nbsp;Cruiser</td>
+    <td>LUETZOW</td>
+    <td class="right">26,180</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr>
+<tr><td>One&nbsp;Pre-dreadnought,</td>
+    <td>POMMERN</td>
+    <td class="right">13,200</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td rowspan="4">Four&nbsp;Light&nbsp;Cruisers,</td>
+    <td>WIESBADEN</td>
+    <td class="right">5,400</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>ELBING</td>
+    <td class="right">4,500</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>ROSTOCK</td>
+    <td class="right">4,900</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>FRAUENLOB</td>
+    <td class="right">2,700</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td colspan="4">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="top" rowspan="6">Five&nbsp;Destroyers,</td>
+    <td>V-4</td>
+    <td class="right">570</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>V-48</td>
+    <td class="right">750</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>V-27</td>
+    <td class="right">640</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>V-29</td>
+    <td class="right">640</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>S-33</td>
+    <td class="right_bb">700</td><td class="center">"</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Total</td>
+    <td class="right">60,180</td><td class="center">tons</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Personnel, killed and wounded: BRITISH, about 6,600: GERMANS, 3,076.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Figures in these tables taken from Lieut. Comdr. H.
+H. Frost, U. S. N., <i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings</i>, Jan.,
+1920, p. 84.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+With all allowance for the poor visibility conditions and the deepening
+twilight, it must be admitted also that Scheer handled <a
+name="page_410"><span class="page">Page 410</span></a> his ships
+with great skill. Caught in a noose by an overwhelming force, he
+disentangled himself by means of the torpedo attacks of his destroyer
+flotillas and turned away under cover of their smoke screens. After
+nightfall he boldly cut through the rear of the British fleet in
+battle line, and reached his base in safety with the great bulk
+of his ships. Meanwhile at practically all stages of the fighting
+German gunnery was both rapid and accurate, the seamanship was
+admirable, and there was no lack of courage of the highest order.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As to material, Admiral Jellicoe notes the superiority of the German
+fleet in range-finding devices, searchlights, smoke screens, a
+star shell&mdash;unknown to the British and invaluable for night
+fighting&mdash;and in the armor piercing quality of the shells.
+Moreover the Germans were completely equipped with systems of director
+firing, while the British were not. According to Admiral Sir Percy
+Scott,[1] "at the Battle of Jutland ... the commander in chief
+had only six ships of his fleet completely fitted with director
+firing ... he had not a single cruiser in the fleet fitted for
+director firing."
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">Fifty Years in the Royal Navy</span>,
+p. 278.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The greatest superiority of all probably lay in the structural
+features of the newer German ships. For some years prior to the
+war Admiral von Tirpitz had devoted himself to the problem of under
+water protection, to localize the effect of torpedo and mine on
+the hull of a ship. To quote the words of von Tirpitz:[2]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: <span class="sc">My Memoirs</span>, Vol. I, p. 171.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"We built a section of a modern ship by itself and carried out
+experimental explosions on it with torpedo heads, carefully testing
+the result every time. We tested the possibility of weakening the
+force of the explosion by letting the explosive gases burst in
+empty compartments without meeting any resistance. We ascertained
+the most suitable steel for the different structural parts, and
+found further that the effect of the explosion was nullified if
+we compelled it to pulverize coal in any considerable quantity.
+This resulted in a special arrangement of the coal bunkers. We
+were then able to meet the force of the explosion ... by a strong,
+carefully constructed <a name="page_411"><span class="page">Page
+411</span></a> steel wall which finally secured the safety of the
+interior of the ship."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The only German armored ship that succumbed to the blow of a single
+torpedo was the <i>Pommern</i>, an old vessel, built before the
+fruits of these experiments were embodied in the German fleet. The
+labor of von Tirpitz was well justified by the results, as may be
+seen by the instantaneous fashion in which the three British battle
+cruisers went to the bottom, compared with the ability of the German
+battle cruisers to stand terrific pounding and yet stay afloat and
+keep going. According to the testimony of a German officer,[1]
+the <i>L&uuml;tzow</i> was literally shot to pieces in the battle
+and even then it took three torpedoes to settle her. Actually she
+was sunk by opening her seacocks to prevent her possible capture.
+The remarkable ability of the battle cruiser <i>G&ouml;ben</i>, in
+Turkish waters, to survive shell, mines, and torpedo, bears the
+same testimony, as does the <i>Mainz</i>, which, in the action of
+the Heligoland Bight had to be sunk by one of her own officers, as
+in the case of the <i>L&uuml;tzow</i>. It is possible that Jellicoe
+assumed an inferiority of the British armor piercing shell because
+of this power of the German ships to stay afloat. But photographs
+published after the armistice showed that British shells penetrated
+the 11-inch turret armor of the <i>Seydlitz</i> and the 13-inch
+of the <i>Derfflinger</i> with frightful effect. The difference
+was in the fact that they did not succeed in sinking those ships,
+which, after all is the chief object of a shell, and this must
+be attributed to better under-water construction.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Quoted in <i>Naval and Military Record</i>, Dec. 24,
+1919, p. 822.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The only criticism it seems possible to suggest on Scheer's tactics
+is the unwariness of his pursuit, which might so easily have led
+to the total destruction of the German fleet. Strangely enough,
+although a Zeppelin hovered over the British fleet at dawn of the
+day after the battle, no aircraft of any kind scouted ahead of the
+Germans the day before. In pursuing Beatty, Scheer had to take
+a chance, well aware that if the Grand Fleet were within reach,
+Beatty's wireless would bring it upon him. But Scheer was evidently
+perfectly willing to <a name="page_412"><span class="page">Page
+412</span></a> risk the encounter. Such criticism as arose in
+Germany&mdash;from Captain Persius, for example&mdash;centered
+on "Tirpitz's faulty constructional methods"; which, in the light
+of the facts of the battle would seem to be the very last thing
+to hit upon.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As for types and weapons it is clear that the armored cruisers
+served only as good targets and death traps. The British would
+have been better off if every armored cruiser had been left at
+home. The dominating feature of the story is the influence of the
+torpedo on Jellicoe's tactics. It is fair to say that it was the
+Parthian tactics of the German destroyer, both actual and potential,
+that saved the High Seas Fleet and robbed the British of a greater
+Trafalgar. At every crisis in the battle it was either what the
+German destroyer did or might do that governed the British commander's
+maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather
+than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers
+might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost
+all contact with their enemy for the rest of the battle, it was
+because of a destroyer attack. At this time eleven destroyers
+accomplished the feat of driving 27 dreadnoughts from the field!
+Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril
+of destroyer attacks under cover of darkness, and finally Jellicoe
+decided not to risk an action the following morning because his
+capital ships had no screening forces against the torpedo of the
+enemy. It is worth noting in this connection that although the
+Admiralty were aware of the battle in progress, they held back
+the Harwich force of destroyers and light cruisers which would
+have proved a welcome re&euml;nforcement in pursuing the retreating
+fleet. The reason for this decision has never been published.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In connection with the important part played by the German destroyers
+at Jutland it is worth remarking that before the war it was the
+Admiralty doctrine that destroyers could not operate successfully
+by day, and they were accordingly painted black for night service.
+The German destroyers were painted gray. After Jutland the British
+flotillas also were painted the battleship gray.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_413"><span class="page">Page 413</span></a> Naturally
+the failure of the superior fleet to crush the inferior one aroused
+a storm of criticism, the most severe emanating from English naval
+writers. The sum and substance is the charge of overcaution on the
+part of the British Commander in Chief. It is held that Jellicoe
+should have formed his battle line on his starboard instead of
+his port wing, thus turning toward the enemy and concentrating
+on the head of their column at once. Forming on the port division
+caused the battle fleet to swerve away from the enemy and open
+the range just at the critical moment of contact, leaving Beatty
+unsupported in his dash across the head of the enemy's line. It is
+said that the latter even sent a signal to the <i>Marlborough</i>
+for the battleships to fall in astern of him, and the failure to
+do so made his maneuver fruitless. Apparently this message was
+not transmitted to the flagship at the time. In answer Jellicoe
+explains in great detail that the preliminary reports received
+from Goodenough and others as to the position of the High Seas
+Fleet were so meager and conflicting that he could not form line
+of battle earlier than he did, and secondly that deploying on the
+starboard division at the moment of sighting the enemy would have
+thrown the entire battle fleet into confusion, blanketed their
+fire, and created a dangerous opening for torpedo attack from the
+destroyers at the head of the German column. On this point Scheer
+agrees with the critics. Deploying on the starboard division instead
+of the port, he says, "would have greatly impeded our movements and
+rendered a fresh attack on the enemy's line extremely difficult."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The second point of criticism rested on the turning away of the
+battleships at the critical point of the torpedo attack at 7.20,
+under cover of which the German battleships wheeled to westward and
+disappeared. Jellicoe's reply is that if he had swung to starboard,
+turning toward the enemy, he would have headed into streams of
+approaching torpedoes under conditions of mist and smoke that were
+ideal for torpedo attack, and if he had maintained position in line
+ahead he would have courted heavy losses. In connection with this
+turn he calls attention to the fact that British light cruisers <a
+name="page_414"><span class="page">Page 414</span></a> and destroyers
+could not be used to deliver a counter attack because, on account of
+the rapid changes of course and formation made by the battlefleet,
+they had been unable to reach their proper station in the van.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Thirdly, if conditions for night battle were too risky why did
+the Grand Fleet fail to keep sufficient touch with the enemy by
+means of its light flotillas so as to be informed of his movements
+and prevent his escape? There were frequent contacts during that
+short night, and the Germans were sighted steering southeast. The
+attacks made by British destroyers certainly threw the German line
+into confusion, and some of the light vessels were driven to the
+north, reaching German bases by way of the Baltic. Nevertheless
+the fleet succeeded in cutting through without serious loss. To
+this there seems to be no answer.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Lastly, to the query why Jellicoe did not seek another action in
+the morning, as originally intended, he replies that he discovered
+by directional wireless that the Germans were already safe between
+the mine fields and the coast, and that he could not safely proceed
+without his screening force of destroyers and light cruisers, which,
+after their night operations, were widely scattered. From German
+accounts, however, we find no mention of a shelter behind mine
+fields, but astonishment at the fact that they were permitted to go
+on their way unmolested. Morning found the two fleets only twenty
+miles apart, and the Germans had a half day's steaming before they
+could reach port. They were in no condition to fight. The battleship
+<i>Ostfriesland</i> had struck a mine and had to be towed. The
+battle cruiser <i>Seydlitz</i> had to be beached to keep her from
+sinking, and other units were limping along with their gun decks
+almost awash.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Certainly the tactics of Jellicoe do not suggest those of Blake,
+Hawke, or Nelson. They do not fit Farragut's motto&mdash;borrowed from
+Danton[1]&mdash;"l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace," or
+Napoleon's "frappez vite, frappez fort." War, as has been observed
+before, cannot be waged without taking risks. The British had a heavy
+margin to gamble on. <a name="page_415"><span class="page">Page
+415</span></a> As it happened, 23 out of the entire 28 battleships
+came out of the fight without so much as a scratch on their paint;
+and, after deployment, only one out of the battle line of 27
+dreadnoughts received a single hit. This was the <i>Colossus</i>,
+which had four men wounded by a shell.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: And borrowed by Danton from Cicero.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The touchstone of naval excellence is Nelson. As Mahan has so ably
+pointed out, while weapons change principles remain. Dewey, in
+deciding to take the chances involved in a night entry of Manila
+Bay did so in answer to his own question, "What would Farragut
+do?" Hence in considering Jutland one may take a broader view than
+merely a criticism of tactics. In a word, does the whole conduct
+of the affair reveal the method and spirit of Nelson?
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At Trafalgar there was no need for a deployment after the enemy
+was sighted because in the words of the famous Memorandum, "the
+order of sailing is to be the order of battle." The tactics to
+be followed when the French appeared had been carefully explained
+by Nelson to his commanders. No signal was needed&mdash;except
+the fine touch of inspiration in "England expects every man to
+do his duty." In brief, the British fleet had been so thoroughly
+indoctrinated, and the plan was so simple, that there was no room
+for hesitation, uncertainty, or dependence on the flagship for
+orders at the last minute. It is hard to see evidence of any such
+indoctrination of the Grand Fleet before Jutland.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Again, Nelson was, by example and precept, constantly insisting
+on the initiative of the subordinate. "The Second in Command will
+... have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon
+the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
+destroyed.... Captains are to look to their particular line as
+their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor
+perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his
+ship alongside that of an enemy." At Jutland, despite the urgent
+signals of Beatty at two critical moments, neither Burney of the
+sixth division nor Jerram of the first felt free to act independently
+of the orders of the Commander in Chief. The latter tried, as Nelson
+emphatically <a name="page_416"><span class="page">Page 416</span></a>
+did not, to control from the flagship every movement of the entire
+fleet.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Further, if naval history has taught anything it has established
+a point so closely related to the responsibility and initiative
+of the subordinate as to be almost a part of it; namely, a great
+fleet that fights in a single rigid line ahead never achieves a
+decisive victory. Blake, Tromp, and de Ruyter fought with squadrons,
+expecting&mdash;indeed demanding&mdash;initiative on the part of
+their flag officers. That was the period when great and decisive
+victories were won. The close of the 17th century produced the
+"Fighting Instructions," requiring the unbroken line ahead, and
+there followed a hundred years of indecisive battles and bungled
+opportunities. Then Nelson came and revived the untrammeled tactics
+of the days of Blake with the added glory of his own genius. It
+appears that at Jutland the battleships were held to a rigid unit
+of fleet formation as in the days of the Duke of York or Admiral
+Graves. And concentration with a long line of dreadnoughts is no
+more possible to-day than it was with a similar line of two-decked
+sailing ships a century and a half ago.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Finally, in the matter of spirit, the considerations that swayed
+the movements of the Grand Fleet at all stages were apparently
+those of what the enemy might do instead of what might be done
+to the enemy, the very antithesis of the spirit of Nelson. It is
+no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander in Chief
+that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his ships.
+The existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the
+Allied cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging
+on its use. But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the
+British fleet exist merely to maintain a numerical preponderance
+over its enemy or to crush that enemy&mdash;whatever the cost?
+If the battle of Jutland receives the stamp of approval as the
+best that could have been done, then the British or the American
+officer of the future will know that he is expected primarily to
+"play safe." But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or
+Nelson, the men who made the traditions of the Service and forged
+the anchors of the British Empire.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_417"><span class="page">Page 417</span></a> Thus
+the great battle turned out to be indecisive; in fact, it elated
+the Germans with a feeling of success and depressed the British
+with a keen sense of failure. Nevertheless, the control of the
+sea remained in the hands of the English, and never again did the
+High Seas Fleet risk another encounter. The relative positions
+at sea of the two adversaries therefore remained unaltered.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On the other hand, if the British had destroyed the German fleet
+the victory would have been priceless. As Jervis remarked at Cape
+St. Vincent, "A victory is very essential to England at this hour."
+The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in Allied prospects. The Verdun
+offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the
+Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians
+had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation
+of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic
+suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of the
+war. Without a German battle fleet, the British could have forced the
+fighting almost to the very harbors of the German coast&mdash;bottling
+up every exit by a barrage of mines. The blockade, therefore, could
+have been drawn close to the coast defenses. Moreover, with the High
+Seas Fleet gone, the British fleet could have entered and taken
+possession of the Baltic, which throughout the war remained a German
+lake. By this move England would have threatened the German Baltic
+coast with invasion and extended her blockade in a highly important
+locality, cutting off the trade between Sweden and Germany. She
+would also have come to the relief of Russia, which was suffering
+terrible losses from the lack of munitions. Indeed it would have
+saved that ally from the collapse that withdrew her from the war.
+With no German "fleet in being" great numbers of workers in English
+industry and vast quantities of supplies might have been transferred
+to the support of the army. The threat of invasion would have been
+removed, and the large army that was kept in England right up to the
+crisis of March, 1918,[1] would have been free to reenforce the army
+at the front. Finally, without the personnel <a name="page_418"><span
+class="page">Page 418</span></a> of the German fleet there could have
+been no ruthless submarine campaign the year after, such as actually
+came so near to winning the war. Thus, while the German claim to
+a triumph that drove the British from the seas is ridiculous, it
+is equally so to argue, as the First Lord of the Admiralty did,
+that there was no need of a British victory at Jutland, that all
+the fruits of victory were gained as it was. The subsequent history
+of the war tells a different tale.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: A quarter of a million men were sent from England at
+this time.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Grand Fleet</span>, 1914-1916, Admiral Viscount
+  Lord Jellicoe of Scapa, 1919.<br>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The German High Seas Fleet in the World War</span>,
+  Vice Admiral von Scheer, 1920.<br>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Battle of Jutland</span>, Commander Carlyon
+  Bellairs, M. P., 1920.<br>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Naval Annual</span>, 1919, Earl Brassey.<br>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">A Description of the Battle of Jutland</span>, Lieut.
+  Commander H. H. Frost, U. S. N., in <span class="sc">U. S. Naval
+  Institute Proceedings</span>, vol. 45, pp. 1829 ff, 2019 ff; vol.
+  46, pp. 61 ff.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The British Navy in Battle</span>, A. H. Pollen,
+  1919.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_419"><span class="page">Page 419</span></a>
+CHAPTER XVIII</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+THE WORLD WAR [<i>Continued</i>]: COMMERCE WARFARE
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Interdiction of enemy trade has always been the great weapon of
+sea power; and hence, though mines, submarines, and the menace
+of the High Seas Fleet itself made a close blockade of the German
+coast impossible, Great Britain in the World War steadily extended
+her efforts to cut off Germany's intercourse with the overseas
+world. Germany, on the other hand, while unwilling or unable to
+take the risks of a contest for surface control of the sea, waged
+cruiser warfare on British and Allied commerce, first by surface
+vessels, and, when these were destroyed, by submarines. In the
+policies adopted by each belligerent there is an evident analogy to
+the British blockade and the French commerce destroying campaigns
+of the Napoleonic Wars. And just as in the earlier conflict British
+sea power impelled Napoleon to a ruinous struggle for the domination
+of Europe, so in the World War, though in a somewhat different
+fashion, the blockade worked disaster for Germany.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+"The consequences of the blockade," writes the German General von
+Freytag-Loringhoven, "showed themselves at once. Although we succeeded
+in establishing our war economics by our internal strength, yet
+the unfavorable state of the world economic situation was felt by
+us throughout the war. That alone explains why our enemies found
+ever fresh possibilities of resistance, because the sea stood open
+to them, and why victories which would otherwise have been absolutely
+decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not bring us
+nearer peace."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_420"><span class="page">Page 420</span></a> For each
+group of belligerents, indeed, the enemy's commerce warfare assumed
+a vital significance. "No German success on land," declares the
+conservative British Annual Register for 1919, "could have ruined or
+even very gravely injured the English-speaking powers. The success
+of the submarine campaign, on the other hand, would have left the
+United States isolated and have placed the Berlin Government in
+a position to dominate most of the rest of the world." "The war
+is won for us," declared General von Hindenburg on July 2, 1917,
+"if we can withstand the enemy attacks until the submarine has
+done its work."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Commerce warfare at once involves a third party, the neutral; and
+it therefore appears desirable, before tracing the progress of
+this warfare, to outline briefly the principles of international
+law which, by a slow and tortuous process, have grown up defining
+the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents in naval war.
+<i>Blockade</i> is among the most fundamental of these rights accorded
+to the belligerent, upon the conditions that the blockade shall be
+limited to enemy ports or coasts, confined within specified limits,
+and made so effective as to create evident danger to traffic. It
+assumes control of the sea by the blockading navy, and, before the
+days of mines and submarines, it was enforced by a cordon of ships
+off the enemy coast. A blockade stops direct trade or intercourse
+of any kind.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Whether or not a blockade is established, a belligerent has the
+right to attempt the prevention of <i>trade in contraband</i>.
+A neutral nation is under no obligation whatever to restrain its
+citizens from engaging in this trade. In preventing it, however,
+a belligerent warship may stop, visit, and search any merchant
+vessel on the high seas. If examination of the ship's papers and
+search show fraud, contraband cargo, offense in respect to blockade,
+enemy ownership or service, the vessel may be taken as a prize,
+subject to adjudication in the belligerent's prize courts. The
+right of merchant vessels to carry defensive armament is well
+established; but resistance justifies destruction. Under certain
+circumstances prizes may be destroyed <a name="page_421"><span
+class="page">Page 421</span></a> at sea, after removal of the ship's
+papers and full provision for the safety of passengers and crew.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The Declaration of London,[1] drawn up in 1909, was an attempt to
+restate and secure general acceptance of these principles, with
+notable modifications. Lists were drawn up of <i>absolute</i> contraband
+(munitions, etc., adapted obviously if not exclusively for use in
+war), <i>conditional</i> contraband (including foodstuffs, clothing,
+rolling stock, etc., susceptible of use in war but having non-warlike
+uses as well), and free goods (including raw cotton and wool, hides,
+and ores). The most significant provision of the Declaration was
+that the doctrine of <i>continuous voyage</i> should apply only to
+absolute contraband. This doctrine, established by Great Britain
+in the French wars and expanded by the United States in the American
+Civil War, holds that the ultimate enemy destination of a cargo
+determines its character, regardless of transshipment in a neutral
+port and subsequent carriage by sea or land. The Declaration of
+London was never ratified by Great Britain, and was observed for
+only a brief period in the first months of the war. Had it been
+ratified and observed, Germany would have been free to import all
+necessary supplies, other than munitions, through neutral states
+on her frontiers.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Printed in full in <span class="sc">International Law
+Topics</span> of the U. S. Naval War College, 1910, p. 169 ff.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Blockade of Germany</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Unable to establish a close blockade, and not venturing at once to
+advance the idea of a "long range" blockade, England was nevertheless
+able to impose severe restrictions upon Germany by extending the
+lists of contraband, applying the doctrine of continuous voyage
+to both absolute and conditional contraband, and throwing upon the
+owners of cargoes the burden of proof as to destination. Cotton
+still for a time entered Germany, and some exports were permitted.
+But on March 1, 1915, in retaliation for Germany's declaration
+of a "war area" around the British Isles, Great Britain asserted
+her purpose to establish what amounted to a complete embargo <a
+name="page_422"><span class="page">Page 422</span></a> on German
+trade, holding herself free, in the words of Premier Asquith, "to
+detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy
+destination, ownership, or origin." In a note of protest on March 30,
+the United States virtually recognized the legitimacy of a long-range
+blockade&mdash;an innovation of seemingly wide possibilities&mdash;and
+confined its objections to British interference with lawful trade
+between neutrals, amounting in effect to a blockade of neutral
+ports.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As a matter of fact, in spite of British efforts, there had been an
+immense increase of indirect trade with Germany through neutrals.
+While American exports to Germany in 1915 were $154,000,000 less
+than in 1913, and in fact practically ceased altogether, American
+exports to Holland and the Scandinavian states increased by
+$158,000,000. This trade continued up to the time when the United
+States entered the war, after which all the restrictions which
+England had employed were given a sharper application. By a simple
+process of substitution, European neutrals had been able to import
+commodities for home use, and export their own products to Germany.
+Now, in order to secure supplies at all, they were forced to sign
+agreements which put them on rations and gave the Western Powers
+complete control of their exports to Germany.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The effect of the Allied blockade upon Germany is suggested by the
+accompanying chart. In the later stages of the war it created a
+dearth of important raw materials, crippled war industries, brought
+the country to the verge of starvation, and caused a marked lowering
+of national efficiency and morale.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Germany protested vigorously to the United States for allowing
+her foodstuffs to be shut out of Germany while at the same time
+shipping to England vast quantities of munitions. Throughout the
+controversy, however, Great Britain profited by the fact that while
+her methods caused only financial injury to neutrals, those employed
+by Germany destroyed or imperiled human lives.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_423"><span class="page">Page 423</span></a>
+<i>The Submarine Campaign</i>
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 556px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig084.png" width="556" height="375" alt="Fig. 84">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">From <i>The Blockade of Germany</i>, Alonzo
+  E. Taylor, <span class="sc">World's Work</span>, Oct. 1919.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">Decreased supply of commodities in successive
+  years of the war.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The German submarine campaign may be dated from February 18, 1915,
+when Germany, citing as a precedent Great Britain's establishment
+of a military area in the North Sea, proclaimed a <i>war zone</i>
+"in the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole
+English Channel," within which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk
+without assurance of safety to passengers or crew. Furthermore, as
+a means of keeping neutrals out of British waters, Germany declared
+she would assume no responsibility for destruction of neutral ships
+within this zone. What this meant was to all intents and purposes a
+"paper" submarine blockade of the British Isles. Its illegitimacy
+arose from the fact that it was conducted surreptitiously over a
+vast area, and was only in the slightest degree effective, causing a
+destruction <a name="page_424"><span class="page">Page 424</span></a>
+each month of less than one percent of the traffic. Had it been
+restricted to narrow limits, it would have been still less effective,
+owing to the facility of countermeasures in a small area.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Determined, however, upon a spectacular demonstration of its
+possibilities, Germany first published danger notices in American
+newspapers, and then, on May 7, 1915, sank the unarmed Cunard liner
+<i>Lusitania</i> off the Irish coast, with a loss of 1198 lives,
+including 102 Americans. In spite of divided American sentiment and
+a strong desire for peace, this act came little short of bringing the
+United States into the war. Having already declared its intention to
+hold Germany to "strict accountability," the United States Government
+now stated that a second offense would be regarded as "deliberately
+unfriendly," and after a lengthy interchange of notes secured the
+pledge that "liners will not be sunk without warning and without
+safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do
+not try to escape or offer resistance." Violations of this pledge,
+further controversies, and increased friction with neutrals marked the
+next year or more, during which, however, sinkings did not greatly
+exceed the level of about 150,000 tons a month already attained.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+During this period Allied countermeasures were chiefly of a defensive
+character, including patrol of coastal areas, diversion of traffic
+from customary routes, and arming of merchantmen. This last measure,
+making surface approach and preliminary warning a highly dangerous
+procedure for the submarine, led Germany to the announcement that,
+after March 1, 1916, all armed merchant vessels would be torpedoed
+without warning. But how were U-boat commanders to distinguish
+between enemy and neutral vessels? Between vessels with or without
+guns? The difficulty brings out clearly the fact that while the
+submarines made good pirates, they were hampered in warfare on
+legitimate lines.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Germany redoubled U-boat activities to lend strength to her peace
+proposals at the close of 1916, and when these failed she decided
+to disregard altogether the cobwebs of legalism that had hitherto
+hindered her submarine war. On February <a name="page_425"><span
+class="page">Page 425</span></a> 1, 1917, she declared unrestricted
+warfare in an immense barred zone within limits extending from
+the Dutch coast through the middle of the North Sea to the Faroe
+Islands and thence west and south to Cape Finisterre, and including
+also the entire Mediterranean east of Spain. An American ship was
+to be allowed to enter and leave Falmauth once a week, and there
+was a crooked lane leading to Greece.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 549px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig085.png" width="549" height="568" alt="Fig. 85">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">GERMAN BARRED ZONES</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">British mined area and North Sea mine
+  barrage.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In thus announcing her intention to sink all ships on sight in
+European waters, Germany burned her bridges behind her. She staked
+everything on this move. Fully anticipating the <a name="page_426"><span
+class="page">Page 426</span></a> hostility of the United States,
+she hoped to win the war before that country could complete its
+preparations and give effective support to the Allies. General
+von Hindenburg's statement has already been quoted. It meant that
+the army was to assume the defensive, while the navy carried out
+its attack on Allied communications. Admiral von Capelle, head
+of the German Admiralty, declared that America's aid would be
+"absolutely negligible." "My personal view," he added, "is that
+the U-boat will bring peace within six months."
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As it turned out, Germany's disregard of neutral rights in 1917,
+like the violation of Belgium in 1914, reacted upon her and proved
+the salvation of the Western Powers. After the defection of Russia,
+France was in imperative need of men. Great Britain needed ships.
+Neither of these needs could have been supplied save by America's
+throwing her utmost energies into active participation in the war.
+This was precisely the result of the proclamation of Feb. 1, 1917.
+The United States at once broke off diplomatic relations, armed
+her merchant vessels in March, and on April 6 declared a state
+of war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Having traced the development of submarine warfare to this critical
+period, we may now turn to the methods and weapons employed by
+both sides at a time when victory or defeat hinged on the outcome
+of the war at sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Germany's submarine construction and losses appear in the following
+table from official German sources, the columns showing first the
+total number built up to the date given, next the total losses to
+date, and finally the remainder with which Germany started out
+at the beginning of each year.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After 1916 Germany devoted the facilities of her shipyards entirely
+to submarine construction, and demoralized the surface fleet to
+secure personnel. Of the entire number built, not more than a score
+were over 850 tons. The U C boats were small mine-layers about 160
+feet in length, with not more than two weeks' cruising period.
+The U B'g were of various sizes, mostly small, and some of them
+were built in sections for transportation by rail. The U boats
+proper, which constituted the largest and most important class, had
+a speed of <a name="page_427"><span class="page">Page 427</span></a>
+about 16 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged, and could
+remain at sea for a period of 5 or 6 weeks, the duration of the
+cruise depending chiefly upon the supply of torpedoes. In addition
+there were a half dozen large submarine merchantmen of the type
+of the <i>Deutschland</i>, which made two voyages to America in
+1916; and a similar number of big cruisers of 2000 tons or more
+were completed in 1918, mounting two 6-inch guns and capable of
+remaining at sea for several months. The 372 boats built totaled
+209,000 tons and had a personnel of over 11,000 officers and men.
+There were seldom more than 20 or 30 submarines in active operation
+at one time. One third of the total number were always in port,
+and the remainder in training.
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="left_btrb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Boats built</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Losses</td>
+    <td class="center_btb">Remainder<br>(On Jan. 1 of year
+      following)</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right_br">End&nbsp;of&nbsp;1914</td>
+    <td class="center_br">31</td>
+    <td class="center_br">5</td>
+    <td class="center">26</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right_br">1915</td>
+    <td class="center_br">93</td>
+    <td class="center_br">25</td>
+    <td class="center">68</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right_br">1916</td>
+    <td class="center_br">188</td>
+    <td class="center_br">50</td>
+    <td class="center">138</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right_br">1917</td>
+    <td class="center_br">291</td>
+    <td class="center_br">122</td>
+    <td class="center">169</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="right_brb">1918</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">372</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">202</td>
+    <td class="center_bb">170</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+It is evident from her limited supply of submarines at the outbreak
+of war that Germany did not contemplate their use as commerce
+destroyers. To the Allied navies also, in spite of warnings from
+a few more far-sighted officers, their use for this purpose came
+as a complete surprise. New methods had to be devised, new weapons
+invented, new types of ship built and old ones put to uses for
+which they were not intended&mdash;in short, a whole new system
+of warfare inaugurated amidst the preoccupations of war. As usual
+in such circumstances, the navy taking the aggressive with a new
+weapon gained a temporary ascendancy, until effective counter-measures
+could be contrived. It is easy to say that all this should have
+been foreseen and provided for, but it is a question to what <a
+name="page_428"></a><a name="page_429"><span class="page">Page
+429</span></a> extent preparations could profitably have been
+made before Germany began her campaign. It has already been pointed
+out in the chapter preceding that, had the German fleet been
+destroyed at Jutland, subsequent operations on the German coast
+might have made the submarine campaign impossible, and preparations
+unnecessary.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 499px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig086.png" width="499" height="791" alt="Fig. 86">
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Anti-Submarine Tactics</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of the general categories of anti-submarine tactics,&mdash;detection,
+evasion, and destruction&mdash;it was naturally those of evasion
+that were first employed. Among these may be included suspension
+of sailings upon warning of a submarine in the vicinity, diversion
+of traffic from customary routes, camouflage, and zigzag courses
+to prevent the enemy from securing favorable position and aim.
+The first method was effective only at the expense of a severe
+reduction of traffic, amounting in the critical months of 1917
+to 40 per cent of a total stoppage. The second sometimes actually
+aided the submarine, for in confined areas such as the Mediterranean
+it was likely to discover the new route and reap a rich harvest.
+Camouflage was discarded as of slight value; but shifts of course were
+employed to advantage by both merchant and naval vessels throughout
+the war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Methods of detection depended on both sight and sound. Efficient
+lookout systems on shipboard, with men assigned to different sectors
+so as to cover the entire horizon, made it possible frequently
+to detect a periscope or torpedo wake in time to change course,
+bring guns to bear, and escape destruction. According to a British
+Admiralty estimate, in case a submarine were sighted the chances
+of escape were seven to three, but otherwise only one to four.
+Aircraft of all kinds proved of great value in detecting the presence
+of U-boats, as well as in attacking them. Hydrophones and other
+listening devices, though at first more highly perfected by the
+enemy, were so developed during the war as to enable patrol vessels
+to discover the presence and even determine the course and speed
+of a submerged foe. Along with these devices, a system of <a
+name="page_430"><span class="page">Page 430</span></a> information
+was organized which, drawing information from a wide variety of
+sources, enabled Allied authorities to trace the cruise of a U-boat,
+anticipate its arrival in a given locality, and prophesy the duration
+of its stay.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Among methods of destruction, the mounting of guns on merchantmen
+was chiefly valuable, as already suggested, because of its effect
+in forcing submarines to resort to illegal and barbarous methods
+of warfare. Hitherto, submarines had been accustomed to operate an
+the surface, board vessels, and sink them by bombs or gunfire. Visit
+and search, essential in order to avoid injury to neutrals, was now
+out of the question, for owing to the surface vulnerability of the
+submarine it might be sent to the bottom by a single well-directed
+shot. In brief, the guns on the merchant ship kept submarines beneath
+the surface, forced them to draw upon their limited and costly
+supply of torpedoes, and hindered them from securing good position
+and aim for torpedo attack.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Much depended, of course, upon the range of the ship's guns and
+the size and experience of the gun-crews. When the United States
+began arming her ships in March, 1917, she was able to put enough
+trained men aboard to maintain lookouts and man guns both night
+and day. A dozen or more exciting duels ensued between ships and
+U-boats before the latter learned that such encounters did not
+repay the risks involved. On October 19, 1917, the steamer <i>J.
+L. Luckenbach</i> had a four-hour running battle with a submarine
+in which the ship fired 202 rounds and the pursuer 225. The latter
+scored nine hits, but was at last driven off by the appearance of
+a destroyer. To cite another typical engagement, the <i>Navajo</i>,
+in the English Channel, July 4, 1917, was attacked first by torpedo
+and then by gunfire. The 27th shot from the ship hit the enemy's
+conning tower and caused two explosions. "Men who were on deck
+at the guns and had not jumped overboard ran aft. The submarine
+canted forward at an angle of almost 40 degrees, and the propeller
+could be plainly seen lashing the air."[1]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: For more detailed narratives of this and other episodes
+of the submarine campaign, see Ralph D. Payne, <span class="sc">The
+Fighting Fleets</span>, 1918.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+<a name="page_431"><span class="page">Page 431</span></a> In coastal
+waters where traffic converged, large forces of destroyers and
+other craft were employed for purposes of escort, mine sweeping,
+and patrol. Yet, save as a means of keeping the enemy under water
+and guarding merchant ships, these units had only a limited value
+owing to the difficulty of making contact with the enemy. During
+the later stages of the war destroyers depended chiefly upon the
+depth bomb, an invention of the British navy, which by means of
+the so-called "Y guns" could be dropped in large numbers around
+the supposed location of the enemy. It was in this way that the
+United States Destroyers <i>Fanning</i> and <i>Nicholson</i>, while
+engaged as convoy escorts, sank the <i>U-58</i> and captured its
+crew.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The "mystery" or "Q" ships (well-armed vessels disguised as harmless
+merchantmen) were of slight efficacy after submarines gave up surface
+attack. In fact, it was the submarine itself which, contrary to all
+pre-war theories, proved the most effective type of naval craft against
+its own kind. Whereas fuel economy compelled German submarines to
+spend as much time as possible on the surface, the Allied under-water
+boats, operating near their bases, could cruise awash or submerged
+and were thus able to creep up on the enemy and attack unawares.
+According to Admiral Sims, Allied destroyers, about 500 in all, were
+credited with the certain destruction of 34 enemy submarines; yachts,
+patrol craft, etc., over 3000 altogether, sank 31; whereas about 100
+Allied submarines sank probably 20.[1] Since 202 submarines were
+destroyed, this may be an underestimate of the results accomplished
+by each type, but it indicates relative efficiency. Submarines
+kept the enemy beneath the surface, led him to stay farther away
+from the coast, and also, owing to the disastrous consequences
+that might ensue from mistaken identity, prevented the U-boats
+from operating in pairs. The chief danger encountered by Allied
+submarines was from friendly surface vessels. On one occasion an
+American submarine, the AL-10, approaching a destroyer of the same
+service, was forced to dive and was then given a bombardment of
+depth charges. This bent plates, extinguished lights, and brought
+the submarine again to the <a name="page_432"><span class="page">Page
+432</span></a> surface, where fortunately she was identified in the
+nick of time. The two commanders had been roommates at Annapolis.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">The Victory at Sea</span>, <i>World's
+Work</i>, May, 1920, p. 56.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Work of the United States Navy</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Having borne the brunt of the naval war for three years, the British
+navy welcomed the re&euml;nforcements which the United States was
+able to contribute, and shared to the utmost the experience already
+gained. On May 3, 1917, the first squadron of 6 American destroyers
+arrived at Queenstown, and was increased to 50 operating in European
+waters in November, and 70 at the time of the armistice. A flotilla
+of yachts, ill adapted as they were for such service, did hazardous
+duty as escorts in the Bay of Biscay; and a score of submarines
+crossed the Atlantic during the winter to operate off Ireland and
+in the Azores. Five dreadnoughts under Admiral Rodman from the U.
+S. Atlantic fleet became a part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Probably the most notable work of the American navy was in projects
+where American manufacturing resources and experience in large-scale
+undertakings could be brought to bear. In four months, from July
+to November, 1917, the United States Navy constructed an oil pipe
+line from the west to the east coast of Scotland, thus eliminating
+the long and dangerous northern circuit. Five 14-inch naval guns,
+on railway mountings, with a complete train of 16 cars for each gun,
+were equipped by the navy, manned entirely with naval personnel, and
+were in action in France from August, 1918, until the armistice,
+firing a total of 782 rounds on the German lines of communication,
+at ranges up to 30 miles.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The American proposal of a mine barrage across the entrance to the
+North Sea from Scotland to Norway at first met with slight approval
+abroad, so unprecedented was the problem of laying a mine-field 230
+miles in length, from 15 to 30 miles in width, and extending at
+least 240 feet downward in waters the total depth of which was 400
+or more feet. Even the mine barrier at the Straits of Dover had
+proved ineffective owing to heavy tides, currents, and bad bottom
+conditions, <a name="page_433"><span class="page">Page 433</span></a>
+until it was strengthened by Admiral Keyes in 1918. By employing a
+large type of mine perfected by the United States Naval Bureau of
+Ordnance, it was found possible, however, to reduce by one-third
+the number of mines and the amount of wire needed for the North
+Sea Barrage. The task was therefore undertaken, and completed in
+the summer of 1918. Out of a total of 70,000 mines, 56,570, or
+about 80 per cent, were planted by American vessels. The barrage
+when completed gave an enemy submarine about one chance in ten of
+getting through. According to reliable records, it accomplished
+the destruction or serious injury of 17 German submarines, and by
+its deterrent effect, must have practically closed the northern
+exit to both under-water and surface craft.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 383px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig087.png" width="383" height="268" alt="Fig. 87">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>The Attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the Channel exit of the North Sea, a vigorous blow at the German
+submarine nests on the Belgian coast was finally struck on April
+22-23, 1918, by the Dover Force under Vice Admiral Roger Keyes,
+in one of the most brilliant naval operations of the war. Of the
+two Belgian ports, Ostend and Zeebrugge, the latter was much more
+useful to the Germans because better protected, less exposed to
+batteries on the land front, and connected by a deeper canal with
+the main base 8 miles distant at Bruges. It was planned, however,
+to attack <a name="page_434"><span class="page">Page 434</span></a>
+both ports, with the specific purpose of sinking 5 obsolete cruisers
+laden with concrete across the entrances to the canals. The operation
+required extensive reconstruction work on the vessels employed, a
+thorough course of training for personnel, suitable conditions of
+atmosphere, wind, and tide, and execution of complicated movements
+in accordance with a time schedule worked out to the minute.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At Ostend the attack failed owing to a sudden shift of wind which
+blew the smoke screen laid by motor boats back upon the two block
+ships, and so confused their approach that they were stranded and
+blown up west of the entrance.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At Zeebrugge, two of the three block ships, the <i>Iphigenia</i>
+and the <i>Intrepid</i>, got past the heavy guns on the mole, through
+the protective nets, and into the canal, where they were sunk athwart
+the channel by the explosion of mines laid all along their keels. To
+facilitate their entrance, the cruiser <i>Vindictive</i> (Commander
+Alfred Carpenter), fitted with a false deck and 18 brows or gangways
+for landing forces, had been brought up 25 minutes earlier&mdash;to
+be exact, at a minute past midnight&mdash;along the outer side of
+the high mole or breakwater enclosing the harbor. Here, in spite of
+a heavy swell and tide, she was held in position by the ex-ferryboat
+<i>Daffodill</i>, while some 300 or 400 bluejackets and marines
+swarmed ashore under a violent fire from batteries and machine
+guns and did considerable injury to the works on the mole. Fifteen
+minutes later, an old British submarine was run into a viaduct
+connecting the mole with the shore and there blown up, breaking a
+big gap in the viaduct. Strange to say, the <i>Vindictive</i> and
+her auxiliaries, after lying more than an hour in this dangerous
+position, succeeded in taking aboard all survivors from the landing
+party and getting safely away. Motor launches also rescued the crews
+of the blockships and the men&mdash;all of them wounded&mdash;from
+the submarine. One British destroyer and two motor boats were sunk,
+and the casualties were 176 killed, 412 wounded, and 49 missing.
+For a considerable period thereafter, all the larger German torpedo
+craft remained cooped up at Bruges, and the Zeebrugge blockships
+still obstructed the channel at the end of the war.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 809px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig088.png" width="809" height="526" alt="Fig. 88">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND
+  BRITISH BLOCKSHIPS
+  <a name="page_435"><span class="page">Page 435</span></a>
+</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="center">
+<a name="page_436"><span class="page">Page 436</span></a>
+<i>The Convoy System</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of all the anti-submarine measures employed, prior to the North
+Sea Barrage and the Zeebrugge attack, the adoption of the convoy
+system was undoubtedly the most effective in checking the loss
+of tonnage at the height of the submarine campaign. Familiar as
+a means of commerce protection in previous naval wars, the late
+adoption of the convoy system in the World War occasioned very
+general surprise. It was felt by naval authorities, however, that
+great delay would be incurred in assembling vessels, and in restricting
+the speed of all ships of a convoy to that of the slowest unit.
+Merchant captains believed themselves unequal to the task of keeping
+station at night in close order, with all lights out and frequent
+changes of course, and they thought that the resultant injuries
+would be almost as great as from submarines. Furthermore, so long
+as a large number of neutral vessels were at sea, it appeared a very
+doubtful expedient to segregate merchant <a name="page_437"><span
+class="page">Page 437</span></a> vessels of belligerent nationality
+and thus distinguish them as legitimate prey.
+</p>
+
+<table class="image" style="width: 605px;">
+<tr><td>
+ <img src="images/fig089.png" width="605" height="288" alt="Fig. 89">
+</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS
+  DESTROYED BY GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="center">(Figures in thousands of gross tons)</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="indent">The accompanying chart shows the merchant
+shipping captured or destroyed by Germany in the course of the war.
+After 1914 the losses were inflicted almost entirely by submarines,
+either by mine laying or by torpedoes. According to a British
+Admiralty statement of Dec. 5, 1919, the total loss during the war
+was 14,820,000 gross tons, of which 8,918,000 was British, and
+5,918,000 was Allied or neutral. The United States lost 354,450
+tons. During the same period the world's ship construction amounted
+to 10,850,000 tons, and enemy shipping captured and eventually put
+into Allied service totalled 2,393,000 tons, so that the net loss
+at the close of the war was about 1,600,000 tons.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+But in April, 1917, the situation was indeed desperate. The losses
+had become so heavy that of every 100 ships leaving England it was
+estimated that 25 never returned.[1] The American commander in
+European waters, Admiral Sims, reports Admiral Jellicoe as saying at
+this time, "They will win unless we can stop these losses&mdash;and
+stop them soon."[2] Definitely adopted in May following, the convoy
+system was in general operation before the end of the summer, with
+a notable decline of sinkings in both the Mediterranean and the
+Atlantic. The following table, based on figures from the Naval
+Annual for 1919, indicates the number of vessels sunk for each
+submarine destroyed. It shows the decreased effectiveness of submarine
+operations after September 1, 1917, which is taken as the date
+when the convoy system had come into full use, and brings out the
+crescendo of losses in 1917.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: Brassey's <span class="sc">Naval Annual</span>, 1919.]
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 2: <i>World's Work</i>, Sept., 1919.]
+</p>
+
+<table class="data">
+<tr><td class="left_btrb">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Vessels sunk<br>per<br>submarine<br>destroyed</td>
+    <td class="center_btrb">Total No. sunk</td>
+    <td class="center_btb">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Aug.&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1914- Feb.,&nbsp;1915</td>
+    <td class="center_br">10.4</td>
+    <td class="center_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>69 ships sunk, almost entirely by surface cruisers.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Feb.&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1915-
+      Feb.&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1917</td>
+    <td class="center_br">48</td>
+    <td class="center_br">544<br>(two&nbsp;years)</td>
+    <td>Half by torpedo; 148 without warning; 3,066 lives
+      lost.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Feb.&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1917-
+      Sept.&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1917</td>
+    <td class="center_br">67</td>
+    <td class="center_br">736<br>(7&nbsp;months)</td>
+    <td>572 by torpedo; 595 (69%) with out warning.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">Sept.&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1917-
+      April&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1918</td>
+    <td class="center_br">20.2</td>
+    <td class="center_br">548<br>(7&nbsp;months)</td>
+    <td>448 (82%) without warning.</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="left_br">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left_brb">April&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1918-
+      Nov.&nbsp;1,&nbsp;1918</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">12</td>
+    <td class="center_brb">252<br>(7&nbsp;months)</td>
+    <td class="left_bb">239 (91%) without warning.</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="indent">
+From July 26, 1917, to October 26, 1918, 90,000 vessels were convoyed,
+with a total loss from the convoys of 436, or <a name="page_438"><span
+class="page">Page 438</span></a> less than half of one per cent.
+The convoy system forced submarines to expose themselves to the
+attacks of destroyer escorts, or else to work close in shore to set
+upon vessels after the dispersion of the convoy. But when working
+close to the coast they were exposed to Allied patrols and submarines.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Testifying before a German investigation committee, Captain Bartenbach,
+of the V-boat section of the German Admiralty, gave the chief perils
+encountered by his boats as follows: (1) mines, (2) Allied submarines,
+which "destroyed a whole series of our boats," (3) aircraft of all
+types, (4) armed merchantmen, (5) hydrophones and listening devices.
+Admiral Capelle in his testimony referred to the weakening of their
+efforts due to "indifferent material and second-rate crews."
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<i>Transport Work</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Dependent in large measure upon the anti-submarine campaign for
+its safety and success, yet in itself an immense achievement, the
+transport of over 2,000,000 American troops to France must be regarded
+as one of the major naval operations of the war. Of these forces
+48% were carried in British, and 43% in American transports. About
+83% of the convoy work was under the protection of American naval
+vessels.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The transportation work of the British navy, covering a longer
+period, was, of course, on a far greater scale. Speaking in Parliament
+on October 29, 1917, Premier Lloyd George indicated the extent of
+this service as follows: "Since the beginning of the war the navy
+has insured the safe transportation to the British and Allied armies
+of 13,000,000 men, 12,000,000 horses, 25,000,000 tons of explosives
+and supplies, and 51,000,000 tons of coal and oil. The loss of
+men out of the whole 13,000,000 was 3500, of which only 2700 were
+lost through the action of the enemy. Altogether 130,000,000 tons
+have been transported by British ships." These figures, covering but
+three years of the war, are of significance chiefly as indicating
+the immense transportation problems of the British and Allied navies
+and the use made of sea communications.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+These three main Allied naval operations&mdash;the blockade of <a
+name="page_439"><span class="page">Page 439</span></a> Germany,
+the anti-submarine campaign, and the transportation of American
+troops to France&mdash;were unquestionably decisive factors in
+the war. Failure in any one of them would have meant victory for
+Germany. The peace of Europe, it is true, could be achieved only by
+overcoming Germany's military power on land. A breakdown there, with
+German domination of the Continent, would have created a situation
+which it is difficult to envisage, and which very probably would have
+meant a peace of compromise and humiliation for England and America.
+It is obvious, however, that, but for the blockade, Germany could
+have prolonged the war; but for American re&euml;nforcements, France
+would have been overrun; but for the conquest of the submarine,
+Great Britain would have been forced to surrender.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In the spring of 1918 Germany massed her troops on the western
+front and began her final effort to break the Allied lines and
+force a decision. With supreme command for the first time completely
+centralized under Marshal Foch, and with the support of American
+armies, the Allies were able to hold up the enemy drives, and on
+July 18 begin the forward movement which pushed the Germans back
+upon their frontiers. Yet when the armistice was signed on November
+11, the German armies still maintained cohesion, with an unbroken
+line on foreign soil. Surrender was made inevitable by internal
+breakdown and revolution, the first open manifestations of which
+appeared among the sailors of the idle High Seas Fleet at Kiel.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On November 21, 1918, this fleet, designed as the great instrument
+for conquest of world empire, and in its prime perhaps as efficient
+a war force as was ever set afloat, steamed silently through two
+long lines of British and Allied battleships assembled off the
+Firth of Forth, and the German flags at the mainmasts went down
+at sunset for the last time.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+REFERENCES
+</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Brassey's Naval Annual</span>, 1919.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">The Victory at Sea</span>, Vice-Admiral W. S. Sims,
+  U. S. N., 1920.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Annual Report</span> of the U. S Secretary of the
+  Navy, 1918</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<a name="page_440"><span class="page">Page 440</span></a>
+<span class="sc">The Dover Patrol</span>, 1915-1917, Admiral Sir
+  Reginald Bacon, R. N., 1919.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Zeebrugge and Ostend Dispatches</span>, ed. by C.
+  Sanford Terry, 1919.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">Laying the North Sea Mine Barrage</span>, Captain
+  R. R. Belknap, U. S. N., U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
+  Jan.-Feb., 1920.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+<span class="sc">American Submarine Operations in the World
+  War</span>, by Prof. C. S. Alden, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
+  June-July, 1920.</p>
+
+<p class="list">
+For more popular treatment see also <span class="sc">Submarine and
+  Anti-Submarine</span>, Sir Henry Newbolt, 1919; <span class="sc">The
+  Fighting Fleets</span>, Ralph D. Payne, 1918; <span class="sc">The
+  U-Boat Hunters</span>, James B. Connolly, 1918; <span class="sc">Sea
+  Warfare</span>, Rudyard Kipling, 1917; etc.</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_441"><span class="page">Page 441</span></a>
+CHAPTER XIX</h2>
+
+<p class="subtitle">
+CONCLUSION
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The brief survey of sea power in the preceding chapters has shown
+that the ocean has been the highway for the march of civilization and
+empire. Crete in its day became a great island power and distributed
+throughout the Mediterranean the wealth and the arts of its own
+culture and that of Egypt. In turn, Ph&oelig;nicia held sway on the inland
+sea, and though creating little, she seized upon and developed the
+material and intellectual resources of her neighbors, and carried
+them not only to the corners of the Mediterranean, but far out
+on the unknown sea. Later when Ph&oelig;nicia was subject to Persia,
+Athens by her triremes saved the growing civilization of Greece,
+and during a brief period of glory planted the seeds of Greek,
+as opposed to Asiatic culture, on the islands and coasts of the
+&AElig;gean. After Athens, Carthage inherited the trident, and
+in turn fell before the energy of a land power, Rome. And as the
+Roman Empire grew to include practically all of the known world,
+every waterway, river and ocean, served to spread Roman law,
+engineering, and ideals of practical efficiency, at the same time
+bringing back to the heart of the Empire not only the products of
+the colonies, but such impalpable treasures as the art, literature,
+and philosophy of Greece. This was the story of the sea in antiquity.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+After the dissolution of the Roman empire, as Christian peoples
+were struggling in blood and darkness, a great menace came from
+Arabia, the Saracen invasion, which was checked successfully and
+repeatedly by the navy of Constantinople. To this, primarily, is due
+the preservation of the Christian ideal in the world. Later, the cities
+of Italy began to re&euml;stablish sea commerce, which had been for
+centuries interrupted by <a name="page_442"><span class="page">Page
+442</span></a> pirates. Venice gained the ascendancy, and Venetian
+ships carried the Crusading armies during the centuries when western
+peoples went eastward to fight for the Cross and brought back new
+ideas they had learned from the Infidels. Then there arose a new
+Mohammedan threat, the Turk, determined like the earlier Saracen
+to conquer the world for the Crescent. Constantinople, betrayed by
+Christian nations, fell, Christian peoples of the Levant were made
+subject to the Turk, and thereafter till our day the &AElig;gean
+was a Turkish lake. About the same time a new Mohammedan sea power
+arose in the Moors of the African coast, and for a century and more
+the Mediterranean was a no-man's land between the rival peoples
+and the rival religions.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Meanwhile the trade with the East by caravan routes to the Arabian
+Gulf had been stopped by the presence of the Turk. To reach the
+old markets, therefore, new routes had to be found and there came
+the great era of discovery. The new world was only an accidental
+discovery in a search for the westward route to Asia. The claims of
+Spain to this new region called forth her fleets of trading ships.
+But the lure of the West attracted the energies of the English
+also, and England and Spain clashed. As Spain became more and more
+dependent on her western colonies for income, and yet failed to
+establish her ascendancy over the Atlantic routes, she declined
+in favor of her enemies, England and Holland. The latter country,
+being dependent on the sea for sustenance, early captured a large
+part of the world's carrying trade, especially in the Mediterranean
+and the East. Her rich profits excited the envy and rivalry of the
+English, and in consequence, after three hard-fought naval wars,
+the scepter of the sea passed to England. The subsequent wars between
+England and France served only to strengthen England's control of
+trade routes and extend her colonial possessions; with one notable
+exception, when France, denying to her rival the control of the sea
+at a critical juncture in the American Revolution, deprived her
+of her richest and most extensive colony. It was primarily England
+with her navy that broke the power of Napoleon in the subsequent
+conflict, and throughout a century <a name="page_443"><span
+class="page">Page 443</span></a> of peace the spread of English
+speech and institutions has extended to the uttermost parts of
+the world. One power in our day challenged Britain's control of
+the sea&mdash;now even more essential to her security than it was
+in the 17th century to that of Holland&mdash;and the World War
+was the consequence.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+In all this story it is interesting to note that insularity in
+position is the reverse of insularity in fact. Crete touched the
+far shores of the Mediterranean because she was an island and her
+people were forced upon the sea. Similarly, Ph&oelig;nicia, driven to
+sea by mountains and desert at her back, spread her sails beyond
+the Pillars of Hercules. And England, hemmed in by the Atlantic,
+has carried her goods and her language to every nook and cranny of
+the earth. Thus the ocean has served less to separate than to bring
+together. As a common highway it has not only excited quarrels, but
+established common interests between nations. Special agreements
+governing the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, navigation
+regulations and the like, have long since brought nations together in
+peace on a common ground. It has also gone far to create international
+law for the problems of war. Rules governing blockade, contraband,
+and neutral rights have been agreed upon long since. But, as every
+war has proved, international law has needed a higher authority to
+enforce its rules in the teeth of a powerful belligerent. To remedy
+this defect is one of the purposes of a League of Nations.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Such has been the significance of the sea. The nations who have
+used it have made history and have laid the rest of the world under
+their dominion intellectually, commercially, and politically. Indeed,
+the story of the sea is the history of civilization.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the conclusion of this survey, it is appropriate to pause and
+summarize what is meant by the term "sea power." It is a catch
+phrase, made famous by Mahan and glibly used ever since. What does
+sea power mean? What are its elements?
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Obviously it means, in brief, a nation's ability to enforce its will
+upon the sea. This means a navy superior to those of its enemies.
+But it means also strategic bases equipped for supplying a fleet for
+battle or offering refuge in defeat. To these <a name="page_444"><span
+class="page">Page 444</span></a> bases there must run lines of
+communication guarded from interruption by the enemy. Imagine, for
+instance, the Suez or the Panama Canal held by a hostile force,
+or a battlefleet cut off from its fuel supply of coal or oil.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The relation of shipping to sea power is not what it was in earlier
+days. Merchantmen are indeed still useful in war for transport
+and auxiliary service, but it is no longer true that men in the
+merchant service are trained for man-of-war service. The difference
+between them has widened as the battleship of to-day differs from
+a merchantman of to-day. Nor can a merchantship be transformed
+into a cruiser, as in the American navy of a hundred years ago.
+The place of shipping in sea power is therefore subsidiary. In
+fact, unless a nation can control the sea, the amount of its wealth
+dispersed in merchantmen is just so much loss in time of war.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The major element in sea power is the fleet, but possession of
+the largest navy is no guarantee of victory or even of control
+of the sea. Size is important, but it is an interesting fact that
+most of the great victories in naval history have been won by a
+smaller fleet over a larger. The effectiveness of a great navy
+depends first on its quality, secondly, on how it is handled, and
+thirdly, on its power of reaching the enemy's communications.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The quality of a navy is two-fold, material and personal. In material,
+the great problem of modern days is to keep abreast of the time. The
+danger to a navy lies in conservatism and bureaucratic control. There
+is always the chance that a weaker power may defeat the stronger, not
+by using the old weapons, but by devising some new weapon that will
+render the old ones obsolete. The trouble with the professional man
+in any walk of life has always been that he sticks to the traditional
+ways. In consequence he lays himself open to the amateur, who,
+caring nothing about tradition, beats him with something novel.
+The inventions that have revolutionized naval warfare have come
+from men outside the naval profession. Thus the Romans, unable to
+match the Carthaginians in seamanship, made that seamanship of no
+value by their invention of the corvus. Greek fire not only saved
+the insignificant fleets of the Eastern <a name="page_445"><span
+class="page">Page 445</span></a> Empire, but annihilated the huge
+armadas of Saracen and Slav. If the South in our Civil War had
+possessed the necessary resources, her ironclad rams would have
+made an end of the Union navy and of the war. In our own time the
+German submarine came within an ace of winning the war despite
+all the Allied dreadnoughts, because its potentialities had not
+been realized and no counter measures devised. A navy that drops
+behind is lost.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The personal side is a matter of training and morale. The material
+part is of no value unless it is operated by skill and by the will
+to win. Slackness or inexperience or lack of heart in officers
+or men&mdash;any of these may bring ruin. Napoleon once spoke of
+the Russian army as brave, but as "an army without a soul." A navy
+must have a soul. Unfortunately, the tendency in recent years has
+been to emphasize the material and the mechanical at the expense of
+the intellectual and spiritual. With all the enormous development
+of the ships and weapons, it must be remembered that the man is,
+and always will be, greater than the machine.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+As to handling the navy, first of all the War Staff and the commander
+in chief must solve the strategic problem correctly. The fate of
+the Spanish Armada in the 16th Century and that of the Russian
+navy at the beginning of the 20th are eloquent of the effect of
+bad strategy on a powerful fleet. Secondly, the commander in chief
+must be possessed of the right fighting doctrine&mdash;the spirit
+of the offensive. In all ages the naval commander who sought to
+achieve his purpose by avoiding battle went to disaster. The true
+objective must be, now as always, <i>the destruction of the enemy's
+fleet</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Such are the material and the spiritual essentials of sea power.
+The phrase has become so popular that a superior fleet has been
+widely accepted as a talisman in war. The idea is that a nation
+with sea power must win. But with all the tremendous "influence of
+sea power on history," the student must not be misled into thinking
+that sea power is invincible. The Athenian navy went to ruin under
+the catapults of Syracuse whose navy was insignificant. Carthage,
+the sea power, succumbed to a land power, Rome. In modern times
+France, <a name="page_446"><span class="page">Page 446</span></a>
+with a navy second to England's, fell in ruin before Prussia, which
+had practically no navy at all. And in the World War it required
+the entry of a new ally, the United States, to save the Entente
+from defeat at the hands of land power, despite an overwhelming
+superiority on the sea.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The significance of sea power is <i>communications</i>. Just so
+far as sea control affects lines of communications vital to either
+belligerent, so far does it affect the war. To a sea empire like
+the British, sea control is essential as a measure of defense.
+If an enemy controls the sea the empire will fall apart like a
+house of cards, and the British Isles will be speedily starved
+into submission. It is another thing, however, to make the navy
+a sword as well as a shield. Whenever the British navy could cut
+the communications of the enemy, as in the case of the wars with
+Spain and Holland, it was terribly effective. When it fought a
+nation like Russia in the Crimean War, it hardly touched the sources
+of Russian supplies, because these came by the interior land
+communications. So also the French navy in 1870 could not touch
+a single important line of German communications and its effect
+therefore was negligible. If in 1914 Russia, for example, had been
+neutral, no Allied naval superiority could have saved France from
+destruction by the combined armies of Germany and Austria, just
+as the Grand Fleet was powerless to check the conquest or deny
+the possession of Belgium. It must be borne in mind that a land
+power has the advantages of central position and interior lines, and
+the interior lines of to-day are those of rail and motor transport,
+offering facilities for a rapid concentration on any front.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Of course, modern life and modern warfare are so complex that few
+nations are able to live and wage war entirely on their own resources;
+important communications extend across the sea. In this respect
+the United States is singularly fortunate. With the exception of
+rubber, every essential is produced in our country, and the sea
+power that would attempt to strangle the United States by a blockade
+on two coasts would find it unprofitable even if it were practicable.
+A hostile navy would have to land armies to strike directly at
+the manufacturing <a name="page_447"><span class="page">Page
+447</span></a> cities near the seaboard in order to affect our
+communications. In brief, sea power is decisive just so far as it
+cuts the enemy's communications.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+Finally in considering sea power we should note the importance
+of co&ouml;rdinating naval policies with national. The character
+of a navy and the size of a navy depend on what policy a nation
+expects to stand for. It is the business of a navy to stand behind
+a nation's will. For Great Britain, circumstances of position have
+long made her policy consistent, without regard to change of party.
+She had to dominate the sea to insure the safety of the empire. With
+the United States, the situation has been different. The nation has
+not been conscious of any foreign policy, with the single exception
+of the Monroe Doctrine. And even this has changed in character
+since it was first enunciated.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At the present day, for example, how far does the United States
+purpose to go in the Monroe Doctrine? Shall we attempt to police
+the smaller South and Central American nations? Shall we make the
+Caribbean an area under our naval control? What is to be our policy
+toward Mexico? How far are we willing to go to sustain the Open Door
+policy in the Far East? Are we determined to resist the immigration
+of Asiatics? Are we bound to hold against conquest our outlying
+possessions,&mdash;the Philippines, Guam, Hawaiian Islands, and
+Alaska? Shall we play a "lone hand" among nations, or join an
+international league? Until there is some answer to these questions
+of foreign policy, our naval program is based on nothing definite. In
+short, the naval policy of a nation should spring from its national
+policy.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+On that national policy must be based not only the types of ships
+built and their numbers, but also the number and locale of the
+naval bases and the entire strategic plan. In the past there has
+been too little mutual understanding between the American navy
+and the American people. The navy&mdash;the Service, as it is
+appropriately called&mdash;is the trained servant of the republic.
+It is only fair to ask that the republic make clear what it expects
+that servant to do. But before a national policy is accepted, it must
+be thought out to its logical conclusion <a name="page_448"><span
+class="page">Page 448</span></a> by both the popular leaders and
+naval advisers. As Mahan has said, "the naval officer must be a
+statesman as well as a seaman." Is the policy accepted going to
+conflict with that of another nation; if so, are we prepared to
+accept the consequences?
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+The recent history of Germany is a striking example of the effect
+of a naval policy on international relations. The closing decade
+of the 19th century found Great Britain still following the policy
+of "splendid isolation," with France and Russia her traditional
+enemies. Her relations with Germany were friendly, as they always
+had been. At the close of the century, the Kaiser, inspired by Mahan's
+"<i>Influence of Sea Power on History,</i>" launched the policy of
+a big navy. First, he argued, German commerce was growing with
+astonishing rapidity. It was necessary, according to Mahan, to have a
+strong navy to protect a great carrying trade. This von Tirpitz[1]
+emphasizes, though he never makes clear just what precise danger
+threatened the German trading fleets, provided Germany maintained a
+policy of friendly relations with England. Secondly, Germany found
+herself with no outlet for expansion. The best colonial fields had
+already been appropriated by other countries, chiefly England. To
+back up German claims to new territory or trading concessions, it
+was necessary to have a strong navy. All this was strictly by the
+book, and it is characteristic of the German mind that it faithfully
+followed the text. "<i>Unsere Zukunft</i>," cried the Kaiser, "<i>liegt
+auf dem Wasser!</i>" But what was implied in this proposal? A great
+navy increasing rapidly to the point of rivaling that of England
+could be regarded by that country only as a pistol leveled at her
+head. England would be at the mercy of any power that could defeat
+her navy. And this policy coupled with the demand for "a place in
+the sun," threatened the rich colonies that lay under the British
+flag. It could not be taken otherwise.
+</p>
+
+<p class="footnote">
+[Footnote 1: <span class="sc">My Memoirs</span>, Chap. xv and
+<i>passim.</i>]
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+These implications began to bear fruit after their kind. In the
+place of friendliness on the part of the English,&mdash;a friendliness
+uninterrupted by war, and based on the blood of their royal family
+and the comradeship in arms against <a name="page_449"><span
+class="page">Page 449</span></a> France in the days of Louis XIV,
+Frederick the Great, and Napoleon&mdash;there developed a growing
+hostility. In vain missions were sent by the British Government
+to promote a better understanding, for the Germans declined to
+accept either a "naval holiday" or a position of perpetual naval
+inferiority. In consequence, England abandoned her policy of isolation,
+and came to an understanding with her ancient enemies, Russia and
+France. Thus Germany arrayed against herself all the resources of
+the British Empire and in this act signed her own death warrant.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+A final word as to the future of sea power. The influence of modern
+inventions is bound to affect the significance of the sea in the
+future. Oceans have practically dwindled away as national barriers.
+Wireless and the speed of the modern steamship have reduced the
+oceans to ponds. "Splendid isolation" is now impossible. Modern
+artillery placed at Calais, for instance, could shell London and
+cover the transportation of troops in the teeth of a fleet. Aircraft
+cross land and sea with equal ease. The submersible has come to
+stay. Indeed, it looks as if the navy of the future will tend first
+to the submersible types and later abandon the sea for the air,
+and the "illimitable pathways of the sea" will yield to still more
+illimitable pathways of the sky. The consequence is bound to be a
+closer knitting of the peoples of the world through the conquering
+of distance by time.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+This bringing together breeds war quite as easily as peace, and
+the progress of invention makes wars more frightful. The closely
+knit economic structure of Europe did not prevent the greatest
+war in history and there is little hope for the idea that wars
+can never occur again. The older causes of war lay in pressure
+of population, the temptation of better lands, racial hatreds or
+ambitions, religious fanaticism, dynastic aims, and imperialism.
+Some of these remain. The chief modern source of trouble is trade
+rivalry, with which imperialism is closely interwoven and trade
+rivalry makes enemies of old friends. There is, therefore, a place
+for navies still.
+</p>
+
+<p class="indent">
+At present there are two great naval powers, Great Britain and
+the United States. A race in naval armaments between <a
+name="page_450"><span class="page">Page 450</span></a> the two
+would be criminal folly, and could lead to only one disastrous
+end. The immediate way toward guaranteeing freedom of the seas is
+a closer entente between the two English-speaking peoples, whose
+common ground extends beyond their speech to institutions and ideals
+of justice and liberty. The fine spirit of c&ouml;operation produced
+by the World War should be perpetuated in peace for the purpose
+of maintaining peace. In his memoirs van Tirpitz mourns the fact
+that now "Anglo-Saxondom" controls the world. There is small danger
+that where public opinion rules, the two peoples will loot the world
+to their own advantage. On the other hand, there is every prospect
+that, for the immediate future, sea power in their hands can be made
+the most potent influence toward peace, and the preservation of
+that inheritance of civilization which has been slowly accumulated
+and spread throughout the world by those peoples of every age who
+have been the pathfinders on the seas.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="page_451"><span class="page">Page 451</span></a>
+INDEX</h2>
+
+<p class="center">A.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Abercromby, British general,
+<a href="#page_226">226</a>, <a href="#page_252">252</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy, British cruisers, loss
+of, <a href="#page_355">355</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Aboukir Bay, battle of, <i>see</i> Nile</p>
+
+<p class="index">Actium, campaign of, <a href="#page_61">61-64</a>;
+battle of, <a href="#page_64">64-69</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">&AElig;gospotami, battle of, <a href="#page_24">24</a>,
+<a href="#page_47">47</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Agrippa, Roman admiral, <a href="#page_62">62-66</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Aircraft, in World War, <a href="#page_411">411</a>,
+<a href="#page_429">429</a>, <a href="#page_449">449</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Albuquerque, Portuguese viceroy,
+<a href="#page_118">118</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Alfred, king of England, <a href="#page_71">71</a>,
+<a href="#page_130">130</a>, <a href="#page_145">145</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Algeciras Convention, <a href="#page_347">347</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ali Pasha, Turkish admiral, <a href="#page_104">104</a>,
+<a href="#page_105">105</a>, <a href="#page_107">107</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Allemand, French admiral,
+<a href="#page_224">224</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Almeida, Portuguese leader,
+<a href="#page_117">117-118</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Amboyna, <a href="#page_143">143</a>,
+<a href="#page_170">170</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Amiens, treaty of, <a href="#page_227">227</a>,
+<a href="#page_259">259</a>, <a href="#page_261">261</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Amsterdam, <a href="#page_119">119</a>,
+<a href="#page_133">133</a>, <a href="#page_141">141</a>,
+<a href="#page_142">142</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Anthony, Roman general, at Actium,
+<a href="#page_61">61-68</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Antwerp, <a href="#page_119">119</a>,
+<a href="#page_133">133</a>, <a href="#page_140">140</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Arabs, at war with Eastern Empire,
+<a href="#page_72">72-83</a>, <a href="#page_441">441-442</a>;
+as traders, <a href="#page_83">83</a>; ships of,
+<a href="#page_117">117</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Arbuthnot, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_388">388</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ariabignes, Persian admiral, <a href="#page_33">33</a>,
+<a href="#page_36">36</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Aristides, <a href="#page_36">36</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Armada, <i>see</i> Spanish Armada</p>
+
+<p class="index">Armed Neutrality, league of,
+<a href="#page_253">253</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Armor, <a href="#page_289">289</a>,
+<a href="#page_296">296</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Armstrong, Sir William, <a href="#page_289">289</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Athens, <i>see</i> Greece</p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Audacious</i>, British ship,
+<a href="#page_355">355</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">August 10, battle of, <a href="#page_334">334</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Austerlitz battle of, <a href="#page_279">279</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Austria, in Napoleonic Wars,
+<a href="#page_232">232</a>, <a href="#page_244">244</a>,
+<a href="#page_253">253</a>, <a href="#page_279">279</a>; at war
+with Italy, <a href="#page_296">296-303</a>; in Triple Alliance,
+<a href="#page_345">345</a>; in World War,
+<a href="#page_351">351</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">B.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Bacon, Roger, <a href="#page_111">111</a>,
+<a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_121">121</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bagdad Railway, <a href="#page_346">346</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bantry Bay, action in, <a href="#page_194">194</a>;
+attempted landing in, <a href="#page_233">233</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Barbarigo, Venetian admiral,
+<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_104">104-105</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Barbarossa, Turkish admiral,
+<a href="#page_90">90-92</a>, <a href="#page_95">95-97</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Barham, First Lord of Admiralty,
+<a href="#page_266">266</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bart, Jean, French naval leader,
+<a href="#page_195">195</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Battle cruiser, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p>
+
+<p class="index">Beachy Head, battle of, <a href="#page_194">194</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Beatty, British admiral, at Heligoland Bight,
+<a href="#page_352">352-354</a>; at Dogger Bank,
+<a href="#page_370">370-373</a>; at Jutland,
+<a href="#page_389">389-408</a>, <a href="#page_413">413</a>,
+<a href="#page_415">415</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Berlin Decree, <a href="#page_279">279</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bismarck, <a href="#page_297">297</a>,
+<a href="#page_345">345</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Blake, British admiral, <a href="#page_169">169</a>,
+<a href="#page_171">171-182</a>, <a href="#page_194">194</a>,
+<a href="#page_414">414</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Blockade, in American Civil War,
+<a href="#page_290">290</a>; in World War,
+<a href="#page_419">419-424</a>, <a href="#page_439">439</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Boisot, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_139">139</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bonaparte, <i>see</i> Napoleon</p>
+
+<p class="index">Bossu, Spanish admiral,
+<a href="#page_138">138-139</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Boxer Rebellion, <a href="#page_329">329-330</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Boyne, battle of, <a href="#page_194">194</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bragadino, Venetian general,
+<a href="#page_100">100</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Breda, peace of, <a href="#page_188">188</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bridport, British admiral, <a href="#page_232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page_233">233</a>, <a href="#page_234">234</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Brill, capture of, <a href="#page_138">138</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Brueys, French admiral, <a href="#page_224">224</a>,
+<a href="#page_248">248</a>, <a href="#page_250">250</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Burney, British admiral, <a href="#page_401">401</a>,
+<a href="#page_415">415</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Bushnell, David, <a href="#page_293">293-294</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">C.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Cabot, John, <a href="#page_121">121</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cadiz, founded, <a href="#page_17">17</a>; British
+expeditions to, <a href="#page_155">155</a>,
+<a href="#page_165">165</a>, <a href="#page_168">168</a>; blockaded
+<a name="page_452"><span class="page">Page 452</span></a> by Blake,
+<a href="#page_181">181</a>; blockaded by Jervis,
+<a href="#page_244">244</a>; Allied fleet in,
+<a href="#page_270">270</a>, <a href="#page_274">274</a>,
+<a href="#page_277">277</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Calder, British admiral, <a href="#page_243">243</a>;
+in action with Villeneuve, <a href="#page_266">266</a>,
+<a href="#page_267">267-269</a>, <a href="#page_270">270</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Camara, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_319">319</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Camperdown, battle of, <a href="#page_223">223</a>,
+<a href="#page_234">234-237</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Canidius, Roman general, <a href="#page_67">67</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Carden, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_375">375-379</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Carpenter, Alfred, British commander,
+<a href="#page_434">434</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Carthage, founded, <a href="#page_18">18</a>; at war
+with Greece, <a href="#page_20">20</a>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>; in
+Punic Wars, <a href="#page_49">49-60</a>, <a href="#page_76">76</a>,
+<a href="#page_441">441</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cervantes, <a href="#page_102">102</a>,
+<a href="#page_119">119</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cervera, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_315">315</a>;
+in Santiago campaign, <a href="#page_321">321-326</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ceylon, <a href="#page_83">83</a>,
+<a href="#page_226">226</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Champlain, battle of Lake,
+<a href="#page_284">284</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Charlemagne, <a href="#page_85">85</a>,
+<a href="#page_130">130</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Charles II of England, <a href="#page_183">183</a>,
+<a href="#page_188">188</a>, <a href="#page_189">189</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Charles V of Spain, <a href="#page_91">91</a>,
+<a href="#page_92">92</a>, <a href="#page_126">126</a>,
+<a href="#page_127">127</a>, <a href="#page_134">134</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Charleston, attack on, <a href="#page_69">69</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Chatham, raided by Dutch,
+<a href="#page_188">188</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Chauncey, U. S. commodore,
+<a href="#page_283">283</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">China, in ancient times, <a href="#page_25">25</a>;
+first ships to, <a href="#page_118">118</a>; at war with Japan,
+<a href="#page_304">304-310</a>; in disruption,
+<a href="#page_328">328-329</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Chios, battle of, <a href="#page_286">286</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Churchill, Winston, <a href="#page_375">375-378</a>,
+<a href="#page_381">381</a>, <a href="#page_383">383</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cinque Ports, <a href="#page_145">145</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, in Actium campaign,
+<a href="#page_61">61</a>, <a href="#page_63">63-68</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Clerk, John, <a href="#page_203">203</a>,
+<a href="#page_204">204</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Collingwood, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_239">239</a>, <a href="#page_243">243</a>; at Trafalgar,
+<a href="#page_272">272</a>, <a href="#page_274">274-277</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Colonna, admiral of Papal States,
+<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_105">105</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Colport, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_233">233</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Columbus, <a href="#page_112">112</a>,
+<a href="#page_120">120</a>, <a href="#page_121">121</a>; voyages
+of, <a href="#page_122">122-125</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Commerce, of Ph&oelig;nicians, <a href="#page_16">16-19</a>;
+under Roman Empire, <a href="#page_70">70</a>; with the East,
+<a href="#page_110">110</a>, <a href="#page_113">113-118</a>; in
+northern Europe, <a href="#page_131">131-132</a>; in modern times,
+<a href="#page_312">312-313</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Commerce Warfare, in Dutch War of Independence,
+<a href="#page_137">137-138</a>; in Napoleonic Wars,
+<a href="#page_259">259-260</a>; in War of 1812,
+<a href="#page_281">281</a>, <a href="#page_284">284</a>; in World
+War, <a href="#page_369">369</a>, <a href="#page_419">419-440</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Communications, in warfare,
+<a href="#page_446">446</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Compass, introduction of,
+<a href="#page_111">111</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Condalmiero, Venetian admiral,
+<a href="#page_93">93</a>, <a href="#page_96">96</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Conflans, French admiral, <a href="#page_197">197</a>,
+<a href="#page_198">198</a>, <a href="#page_199">199</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Constantinople, founded, <a href="#page_71">71</a>;
+attacked by Arabs, <a href="#page_72">72-83</a>; attacked by Russians,
+<a href="#page_83">83-84</a>; sacked by Crusaders,
+<a href="#page_85">85</a>; captured by Turks, <a href="#page_86">86</a>,
+<a href="#page_89">89</a>, <a href="#page_110">110</a>; in World
+War, <a href="#page_375">375</a>, <a href="#page_381">381-382</a>,
+<a href="#page_384">384</a>; <a href="#page_441">441</a>,
+<a href="#page_442">442</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Continental System, <a href="#page_279">279-280</a>,
+<a href="#page_285">285</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Continuous Voyage, doctrine of,
+<a href="#page_290">290</a>, <a href="#page_420">420-421</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Contraband, <a href="#page_253">253</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Convoy, System in World War,
+<a href="#page_436">436-438</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cook, Captain James, <a href="#page_219">219-220</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Copenhagen, battle of, <a href="#page_223">223</a>,
+<a href="#page_236">236</a>, <a href="#page_252">252-259</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Corinthian Gulf, battle of, <a href="#page_35">35</a>,
+<a href="#page_40">40-43</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cornwallis, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_263">263</a>, <a href="#page_265">265</a>,
+<a href="#page_267">267</a>, <a href="#page_270">270</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Coronel, battle of, <a href="#page_359">359-361</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Corsica, <a href="#page_17">17</a>,
+<a href="#page_238">238</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Corunna, Armada sails from, <a href="#page_158">158</a>;
+attacked by Drake, <a href="#page_165">165</a>; Allied fleet in,
+<a href="#page_269">269</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Corvi, <a href="#page_52">52</a>,
+<a href="#page_55">55</a>, <a href="#page_444">444</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cradock, British admiral, at Coronel,
+<a href="#page_358">358-361</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Crete, <a href="#page_15">15-16</a>,
+<a href="#page_25">25</a>, <a href="#page_26">26</a>,
+<a href="#page_43">43</a>, <a href="#page_247">247</a>,
+<a href="#page_442">442</a>, <a href="#page_443">443</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cromwell, Oliver, <a href="#page_170">170</a>,
+<a href="#page_181">181</a>, <a href="#page_182">182</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Custozza, battle of, <a href="#page_297">297</a>,
+<a href="#page_298">298</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Cyprus, <a href="#page_88">88</a>,
+<a href="#page_99">99</a>.</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">D.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Da Gama, Vasco, <a href="#page_114">114</a>,
+<a href="#page_116">116-117</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dardanelles, German squadron enters,
+<a href="#page_356">356-357</a>; campaign of,
+<a href="#page_374">374-385</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Darius, king of Persia, <a href="#page_21">21</a>,
+<a href="#page_27">27</a>, <a href="#page_28">28</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">De Grasse, French admiral, at Virginia Capes,
+<a href="#page_207">207-211</a>; at Saints'</p> <p class="index">Passage,
+<a href="#page_212">212-215</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">De Guichen, French admiral, <a href="#page_203">203</a>,
+<a href="#page_204">204</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Denmark, in Copenhagen campaign,
+<a href="#page_252">252-259</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">De Ruyter, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_173">173</a>,
+<a href="#page_175">175</a>, <a href="#page_179">179</a>,
+<a href="#page_182">182</a>, <a href="#page_184">184-190</a>,
+<a href="#page_194">194</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">D'Estaing, French admiral,
+<a href="#page_202">202-203</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Destroyer, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p>
+
+<p class="index">Dewa, Japanese admiral, <a href="#page_339">339</a>,
+<a href="#page_341">341</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dewey, U. S. admiral, at Manila,
+<a href="#page_316">316-320</a>, <a href="#page_415">415</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"> De Witt, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_172">172</a>,
+<a href="#page_177">177</a> <a name="page_453"><span class="page">Page
+453</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Diaz, Bartolomeo, <a href="#page_114">114</a>,
+<a href="#page_116">116</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Diedrichs, German admiral,
+<a href="#page_320">320</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Director fire, <a href="#page_350">350</a>,
+<a href="#page_410">410</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dirkzoon, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_138">138</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Diu, battle of, <a href="#page_118">118</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dogger Bank, Russian fleet off,
+<a href="#page_335">335</a>; action off, <a href="#page_364">364</a>,
+<a href="#page_369">369-374</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Don Juan of Austria, at Lepanto,
+<a href="#page_100">100-109</a>; <a href="#page_135">135</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral,
+<a href="#page_91">91</a>, <a href="#page_92">92</a>,
+<a href="#page_95">95-98</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Doria, Gian Andrea, Genoese admiral
+<a href="#page_98">98-108</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dragut, Turkish commander, <a href="#page_90">90</a>,
+<a href="#page_98">98</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Drake, Sir Francis, British admiral, voyages of,
+<a href="#page_153">153-155</a>; in Armada campaign,
+<a href="#page_157">157-163</a>; last years of,
+<a href="#page_165">165</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dreadnought, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p>
+
+<p class="index">Drepanum, battle of, <a href="#page_57">57</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Duguay-Trouin, French commander,
+<a href="#page_195">195</a>, <a href="#page_197">197</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Duilius, Roman consul, <a href="#page_52">52</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dumanoir, French admiral,
+<a href="#page_277">277</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Duncan, British admiral, at Camperdown,
+<a href="#page_234">234-237</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Dungeness, battle of, <a href="#page_172">172</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">E.</p>
+
+<p class="index">East Indies Companies, British and Dutch,
+<a href="#page_141">141</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ecnomus, battle of, <a href="#page_53">53-56</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Egypt, early ships of, <a href="#page_15">15</a>;
+Napoleon in, <a href="#page_233">233</a>, <a href="#page_347">347</a>,
+<a href="#page_357">357</a>, <a href="#page_374">374</a>,
+<a href="#page_441">441</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Elizabeth, queen of England,
+<a href="#page_125">125</a>, <a href="#page_138">138</a>,
+<a href="#page_151">151</a>, <a href="#page_152">152</a>,
+<a href="#page_155">155</a>, <a href="#page_166">166</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Emden</i>, German cruiser,
+<a href="#page_355">355</a>; cruise of,
+<a href="#page_366">366-368</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">England, early naval history of,
+<a href="#page_145">145-151</a>; at war with Spain,
+<a href="#page_151">151-167</a>; at war with Holland,
+<a href="#page_168">168-192</a>; at war with France,
+<a href="#page_193">193-221</a>; plans for invasion of,
+<a href="#page_197">197-198</a>, <a href="#page_232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page_261">261-265</a>. <i>See</i> Great Britain</p>
+
+<p class="index">Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia,
+<a href="#page_347">347</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ericsson, John, <a href="#page_287">287</a>,
+<a href="#page_290">290</a>, <a href="#page_292">292</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Erie, battle of Lake, <a href="#page_284">284</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Eurybiades, Spartan commander,
+<a href="#page_32">32</a>, <a href="#page_45">45</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Evan-Thomas, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_390">390</a>, <a href="#page_392">392</a>,
+<a href="#page_393">393</a>, <a href="#page_396">396-398</a>,
+<a href="#page_401">401</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Evertsen, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_174">174</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">F.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Falkland Islands, battle of,
+<a href="#page_363">363-366</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Farragut, U. S. admiral, <a href="#page_292">292</a>,
+<a href="#page_296">296</a>, <a href="#page_317">317</a>,
+<a href="#page_381">381</a>, <a href="#page_414">414</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Fighting Instructions, of British Navy,
+<a href="#page_184">184</a>, <a href="#page_187">187</a>,
+<a href="#page_190">190</a>, <a href="#page_200">200</a>,
+<a href="#page_206">206</a>, <a href="#page_211">211</a>,
+<a href="#page_216">216-217</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Fireships, <a href="#page_162">162</a>,
+<a href="#page_178">178</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">First of June, battle of,
+<a href="#page_227">227-232</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Fisher, British admiral, <a href="#page_348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page_359">359</a>, <a href="#page_377">377</a>,
+<a href="#page_378">378</a>, <a href="#page_381">381</a>,
+<a href="#page_384">384</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Fisher, Fort, capture of,
+<a href="#page_293">293</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Fleet in Being, <a href="#page_190">190</a>,
+<a href="#page_321">321</a>, <a href="#page_331">331</a>,
+<a href="#page_358">358</a>, <a href="#page_417">417</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Foch, French general, <a href="#page_439">439</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Foley, British captain, <a href="#page_249">249</a>,
+<a href="#page_256">256</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Four Days' Battle, in Dutch Wars,
+<a href="#page_185">185-186</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">France, at war with England in
+<a href="#page_18">18</a>th century, <a href="#page_193">193-221</a>;
+in Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_222">222-280</a>; in Far East,
+<a href="#page_329">329</a>; aids Russia, <a href="#page_335">335</a>;
+in World War, <a href="#page_345">345</a>, <a href="#page_347">347</a>
+Francis I, of France, <a href="#page_91">91</a>,
+<a href="#page_125">125</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Frobisher, Martin, <a href="#page_158">158</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Fulton, Robert, <a href="#page_270">270</a>,
+<a href="#page_287">287</a>; his submarine,
+<a href="#page_293">293-295</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">G.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Gabbard, battle of, <a href="#page_176">176</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Galleon of Venice</i>, Venetian ship,
+<a href="#page_93">93</a>, <a href="#page_96">96</a>,
+<a href="#page_97">97</a>, <a href="#page_98">98</a>,
+<a href="#page_103">103</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Galley, galleon, galleas, <i>see</i> Ships of War</p>
+
+<p class="index">Gallipoli Peninsula, operations on,
+<a href="#page_383">383-385</a>; <i>see</i> Dardanelles</p>
+
+<p class="index">Ganteaume, French admiral, <a href="#page_263">263</a>,
+<a href="#page_265">265</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Genoa, <a href="#page_82">82</a>,
+<a href="#page_85">85</a>; at war with Venice <a href="#page_88">88</a>,
+<a href="#page_122">122</a>, <a href="#page_135">135</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Germany, early commerce under Hausa,
+<a href="#page_131">131-133</a>; unification of,
+<a href="#page_286">286</a>; in Far East, <a href="#page_320">320</a>,
+<a href="#page_328">328</a>, <a href="#page_330">330</a>; aids Russia,
+<a href="#page_335">335</a>; growth of, <a href="#page_345">345-347</a>;
+in World War, <a href="#page_345">345</a>ff.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Gibraltar, captured by British,
+<a href="#page_196">196</a>; blockaded, <a href="#page_218">218</a>,
+<a href="#page_227">227</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>G&ouml;ben</i>, German battle cruiser, escape
+of, <a href="#page_355">355-357</a>; <a href="#page_381">381</a>,
+<a href="#page_411">411</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Goodenough, British naval officer, at Heligoland
+Bight, <a href="#page_352">352-353</a>; at Jutland,
+<a href="#page_396">396</a>, <a href="#page_401">401</a>,
+<a href="#page_413">413</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Grand Fleet, British, <a href="#page_349">349</a>;
+strength of, <a href="#page_350">350</a>, <a href="#page_351">351</a>,
+<a href="#page_369">369</a>; at Jutland,
+<a href="#page_386">386-417</a>; <a href="#page_432">432</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Graves, British admiral, <a href="#page_209">209-211</a>
+<a name="page_454"><span class="page">Page 454</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Gravina, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_266">266</a>,
+<a href="#page_274">274</a>, <a href="#page_277">277</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Great Britain, in Napoleonic Wars,
+<a href="#page_222">222-280</a>; in War of 1812,
+<a href="#page_280">280-285</a>; in World War,
+<a href="#page_345">345</a> ff. <i>See</i> England.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Greece, <a href="#page_16">16</a>; at war with
+Persia, <a href="#page_27">27-39</a>; in Peloponnesian War,
+<a href="#page_39">39-47</a>; <a href="#page_441">441</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Greek fire, <a href="#page_77">77</a>,
+<a href="#page_78">78</a>, <a href="#page_80">80</a>,
+<a href="#page_94">94</a>, <a href="#page_444">444</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Grenville, Sir Richard, <a href="#page_165">165</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Guns, gunpowder, <i>see</i> Ordnance</p>
+
+<p class="index">Gunfleet, battle of, <a href="#page_186">186-188</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">H.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Hampton Roads, battle of, <a href="#page_287">287</a>,
+<a href="#page_291">291-292</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hannibal, <a href="#page_60">60</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hanseatic League, <a href="#page_131">131-133</a>,
+<a href="#page_145">145</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hase, German naval officer, quoted
+<a href="#page_404">404-407</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hawke, British admiral, <a href="#page_198">198-200</a>,
+<a href="#page_227">227</a>, <a href="#page_414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page_416">416</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hawkins, John, <a href="#page_151">151</a>,
+<a href="#page_152">152-153</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Heath, British admiral, <a href="#page_388">388</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Heimskirck, Jacob van, Dutch seaman,
+<a href="#page_141">141</a>, <a href="#page_142">142</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Heligoland, <a href="#page_227">227</a>,
+<a href="#page_280">280</a>; battle of, <a href="#page_297">297</a>,
+<a href="#page_299">299</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Heligoland Bight, battle of,
+<a href="#page_351">351-354</a>, <a href="#page_411">411</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hellespont, <a href="#page_28">28</a>,
+<a href="#page_36">36</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Henry, Prince, the Navigator,
+<a href="#page_114">114</a>, <a href="#page_116">116</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Henry VIII, of England, <a href="#page_146">146</a>,
+<a href="#page_148">148</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Herbert, Lord Torrington, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_194">194</a>, <a href="#page_195">195</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Herm&aelig;a, battle of, <a href="#page_56">56</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">High Seas Fleet, of Germany,
+<a href="#page_349">349</a>; strength of, <a href="#page_350">350</a>;
+at Jutland, <a href="#page_373">373</a>,
+<a href="#page_387">387-417</a>; surrender of,
+<a href="#page_439">439-440</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hindenberg, German general,
+<a href="#page_420">420</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hipper, German admiral, at Dogger Bank,
+<a href="#page_370">370</a>, <a href="#page_373">373</a>; at Jutland,
+<a href="#page_390">390-391</a>, <a href="#page_393">393</a>,
+<a href="#page_396">396-398</a>, <a href="#page_403">403</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hobson, U. S. naval officer,
+<a href="#page_324">324</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hoche, French general, <a href="#page_233">233</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Holland, <i>see</i> Netherlands</p>
+
+<p class="index">Holland, John P., <a href="#page_296">296</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hood, British admiral, at Virginia Capes,
+<a href="#page_207">207-211</a>; at Saints' Passage,
+<a href="#page_212">212</a>, <a href="#page_215">215</a>,
+<a href="#page_238">238</a>, <a href="#page_239">239</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hood, British rear-admiral, at Jutland,
+<a href="#page_388">388</a>, <a href="#page_392">392</a>,
+<a href="#page_397">397</a>, <a href="#page_398">398</a>,
+<a href="#page_401">401</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Horton, Max, British commander,
+<a href="#page_355">355</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hotham, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_238">238-239</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Howard, Thomas, of Effingham,
+<a href="#page_158">158</a>, <a href="#page_160">160</a>,
+<a href="#page_178">178</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Howe, British admiral, <a href="#page_202">202</a>;
+at First of June, <a href="#page_227">227-232</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hudson, Henry, <a href="#page_141">141</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Hughes, British admiral</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">I.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Interior Lines, defined, <a href="#page_28">28</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Italy, at war with Austria,
+<a href="#page_296">296-303</a>; in World War,
+<a href="#page_345">345</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ito, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu,
+<a href="#page_306">306-308</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">J.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Jamaica, captured by British,
+<a href="#page_181">181</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Janissaries, <a href="#page_89">89</a>,
+<a href="#page_105">105</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Japan, at war with China,
+<a href="#page_304">304-310</a>; at war with Russia,
+<a href="#page_330">330-343</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Jellicoe, British admiral, <a href="#page_350">350</a>;
+at Jutland, <a href="#page_387">387-417</a>,
+<a href="#page_437">437</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_232">232</a>, <a href="#page_234">234</a>,
+<a href="#page_236">236</a>; character of,
+<a href="#page_239">239-240</a>; at Cape St. Vincent,
+<a href="#page_241">241-244</a>, <a href="#page_263">263</a>,
+<a href="#page_295">295</a>, <a href="#page_417">417</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Jones, Paul, American naval officer,
+<a href="#page_200">200-201</a>, <a href="#page_202">202</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Juan, <i>see</i> Don Juan</p>
+
+<p class="index">Jutland, battle of, <a href="#page_374">374</a>,
+<a href="#page_386">386-418</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">K.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Kamimura, Japanese admiral,
+<a href="#page_334">334</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Karlsr&uuml;he</i>, German cruiser,
+<a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_367">367</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Keith, British admiral, <a href="#page_263">263</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Kentish Knock, battle of,
+<a href="#page_172">172</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Keyes, British naval officer,
+<a href="#page_352">352</a>, <a href="#page_353">353</a>,
+<a href="#page_433">433</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Kiao-chau, seized by Germany,
+<a href="#page_320">320</a>, <a href="#page_328">328</a>,
+<a href="#page_334">334</a>, <a href="#page_346">346</a>,
+<a href="#page_366">366</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Kiel Canal, <a href="#page_348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page_349">349</a>, <a href="#page_408">408</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Kitchener, British general,
+<a href="#page_377">377-379</a>, <a href="#page_383">383</a>,
+<a href="#page_384">384</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>K&ouml;nigsberg</i>, German cruiser,
+<a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_367">367</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Korea, <a href="#page_304">304</a>,
+<a href="#page_310">310</a>, <a href="#page_330">330</a>,
+<a href="#page_343">343</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">L.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Lake, Simon, <a href="#page_296">296</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">La Hogue, battle of, <a href="#page_195">195</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">La Touche Tr&eacute;ville, French admiral,
+<a href="#page_262">262</a>, <a href="#page_265">265</a> <a
+name="page_455"><span class="page">Page 455</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Lepanto, campaign of, <a href="#page_100">100-103</a>;
+battle of, <a href="#page_103">103-108</a>,
+<a href="#page_148">148</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Lepidus, Roman general, <a href="#page_61">61</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Leyden, siege of, <a href="#page_139">139-140</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Lowestoft, battle of,
+<a href="#page_184">184-185</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">London, Declaration of, <a href="#page_421">421</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Louis XIV of France, <a href="#page_185">185</a>,
+<a href="#page_189">189</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a>,
+<a href="#page_191">191</a>, <a href="#page_193">193</a>,
+<a href="#page_195">195</a>, <a href="#page_448">448</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Lusitania</i>, loss of,
+<a href="#page_424">424</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">M.</p>
+
+<p class="index">McGiffin, American naval officer, at the Yalu,
+<a href="#page_305">305</a>, <a href="#page_307">307</a>,
+<a href="#page_309">309</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Macdonough, U. S. commodore,
+<a href="#page_284">284</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Magellan, Portuguese navigator,
+<a href="#page_119">119-121</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mahan, American naval officer, quoted,
+<a href="#page_60">60</a>, <a href="#page_189">189</a>,
+<a href="#page_197">197</a>, <a href="#page_216">216</a>,
+<a href="#page_270">270</a>, <a href="#page_310">310</a>,
+<a href="#page_313">313</a>, <a href="#page_324">324</a>,
+<a href="#page_345">345</a>; in Spanish-American War,
+<a href="#page_321">321</a>, <a href="#page_348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page_443">443</a>, <a href="#page_448">448</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Maine</i>, U. S. battleship,
+<a href="#page_314">314</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Makaroff, Russian admiral,
+<a href="#page_332">332</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Malta, <a href="#page_17">17</a>; siege of,
+<a href="#page_98">98</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a>,
+<a href="#page_247">247</a>, <a href="#page_253">253</a>,
+<a href="#page_261">261</a>, <a href="#page_266">266</a>,
+<a href="#page_280">280</a>, <a href="#page_356">356</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Manila, battle of, <a href="#page_316">316-320</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Marathon, battle of, <a href="#page_28">28</a>,
+<a href="#page_37">37</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mardonius, <a href="#page_27">27</a>,
+<a href="#page_37">37</a>, <a href="#page_38">38</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Martel, Charles, <a href="#page_82">82</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mary Queen of Scots, <a href="#page_151">151</a>,
+<a href="#page_152">152</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Matelieff, de Jonge, Dutch seaman,
+<a href="#page_143">143</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Medina Sidonia, Duke of,
+<a href="#page_156">156-162</a>, <a href="#page_178">178</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Merrimac</i>, Confederate ram,
+<a href="#page_290">290</a>; in action with <i>Monitor</i>,
+<a href="#page_291">291-292</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Milne, British admiral, <a href="#page_357">357</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mine barrage, in North Sea,
+<a href="#page_432">432-433</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Missiessy, French admiral, <a href="#page_224">224</a>,
+<a href="#page_263">263</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mohammed, <a href="#page_72">72</a>,
+<a href="#page_73">73</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mohammedans, <i>see</i> Arabs</p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Monitor</i>, U. S. ironclad,
+<a href="#page_287">287</a>, <a href="#page_290">290-292</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Monk, British admiral, <a href="#page_173">173-179</a>,
+<a href="#page_183">183</a>, <a href="#page_185">185-188</a>,
+<a href="#page_190">190</a>, <a href="#page_191">191</a>,
+<a href="#page_194">194</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#page_313">313</a>,
+<a href="#page_347">347</a>, <a href="#page_447">447</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Montojo, Spanish admiral, <a href="#page_317">317</a>,
+<a href="#page_319">319</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Moore, British admiral, <a href="#page_373">373</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Muaviah, Emir of Syria, <a href="#page_73">73-78</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mukden, battle of, <a href="#page_335">335</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">M&uuml;ller, German naval officer,
+<a href="#page_367">367</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Muza, Mohammedan general, <a href="#page_79">79</a>,
+<a href="#page_82">82</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Mycale, battle of, <a href="#page_38">38</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Myl&aelig;, battle of, <a href="#page_52">52-53</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">N.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Napoleon, quoted, <a href="#page_222">222</a>,
+<a href="#page_223">223</a>, <a href="#page_224">224</a>,
+<a href="#page_233">233</a>; in Italy, <a href="#page_238">238</a>,
+<a href="#page_239">239</a>; in Egypt, <a href="#page_244">244-248</a>,
+<a href="#page_252">252</a>; plans northern coalition,
+<a href="#page_253">253</a>; attempts invasion of England,
+<a href="#page_261">261-265</a>; instructs Villeneuve,
+<a href="#page_269">269</a>, <a href="#page_270">270</a>; adopts
+continental system, <a href="#page_279">279-280</a>,
+<a href="#page_414">414</a>, <a href="#page_419">419</a>,
+<a href="#page_445">445</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Naupaktis, battle of, <a href="#page_43">43-45</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Navarino, battle of, <a href="#page_286">286</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Navigation, progress in,
+<a href="#page_111">111-112</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Navigation Acts, <a href="#page_170">170</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Navy, British, administration of,
+<a href="#page_146">146</a>, <a href="#page_150">150</a>; under
+Commonwealth, <a href="#page_168">168</a>; training of officers
+for, <a href="#page_183">183</a>; at Restoration,
+<a href="#page_183">183</a>; in <a href="#page_18">18</a>th century,
+<a href="#page_202">202</a>; in French Revolutionary Wars,
+<a href="#page_225">225</a>; mutiny in, <a href="#page_234">234-235</a>;
+in War of 1812, <a href="#page_281">281</a>;
+size of, in World War, <a href="#page_350">350</a>. <i>See</i>
+England, Great Britain.<br> French, in <a href="#page_18">18</a>th
+century, <a href="#page_201">201-202</a>; in French Revolution,
+<a href="#page_223">223-225</a>. <i>See</i> France.<br> United
+States, in War of 1812, <a href="#page_281">281-284</a>; in Civil War,
+<a href="#page_290">290-296</a>; in World War,
+<a href="#page_432">432-433</a>. <i>See</i> United States</p>
+
+<p class="index">Nebogatoff, Russian admiral,
+<a href="#page_336">336</a>, <a href="#page_342">342</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Nelson, Horatio, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_169">169</a>, <a href="#page_178">178</a>,
+<a href="#page_179">179</a>, <a href="#page_182">182</a>,
+<a href="#page_223">223</a>; in Mediterranean,
+<a href="#page_238">238-240</a>; at Cape St. Vincent,
+<a href="#page_241">241-244</a>; at the Nile,
+<a href="#page_244">244-252</a>; at Copenhagen,
+<a href="#page_252">252-259</a>; in the Channel,
+<a href="#page_259">259</a>; in Trafalgar campaign and battle,
+<a href="#page_265">265-270</a>, <a href="#page_310">310</a>,
+<a href="#page_360">360</a>, <a href="#page_414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page_415">415</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Netherlands, at war with Hansa,
+<a href="#page_132">132</a>; commerce of, <a href="#page_133">133</a>,
+<a href="#page_140">140-143</a>, <a href="#page_168">168</a>,
+<a href="#page_191">191</a>, <a href="#page_442">442</a>; at war
+with Spain, <a href="#page_134">134-140</a>; at war with England,
+<a href="#page_168">168</a>, <a href="#page_192">192</a>; in War
+of American Revolution, <a href="#page_200">200</a>,
+<a href="#page_232">232</a>; in Napoleonic Wars,
+<a href="#page_237">237</a>, <a href="#page_279">279</a>
+
+<p class="index">New York, taken by British, <a href="#page_184">184</a>,
+<a href="#page_191">191</a>; held by Howe,
+<a href="#page_202">202</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Nicosia, siege of, <a href="#page_99">99-100</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Nile, campaign of, <a href="#page_244">244-248</a>;
+battle of, <a href="#page_249">249-252</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Nore, mutiny at, <a href="#page_234">234-235</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">North Sea Mine Barrage, <i>see</i> Mine Barrage</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">O. <a name="page_456"><span class="page">Page
+456</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Octavius, Roman emperor, at Actium,
+<a href="#page_61">61-69</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ontario, campaign on Lake,
+<a href="#page_283">283</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Open Door Policy, <a href="#page_330">330</a>,
+<a href="#page_447">447</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Oquendo, Spanish naval officer,
+<a href="#page_157">157</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ordnance, early types of, <a href="#page_94">94</a>;
+introduced on ships, <a href="#page_146">146</a>; at Armada,
+<a href="#page_150">150</a>; breech-loading,
+<a href="#page_289">289</a>; rifled, <a href="#page_289">289</a>;
+long range, <a href="#page_374">374</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Oregon</i>, U. S. battleship, cruise of,
+<a href="#page_314">314</a>, <a href="#page_315">315</a>; at Santiago,
+<a href="#page_326">326</a>, <a href="#page_327">327</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">P.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Panama Canal, <a href="#page_348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page_362">362</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Parker, British admiral, at Copenhagen,
+<a href="#page_254">254-258</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Parma, Duke of, <a href="#page_135">135</a>,
+<a href="#page_156">156</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a>,
+<a href="#page_160">160</a>, <a href="#page_162">162</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Peloponnesian War, <a href="#page_39">39-47</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Penn, British admiral, <a href="#page_174">174</a>,
+<a href="#page_175">175</a>, <a href="#page_181">181</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Perry, U. S. Commodore, <a href="#page_284">284</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Persano, Italian admiral, at Lissa,
+<a href="#page_298">298-303</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Persia, conquers Ph&oelig;nicia, <a href="#page_20">20-21</a>;
+at war with Greece, <a href="#page_27">27-39</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Pharselis, battle of, <a href="#page_75">75</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Philip II, of Spain, <a href="#page_99">99</a>,
+<a href="#page_100">100</a>, <a href="#page_101">101</a>,
+<a href="#page_128">128</a>, <a href="#page_134">134</a>,
+<a href="#page_151">151</a>, <a href="#page_152">152</a>,
+<a href="#page_156">156</a>, <a href="#page_157">157</a>,
+<a href="#page_158">158</a>, <a href="#page_165">165</a>,
+<a href="#page_166">166</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ph&oelig;nicia, commerce and colonies of,
+<a href="#page_16">16-20</a>, <a href="#page_25">25-26</a>; at
+Salamis, <a href="#page_33">33-34</a>, <a href="#page_36">36</a>,
+<a href="#page_49">49</a>, <a href="#page_441">441</a>,
+<a href="#page_443">443</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Phormio, Greek admiral, <a href="#page_39">39-45</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Platea, battle of, <a href="#page_21">21</a>,
+<a href="#page_37">37</a>, <a href="#page_38">38</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Port Arthur, <a href="#page_307">307</a>; given
+to Japan, <a href="#page_310">310</a>; seized by Russia,
+<a href="#page_329">329</a>; operations around,
+<a href="#page_332">332-335</a>; fall of, <a href="#page_334">334</a>,
+<a href="#page_343">343</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Portland, battle of, <a href="#page_173">173-175</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Portsmouth, Treaty of, <a href="#page_343">343</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Portugal, commerce and colonies of,
+<a href="#page_114">114-121</a>; decline of,
+<a href="#page_143">143</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Prevesa, battle of, <a href="#page_96">96-98</a>,
+<a href="#page_103">103</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Prussia, in Northern Coalition,
+<a href="#page_253">253</a>; at war with Austria,
+<a href="#page_297">297</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ptolemy, <a href="#page_112">112</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">Q.</p>
+
+<p class="index">"Q-ships," <a href="#page_431">431</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Quiberon Bay, battle of,
+<a href="#page_198">198-199</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">R.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Raleigh, Sir Walter, <a href="#page_149">149</a>,
+<a href="#page_164">164</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Recalde, Spanish naval officer,
+<a href="#page_157">157</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Renaissance, <a href="#page_86">86</a>,
+<a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_121">121</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Revenge</i>, Drake's flagship,
+<a href="#page_149">149</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a>; last fight
+of, <a href="#page_165">165</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Robeck, British admiral, at Dardanelles,
+<a href="#page_379">379</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Rodman, U. S. admiral, <a href="#page_432">432</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Rodney, British admiral, <a href="#page_203">203</a>;
+at Saints' Passage, <a href="#page_212">212-217</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Rojdestvensky, Russian admiral, cruise of,
+<a href="#page_335">335-339</a>; at Tsushima,
+<a href="#page_339">339-343</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Rome, in Punic Wars, <a href="#page_49">49-60</a>;
+in Actium campaign, <a href="#page_61">61-70</a>; wars of Eastern
+Empire, <a href="#page_71">71-86</a>; <a href="#page_441">441</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Rooke, British admiral, <a href="#page_196">196</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Roosevelt, Theodore, <a href="#page_316">316</a>,
+<a href="#page_324">324</a>, <a href="#page_343">343</a>,
+<a href="#page_347">347</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Rosyth, British base, <a href="#page_348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_387">387</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Rupert, Prince, <a href="#page_169">169</a>,
+<a href="#page_185">185</a>, <a href="#page_186">186</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Russia, in Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_250">250</a>,
+<a href="#page_253">253</a>, <a href="#page_259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page_266">266</a>, <a href="#page_280">280</a>; in Far
+East, <a href="#page_328">328-330</a>; at war with Japan,
+<a href="#page_330">330-343</a>, in World War,
+<a href="#page_345">345</a>, <a href="#page_375">375</a>,
+<a href="#page_417">417</a>, <a href="#page_446">446</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ruyter. <i>See</i> De Ruyter</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">S.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Saint Andr&eacute;e, Jean Bon,
+<a href="#page_228">228</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">St. Vincent, battle of Cape,
+<a href="#page_223">223</a>, <a href="#page_233">233</a>,
+<a href="#page_241">241-244</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">St. Vincent, Earl of. <i>See</i> Jervis</p>
+
+<p class="index">Saints' Passage, battle of,
+<a href="#page_212">212-217</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Salamis, battle of, <a href="#page_21">21</a>,
+<a href="#page_32">32-39</a>; <a href="#page_45">45-47</a>; campaign
+of, <a href="#page_28">28-32</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Salonika, <a href="#page_385">385</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sampson, U. S. admiral, in Santiago campaign,
+<a href="#page_320">320-327</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">San Juan de Ulna, fight at,
+<a href="#page_153">153</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Santa Cruz, Spanish admiral,
+<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_107">107</a>,
+<a href="#page_155">155</a>, <a href="#page_157">157</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Santiago, battle of, <a href="#page_320">320-327</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Saracens. <i>See</i> Arabs</p>
+
+<p class="index">Scapa Flow, British base, <a href="#page_348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page_351">351</a>, <a href="#page_355">355</a>,
+<a href="#page_386">386</a>, <a href="#page_432">432</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Scheer, German admiral, at Jutland,
+<a href="#page_387">387-411</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Scheldt River, <a href="#page_133">133</a>; battle
+in, <a href="#page_139">139</a>; blockaded by Dutch,
+<a href="#page_142">142</a>, <a href="#page_156">156</a>,
+<a href="#page_225">225</a>, <a href="#page_261">261</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Scheveningen, battle of, <a href="#page_177">177</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Schley, U. S. naval officer, in Santiago campaign,
+<a href="#page_321">321-323</a>, <a href="#page_326">326</a> <a
+name="page_457"><span class="page">Page 457</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Schoonevelt, battle of, <a href="#page_189">189</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Scott, Sir Percy, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_348">348</a>, <a href="#page_410">410</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sea Beggars, <a href="#page_135">135-137</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sea Power, preserves Greece, <a href="#page_39">39</a>;
+England's gains by, <a href="#page_191">191</a>,
+<a href="#page_196">196-197</a>, <a href="#page_220">220</a>; in
+Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_222">222-223</a>,
+<a href="#page_285">285</a>; in World War,
+<a href="#page_348">348-349</a>, <a href="#page_385">385</a>; influence
+of, <a href="#page_441">441-443</a>; elements of,
+<a href="#page_443">443-445</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Selim the Drunkard, Sultan of Turkey,
+<a href="#page_99">99</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Semenoff, Russian naval officer,
+<a href="#page_335">335</a>, <a href="#page_339">339</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Seymour, British admiral, at Armada,
+<a href="#page_158">158</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Shafter, U. S. general, <a href="#page_324">324</a>,
+<a href="#page_325">325</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Shimonoseki, Treaty of, <a href="#page_310">310</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ships of War, "round" and "long,"
+<a href="#page_19">19</a>; trireme, <a href="#page_19">19</a>,
+<a href="#page_21">21-24</a>; penteconter, <a href="#page_32">32</a>;
+liburna, <a href="#page_62">62</a>; galley, <a href="#page_69">69</a>,
+<a href="#page_93">93-95</a>; dromon, <a href="#page_74">74</a>;
+galleas, <a href="#page_102">102-103</a>, <a href="#page_148">148</a>;
+junk, <a href="#page_117">117</a>; Viking craft,
+<a href="#page_131">131</a>; galleon, <a href="#page_147">147-149</a>;
+two and three-deckers, <a href="#page_178">178</a>; steam,
+<a href="#page_287">287</a>; submarine, <a href="#page_293">293-296</a>,
+<a href="#page_426">426-428</a>; destroyer, <a href="#page_296">296</a>,
+<a href="#page_412">412</a>; battle cruiser,
+<a href="#page_343">343</a>, <a href="#page_348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page_369">369</a>; dreadnought, <a href="#page_343">343</a>,
+<a href="#page_348">348</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sicily, <a href="#page_17">17</a>,
+<a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_46">46</a>; in Punic Wars,
+<a href="#page_50">50-59</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sims, U. S. admiral, <a href="#page_431">431</a>,
+<a href="#page_437">437</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sinope, bombardment of, <a href="#page_288">288</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sirocco. Turkish admiral, <a href="#page_104">104</a>,
+<a href="#page_105">105</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sluis, battle of, <a href="#page_146">146</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Solebay, battle of, <a href="#page_189">189</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Soliman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey,
+<a href="#page_92">92</a>, <a href="#page_98">98</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Souchon, German admiral, <a href="#page_356">356</a>,
+<a href="#page_357">357</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Spain, at war with Turks,
+<a href="#page_100">100-108</a>; discoveries of,
+<a href="#page_121">121-128</a>; at war with Dutch,
+<a href="#page_134">134-143</a>; at war with England,
+<a href="#page_151">151-167</a>, <a href="#page_442">442</a>; in
+Napoleonic Wars, <a href="#page_240">240</a>,
+<a href="#page_265">265</a>; at war with United States,
+<a href="#page_313">313-328</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Spanish Armada, <a href="#page_128">128</a>,
+<a href="#page_141">141</a>, <a href="#page_149">149</a>,
+<a href="#page_156">156-167</a>, <a href="#page_445">445</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sparta. <i>See</i> Greece.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Spee, German admiral, <a href="#page_358">358-366</a>,
+<a href="#page_369">369</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Steam navigation, beginnings of,
+<a href="#page_287">287</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Sturdee, British admiral,
+<a href="#page_363">363-365</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Submarine, early types of,
+<a href="#page_293">293-296</a>; in World War,
+<a href="#page_350">350</a>, <a href="#page_420">420</a>,
+<a href="#page_423">423-439</a>, <a href="#page_445">445</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Suez Canal, <a href="#page_357">357</a>,
+<a href="#page_374">374</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Suffren, French admiral, <a href="#page_201">201</a>,
+<a href="#page_203">203</a>, <a href="#page_217">217-218</a>,
+<a href="#page_220">220</a>, <a href="#page_228">228</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Syracuse, at war with Athens,
+<a href="#page_46">46-47</a>, <a href="#page_76">76</a>,
+<a href="#page_247">247</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">T.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Tactics, of galleys, <a href="#page_94">94-95</a>;
+after use of sails and guns, <a href="#page_163">163-164</a>;
+in Dutch wars, <a href="#page_179">179</a>;
+in <a href="#page_18">18</a>th century, <a href="#page_194">194</a>,
+<a href="#page_216">216-217</a>; after use of armor,
+<a href="#page_296">296-297</a>; influenced by Lissa,
+<a href="#page_310">310</a>; at Jutland,
+<a href="#page_411">411-416</a>; in submarine warfare,
+<a href="#page_429">429-431</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Takeomi, Japanese naval officer,
+<a href="#page_339">339</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tegetthoff, Austrian admiral, at Lissa,
+<a href="#page_299">299-303</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Teneriffe, attacked by Blake,
+<a href="#page_181">181</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Terschelling, raided by English,
+<a href="#page_188">188</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Texel, battle of, <a href="#page_189">189</a>,
+<a href="#page_190">190</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Themistocles, <a href="#page_28">28</a>,
+<a href="#page_31">31</a>, <a href="#page_32">32</a>,
+<a href="#page_37">37</a>, <a href="#page_43">43</a>,
+<a href="#page_45">45</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Theophanes, <a href="#page_84">84</a>,
+<a href="#page_85">85</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Thermopyl&aelig;, battle of, <a href="#page_29">29</a>,
+<a href="#page_31">31</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Ting, Chinese admiral, at the Yalu,
+<a href="#page_305">305</a>, <a href="#page_306">306</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tirpitz, German admiral, <a href="#page_346">346</a>,
+<a href="#page_410">410</a>, <a href="#page_411">411</a>,
+<a href="#page_448">448</a>, <a href="#page_450">450</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Togo, Japanese admiral, <a href="#page_304">304</a>;
+at battle of 10th of August,
+<a href="#page_333">333-334</a>; at Tsushima,
+<a href="#page_339">339-342</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Togo, Japanese squadron commander,
+<a href="#page_339">339</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tordesillas, Treaty of, <a href="#page_125">125</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Torpedoes, origin of name, <a href="#page_295">295</a>;
+Whitehead, <a href="#page_296">296</a>; in Russo-Japanese war,
+<a href="#page_342">342</a>, <a href="#page_343">343</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Torrington, Earl of. <i>See</i> Herbert</p>
+
+<p class="index">Toscanelli, Paul, <a href="#page_122">122</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Toulon, French base, <a href="#page_226">226</a>,
+<a href="#page_238">238</a>, <a href="#page_246">246</a>,
+<a href="#page_263">263</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tourville, French admiral, <a href="#page_194">194</a>,
+<a href="#page_195">195</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Trafalgar, battle of, <a href="#page_178">178</a>,
+<a href="#page_179">179</a>, <a href="#page_223">223</a>,
+<a href="#page_236">236</a>, <a href="#page_265">265-279</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Transport service, in World War,
+<a href="#page_438">438-439</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Triple Alliance, <a href="#page_345">345</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tromp, Cornelius, Dutch admiral,
+<a href="#page_185">185-188</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tromp, Martin, Dutch admiral,
+<a href="#page_169">169</a>, <a href="#page_171">171-179</a>,
+<a href="#page_182">182</a>, <a href="#page_185">185</a>,
+<a href="#page_190">190</a>, <a href="#page_416">416</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Troubridge, British naval officer,
+<a href="#page_239">239</a>, <a href="#page_241">241</a>,
+<a href="#page_250">250</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tsuboi, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu,
+<a href="#page_306">306-309</a> <a name="page_458"><span
+class="page">Page 458</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tsushima, battle of, <a href="#page_339">339-343</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tunis, <a href="#page_18">18</a>; captured by Spanish,
+<a href="#page_91">91-92</a>; attacked by Blake,
+<a href="#page_180">180</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Turkey, rise of, <a href="#page_89">89-90</a>;
+at war with Venice and Spain, <a href="#page_90">90-109</a>; in
+World War, <a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_357">357</a>,
+<a href="#page_374">374-384</a>, <a href="#page_442">442</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Tyrwhitt, British naval officer,
+<a href="#page_351">351</a>, <a href="#page_352">352</a>,
+<a href="#page_353">353</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">U.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Ulm, battle of, <a href="#page_279">279</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Uluch Ali, Turkish leader, <a href="#page_90">90</a>;
+in Lepanto campaign, <a href="#page_101">101</a>,
+<a href="#page_104">104</a>, <a href="#page_106">106-108</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">United States, in American Revolution,
+<a href="#page_200">200-212</a>; in War of 1812,
+<a href="#page_280">280-285</a>; in
+Civil War, <a href="#page_286">286</a>, <a href="#page_290">290-296</a>;
+in Spanish-American War, <a href="#page_313">313-328</a>; in World
+War, <a href="#page_424">424</a>, <a href="#page_432">432-433</a>,
+<a href="#page_438">438-439</a>; naval problems of,
+<a href="#page_446">446-447</a>. <i>See</i> Navy</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">V.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Valdes, Pedro de, Spanish naval officer,
+<a href="#page_157">157</a>, <a href="#page_161">161</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Valdes, Pedrode, Spanish naval officer,
+<a href="#page_157">157</a>, <a href="#page_161">161</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Vandals, <a href="#page_71">71</a>,
+<a href="#page_72">72</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Veniero, Venetian admiral,
+<a href="#page_101">101-103</a>, <a href="#page_105">105</a></p>
+
+<p class="index"><i>Vengeur du Peuple</i>, French ship,
+<a href="#page_228">228</a>, <a href="#page_230">230</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Venice, early history of, <a href="#page_82">82</a>,
+<a href="#page_85">85</a>; commerce of, <a href="#page_87">87-89</a>,
+<a href="#page_442">442</a>; at war with Turks,
+<a href="#page_90">90-109</a>; ships of, <a href="#page_147">147</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Vikings, <a href="#page_49">49</a>,
+<a href="#page_71">71</a>, <a href="#page_83">83</a>,
+<a href="#page_130">130-131</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Villaret de Joyeuse, French admiral, at First of
+June, <a href="#page_228">228-231</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Villeneuve, French admiral, <a href="#page_224">224</a>;
+at the Nile, <a href="#page_250">250</a>; in Trafalgar campaign
+and battle, <a href="#page_265">265-270</a>,
+<a href="#page_273">273-276</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Virginia Capes, battle of, <a href="#page_68">68</a>,
+<a href="#page_201">201</a>, <a href="#page_207">207-211</a>,
+<a href="#page_442">442</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">W.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Wangenheim, Baron von, <a href="#page_357">357</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Wei-hai-wei, <a href="#page_310">310</a>,
+<a href="#page_329">329</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">William II, German emperor, <a href="#page_328">328</a>,
+<a href="#page_345">345</a>, <a href="#page_347">347</a>,
+<a href="#page_448">448</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">William III of England, <a href="#page_193">193</a>,
+<a href="#page_194">194</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">William, Prince of Orange, <a href="#page_134">134</a>,
+<a href="#page_137">137</a>, <a href="#page_140">140</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Wilson, Woodrow, President of United States,
+<a href="#page_387">387</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Winter, Dutch admiral, <a href="#page_235">235</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Witjeft, Russian admiral, <a href="#page_331">331</a>,
+<a href="#page_333">333</a></p>
+
+
+<p class="center">X.-Y.-Z.</p>
+
+<p class="index">Xerxes, <a href="#page_28">28</a>,
+<a href="#page_31">31</a>, <a href="#page_32">32-39</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">"Y-guns," <a href="#page_431">431</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Yalu, battle of, <a href="#page_304">304-310</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">York, Duke of, afterward James II of England,
+<a href="#page_184">184</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Zama, battle of, <a href="#page_60">60</a></p>
+
+<p class="index">Zeebrugge, attack on,
+<a href="#page_433">433-435</a></p>
+
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full">
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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, A History of Sea Power, by William Oliver
+Stevens and Allan Westcott
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
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+
+
+
+Title: A History of Sea Power
+
+
+Author: William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott
+
+
+
+Release Date: March 10, 2008  [eBook #24797]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
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+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF SEA POWER***
+
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+
+
+
+A HISTORY OF SEA POWER
+
+by
+
+WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS and ALLAN WESTCOTT
+
+Professors in the United States Naval Academy
+
+With Maps, Diagrams, and Illustrations
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+New York
+George H. Doran Company
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+This volume has been called into being by the absence of any brief
+work covering the evolution and influence of sea power from the
+beginnings to the present time. In a survey at once so comprehensive
+and so short, only the high points of naval history can be touched.
+Yet it is the hope of the authors that they have not, for that
+reason, slighted the significance of the story. Naval history is
+more than a sequence of battles. Sea power has always been a vital
+force in the rise and fall of nations and in the evolution of
+civilization. It is this significance, this larger, related point
+of view, which the authors have tried to make clear in recounting
+the story of the sea. In regard to naval principles, also, this
+general survey should reveal those unchanging truths of warfare
+which have been demonstrated from Salamis to Jutland. The tendency
+of our modern era of mechanical development has been to forget the
+value of history. It is true that the 16" gun is a great advance
+over the 32-pounder of Trafalgar, but it is equally true that the
+naval officer of to-day must still sit at the feet of Nelson.
+
+The authors would acknowledge their indebtedness to Professor F.
+Wells Williams of Yale, and to the Classical Departments of Harvard
+and the University of Chicago for valuable aid in bibliography.
+Thanks are due also to Commander C. C. Gill, U. S. N., Captain T. G.
+Frothingam, U. S. N. R., Dr. C. Alphonso Smith, and to colleagues of
+the Department of English at the Naval Academy for helpful criticism.
+As to the "References" at the conclusion of each chapter, it should
+be said that they are merely references, not bibliographies. The
+titles are recommended to the reader who may wish to study a period
+in greater detail, and who would prefer a short list to a complete
+bibliography.
+
+    WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS
+
+    ALLAN WESTCOTT
+
+United States Naval Academy,
+  _June_, 1920.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+CHAPTER
+     I  THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES
+    II  ATHENS AS A SEA POWER:
+           1. THE PERSIAN WAR
+           2. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
+   III  THE SEA POWER OF ROME:
+           1. THE PUNIC WARS
+           2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY
+    IV  THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES:
+           THE EASTERN EMPIRE
+     V  THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES [_Continued_]:
+           VENICE AND THE TURK
+    VI  OPENING THE OCEAN ROUTES:
+           1. PORTUGAL AND THE NEW ROUTE TO INDIA
+           2. SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD
+   VII  SEA POWER IN THE NORTH:
+           HOLLAND'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
+  VIII  ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA
+    IX  RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER:
+           WARS WITH THE DUTCH
+     X  RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER [_continued_]:
+           WARS WITH FRANCE TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
+    XI  NAPOLEONIC WARS:
+           THE FIRST OF JUNE AND CAMPERDOWN
+   XII  NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Continued_]:
+           THE RISE OF NELSON
+  XIII  NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Concluded_]:
+           TRAFALGAR AND AFTER
+   XIV  REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE:
+           HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA
+    XV  RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
+   XVI  THE WORLD WAR:
+           THE FIRST YEAR
+  XVII  THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]:
+           THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+ XVIII  THE WORLD WAR [_Concluded_]:
+           COMMERCE WARFARE
+   XIX  CONCLUSION
+        INDEX
+
+
+
+
+MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+EGYPTIAN SHIP
+SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER
+GREEK WAR GALLEY
+GREEK MERCHANT SHIP
+ROUTE OF XERXES' FLEET TO BATTLE OF SALAMIS
+SCENE OF PRELIMINARY NAVAL OPERATIONS, CAMPAIGN OF SALAMIS
+THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, 480 B. C.
+THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT--ABOUT 450 B. C.
+SCENE OF PHORMIO'S CAMPAIGN
+BATTLE OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF, 429 B. C.
+SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS
+ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS
+CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS, 256 B. C.
+POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
+SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B. C.
+THE SARACEN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, ABOUT 715 A. D.
+EUROPE'S EASTERN FRONTIER
+CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY
+THEATER OF OPERATIONS, VENICE AND THE TURK
+16TH CENTURY GALLEY
+BATTLE OF LEPANTO, OCTOBER 7, 1571
+CROSS-STAFF
+THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WORLD IN 1450
+PORTUGUESE VOYAGES AND POSSESSIONS
+FLAGSHIP OF COLUMBUS
+CHART OF A. D. 1589
+THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 16TH CENTURY
+GALLEON
+CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA
+ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA
+THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL
+SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE 17TH CENTURY
+  BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND FRANCE
+THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEBRUARY 18, 1653
+THE THAMES ESTUARY
+THREE-DECKED SHIP OF THE LINE, 18TH CENTURY
+THE WEST INDIES
+SCENE OF THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN
+BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, SEPTEMBER 5, 1781
+BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, APRIL 12, 1782
+BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1794
+BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN, OCTOBER 11, 1797
+BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14, 1797
+THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST, 1798
+COAST MAP--FROM ALEXANDRIA TO ROSETTA MOUTH OF THE NILE
+BATTLE OF THE NILE
+BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN
+POSITION OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, 1805
+NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE
+NELSON'S VICTORY
+BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805
+TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30
+EARLY IRONCLADS
+BUSHNELL'S TURTLE
+FULTON'S NAUTILUS
+BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866
+BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPTEMBER 17, 1894
+APPROACHES TO MANILA
+BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898
+WEST INDIES--MOVEMENTS IN SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN
+BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898
+THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
+HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR
+ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCTOBER 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905
+BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905
+HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION
+HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, 12:30-1:40
+BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOVEMBER 1, 1914
+ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS
+BATTLE OF FALKLAND ISLANDS, DECEMBER 8, 1914
+THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPTEMBER 1-NOVEMBER 9, 1914
+THEATER OF OPERATIONS, IN THE NORTH SEA
+DOGGER BANK ACTION, JANUARY 24, 1915
+THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE
+DARDANELLES DEFENSES
+CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
+BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION
+TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLE CRUISER: THE DERFLINGER
+TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER: THE LION
+BATTLE OF JUTLAND: FIRST PHASE
+TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLESHIP: THE IRON DUKE
+BATTLE OF JUTLAND: SECOND AND THIRD PHASES
+TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLESHIP: THE KOENIG
+EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY
+GERMAN BARRED ZONES
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES OF GERMAN SUBMARINES
+OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA
+ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND BRITISH BLOCKSHIPS
+BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS DESTROYED BY
+  GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES
+
+
+
+
+A HISTORY OF SEA POWER
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES
+
+Civilization and sea power arose from the Mediterranean, and the
+progress of recent archeological research has shown that civilizations
+and empires had been reared in the Mediterranean on sea power long
+before the dawn of history. Since the records of Egypt are far
+better preserved than those of any other nation of antiquity, and
+the discovery of the Rosetta stone has made it possible to read
+them, we know most about the beginnings of civilization in Egypt.
+We know, for instance, that an Egyptian king some 2000 years before
+Christ possessed a fleet of 400 fighting ships. But it appears
+now that long before this time the island of Crete was a great
+naval and commercial power, that in the earliest dynasties of Egypt
+Cretan fleets were carrying on a commerce with the Nile valley.
+Indeed, the Cretans may have taught the Egyptians something of the
+art of building sea-going ships for trade and war.[1] At all events,
+Crete may be regarded as the first great sea power of history, an
+island empire like Great Britain to-day, extending its influence
+from Sicily to Palestine and dominating the eastern Mediterranean
+for many centuries. From recent excavations of the ancient capital
+we get an interesting light on the old Greek legends of the Minotaur
+and the Labyrinth, going back to the time when the island kingdom
+levied tribute, human as well as monetary, on its subject cities
+throughout the AEgean.
+
+[Footnote 1: It is interesting to note that the earliest empires,
+Assyria and Egypt, were not naval powers, because they arose in rich
+river valleys abundantly capable of sustaining their inhabitants.
+They did not need to command the sea.]
+
+On this sea power Crete reared an astonishingly advanced civilization.
+Until recent times, for instance, the Phoenicians had been credited
+with the invention of the alphabet. We know now that 1000 years
+before the Phoenicians began to write the Cretans had evolved a
+system of written characters--as yet undeciphered--and a decimal
+system for numbers. A correspondingly high stage of excellence
+had been reached in engineering, architecture, and the fine arts,
+and even in decay Crete left to Greece the tradition of mastery
+in laws and government.
+
+[Illustration: EGYPTIAN SHIP
+
+From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
+
+The power of Crete was already in its decline centuries before
+the Trojan War, but during a thousand years it had spread its own
+and Egyptian culture over the shores of the AEgean. The destruction
+of the island empire in about 1400 B.C. apparently was due to some
+great disaster that destroyed her fleet and left her open to invasion
+by a conquering race--probably the Greeks--who ravaged her cities
+by sword and fire. On account of her commanding position in the
+Mediterranean, Crete might again have risen to sea power but for
+the endless civil wars that marked her subsequent history.
+
+The successor to Crete as mistress of the sea was Phoenicia. The
+Phoenicians, oddly enough, were a Semitic people, a nomadic race
+with no traditions of the sea whatever. When, however, they migrated
+to the coast and settled, they found themselves in a narrow strip
+of coast between a range of mountains and the sea. The city of Tyre
+itself was erected on an island. Consequently these descendants of
+herdsmen were compelled to find their livelihood upon the sea--as
+were the Venetians and the Dutch in later ages--and for several
+hundred years they maintained their control of the ocean highways.
+
+The Phoenicians were not literary, scientific, or artistic; they
+were commercial. Everything they did was with an eye to business.
+They explored the Mediterranean and beyond for the sake of tapping
+new sources of wealth, they planted colonies for the sake of having
+trading posts on their routes, and they developed fighting ships for
+the sake of preserving their trade monopolies. Moreover, Phoenicia
+lay at the end of the Asiatic caravan routes. Hence Phoenician ships
+received the wealth of the Nile valley and Mesopotamia and distributed
+it along the shores of the Mediterranean. Phoenician ships also
+uncovered the wealth of Spain and the North African coast, and,
+venturing into the Atlantic, drew metals from the British Isles.
+According to Herodotus, a Phoenician squadron circumnavigated Africa
+at the beginning of the seventh century before Christ, completing
+the voyage in three years. We should know far more now of the extent
+of the explorations made by these master mariners of antiquity
+were it not for the fact that they kept their trade routes secret
+as far as possible in order to preserve their trade monopoly.
+
+In developing and organizing these trade routes the Phoenicians
+planted colonies on the islands of the Mediterranean,--Sicily,
+Sardinia, Corsica, and Malta. They held both shores of the Straits
+of Gibraltar, and on the Atlantic shores of Spain established posts
+at Cadiz and Tarshish, the latter commonly supposed to have been
+situated just north of Cadiz at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River.
+Cadiz was their distributing point for the metals of northern Spain
+and the British Isles. The most famous colony was Carthage, situated
+near the present city of Tunis. Carthage was founded during the first
+half of the ninth century before Christ, and on the decay of the
+parent state became in turn mistress of the western Mediterranean,
+holding sway until crushed by Rome in the Punic Wars.
+
+Of the methods of the Phoenicians and their colonists in establishing
+trade with primitive peoples, we get an interesting picture from
+Herodotus,[1] who describes how the Carthaginians conducted business
+with barbarous tribes on the northern coast of Africa.
+
+[Footnote 1: HISTORY, translated by Geo. Rawlinson, vol. III, p.
+144.]
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER]
+
+"When they (the Carthaginian traders) arrive, forthwith they unload
+their wares, and having disposed them in orderly fashion on the
+beach, leave them, and returning aboard their ships, raise a great
+smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, came dawn to the shore,
+and laying out to view so much gold as they think the wares to be
+worth, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come
+ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it up and
+go their way; but if it does not seem sufficient they go aboard
+their ships once more and wait patiently. Then the others approach
+and add to the gold till the Carthaginians are satisfied. Neither
+party deals unfairly with the other; for the Carthaginians never
+touch the gold till it comes up to the estimated value of their
+goods, nor do the natives ever carry off the goads till the gold
+has been taken away."
+
+In addition to the enormous profits of the carrying trade the Phoenicians
+had a practical monopoly of the famous "Tyrian dyes," which were in
+great demand throughout the known world. These dyes were obtained
+from two kinds of shellfish together with an alkali prepared from
+seaweed. Phoenicians were also pioneers in the art of making glass.
+It is not hard to understand, therefore, how Phoenicia grew so
+extraordinarily rich as to rouse the envy of neighboring rulers,
+and to maintain themselves the traders of Tyre and Sidon had to
+develop fighting fleets as well as trading fleets.
+
+Early in Egyptian history the distinction was made between the
+"round" ships of commerce and the "long" ships of war. The round
+ship, as the name suggests, was built for cargo capacity rather
+than for speed. It depended on sail, with the oars as auxiliaries.
+The long ship was designed for speed, depending on oars and using
+sail only as auxiliary. And while the round ship was of deep draft
+and rode to anchor, the shallow flat-bottomed long ships were drawn
+up on shore. The Phoenicians took the Egyptian and Cretan models
+and improved them. They lowered the bows of the fighting ships,
+added to the blunt ram a beak near the water's edge, and strung
+the shields of the fighting men along the bulwarks to protect the
+rowers. To increase the driving force and the speed, they added a
+second and then a third bank of oars, thus producing the "bireme" and
+the "trireme." These were the types they handed down to the Greeks,
+and in fact there was little advance made beyond the Phoenician war
+galley during all the subsequent centuries of the Age of the Oar.
+
+About the beginning of the seventh century before Christ the Phoenicians
+had reached the summit of their power on the seas. Their extraordinary
+wealth tempted the king of Assyria, in 725 B.C., to cross the mountain
+barrier with a great army. He had no difficulty in overrunning the
+country, but the inhabitants fled to their colonies. The great
+city of Tyre, being on an island, defied the invader, and finally
+the Assyrian king gave up and withdrew to his own country. Having
+realized at great cost that he could not subdue the Phoenicians
+without a navy, he set about finding one. By means of bribes and
+threats he managed to seduce three Phoenician cities to his side.
+These furnished him sixty ships officered by Phoenicians, but manned
+by Assyrian crews.
+
+With this fleet an attack was made on Tyre, but such was the contempt
+felt by the Tyrians for their enemy that they held only twelve ships
+for defense. These twelve went out against the sixty, utterly routed
+them, and took 500 prisoners. For five years longer the Assyrian
+king maintained a siege of Tyre from the mainland, attempting to
+keep the city from its source of fresh water, but as the Tyrians
+had free command of the sea, they had no difficulty in getting
+supplies of all kinds from their colonies. At the end of five years
+the Assyrians again returned home, defeated by the Phoenician control
+of the sea. When, twenty years later, Phoenicia was subjugated by
+Assyria, it was due to the lack of union among the scattered cities
+and colonies of the great sea empire. Widely separated, governed
+by their own princes, the individual colonies had too little sense
+of loyalty for the mother country. Each had its own fleets and its
+own interests; in consequence an Assyrian fleet was able to destroy
+the Phoenician fleets in detail. From this point till the rise of
+Athens as a sea power, the fleets of Phoenicia still controlled the
+sea, but they served the plans of conquest of alien rulers.
+
+As a dependency of Persia, Phoenicia enabled Cambyses to conquer
+Egypt. However, when the Phoenician fleet was ordered to subjugate
+Carthage, already a strong power in the west, the Phoenicians refused
+on the ground of the kinship between Carthage and Phoenicia. And
+the help of Phoenicia was so essential to the Persian monarch that
+he countermanded the order. Indeed the relation of Phoenicia to
+Persia amounted to something more nearly like that of an ally than
+a conquered province, for it was to the interests of Persia to
+keep the Phoenicians happy and loyal.
+
+When, in 498 B.C., the Greeks of Asia and the neighboring islands
+revolted, it was due chiefly to the loyalty of the Phoenicians that the
+Persian empire was saved. Thereafter, the Persian yoke was fastened
+on the Asiatic Greeks, and any prospect of a Greek civilization
+developing on the eastern shore of the AEgean was destroyed.
+
+[Illustration: GREEK WAR GALLEY
+
+From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
+
+But on the western shore lay flourishing Greek cities still independent
+of Persian rule. Moreover, the coastal towns like Corinth and Athens
+were developing considerable power on the sea, and it was evident
+that unless European Greece were subdued it would stand as a barrier
+between Persia and the western Mediterranean. Darius perceived the
+situation and prepared to destroy these Greek states before they
+should become too formidable. The story of this effort, ending at
+Salamis and Platea, and breaking for all time the power of Persia,
+belongs in the subsequent chapter that narrates the rise and fall
+of Athens as a sea power.
+
+At this point, it is worth pausing to consider in detail the war
+galley which the Phoenicians had developed and which they handed
+down to the Greeks at this turning point in the world's history.
+The bireme and the trireme were adopted by the Greeks, apparently
+without alteration, save that at Salamis the Greek galleys were
+said to have been more strongly built and to have presented a lower
+freeboard than those of the Phoenicians. A hundred years later,
+about 330 B.C., the Greeks developed the four-banked ship, and
+Alexander of Macedon is said to have maintained on the Euphrates
+a squadron of seven-banked ships. In the following century the
+Macedonians had ships of sixteen banks of oars, and this was probably
+the limit for sea-going ships in antiquity. These multiple banked
+ships must have been most unhandy, for a reversal of policy set in
+till about the beginning of the Christian era the Romans had gone
+back to two-banked ships. In medieval times war galleys reverted
+to a single row of oars on each side, but required four or five
+men to every oar.
+
+[Illustration: GREEK MERCHANT SHIP
+
+From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
+
+At the time of the Persian war the trireme was the standard type of
+warship, as it had been for the hundred years before, and continued
+to be during the hundred years that followed. In fact, the name
+trireme was used loosely for all ships of war whether they had two
+banks of oars or three. But the fleets that fought in the Persian
+war and in the Peloponnesian war were composed of three-banked ships,
+and fortunately we have in the records of the Athenian dockyards
+accurate information as to structural detail.
+
+The Athenian trireme was about 150 feet in length with a beam of 20
+feet. The beam was therefore only 2/15 of the length. (A merchant
+ship of the same period was about 180 feet long with a beam of 1/4
+its length.) The trireme was fitted with one mast and square sail,
+the latter being used only when the wind was fair, as auxiliary
+to the oars, especially when it needed to retire from battle. In
+fact, the phrase "hoist the sail" came to be used colloquially
+like our "turn tail" as a term for running away.
+
+The triremes carried two sails, usually made of linen, a larger
+one used in cruising and a smaller one for emergency in battle.
+Before action it was customary to stow the larger sail on shore,
+and the mast itself was lowered to prevent its snapping under the
+shock of ramming.
+
+The forward part of the trireme was constructed with a view to
+effectiveness in ramming. Massive catheads projected far enough to
+rip away the upper works of an enemy, while the bronze beak at the
+waterline drove into her hull. This beak, or ram, was constructed
+of a core of timber heavily sheathed with bronze, presenting three
+teeth. Although the ram was the prime weapon of the ship, it often
+became so badly wrenched in collision as to start the whole forward
+part of the vessel leaking.
+
+The rowers were seated on benches fitted into a rectangular structure
+inside the hull. These benches were so compactly adjusted that
+the naval architects allowed only two feet of freeboard for every
+bank of oars. Thus the Roman quinquiremes of the Punic wars stood
+only about ten feet above water. The covering of this rectangular
+structure formed a sort of hurricane deck, standing about three
+feet above the gangway that ran around the ship at about the level
+of the bulwarks. This gangway and upper deck formed the platform
+for the fighting men in battle. Sometimes the open space between
+the hurricane deck and the gangway was fenced in with shields or
+screens to protect the rowers of the uppermost bank of oars from
+the arrows and javelins of the enemy.
+
+The complement of a trireme amounted to about 200 men. The captain,
+or "trierarch," commanded implicit obedience. Under him were a
+sailing master, various petty officers, sailors, soldiers or marines,
+and oarsmen.
+
+The trireme expanded in later centuries to the quinquereme: upper
+works were added and a second mast, but in essentials it was the
+same type of war vessel that dominated the Mediterranean for three
+thousand years--an oar driven craft that attempted to disable its
+enemy by ramming or breaking away the oars. After contact the fighting
+was of a hand to hand character such as prevailed in battles on
+land. These characteristics were as true of the galley of Lepanto
+(1571 A.D.) as of the trireme of Salamis (480 B.C.). Of the three
+cardinal virtues of the fighting ship, mobility, seaworthiness,
+and ability to keep the sea, or cruising radius, the oar-driven
+type possessed only the first. It was fast, it could hold position
+accurately, it could spin about almost on its own axis, but it was
+so frail that it had to run for shelter before a moderate wind
+and sea. In consequence naval operations were limited to the summer
+months. As to its cargo capacity, it was so small that it was unable
+to carry provisions to sustain its own crew for more than a few
+days. As a rule the trireme was beached at night, with the crew
+sleeping on shore, and as far as possible the meals were cooked
+and eaten on shore. In the battle of AEgospotami (405 B.C.), for
+example, the Spartans fell upon the Athenians when their ships
+were drawn up on the beach and the crews were cooking their dinner.
+Moreover, the factors of speed and distance were both limited by
+the physical fatigue of the oarsmen. In the language of to-day,
+therefore, the oar-driven man-of-war had a small "cruising radius."
+
+This dependence on the land and this sensitiveness to weather are
+important facts in ancient naval history. It is fair to say that
+storms did far more to destroy fleets and naval expeditions than
+battles during the entire age of the oar. The opposite extreme
+was reached in Nelson's day. His lumbering ships of the line made
+wretched speed and straggling formations, but they were able to
+weather a hurricane and to keep the sea for an indefinite length
+of time.
+
+As a final word on the beginnings of navies, emphasis should be
+laid on the enormous importance of these early mariners, such as
+the Cretans and the Phoenicians, as builders of civilization. The
+venturesome explorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port
+not only opened up a new source of wealth but also established a
+reciprocal relation that quickened civilization at both ends of
+his route. The cargo ships that left the Nile delta distributed the
+arts of Egypt as well as its wheat, and the richest civilization of
+the ancient world, that of Greece, rose on foundation stones brought
+from Egypt, Assyria, and Phoenicia. It may be said of Phoenicia herself
+that she built-up her advanced culture on ideas borrowed almost
+wholly from her customers. But control of the seas for trade involved
+control of the seas for war, and behind the merchantman stood the
+trireme. It is significant and appropriate that a Phoenician coin
+that has come down to us bears the relief of a ship of war.
+
+In contrast with these early sea explorers and sea fighters stand
+the peoples of China and India. Having reached a high state of
+culture at an early period, they nevertheless, sought no contact
+with the world outside and became stagnant for thousands of years.
+Indeed, among the Hindus the crossing of the sea was a crime to be
+expiated only by the most agonizing penance. Hence these peoples
+of Asia, the most numerous in the world, exercised no influence
+on the development of civilization compared with a mere handful
+of people in Crete or the island city of Tyre. And for the same
+reason China and India ceased to progress and became for centuries
+mere backwaters of history.
+
+It is worth noting also that the Mediterranean, leading westwards
+from the early developed nations of Asia Minor and Egypt, opened
+a westward course to the advance of discovery and colonization,
+and this trend continued as the Pillars of Hercules led to the
+Atlantic and eventually to the new world. For every nation that
+bordered the Mediterranean illimitable highways opened out for
+expansion, provided it possessed the stamina and the skill to win
+them. And in those days they were practically the only highways.
+Frail as the early ships were and great as were the perils they
+had to face, communications by water were far centuries faster
+and safer than communications by land. Hence civilization followed
+the path of the sea. Even in these early beginnings it is easy
+to see that sea-borne commerce leads to the founding of colonies
+and the formation of an empire whose parts are linked together
+by trade routes, and finally, that the preservation of such an
+empire depends an the naval control of sea. This was as true of
+Crete and Phoenicia as it was later true of Venice, Holland, and
+England.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+THE SEA KINGS OF CRETE, J. Baikie, 1910.
+PHoeNICIA, Story of the Nations Series, George Rawlinson, 1895.
+THE SAILING SHIP, E. Keble Chatterton, 1909.
+SHIPS AND THEIR WAYS OF OTHER DAYS, E. Keble Chatterton, 1913.
+ANCIENT SHIPS, Cecil Torr, 1894.
+ARCHEOLOGIE NAVALE, Auguste Jal, 1840.
+THE PREHISTORIC NAVAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE NORTH OF EUROPE,
+  G. H. Buhmer, in Report of the U. S. National Museum, 1893.
+  This article contains a complete bibliography on the subject of
+  ancient ships.
+SEA POWER AND FREEDOM (chap. 2), Gerard Fiennes, 1918.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+ATHENS AS A SEA POWER
+
+1. THE PERSIAN WAR
+
+In determining to crush the independence of the Greek cities of
+the west, Darius was influenced not only by the desire to destroy a
+dangerous rival on the sea and an obstacle to further advances by the
+Persian empire, but also to tighten his hold on the Greek colonies of
+Asia Minor. Helped by the Phoenician fleet and the treachery of the
+Lesbians and Samians, he had succeeded in putting down a formidable
+rebellion in 500 B.C. In this rebellion the Asiatic Greeks had
+received help from their Athenian brethren on the other side of
+the AEgean; indeed just so long as Greek independence flourished
+anywhere there would always be the threat of revolt in the Greek
+colonies of Persia. Darius perceived rightly that the prestige and
+the future power of his empire depended on his conquering Greece.
+
+In 492 he dispatched Mardonius with an army of invasion to subdue
+Attica and Eretria, and at the same time sent forth a great fleet to
+conquer the independent island communities of the AEgean. Mardonius
+succeeded in overcoming the tribes of Thrace and Macedonia, but the
+fleet, after taking the island of Thasus, was struck by a storm
+that wrecked three hundred triremes with a loss of 20,000 lives. As
+the broken remnants of the fleet returned to Asia, leaving Mardonius
+with no sea communications, and harassed by increasing opposition,
+he was compelled to retreat also. In 490 Darius sent out another
+army under Mardonius, this time embarking it on a fleet of 600
+triremes which succeeded in arriving safely at the coast of Attica
+in the bay of Marathon. While the army was disembarking it was
+attacked by Miltiades and utterly defeated. The second expedition,
+therefore, came to nothing. But Marathon can hardly be called a
+decisive battle because it merely postponed the invasion; it affected
+in no way the communications of the Persians and it did not weaken
+seriously their military resources.
+
+The great savior of Greece at this crisis was the Athenian,
+Themistocles. He foresaw the renewed efforts of the Persian king
+to destroy Greece, and realized also that the most vital point in
+the coming conflict would be the control of the sea. Accordingly
+he urged upon the Athenians the necessity of building a powerful
+fleet. In this policy he was aided by one of those futile wars
+so characteristic of Greek history, a war between Athens and the
+island of AEgina. In order to overcome the AEginetans, who had a
+large fleet, the Athenians were compelled to build a larger one,
+and by the time this purpose was accomplished rumors came that
+the Persian king was getting ready another invasion of Greece.
+
+_Campaign of Salamis_
+
+The third attempt was undertaken ten years after the second, in
+the year 480, under Xerxes, the successor to Darius. This time the
+very immensity of the forces employed was to overcome all opposition
+and all misfortunes. An army, variously estimated at from one to
+five million men, crossed the Hellespont on a bridge of boats to
+invade the peninsula from the north, while a fleet of 1200 triremes
+was assembled to insure the command of the sea.
+
+Against the unlimited resources of the Persian empire and the unity
+of plan represented by Xerxes and his generals, the Greeks had
+little to offer. They possessed the two advantages of the defensive,
+knowledge of the terrain and interior lines,[1] but their resources
+were small and their spirit divided. Greece in those days was, as
+was later said of Italy, "merely a geographical expression." The
+various cities were mutually jealous and hostile, and it took a great
+common danger to bring them even into a semblance of cooperation.
+Even during this desperate crisis the cities of western Greece,
+counting themselves reasonably safe from invasion, declined to
+send a ship or a man for the common cause.
+
+[Footnote 1: "'Interior Lines' conveys the meaning that from a
+central position one can assemble more rapidly on either of two
+opposite fronts than the enemy can, and therefore utilize force
+more effectively." NAVAL STRATEGY, A. T. Mahan, p. 32.]
+
+[Illustration: ROUTE OF XERXES' FLEET TO BATTLE OF SALAMIS]
+
+The Persian army advanced without opposition as far as the pass of
+Thermopylae, which guarded the only road into the rest of Greece.
+Twelve days after the army had started on its march the great fleet
+crossed the AEgean to establish contact with the army and bring
+supplies. The army was checked by the valor of Leonidas, and the
+Persian fleet was intercepted by a Greek fleet which stood guard
+over the channel leading to the Gulf of Lamia, thus protecting the
+sea flank of Leonidas. The Persian fleet, after crossing the open
+sea safely, made its base at Sepias preparatory to the attack on
+the Greek fleet. The latter numbered only about 380 vessels to some
+1200 of their enemy and the prospects for the Persian cause looked
+bright indeed. But as the very number of the Persian ships made it
+impossible to beach all of them for the night a large proportion
+of them were anchored, lying in eight lines, prows toward the sea.
+At dawn a northeast gale fell upon them, and, according to the
+Greek accounts, wrecked 400 triremes, together with an uncounted
+number of transports. Meanwhile the Greek ships had taken refuge
+under the lee of the island of Euboea, and the news of the Persian
+disaster was signaled to them by the watchers on the heights.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF PRELIMINARY NAVAL OPERATIONS, CAMPAIGN OF
+SALAMIS]
+
+As soon as the weather moderated the Greeks returned to their position
+in the straits near Artemisium, and during the next three days the
+two fleets fought stubbornly but without advantage to either side.
+During the second day a southerly gale caught a flying squadron
+of some 200 triremes, that had been dispatched round the island of
+Euboea to catch the Greeks in the rear, and not one of the Persian
+ships survived. The Greek rear guard squadron of fifty brought
+the welcome news to the main fleet and served as a much needed
+reenforcement. Although the Persian armada had lost about half
+its force in three days by storms, the odds were still so heavily
+against the Greeks that they found themselves in constant peril
+of having their flanks turned in this open sea fighting.
+
+On the afternoon of the third day the pass of Thermopyae was forced,
+thanks to the treachery of a Greek and the contemptible policy of
+the Spartan government which steadily refused the plea of Leonidas
+for reenforcements. With Thermopyae taken there was no further reason
+for the Greek fleet to try to hold the straits north of Euboea,
+and during the night it retired unobserved. The following day the
+Persian fleet advanced and brought to the army the supplies which
+it sorely needed.
+
+With the fall of Thermopyae and the contact established between his
+army and his fleet, Xerxes found his route open for the invasion
+of Attica. Since there was no possibility of opposing him on land,
+the population of the province was removed and Athens left to its
+fate. Themistocles, who was in command of the Athenian division of
+the Greek fleet, now urged the assembling of the fleet at Salamis,
+partly to cover the withdrawal of the Athenians and partly to assist
+in the defense of the Isthmus of Corinth, which was to be the next
+stand of the Greeks. The advice was adopted and the fleet assembled
+off the town of Salamis. Athenian refugees had crowded into the town
+and from the heights above they watched the smoke of their burning
+city. Their own future and the future of Athenian civilization hung
+on the long lines of triremes drawn up on the shore.
+
+A glance at the map of the region of Salamis shows the advantages
+offered by the position for the defensive. The fighting off Artemisium
+had shown the peril of attacking a greatly superior force in the open
+because of the danger of being outflanked. In the narrow straits
+between Salamis and the mainland the Greek line of battle would
+rest its flanks on the opposite shores. But it is one thing to
+choose a position and another to get the enemy to accept battle in
+that position. If the Persians ignored the Greek fleet and moved to
+the Isthmus, the Greeks would be caught in an awkward predicament. To
+regain touch with the Greek army, the fleet would be then compelled
+to come out of the straits and fight at a disadvantage in the open.
+There was only one chance of defeating the Persian fleet and that
+was to make it fight in the narrow waters of the strait where numbers
+would not count so heavily. Everything depended on bringing this
+to pass.
+
+Nor could the Greeks wait indefinitely for the Persians. Already
+the incorrigible jealousies of rival cities had almost reached the
+point of disintegrating the fleet. Although the commander in chief
+was the Spartan general Eurybiades, the whole Spartan contingent
+was on the point of deserting in a body to its own coasts. The
+situation was saved by Themistocles. Having wrung from his allies
+a reluctant consent to stop at Salamis temporarily to cover the
+withdrawal of the Athenian populace, the story is that he secretly
+dispatched a messenger to Xerxes to say that if he would attack
+at once he could crush the entire naval forces of the Greeks at a
+blow, but if he delayed the Greeks would scatter. Acting on this
+advice, Xerxes landed troops on the island of Psyttaleia, dispatched
+a squadron to block the western outlet of Salamis Straits, and
+proceeded to move the main body of his fleet to attack the Greeks
+by way of the eastern channel. The preparations were made during
+the night and were not completed till dawn of the day of battle,
+September 20, 480 B.C.
+
+The debates in the allied fleet came to an end with the appearance
+of the Persians. The shrewd plan of Themistocles had succeeded.
+The Greeks would have to fight with their backs to the wall, but
+they would fight with better chance of success than under any other
+circumstances.
+
+The Greek force consisted of about 380 vessels. Of these, Athens
+contributed 180, Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnesus were
+represented by 89 and the remainder were made up of squadrons from
+the island states. Some of these island contingents contained a
+type of ship different from the triremes, the penteconter. This was
+a galley with only one bank of oars, but these were long sweeps,
+each manned by five oarsmen. The penteconter was an early prototype
+of the galley of the Christian era.
+
+The Persians had been reduced by this time to about 600 ships,
+although there had been numerous reenforcements since the disaster
+at Cape Sepias. The fleet was "Persian" only in name, for, except
+for bands of Persian archers on some of the ships, it was composed
+of elements levied from each of the subject nations that followed
+the sea. Indeed Persia is a curious example in history of a nation
+with a purely artificial sea power, for its navy was composed of
+aliens entirely. Thus the squadron that was sent to blockade the
+western end of the straits was Egyptian, the right wing of the fleet
+as it advanced to the attack was composed of Phoenicians, and the
+center and left was made up of Cyprians, Cilicians, Samothracians,
+and Ionians, the latter only recently in rebellion against Persia
+and at that time welcoming help from Athens in a cause in which
+Athens herself was now involved. Apparently there was no compunction
+felt on this account, for the Ionians distinguished themselves by
+gallant fighting against their Greek brethren. Nevertheless, it
+is not hard to imagine difficulties involved in the task of making
+a unit of such an assortment of peoples. The fleet was commanded
+by a Persian, Prince Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes.
+
+At daybreak the Persian triremes drew up in three lines on each
+side of the island of Psyttaleia and advanced into the straits.
+But the narrowing waters of the channel made it necessary to reduce
+the front and bear to the left. Consequently all formation was
+lost, and the Persian triremes poured into the narrows "in a
+stream,"--to quote the phrase of the tragedian AEschylus, who fought
+on an Athenian trireme in this battle and describes it in one of
+his plays.
+
+Facing the invader was a smaller array of ships but a better ordered
+line of battle. On the Greek left was the Athenian division opposing
+the advancing triremes of Phoenicia; on the right was the Spartan
+division facing the Greeks of Asia Minor. The two fleets rushed toward
+each other, but just before contact the Persians found themselves
+embarrassed by their very number of ships. As may be seen by the
+map, they had an awkward turn to make in entering the narrows. At
+this point, just opposite the peninsula of Salamis, the straits
+are only about 2000 yards wide, making it impossible for more than
+80 or 90 triremes to advance abreast. As a result the Phoenician
+wing of the line was extended considerably in advance of the rest,
+forced ahead by the pressure of ships behind. Although, as a matter
+of fact, the Spartan wing also was somewhat in advance of the rest of
+the Greek line, the first shock of battle came between the Phoenicians
+and the Athenians.
+
+[Illustration: After Grundy, _The Great Persian War._
+
+THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, 480 B. C.
+
+  1 The Original Position
+  2 The Advance
+  3 The Contact]
+
+This initial advantage offered by an exposed wing was immediately
+seized upon. While the Athenians bore the frontal attack, the AEginetans
+on their right fell upon the Phoenicians' flank. This double attack
+on the Persian right wing eventually proved the turning point of
+the battle. The Phoenicians, however, had the reputation of being
+the foremost sea fighters in the world, and they bore themselves
+well. Similarly the Asiatic Greeks proved themselves foemen worthy
+of their brethren from the Peloponnesus, and the fight was maintained
+with great ferocity all along the line. The inhabitants of Athens
+who had been removed to Salamis blackened the shores on one side of
+the Strait, as anxious watchers of the tremendous spectacle. Opposite
+them on the slope of Mt. AEgaleos sat Xerxes himself, surrounded by
+his staff, a less anxious spectator but no less interested in the
+outcome.
+
+About seven o'clock a fresh westerly wind arose, as it does at
+this day in that region, and as it did some years later during a
+battle won by an Athenian admiral in the Gulf of Corinth.[1] This
+wind blows every morning with considerable violence for about two
+hours; and in this battle it must have tended to make the bows of
+the Persian ships pay off--thus exposing their sides to the Greek
+rams--and drift back upon the galleys that were crowding forward
+from the rear in the attempt to get into the battle.
+
+[Footnote 1: The Battle of the Corinthian Gulf: v. p. 43]
+
+The Greeks pressed their advantage, using their rams to sink an
+adversary or disable her by cutting away her oars. Where the melee
+was too close for such tactics they tried to take their enemy by
+boarding. On every Greek trireme was a specially organized boarding
+party consisting of 36 men--18 marines, 14 heavily armed soldiers,
+and four bowmen; and the Greeks seem to have been superior to their
+enemy at close quarters. On the Persian side the superiority lay in
+their archers and javelin throwers. Toward the end of the battle,
+for instance, a Samothracian trireme performed a remarkable feat.
+Having been disabled by an AEginetan ship, the Samothracian cleared the
+decks of her assailant with arrows and javelins and took possession.
+Although the invaders seem to have fought with the greatest courage
+and determination, the disadvantage of confusion at the outset of
+the battle, augmented by the head wind, told decisively against
+them. They were unable to take advantage of their superiority in ships
+on account of the narrowness of the channel, and indeed found that
+the very multitude of their ships only added to their difficulties.
+
+The retreat began with the flower of the Persian fleet, the Phoenician
+division. Caught at the opening of the battle with the Athenians in
+front and the AEginetans on the left flank, they were never able to
+extricate themselves, although they fought stubbornly. The foremost
+ships, many in a disabled condition, began to retreat; others backed
+water to make way for them; the rearmost finding it impossible to
+reach the battle at all, withdrew out of the straits; and soon the
+retreat became general. As the Phoenicians withdrew, the Athenians
+and the AEginetans fell upon the center of the Persian line, and the
+rout became general with the Greeks in full pursuit. The latter
+pressed their enemy as far as the island of Psyttaleia, thus cutting
+off the Persian force on the island from their communications.
+Whereupon Aristides, the Athenian, led a force in boats from Salamis
+to the island and put to death every man of the Persian garrison.
+The Persian ships fled to their base at Phaleron, while the Greeks
+returned to their base at Salamis.
+
+The battle of Salamis was won, but at the moment neither side realized
+its decisive character. The Greeks had lost 40 ships; the Persians
+had lost over 200 sunk, and an indeterminate number captured.
+Nevertheless, the latter could probably have mustered a considerable
+force for another attack--which the Greeks expected--if their morale
+had not been so badly shaken. Their commander, Ariabignes, was
+among the killed, and there was no one else capable of reorganizing
+the shattered forces. Xerxes, fearing for the safety of his bridge
+over the Hellespont, gave orders for his ships to retire thither to
+protect it, and the very night after the battle found the remains
+of the Persian fleet in full flight across the AEgean.
+
+The news reached the Greeks at noon of the following day and they
+set out in pursuit, but having gone as far as Andros without coming
+up with the enemy, they paused for a council of war. The Athenians
+urged the policy of going on and destroying the bridge over the
+Hellespont, but they were voted down by their allies, who preferred
+to leave well enough alone.
+
+It is customary to speak of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis
+as due to their superior physique and fighting qualities. This
+superiority may be claimed for the Greek soldiers at Marathon and
+Platae, where the Persian army was actually Persian. The Asiatic
+soldier, forced into service and flogged into battle, was indeed
+no match for the virile and warlike Greek. But at Salamis it was
+literally a case of Greek meeting Greek, except in the case of the
+Phoenicians--who had the reputation of being the finest seafighters
+in the world--and it is not easy to see how the battle was won by
+sheer physical prowess. There is no evidence to show any lack of
+either courage or fighting ability on the Persian side. The decisive
+feature of the battle was the fatal exposure of the Phoenician wing
+at the very outset. However, it is worth noting that the invaders
+had been maneuvering all night and were tired--especially the
+oarsmen--when called upon to enter battle against an enemy that
+was fresh. In that respect there was undoubtedly some advantage
+to the Greeks, but it can hardly have been of prime importance.
+
+The immediate results of the victory at Salamis were soon apparent.
+The all-conquering Persian army suddenly found itself in a critical
+situation. Cut off from its supplies by sea, it had to retreat or
+starve, for the country which it occupied was incapable of furnishing
+supplies for a host so enormous. Xerxes left an army of occupation in
+Thessaly consisting of 300,000 men under Mardonius, but the rest were
+ordered to get back to Persia as best they could. A panic-stricken
+rout to the Hellespont began, and for the next forty-five days
+a great host, that had never been even opposed in battle, went
+to pieces under famine, disease, and the guerilla warfare of the
+inhabitants of the country it traversed, and it was only a broken
+and demoralized remnant of the great army that survived to see the
+Hellespont. This great military disaster was due entirely to the
+fact that Salamis had deprived Xerxes of the command of the sea.
+Indeed, if the advice of Themistodes had been taken and the Greek
+fleet had proceeded to the Hellespont and held the position, not even
+a remnant of the retreating army would have survived. It happened
+that the bridge had been carried away by storms and the army had to
+be ferried over by the ships of the beaten and demoralized Persian
+fleet, an operation which would have been impossible in the face
+of the victorious Greeks.
+
+Xerxes still held to the idea of conquering Greece; but the chance
+was gone. Mardonius, it is true, remained in Thessaly with an army,
+but it was no longer an army of millions. The Greeks assembled an
+army of about 100,000 men and in the battle of Plataea the following
+year utterly defeated it. On the same day the Greeks destroyed
+what was left of the Persian fleet in the battle of Mycale, on
+the coast of Asia Minor. This, strictly speaking, was not a naval
+battle at all, for the Persians had drawn their ships up on shore
+and built a stockade around them. The Greeks landed their crews,
+took the stockade by storm and burnt the ships. These later victories
+were the direct consequences of the earlier victory of Salamis.
+
+Another phase of the Persian plan of conquering the Greeks must not
+be overlooked. Xerxes had stirred up Carthage to undertake a naval
+and military expedition against the Greeks of Sicily, in order that
+all the independent Greek states might be crushed simultaneously.
+Again the weather came to the rescue, for the greater part of the
+Carthaginian fleet was wrecked by storms. The survivors of the
+expedition laid siege to the city of Himera, but were eventually
+driven back to their ships in rout with the loss of their general.
+Thus the Greek civilization of Sicily was saved at the same time
+as that of Athens.
+
+East and west, therefore, the grandiose plan of the Persian despot
+fell in ruin, and with it fell the prestige and the power of the
+empire. The Ionians revolted and joined Athens as allies, and the
+control of the AEgean passed from Persia to Athens. With this loss
+of sea power began the decline of Persia as a world power.
+
+The significance of this astounding defeat of the greatest military
+and naval power of the time lies in the fact that European, or
+more particularly Greek, civilization was spared to develop its
+own individuality. Had Xerxes succeeded, the paralyzing regime of
+an Asiatic despotism would have stifled the genius of the Greek
+people. Self-government would never have had its beginnings in
+Greece, and a subjugated Athens would never have produced the "Age
+of Pericles." In the two generations following Salamis, Athens
+made a greater original contribution to literature, philosophy,
+science, and art than any other nation in any two centuries of
+its existence.
+
+For the fact that this priceless heritage was left to later ages
+the world is indebted chiefly to the Greeks who fought at Salamis.
+The night before that battle the cause of Greece seemed doomed
+beyond hope. The day after, the invaders began a retreat that ended
+forever their hopes of conquest. This amazing change of fortune was
+due to the fact that the success of the Persian invasion depended
+on the control of the sea. Hence the Greeks, though unable to muster
+an army large enough to meet the Persian host on land, defeated
+it disastrously by winning a victory on the sea.
+
+2. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
+
+After Salamis, Athens rose to a commanding position among the Greek
+states. Her period of supremacy was brief, lasting less than 75
+years, but while it endured it rested on her triremes. In the middle
+of the fifth century she had 100,000 men in her navy, practically
+as many as Great Britain in her fleet before 1914. Although the
+period of Athenian supremacy was short-lived, it is interesting
+because it produced a great naval genius, Phormio, and because
+it wrecked itself as Persian sea power had done, in an attempt at
+foreign conquest.
+
+Scarcely had the Persian invasion come to an end when bickering broke
+out among the various Greek states, much of it directed against Athens.
+She had small difficulty, however, in maintaining her ascendancy in
+northern Greece on account of her superiority on the sea, and it
+was during the half century after Salamis that Athens arose to
+her splendid climax as the intellectual and artistic center of
+the world.
+
+[Illustration: After Shepherd's _Historical Atlas._
+
+THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT--ABOUT 450 B.C.]
+
+In 431 began the Peloponnesian War. Its immediate cause was the
+help given by Athens to Corcyra (Corfu) in a war against Corinth.
+Corinth called on Sparta for help, and in consequence northern and
+southern Greece were locked in a mortal struggle. The Athenians
+had a naval base at Naupaktis on the Gulf of Corinth, and in 429,
+two years after war broke out, the Athenian Phormio found himself
+supplied with only twenty triremes with which to maintain control
+of that important waterway. At the same time Sparta was setting in
+motion a large land and water expedition with the object of sweeping
+Athenian influence from all of western Greece and of obtaining
+control of the Gulf of Corinth. A fleet from Corinth was to join
+another at Leukas, one of the Ionian Islands, and then proceed to
+operate on the northern coast of the gulf while an army invaded
+the province.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF PHORMIO'S CAMPAIGNS]
+
+As it happened, the army moved off without waiting for the cooperation
+of the fleet and eventually went to pieces in an ineffectual siege of
+an inland city. When the fleet started out from Corinth it numbered
+47 triremes. As this was more than twice the number possessed by
+Phormio, the Corinthian admiral evidently counted on being secure
+from attack. Accordingly he used some of his triremes as transports
+and started on his journey without taking the precaution to train
+his oarsmen or practice maneuvers. But as he skirted along the
+southern coast he was surprised to see the Athenian ships moving in
+a parallel course as if on the alert for an opportunity to attack.
+When the Corinthian ships bore up from Patrae to cross to the AEtolian
+shore, the Athenian column steered directly toward them. At this
+threat the Corinthian fleet turned away and put in at Rhium, a
+point near the narrowest part of the strait, in order to make the
+crossing under cover of night. The Corinthian admiral made the same
+fatal mistake committed by the commander of the Spanish Armada
+2000 years later in a similar undertaking, that of trying to avoid
+an enemy on the sea rather than fight him before carrying out an
+invasion of the enemy's coast. This ignominious conduct on the
+part of the Corinthian admiral was partly due to the fact that he
+was encumbered with his transports, but chiefly to the fact that
+he knew that in fighting qualities his men were no match for the
+Athenians. The latter had no peers on the sea at that time. Since
+Salamis they had progressed far in naval science and efficiency
+and were filled with the confidence that comes from knowledge and
+experience.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF, 429 B. C.
+
+Corinthian Formation and Circling Tactics of Phormio.]
+
+All night Phormio watched his enemy and at dawn surprised him in
+mid-crossing. On seeing Phormio advance to the attack, the Corinthian
+drew up his squadron in a defensive position, ranging his vessels
+in concentric circles, bows outward, like the spokes of a wheel.
+In the center of this formation he placed his transports, together
+with five of his largest triremes to assist at any threatened spot.
+The formation suggests a leader of infantry rather than an admiral;
+moreover, it revealed a fatal readiness to give up the offensive
+to an enemy force less than half his own.
+
+At any rate there was no lack of decision on the part of Phormio.
+He advanced rapidly in line ahead formation, closed in near the
+enemy's prows as if he intended to strike at any moment and circled
+round the line. The Corinthian triremes, having no headway and
+manned by inexperienced rowers, began crowding back on one another
+as they tried to keep in position for the expected attack. Then the
+same early morning wind that had embarrassed the Persian ships at
+Salamis sprang up and added to the confusion of fouling ships and
+clashing oar blades. Choosing his opening, Phormio flew the signal
+for attack and rammed one of the flagships of the Corinthian fleet.
+The Athenians fell upon their enemy and almost at the first blow
+routed the entire Corinthian force. In addition to those triremes
+that were sunk outright, twelve remained as prizes with their full
+complement of crews, and the rest scattered in flight. Phormio
+returned in triumph to Naupaktis with the loss of scarcely a man.
+
+So humiliating a defeat had to be avenged, and Sparta organized
+a new expedition. This time a fleet of 77 triremes was collected.
+Meanwhile Phormio had sent to Athens the news of his victory together
+with an urgent plea for reenforcements. Unfortunately the great
+Pericles was dying and the government had fallen into weak and
+unscrupulous hands. Consequently while 20 triremes were ordered to
+the support of Phormio, political intrigue succeeded in diverting
+this squadron to carry out a futile expedition to Crete, and Phormio
+was left to contest the control of the gulf against a fleet of 77
+with nothing more than his original twenty.
+
+It is interesting to observe what strategy Phormio adopted in this
+difficult situation. In the campaign of Salamis, Themistocles chose
+the narrow waters of the strait as the safest position for a fleet
+outnumbered by the enemy, because of the protection offered to the
+flanks by the opposite shores. But Phormio, commanding a fleet about
+one-fourth that of his adversary, chose the open sea. Apparently
+his decision was based on the fact that the superiority of the
+Athenian ship lay in its greater speed and skill in maneuvering.
+Unable to cope with his adversary in full force, he might by his
+superior mobility beat him in detail. Accordingly, he boldly took
+the open sea.
+
+For about a week the two fleets lay within sight of each other,
+with Phormio trying to draw his enemy out of the narrows into open
+water and his adversary attempting to crowd him into a corner against
+the share. Finally the Peloponnesian, realizing that Phormio would
+have to defend his base, and hoping to force him to fight at a
+disadvantage, moved upon Naupaktis. As this port was undefended,
+Phormio was compelled to return thither.
+
+The Peloponnesian fleet advanced in line of four abreast with the
+Spartan admiral and the twenty Spartan triremes--the best in the
+fleet--in the lead. At the signal from the admiral the column swung
+"left into line" and bore down in line abreast upon the Athenians
+who were ranging along the shore in line ahead. The object of the
+maneuver was to cut the Athenians off from the port and crowd them
+upon the shore. The latter, however, developed such a burst of
+speed that eleven of the twenty succeeded in reaching Naupaktis;
+the remaining nine drove ashore and their crews escaped. Apparently
+the victory of the Spartan was as complete as it was easy. But while
+the rest of the fleet busied itself with the deserted Athenian
+triremes on the share, the Spartan squadron continued in the pursuit
+of the eleven Athenian ships that were heading for Naupaktis. Ten
+of the eleven reached port and drew up in a position of defense.
+The eleventh, less speedy than the rest, was being overhauled by
+the Spartan flagship which was pushing the pursuit far in advance
+of the rest of the squadron. The captain of the Athenian ship,
+seeing this situation, determined on a bold stroke. Instead of
+pushing on into the harbor he pulled round a merchant ship that lay
+anchored at the mouth, and rammed his pursuer amidships, disabling
+her at a blow. The Spartan admiral promptly killed himself and the
+rest of the ship's company were too panic stricken to resist.
+
+At this disaster the rest of the Spartan squadron hesitated, dropped
+oars or ran into shallow water. Seeing his opportunity, Phormio
+dashed out of the harbor with his ten triremes and fell upon the
+Spartans. In spite of the ridiculous disparity of forces, this
+handful of Athenian ships pressed their attack so gallantly that
+they destroyed the Spartan advance wing and then, catching the
+rest of the fleet in disorder, routed the main body as well. By
+nightfall Phormio had rescued eight of the nine Athenian triremes
+that had fallen into the hands of the enemy and sent the scattered
+remnants of the Peloponnesian fleet in full flight towards Corinth.
+This battle of Naupaktis remains one of the most brilliant naval
+victories in history, a victory won against overwhelming odds by
+quick decision and superb audacity.
+
+Only a half century separates Salamis from the battle of the Corinthian
+Gulf and the battle of Naupaktis, but during that period there had
+been a great advance in naval science.
+
+As far as naval tactics are concerned, Salamis was merely a fight
+between two mobs of ships, except that when opportunity offered,
+a vessel used her ram. Otherwise the only difference from land
+fighting was the fact that the combatants stood on floating platforms.
+But in the Peloponnesian war we see not only the birth of naval
+tactics but a very high development, especially as revealed in
+these two victories of Phormio.
+
+With the development of a naval science rose also a naval profession.
+At Salamis Themistocles was a politician and Eurybiades was a soldier;
+it happened that they were made fleet commanders for the emergency.
+Phormio was a naval officer by profession, and he won by genius
+combined with superior efficiency in the personnel under his command.
+In his courage, resourcefulness, in the spirit he inspired, and
+the high pitch of skill he developed among his officers and men,
+he is an ideal type for every later age. Little is known of his
+life and character beyond the story of these two exploits, but
+they are sufficient to give him the name of the first great admiral
+of history.
+
+His exploits illustrate, too, at the very outset of naval history,
+the vital truth that the man counts more than the machine. In these
+later days, when the tendency is to measure naval power merely by
+counting dreadnoughts, and to settle all hypothetical combats by
+the proportion of strength at a given point on the game board, it
+is well to remember that the most overwhelming victories have been
+won by the skill and audacity of a great leader, which overcame
+odds that would be reckoned by the experts as insuperable.
+
+The Peloponnesian war dragged on with varying fortunes for ten
+years. The Athenians were regularly successful on the sea and
+unsuccessful on land. They seem to have laid an unwise dependence
+on their navy for a state situated on the mainland with land
+communications open to the enemy. They attempted to make an island
+of their state by withdrawing into the city of Athens the entire
+population of Attica, leaving open to the invader the rest of the
+province. The repeated ravaging of Attica by Peloponnesian armies
+weakened both the resources and the morale of the Athenians, and
+the crowding of the inhabitants into the city resulted in frightful
+mortality from the plague. At the same time the naval expeditions
+sent out to harry the coast of the Peloponnesus accomplished nothing
+of real advantage.
+
+In 421 a truce was agreed upon between Athens and Sparta, which
+was to last fifty years. Both sides were sorely weakened by the
+protracted struggle and neither had gained any real advantage over
+the other. Without waiting to recuperate from the losses of the
+war, Athens embarked in 415 on an ambitious plan of conquering
+Syracuse, and gaining all of Sicily as an Athenian colony. In the
+event of success Athens would have a western outpost for the eventual
+control of the Mediterranean, as she already had an eastern outpost
+in Ionia, which gave her control of the AEgean.
+
+In the light of the event it is customary to refer to this expedition
+as the climax of folly, and yet it is clear that if the commander
+in chief had not wasted time in interminable delays the Athenians
+might easily have won their objective. At first the Syracusans felt
+hopeless because of the large army and fleet dispatched against
+them, and the great naval prestige of their enemy, but as delay
+succeeded delay, assistance arrived from Corinth and Sparta, and
+the besieged citizens took heart. The siege dragged on for the
+greater part of two years, with the offensive gradually slipping
+from the Athenians to the Syracusans, till finally the invaders
+found their troops besieged on shore and their ships bottled up
+in the harbor by a line of galleys anchored across the entrance.
+The Syracusans knew that they were no match for the Athenians on
+the open sea, but with a fleet crowded into a harbor with no room
+for maneuvering, the problem was not essentially different from
+that of fighting on land. They built a fleet of ships with specially
+strengthened bows for ramming and erected catapults for throwing
+heavy stones on the decks of the enemy. Meanwhile, the Athenian
+ships had deteriorated from lack of opportunity to refit and their
+crews had been heavily reduced by disease. In a pitched battle
+between the two fleets in the harbor, the Athenians were worsted.
+Shortly after as the Athenians were attempting to break through
+the barrier and escape, they were again attacked by the Syracusans.
+There was no room for maneuvering; the Athenian ships were jammed
+together in a mass in which all advantage of numbers was lost.
+Moreover, against the deadly rain of huge stones the Athenians had
+no defense whatever.
+
+The result was an overwhelming victory for the Syracusans. Out
+of 110 triremes the Athenians lost fifty. The besieging army went
+to pieces in attempting a retreat across the island, and the whole
+expedition came to a tragic end. This defeat of the Athenian fleet
+in the harbor of Syracuse was the ruin of Athens. When the news
+reached Greece, many of her dependencies revolted, the Peloponnesian
+war had broken out anew, and she had no strength left to hold her
+own. The deathblow was given when a Spartan admiral destroyed all
+that was left of the Athenian navy at AEgospotami in the year 405.
+Thereafter Athens was merely a conquered province, permitted to
+keep a fleet of only twelve ships, and watched by a garrison of
+Spartan soldiers in the citadel.
+
+The downfall of Athenian sea power at Syracuse may be compared
+with the downfall of Persian sea power at Salamis. Just as the
+latter prevented the spread of an Asiatic form of civilization
+in Europe and gave Greek civilization a chance to develop, so the
+former put an end to the extension of a strong Hellenic power in
+Italy and left opportunity for the rise of the civilization of
+Rome.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+HISTORY OF GREECE, Ernst Curtius, 1874.
+HISTORY OF GREECE, George Grote, 1856.
+THE GREAT PERSIAN WAR, G. B. Grundy, 1901.
+HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN WARS, Herodotus, ed. and transl. by Geo.
+  Rawlinson, 1862.
+HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, Thucydides, ed. and transl.
+  by Jowett.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE SEA POWER OF ROME
+
+1. THE PUNIC WARS
+
+When peoples have migrated in the past, they have frequently changed
+their habits to conform to new topographical surroundings. We have
+seen that the Phoenicians, originally a nomadic people, became a
+seafaring race because of the conditions of the country they settled
+in; and on the other hand, at a later period, the Vikings who overran
+Normandy or Britain forsook the sea and became farmers. The popular
+idea that a race follows the sea because of an "instinct in the blood
+of the race" has little to stand on. When, however, the colonists
+from Phoenicia settled Carthage and founded an empire, they continued
+the traditions of their ancestors and built up their power on a
+foundation of ships. This was due to the conditions--topographical
+and geographical--which surrounded them, and which were much like
+those of the mother country. Carthage possessed the finest harbor
+on the coast of Africa, situated in the middle of the Mediterranean,
+where all the trade routes crossed. To counteract these attractions
+of the sea there was nothing but the arid and mountainous character
+of the interior. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Carthaginians,
+like their ancestors, should build an empire of the sea.
+
+As early as the sixth century B.C. Carthage had established her
+power so securely in the western Mediterranean as to be able to
+set down definite limits beyond which Rome agreed not to go. Thus
+the opening sentence of a treaty between the two nations in 509
+B. C. ran as follows:
+
+"Between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and
+their allies there shall be peace and alliance upon the conditions
+that neither the Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the
+Fair Promontory[1] unless compelled by bad weather or an enemy;
+and in case they are forced beyond it they shall not be allowed
+to take or purchase anything except what is barely necessary for
+refitting their vessels or for sacrifice, and they shall depart
+within five days."[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: A cape on the African coast about due north from
+Carthage.]
+
+[Footnote 2: GENERAL HISTORY, Polybius, Bk. III, chap. 3.]
+
+A second and a third treaty emphasized even mare strongly the
+Carthaginian dictatorship over the Mediterranean.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS]
+
+It was inevitable, therefore, that as Rome expanded her interests
+should come in collision with those of Carthage. The immediate
+causes of the Punic wars are of no consequence for our purpose;
+the two powers had rival interests in Sicily, and the clash of
+these brought on the war in the year 264 B.C. There followed a
+mortal struggle between Rome and Carthage that extended through
+three distinct wars and a period of aver a hundred years.
+
+When the two nations faced each other in arms, Carthage had the
+advantage of prestige and the greatest navy in the world. Her weaknesses
+lay in the strife of political factions and the mercenary character
+of her forces. Her officers were usually Carthaginians, but it was
+considered beneath the dignity of a Carthaginian to be a private.
+The rank and file, therefore, were either hired or pressed into
+service from the subject provinces. In the case of Xanthippus,
+who defeated Regulus in the first Punic war, even the commanding
+officer was a Spartan mercenary. These troops would do well so
+long as campaigns promised plunder but would became disaffected
+if things went wrong.
+
+The Romans, on the other hand, had only a small navy and no naval
+experience; their strength lay in their legionaries. And in further
+contrast with their enemy they had none but Romans in their forces,
+or allies who were proud of fighting on the side of Rome. Consequently
+they fought in the spirit of intense patriotism which could stand
+the moral strain of defeat and even disaster. On land there was
+no better fighter than the Roman soldier. At sea, however, all
+the advantage lay with the Carthaginian, and it soon became clear
+that if the Romans were to succeed they would have to learn to
+fight on water.
+
+For the first three years Carthaginian fleets raided the coasts of
+Sicily and Italy with impunity. Finally, in desperation, Rome set
+about the creation of a fleet, and the story is that a Carthaginian
+quinquereme that had been wrecked an the coast was taken as a model,
+and while the ships were building, rowers were trained in rowing
+machines set up an shore. The first contact with the enemy was not
+encouraging. The new fleet, which was constructed in two months,
+consisted of 100 quinqueremes and 30 triremes. Seventeen of these
+while on a trial cruise were blockaded in the harbor of Messina
+by twenty Carthaginian ships, and the Roman commander was obliged
+to surrender after his crews had landed and escaped.
+
+The next encounter was a different story. The Romans, realizing
+their ignorance of naval tactics and their superiority in land
+fighting, determined to make the next naval battle as nearly as
+possible like an engagement of infantry. Accordingly the ships
+were fitted with boarding gangways with a huge hooked spike at the
+end, like the beak of a crow, which gave them their name, "corvi"
+or "crows."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: The following is the description in Polybius of what
+they were like and how they were worked.
+
+"They [the Romans] erected on the prow of every vessel a round pillar
+of wood, of about twelve feet in height, and of three palms breadth
+in diameter, with a pulley at the top. To this pillar was fitted a
+kind of stage, eighteen feet in length and four feet broad, which
+was made ladder-wise, of strong timbers laid across, and cramped
+together with iron: the pillar being received into an oblong square,
+which was opened for that purpose, at the distance of six feet
+within the end of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways
+was a parapet, which reached just above the knee. At the farthest
+end of this stage or ladder was a bar of iron, whose shape was
+somewhat like a pestle; but it was sharpened at the bottom, or
+lower point; and on the top of it was a ring. The whole appearance
+of this machine very much resembled those that are used in grinding
+corn. To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, by which, with
+the help of the pulley that was at the top of the pillar, they
+hoisted up the machines, and, as the vessels of the enemy came near,
+let them fall upon them, sometimes on their prow, and sometimes
+on their sides, as occasion best served. As the machine fell, it
+struck into the decks of the enemy, and held them fast. In this
+situation, if the two vessels happened to lie side by side, the
+Romans leaped on board from all parts of their ships at once. But
+in case that they were joined only by the prow, they then entered
+two and two along the machine; the two foremost extending their
+bucklers right before them to ward off the strokes that were aimed
+against them in front; while those that followed rested the boss
+of their bucklers upon the top of the parapet on either side, and
+thus covered both their flanks." GENERAL HISTORY, Book 1.]
+
+Armed with this new device, the Consul Duilius took the Roman fleet
+to sea to meet an advancing Carthaginian fleet and encountered
+it off the port of Mylae (260 B.C.). The Carthaginians had such
+contempt for their enemy that they advanced in irregular order,
+permitting thirty of their ships to begin the battle unsupported
+by the rest of the fleet. One after the other the Carthaginian
+quinqueremes were grappled and stormed, for once the great _corvus_
+crashed down on a deck all the arts of seamanship were useless.
+Before the day was over the Carthaginians had lost 14 ships sunk
+and 31 captured, a total of half their fleet, and the rest had
+fled in disorder towards Carthage.
+
+The unexpected had happened, as it so frequently does in history.
+The amateurs had beaten the professionals, not by trying to achieve
+the same efficiency but by inventing something new that would make
+that efficiency useless. Thus, as we nave seen, the Syracusans,
+who were no match for the Athenians in the open sea, destroyed
+the sea power of Athens by bottling up her fleet in a harbor and
+bombarding it with catapults. It is an instance such as we shall
+see recurring throughout naval history, in which the power of a
+great fleet is largely or completely neutralized by a new or device
+in the hands of the nation with the smaller navy.
+
+The significance of Mylae lay in the fact that a new naval power
+had arisen, that henceforth Rome must be reckoned with on the sea.
+The victory served to encourage the Romans to enlarge their navy,
+and with it to press the war into the enemy's territory. Soon after
+Mylae they gained possession of the greater part of Sicily, and in
+the year 256 they dispatched a fleet to carry the offensive into
+Africa. This Roman fleet of 330 ships met, just off Ecnomus, on
+the southern coast of Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet of 350, and a
+great battle took place, interesting for the grand scale on which
+it was fought and the tactics employed.
+
+The Romans, an seeing their enemy, assumed a formation hitherto
+unknown in tactics at sea. Their first and second squadrons formed
+the sides of an acute-angled triangle; the third squadron formed
+the base of the triangle, towing the transports, and the fourth
+squadron brought up the rear, covering the transports. The whole
+formed a compact wedge, pushing forward like a great spear head
+to pierce the enemy's line.
+
+Admirable as this formation was, the Carthaginians were no less
+skillful in their tactics for destroying it. Instead of keeping
+an unbroken line to receive the attack, they stationed their left
+wing at same distance from the center so as to overlap the Roman
+right, and their right wing in column ahead, so as to overlap the
+Roman left. As the Romans advanced, the Carthaginian center purposely
+gave way, drawing the advance wings of their enemy away from the
+transports and the two squadrons in the rear. Then they faced about
+and attacked. Meanwhile the two Carthaginian squadrons on the flanks
+swung round the Roman wedge, the left wing engaging the Roman third
+squadron, which was hampered by the transports, and driving it
+toward the shore. At the same time the Carthaginian right wing
+attacked the fourth, or reserve, squadron from the rear and drove
+it into the open sea. Thus the battle went on in three distinct
+engagements, each separated by considerable distance from the others.
+The outcome is thus narrated by Polybius:
+
+[Illustration: ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS]
+
+"Because in each of these divisions the strength of the combatants
+was nearly equal, the success was also for some time equal. But
+in the progress of the action the affair was brought at last to
+a decision: a different one, perhaps, from what might reasonably
+have been expected in such circumstances. For the Roman squadron
+that had begun the engagement gained so full a victory, that Amilcar
+[the Carthaginian commander] was forced to fly, and the consul
+Manlius brought away the vessels that were taken.
+
+"The other consul, having now perceived the danger in which the
+triarii[1] and the transports were involved, hastened to their
+assistance with the second squadron, which was still entire. The
+triarii, having received these succors, when they were Just upon
+the point of yielding, again resumed their courage, and renewed
+the fight with vigor: so that the enemy, being surrounded on every
+side in a manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at once
+both in the front and rear were at last constrained to steer away
+to sea.
+
+[Footnote 1: The rear guard, or fourth squadron.]
+
+"About this time Manlius also, returning from the engagement, observed
+that the ships of the third squadron were forced in close to the
+shore, and there blocked up by the left division of the Carthaginian
+fleet. He joined his forces, therefore, with those of the other
+consul, who had now placed the transports and triarii in security,
+and hastened to assist these vessels, which were so invested by
+the enemy that they seemed to suffer a kind of siege. And, indeed,
+they must have all been long before destroyed if the Carthaginians,
+through apprehension of the _corvi_, had not still kept themselves
+at distance, and declined a close engagement. But the consuls,
+having now advanced together, surround the enemy, and take fifty
+of their ships with all the men. The rest, being few in number,
+steered close along the shore, and saved themselves by flight.
+
+[Illustration: CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS, 256
+B.C.]
+
+"Such were the circumstances of this engagement; in which the victory
+at last was wholly on the side of the Romans. Twenty-four of their
+ships were sunk in the action, and more than thirty of the
+Carthaginians. No vessel of the Romans fell into the hands of the
+enemy; but sixty-four of the Carthaginians were taken with their
+men."[2]
+
+[Footnote 2: Polybius's GENERAL HISTORY, Book I, Chap. 2.]
+
+The battle of Ecnomus had no such decisive effect on history as
+the battle of Salamis, but it was on a far greater scale and it
+reveals an enormous advance in tactics. Three hundred thousand
+men, rowers and warriors, were engaged, and nearly 700 ships. Up
+to the battle of Actium, two centuries later, Ecnomus remained
+the greatest naval action in history. Moreover, the tactics of the
+rival fleets show a high degree of discipline and efficiency. The
+Carthaginian plan of dividing their enemy's force and defeating it
+by a concentrated attack on his transport division, was skillfully
+carried out and came perilously near succeeding. Had the first
+and second squadrons of the Carthaginians been able to carry out
+their part of the plan and "contain" the corresponding advance
+squadrons of the Romans, the result would have been an overwhelming
+victory for Carthage, involving not only the destruction of the
+Roman fleet but also the capture of the Roman army of invasion.
+
+This victory left open the way for the advance into Africa. The
+Romans had landed and marched almost to the gates of Carthage when
+the army was destroyed by the skill of a Spartan, Xanthippus, and
+Regulus, the Consul in command, was captured. This astonishing
+catastrophe inflicted on the Roman legionaries was due to the use
+of elephants, and offers a curious parallel to the effect of the
+_corvi_ on the Carthaginian sailors. Such was the terror inspired
+by these animals that the Roman soldier would not stand before
+them until a year or two later, in Sicily, the Consul Cecilius
+showed how they could not only be repulsed but turned back on their
+own army by the use of javelins and arrows.
+
+Nothing daunted by the loss of their army, Rome dispatched a fleet
+of 350 ships to Africa to carry off the remnants of the defeated
+army that were besieged in the city of Aspis. They were met by a
+hastily organized Carthaginian fleet off the promontory of Hermaea
+in a brief action in which the Romans were overwhelmingly victorious.
+The latter took 114 vessels with their crews. The Roman expedition
+continued on its course to Africa, rescued the besieged troops and
+turned back in high feather toward Sicily. The Consuls in command
+had been warned by the pilots not to attempt to skirt the southern
+coast of Sicily at that season of the year, but the warning was
+disregarded. Suddenly, as the fleet was approaching the shore it
+was overwhelmed by a great gale, and out of 464 vessels only eighty
+survived.
+
+Frightful as this loss was in ships and men, Rome proceeded at
+once to build another fleet, to the number of 250, which, with
+characteristic energy, was made ready for service in three months.
+This force also, after an ineffectual raid on the African coast,
+fell victim to a storm on the way home with the loss of 150 ships.
+
+Unwilling to relinquish the mastery of the sea that had been won
+by an uninterrupted series of victories, Rome sent another fleet
+to attack a Carthaginian force lying in the harbor of Drepanum.
+As the Romans approached, the Carthaginians went out to meet them,
+and so maneuvered as to force them to fight with an enemy in front
+and the rocks and shoals of the coast in their rear. The Roman ships
+were never able to extricate themselves from this predicament,
+and the greater part were either taken or wrecked on the coast.
+The Consul in command managed to escape with about thirty of his
+vessels, but 93 were taken with their crews. This is the single
+instance of a pitched battle between Roman and Carthaginian fleets
+in which the victory went to Carthage, a victory due entirely to
+better seamanship. The immediate result of this success was the
+destruction of the Roman squadron lying in the port of Lilybaeum
+which was assisting the troops in the siege of that town.
+
+Still another Roman fleet that had the temerity to anchor in an
+exposed position was destroyed by a storm. "For so complete was
+the destruction," writes Polybius, "that scarcely a single plank
+remained entire."
+
+Stunned by these disasters, the government at Rome gave up the idea
+of contesting any further the command of the sea. The citizens, how
+ever, were not willing to submit, and displayed a magnificent spirit
+of patriotism in this the darkest period of the war. Individuals
+of means, or groups of individuals, pledged each a quinquereme,
+fully equipped, for a new fleet, asking reimbursement from the
+government only in case of victory. By these private efforts a
+force of 200 quinqueremes was constructed. At this time, as at the
+very beginning, the model for the Roman ships was a prize taken
+from the enemy.
+
+[Illustration: POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC WAR]
+
+Meanwhile the Carthaginians, confident that the Romans were finally
+driven from the sea, had allowed their own fleet to disintegrate.
+Accordingly when the astonishing news reached them that the Romans
+were again abroad they were compelled to fill their ships with
+raw levies of troops and inexperienced rowers and sailors. And,
+since the Carthaginian troops who were besieging the city of Eryx
+in Sicily were in need of supplies, a large number of transports
+were sent with the fleet. The Carthaginian commander planned to
+make a landing unobserved, leave his transports, exchange his raw
+crews for some of the veterans before Eryx and then give battle
+to the Roman fleet.
+
+This program failed because of the initiative of the Roman Consul
+commanding the new fleet. Having got word of the coming of the
+Carthaginians and divining their plan, he braved an unfavorable
+wind and a rough sea for the sake of forcing an action before they
+could establish contact with their army. Accordingly he sought
+out his enemy and met him (in the year 241 B.C.) off the island
+of AEgusa, near Lilybaeum. Almost at the first onset the Romans won
+an overwhelming victory, capturing seventy and sinking fifty of
+the Carthaginian force.
+
+This final desperate effort of Rome was decisive. The Carthaginians
+had no navy left, and their armies in Sicily were cut off from
+all communications with their base. Accordingly ambassadors went
+to Rome to sue for peace, and the great struggle that had lasted
+without intermission for twenty-four years and reduced both parties
+to the point of exhaustion, ended with a triumph for Rome through
+a victory on the sea. By the treaty of peace Carthage was obliged
+to pay a heavy indemnity and yield all claim to Sicily.
+
+Whatever historical moral may be drawn from the story of the first
+Punic war, the fact remains that a nation of landsmen met the greatest
+maritime power in the world and defeated it on its own element. In
+every naval battle save one the Romans were victors. It is true,
+however, that in the single defeat off Drepanum and in the dreadful
+disasters inflicted by storms, Rome lost through lack of knowledge
+of wind and sea. No great naval genius stands above the rest, to
+whom the final success can be attributed. Rome won simply through
+the better fighting qualities of her rank and file and the stamina
+of her citizens. To quote the phrase of a British writer,[1] Rome
+showed the superior "fitness to win."
+
+[Footnote 1: Fred Jane, HERESIES OF SEA POWER, _passim_.]
+
+_The Second Punic War_
+
+In the first Punic war the prize was an island, Sicily. Naturally,
+therefore, the fighting was primarily naval. The second Punic war
+(218-202 B.C.) was essentially a war on land. Carthage, driven
+from Sicily, turned to Spain and made the southern part of the
+peninsula her province. Using this as his base, Hannibal marched
+overland, crossed the Alps, and invaded Italy from the north. Had
+he followed up his unbroken series of victories by marching on
+the capital instead of going into winter quarters at Capua, it is
+possible that Rome might have been destroyed and all subsequent
+history radically changed. The Romans had no general who could
+measure up to the genius of Hannibal, but their spirit was unbroken
+even by the slaughter of Cannae, and their allies remained loyal.
+Moreover, Carthage, thanks to factional quarrels and personal
+jealousies, was deaf to all the requests sent by Hannibal for
+reenforcements when he needed them most. In the end, Scipio, after
+having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, dislodged Hannibal
+from Italy by carrying an invasion into Africa. At the battle of
+Zama the Romans defeated Hannibal and won the war.
+
+It is difficult to see any significant use of sea power in this
+second Punic war. Neither side seemed to realize what might be
+done in cutting the communications of the other, and both sides
+seemed to be able to use the sea at will. Of course due allowance
+must be made for the limitations of naval activity. The quinquereme
+was too frail to attempt a blockade or to patrol the sea lanes in
+all seasons. Nevertheless both sides used the sea for the transport
+of troops and the conveying of intelligence, and neither side made
+any determined effort to establish a real control of the sea.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: For a distinguished opinion to the contrary, v. Mahan,
+INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 14 ff. In this view, however,
+Mahan is not supported by Mommsen (vol. II, p. 100). See also Jane,
+HERESIES OF SEA POWER, 60 ff.]
+
+_The Third Punic War_ (149-146 B.C.)
+
+The third Punic war has no naval interest. Rome, not satisfied with
+defeating her rival in the two previous wars, took a convenient
+pretext to invade Carthage and destroy every vestige of the city.
+With this the great maritime empire came to an end, and Rome became
+supreme in the Mediterranean.
+
+2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY; THE CAMPAIGN OF ACTIUM
+
+After the fall of Carthage no rival appeared to contest the sovereignty
+of Rome upon the sea. The next great naval battle was waged between
+two rival factions of Rome herself at the time when the republic
+had fallen and the empire was about to be reared on its ruins. This
+was the battle of Actium, one of the most decisive in the world's
+history.
+
+The rivalry between Antony and Octavius as to who should control
+the destinies of Rome was the immediate cause of the conflict.
+In the parceling out of spoil from the civil wars following the
+murder of Caesar, Octavius had taken the West, Lepidus the African
+provinces, and Antony the East. Octavius soon ousted Lepidus and
+then turned to settle the issue of mastery with Antony. In this he
+had motives of revenge as well as ambition. Antony had robbed him
+of his inheritance from Caesar, and divorced his wife, the sister of
+Octavius, in favor of Cleopatra, with whom he had become completely
+infatuated. In this quarrel the people of Rome were inclined to
+support Octavius, because of their indignation over a reported
+declaration made by Antony to the effect that he intended to make
+Alexandria rather than Rome the capital of the empire and rule East
+and West from the Nile rather than the Tiber. Both sides began
+preparations for the conflict. Antony possessed the bulk of the
+Roman navy and the Roman legions of the eastern provinces. To his
+fleet he added squadrons of Egyptian and Phoenician vessels of war,
+and to his army he brought large bodies of troops from the subject
+provinces of the East. In addition he spent great sums of money by
+means of his agents in Rome to arouse disaffection against Octavius.
+At the outset he acted with energy and caused his antagonist the
+gravest anxiety. It was clear also that Antony intended to take
+the offensive. He established winter quarters at Patras, on the
+Gulf of Corinth, during the winter of 32-31 B.C., billeting his
+army in various towns on the west coast of Greece, and keeping
+it supplied by grain ships from Alexandria. His fleet he anchored
+in the Ambracian Gulf, a landlocked bay, thirty miles wide, lying
+north of the Gulf of Corinth; it is known to-day as the Gulf of
+Arta.
+
+Octavius, however, was equally determined not to yield the offensive
+to his adversary, and boldly collected ships and troops for a movement
+in force against Antony's position. His troops were also Roman
+legionaries, experienced in war, but his fleet was considerably
+less in numbers and the individual ships much smaller than the
+quinqueremes and octiremes of Antony. The ships of Octavius were
+mostly biremes and triremes. These disadvantages, however, were
+offset by the fact that his admiral, Agrippa, was an experienced
+sea-fighter, having won a victory near Mylae during the civil wars,
+and by the other fact that the crews under him, recruited from
+the Dalmatian coast, were hardy, seafaring men. These were called
+Liburni, and the type of ship they used was known as the _Liburna_.
+This was a two-banked galley, but the term was already becoming
+current for any light man of war, irrespective of the number of
+banks of oars. In contrast with these Liburni, who divided their
+days between fishing and piracy and knew all the tricks of fighting
+at sea, the crews of Antony's great fleet were in many cases landsmen
+who had been suddenly impressed into service.
+
+As soon as Antony had moved his force to western Greece he seemed
+paralyzed by indecision and made no move to avail himself of his
+advantageous position to strike. He had plenty of money, while
+his adversary was at his wit's end to find even credit. He had
+the admiration of his soldiers, who had followed him through many
+a campaign to victory, while Octavius had no popularity with his
+troops, most of whom were reluctant to fight against their old
+comrades in arms. And finally, Antony had a preponderating fleet
+with which he could command the sea and compel his opponent to
+fight on the defensive in Italian territory. All these advantages
+he allowed to slip away.
+
+During the winter of 32-31 one-third of Antony's crews perished
+from lack of proper supplies and the gaps were filled by slaves,
+mule-drivers, and plowmen--any one whom his captains could seize and
+impress from the surrounding country. The following spring Agrippa
+made a feint to the south by capturing Methone at the southern tip
+of the Peloponnesus, thus threatening the wheat squadrons from
+Egypt on which Antony depended. Next came the news that Octavius
+had landed an army in Epirus and was marching south. Then Antony
+realized that his adversary was aiming to destroy the fleet in the
+Ambracian Gulf and hastened thither. He arrived with a squadron
+ahead of his troops, at almost the same instant as Octavius, and if
+Octavius had had the courage to attack the tired and disorganized
+crews of Antony's squadron, Antony would have been lost. But by
+dressing his crews in the armor of legionaries and drawing up his
+ships in a position for fighting, with oars suspended, he "bluffed"
+his enemy into thinking that he had the support of his troops.
+When the latter arrived Antony established a great camp on Cape
+Actium, which closes the southern side of the Gulf, and fortified
+the entrance on that side.
+
+Thereafter for months the two forces faced each other on opposite
+sides of the Gulf, neither side risking more than insignificant
+skirmishes. During this time Octavius had free use of the sea for
+his supplies, while the heavier fleet of Antony lay idle in harbor.
+Nevertheless, Octavius did not dare to risk all on a land battle, and
+conducted his campaign in a characteristically timid and vacillating
+manner which should have made it easy for Antony to take the aggressive
+and win. But the famous lieutenant of Julius Caesar was no longer the
+man who used to win the devotion of his soldiers by his courage and
+audacity. He was broken by debauchery and torn this way and that by
+two violently hostile parties in his own camp. One party, called the
+Roman, wanted him to come to an understanding with Octavius, or beat
+him in battle, and go to Rome as the restorer of the republic. The
+other party, the Egyptian, was Cleopatra and her following. Cleopatra
+was interested in holding Antony to Egypt, to consolidate through
+him a strong Egyptian empire, and she was not at all interested in
+the restoration of Roman liberties. In Antony's desire to please
+Cleopatra and his attempt to deceive his Roman friends into thinking
+that he was working for their aims, may be seen the explanation
+of the utter lack of strategy or consistent plan in his entire
+campaign against Octavius.
+
+At the beginning of July Antony apparently proposed a naval battle.
+Instantly the suspicions of the Roman party were awakened. They
+cried out that Antony was evidently going back to Egypt without
+having won the decisive battle against Octavius on land, which
+would really break the enemy's power, and without paying any heed
+to the political problems at Rome. Such a furor was raised between
+the two parties that Antony abandoned his plan and made a feint
+toward the land battle in Epirus that the Romans wanted. Meanwhile
+two of his adherents, one a Roman, the other a king from Asia Minor,
+exasperated by the insolence of Cleopatra, deserted to Octavius.
+
+August came and went without action or change in the situation.
+Meanwhile as Antony's camp had been placed in a pestilential spot
+for midsummer heat, he suffered great losses from disease. By this
+time Cleopatra was interested in nothing but a return to Egypt.
+Accordingly she persuaded Antony to order a naval battle without
+asking anybody's advice, and he set the date August 29 for the
+sally of his fleet. The Romans were amazed and protested, but in
+vain. Preparations went on in such a way as to make it clear to the
+observing that what Antony was planning was not so much a battle
+as a return to Egypt. Vessels which he did not need outside for
+battle he ordered burned, although such ships would usually be kept
+as reserves to make up losses in fighting. Moreover, he astonished
+the captains by ordering them to take out into action the big sails
+which were always left ashore before a battle. Nor did his explanation
+that they would be needed in pursuit satisfy them. It appeared also
+that he was employing trusted slaves at night to load the Egyptian
+galleys with all of Cleopatra's treasure. Two more Roman leaders,
+satisfied as to Antony's real intention, deserted to Octavius and
+informed him of Antony's plans.
+
+Meanwhile a heavy storm had made it impossible to attempt the action
+on August 29 or several days after. On the 2d of September (31
+B.C.) the sea became smooth again. Octavius and Agrippa drew out
+their fleet into open water, about three-quarters of a mile from
+the mouth of the gulf, forming line in three divisions. They waited
+till nearly noon before Antony's fleet began to make its expected
+appearance to offer battle. This also was formed in three divisions
+corresponding to those of their enemy. The Egyptian division of
+sixty ships under Cleopatra took up a safe position in the rear
+of the center.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B.C.]
+
+There was a striking contrast in the types of ships in the opposing
+ranks. The galleys of Octavius were low in the water, and nimble in
+their handling; those of Antony were bulky and high, with five to
+ten banks of oars, and their natural unhandiness was made worse by
+a device intended to protect them against ramming. This consisted
+of a kind of boom of heavy timbers rigged out on all sides of the
+hull. In addition to the higher sides these ships supported towers
+and citadels built upon their decks, equipped with every form of
+the artillery of that day, especially catapults capable of hurling
+heavy stones upon the enemy's deck.
+
+Against such formidable floating castles, the light ships of Agrippa
+and Octavius could adopt only skirmishing tactics. They rushed in
+where they could shear away the oar blades of an enemy without
+getting caught by the great grappling irons swung out from his
+decks. They kept clear of the heavy stones from the catapults through
+superior speed and ability to maneuver quickly, but they were unable
+to strike their ponderous adversaries any vital blow. On the other
+hand the great hulks of Antony were unable to close with them,
+and though the air was filled with a storm of arrows, stones and
+javelins, neither side was able to strike decisively at the other.
+As at Salamis the opposite shores were lined with the opposing
+armies, and every small success was hailed by shouts from a hundred
+thousand throats on the one side and long drawn murmurs of dismay
+from an equal host on the other.
+
+In these waters a north wind springs up every afternoon--a fact
+that Antony and Cleopatra had counted on--and as soon as the breeze
+shifted the royal galley of Cleopatra spread its crimson sail and,
+followed by the entire Egyptian division, sailed through the lines
+and headed south. Antony immediately left his flagship, boarded
+a quinquereme and followed. This contemptible desertion of the
+commander in chief was not generally known in his fleet; as for the
+disappearance of the Egyptian squadron, it was doubtless regarded
+as a good riddance. The battle, therefore, went on as stubbornly
+as ever.
+
+Late in the afternoon Agrippa, despairing of harming his enemy by
+ordinary tactics, achieved considerable success by the use of javelins
+wrapped in burning tow, and fire rafts that were set drifting upon
+the clumsy hulks which could not get out of their way. By this means
+a number of Antony's ships were destroyed, but the contest remained
+indecisive. At sunset Antony's fleet retired in some disorder to
+their anchorage in the gulf. Octavius attempted no pursuit but
+kept the sea all night, fearing a surprise attack or an attempted
+flight from the gulf.
+
+Meanwhile a flying wing of Octavius's fleet had been sent in pursuit
+of Antony and Cleopatra, who escaped only after a rear guard action
+had been fought in which two of Cleopatra's ships were captured.
+The fugitives put ashore at Cape Taenarus, to enable Antony to send
+a message to his general, Canidius, ordering him to take his army
+through Macedonia into Asia. Then the flight was resumed to Alexandria.
+
+On the morning of the 3d Octavius sent a message to the enemy's
+camp announcing the fact of Antony's desertion and calling on the
+fleet and army to surrender. The Roman soldiers were unwilling to
+believe that their commander had been guilty of desertion, and
+were confident that he had been summoned away on important business
+connected with the campaign. Their general, however, did not dare
+convey to them Antony's orders because they would betray the truth
+and provoke mutiny. Consequently he did nothing. Certain Roman
+senators and eastern princes saw the light and quietly went over
+to the camp of Octavius. Several days of inaction followed, during
+which the desertions continued and the rumor of Antony's flight
+found increasing belief. On the seventh day, Canidius, who found
+himself in a hopeless dilemma, also went over to Octavius. This
+desertion by the commander settled the rest of the force. A few
+scattered into Macedonia, but the great bulk of the army and all
+that was left of the fleet surrendered. Nineteen legions and more
+than ten thousand cavalry thus came over to Octavius and took service
+under him. This was the real victory of Actium. In the words of
+the Italian historian Ferrero, "it was a victory gained without
+fighting, and Antony was defeated in this supreme struggle, not
+by the valor of his adversary or by his own defective strategy
+or tactics, but by the hopeless inconsistency of his double-faced
+policy, which, while professing to be republican and Roman, was
+actually Egyptian and monarchical."
+
+The story of the naval battle of Actium is a baffling problem to
+reconstruct on account of the wide divergence in the accounts.
+For instance, the actual number of ships engaged is a matter of
+choice between the extremes of 200 to 500 on a side. And the
+consequences were so important to Octavius and to Rome that the
+accounts were naturally adorned afterwards with the most glowing
+colors. Every poet who lived by the bounty of Augustus in later
+years naturally felt inspired to pay tribute to it in verse. But the
+actual naval battle seems to have been of an indecisive character.
+For that matter, even after the wholesale surrender of Antony's
+Roman army and fleet, neither Anthony nor Octavius realized the
+importance of what had happened. Antony had recovered from worse
+disasters before, and felt secure in Alexandria. Octavius at first
+followed up his advantage with timid and uncertain steps. Only
+after the way was made easy by the hasty submission of the Asiatic
+princes and the wave of popularity and enthusiasm that was raised
+in Rome by the news of the victory, did Octavius press the issue
+to Egypt itself. There the war came to an end with the suicide
+of both Antony and Cleopatra.
+
+As in the case of the indecisive naval battle off the capes of
+the Chesapeake, which led directly to the surrender of Cornwallis,
+an action indecisive in character may be most decisive in results.
+Actium may not have been a pronounced naval victory but it had
+tremendous consequences. As at Salamis, East and West met for the
+supremacy of the western world, and the East was beaten back. It
+is not likely that the Egyptian or the Syrian would have dominated
+the genius of the western world for any length of time, but the
+defeat of Octavius would have meant a hybrid empire which would
+have fallen to pieces like the empire of Alexander, leaving western
+Europe split into a number of petty states. On the other hand,
+Octavius was enabled to build on the consequences of Actium the
+great outlines of the Roman empire, the influence of which on the
+civilized world to-day is still incalculable. When he left Rome
+to fight Antony, the government was bankrupt and the people torn
+with faction. When he returned he brought the vast treasure of
+Egypt and found a people united to support him. Actium, therefore,
+is properly taken as the significant date for the beginning of the
+Roman empire. Octavius took the name of his grand-uncle Caesar,
+the title of Augustus, and as "Imperator" became the first of the
+Roman emperors.
+
+The relation of the battle of Actium to this portentous change
+in the fortunes of Octavius was formally recognized by him on the
+scene where it took place. Nicopolis, the City of Victory, was
+founded upon the site of his camp, with the beaks of the captured
+ships as trophies adorning its forum. The little temple of Apollo on
+the point of Actium he rebuilt on an imposing scale and instituted
+there in honor of his victory the "Actian games," which were held
+thereafter for two hundred years.
+
+After the battle of Actium and the establishment of a powerful
+Roman empire without a rival in the world, there follows a long
+period in which the Mediterranean, and indeed all the waterways
+known to the civilized nations, belonged without challenge to the
+galleys of Rome. Naval stations were established to assist in the
+one activity left to ships of war, the pursuit of pirates, but
+otherwise there was little or nothing to do. And during this long
+period, indeed, down to the Middle Ages, practically nothing is
+known of the development in naval types until the emergence of the
+low, one- or two-banked galley of the wars between the Christian
+and the Mohammedan. The first definite description we have of warships
+after the period of Actium comes at the end of the ninth century.
+
+There was some futile naval fighting against the Vandals in the days
+when Rome was crumbling. Finally, by a curious freak of history,
+Genseric the Vandal took a fleet out from Carthage against Rome,
+and swept the Mediterranean. In the year 455, some six centuries
+after Rome had wreaked her vengeance on Carthage, this Vandal fleet
+anchored unopposed in the Tiber and landed an army that sacked
+the imperial city, which had been for so long a period mistress
+of the world, and had given her name to a great civilization.
+
+During the four centuries in which the _Pax Romana_ rested upon
+the world, it is easy to conceive of the enormous importance to
+history and civilization of having sea and river, the known world
+over, an undisputed highway for the fleets of Rome. Along these
+routes, even more than along the military roads, traveled the
+institutions, the arts, the language, the literature, the laws,
+of one of the greatest civilizations in history. And ruthless as
+was the destruction of Vandal and Goth in the city itself and in
+the peninsula, they could not destroy the heritage that had been
+spread from Britain to the Black Sea and from the Elbe to the upper
+waters of the Nile.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+HISTORY OF ROME, Theodor Mommsen, tr. by W. P. Dickson, 1867.
+GENERAL HISTORY, Polybius, transl. by Hampton, 1823.
+HISTORY OF THE ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE, Chas. Merivale (vol. III.),
+  1866.
+THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME, G. Ferrero, tr. by A. E.
+  Zemmern, 1909.
+ETUDES SUR L'HISTOIRE MILITAIRE ET MARITIME DES GRECS ET DES
+  ROMAINS, Paul Serre, 1888.
+FLEETS OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, W. W. Tarn, in _Journal of
+  Hellenic Studies_, 1907.
+HERESIES OF SEA POWER (pp. 40-71), Fred Jane, 1906.
+INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON HISTORY (pp. 15 ff.), A. T. Mahan, 1889.
+For a complete bibliography of Roman sea power, v. INFLUENCE OF
+  SEA POWER ON THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (Doctoral Dissertation),
+  F. W. Clark, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES: THE EASTERN EMPIRE
+
+The thousand years following the collapse of the Roman empire, a
+period generally referred to as the Middle Ages, are characterized
+by a series of barbarian invasions. Angles, Saxons, Goths, Visigoths,
+Huns, Vandals, Vikings, Slavs, Arabs, and Turks poured over the
+broken barriers of the empire and threatened to extinguish the last
+spark of western and Christian civilization. Out of this welter
+of invasions and the anarchy of petty kingdoms arose finally the
+powerful nations that perpetuated the inheritance from Athens,
+Rome, and Jerusalem, and developed on this foundation the newer
+institutions of political and intellectual freedom that have made
+western civilization mistress of the world. For this triumph of
+West over East, of Christianity over barbarism, we have to thank
+partly the courage and genius of great warriors and statesmen who
+arose here and there, like Alfred of England and Martel of France,
+but chiefly the Eastern Empire, with its capital at Constantinople,
+which stood through this entire epoch as the one great bulwark against
+which the invasions dashed in vain. In this story of defense, the
+Christian fleets won more than one Salamis, as we shall see in
+the course of this chapter.
+
+In the year 328 A.D. the Emperor Constantine the Great moved his
+capital to Byzantium and named it "New Rome." In honor of its founder,
+however, the name was changed soon to "Constantinople," which it
+has retained ever since. It may seem strange that after so many
+glorious centuries Rome should have been deprived of the honor of
+being the center of the great empire which bore its own name, but
+in the fourth century the city itself had no real significance.
+All power rested in the person of the Emperor himself, and wherever
+he went became for the time being the capital for all practical
+purposes. At this time the empire was already on the defensive and
+the danger lay in the east. Constantine needed a capital nearer
+the scene of future campaigns, nearer his weakest frontier, the
+Danube, and nearer the center of the empire. Byzantium not only
+served these purposes but also possessed natural advantages of a
+very high order. It was situated where Europe and Asia meet, it
+commanded the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean,
+and it was a natural citadel. Whoever captured the city must needs
+be powerful by land and sea. Under the emperor's direction the new
+capital was greatly enlarged and protected by a system of massive
+walls. Behind these walls the city stood fast for over a thousand
+years against wave after wave of barbarian invasion.
+
+Of the wars with the Persians, the Vandals, and the Huns nothing
+need be said here, for they do not involve the operations of fleets.
+The city was safe so long as no enemy appeared with the power to
+hold the sea. That power appeared in the seventh century when the
+Arabs, or "Saracens," as they were called in Europe, swept westward
+and northward in the first great Mohammedan invasion.
+
+Most migrations are to be explained by the pressure of enemies,
+or the lack of food and pasturage in the countries left behind,
+or the discovery of better living conditions in the neighboring
+countries. But the impulse behind the two tremendous assaults of
+Islam upon Europe seems to have been religious fanaticism of a
+character and extent unmatched in history. The founder of the Faith,
+Mohammed, taught from 622 to 632. He succeeded in imbuing his followers
+with the passion of winning the world to the knowledge of Allah
+and Mohammed his prophet. The unbeliever was to be offered the
+alternatives of conversion or death, and the believer who fell in
+the holy wars would be instantly transported to Paradise. Men who
+actually believe that they will be sent to a blissful immortality
+after death are the most terrible soldiers to face, for they would
+as readily die as live. In fact Cromwell's "Ironsides" of a later
+day owed their invincibility to very much the same spirit. At all
+events, by the time of Mohammed's death all Arabia had been converted
+to his faith and, fired with zeal, turned to conquer the world.
+Hitherto the tribes of Arabia were scattered and disorganized,
+and Arabia as a country meant nothing to the outside world. Now
+under the leadership of the Prophet it had become a driving force
+of tremendous power. Mohammedan armies swept over Syria into Persia.
+In 637, only five years after Mohammed's death, Jerusalem surrendered,
+and shortly afterwards Egypt was conquered. Early in the eighth
+century the Arabs ruled from the Indus on the east, and the Caucasus
+on the north, to the shores of the Atlantic on the west. Their
+empire curved westward along the coast of northern Africa, through
+Spain, like one of their own scimitars, threatening all Christendom.
+Indeed, the Arab invasion stands unparalleled in history for its
+rapidity and extent.
+
+[Illustration: THE SARACEN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, ABOUT 715 A.D.]
+
+The one great obstacle in the way was the Christian, or Roman,
+empire with its center at Constantinople. Muaviah, the Emir of
+Syria, was the first to perceive that nothing could be done against
+the empire until the Arabs had wrested from it the command of the
+sea. Accordingly he set about building a great naval armament.
+In 649 this fleet made an attack on Cyprus but was defeated. The
+following year, however, it took an important island, Aradus, off
+the coast of Syria, once a stronghold of the Phoenicians, and sacked
+it with savage barbarity. An expedition sent from Constantinople to
+recover Alexandria was met by this fleet and routed. This first naval
+victory over the Christians gave the Saracens unbounded confidence in
+their ability to fight on the sea. They sailed into the AEgean, took
+Rhodes, plundered Cos, and returned loaded with booty. Muaviah,
+elated with these successes, planned a great combined land and
+water expedition against the Christian capital.
+
+At this point it is worth pausing to consider what the fighting
+ship of this period was like. As we have seen in the preceding
+chapter the Roman navy sank into complete decay. At the end of the
+fourth century there was practically no imperial navy in existence.
+The conquest of the Vandals by Belisarius in the sixth century
+involved the creation of a fleet, but when that task was over the
+navy again disappeared until the appearance of the Arabs compelled
+the building of a new imperial fleet. The small provincial squadrons
+then used to patrol the coasts were by no means adequate to meet
+the crisis.
+
+The warships of this period were called "dromons," a term that
+persists even in the time of the Turkish invasion eight centuries
+later. The word means "fast sailers" or "racers." The dromon was
+not the low galley of the later Middle Ages but a two-banked ship,
+probably quite as large as the Roman quinquereme, carrying a complement
+of about 300 men. Amidships was built a heavy castle or redoubt of
+timbers, pierced with loopholes for archery. On the forecastle
+rose a kind of turret, possibly revolving, from which, after Greek
+fire was invented, the tubes or primitive cannon projected the
+substance on the decks of the enemy. The dromon had two masts, lateen
+rigged, and between thirty and forty oars to a side.
+
+There were two classes of dromons, graded according to size, and a
+third class of ship known as the "pamphylian," which was apparently
+of a cruiser type, less cumbered with superstructure. In addition
+there were small scout and dispatch boats of various shapes and
+sizes.
+
+Both Christian and Saracen fought with these kinds of warships.
+Apparently the Arabs simply copied the vessels they found already
+in use by their enemies, and added no new device of their own.
+
+[Illustration: EUROPE'S EASTERN FRONTIER]
+
+In 655 Muaviah started his great double invasion against Constantinople.
+He sent his fleet into the AEgean, while he himself with an army
+tried to force the passes of the Taurus mountains. Before the Arab
+fleet had gone far it met the Christian fleet, commanded by the
+Emperor himself, off the town of Phaselis on the southwestern coast
+of Asia Minor. A great battle followed. The Christian emperor,
+Constantine II, distinguished himself by personal courage throughout
+the action, but the day went sorely against the Christians. At last
+the flagship was captured and he himself survived only by leaping
+into a vessel that came to his rescue while his men fought to cover
+his escape. It was a terrible defeat, for 20,000 Christians had been
+killed and the remnants of their fleet were in full retreat. But
+the Saracens had bought their victory at such a price that they
+were themselves in no condition to profit by it, and the naval
+expedition went no further. Meanwhile Muaviah had not succeeded
+in forcing the Taurus with his army, so that the grand assault
+came to nothing after all.
+
+The following year the murder of the Caliph brought on a civil
+war among the Saracens, in consequence of which Muaviah arranged
+a truce with Constantine. The latter was thus enabled to turn his
+attention to the beating back of the Slavs in the east and the
+recovery of imperial possessions in the west, notably the city
+and province of Carthage. During the last of these campaigns he
+was killed by a slave.
+
+The death of this energetic and able ruler seemed to Muaviah the
+opportunity to begin fresh operations against the Christian empire.
+Three great armies invaded the territory of the Cross. One plundered
+Syracuse, another seized and fortified a post that threatened the
+existence of Carthage, a third pushed to the shores of the Sea of
+Marmora. These were, however, only preliminary to the grand assault
+on the capital itself.
+
+In 673 a great Arab armada forced the Hellespont and captured Cyzicus.
+With this as a base, the fleet landed an army on the northern shore
+of the Sea of Marmora. By these means Constantinople was invested
+by land and sea. But the great walls proved impregnable against
+the attacks of the army, and the Christian fleet, sheltered in
+the Golden Horn, was able to sally out from time to time and make
+successful raids on detachments of the Saracen ships. This state
+of affairs continued for six months, after which Muaviah retired
+with his army to Cyzicus, leaving a strong naval guard to hold
+the straits.
+
+The next spring Muaviah again landed his army on the European side
+and besieged the city for several months. The second year's operations
+were no more successful than the first, and again the Arab force
+retired to Cyzicus for the winter.
+
+The Arab commander was determined to stick it out until he had
+forced the surrender of the city by sheer exhaustion, but his plan
+had a fatal error. During the winter months the land blockade was
+abandoned, with the result that supplies for the next year's siege
+were readily collected for the beleaguered city. Emperor and citizens
+alike rose to the emergency with a spirit of devotion that burned
+brighter with every year of the siege. Meanwhile the Christians
+of the outlying provinces of Syria and Africa were also fighting
+stubbornly and with considerable success against the enemy. The
+year 676 passed without any material change in the situation.
+
+[Illustration: CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY]
+
+During the siege a Syrian architect named Callinicus is said to
+have come to Constantinople with a preparation of his own invention,
+"Greek fire," which he offered the Emperor for use against the Saracen.
+This, according to one historian, "was a semi-liquid substance,
+composed of sulphur, pitch, dissolved niter, and petroleum boiled
+together and mixed with certain less important and more obscure
+substances.... When ejected it caught the woodwork which it fell
+and set it so thoroughly on fire that there was no possibility
+of extinguishing the conflagration. It could only be put out, it
+is said, by pouring vinegar, wine, or sand upon it."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE ART OF WAR, Oman, p. 546.]
+
+Constantine IV, the Emperor, was quick to see the possibilities
+of the innovation and equipped his dromons with projecting brass
+tubes for squirting the substance upon the enemy's ships. These are
+sometimes referred to as "siphons," but it is not clear just how
+they were operated. One writer[2] is of the opinion that something
+of the secret of gunpowder had been obtained from the East and that
+the substance was actually projected by a charge of gunpowder;
+in short, that these "siphons" were primitive cannon. In addition
+to these tubes other means were prepared for throwing the fire.
+Earthenware jars containing it were to be flung by hand or arbalist,
+and darts and arrows were wrapped with tow soaked in the substance.
+
+[Footnote 2: THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, Foord, p. 139.]
+
+The Christian fleet was no match for the Saracen in numbers, but
+Constantine pinned his faith on the new invention. Accordingly,
+during the fourth year of the siege, 677, he boldly led his fleet
+to the attack. We have no details of this battle beyond the fact
+that the Greek fire struck such terror by its destructive effect that
+the Saracens were utterly defeated. This unexpected blow completed
+the growing demoralization of the besiegers. The army returned
+to the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and the survivors of the
+fleet turned homewards. Constantine followed up his victory with
+splendid energy. He landed troops on the Asiatic shore, pursued
+the retreating Arabs and drove the shattered remnant of their army
+back into Syria. The fleet was overtaken by a storm in the AEgean and
+suffered heavily. Before the ships could reassemble, the Christians
+were upon them and almost nothing was left of the great Saracen
+armada. Thus the second great assault on Constantinople was shattered
+by the most staggering disaster that had ever befallen the cause
+of Islam.
+
+The Christian empire once more stood supreme, and that supremacy
+was attested by the terms of peace which the defeated Muaviah was
+glad to accept. There was to be a truce of thirty years, during
+which the Christian emperor was to receive an annual tribute of
+3000 pounds of gold, fifty Arab horses and fifty slaves.
+
+It is unfortunate that there was no Herodotus to tell the details
+of this victory, for it was tremendously important to European
+civilization. Western Europe was then a welter of barbarism and
+anarchy, and if Constantinople had fallen, in all probability the
+last vestige of Roman civilization would have been destroyed. Moreover,
+the battle is of special interest from a tactical point of view
+because it was won by a new device, Greek fire, which was the most
+destructive naval weapon up to the time when gunpowder and artillery
+took its place. Indeed this substance may be said to have saved
+Christian civilization for several centuries, for the secret of
+its composition was carefully preserved at Constantinople and the
+Arabs never recovered from their fear of it.
+
+The victory did not, however, mark the crisis of the struggle.
+In the half century that followed, Constantinople suffered from
+weak or imbecile emperors while the Caliphate gained ground under
+able rulers and generals. In the first fifteen years of the eighth
+century the Saracens reached the climax of their power. Under a
+great general, Muza, they conquered Spain and spread into southern
+France. It was he who conceived the grandiose plan of conquering
+Christendom by a simultaneous attack from the west and from the
+east, converging at the city of Rome. One army was to advance from
+Asia Minor and take Constantinople; another was to cross the Pyrenees
+and overrun the territory of the Franks. Had the enterprise been
+started at the time proposed there could have been little opposition
+in the west, for the Franks were then busy fighting each other,
+but luckily Muza fell into disgrace with the Caliph at this time
+and his great project was undertaken by less able hands and on
+a piecemeal plan.
+
+The eastern line of invasion was undertaken first in the year 717.
+A fleet of warships and transports to the number of 1800 sailed
+to the Hellespont, carrying about 80,000 troops, while a great
+army collected at Tarsus and marched overland toward the same
+destination. Meanwhile two more fleets were being prepared in the
+ports of Africa and Egypt, and a third army was being collected
+to reenforce the first expedition. This army was to be under the
+personal command of the Caliph himself. The third attack on the
+Christian capital was intended to be the supreme effort.
+
+Fortunately, the ruler of Constantinople at this hour of peril
+was a man of ability and energy, Leo III; but the empire had sunk
+so low as a result of the misrule of his predecessors that his
+authority scarcely extended beyond the shores of the Sea of Marmora,
+and his resources were at a low ebb. The navy on which so much
+depended was brought to a high point of efficiency, but it was so
+inferior in numbers to the Saracen armada that he dared not attempt
+even a defense of the Dardanelles.
+
+For the Arabs all went well at first. Unopposed they transported a
+part of their army to the European shore, moved toward Constantinople
+and invested it by land and sea. One detachment was sent to cover
+Adrianople, which was occupied by a Christian garrison; the rest
+of the force concentrated on the capital itself.
+
+Meanwhile the Christian fleet lay anchored in the shelter of the
+Golden Horn, protected by a boom of chains and logs. As the Saracen
+ships came up to occupy the straits above the city they fell into
+confusion in trying to stem the rapid current. Seeing his opportunity,
+the emperor ordered the boom opened, and leading the way in his
+flagship, he fell upon the huddle of Saracen vessels in the channel.
+The latter could make little resistance, and before the main body of
+the fleet could work up to the rescue, the Christians had destroyed
+twenty and taken a number of prizes back to the Horn. Again Greek
+fire had proved its deadly efficacy. Elated with this success,
+Leo ordered the boom opened wide and, lying in battle order at
+the mouth of the Horn, he challenged the Arab fleet to attack. But
+such was the terror inspired by Greek fire that the Grand Vizier,
+in spite of his enormous superiority in numbers, declined to close.
+Instead he withdrew his dromons out of the Bosphorus and thereafter
+followed the less risky policy of a blockade. This initial success
+of the Christian fleet had the important effect of leaving open
+the sea route to the Black Sea, through which supplies could still
+reach the beleaguered city.
+
+The Arabs then sat down to wear out the defenders by a protracted
+siege on land and sea. In the spring of 718 the new army and the
+two new fleets arrived on the scene. One of the latter succeeded,
+probably by night, in passing through the Bosphorus and closing
+the last inlet to the city. The situation for the defenders became
+desperate. Many of the men serving on these new fleets, however,
+were Christians. These took every opportunity to desert, and gave
+important information to the emperor as to the disposition of the
+Arab ships. Acting on this knowledge, Leo took his fleet out from
+the shelter of the boom and moved up the straits against the African
+and Egyptian squadrons that were blockading the northern exit. The
+deserters guided him to where these squadrons lay, at anchor and
+unprepared for action. What followed was a massacre rather than
+a battle. The Christian members of the crews deserted wholesale
+and turned upon their Moslem officers. Ship after ship was rammed
+by the Christian dromons or set on fire by the terrible substance
+which every Arab regarded with superstitious dread. Some were driven
+ashore, others captured, many more sunk or burnt to the water's
+edge. Of a total of nearly 800 vessels practically nothing was
+left.
+
+Leo followed up this spectacular naval victory by transporting
+a force from the garrison of the city to the opposite shore of
+the Bosphorus, attacking the army encamped there and driving it
+in rout. Meanwhile the Bulgarian chieftain had responded to Leo's
+appeal and, relieving the siege of Adrianople, beat back the Saracen
+army at that point with great slaughter. The fugitives of that army
+served to throw into panic the troops encamped round the walls
+of Constantinople, already demoralized by disease, the death of
+their leaders, and the annihilation of the African and Egyptian
+fleets in the Bosphorus.
+
+The great retreat began. The Arab soldiers started back through
+Asia Minor, but only 30,000 out of the original force of 180,000
+lived to reach Tarsus. The fleet set sail for the AEgean, and as
+in the similar retreat of a half century before, the Arabs were
+overwhelmed by a storm with terrible losses. The Christian ships
+picked off many survivors, and the Christians of the islands destroyed
+others that sought shelter in any port. It is said that out of
+the original armada of 1800 vessels only five returned to Syria!
+Thus the third and supreme effort of the Saracen ended in one of
+the greatest military disasters in history.
+
+The service of the Christian fleet in the salvation of the empire
+at this time is thus summarized by a historian:
+
+"The fleet won most of the credit for the fine defense; it invariably
+fought with admirable readiness and discipline, and was handled in
+the most masterful manner. It checked the establishment of a naval
+blockade at the very outset, and broke it when it was temporarily
+formed in 718; it enabled the army to operate at will on either
+shore of the Bosphorus, and it followed up the retreating Saracens
+and completed the ruin of the great armament."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, Foard, p. 170.]
+
+The winning stroke in this campaign was the tremendous naval victory
+at the mouth of the Bosphorus, and this, even more emphatically
+than Constantine's victory in 677, deserves to be called another
+Salamis. Not only did it save the Christian empire but it checked
+the Caliphate at the summit of its power and started it on its
+decline. Not for thirty years afterwards was the Saracen able to
+put any considerable fleet upon the sea.
+
+It was ten years after the Arab defeat at Constantinople that the
+armies of the west began the other part of Muza's project--the
+conquest of the Franks. By this time the Frankish power was united
+and able to present a powerful defense. In six bitterly contested
+battles between Tours and Poitiers in 732 Charles Martel defeated
+the Arabs in a campaign that may well be called the Marathon, or
+better, the Plataea, of the Middle Ages, for it completed the work
+done by the imperial navy at Constantinople. From this time forward
+the power of the Saracen began to ebb by land and sea.
+
+As it ebbed, the new cities of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice began to
+capture the trade and hold the control of the sea that once had
+been Saracen, until the Christian control was so well established
+as to make possible the Crusades. Later, as we shall see, a second
+invasion of Mohammedans, the Turks, ably assisted by the descendants
+of the Arabs who conquered Spain, once more threatened to control
+the Mediterranean for the cause of Islam. But the Persian Gulf
+and the Indian Ocean, which fell into the hands of the Arabs as
+soon as they took to the water, remained in Arab hands down to
+the times of the Portuguese. In those waters, because they were
+cut off from the Mediterranean, the Saracen had no competitor.
+As early as the eighth century Ceylon was an Arab trading base,
+and when the Portuguese explorers arrived at the end of the 15th
+century they found the Arabs still dominating the water routes
+of India and Asia, holding as they had held for seven centuries
+a monopoly of the commerce of the east.
+
+Of the Mediterranean during the struggle between Christian and
+Saracen a recent English writer makes the following suggestive comment:
+
+"The function of the Mediterranean has thus undergone a change.
+In early times it had been a barrier; later, under the Phoenicians,
+it became a highway, and to the Greeks a defense. We find that the
+Romans made it a basis for sea power and subdued all the lands
+on its margin. With the weakening of Rome came a weakening of sea
+power. The Barbary states and Spain became Saracen only because
+the naval power of the eastern empire was not strong enough to hold
+the whole sea, but neither was the Saracen able to gain supreme
+control. Thus the conditions were the same as in the earlier days
+of the conflict between Rome and Carthage: the Mediterranean became
+a moat separating the rivals, though first one and then the other
+had somewhat more control. The islands became alternately Saracen
+and Christian. Crete and Sicily were held for centuries before
+they were regained by a Christian power."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: GEOGRAPHY AND WORLD POWER, Fairgrieve, p. 125.]
+
+The victory of 718 saved Constantinople from any further peril
+from the Arabs, but it was again in grave peril, two centuries
+later, when a sudden invasion of Russians in great force threatened
+to accomplish at a stroke what the Saracens had failed to do in three
+great expeditions. The King of Kiev, one of the race of Vikings
+that had fought their way into southern Russia, collected a huge
+number of ships, variously estimated from one to ten thousand, and
+suddenly appeared in the Bosphorus. Probably there were not more
+than 1500 of these vessels all told and they must have been small
+compared with the Christian dromons; nevertheless they presented an
+appalling danger at that moment. The Christian fleet was watching
+Crete, the army was in the east winning back territory from the
+Arabs, and Constantinople lay almost defenseless. The great walls
+could be depended an to hold off a barbarian army, but a fleet
+was needed to hold the waterways; otherwise the city was doomed.
+
+In the Horn lay a few antiquated dromons and a few others still on
+the stocks. To Theophanes the Patrician was given this nucleus of
+a squadron with which to beat back the Russians. Desperate and even
+hopeless as the situation appeared, he went to work with the greatest
+energy, patching up the old ships, and hurrying the completion of
+the new. Meanwhile the invaders sent raiding parties ashore that
+harried the unprotected country districts with every refinement
+of cruelty. In order to make each ship count as much as possible
+as an offensive unit, Theaphanes made an innovation by fitting out
+Greek fire tubes on the broadsides as well as in the bows. This
+may be noted as the first appearance of the broadside armament
+idea, which had to wait six hundred years more before it became
+finally established.
+
+When the new ships had been completed and the old ones made serviceable,
+Theophanes had exactly fifteen men of war. With this handful of
+vessels, some hardly fit to take the sea, he set out from the Horn
+and boldly attacked the Russian fleet that blocked the entrance to
+the strait. Never was there a more forlorn hope. Certainly neither
+the citizens on the walls nor the men on the ships had any expectation
+of a return.
+
+What followed would be incredible were it not a matter of history.
+These fifteen ships were immediately swallowed up by the huge fleet
+of the enemy, but under the superb leadership of Theophanes each
+one fought with the fury of desperation. They had one hope, the
+weapon that had twice before saved the city, Greek fire. The Russians
+swarmed alongside only to find their ships taking fire with a flame
+that water would not quench. Contempt of their feeble enemy changed
+soon to a wild terror. There was but one impulse, to get out of
+reach of the Christians, and the ships struggled to escape. Soon
+the whole Russian fleet was in wild flight with the gallant fifteen
+in hot pursuit. Some of these could make but slow headway because
+of their unseaworthiness, but when all was over the Russians are
+said to have lost two-thirds of their entire force. The invaders who
+had been left on shore were then swept into the sea by reenforcements
+that had arrived at Constantinople, and not a vestige was left
+of the Russian invasion. Once more Greek fire and the Christian
+navy had saved the empire; and for sheer audacity, crowned with a
+victory of such magnitude, the feat of Theophanes stands unrivaled
+in history.
+
+From the tenth century on, Constantinople began to find her rivalries
+in the west. The coronation of Charlemagne in 800 had marked the
+final separation of the eastern and the western empire. As noted
+above, the passing of the Saracens gave opportunity for the growth
+of commercial city-states like Genoa, Pisa and Venice, and their
+interests clashed not only with one another but also with those
+of Constantinople.
+
+The climax came in 1204 when Venice succeeded in diverting the
+Fourth Crusade to an expedition of vengeance for herself, first
+against the city of Zara and then against Constantinople. This
+time the Eastern Empire had no fleet ready for defense and the
+Venetian galleys filled the waters under the city walls. Many of
+these galleys were fitted with a kind of flying bridge, a long
+yard that extended from the mast to the top of the wall and stout
+enough to bear a file of men that scrambled by this means to the
+parapets. After many bloody repulses the city was finally captured,
+and there followed a sack that for utter barbarity outdid anything
+ever perpetrated by Arab or Turk. Thus the city that for nearly a
+thousand years had saved Christian civilization was, by a hideous
+irony of fate, taken and sacked by a Crusading army.
+
+When the second Mohammedan invasion threatened Europe, Constantinople,
+weak on land and impotent by sea, and deserted by the Christian
+nations of the west, was unable to put up a strong resistance. At
+last, in 1453, it was captured by the Turks, and became thereafter
+the capital of the Moslem power. Great as this catastrophe was,
+it cannot compare with what would have happened if the city had
+fallen to the Saracen, the Hun, or the Russian during the dark
+centuries when the nations of the west were scarcely in embryo.
+In the 15th century they were strong enough to take up the sword
+that Constantinople had dropped and draw the line beyond which
+the Turk was not permitted to go.
+
+Although it has been the fashion since Gibbon to sneer at the Eastern
+Empire, it must be remembered with respect as the last treasure
+house of the inheritance bequeathed by Rome and Greece during the
+dark centuries of barbarian and Saracen. Even in its ruin it sent its
+fugitives westward with the manuscripts of a language and literature
+then little known, the Greek, and thereby added greatly to the
+growing impetus of the Renaissance. It is significant also that
+during its thousand years of life, as long as it kept its hold on
+the sea it stood firm. When it yielded that, its empire dwindled
+to a mere city fortress whose doom was assured long before it fell.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY, Vol. II., 1913.
+THE HISTORY OF THE SARACENS, E. Gibbon & S. Ockley.
+HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, Edward
+  Gibbon, ed. by J. B. Bury.
+THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, E. A. Foord, 1911.
+MILITARY AND RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES, Paul Lacroix,
+  1874.
+HISTORY OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE, J. B. Bury, 1889.
+HISTORY OF THE EASTERN ROMAN EMPIRE, J. B. Bury, 1912.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES [_Continued_]: VENICE AND THE TURK
+
+The city-state of Venice owed its origin to the very same barbarian
+invasions that wrecked the old established cities of the Italian
+peninsula. Fugitives from these towns in northern Italy and the
+outlying country districts fled to the islets and lagoons for shelter
+from the Hun, the Goth, and the Lombard. As the sea was the Venetians'
+barrier from the invader, so also it had to be their source of
+livelihood, and step by step through the centuries they built up
+their commerce until they practically controlled the Mediterranean,
+for trade or for war.
+
+As early as 991 a Doge of Venice made a treaty with the Saracens
+inaugurating a policy held thereafter by Venice till the time of
+Lepanto; namely, to trade with Mohammedans rather than fight them.
+The supreme passion of Venice was to make money, as it had been of
+ancient Phoenicia, and to this was subordinated every consideration
+of race, nationality, and religion. The first important step was
+the conquest of the Dalmatian pirates at the beginning of the 11th
+century. This meant the Venetian control of the Adriatic. When the
+Crusades began, the sea routes to the Holy Land were in the hands
+of the Venetians; indeed it was this fact that made the Crusades
+possible. As the carrying and convoying agent of the Crusaders,
+Venice developed greatly in wealth and power. With direct access to
+the Brenner Pass, she became a rich distributing center for Eastern
+goods to northern Europe. In all important Levantine cities there
+was a Venetian quarter, Venetians had special trading privileges,
+and many seaports and islands came directly under Venetian rule.
+
+[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS, VENICE AND THE TURK]
+
+This rapid expansion naturally roused the jealousy of others. In
+1171 Venice fought an unsuccessful war with Constantinople, and
+yet continued to grow in wealth and power. In 1204, as we have
+seen, Venice avenged herself by diverting the Fourth Crusade to
+the siege and sack of her eastern rival. As the reward of that
+nefarious exploit Venice received the greater part of the eastern
+empire, and became the dominating power in the Mediterranean. During
+the 13th and 14th centuries, however, she was compelled to fight
+with her rebellious colonies and her new rivals, Genoa and Padua.
+The wars with Genoa very nearly proved fatal to Venice, but just
+when matters seemed most desperate she was saved by a naval victory
+against a Genoese fleet in her own waters. In consequence of these
+wars between Venice and Genoa both were heavy losers in wealth
+and lives; Genoa never recovered from her defeat, but her rival
+showed amazing powers of recuperation. She extended her territory
+in Italy to include the important cities of Treviso, Padua, Vicenza,
+and Verona, and in 1488 acquired the island of Cyprus in the Levant.
+At this time the Venetian state owned 3300 ships, manned by 36,000
+men, and stood at the height of her power.
+
+Already, however, a new enemy had appeared who threatened not only
+Venice but all Europe. This was the Ottoman Turk. The Turks were
+not like the Arabs, members of the Indo-European family, but a
+race from the eastern borders of the Caspian Sea, a branch of the
+Mongolian stock. As these peoples moved south and west they came in
+contact with Mohammedanism and became ardent converts. Eventually
+they swept over Asia Minor, crossed the Dardanelles, took Adrianople,
+and pushed into Serbia. Thus, when Constantinople fell in 1453 it
+had been for some time a mere island of Christianity surrounded by
+Moslems. Indeed it was only the civil wars among the Turks themselves
+that held them back so long from the brilliant career of conquest
+that characterized the 15th and early 16th centuries, for these
+later followers of Mohammed had all the fanaticism of the Saracens.
+Before the fall of Constantinople and the transfer of the Turkish
+seat of government to that city, a corps of infantry was organized
+that became the terror of the Christian world--the Janissaries. By
+a grim irony of the Sultan, who created this body of troops, these
+men were exclusively of Christian parentage, taken as children either
+in the form of a human tribute levied on the Christian population
+of Constantinople, or as captives in the various expeditions in
+Christian territory. The Janissaries were brought up wholly to a
+military life, they were not permitted to marry, and their lives
+were devoted to fighting for the Crescent. For a long time they
+were invincible in the open field.
+
+The first half of the 16th century saw the Turks in Persia, in the
+east, and at the gates of Vienna in the west. For a time they got
+a foothold in Italy by seizing Otranto. They had conquered Egypt
+and Syria, penetrated Persia, and in Arabia gained the support of
+the Arabs for the Turkish sultan as the successor to the Caliphs.
+Constantinople, therefore, became not only the political capital
+for the Turkish empire but the religious center of the whole Moslem
+world. Moreover, the Arab states on the southern borders of the
+Mediterranean acknowledged the suzerainty of the Turkish ruler.
+
+This fact was of great importance, for it enabled the Turks to become
+masters of the inland sea. In 1492 the greater part of the Moors--the
+descendants of the Arab conquerors of Spain--were expelled from the
+Peninsula by the conquest of Granada. This event was hailed with
+joy throughout Christendom, but it had an unexpected and terrible
+consequence. Flung back into northern Africa, and filled with hatred
+because of the persecution they had endured, these Moors embarked
+on a career of piracy directed against Christians. In making common
+cause with the Turks they supplied the fleets that the Turkish
+power needed to carry out its schemes of conquest. Apparently the
+Turks had never taken to salt water as the Arabs had done, but in
+these Moorish pirates they found fighters on the sea well worthy
+to stand comparison with their peerless fighters on land, the
+Janissaries. Between 1492 and 1580, the date of Ali's death, there
+was a period in which the Moorish corsairs were supreme. It produced
+three great leaders, each of whom in turn became the terror of the
+sea: Kheyr ed Din, known as Barbarossa, Dragut, and Ali. It is a
+curious fact that the first and third were of Christian parentage.
+
+So long as the Turk invaded Christian territory by land alone,
+the Venetians were unconcerned. They made what treaties they could
+for continuing their trade with communities that had fallen into
+the conquerors' hands. But when the Turk began to spread out by
+sea it was inevitable that he must clash with the Venetian, and so
+there was much fighting. Yet even after a successful naval campaign
+the emissary of Venice was obliged to come before the Sultan, cap
+in hand, to beg trading privileges in Turkish territory. Everything
+in Venetian policy was subordinated to the maintenance of sufficient
+friendly relations with the Turk to assure a commercial monopoly in
+the Levant. Although the Moslem peril grew more and more menacing,
+Venice remained unwilling to join in any united action for the
+common good of Europe.
+
+Of course Venice was not alone in this policy. In 1534 Francis
+the First, for example, in order to humiliate his rival, Charles
+V, secretly sent word to Barbarossa of the plans being made against
+him. Indeed France showed no interest in combating the Turk even
+at the time when he was at the summit of his power. But Venice, as
+the dominating naval power, had the means of checking the Turkish
+invasion if she had chosen to do so. Instead she permitted the
+control of the Mediterranean to slip from her into the hands of
+the Moslems with scarcely a blow.
+
+The leading part in the resistance to the Moslem sea power was
+taken by Spain under Charles V. He had, as admiral of the navy,
+Andrea Doria, the Genoese, the ablest seaman on the Christian side.
+Early in his career he had captured a notorious corsair; later
+in the service of Spain, he defeated the Turks at Patras (at the
+entrance to the Gulf of Corinth), and again at the Dardanelles.
+These successes threatened Turkish supremacy on the Mediterranean,
+and Sultan Soliman "the Magnificent," the ruler under whom the
+Turkish empire reached its zenith, summoned the Algerian corsair
+Barbarossa and gave him supreme command over all the fleets under
+the Moslem banner. At this time, 1533, Barbarossa was seventy-seven
+years old, but he had lost none of his fire or ability. On the
+occasion of being presented to the Sultan, he uttered a saying
+that might stand as the text for all the writings of Mahan: "Sire,
+he who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also."
+
+The following year Barbarossa set out from Constantinople with
+a powerful fleet and proceeded to ravage the coast of Italy. He
+sacked Reggio, burnt and massacred elsewhere on the coast without
+opposition, cast anchor at the mouth of the Tiber and if he had
+chosen could have sacked Rome and taken the Pope captive. He then
+returned to Constantinople with 11,000 Christian captives.
+
+Charles V was roused by this display of corsair power and barbarity
+to collect a force that should put an end to such raids. Barbarossa
+had recently added Tunis to his personal domains, and the great
+expedition of ships and soldiers which the emperor assembled was
+directed against that city. Despite the warning given by the King
+of France, Barbarossa was unable to oppose the Christian host with
+a force sufficiently strong to defend the city. The Christians
+captured it and the chieftain escaped only by a flight along the
+desert to the port of Bona where he had a few galleys in reserve.
+With these he made his way to Algiers before Andrea Doria could
+come up with him. The Christians celebrated the capture of Tunis by
+a massacre of some 30,000 inhabitants and returned home, thanking
+God that at last Barbarossa was done for. Indeed, with the loss
+of his fleet and his newly acquired province it seemed as if the
+great pirate was not likely to give much trouble, but the Christians
+had made the mistake of leaving the work only half done.
+
+In 1537, two years after the fall of Tunis, the Sultan declared war
+on Venice. The Turkish fleet, although led by the Sultan Soliman
+himself, was defeated by the Venetians off Corfu. Doria, in the
+service of Charles V, caught and burned ten richly laden Turkish
+merchant ships and then defeated a Turkish squadron. The prestige
+of the Crescent on the sea was badly weakened by these events,
+but suddenly Barbarossa appeared and raided the islands of the
+Archipelago and the coasts of the Adriatic with a savagery and
+sweep unmatched by anything in his long career. He arrived in the
+Golden Horn laden with booty, and delivered to his master, the
+Sultan, 18,000 captives.
+
+This exploit changed the complexion of affairs. During the winter
+of 1537-1538 the naval yards of Constantinople were busy with the
+preparations for a new fleet which should take the offensive against
+the Venetians and the Christians generally. In the spring Barbarossa
+got out into the Archipelago and, raiding at will, swept up another
+batch of prisoners to serve as galley slaves for the new ships.
+Meanwhile the Mediterranean states nerved themselves for a final
+effort. Venice contributed 81 galleys, the Pope sent 36, and Spain,
+30. Later the Emperor sent 50 transports with 10,000 soldiers,
+and 49 galleys, together with a number of large sailing ships.
+Venice also added 14 sailing ships of war, or "nefs," and Doria
+22; these formed a special squadron. The Venetian nefs were headed
+by Condalmiero in his flagship the _Galleon of Venice_, the most
+formidable warship in the Mediterranean, and the precursor of a
+revolution in naval architecture and naval tactics.
+
+[Illustration: 16TH CENTURY GALLEY]
+
+Although the sailing ship was coming more and more into favor because
+of the discoveries across the Atlantic, the galley was the man
+of war of this period. The dromons of the Eastern empire, with
+their stout build and two banks of oars, had given way to a long,
+narrow vessel with a single bank of oars which had been developed
+by men who lived on the shores of the sheltered lagoons of the
+Adriatic. The prime characteristic of this type was its mobility.
+For the pirate whose business it was to lie in wait and dash out
+on a merchantman, this quality of mobility--independence of wind
+and speed of movement--was of chief importance. Similarly, in order
+to combat the pirate it was necessary to possess the same
+characteristic. Of course, as in all the days of rowed ships, this
+freedom of movement was limited by the physical exhaustion of the
+rowers. In the ships of Greek and Roman days these men had some
+protection from the weapons of the enemy and from the weather,
+but in the 16th century galley, whether Turkish or Christian, they
+were chained naked to their benches day and night, with practically
+nothing to shelter them from the weather or from the weapons of
+an enemy. So frightful were the hardships of the life that the
+rowers were almost always captives, or felons who worked out their
+sentences on the rowers' bench. An important difference between
+the galley of this period and the earlier types of rowed ship is
+the fact that in the galley there was but one row of oars on a
+side, but these oars were very long and manned by four or five men
+apiece.
+
+A typical galley was about 180 feet over all with a beam of 19
+feet and a depth of hold of about 7-1/2 feet. A single deck sloped
+from about the water line to a structure that ran fore and aft
+amidships, about six feet wide, which served as a gangway between
+forecastle and poop and gave access to the hold. The forecastle
+carried the main battery of guns, and was closed in below so as to
+provide quarters for the fighting men. The poop had a deck house
+and a smaller battery; this deck also was closed in, furnishing
+quarters for the officers. There were two or three masts, lateen
+rigged, adorned in peace or war with the greatest profusion of
+banners and streamers. Indeed huge sums of money were expended on
+the mere ornament of these war galleys, particularly in the elaborate
+carvings that adorned the stern and prow.
+
+In the conflict of Christian and Moslem, when Constantinople was
+the capital of Christendom, Greek fire on two critical occasions
+routed the Saracens. This substance was never understood in western
+Europe, and for centuries the secret was carefully preserved in
+the eastern capital. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
+it was used by the Moslem against the Christian, but the discovery
+of gunpowder soon made the earlier substance obsolete. In the 16th
+century cannon had already reached considerable dimensions, but in
+a naval battle between galleys these weapons were not used after
+the first volley or so. The tactics were little different from
+those of the day of the trireme, consisting simply of ramming, and
+fighting at close quarters with arquebus, bows, pike, and sword.
+
+Twenty feet from the bows of every galley projected her metal beak,
+and all her guns pointed forward; hence in the naval tactics of
+the period everything turned on a head-on attack. The battle line,
+therefore, was line abreast. For the same reasons a commander had
+to fear an attack on his flank, and he maneuvered usually to get
+at least one flank protected by the shore. The battle line in the
+days of the galley could be dressed as accurately as a file of
+soldiers, but the fighting was settled in a close melee in which
+all formation was lost from the moment of collision between the
+two fleets.
+
+_The Campaign of Prevesa_
+
+Such were the men of war and the tactics common to Christian and
+corsair during the 16th century. While the Christians were slowly
+collecting their armada, Barbarossa, with a force of 122 galleys,
+set out to catch his enemy in detail if he could. Pirate as he
+was, the old ruffian had a clear strategic grasp of what he might
+do with a force that was inferior to the fleet collecting against
+him. The Christians were to mobilize at Corfu. The Papal squadron
+had collected in the Gulf of Arta, and Barbarossa made for it. By
+sheer luck just before he arrived it had moved to the rendezvous.
+If he had followed it up immediately, he might have crushed both
+the Papal and Venetian contingents, because Doria and the Spanish
+fleet had not yet arrived; but apparently he felt uncertain as
+to just how far off these reenforcements were and therefore did
+not attempt the stroke. Instead, he took up a defensive position
+in the Gulf of Arta, exactly where Antony had collected his fleet
+before the battle of Actium.
+
+In September (1538) the Christian fleet under Doria left Corfu and
+crossed to the Gulf. Barbarossa had drawn up his force in battle
+array inside the entrance, under the guns of the Turkish fortress
+at Prevesa. Since this entrance is obstructed by a bar with too
+little water for Doria's heavier ships, he lay outside. Thus the
+two fleets faced each other, each waiting for the other to make
+the next move. For the first time in their careers the greatest
+admiral on the Christian side was face to face with the greatest on
+the Moslem side. Both were old men, Doria over seventy and Barbarossa
+eighty-two. The stage was set for another decisive battle on the scene
+of Actium. The town of Prevesa stood on the site of Octavius's camp,
+and again East and West faced each other for the mastery of the sea.
+With the vastly greater strength of the Christian fleet, and the
+known skill of its leader, everything pointed to an overwhelming
+victory for the Cross. What followed is one of the most amazing
+stories in history.
+
+Having the interior lines and the smooth anchorage, Barbarossa
+had only to watch his enemy go to pieces in the open roadstead
+in trying to maintain a blockade. His officers, however, scorned
+such a policy, and, being appointees of the Sultan and far from
+subordinate in spirit to their chief, they were finally able to
+force his hand and compel him to offer battle to the Christians
+by leaving the security of the gulf and the fortress and going
+out into the open, exactly where Doria wanted him. Accordingly
+on the 27th of September, the Turkish fleet sailed out to offer
+battle. It happened that Doria had gone ten miles away to Sessola
+for anchorage, and the _Galleon of Venice_ lay becalmed right in
+the path of the advancing fleet. Condalmiero sent word for help,
+and Doria ordered him to begin fighting, assuring him that he would
+soon be reenforced.
+
+The Turkish galleys, advancing in a crescent formation, soon enveloped
+the lonely ship. Her captain ordered his crew to lie down on her
+deck while he alone stood, in full armor, a target to the host of
+Moslems who pushed forward in their galleys anxious for the honor
+of capturing this great ship. Condalmiero ordered his gunners to
+hold their fire until the enemy were within arquebus range. Then
+the broadsides of the galleon blazed and the surrounding galleys
+crumpled and sank. A single shot weighing 120 pounds sank a galley
+with practically all on board. The signal to retreat was given
+and speedily obeyed.
+
+Thereafter there were to be no more rushing tactics. Barbarossa
+organized his galleys in squadrons of twenty, which advanced, one
+after the other, delivered their fire, and retired. All the rest
+of the day, from about noon till sunset, this strange conflict
+between the single galleon and the Turkish fleet went on. The ship
+was cumbered with her fallen spars; she had lost thirteen men killed
+and forty wounded. The losses would have been far greater but for
+the extraordinarily thick sides of the galleon. After sundown the
+Turkish fleet appeared to be drawing up in line for the last assault.
+On the _Galleon of Venice_ there was no thought of surrender; the
+ammunition was almost spent and the men were exhausted with their
+tremendous efforts, but they stood at their posts determined to
+defend their ship to the last man.
+
+Then, to their astonishment Barbarossa drew off, sending some of
+his galleys to pursue and cut off certain isolated Christian units,
+but leaving the field to the Venetian galleon. Meanwhile, during all
+that long, hot afternoon the great fleet of Andrea Doria, instead
+of pressing forward to the relief of the _Galleon of Venice_ and
+crushing Barbarossa with its great superiority in numbers, was
+going through strange parade maneuvers about ten miles away. Doria's
+explanation was that he was trying to decoy Barbarossa out into
+deeper water where the guns of the nefs could be used, but there is
+no other conclusion to be reached than that Doria did not want to
+fight. Fortune that day offered him everything for an overwhelming
+victory, one that might have ranked with the decisive actions of the
+world's history, and he threw it away under circumstances peculiarly
+disgraceful and humiliating. Never did commander in chief so richly
+deserve to be shot on his own deck. The following day as a fair
+wind blew for Corfu, Doria spread sail and retired from the gulf,
+while Barbarossa, roaring with laughter, called on his men to witness
+the cowardice of this Christian admiral.
+
+The victory lay with Barbarossa. With a greatly inferior force
+he had challenged Doria and attacked. Doria had not only declined
+the challenge but fled back to Corfu. No wonder the Sultan ordered
+the cities of his domain to be illuminated. Barbarossa's prizes
+included two galleys and five nefs, but he, too, had failed in
+an inexplicable fashion in drawing off from the assault on the
+_Galleon of Venice_ at the end of the day's fighting. It is with
+her, with the gallant Condalmiero and his men, that all the honor of
+the day belongs. Nothing in the adventurous 16th century surpasses
+their splendid, disciplined valor on this occasion.
+
+The astonishing powers of resistance and the deadly effect of the
+broadsides of the _Galleon of Venice_ displayed in a long and successful
+fight against an entire fleet of galleys should have had the effect
+of making a revolution in naval architecture fifty years before
+that change actually occurred. But men of war of those days were
+built after the models of Venetian architects, and the latter clung
+doggedly to the galley. They overlooked the great defensive and
+offensive powers of the galleon displayed in this story and saw
+only the fact that she was becalmed and unable to move.
+
+Doria's failure left conditions in the Mediterranean as bad as
+ever. Barbarossa died at the age of ninety, but one of the last
+acts of his life was to ransom a follower of his, Dragut, Pasha
+of Tripoli, who had served under him at Prevesa and, having been
+captured two years later, served four years as a galley slave on
+the ship of Gian Andrea Doria, the grandnephew and heir of Andrea
+Doria. Dragut soon assumed the leadership laid down by Barbarossa,
+his master, fighting first the elder Doria and then his namesake
+with great skill and audacity. For years the Knights of Malta had
+been a thorn in the side of the Moslems who roamed the sea, and
+in 1565 a gigantic effort was made by the Sultan, together with
+his tributaries from the Barbary states, to wipe out this naval
+stronghold. The siege that followed was distinguished by the most
+reckless courage and the most desperate fighting on both sides. It
+extended from May 18 to September 8, costing the Christians 8000
+and the Moslems 30,000 lives. In the midst of the siege Dragut
+himself was slain, and the conduct of the siege fell into less
+capable hands. Finally the Turks withdrew.
+
+The death of Soliman the Magnificent, in 1566, brought to the head
+of the Turkish state a ruler known by the significant name, Selim
+the Drunkard. Weak and debauched as he was, nevertheless he aspired
+to add to the Turkish dominions as his father had done. Accordingly,
+he informed Venice that she must evacuate Cyprus. Previous to this
+time Venice had succeeded, by means of heavy bribes to the Sultan's
+ministers, in keeping her hold on this important island, but this
+policy only tempted further arrogance on the part of the Turk.
+Further, the time was propitious for such a stroke because Venice
+was impoverished by bad harvests and the loss of her naval arsenal
+by fire, Spain was occupied in troubles with the Moors, and France,
+torn with civil war, wanted to keep peace with the Sultan at any
+price. During the terrible siege of Malta Venice had remained neutral;
+now that the danger came home to her she cried for help, and not
+unnaturally there were those who sneered at her in this crisis
+and bade her save herself.
+
+The Pope, however, had long been anxious to organize a league of
+Christian peoples to win back the Mediterranean to the Cross and draw
+a line beyond which the Crescent should never pass. In this plight
+of Venice he saw an opportunity, because hitherto the persistent
+neutrality or the unwillingness of the Venetians to fight the Turk to
+the finish had been one of the chief obstacles to concerted action.
+He therefore pledged his own resources to Venice and attempted
+to collect allies by the appeal to the Cross. The results were
+discouraging, but a force of Spanish, Papal, and Venetian galleys
+was finally collected and after endless delays dispatched to the
+scene in the summer of 1570.
+
+Meanwhile the Turks had been pressing their attack on Cyprus and
+were besieging the city of Nicosia. If the Christians had been
+moved by any united spirit they could have relieved Nicosia and
+struck a heavy blow at the Turkish fleet, which lay unready and
+stripped of its men in the harbor. But Gian Doria, who inherited
+from his great uncle his great dislike of Venetians, and who probably
+had secret instructions from his master, Philip II, to help as
+little as possible, succeeded in blocking any vigorous move on the
+part of the other commanders. Finally, after a heated quarrel, he
+sailed back to Sicily with his entire fleet, and the rest followed.
+The allies had gone no nearer Cyprus than the port of Suda in Crete.
+The whole expedition, therefore, came to nothing.
+
+In September Nicosia fell to the Turk, who then turned to the conquest
+of Famagusta, the last stronghold of the Venetians on the island.
+Bragadino, the commander of the besieged forces, fought against
+desperate odds with a courage and skill worthy of the best traditions
+of his native city, hoping to repulse the Turks until help could
+arrive. But Doria's defection in 1570 decided the fate of the city
+the following year. After fifty-five days of siege, with no resources
+left, Bragadino was compelled, on August 4, 1571, to accept an offer
+of surrender on honorable terms. The Turkish commander, enraged
+at the loss of 50,000 men, which Bragadino's stubborn defense had
+cost, no sooner had the Venetians in his power than he massacred
+officers and men and flayed their commander alive. This news did
+not reach the Christians, however, until their second expedition
+was almost at grips with the Turks at Lepanto.
+
+_The Campaign of Lepanto_
+
+Undismayed by the failure of his first attempt, Pope Pius had
+immediately gone to work to reorganize his Holy League. He had
+to overcome the mutual hatred and mistrust that lay between Spain
+and Venice, aggravated by the recent conduct of Doria, but neither
+the Pope nor Venice could do without the help of Spain. There was
+much bickering between the envoys in the Papal chambers, and it
+was not till February, 1571, that the terms of the new enterprise
+were agreed upon. By this contract no one of the powers represented
+was to make a separate peace with the Porte. The costs were divided
+into six parts, of which Spain undertook three, Venice, two, and
+the Pope, one. Don Juan, the illegitimate brother of Philip II, was
+to be commander in chief. Although only twenty-four, this prince
+had won a military reputation in suppressing the Moorish rebellion
+in Spain, and, having been recognized by Philip as a half brother,
+he had a princely rank that would subordinate the claims of all the
+rival admirals. Finally, the rendezvous was appointed at Messina.
+
+The aged Venetian admiral, Veniero, had been compelled by the situation
+in the east to divide his force into two parts, one at Crete, and
+the other under himself at Corfu. By the time he received orders
+to proceed to the rendezvous, he learned that Ali, the corsair
+king of Algiers, known better by his nickname of "Uluch" Ali, was
+operating at the mouth of the Adriatic with a large force. To reach
+Messina with his divided fleet, Veniero ran the risk of being caught
+by Ali and destroyed in detail, but the situation was so critical
+that he took the risk and succeeded in slipping past the corsair
+undiscovered. In permitting this escape, and in fact in allowing
+all the other units of the Christian fleet to assemble at Messina,
+Ali missed a golden opportunity to destroy the whole force before
+it ever collected. Instead, he continued his ravages on the coasts
+of the Adriatic, bent only on plunder. He carried his raids almost
+to the lagoons of Venice itself, and indeed might have attacked
+the city had he not been hampered by a shortage of men.
+
+Although the Turks were having their own way, unopposed, and the
+situation was growing daily more critical, the Christian fleet was
+slow in assembling. For a whole month Veniero waited in Messina
+for the arrival of Don Juan and the Spanish squadrons. Philip,
+apparently, used one pretext after another to delay the prince,
+and once on his way Don Juan had to tarry at every stage of the
+journey to witness ceremonial fetes held in his honor. Philip acted
+in good faith as far as his preparations went, but he wanted to
+save his galleys for use against the Moors of the Barbary coast,
+which was nearer the ports of Spain, and was indifferent to the
+outcome of the quarrel between Venice and the Porte. Undoubtedly
+Doria and the other Spanish officers were fully informed of their
+royal master's desires in this expedition as in the one of the
+year before. They were to avoid battle if they could.
+
+On August 25 Don Juan arrived at Messina and was joyously received
+by the city and the fleet. Nevertheless, it was the 12th of September
+before the decision was finally reached to seek out the Turkish
+fleet and offer battle. Fortunately Don Juan was a high-spirited
+youth who shared none of his brother's half-heartedness; he went
+to work to organize the discordant elements under his command into
+as much of a unit as he could, and to imbue them with the idea of
+aggressive action. In this spirit he was seconded by thousands
+of young nobles and soldiers of fortune from Spain and Italy, who
+had flocked to his standard like the knight errants of the age of
+chivalry, burning to distinguish themselves against the infidel.
+Among these, oddly enough, was a young Spaniard, Cervantes, who
+was destined in later years to laugh chivalry out of Europe by
+his immortal "Don Quixote."
+
+In order to knit together the three elements, Spanish, Venetian,
+and Papal, Don Juan so distributed their forces that no single
+squadron could claim to belong to any one nation. As the Venetian
+galleys lacked men, he put aboard them Spanish and Italian infantry.
+Before leaving Messina, he had given every commander written
+instructions as to his cruising station and his place in the battle
+line. The fighting formation was to consist of three squadrons of
+the line and one of reserve. The left wing was to be commanded
+by the Venetian Barbarigo; the center, by Don Juan himself, in the
+flagship _Real_, with Colonna, the Papal commander on his right and
+Veniero, the Venetian commander, on his left, in their respective
+flagships. The right wing was intrusted to Doria, and the reserve,
+amounting to about thirty galleys, was under the Spaniard, Santa
+Cruz. In front of each squadron of the line two Venetian galleasses
+were to take station in order to break up the formation of the
+Turkish advance. The total fighting force consisted of 202 galleys,
+six galleasses, and 28,000 infantrymen besides sailors and oarsmen.
+
+The Venetian galleasses deserve special mention because they attracted
+considerable attention by the part they subsequently played in
+the action. Sometimes the word was applied to any specially large
+galley, but these represented something different from anything
+in either Christian or Turkish fleets. They were an attempt to
+reach a combination of galleon and galley, possessing the bulk,
+strength, and heavy armament of the former, together with the oar
+propulsion of the latter to render them independent of the wind.
+But like most, if not all, compromise types, the galleass was
+short-lived. It was clumsy and slow, being neither one thing nor
+the other. Most of the time on the cruise these galleasses had
+to be towed in order to keep up with the rest of the fleet. It
+is interesting to note that, despite the example of the _Galleon
+of Venice_ at Prevesa, there was not a single galleon in the whole
+force.
+
+On September 16 the start from Messina was made. The fleet crossed
+to the opposite shore of the Adriatic, creeping along the coast and
+in the lee of the islands after the manner of oar driven vessels
+that were unable to face a fresh breeze or a moderate sea. Delayed
+by unfavorable winds, it was not till October 6 that it arrived
+at the group of rocky islets lying just north of the opening of
+the Gulf of Corinth, or Lepanto[1] where the Turkish fleet was
+known to be mobilized. Meanwhile trouble had broken out among the
+Christians. Serious fighting had taken place between Venetians and
+Spaniards, and Veniero, without referring the case to Don Juan,
+had hanged a Spanish soldier who had been impudent to him, thus
+enraging the commander in chief. In a word, the various elements
+were nearly at the point of fighting each other before the object
+of their crusade was even sighted.
+
+[Footnote 1: Lepanto is the modern name of Naupaktis, the naval
+base of Athens in the gulf. It had been a Venetian stronghold,
+but fell to the Turks in 1499. The name Lepanto is given to both
+the town and the gulf.]
+
+At dawn of the 7th the lookout on the _Real_ sighted the van of
+the Turkish fleet coming out to the attack, and this news had a
+salutary effect. Don Juan called a council of war, silenced those
+like Doria who still counseled avoiding battle, and then in a swift
+sailing vessel went through the fleet exhorting officers and men
+to do their utmost. The sacrament was then administered to all,
+the galley slaves freed from their chains, and the standard of
+the Holy League, the figure of the Crucified Savior, was raised
+to the truck of the flagship.
+
+As the Christians streamed down from the straits to meet their
+enemy, they faced a serious peril. The Turks were advancing in
+full array aided by a wind at their backs; the same wind naturally
+was against the Christians, who had to toil at their oars with great
+labor to make headway. If the wind held there was every prospect
+that the Turks would be able to fall upon their enemy before Don
+Juan could form his line of battle. Fortunately, toward noon the
+wind shifted so as to help the Christians and retard the Turks.
+This shift just enabled most of the squadrons to fall into their
+appointed stations before the collision. Two of the galleasses,
+however, were not able to reach their posts in advance of the right
+wing before the melee began, and the right wing itself, though it
+had ample time to take position, kept on its course to the south,
+leaving the rest of the fleet behind. To Turk and Christian alike
+this move on the part of Doria meant treachery, for which Doria's
+previous conduct gave ample color, but there was no time to draw
+back or reorganize the line.
+
+The Turkish force, numbering 222 galleys, swept on to the attack,
+also in three divisions, stretched out in a wide crescent. The
+commander in chief, Ali Pasha, led the center, his right was commanded
+by Sirocco, the Viceroy of Egypt, and his left by "Uluch" Ali. This
+arrangement should have brought Ali, the greatest of the Moslem
+seafighters of his day, face to face with Doria, the most celebrated
+admiral in Christendom. The two opposing lines swung together with a
+furious plying of oars and a tumult of shouting. The four galleasses
+stationed well in front of the Christian battle line opened an
+effective fire at close quarters on the foremost Turkish galleys
+as they swept past. In trying to avoid the heavy artillery of these
+floating fortresses, the Turks fell into confusion, losing their
+battle array almost at the very moment of contact, and masking
+the fire of many of their ships. This was an important service
+to the credit of the galleasses, but as they were too unwieldy to
+maneuver readily they seem to have taken no further part in the
+action.
+
+The first contact took place about noon between Barbarigo's and
+Sirocco's squadrons. The Venetian had planned to rest his left
+flank so close to the shore as to prevent the Turks from enveloping
+it, but Sirocco, who knew the depth of water better, was able to
+pour a stream of galleys between the end of Barbarigo's line and
+the coast so that the Christians at this point found themselves
+attacked in front and rear. For a while it looked as if the Turks
+would win, but the Christians fought with the courage of despair.
+There was no semblance of line left; only a melee of ships laid
+so close to each other as to form almost a continuous platform
+over which the fighting raged hand to hand. Both the leaders fell.
+Barbarigo was mortally wounded, and Sirocco was killed when his
+flagship was stormed. The loss of the Egyptian flagship and commander
+seemed to decide the struggle at this point. The Christian slaves,
+freed from the rowers' benches, were supplied with arms and joined
+in the fighting with the fury of vengeance on their masters. A
+backward movement set in among the Turkish ships; then many headed
+for the shore to escape.
+
+Meanwhile, shortly after the Christian left had been engaged the
+two centers crashed together. Such was the force of the impact
+that the beak of Ali Pasha's galley drove as far as the fourth
+rowing bench of the _Real_. Instantly a fury of battle burst forth
+around the opposing flagships. Attack and counter attack between
+Spanish infantry and Turkish Janissaries swayed back and forth
+across from one galley to another amid a terrific uproar. Once
+the _Real_ was nearly taken, but Colonna jammed the bows of his
+galley alongside and saved the situation by a counter attack. On
+the other side of the flagship Veniero was also at one time in
+grave peril but was saved by the timely assistance of his comrades.
+Though wounded in the leg, this veteran of seventy fought throughout
+the action as stoutly as the youngest soldier.
+
+The prompt action of Colonna turned the tide in the center, for
+after clearing the Turks from the deck of the _Real_, the Christians,
+now reenforced, made a supreme effort that swept the length of
+Ali Pasha's galley and left the Turkish commander in chief among
+the slain. In fighting of this character no quarter was given;
+of the 400 men on the Turkish flagship not one was spared. Don
+Juan immediately hoisted the banner of the League to the masthead
+of the captured ship. This sign of victory broke the spirit of
+the Turks and nerved the Christians to redoubled efforts. As on
+the left wing so in the center the offensive now passed to the
+allies. Thus after two hours' fighting the Turks were already beaten
+on left and center, though fighting still went on hotly in tangled
+and scattered groups of ships.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF LEPANTO, OCT. 7. 1571
+
+Formation of the two fleets just before contact, about 11 a. m.]
+
+On the Christian right, however, the situation was different. Doria
+had from the beginning left the right center "in the air" by sailing
+away to the south. He explained this singular conduct afterwards by
+saying that he noticed Ali moving seaward as if to try an enveloping
+movement round the Christians' southern flank, and therefore moved
+to head him off. However plausible this may be, the explanation did
+not satisfy Doria's captains, who obeyed his signals with indignant
+rage. At all events Ali had a considerably larger force than Doria,
+and after the latter had drawn away so far as to create a wide
+gap between his own squadron and the center, Ali suddenly swung
+his galleys about in line and fell upon the exposed flank, leaving
+Doria too far away to interfere. The Algerian singled out a detached
+group of about fifteen galleys, among which was the flagship of
+the Knights of Malta. No Christian flag was so hated as the banner
+of this Order, and the Turks fell upon these ships with shouts
+of triumph. One after another was taken and it began to look as
+if Ali would soon roll up the entire flank and pluck victory from
+defeat.
+
+But Santa Cruz, who was still laboring through the straits when
+the battle began, was now in a position to help. After an hour's
+fighting with all the advantage on Ali's side, Santa Cruz arrived
+with his reserve squadron and turned the scale. By this time, too,
+Doria managed to reach the scene with a part of his squadron. Thus
+Ali found himself outnumbered and in danger of capture. Signaling
+retreat, he collected a number of his galleys and, boldly steering
+through the field of battle, escaped to lay at the feet of the
+Sultan the captured flag of the Knights of Malta. Some thirty-five
+others of his force made their way safely back to Lepanto.
+
+The fighting did not end till evening. By that time the Christians
+had taken 117 galleys and 20 galliots, and sunk or burnt some fifty
+other ships of various sorts. Ten thousand Turks were captured and
+many thousands of Christian slaves rescued. The Christians lost
+7500 men; the Turks, about 30,000. It was an overwhelming victory.
+
+As far as the tactics go, Lepanto was, like Salamis, an infantry
+battle on floating platforms. It was fought and won by the picked
+infantrymen of Spain and Italy; the day of seamanship had not yet
+arrived. For the conduct of the most distinguished admiral on the
+Christian side, Gian Andrea Doria, little justification can be
+found. Even if we accept his excuse at its face value, the event
+proved his folly. It is strange that in this, the supreme victory
+of the Cross over the Crescent on the sea, a Doria should have
+tarnished his reputation so foully, even as his great-uncle Andrea
+had tarnished his in the battle of Prevesa. It seems as if in both, as
+Genoese, the hatred of Venice extinguished every other consideration
+of loyalty to Christendom.
+
+What were the consequences of Lepanto, and in what sense can it
+be called a decisive battle? The question at first seems baffling.
+Overwhelming as was the defeat of the Turks, Ali had another fleet
+ready the next spring and was soon ravaging the seas again. Twice
+there came an opportunity for the two fleets to meet for another
+battle, but Ali declined the challenge. After Lepanto he seemed
+unwilling, without a great superiority, to risk another close action
+and contented himself with a "fleet in being." In this new attitude
+toward the Christians lies the hint to the answer. The significance
+of Lepanto lies in its moral effect. Never before had the Turkish
+fleet been so decisively beaten in a pitched battle. The fame of
+Lepanto rang through Europe and broke the legend of Turkish
+invincibility on the sea.
+
+The material results, it must be admitted, were worse than nothing
+at the time. In 1573 Don Juan was amazed and infuriated to learn
+that Venice, contrary to the terms of the Holy League, had secretly
+arranged a separate peace with the Sultan. The terms she accepted
+were those of a beaten combatant. Venice agreed to the loss of
+Cyprus, paid an indemnity of 300,000 ducats, trebled her tribute
+for the use of Zante as a trading post, and restored to the Turk
+all captures made on the Albanian and Dalmatian coast. Apparently
+the Venetian had to have his trade at any price, including honor.
+At this news Don Juan tore down the standard of the allies and
+raised the flag of Castile and Aragon. In two years and after a
+brilliant victory, the eternal Holy League, which was pledged to
+last forever, fell in pieces.
+
+As for Venice, her ignoble policy brought her little benefit. She
+steadily declined thereafter as a commercial and naval power. Her
+old markets were in the grip of the Turk, and the new discoveries of
+ocean routes to the east--beyond the reach of the Moslem,--diverted
+the course of trade away from the Mediterranean, which became,
+more and more, a mere backwater of the world's commerce. In fact,
+it was not until the cutting of the Suez Canal that the inland
+sea regained its old time importance.
+
+In the long unsuccessful struggle of Christian against the Turk
+Venice must bear the chief blame, for she had the means and the
+opportunity to conquer if she had chosen the better part. And yet
+the story of this chapter shows also that the rest of Christendom
+was not blameless. If Christians in the much extolled Age of Faith
+had shown as much unity of spirit as the Infidels, the rule of the
+Turk would not have paralyzed Greece, the Balkans, the islands of
+the AEgean, and the coasts of Asia Minor for nearly five centuries.
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+LA GUERRE DE CHYPRE ET LA BATAILLE DE LePANTE, J. P. Jurien de
+  la Graviere, 1888.
+By the same author, DORIA ET BARBEROUSSE, 1886.
+HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE SECOND (vol. III.), W. H.
+  Prescott, 1858.
+SEA WOLVES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, E. Hamilton Currey. This
+  contains a full bibliography.
+THE NAVY OF VENICE, Alethea Wiel, 1910.
+THE EASTERN QUESTION (chap. V.), J. A. R. Marriott, 1917.
+BARBARY CORSAIRS, Story of the Nations Series, Lane-Poole, 1890.
+DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY (Introduction), J. S. Corbett, 1898.
+GEOGRAPHY AND WORLD POWER, James Fairgrieve, 1917.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+OPENING THE OCEAN ROUTES
+
+1. PORTUGAL AND THE NEW ROUTE TO INDIA
+
+From the days of the Phoenicians to the close of the 15th century,
+all trade between Europe and Asia crossed the land barrier east of
+the Mediterranean. Delivered by Mohammedan vessels at the head of
+the Persian Gulf or the ports of the Red Sea, merchandise followed
+thence the caravan routes across Arabia or Egypt to the Mediterranean,
+quadrupling in value in the transit. Intercourse between East and
+West, active under the Romans, was again stimulated by the crusades
+and by Venetian traders, until in the 14th and the 15th centuries
+the dyes, spices, perfumes, cottons, muslins, silks, and jewels
+of the Orient were in demand throughout the western world. This
+assurance of a ready market and large profits, combined with the
+capture of Constantinople by the Turks (1453), their piratical
+attacks in the Mediterranean which continued unchecked until Lepanto,
+and their final barring of all trade routes through the Levant,
+revived among nations of western Europe the old legends of all-water
+routes to Asia, either around Africa or directly westward across
+the unknown sea.
+
+With the opening of ocean routes and the discovery of America,
+a rivalry in world trade and colonial expansion set in which has
+continued increasingly down to the present time, forming a dominant
+element in the foreign policies of maritime nations and a primary
+motive for the possession and use of navies. The development of
+overseas trade, involving the factors of merchant shipping, navies,
+and control of the seas, is thus an integral part of the history
+of sea power. The great voyages of discovery are also not to be
+disregarded, supplying as they did the basis for colonial claims,
+and illustrating at the same time the progress of nautical science
+and geographical knowledge.
+
+[Illustration: CROSS-STAFF]
+
+The art of navigation, though still crude, had by the 15th century
+so advanced that the sailor was no longer compelled to skirt the
+shore, with only rare ventures across open stretches of sea. The
+use of the compass, originating in China, had been learned from the
+Arabs by the crusaders, and is first mentioned in Europe towards
+the close of the 12th century. An Italian in England, describing a
+visit to the philosopher Roger Bacon in 1258, writes as follows:
+"Among other things he showed me an ugly black stone called a magnet
+... upon which, if a needle be rubbed and afterward fastened to
+a straw so that it shall float upon the water, the needle will
+instantly turn toward the pole-star; though the night be never so
+dark, yet shall the mariner be able by the help of this needle to
+steer his course aright. But no master-mariner," he adds, "dares
+to use it lest he should fall under the imputation of being a
+magician."[1] By the end of the 13th century the compass was coming
+into general use; and when Columbus sailed he had an instrument
+divided as in later times into 360 degrees and 32 points, as well as
+a quadrant, sea-astrolabe, and other nautical devices. The astrolabe,
+an instrument for determining latitude by measuring the altitude of
+the sun or other heavenly body, was suspended from the finger by a
+ring and held upright at noon till the shadow of the sun passed the
+sights. The cross-staff, more frequently used for the same purpose
+by sailors of the time, was a simpler affair less affected by the
+ship's roll; it was held with the lower end of the cross-piece
+level with the horizon and the upper adjusted to a point on a line
+between the eye of the observer and the sun at the zenith. By these
+various means the sailor could steer a fixed course and determine
+latitude. He had, however, as yet no trustworthy means of reckoning
+longitude and no accurate gauge of distance traveled. The log-line
+was not invented until the 17th century, and accurate chronometers
+for determining longitude did not come into use until still later.
+A common practice of navigators, adopted by Columbus, was to steer
+first north or south along the coast and then due west on the parallel
+thought to lead to the destination sought.
+
+[Footnote 1: Dante's tutor Brunetto Latini, quoted in THE DISCOVERY
+OF AMERICA, Fiske, Vol. I, p. 314.]
+
+[Illustration: THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WORLD IN 1450, SHOWING THE
+VOYAGES OF COLUMBUS, VASCO DE GAMA, MAGELLAN, AND DRAKE]
+
+With the revival of classical learning in the Renaissance, geographical
+theories also became less wildly imaginative than in the medieval
+period, the charts of which, though beautifully colored and highly
+decorated with fauna and flora, show no such accurate knowledge
+even of the old world as do those of the great geographer Ptolemy,
+who lived a thousand years before. Ptolemy (200 A.D.), in company
+with the majority of learned men since Aristotle, had declared
+the earth to be round and had even estimated its circumference
+with substantial accuracy, though he had misled later students
+by picturing the Indian Ocean as completely surrounded by Africa,
+which he conceived to extend indefinitely southward and join Asia
+on the southeast, leaving no sea-route open from the Atlantic. There
+was another body of opinion of long standing, however, which outlined
+Africa much as it actually is. Friar Roger Bacon, whose interest
+in the compass has already been mentioned, collected statements of
+classical authorities and other evidence to show that Asia could
+be reached by sailing directly westward, and that the distance was
+not great; and this material was published in Paris in a popular
+_Imago Mundi_ of 1410. In general, the best geographical knowledge
+of the period, though it underestimated the distance from Europe
+westward to Asia and was completely ignorant of the vast continents
+lying between, gave support to the theories which the voyages of
+Diaz, Vasco da Gama, and Columbus magnificently proved true.
+
+When the best sailors of the time were Italians, and when astronomical
+and other scientific knowledge of use in navigation was largely
+monopolized by Arabs and Jews, it seems strange that the isolated
+and hitherto insignificant country of Portugal should have taken,
+and for a century or more maintained primacy in the great epoch
+of geographical discovery. The fact is explained, not so much by
+her proximity to the African coast and the outlying islands in the
+Atlantic, as by the energetic and well-directed patronage which
+Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460) extended to voyages of
+exploration and to the development of every branch of nautical
+art. The third son of John the Great of Portugal, and a nephew on
+his mother's side of Henry IV of England, the prince in 1415 led
+an armada to the capture of Ceuta from the Moors, and thereafter,
+as governor of the conquered territory and of the southern province
+of Portugal, settled at Saigres near Cape St. Vincent. On this
+promontory, almost at the western verge of the known world, Henry
+founded a city, Villa do Iffante, erected an observatory on the
+cliff, and gathered round him the best sailors, geographers and
+astronomers of his age.
+
+[Illustration: PORTUGUESE VOYAGES AND POSSESSIONS]
+
+Under this intelligent stimulus, Portuguese navigators within a
+century rounded the Cape of Good Hope, opened the sea route to
+the Indies, discovered Brazil, circumnavigated the globe, and made
+Portugal the richest nation in Europe, with a great colonial empire
+and claims to dominion over half the seas of the world. Portuguese
+ships carried her flag from Labrador (which reveals its discoverers
+in its name) and Nova Zembla to the Malay Archipelago and Japan.
+
+It is characteristic of the crusading spirit of the age that Prince
+Henry's first ventures down the African coast were in pursuance of
+a vague plan to ascend one of the African rivers and unite with
+the legendary Christian monarch Prester John (Presbyter or Bishop
+John, whose realm was then supposed to be located in Abyssinia) in
+a campaign against the Turk. But crusading zeal changed to dreams
+of wealth when his ships returned from the Senegal coast between
+1440 and 1445 with elephants' tusks, gold, and negro slaves. The
+Gold Coast was already reached; the fabled dangers of equatorial
+waters--serpent rocks, whirlpools, liquid sun's rays and boiling
+rivers--were soon proved unreal; and before 1480 the coast well
+beyond the Congo was known.
+
+The continental limits of Africa to southward, long clearly surmised,
+were verified by the voyage of Bartolomeo Diaz, in 1487. Diaz rounded
+the cape, sailed northward some 200 miles, and then, troubled by
+food shortage and heavy weather, turned backward. But he had blazed
+the trail. The cape he called _Tormentoso_ (tempestuous) was renamed
+by his sovereign, Joao II, Cape _Bon Esperanto_--the Cape of Goad
+Hope. The Florentine professor Politian wrote to congratulate the
+king upon opening to Christianity "new lands, new seas, new worlds,
+dragged from secular darkness into the light of day."
+
+It was not until ten years later that Vasco da Gama set out to
+complete the work of Diaz and establish contact between east and
+west. The contour of the African coast was now so well understood
+and the art of navigation so advanced that Vasco could steer a
+direct course across the open sea from the Cape Verde Islands to
+the southern extremity of Africa, a distance of 3770 miles (more
+than a thousand miles greater than that of Columbus' voyage from
+the Canaries to the Bahamas), which he covered in one hundred days.
+After touching at Mozambique, he caught the steady monsoon winds
+for Calicut, on the western coast of the peninsula of India, then a
+great _entrepot_ where Mohammedan and Chinese fleets met each year
+to exchange wares. Thwarted here by the intrigues of Mohammedan
+traders, who were quick to realize the danger threatening their
+commercial monopoly, he moved on to Cannanore, a port further north
+along the coast, took cargo, and set sail for home, reaching the
+Azores in August of 1499, with 55 of his original complement of
+148 men. They came back, in the picturesque words of the Admiral,
+"With the pumps in their hands and the Virgin Mary in their mouths,"
+completing a total voyage of 13,000 miles. The profits are said
+to have been sixty-fold.
+
+The ease with which in the next two decades Portugal extended and
+consolidated her conquest of eastern trade is readily accounted
+for. She was dependent indeed solely upon sea communications, over
+a distance so great as to make the task seem almost impossible.
+But the craft of the east were frail in construction and built for
+commerce rather than for warfare. The Chinese junks that came to
+India are described as immense in size, with large cabins for the
+officers and their families, vegetable gardens growing on board,
+and crews of as many as a thousand men; but they had sails of matted
+reed that could not be lowered, and their timbers were loosely
+fastened together with pegs and withes. The Arab ships, according
+to Marco Polo, were also built without the use of nails. Like the
+Portuguese themselves, the Arab or Mohammedan merchants belonged
+to a race of alien invaders, little liked by the native princes
+who retained petty sovereignties along the coast. But the real
+secret of Portuguese success lay in the fact that their rivals were
+traders rather than fighters, who had enjoyed a peaceful monopoly for
+centuries, and who could expect little aid from their own countries
+harassed by the Turk. The Portuguese on the other hand inherited
+the traditions of Mediterranean seamanship and warfare, and, above
+all, were engaged in a great national enterprise, led by the best
+men in the land, with enthusiastic government support.
+
+After Vasco's return, fleets were sent out each year, to open the
+Indian ports by either force or diplomacy, destroy Moslem merchant
+vessels, and establish factories and garrisons. In 1505 Francisco de
+Almeida set sail with the largest fleet as yet fitted out (sixteen
+ships and sixteen caravels), an appointment as Viceroy of Cochin,
+Cannanore, and Quilon, and supreme authority from the Cape to the
+Malay Peninsula. Almeida in the next four years defeated the Mohammedan
+traders, who with the aid of Egypt had by this time organized to
+protect themselves, in a series of naval engagements, culminating
+on February 3, 1509, in the decisive battle of Diu.
+
+Mir Hussain, Admiral of the Gran Soldan of Egypt and commander in
+chief of the Mohammedan fleet in this battle, anchored his main
+force of more than a hundred ships in the mouth of the channel
+between the island of Diu and the mainland, designing to fall back
+before the Portuguese attack towards the island, where he could
+secure the aid of shore batteries and a swarm of 300 or more foists
+and other small craft in the harbor. Almeida had only 19 ships
+and 1300 men, but against his vigorous attack the flimsy vessels
+of the east were of little value. The battle was fought at close
+quarters in the old Mediterranean style, with saber, cutlass, and
+culverin; ramming, grappling, and boarding. Before nightfall Almeida
+had won. This victory ensured Portugal's commercial control in
+the eastern seas.
+
+Alfonso d'Albuquerque, greatest of the Portuguese conquistadores,
+succeeded Almeida in 1509. Establishing headquarters in a central
+position at Goa, he sent a fleet eastward to Malacca, where he set
+up a fort and factory, and later fitted out expeditions against
+Ormuz and Aden, the two strongholds protecting respectively the
+entrances to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The attack on Aden
+failed, but Ormuz fell in 1515. Albuquerque died in the same year
+and was buried in his capital at Goa. His successor opened trade and
+founded factories in Ceylon. In 1526 a trading post was established
+at Hugli, near the mouth of the Ganges. Ormuz became a center for
+the Persian trade, Malacca for trade with Java, Sumatra, and the
+Spice Islands. A Portuguese envoy, Fernam de Andrada, reached Canton
+in 1517--in the first European ship to enter Chinese waters--and
+Pekin three years later. Another adventurer named Mendez Pinto spent
+years in China and in 1548 established a factory near Yokohama,
+Japan. Brazil, where a squadron under Cabral had touched as early
+as 1502, was by 1550 a prosperous colony, and in later centuries
+a chief source of wealth. Mozambique, Mombassa, and Malindi, on
+the southeastern coast of Africa, were taken and fortified as
+intermediate bases to protect the route to Asia. The muslins of
+Bengal, the calicoes of Calicut, the spices from the islands, the
+pepper of Malabar, the teas and silks of China and Japan, now found
+their way by direct ocean passage to the Lisbon quays.
+
+A few strips along the African coast, tenuously held by sufferance
+of the great powers, and bits of territory at Goa, Daman, and Diu
+in India, are the twentieth century remnants of Portugal's colonial
+empire. The greater part of it fell away between 1580 and 1640, when
+Portugal was under Spanish rule. But her own system of colonial
+administration, or rather exploitation, was if possible worse than
+Spain's. Her scanty resources of man power were exhausted in colonial
+warfare. The expulsion of Protestants and Jews deprived her of
+elements in her population that might have known how to utilize
+wealth from the colonies to build up home trade and industries.
+Her situation was too distant from the European markets; and the
+raw materials landed at Lisbon were transshipped in Dutch bottoms
+for Amsterdam and Antwerp, which became the true centers of
+manufacturing and exchange. Cervantes, in 1607, could still speak
+of Lisbon as the greatest city in Europe,[1] but her greatness was
+already decaying; and her fate was sealed when Philip of Spain
+closed her ports to Dutch shipping, and Dutch ships themselves
+set sail for the east.
+
+[Footnote 1: PERSILES AND SIGISMUDA, III, i.]
+
+But the period of Portugal's maritime ascendancy cannot be left
+without recording, even if in barest outline, the circumnavigation
+of the globe by Fernao da Magalhaes, or Magellan, who, though he
+made this last voyage of his under the Spanish flag, was Portuguese
+by birth and had proved his courage and iron resolution under Almeida
+and Albuquerque in Portugal's eastern campaigns. Seeking a westward
+passage to the Spice Islands, the five vessels of 75 to 100 tons
+composing his squadron cleared the mouth of the Guadalquivir on
+September 20, 1519. They established winter quarters in the last
+of March at Port St. Julian on the coast of Patagonia. Here, on
+Easter Sunday, three of his Spanish captains mutinied. Magellan
+promptly threw a boat's crew armed with cutlasses aboard one of
+the mutinous ships, killed the leader, and overcame the unruly
+element in the crew. The two other ships he forced to surrender
+within 24 hours. One of the guilty captains was beheaded and the
+other marooned on the coast when the expedition left in September.
+Five weeks were now spent in the labyrinths of the strait which has
+since borne the leader's name. "When the capitayne Magalianes,"
+so runs the contemporary English translation of the story of the
+voyage, "was past the strayght and sawe the way open to the other
+mayne sea, he was so gladde thereof that for joy the teares fell
+from his eyes."
+
+He had sworn he would go on if he had to eat the leather from the
+ships' yards. With three vessels--one had been shipwrecked in the
+preceding winter and the other deserted in the straits--they set out
+across the vast unknown expanse of the Pacific. "In three monethes
+and xx dayes they sailed foure thousande leagues in one goulfe
+by the sayde sea called Pacificum.... And havying in this tyme
+consumed all their bysket and other vyttayles, they fell into such
+necessitie that they were in forced to eate the pouder that remayned
+thereof being now full of woormes.... Theyre freshe water was also
+putryfyed and become yellow. They dyd eate skynnes and pieces of
+lether which were foulded about certeyne great ropes of the shyps."
+On March 6, 1521, they reached the Ladrones, and ten days later, the
+Philippines, even these islands having never before been visited by
+Europeans. Here the leader was killed in a conflict with the natives.
+One ship was now abandoned, and another was later captured by the
+Portuguese. Of the five ships that had left Spain with 280 men,
+a single vessel, "with tackle worn and weather-beaten yards," and 18
+gaunt survivors reached home. "It has not," writes the historian
+John Fiske of this voyage, "the unique historic position of the
+first voyage of Columbus, which brought together two streams of
+human life that had been disjoined since the glacial period. But
+as an achievement in ocean navigation that voyage of Columbus sinks
+into insignificance beside it.... When we consider the frailness
+of the ships, the immeasurable extent of the unknown, the mutinies
+that were prevented or quelled, and the hardships that were endured,
+we can have no hesitation in speaking of Magellan as the prince
+of navigators."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA, Vol. II, p. 210.]
+
+2. SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD
+
+It is generally taken for granted that the great movement of the
+Renaissance, which spread through western Europe in the 15th and
+the 16th centuries, quickening men's interest in the world about
+them rather than the world to come, and inspiring them with an
+eagerness and a confident belief in their own power to explore
+its hidden secrets, was among the forces which brought about the
+great geographical discoveries of the period. Its influence in
+this direction is evident enough in England and elsewhere later on;
+but, judging by the difficulties of Columbus in securing support,
+it was not in his time potent with those in control of government
+policy and government funds. The Italian navigator John Cabot and
+his son Sebastian made their voyages from England in 1498 and 1500
+with very feeble support from Henry VII, though it was upon their
+discoveries that England later based her American claims. Even in
+Spain there seems to have been little eagerness to emulate the
+methods by which her neighbor Portugal had so rapidly risen to
+wealth and power.
+
+But the influence of revived classical information on geographical
+matters was keenly felt; and the idea of a direct westerly passage
+to India was suggested, not only by Portugal's monopoly of the
+Cape route, but by classical authority, generally accepted by the
+best geographers of the time. The _Imago Mundi_ of 1410, already
+mentioned, embodying Roger Bacon's arguments that the Atlantic washed
+the shores of Asia and that the voyage thither was not long, was a
+book carefully studied by Columbus. Paul Toscanelli, a Florentine
+physicist and astronomer, adopting and developing this theory, sent
+in 1474 to Alfonso V of Portugal a map of the world in which he
+demonstrated the possibilities of the western route. The distance
+round the earth at the equator he estimated almost exactly to be
+24,780 statute miles, and in the latitude of Lisbon 19,500 miles;
+but he so exaggerated the extent of Europe and Asia as to reduce
+the distance between them by an Atlantic voyage to about 6500 miles,
+putting the east coast of China in about the longitude of Oregon.
+This distance he still further shortened by locating Cipango (Japan)
+far to the eastward of Asia, in about the latitude of the Canary
+Islands and distant from them only 3250 miles.
+
+With all these opinions Columbus was familiar, for the list of his
+library and the annotations still preserved in his own handwriting,
+show that he was not an ignorant sailor, nor yet a wild visionary,
+but prepared by closest study for the task to which he gave his
+later years. His earlier career, on the other hand, had supplied
+him with abundant practical knowledge. Born in Genoa, a mother
+city of great seamen, probably in the year 1436, he had received
+a fair education in Latin, geography, astronomy, drafting, and
+other subjects useful to the master-mariner of those days. He had
+sailed the Mediterranean, and prior to his great adventure, had
+been as far north as Iceland, and on many voyages down the African
+coast. Following his brother Bartholomew, who was a map-maker in
+the Portuguese service, he came about 1470 to Lisbon, even then a
+center of geographical knowledge and maritime activity. Probably
+as early as this time the idea of a western voyage was in his mind.
+
+Skepticism may account for Portugal's failure to listen to his
+proposals; and her interest was already centered in the route around
+Africa under her exclusive control. The tale of his years of search
+for assistance is well known. Indeed, while the fame of Columbus
+rests rightly enough upon his discovery of a new world, of whose
+existence he had never dreamed and which he never admitted in his
+lifetime, his greatness is best shown by his faith in his vision,
+and the steadfast energy and fortitude with which he pushed towards
+its practical accomplishment, during years of vain supplication, and
+amid the trials of the voyage itself. He had actually left Granada,
+when Isabella of Spain at last agreed to support his venture. In
+the contract later drawn up he drove a good bargain, contingent
+always upon success; he was to be admiral and viceroy of islands
+and continents discovered and their surrounding waters, with control
+of trading privileges and a tenth part of the wealth of all kinds
+derived.
+
+With the explorations of Columbus on his first and his three later
+voyages (in 1496, 1498, and 1502) we are less concerned than with
+the first voyage itself as an illustration of the problems and
+dangers faced by the navigator of the time, and with the effect of
+the discovery of the new world upon Spain's rise as a sea power.
+The three caravels in which he sailed were typical craft of the
+period. The _Santa Maria_, the largest, was like the other two, a
+single-decked, lateen-rigged, three-masted vessel, with a length
+of about 90 feet, beam of about 20 feet, and a maximum speed of
+perhaps 6-1/2 knots. She was of 100 tons burden and carried 52
+men. The _Pinta_ was somewhat smaller. The _Nina_ (Baby) was a
+tiny, half-decked vessel of 40 tons. Heavily timbered and seaworthy
+enough, the three caravels were short provisioned and manned in
+part from the rakings of the Palos jail.
+
+Leaving Palos August 3, 1492, Columbus went first to the Canaries,
+and thence turned his prow directly westward, believing that he
+was on the parallel that touched the northern end of Japan. By
+a reckoning even more optimistic than Toscanelli's, he estimated
+the distance thither to be only 2500 miles. Thence he would sail
+to Quinsay (Hang Chow), the ancient capital of China, and deliver
+the letter he carried to the Khan of Cathay. The northeast trade
+winds bore them steadily westward, raising in the minds of the
+already fear-stricken sailors the certainty that against these
+head winds they could never beat back. At last they entered the
+vast expanse of the Sargasso Sea, six times as large as France,
+where they lay for a week almost becalmed, amid tangled masses of
+floating seaweeds. To add to their perplexities, they had passed
+the line of no variation, and the needle now swung to the left of the
+pole-star instead of the right. On the last day of the outward voyage
+they were 2300 miles to the westward according to the information
+Columbus shared with his officers and men; according to his secret
+log they were 2700 miles from the Canaries, and well beyond the
+paint where he had expected to strike the islands of the Asiatic
+coast. The mutinous and panic-stricken spirit of his subordinates,
+the uncertainty of Columbus himself, turned to rejoicing when at
+2:00 A.M. of Friday, October 12, a sailor on the _Pinta_ sighted
+the little island of the Bahamas, which, since the time of the
+Vikings, was the first land sighted by white men in the new world.
+
+[Illustration: FLAGSHIP OF COLUMBUS]
+
+The three vessels cruised southward, in the belief, expressed by
+the name Indian which they gave the natives, that they were in
+the archipelago east of Asia. Skirting the northern coast of Cuba
+and Hayti, they sought for traces of gold, and information as to
+the way to the mainland. The _Santa Maria_ was wrecked on Christmas
+Day; the _Pinta_ became separated; Columbus returned in the
+little _Nina_, putting in first at the Tagus, and reaching Palos
+on March 15, 1493.
+
+Though his voyage gave no immediate prospect of immense profits,
+yet it was the general belief that he had reached Asia, and by a
+route three times as short as that by the Cape of Good Hope. The
+Spanish court celebrated his return with rejoicing. Appealing to
+the Pope, at this time the Spaniard Rodrigo Bargia, King Ferdinand
+lost no time in securing holy sanction for his gains. A Papal bull
+of May 3, 1493, conferred upon Spain title to all lands discovered
+or yet to be discovered in the western ocean. Another on the day
+following divided the claims of Spain and Portugal by a line running
+north and south "100 leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde
+Islands" (an obscure statement in view of the fact that the Cape
+Verdes lie considerably to the westward of the other group), and
+granted to Spain a monopoly of commerce in the waters "west and
+south" (again an obscure phrase) of this line, so that no other
+nation could trade without license from the power in control. This
+was the extraordinary Papal decree dividing the waters of the world.
+Small wander that the French king, Francis I, remarked that he
+refused to recognize the title of the claimants till they could
+produce the will of Father Adam, making them universal heirs; or
+that Elizabeth, when a century later England became interested
+in world trade, disputed a division contrary not only to common
+sense and treaties but to "the law of nations." The Papal decree,
+intended merely to settle the differences of the two Catholic states,
+gave rise to endless disputes and preposterous claims.
+
+The treaty of Tordesillas (1494) between Spain and Portugal fixed
+the line of demarcation more definitely, 370 miles west of the
+Cape Verde Islands, giving Portugal the Brazilian coast, and by
+an additional clause it made illegitimate trade a crime punishable
+by death. Another agreement in 1529 extended the line around to
+the Eastern Hemisphere, 17 degrees east of the Moluccas, which, if
+Spain had abided by it, would have excluded her from the Philippines.
+After Portugal fell under Spanish rule in 1580, Spain could claim
+dominion over all the southern seas.
+
+[Illustration: CHART OF A.D. 1589
+
+Showing Papal line of Demarcation]
+
+The enthusiasm and confident expectation with which Spain set out
+to exploit the discoveries of Columbus's first voyage changed to
+disappointment when subsequent explorations revealed lands of
+continental dimensions to be sure, but populated by ignorant savages,
+with no thoroughfare to the ancient civilization and wealth of
+the East, and no promise of a solid, lucrative commerce such as
+Portugal had gained. Mines were opened in the West Indies, but it
+was not until the conquest of Mexico by Cortez (1519-1521) laid open
+the accumulated wealth of seven centuries that Spain had definite
+assurance of the treasure which was to pour out of America in a
+steadily increasing stream. The first two vessels laden with Mexican
+treasure returned in 1523. Ten years later the exploration and
+conquest of Peru by Pizarro trebled the influx of silver and gold.
+The silver mines of Europe were abandoned. The Emperor Charles, as
+Francis I said, could fight his European campaigns on the wealth
+of the Indies alone.
+
+But between Spain and her "sinews of war" lay 3000 miles of ocean.
+To hold the colonies themselves, to guard the plate fleets against
+French, Dutch, and English raiders, to protect her own coastline
+and maintain communications with her possessions in Italy and the
+Low Countries, to wage war against the Turk in the Mediterranean,
+Spain felt the need of a navy. Indeed, in view of these varied
+motives for maritime strength, it is surprising that Spain depended
+so largely on impressed merchant vessels, and had made only the
+beginnings of a royal navy at the time of the Grand Armada.[1]
+Not primarily a nation of traders or sailors, she had, by grudging
+assistance to the greatest of sea explorers, fallen into a rich
+colonial empire, to secure and make the most of which called for
+sea power.
+
+[Footnote 1: "For the kings of England have for many years been
+at the charge to build and furnish a navy of powerful ships for
+their own defense, and for the wars only; whereas the French, the
+Spaniards, the Portugals, and the Hollanders (till of late) have
+had no proper fleet belonging to their princes or state." Sir Walter
+Raleigh, A DISCOURSE OF THE INVENTION OF SHIPS.]
+
+It is possible, however, to lay undue stress on the factor just
+mentioned in accounting for both the rise and the decay of Spain.
+Her ascendancy in Europe in the 16th century was due chiefly to
+the immense territories united with her under Charles the Fifth
+(1500-1558), who inherited Spain, Burgundy, and the Low Countries,
+and added Austria with her German and Italian provinces by his
+accession to the imperial throne. Under Charles's powerful leadership
+Spain became the greatest nation in Europe; but at the same time her
+resources in men and wealth were exhausted in the almost constant
+warfare of his long reign. The treasures of America flowed through
+the land like water, in the expressive figure of a German historian,
+"not fertilizing it but laying it waste, and leaving sharper dearth
+behind."[2] The revenues of the plate fleet were pledged to German
+or Genoese bankers even before they reached the country, and were
+expended in the purchase of foreign luxuries or in waging imperial
+wars, rather than in the encouragement of home agriculture, trade,
+and industry. While the vast possessions of church and nobility
+escaped taxation, the people were burdened with levies on the movement
+and sale of commodities and on the common necessities of life.
+Prohibition of imports to keep gold in the country was ineffectual,
+for without the supplies brought in by Dutch merchantmen Spain would
+have starved, and Philip II often had to connive in violations
+of his own restrictions. Prohibition of exports to keep prices
+down was an equally Quixotic measure, the chief effect of which
+was to kill trade. Spain could not supply the needs of her own
+colonies, and in fact illustrates the truth that a nation cannot,
+in the end, profit greatly by colonies unless it develops industries
+to utilize their raw materials and supply their demands.
+
+[Footnote 2: DAS ZEITALTER DER FUGGER, Vol. II, p. 150.]
+
+For some time before the Armada Spain was on the downward path,
+as a result of the conditions mentioned. On the other hand, while
+the Armada relieved England of a terrible danger and dashed Spain's
+hope of domination in the north, it was not of itself a fatal blow.
+The war still continued, with other Spanish expeditions organized on
+a grand scale, and ended in 1604, so far as England was concerned,
+with that country's renunciation of trade to the Indies and aid
+to the Dutch.
+
+But even if Spain's rise and decline were not primarily a result
+of sea power, still, taking the term to include the extension of
+shipping and maritime trade as well as the employment of naval
+forces in strictly military operations, there are lessons to be
+drawn from the use or neglect of sea power by both sides in Spain's
+long drawn-out struggle with Holland and England.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+_General_
+
+THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE, a History of the Foundations of the
+  Modern World, by Prof. W. C. Abbot, 1918.
+THE STORY OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERY, J. Jacobs, 1913.
+SHIPS AND THEIR WAYS OF OTHER DAYS, E. Keble Chatterton, 1906.
+THE DAWN OF NAVIGATION, Thomas G. Ford, U. S. Naval Institute
+  Proceedings, Vol. XXXIII., 1-3.
+THE DAWN OF MODERN GEOGRAPHY, 2 vols., C. Raymond Beazley, 1904.
+
+_Portugal_
+
+  PRINCE HENRY THE NAVIGATOR, C. Raymond Beazley, 1895.
+VASCO DA GAMA AND HIS SUCCESSORS, 1460-1580, K. G. Jayne, 1910.
+RISE OF PORTUGUESE POWER IN INDIA, R. S. Whiteway, 1910.
+CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, Vol. I., Ch. I.
+HISTORY OF THE INDIAN NAVY, Lieut. C. R. Low, 1877.
+
+_Spain_
+
+  THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA, John Fiske, 1893.
+SPAIN IN AMERICA, E. G. Bourne, American Nation Series, 1909.
+SPAIN, Martin Hume, Cam. Modern Hist. Series, 1898.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+SEA POWER IN THE NORTH: HOLLAND'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
+
+The first sea-farers in the storm-swept waters of the north, at
+least in historic times, were the Teutonic tribes along the North
+Sea and the Baltic. On land the Teutons held the Rhine and the
+Danube against the legions of Rome, spread later southward and
+westward, and founded modern European states out of the wreckage
+of the Roman Empire. On the sea, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes in the
+5th century began plundering the coasts of what is now England,
+and, after driving the Celts into mountain fastnesses, established
+themselves in permanent control.
+
+_The Vikings_
+
+These Teutonic voyagers were followed toward the close of the 8th
+century by their Scandinavian kindred to the northward, the
+Vikings--superb fighting men and daring sea-rovers who harried
+the coasts of western Europe for the next 200 years. There were no
+navies to stop them. "These sea dragons," exclaimed Charlemagne,
+"will tear my kingdom asunder!" In England no king before Alfred
+had a navy; and Alfred was compelled to organize a strong sea force
+to bring the invaders to terms.
+
+Elsewhere the Vikings met little opposition. Wherever they found
+lands that attracted them, they conquered and settled dawn. Thus
+Normandy came into being. They swept up the rivers, burning and
+looting where they pleased, from the Elbe to the Rhone. They carried
+their raids as far south as Sicily and the Mediterranean coast of
+Africa, and as far north and west as Iceland, Greenland, and the
+American continent. In the east, by establishing a Viking colony
+at Nishni Novgorod, they laid the foundations of the Russian empire,
+and their leader, Rus, gave it his name. Following river courses,
+others penetrated inland as far as Constantinople, where, being
+bought off by the emperor, they took service as imperial guards.
+
+Their extraordinary voyages were made in boats that resemble so
+closely Greek and Roman models--even Phoenician, for that matter--as
+to suggest that the Vikings learned their ship-building from
+Mediterranean traders who forced their way into the Baltic in very
+early times. For example, the Viking method of making a rib in
+three parts is identical with the method of the Greeks and Romans.
+The chief points of difference are that Viking ships were sharp
+at both ends--like a canoe, were round-bottomed instead of flat,
+and had one steering oar instead of two. The typical Viking ship
+was only about 75 feet in length; but a royal vessel--the _Dragon_
+of the chief--sometimes attained a length of 300 feet, with sixty
+pairs of oars.
+
+If the Vikings had had national organization under one head, they
+might well have laid the rest of Europe under tribute. In the 11th
+century, Cnut, a descendant of the Vikings, ruled in person over
+England, Denmark, and Norway. But their ocean folk-wanderings seem
+to have ended as suddenly as they began, and the effects were social
+rather than political. Where they settled, they brought a strain
+of the hardiest racial stock in Europe to blend with that of the
+conquered peoples.
+
+_The Hanseatic League_
+
+During the Middle Ages, peaceful trading gradually gained the upper
+hand over piracy and conquest. From the Italian cities the wares
+of the south and the Orient came over the passes of the Alps and
+down the German rivers, where trading cities grew up to act as
+carriers of merchandise and civilization among the nations of the
+north. The merchant guilds of these cities, banded together in
+the Hanseatic League, for at least three centuries dominated the
+northern seas.
+
+Perhaps the most extensive commercial combination ever formed for
+the control of sea trade, the Hanseatic League began with a treaty
+between Luebeck and Hamburg in 1174, and at the height of its power
+in the 14th and 15th centuries it included from 60 to 80 cities,
+of which Luebeck, Cologne, Brunswick, and Danzig were among the
+chief. The league cleared northern waters of pirates, and used
+embargo and naval power to subdue rivals and promote trade. It
+established factories or trading stations from Nishni Novgorod to
+Bergen, London, and Bruges. From Russia it took cargoes of fats,
+tallows, wax, and wares brought into Russian markets from the east;
+from Scandinavia, iron and copper; from England, hides and wool; from
+Germany, fish, grain, beer, and manufactured goods of all kinds.
+The British pound sterling (Oesterling) and pound avoirdupois, in
+fact the whole British system of weights and coinage, are legacies
+from the German merchants who once had their headquarters in the
+Steelyard, London.
+
+In the early 15th century the league attempted to shut Dutch ships
+from the Baltic trade by restricting their cargoes to wares produced
+in their own country, and by coercing Denmark into granting the
+league special privileges on the route through the Sound. This
+policy, culminating in the destruction of the Dutch grain fleet
+in 1437, led to a naval struggle which extended over four years
+and ended in a truce by which the Dutch secured the freedom of the
+Baltic. It was a typical naval war for sea control and commercial
+advantage, in which the Dutch as a rule seem to have got the better,
+and in which the legend first made its appearance of a Dutch admiral
+sweeping the seas with a broom nailed to his mast.
+
+From this time the power of the Hansa declined. This was partly
+because the free cities came more and more under the rule of German
+princes with no interest in, or knowledge of, commerce; partly
+because of rivalry arising from the union of the Scandinavian states
+(1397) and the growth of England, France, and the Low Countries
+to national strength and commercial independence; and partly also
+because of the decline of German fisheries when the herring suddenly
+shifted from the Baltic to the North Sea. Underlying these varied
+causes, however, and significant of the far-reaching effect of
+changing trade-routes upon the progress and prosperity of nations,
+was the fact that, when the Mediterranean trade route was closed
+by the Turks, and also the route through Russia by Ivan III, the
+German cities were side-tracked. Antwerp and Amsterdam were not
+only more centrally located for the distribution of trade, but
+also much nearer for Atlantic traffic--an advantage which Germany
+has ever since keenly envied.
+
+Long before the rise of the Low Countries as a maritime power,
+Ghent and Bruges had enjoyed an early preeminence owing to their
+development of cloth manufacture, and the latter city as a terminus
+for the galleys of Venice and Genoa. After the silting up of the
+port of Bruges (1432), Antwerp grew in importance, and in the 16th
+century became the chief market and money center of Europe. Its
+inhabitants numbered about 100,000, with a floating population
+of upwards of 50,000 more. It contained the counting-houses of
+the great bankers of Europe--the Fuggers of Germany, the Pazzi
+of Florence, the Dorias of Genoa. Five thousand merchants were
+registered on the Bourse, as many as 500 ships often left the city
+in a single day, and two or three thousand more might be seen anchored
+in the Scheldt or lying along the quays.[1] Amsterdam by 1560 was
+second to Antwerp with a population of 40,000, and forged ahead
+after the sack of Antwerp by Spanish soldiers in 1576 and the Dutch
+blockade of the Scheldt during the struggle with Spain.
+
+[Footnote 1: Blok, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS, Part
+II, Ch. XII.]
+
+This early prosperity of the Netherland cities may be attributed
+less to aggressive maritime activity than to their flourishing
+industries, their natural advantages as trading centers at the
+mouths of the Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse, and the privileges of
+self-government enjoyed by the middle classes under the House of
+Burgundy and even under Charles the Fifth. Charles taxed them
+heavily--his revenues from the Low Countries in reality far exceeded
+the treasure he drew from America; but he was a Fleming born, spoke
+their language, and accorded them a large measure of political and
+religious freedom. The grievances which after his death led to
+the Dutch War of Independence, are almost personified in the son
+who succeeded him in 1555--Philip II, a Spaniard born and bred,
+who spoke no Flemish and left Brussels for the last time in 1573,
+dour, treacherous, distrustful, fanatical in religion; a tragic
+character, who, no doubt with great injustice to the Spanish, has
+somehow come to represent the character of Spain in his time.
+
+_The Dutch Struggle for Freedom_
+
+The causes of the long war in the Netherlands, which began in 1566
+and ended with their independence 43 years later, is best explained
+in terms of general principles rather than specific grievances.
+"A conflict in which the principle of Catholicism with unlimited
+royal autocracy as Spain recognized it, was opposed to toleration
+in the realm of religion, with a national government according to
+ancient principles and based on ancient privileges,"--so the Dutch
+historian Blok sums up the issues at stake. The Prince of Orange,
+just before he was cut down by an assassin, asserted in his famous
+_Defense_ three fundamental principles: freedom to worship God;
+withdrawal of foreigners; and restoration of the charters, privileges,
+and liberties of the land. The Dutch fought for political, religious,
+and also for economic independence. England gave aid, not so much
+for religious motives as because she saw that her political safety
+and commercial prosperity hinged on the weakening of Spain.
+
+Resembling our American Revolution in the character of the struggle
+as well as the issues at stake--though it was far more bloody and
+desperate--the Dutch War of Independence was fought mainly within
+the country itself, with the population divided, and the Spanish
+depending on land forces to maintain their rule; but, as in the
+American war, control of the sea was a vital factor. For munitions,
+supplies, gold, for the transport of the troops themselves, Spain
+had to depend primarily on the sea. It is true one could continue
+on Spanish territory from Genoa, which was Spain's watergate into
+Italy, across the Mont Cenis Pass, and through Savoy, Burgundy,
+Lorraine, and Luxembourg to Brussels, and it was by this route that
+Parma's splendid army of 10,000 "Blackbeards" came in 1577. But
+this was an arduous three months' march for troops and still more
+difficult for supplies. To cross France was as a rule impossible;
+when Don Juan of Austria went to Flanders for the brief period of
+leadership ended by his death of camp fever in 1578, he passed
+through French territory disguised as a Moorish slave. By the sea
+route, upon which Spain was after all largely dependent, and the
+complete control of which would have made her task infinitely easier,
+she was constantly exposed to Huguenot, Dutch, and English privateers.
+These gentry cared little whether or not their country was actually
+at war with Spain, but took their letters of marque, if they carried
+them, from any prince or ruler who would serve their turn.
+
+With this opportunity to strike at Spanish communications, it will
+appear strange that the Dutch should not have immediately seized
+their advantage and made it decisive. One curious difficulty lay
+in the fact that throughout the war Dutch shipping actually carried
+the bulk of Spanish trade and drew from it immense profits. Even
+at the close of the century, while the war was still continuing,
+nine-tenths of Spain's foreign trade and five-sixths of her home
+trade was in foreign--and most of it in Dutch--hands. Hence any
+form of sea warfare was sure to injure Dutch trade. The Revolution,
+moreover, began slowly and feebly, with no well-thought-out plan of
+campaign, and could not at once fit out fully organized forces to
+cope with those of Spain. The Dutch early took to commerce warfare,
+but it was at first semi-piratical, and involved the destruction
+of ships of their own countrymen.
+
+The Sea Beggars--_Zee Geuzen_ or _Gueux der Mer_--made their
+appearance shortly after the outbreak of rebellion. "_Vyve les
+geus par mer et par terre,_" wrote the patriot Count van Brederode
+as early as 1566. The term "beggar" is said to have arisen from a
+contemptuous remark by a Spanish courtier to Margaret of Parma, when
+the Dutch nobles presented their grievances in Brussels. Willingly
+accepting the name, the patriots applied it to their forces both
+by land and by sea. Letters of marque were first issued by Louis
+of Nassau, brother of William of Orange, and in 1569 there were
+18 ships engaged, increased in the next year to 84. The bloody
+and licentious De la Marek, who wore his hair and beard unshorn
+till he had avenged the execution of his relative, Egmont, was
+a typical leader of still more wild and reckless crews. It was
+no uncommon practice to go over the rail of a merchant ship with
+pike and ax and kill every Spaniard on board. In 1569 William of
+Orange appointed the Seigneur de Lumbres as admiral of the beggar
+fleet, and issued strict instructions to him to secure better order,
+avoid attacks on vessels of friendly and neutral states, enforce
+the articles of war, and carry a preacher on each ship. The booty
+was to be divided one-third to the Prince for the maintenance of
+the war, one-third to the captains to supply their vessels, and
+one-third to the crews, one-tenth of this last share going to the
+admiral in general command.
+
+[Illustration: THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 16TH CENTURY]
+
+The events of commerce warfare, though they often involve desperate
+adventures and hard fighting, are not individually impressive, and
+the effectiveness of this warfare is best measured by collective
+results. On one occasion, when a fleet of transports fell into the
+hands of patriot forces off Flushing in 1572, not only were 1000
+troops taken, but also 500,000 crowns of gold and a rich cargo, the
+proceeds of which, it is stated, were sufficient to carry on the whole
+war for a period of two years. Again it was fear of pirates (Huguenot
+in this case) that in December of 1568 drove a squadron of Spanish
+transports into Plymouth, England, with 450,000 ducats ($960,000)
+aboard for the pay of Spanish troops. Elizabeth seized the money
+(on the ground that it was still the property of the Genoese bankers
+who had lent it and that she might as well borrow it as Philip),
+and minted it into English coin at a profit of L3000. But Alva at
+Antwerp, with no money at all, was forced to the obnoxious "Hundreds"
+tax--requiring a payment of one per cent on all possessions, five
+per cent on all real estate transfers, and 10 per cent every time
+a piece of merchandise was sold--a typical tax after the Spanish
+recipe, which, though not finally enforced to its full extent, aroused
+every Netherlander as a fatal blow at national prosperity. To return
+to the general effect of commerce destruction, it is estimated
+that Spain thus lost annually 3,000,000 ducats ($6,400,000), a sum
+which of course meant vastly more then than now. When the Duke
+of Alva retired from command in 1578, the pay of Spanish troops
+was 6,500,000 ducats in arrears.
+
+Among the exploits of organized naval forces, the earliest was the
+capture of Brill, by which, according to Motley, "the foundations
+of the Dutch republic were laid." Driven out of England by Elizabeth,
+who upon the representations of the Spanish ambassador ordered her
+subjects not to supply the Beggars with "meat, bread or beer,"
+a fleet of 25 vessels and 300 or 400 men left Dover towards the
+end of March, 1572, with the project of seizing a base on their
+own coast. On the afternoon of April 1, they appeared off the town
+of Brill, located on an island at the mouth of the Meuse. The
+magistrates and most of the inhabitants fled; and the Beggars battered
+down the gates, occupied the town, and put to death 13 monks and
+priests. When Spanish forces attempted to recapture the city, the
+defenders opened sluice gates to cut off the northern approach,
+and at the same time set fire to the boats which had carried the
+Spanish to the island. The Spanish, terrorized by both fire and
+water, waded through mud and slime to the northern shore. During
+the same week Flushing was taken, and before the end of June the
+Dutch were masters of nearly the entire Zealand coast.
+
+In the north the Spanish at first found an able naval leader in
+Admiral Bossu, himself a Hollander, who for a time kept the coast
+clear of Beggars. In October, 1573, however, 30 of his ships were
+beaten in the Zuyder Zee by 25 under Dirkzoon, who captured five
+of the Spanish vessels and scattered the rest with the exception
+of the flagship. The latter, a 32-gun ship terrifyingly named the
+_Inquisition_ and much stronger than any of the others on either
+side, held out from three o'clock in the afternoon until the next
+morning. Three patriot vessels closed in on her, attacking with
+the vicious weapons of the period--pitch, boiling oil, and molten
+lead. By morning the four combatants had drifted ashore in a tangled
+mass. When Bossu at last surrendered, 300 men, out of 382 in his
+ship's complement, were dead or disabled.
+
+Though not yet able to stand up against Spanish infantry, the Dutch
+in naval battles were usually successful. In the Scheldt, January
+29, 1574, 75 Spanish vessels were attacked by 64 Dutch under Admiral
+Boisot. After a single broadside, the two fleets grappled, and in
+a two-hour fight at close quarters eight of the Spanish ships were
+captured, seven destroyed, and 1200 Spaniards killed. The Spanish
+commander, Julian Romero, escaped through a port-hole, is said to
+have remarked afterwards, "I told you I was a land fighter and no
+sailor; give me a hundred fleets and I would fare no better."
+
+In September following, Admiral Boisot brought some of his victorious
+ships and sailors to the relief of Leyden, whose inhabitants and
+garrison had been reduced by siege to the very last extremities.
+The campaign that followed was typical of this amphibious war.
+Boisot's force, with those already an the scene, numbered about
+2500, equipped with some 200 shallow-draft boats and row-barges
+mounting an average of ten guns each. Among them was the curious
+_Ark of Delft_, with shot-proof bulwarks and paddle-wheels turned
+by a crank. As a result of ruthless flooding of the country, ten
+of the fifteen miles between Leyden and the outer dyke were easily
+passed; but five miles from the city ran the Landscheidung or inner
+dyke, which was above water, and beyond this an intricate system
+of canals and flooded polders, with forts and villages held by a
+Spanish force four times as strong. The most savage fighting on
+decks, dykes, and bridges marked every step forward; the Dutch in
+their native element attacking with cutlass, boathook and harpoon,
+while the superior military discipline of the Spanish could not
+come in play. But at least 20 inches of water were necessary to
+float the Dutch vessels, and it was not until October 3 that a
+spring tide and a heavy northwest gale made it possible to reach the
+city walls. In storm and darkness, terrified by the rising waters,
+the Spanish fled. The relief of the city marked a turning-point in
+the history of the revolt.
+
+During the six terrible years of Alva's rule in the Netherlands
+(1567-1573) the Dutch sea forces contributed heavily toward the
+maintenance of the war, assured control of the Holland and Zealand
+coasts, and more than once, as at Brill and Leyden, proved the
+salvation of the patriot cause. Holland and Zealand, the storm-centers
+of rebellion, were not again so devastated, though the war dragged
+on for many years, maintained by the indomitable spirit of William
+of Orange until his assassination in 1584, and afterward by the
+military skill of Maurice of Nassau and the aid of foreign powers.
+The seven provinces north of the Scheldt, separating from the Catholic
+states of the south, prospered in trade and industry as they shook
+themselves free from the stifling rule of Spain. By a twelve-year
+truce, finally ratified in 1609, they became "free states over
+which Spain makes no pretensions," though their independence was
+not fully recognized until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The
+war, while it ruined Antwerp, increased the prosperity of Holland
+and Zealand, which for at least twenty years before the truce were
+busily extending their trade to every part of the world.
+
+_Growth of Dutch Commerce_
+
+The story of this expansion of commerce is a striking record. The
+grain and timber of the Baltic, the wines of France and Spain,
+the salt of the Cape Verde Islands, the costly wares of the east,
+came to the ports of the Meuse and Zuyder Zee. In 1590 the first
+Dutch traders entered the Mediterranean, securing, eight years
+later, the permission of the Sultan to engage in Constantinople
+trade. In 1594 their ships reached the Gold Coast, and a year later
+four vessels visited Madagascar, Goa, Java, and the Moluccas or
+Spice Islands. A rich Zealand merchant had a factory at Archangel
+and a regular trade into the White Sea. Seeking a reward of 25,000
+florins offered by the States for the discovery of a northeast
+passage, Jacob van Heimskirck sailed into the Arctic and wintered
+in Nova Zembla; Henry Hudson, in quest of a route northwestward,
+explored the river and the bay that bear his name and died in the
+Polar Seas.
+
+Statistics, while not very trustworthy and not enlightening unless
+compared with those for other nations, may give some idea of the
+preponderance of Dutch shipping. At the time of the truce she is
+said to have had 16,300 ships, about 10,000 of which were small
+vessels in the coasting trade. Of the larger, 3000 were in the
+Baltic trade, 2000 in the Spanish, 600 sailed to Italy, and the
+remainder to the Mediterranean, South America, the Far East, and
+Archangel. The significance of these figures may be made clearer by
+citing Colbert's estimate that at a later period (1664) there were
+20,000 ships in general European carrying trade, 16,000 of which
+were Dutch. Throughout the 17th century Dutch commerce continued to
+prosper, and did not reach its zenith until early in the century
+following.
+
+In the closing years of the 16th century several private companies
+were founded in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Zealand to engage in eastern
+trade. These were combined in 1602 into the United East Indies
+Company, which sent large fleets to the Orient each year, easily
+ousted the Portuguese from their bases on the coast and islands,
+and soon established almost a monopoly, leaving to England only a
+small share of trade with Persia and northwest India. The relative
+resources invested by English and Dutch in Eastern ventures is
+suggested by the fact that the British East Indies Company founded in
+1600 had a capital of L80,000, while the Dutch Company had L316,000.
+By 1620 the shares of the Dutch company had increased to three
+times their original value, and they paid average dividends of 18
+per cent for the next 200 years.
+
+In this Dutch conquest of eastern trade, like that of the Portuguese
+a century earlier, we have an illustration of what has since been a
+guiding principle in the history of sea power--a national policy of
+commercial expansion sturdily backed by foreign policy and whenever
+necessary by naval force. The element of national policy is evident
+in the fact that Holland--and England until the accession of James I
+in 1603--preferred war rather than acceptance of Spanish pretensions
+to exclusive rights in the southern seas. The Dutch, like the
+Portuguese, saw clearly the need of political control. They made
+strongholds of their trading bases, and gave their companies power
+to oust competitors by force. As a concession to Spanish pride,
+the commerce clause in the Truce of 1609 was made intentionally
+unintelligible--but the Dutch interpreted it to suit themselves.
+As for the element of force, every squadron that sailed to the
+east was a semi-military expedition. The Dutch seaman was sailor,
+fighter, and trader combined. The merchant was truly, in the phrase
+of the age, a "merchant adventurer," lucky indeed and enriched
+if, after facing the perils of navigation in strange waters, the
+possible hostility of native rulers, and the still greater danger
+from European rivals, half his ships returned. The last statement
+is no hyperbole; of 9 ships sent to the East from Amsterdam in
+1598, four came back, and just half of the 22 sent out from the
+entire Netherlands.
+
+From time to time, either to maintain the blockade of the Scheldt
+and assist in operations on the Flanders coast, or to protect their
+trade and strike a direct blow at Spain, the Dutch fitted out purely
+naval expeditions. One of the most effective, from the standpoint
+of actual fighting, was that led by van Heimskirck, already famous
+for Arctic exploration and exploits in the Far East. In 1607 he
+took 21 converted merchantmen and 4 transports to the Spanish coast
+to protect Dutch vessels from the east and the Mediterranean.
+Encountering off Gibraltar an enemy force of 11 large galleons
+and as many galleys under Alvarez d'Avila, a veteran of Lepanto,
+he destroyed half the Spanish force and drove the rest into port,
+killing about 2000 Spanish and coming out of the fight with the
+loss of only 100 men. Heimskirck concentrated upon the galleons
+and came to close action after the fashion which seems to have
+been characteristic of the Dutch in naval engagements throughout
+the war. "Hold your fire till you hear the crash," he cried, as
+he drove his prow into the enemy flagship; and the battle was won
+after a struggle yard-arm to yard-arm. Bath admirals were killed.
+
+Portugal, broken by the Spanish yoke, could offer little resistance
+in the Far East. In 1606 a Dutch fleet of 12 ships under Matelieff
+de Jonge laid siege to Malacca, and gave up the attempt only after
+destroying 10 galleons sent to relieve the town. Matelieff then
+sailed to the neighboring islands, and established the authority
+of the company at Bantam, Amboyna, Ternate, and other centers of
+trade.
+
+Other fleets earlier and later promoted the interests of the company
+by the same means. English traders, with scanty government encouragement
+from the Stuart kings, were not as yet dangerous rivals. A conflict
+occurred with them in 1611 off Surat; and at Amboyna in 1623 the
+Dutch seized the English Company's men, tortured ten of them, and
+broke up the English base. For more than a century Holland remained
+supreme in the east; she has retained her colonial empire down to
+the 20th century; and she did not surrender her commercial primacy
+until exhausted by the combined attacks of England and France.
+Less successful than England in the development of colonies, she
+has stood out as the greatest of trading nations.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+_The Vikings_
+
+THE VIKING AGE, H. F. Du Chaillu, 1889.
+
+_The Hansa_
+
+THE HANSA TOWNS, H. Zimmerman, 1889.
+HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Clive Day, 1913 (bibliography).
+CIVILIZATION DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, George Burton Adams, 1918.
+CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, Vols. I and II.
+
+_Dutch Sea Power_
+
+MOTLEY'S RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC (still the best source in English
+  for political and naval history of the period).
+HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS, P. J. Blok, trans. Ruth
+  Putnam, 1898-1912.
+HISTORY OF COMMERCE IN EUROPE, W. H. Gibbins, 1917.
+THE SEA BEGGARS, Dingman Versteg, 1901.
+SOME EXPLOITS OF THE OLD DUTCH NAVY, Lieut. H. H. Frost, U. S.
+  Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1919.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA
+
+By reason of England's insularity, it is an easy matter to find
+instances from even her early history of the salutary or fatal
+influence of sea power. Romans, Saxons, Danes swept down upon England
+from the sea. By building a fleet, King Alfred, said to have been
+the true father of the British navy, kept back the Danes. It was
+the dispersion of the English fleet by reason of the lateness of
+the season that enabled William the Conqueror, in the small open
+vessels interestingly pictured in the Bayeux tapestry, to win a
+footing on the English shore.
+
+But during the next three centuries, with little shipping and little
+trade save that carried on by the Hansa, with no enemy that dangerously
+threatened her by sea, England had neither the motives nor the
+national strength and unity to develop naval power. She claimed,
+it is true, dominion over the narrow waters between her and her
+possessions in France, and also over the "four seas" surrounding
+her; and as early as 1201 an ordinance was passed requiring vessels
+in these waters to lower sails ("vail the bonnet") and also to
+"lie by the lee" when so ordered by King's ships. But though these
+claims were revived in the 17th century against the Dutch, and
+though the requirement that foreign vessels strike their topsails
+to the British flag remained in the Admiralty Instructions until
+after Trafalgar, they were at this time enforced chiefly to rid
+the seas of pirates--the common enemies of nations. During this
+period there were a few "king's ships," the sovereign's personal
+property, forming a nucleus around which a naval force of fishing
+and merchant vessels could be assembled in time of war. The Cinque
+Ports, originally Dover, Sandwich, Hastings, Romney and Hythe, long
+enjoyed certain trading privileges in return for the agreement
+that when the king passed overseas they would "rigge up fiftie and
+seven ships" (according to a charter of Edward I) with 20 armed
+soldiers each, and maintain them for 15 days.
+
+An attack in 1217 by such a fleet, under the Governor of Dover
+Castle, affords perhaps the earliest instance of maneuvering for
+the weather-gage. The English came down from the windward and, as
+they scrambled aboard the enemy, threw quicklime into the Frenchmen's
+eyes. At Sluis, in 1340, to take another instance of early English
+naval warfare, Edward III defeated a large French fleet and a number
+of hired Genoese galleys lashed side by side in the little river
+Eede in Flanders. Edward came in with a fair wind and tide and fell
+upon the enemy as they lay aground at the stem and unmanageable.
+This victory gave control of the Channel for the transport of troops
+in the following campaign. But like most early naval combats, it
+was practically a land battle over decks, and, although sanguinary
+enough, it is from a naval stand paint interesting chiefly for
+such novelties as a scouting force of knights on horseback along
+the shore.
+
+The beginnings of a permanent and strong naval establishment, as
+distinct from merchant vessels owned by the king or in his service,
+must be dated, however, from the Tudors and the period of national
+rehabilitation following the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and
+the War of the Roses (1455-1485). One reason for this was that
+the employment of artillery on shipboard and the introduction of
+port-holes made it increasingly difficult to convert merchant craft
+into dependable men-of-war. Henry VIII took a keen interest in
+his navy, devoted the revenues of forfeited church property to
+its expansion, established the first Navy Board (1546), and is
+even credited with the adoption of sailing vessels as the major
+units of his fleet.
+
+_From Oar to Sail_
+
+The use of heavy ordnance, already mentioned, as well as the increasing
+size and efficiency of sail-craft that came with the spread of
+ocean commerce and navigation, naturally pointed the way to this
+transition in warfare from oar to sail. The galley was at best a
+frail affair, cumbered with oars, benches and rowers, unable to
+carry heavy guns or withstand their fire. Once sailing vessels had
+attained reasonable maneuvering qualities, their superior strength
+and size, reduced number of non-combatant personnel, and increased
+seaworthiness and cruising radius gave them a tremendous superiority.
+That the change should have begun in the north rather than in the
+Mediterranean, where naval and military science had reached its
+highest development, must be attributed not only to the rougher
+weather conditions of the northern seas, and the difficulty of
+obtaining slaves as rowers, but also to the fact that the southern
+nations were more completely shackled by the traditions of galley
+warfare.
+
+[Illustration: GALLEON]
+
+Yet for the new type it was the splendid trading vessels of Venice
+that supplied the design. For the Antwerp and London trade, and in
+protection against the increasing danger from pirates, the Venetians
+had developed a compromise between the war-galley and the round-ship
+of commerce, a type with three masts and propelled at least primarily
+by sails, with a length about three times its beam and thus shorter
+and more seaworthy than the galley, but longer, lower and swifter
+than the clumsy round-ship. To this new type the names _galleass_ and
+_galleon_ were bath given, but in English and later usage _galleass_
+came to be applied to war vessels combining oar and sail, and _galleon_
+to either war or trading vessels of medium size and length and
+propelled by sail alone.
+
+The Spanish found the galleon useful in the Atlantic carrying trade,
+but, as shown at Lepanto, they retained the galley in warfare;
+whereas Henry VIII of England was probably the first definitely
+to favor sail for his men-of-war. An English navy list of 1545
+shows four clumsy old-fashioned "great-ships" of upwards of 1000
+tons, but second to these a dozen newer vessels of distinctly galleon
+lines, lower than the great-ships, flush-decked, and sail-driven.
+Though in engagements with French galleys during the campaign of
+1545 these were handicapped by calm weather, they seem to have
+held their own both in battle and in naval opinion. Of the royal
+ships at the opening of Elizabeth's reign (1558), there were 11
+large sailing vessels of 200 tans and upwards, and 10 smaller ones,
+but only two galleys, and these "of no continuance and not worth
+repair."[1] In comment on these figures, it should be added that
+there were half a hundred large ships available from the merchant
+service, and also that pinnaces and other small craft still combined
+oar and sail.
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Corbett, Vol. I, p. 133.]
+
+In England the superiority of sail propulsion was soon definitely
+recognized, and discussion later centered on the relative merits
+of the medium-sized galleon and the big "great-ship." The
+characteristics of each are well set forth in a contemporary naval
+treatise by Sir William Monson: the former with "flush deck fore and
+aft, sunk and low in the water; the other lofty and high-charged,
+with a half-deck, forecastle, and copperidge-heads [athwortship
+bulkheads where light guns were mounted to command the space between
+decks]." The advantages of the first were that she was speedy and
+"a fast ship by the wind" so as to avoid boarding by the enemy,
+and could run in close and fire effective broadsides between wind
+and water without being touched; whereas the big ship was more
+terrifying, more commodious, stronger, and could carry more and
+heavier guns. Monson, like many a later expert, suspended judgment
+regarding the two types; but Sir Walter Raleigh came out strongly
+for the smaller design. "The greatest ships," he writes, "are the
+least serviceable...., less nimble, less maniable; 'Grande navi
+grande fatiga,' saith the Spaniard. A ship of 600 tons will carry
+as good ordnance as a ship of 1200 tons; and though the greater
+have double her number, the lesser will turn her broadsides twice
+before the greater can wind once." And elsewhere: "The high charging
+of ships makes them extreme leeward, makes them sink deep in the
+water, makes them labor, and makes them overset. Men may not expect
+the ease of many cabins and safety at once in sea-service."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: WORKS, Oxford ed. 1829, Vol. VIII, p. 338.]
+
+These statements were made after the Armada; but the trend of English
+naval construction away from unwieldy ships such as used by the Spanish
+in the Armada, is clearly seen in vessels dating from 1570-1580--the
+_Foresight, Bull,_ and _Tiger_ (rebuilt from galleasses), the
+_Swiftsure, Dreadnought, Revenge,_ and others of names renowned
+in naval annals. These were all of about the dimensions of the
+_Revenge,_ which was of 440 tons, 92 feet over all, 32 feet beam,
+and 15 feet from deck to keel. That is to say, their length was
+not more than three times their beam, and their beam was about
+twice their depth in the hold--the characteristic proportions of
+the galleon type.
+
+The progressiveness of English ship construction is highly significant,
+for to it may be attributed in large measure the Armada victory.
+Spain had made no such advances; in fact, until the decade of the
+Armada, she hardly had such a thing as a royal navy. The superiority
+of the English ships was generally recognized. An English naval
+writer in 1570 declared the ships of his nation so fine "none of
+any other region may seem comparable to them"; and a Spaniard some
+years later testified that his people regarded "one English ship
+worth four of theirs."
+
+Though not larger than frigates of Nelson's time, these ships were
+crowded with an even heavier armament, comprising guns of all sizes
+and of picturesque but bewildering nomenclature. According to
+Corbett,[1] the ordnance may be divided into four main classes
+based on caliber, the first two of the "long gun" and the other
+two of the carronade or mortar type.
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Vol. I, p. 384.]
+
+I. Cannon proper, from 16 to 28 caliber, of 8.5-inch bore and 12
+feet in length, firing 65-pound shot. The demi-cannon, which was
+the largest gun carried on ships of the time, was 6.5 inches by
+9 feet and fired 30-pound shot.
+
+II. Culverins, 28 to 34 caliber long guns, 5 inches by 12 feet,
+firing 17-pound shot. Demi-culverins were 9-pounders. Slings, bases,
+sakers, port-pieces, and fowlers belonged to this class.
+
+III. Perriers, from 6 to 8 caliber, firing stone-balls, shells,
+fire-balls, etc.
+
+IV. Mortars, of 1.5 caliber, including petards and murderers.
+
+The "great ordnance," or cannon, were muzzle-loading. The secondary
+armament, mounted in tops, cageworks, bulkheads, etc., were
+breech-loading; but these smaller pieces fell out of favor as time
+went on owing to reliance on long-range fire and rareness of boarding
+actions. Down to the middle of the 19th century there was no great
+improvement in ordnance, save in the way of better powder and boring.
+Even in Elizabeth's day the heaviest cannon had a range of three
+miles.
+
+These advances in ship design and armament were accompanied by
+some changes in naval administration. In 1546 the Navy Board was
+created, which continued to handle matters of what may be termed
+civil administration until its functions were taken over by the
+Board of Admiralty in the reorganization of 1832. The chief members
+of the Navy Board, the Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor of Ships,
+Surveyor of Ordnance, and Clerk of Ships, were in Elizabethan times
+usually experienced in sea affairs. To John Hawkins, Treasurer from
+1578 to 1595, belongs chief credit for the excellent condition of
+ships in his day. The Lord High Admiral, a member of the nobility,
+exercised at least nominal command of the fleet in peace and war. For
+vice admiral under him a man of practical experience was ordinarily
+chosen. On shipboard, the only "gentleman" officers were the captains;
+the rest--masters, master's mates, pilots, carpenters, boatswains,
+coxswains, and gunners--were, to quote a contemporary description,
+"mechanick men that had been bred up from swabbers." But owing
+to the small proportion of soldiers on board, the English ships
+were not like those of Spain, which were organized like a camp,
+with the soldier element supreme and the sailors "slaves to the
+rest."
+
+_The Political Situation_
+
+The steps taken to build up the navy in the decade or more preceding
+the Armada were well justified by the political and religious strife
+in western Europe and the dangers which on all sides threatened the
+English realm. France, the Netherlands, and Scotland were torn by
+religious warfare. In England the party with open or secret Catholic
+sympathies was large, amounting to perhaps half the population,
+the strength of whose loyalty to Elizabeth it was difficult to
+gage. Since 1568 Elizabeth had held captive Mary Queen of Scots,
+driven out of her own country by the Presbyterian hierarchy, and
+a Catholic with hereditary claims to the English throne. Before
+her death, Philip of Spain had conspired with her to assassinate
+the heretic Elizabeth; after Mary's execution in 1587 he became
+heir to her claims and entered the more willingly upon the task
+of conquering England and restoring it to the faith. For years,
+in fact, there had been a state of undeclared hostility between
+England and Spain, and acts which, with sovereigns less cautious
+and astute than both Elizabeth and Philip, would have meant war.
+In 1585 Elizabeth formed an alliance with the Netherlands, and sent
+her favorite, Leicester, there as governor-general, and Sir Philip
+Sidney as Governor of Flushing, which with two other "cautionary
+towns" she took as pledges of Dutch loyalty. The motives for this
+action are well stated in a paper drawn up by the English Privy
+Council in 1584, presenting a situation interesting in its analogy
+to that which faced the United States when it entered the World
+War:
+
+"The conclusion of the whole was this: Although her Majesty should
+thereby enter into the war presently, yet were she better to do
+it now, while she may make the same out of her realm, having the
+help of the people of Holland, and before the King of Spain shall
+have consummated his conquest of those countries, whereby he shall
+be so provoked by pride, solicited by the Pope, and tempted by the
+Queen's own subjects, and shall be so strong by sea; and so free
+from all other actions and quarrels--yea, shall be so formidable
+to all the rest of Christendom, as that her Majesty shall no wise
+be able, with her own power, nor with the aid of any other, neither
+by land nor sea, to withstand his attempts, but shall be forced
+to give place to his insatiable malice, which is most terrible
+to be thought of, but miserable to suffer."
+
+These were the compelling reasons for England's entry into the
+war. The aid to Holland and the execution of Mary, on the other
+hand, were sufficient to explain Philip's attempted invasion. The
+grievance of Spain owing to the incursions of Hawkins and Drake
+into her American possessions, and England's desire to break Spain's
+commercial monopoly, were at the time relatively subordinate, though
+from a naval standpoint the voyages are interesting in themselves
+and important in the history of sea control and sea trade.
+
+_Hawkins and Drake_
+
+John Hawkins was a well-to-do ship-owner of Plymouth, and as already
+stated, Treasurer of the Royal Navy, with a contract for the upkeep
+of ships. His first venture to the Spanish Main was in 1562, when
+he kidnapped 300 negroes on the Portuguese coast of Africa and
+exchanged them at Hispanola (Haiti), for West Indian products,
+chartering two additional vessels to take his cargo home. Though
+he might have been put to death if caught by either Portugal or
+Spain, his profits were so handsome by the double exchange that
+he tried it again in 1565, this time taking his "choice negroes
+at L160 each" to Terra Firme, or the Spanish Main, including the
+coasts of Venezuela, Colombia, and the Isthmus. When the Spanish
+authorities, warned by their home government, made some show of
+resistance, Hawkins threatened bombardment, landed his men, and
+did business by force, the inhabitants conniving in a contraband
+trade very profitable to them.
+
+On his third voyage he had six vessels, two of which, the _Jesus
+of Lubeck_ and the _Minion_, were Queen's ships hired out for the
+voyage. The skipper of one of the smaller vessels, the _Judith_,
+was Francis Drake, a relative and protege of the Hawkins family,
+and then a youth of twenty-two. On September 16, 1567, after a
+series of encounters stormier than ever in the Spanish settlements,
+the squadron homeward bound was driven by bad weather into the
+port of Mexico City in San Juan de Ulua Bay. Here, having a
+decided superiority over the vessels in the harbor, Hawkins secured
+the privilege of mooring and refitting his ships inside the island
+that formed a natural breakwater, and mounted guns on the island
+itself. To his surprise next morning, he beheld in the offing 13
+ships of Spain led by an armed galleon and having on board the
+newly appointed Mexican viceroy. Hawkins, though his guns commanded
+the entrance, took hostages and made some sort of agreement by
+which the Spanish ships were allowed to come in and moor alongside.
+But the situation was too tense to carry off without an explosion.
+Three days later the English were suddenly attacked on sea and
+shore. They at once leaped into their ships and cut their cables,
+but though they hammered the Spanish severely in the fight that
+followed, only two English vessels, the _Minion_ and the _Judith_,
+escaped, the _Minion_ so overcrowded that Hawkins had to drop 100 of
+his crew on the Mexican coast. Drake made straight for Plymouth,
+nursing a bitter grievance at the alleged breach of faith, and
+vowing vengeance on the whole Spanish race. "The case," as Drake's
+biographer, Thomas Fuller, says, "was clear in sea-divinity, and
+few are such infidels as not to believe doctrines which make for
+their own profit."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE HOLY STATE, Bk. II, Ch. XXII.]
+
+In the next three years, following the example of many a French
+Huguenot privateersman before him, and forsaking trade for semi-private
+reprisal (in that epoch a few degrees short of piracy), he made
+three voyages to the Spanish Indies. On the third, in 1572, he
+raided Nombre de Dios with fire and sword. Then, leaguing himself
+with the mixed-breed natives or cameroons, he waylaid a guarded
+mule-train bearing treasure across the Isthmus, securing 15 tons of
+silver which he buried, and as much gold as his men could stagger
+away under. It was on this foray that he first saw the Pacific
+from a height of the Cordilleras, and resolved to steer an English
+squadron into this hitherto unmolested Spanish sea.
+
+The tale of Drake's voyage into the Pacific and circumnavigation
+of the globe is a piratical epic, the episodes of which, however,
+find some justification in the state of virtual though undeclared
+hostilities between England and Spain, in the Queen's secret sanction,
+and in Spain's own policy of ruthless spoliation in America. Starting
+at the close of 1577 with five small vessels, the squadron was
+reduced by shipwreck and desertion until only the flagship remained
+when Drake at last, on September 6 of the next year, achieved his
+midwinter passage of the Straits of Magellan and bore down, "like
+a visitation of God" as a Spaniard said, upon the weakly defended
+ports of the west coast. After ballasting his ship with silver from
+the rich Potosi mines, and rifling even the churches, he hastened
+onward in pursuit of a richly laden galleon nicknamed _Cacafuego_--a
+name discreetly translated _Spitfire_, but which, to repeat a joke
+that greatly amused Drake's men at the time, it was proposed to
+change to _Spitsilver_, for when overtaken and captured the vessel
+yielded 26 tons of silver, 13 chests of pieces of eight, and gold
+and jewels sufficient to swell the booty to half a million pounds
+sterling.
+
+For 20 years the voyage across the northern Pacific had been familiar
+to the Spanish, who had studied winds and currents, laid down routes,
+and made regular crossings. Having picked up charts and China pilots,
+and left the whole coast in panic fear, Drake sailed far to the
+northward, overhauled his ship in a bay above San Francisco, then
+struck across the Pacific, and at last rounded Good Hope and put
+into Plymouth in September of the third year. It suited Elizabeth's
+policy to countenance the voyage. She put the major part of the
+treasure into the Tower, took some trinkets herself, knighted Drake
+aboard the _Golden Hind_, and when the Spanish ambassador talked
+war she told him, in a quiet tone of voice, that she would throw
+him into a dungeon.
+
+This red-bearded, short and thickset Devon skipper, bold of speech
+as of action, was now the most renowned sailor of England, with a
+name that inspired terror on every coast of Spain. It was inevitable,
+therefore, that when Elizabeth resolved upon open reprisals in
+1585, Drake should be chosen to lead another, and this time fully
+authorized, raid on the Spanish Indies. Here he sacked the cities
+of San Domingo and Carthagena, and, though he narrowly missed the
+plate fleet, brought home sufficient spoils for the individuals
+who backed the venture. In the year 1587 with 23 ships and orders
+permitting him to operate freely on Spain's home coasts, he first
+boldly entered Cadiz, in almost complete disregard of the puny
+galleys guarding the harbor, and destroyed some 37 vessels and
+their cargoes. Despite the horrified protests of his Vice Admiral
+Borough (an officer "of the old school" to be found in every epoch)
+at these violations of traditional methods, he then took up a position
+off Saigres where he could harry coastwise commerce, picked up the
+East Indiaman _San Felipe_ with a cargo worth a million pounds
+in modern money, and even appeared off Lisbon to defy the Spanish
+Admiral Santa Cruz. Thus he "singed the King of Spain's beard,"
+and set, in the words of a recent biographer, "what to this day
+may serve as the finest example of how a small, well-handled fleet,
+acting on a nicely timed offensive, may paralyze the mobilization
+of an overwhelming force."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Corbett, Vol. II, p. 108.]
+
+_The Grand Armada_
+
+At the time of this Cadiz expedition Spanish preparations for the
+invasion of England were already well under way, Philip being now
+convinced that by a blow at England all his aims might be secured--the
+subjugation of the Netherlands, the safety of Spanish America,
+the overthrow of Protestantism, possibly even his accession to
+the English throne. As the secret instructions to Medina Sidonia
+more modestly stated, it was at least believed that by a vigorous
+offensive and occupation of English territory England could be forced
+to cease her opposition to Spain. For this purpose every province
+of the empire was pressed for funds. Pope Sixtus VI contributed
+a million gold crowns, which he shrewdly made payable only when
+troops actually landed on English soil. Church and nobility were
+squeezed as never before. The Cortes on the eve of the voyage voted
+8,000,000 ducats, secured by a tax on wine, meat, and oil, the
+common necessities of life, which was not lifted for more than two
+hundred years.
+
+To gain control of the Channel long enough to throw 40,000 troops
+ashore at Margate, and thereafter to meet and conquer the army
+of defense--such was the highly difficult objective, to assure
+the success of which Philip had been led to hope for a wholesale
+defection of English Catholics to the Spanish cause. Twenty thousand
+troops were to sail with the Armada; Alexander Farnese, Duke of
+Parma, was to add 17,000 veterans from Flanders and assume supreme
+command. With the Spanish infantry once landed, under the best
+general in Europe, it was not beyond reason that England might become
+a province of Spain.
+
+What Philip did not see clearly, what indeed could scarcely be
+foreseen from past experience, was that no movement of troops should
+be undertaken without first definitely accounting for the enemy
+fleet. The Spanish had not even an open base to sail to. With English
+vessels thronging the northern ports of the Channel, with 90 Dutch
+ships blockading the Scheldt and the shallows of the Flanders coast,
+it would be necessary to clear the Channel by a naval victory,
+and maintain control until it was assured by victory on land. The
+leader first selected, Santa Cruz--a veteran of Lepanto--at least
+put naval considerations uppermost and laid plans on a grand scale,
+calling for 150 major ships and 100,000 men, 30,000 of them sailors.
+But with his death in 1587 the campaign was again thought of primarily
+from the army standpoint. The ships were conceived as so many
+transports, whose duty at most was to hold the English fleet at
+bay. Parma was to be supreme. To succeed Santa Cruz as naval leader,
+and in order, it is said, that the gray-haired autocrat Philip
+might still control from his cell in the Escorial, the Duke of
+Medina Sidonia was chosen--an amiable gentleman of high rank, but
+consciously ignorant of naval warfare, uncertain of purpose, and
+despondent almost from the start. Medina had an experienced Vice
+Admiral in Diego Flores de Valdes, whose professional advice he
+usually followed, and he had able squadron commanders in Recalde,
+Pedro de Valdes, Oquendo, and others; but such a commander-in-chief,
+unless a very genius in self-effacement, was enough to ruin a far
+more auspicious campaign.
+
+Delayed by the uncertain political situation in France, even more
+than by Drake's exploits off Cadiz, the Armada was at last, in
+May of 1588, ready to depart. The success of the Catholic party
+under the leadership of the Duke of Guise gave assurance of support
+rather than hostility on the French flank. There were altogether
+some 130 ships, the best of which were 10 war galleons of Portugal
+and 10 of the "Indian Guard" of Spain. These were supported by
+the Biscayan, Andalusian, Guipuscoan, and Levantine squadrons of
+about 10 armed merchantmen each, four splendid Neapolitan galleasses
+that gave a good account of themselves in action, and four galleys
+that were driven upon the French coast by storms and took no part
+in the battle--making a total (without the galleys) of about 64
+fighting ships. Then there were 35 or more pinnaces and small craft,
+and 23 _urcas_ or storeships of little or no fighting value. The
+backbone of the force was the 60 galleons, large, top-lofty vessels,
+all but 20 of them from the merchant service, with towering poops
+and forecastles that made them terrible to look upon but hard to
+handle. On board were 8,000 sailors and 19,000 troops.
+
+Dispersed by a storm on their departure from Lisbon, the fleet
+again assembled at Corunna, their victuals already rotten, and
+their water foul and short. Medina Sidonia even now counseled
+abandonment; but religious faith, the fatalistic pride of Spain,
+and Philip's dogged fixity of purpose drove them on. Putting out
+of Corunna on July 22, and again buffeted by Biscay gales, they
+were sighted off the Lizard at daybreak of July 30, and a pinnace
+scudded into Plymouth with the alarm.
+
+[Illustration: CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA]
+
+For England the moment of supreme crisis had come, Elizabeth's
+policy of paying for nothing that she might expect her subjects
+to contribute had left the royal navy short of what the situation
+called for, and the government seems also, even throughout the
+campaign, to have tied the admirals to the coast and kept them from
+distant adventures by limited supplies of munitions and food. But
+in the imminent danger, the nobility, both Catholic and Protestant,
+and every coastwise city, responded to the call for ships and men.
+Their loyalty was fatal to Philip's plan. The royal fleet of 25
+ships and a dozen pinnaces was reenforced until the total craft of
+all descriptions numbered 197, not more than 140 of which, however,
+may be said to have had a real share in the campaign. For a month
+or more a hundred sail had been mobilized at Plymouth, of which
+69 were greatships and galleons. These were smaller in average
+tonnage than the Spanish ships, but more heavily armed, and manned
+by 10,000 capable seamen. Lord Henry Seymour, with Palmer and Sir
+William Winter under him, watched Parma at the Strait of Dover,
+with 20 ships and an equal number of galleys, barks and pinnaces.
+The Lord High Admiral, Thomas Howard of Effingham, a nobleman of 50
+with some naval experience and of a family that had long held the
+office, commanded the western squadron, with Drake as Vice Admiral
+and John Hawkins as Rear Admiral. The _Ark_ (800 tons), _Revenge_
+(500), and _Victory_ (800) were their respective flagships. Martin
+Frobisher in the big 1100-ton _Triumph_, Lord Sheffield in the
+_White Bear_ (1000), and Thomas Fenner in the _Nonpareil_ (500)
+were included with the Admirals in Howard's inner council of war.
+"Howard," says Thomas Fuller, "was no deep-seaman, but he had
+skill enough to know those who had more skill than himself and
+to follow their instructions." As far as as possible for a
+commoner, Drake exercised command.
+
+[Illustration: From Pigafetta's _Discorso sopro l'Ordinanza dell'
+Armata Catholico_ (Corbett's _Drake_, Vol. II, p. 213).
+
+ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA, PROBABLY ADOPTED WITH
+SOME MODIFICATIONS AND SHOWING THE INFLUENCE OF GALLEY WARFARE]
+
+On the morning of the 31st the Armada swept slowly past Plymouth
+in what has been described as a broad crescent, but which, from a
+contemporary Italian description, seems to have been the "eagle"
+formation familiar to galley warfare, in line abreast with wide
+extended wings bent slightly forward, the main strength in center
+and guards in van and rear. Howard was just completing the arduous
+task of warping his ships out of the harbor. Had Medina attacked at
+once, as some of his subordinates advised, he might have compelled
+Howard to close action and won by superior numbers. But his orders
+suggested the advisability of avoiding battle till he had joined with
+Parma; and for the Duke this was enough. As the Armada continued its
+course, Howard fell in astern and to windward, inflicting serious
+injuries to two ships of the enemy rear.
+
+[Illustration: From Hale's _Story of the Great Armada._
+
+THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL]
+
+A week of desultory running battle ensued as the fleets moved slowly
+through the Channel; the English fighting "loose and large," and
+seeking to pick off stragglers, still fearful of a general action,
+but taking advantage of Channel flaws to close with the enemy and
+sheer as swiftly away; the Spanish on the defensive but able to
+avoid disaster by better concerted action and fleet control. Only
+two Spanish ships were actually lost, one of them Pedro de Valdes'
+flagship _Neustra Senora del Rosario_, which had been injured in
+collision and surrendered to Drake without a struggle on the night
+of August 1, the other the big _San Salvador_ of the Guipuscoan
+squadron, the whole after part of which had been torn up by an
+explosion after the fighting on the first day. But the Spanish
+inferiority had been clearly demonstrated and they had suffered
+far more in morale than in material injuries when on Sunday, August
+7, they dropped anchor in Calais roads. The English, on their part,
+though flushed with confidence, had seen their weakness in organized
+tactics, and now divided their fleet into four squadrons, with
+the flag officers and Frobisher in command.
+
+It betrays the fatuity of the Spanish leader, if not of the whole
+plan of campaign, that when thus practically driven to refuge in
+a neutral port, Medina Sidonia thought his share of the task
+accomplished, and wrote urgent appeals to Parma to join or send
+aid, though the great general had not enough flat-boats and barges
+to float his army had he been so foolhardy as to embark, or the
+Dutch so benevolent as to let him go. But the English, now reenforced
+by Seymour's squadron, gave the Duke little time to ponder his next
+move. At midnight eight fire hulks, "spurting flames and their
+ordnance exploding," were borne by wind and tide full upon the
+crowded Spanish fleet. Fearful of _maquinas de minas_ such as had
+wrought destruction a year before at the siege of Antwerp, the
+Spanish made no effort to grapple the peril but slipped or cut cables
+and in complete confusion beat off shore.
+
+At dawn the Spanish galleons, attempting with a veering wind from
+the southward and westward to form in order off Gravelines, were set
+upon in the closest approach to a general engagement that occurred
+in the campaign. While Howard and several of his ships were busy
+effecting the capture of a beached galleass, Drake led the attack
+in the _Revenge_, seeking to force the enemy to leeward and throw
+the whole body upon the shallows of the Flanders coast. With splendid
+discipline, the Spanish weather ships, the flagship _San Martin_
+among them, fought valiantly to cover the retreat. But it was an
+unequal struggle, the heavier and more rapid fire of the English
+doing fearful execution on decks crowded with men-at-arms. Such
+artillery combat was hitherto unheard of. Though warned of the new
+northern methods, the Spanish were obsessed by tradition; they were
+prepared for grappling and boarding, and could they have closed,
+their numbers and discipline would have told. Both sides suffered
+from short ammunition; but the Armada, with no fresh supplies, was
+undoubtedly in the worse case. "They fighting with their great
+ordnance," writes Medina Sidonia, "and we with harquebus fire and
+musketry, the distance being very small." Six-inch guns against
+bows and muskets tells the tale.
+
+A slackening of the English pursuit at nightfall after eight hours'
+fighting, and an off-shore slant of wind at daybreak, prevented
+complete disaster. One large galleon sank and two more stranded
+and were captured by the Dutch. These losses were not indeed fatal,
+but the remaining ships staggering away to leeward were little
+more than blood-drenched wrecks. Fifteen hundred had been killed
+and wounded in the day's action, and eleven ships and some eight
+thousand men sacrificed thus far in the campaign. The English,
+on the other hand, had suffered no serious ship injuries and the
+loss of not above 100 men. In the council held next day beyond the
+Straits of Dover, only a few of the Spanish leaders had stomach
+for further fighting; the rest preferred to brave the perils of a
+return around the Orkneys rather than face again these defenders
+of the narrow seas. Before a fair wind they stood northward, Drake
+still at their heels, though by reason of short supplies he left
+them at the Firth of Forth.
+
+In October, fifty ships, with 10,000 starved and fever-stricken
+men, trailed into the Biscay ports of Spain. Torn by September
+gales, the rest of the Armada had been sunk or stranded on the rough
+coasts of Scotland and Ireland. "The wreckers of the Orkneys and the
+Faroes, the clansmen of the Scottish isles, the kernes of Donegal
+and Galway, all had their part in the work of murder and robbery.
+Eight thousand Spaniards perished between the Giant's Causeway and
+the Blaskets. On a strand near Sligo an English captain numbered
+eleven hundred corpses which had been cast up by the sea."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE, Green, Vol. II, p. 448.]
+
+"Flavit Deus, et dissipati sunt"--"The Lord sent His wind, and
+scattered them." So ran the motto on the English medal of victory.
+But storms completed the destruction of a fleet already thoroughly
+defeated. Religious faith, courage, and discipline had availed
+little against superior ships, weapons, leadership, and nautical
+skill. "Till the King of Spain had war with us," an Englishman
+remarked, "he never knew what war by sea meant."[2] It might be
+said more accurately that the battle gave a new meaning to war
+by sea.
+
+[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Monson, NAVAL TRACTS, Purchas, Vol. III, p.
+121.]
+
+From the standpoint of naval progress, the campaign demonstrated
+definitely the ascendancy of sail and artillery. For the old galley
+tactics a new system now had to be developed. Since between sailing
+vessels head-on conflict was practically eliminated, and since
+guns mounted to fire ahead and astern were of little value save
+in flight or pursuit, the arrangement of guns in broadside soon
+became universal, and fleets fought in column, or "line ahead,"
+usually close-hauled on the same or opposite tacks. While these
+were lessons for the next generation, there is more permanent value
+in the truth, again illustrated, that fortune favors the belligerent
+quicker to forsake outworn methods and to develop skill in the use
+of new weapons. The Spanish defeat illustrates also the necessity
+of expert planning and guidance of a naval campaign, with naval
+counsels and requirements duly regarded; and the fatal effect of
+failure to concentrate attention on the enemy fleet. It is doubtful,
+however, whether it would have been better, as Drake urged, and as
+was actually attempted in the month before the Armada's arrival, if
+the English had shifted the war to the coast of Spain. The objections
+arise chiefly from the difficulties, in that age, of maintaining
+a large naval force far from its base, all of which the Spanish
+encountered in their northward cruise. It is noteworthy that, even
+after the brief Channel operations, an epidemic caused heavy mortality
+in the English fleet. Finally, the Armada is a classic example
+of the value of naval defense to an insular nation. In the often
+quoted words of Raleigh, "To entertain the enemy with their own
+beef in their bellies, before they eat of our Kentish capons, I
+take it to be the wisest way, to do which his Majesty after God
+will employ his good ships at sea."
+
+Upon Spain, already tottering from inherent weakness, the Armada
+defeat had the effect of casting down her pride and confidence
+as leader of the Catholic world. Though it was not until three
+centuries later that she lost her last colonies, her hold on her
+vast empire was at once shaken by this blow at her sea control.
+While she maintained large fleets until after the Napoleonic Wars,
+she was never again truly formidable as a naval power. But the victory
+lifted England more than it crushed Spain, inspiring an intenser
+patriotism, an eagerness for colonial and commercial adventure, an
+exaltation of spirit manifested in the men of genius who crowned
+the Elizabethan age.
+
+_The Last Years of the War_
+
+The war was not ended; and though Philip was restrained by the
+rise of Protestant power in France under Henry of Navarre, he was
+still able to gather his sea forces on almost as grand a scale. In
+the latter stages of the war the naval expeditions on both sides
+were either, like the Armada, for the purpose of landing armies on
+foreign soil, or raids on enemy ports, colonies and commerce. Thus
+Drake in 1589 set out with a force of 18,000 men, which attacked
+Corunna, moved thence upon Lisbon, and lost a third or more of
+its number in a fruitless campaign on land. Both Drake and the
+aged Hawkins, now his vice admiral, died in the winter of 1595-96
+during a last and this time ineffective foray upon the Spanish
+Main. Drake was buried off Puerto Bello, where legend has it his
+spirit still awaits England's call--
+
+  "Take my drum to England, hang et by the shore,
+Strike et when your powder's running low.
+  If the Dons sight Devon, I'll leave the port of Heaven,
+An' drum them up the Channel as we drummed them long ago."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: DRAKE'S DRUM, Sir Henry Newbolt.]
+
+We are still far from the period when sea control was thought of
+as important in itself, apart from land operations, or when fleets
+were kept in permanent readiness to take the sea. It is owing to
+this latter fact that we hear of large flotillas dispatched by
+each side even in the same year, yet not meeting in naval action.
+Thus in June of 1596 the Essex expedition, with 17 English and
+18 Dutch men-of-war and numerous auxiliaries, seized Cadiz and
+burned shipping to the value of 11,000,000 ducats. There was no
+naval opposition, though Philip in October of the same year had
+ready a hundred ships and 16,000 men, which were dispersed with
+the loss of a quarter of their strength in a gale off Finisterre.
+Storms also scattered Philip's fleet in the next year; in 1598,
+Spanish transports landed 5,000 men at Calais; and England's fears
+were renewed in the year after that by news of over 100 vessels
+fitting out for the Channel, which, however, merely protected the
+plate fleet by a cruise to the Azores. As late as 1601, Spain landed
+3500 troops in Ireland.
+
+But if these major operations seem to have missed contact, there
+were many lively actions on a minor scale, the well-armed trading
+vessels of the north easily beating off the galley squadrons guarding
+Gibraltar and the routes past Spain. Among these lesser encounters, the
+famous "Last Fight of the Revenge," which occurred during operations
+of a small English squadron off the Azores in 1591, well illustrates
+the fighting spirit of the Elizabethan Englishman and the ineptitude
+which since the Armada seems to have marked the Spaniard at sea.
+In Drake's old flagship, attacked by 15 ships and surrounded by
+a Spanish fleet of 50 sail, a bellicose old sea-warrior named Sir
+Richard Grenville held out from nightfall until eleven the next
+day, and surrendered only after he had sunk three of the enemy,
+when his powder was gone, half his crew dead, the rest disabled,
+and his ship a sinking wreck. "Here die I, Richard Grenville," so
+we are given his last words, "with a joyful and a quiet mind, for
+that I have ended my life as a good soldier ought to do, who has
+fought for his country and his queen, his honor and his religion."
+
+The naval activities mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraphs
+had no decisive effect upon the war, which ended, for England at
+least, with the death of Elizabeth in 1603 and the accession of
+James Stuart of Scotland to the English throne. James at once adopted
+a policy of _rapprochement_ with Spain, which while it guaranteed
+peace during the 22 years of his reign, was by its renunciation of
+trade with the Indies, aid to the Dutch, and leadership of Protestant
+Europe, a sorry sequel to the victory of fifteen years before.
+
+The Armada nevertheless marks the decadence of Spanish sea power.
+With the next century begins a new epoch in naval warfare, an age
+of sail and artillery, in which Dutch, English, and later French
+fleets contested for the sea mastery deemed essential to colonial
+empire and commercial prosperity.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Sir Julian Corbett, 2 vols., 1898.
+THE SUCCESSORS OF DRAKE, Sir Julian Corbett, 1900.
+THE STORY OF THE GREAT ARMADA, J. R. Hale, no date.
+ARMADA PAPERS, Sir John Knox Laughtun, 2 vols., Navy Records
+  Society, 1894.
+LA ARMADA INVENCIBLE, Captain Fernandez Duro, 1884.
+A HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1509-1660,
+  by M. Oppenheim, 1896.
+A HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, William Laird Clowes, Vol. 1., 1897.
+THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, W. Cunningham, 1907.
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS IN THE TUDOR NAVY, Capt. G. Goldingham,
+  United Service Magazine, June, 1918.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER: WARS WITH THE DUTCH.
+
+In the Dutch Wars of the 17th century the British navy may be said
+to have caught its stride in the march that made Britannia the
+unrivaled mistress of the seas. The defeat of the Armada was caused
+by other things besides the skill of the English, and the steady
+decline of Spain from that point was not due to that battle or to
+any energetic naval campaign undertaken by the English thereafter.
+In fact, save for the Cadiz expedition of 1596, in which the Dutch
+cooperated, England had a rather barren record after the Armada
+campaign down to the middle of the 17th century. During that period
+the Dutch seized the control of the seas for trade and war. They
+appropriated what was left of the Levantine trade in the Mediterranean,
+and contested the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies and the
+Spanish in the West. Indeed the Dutch were at this time freely
+acknowledged to be the greatest sea-faring people of Europe.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: "Dutch exports reached a figure in the 17th century,
+which was not attained by the English until 1740. Even the Dutch
+fisheries, which employed over 2000 boats, were said to be more
+valuable than the manufactures of France and England combined."
+A HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Clive Day, p. 194.]
+
+When the Commonwealth came into power in England the new government
+turned its attention to the navy, which had languished under the
+Stuarts. A great reform was accomplished in the bettering of the
+living conditions for the seamen. Their pay was increased, their
+share of prize money enlarged, and their food improved. At the
+same time, during the years 1648-51, the number of ships of the
+fleet was practically doubled, and the new vessels were the product
+of the highest skill in design and honest work in construction. The
+turmoil between Roundhead and Royalist had naturally disorganized
+the officer personnel of the fleet. Prince Rupert, nephew of Charles
+I, had taken a squadron of seven Royalist ships to sea, hoping to
+organize, at the Scilly Islands or at Kinsdale in Ireland, bases
+for piratical raids on the commerce of England, and it was necessary
+to bring him up short. Moreover, Ireland was still rebellious,
+Barbados, the only British possession in the West Indies, was held
+for the King, and Virginia also was Royalist. To establish the
+rule of the Commonwealth Cromwell needed an efficient fleet and
+an energetic admiral.
+
+For the latter he turned to a man who had won a military reputation
+in the Civil War second only to that of the great Oliver himself,
+Robert Blake, colonel of militia. Blake was chosen as one of three
+"generals at sea" in 1649. As far as is known he had never before
+set foot on a man of war; he was a scholarly man, who had spent ten
+years at Oxford, where he had cherished the ambition of becoming
+a professor of Greek. At the time of his appointment he was fifty
+years old, and his entire naval career was comprised in the seven
+or eight remaining years of his life, and yet he so bore himself
+in those years as to win a reputation that stands second only to
+that of Nelson among the sea-fighters of the English race.
+
+Blake made short work of Rupert's cruising and destroyed the Royalist
+pretensions to Jersey and the Scillies. One of his rewards for
+the excellent service rendered was a position in the Council of
+State, in which capacity he did much toward the bettering of the
+condition of the sailors, which was one of the striking reforms
+of the Commonwealth. His test, however, came in the first Dutch
+War, in which he was pitted against Martin Tromp, then the leading
+naval figure of Europe.
+
+In the wars with Spain, English and Dutch had been allies, but
+the shift of circumstances brought the two Protestant nations into
+a series of fierce conflicts lasting throughout the latter half
+of the 17th century. The outcome of these was that England won
+the scepter of the sea which she has ever since held. The main
+cause of the war was the rivalry of the two nations on the sea.
+There were various other specific reasons for bad feeling on both
+sides, as for instance a massacre by the Dutch of English traders
+at Amboyna in the East Indies, during the reign of James I, which
+still rankled because it had never been avenged. The English on
+their side insisted on a salute to their men of war from every
+ship that passed through the Channel, and claimed the rights to
+a tribute, of all herrings taken within 30 miles off the English
+coast.
+
+Cromwell formulated the English demands in the Navigation Act of
+1651. The chief of these required that none but English ships should
+bring cargoes to England, save vessels of the country whence the
+cargoes came. This was frankly a direct blow at the Dutch carrying
+trade, one to which the Dutch could not yield without a struggle.
+
+For this struggle the Netherlanders were ill prepared. The Dutch
+Republic was a federation of seven sovereign states, lacking a strong
+executive and torn by rival factions. Moreover, her geographical
+position was most vulnerable. Pressed by enemies on her land frontiers,
+she was compelled to maintain an army of 57,000 men in addition to
+her navy. As the resources of the country were wholly inadequate
+to support the population, her very life depended on the sea. For
+the Holland of the 17th century, as for the England of the 20th, the
+fleets of merchantmen were the life blood of the nation. Unfortunately
+for the Dutch, this life blood had to course either through the
+Channel or else round the north of Scotland. Either way was open
+to attacks by the British, who held the interior position. Further,
+the shallows of the coasts and bays made necessary a flat bottomed
+ship of war, lighter built than the English and less weatherly
+in deep water.
+
+In contrast the British had a unity of government under the iron
+hand of Cromwell, they had the enormous advantage of position,
+they were self-sustaining, and their ships were larger, stouter
+and better in every respect than those of their enemies. Hence,
+although the Dutch entered the conflict with the naval prestige
+on their side, it is clear that the odds were decidedly against
+them.
+
+_The First Dutch War_
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE 17TH
+CENTURY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND FRANCE]
+
+The fighting did not wait for a declaration of war. Blake met Tromp,
+who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen, off Dover on May 19,
+1652. On coming up with him Blake fired guns demanding the required
+salute. Tromp replied with a broadside. Blake attacked with his
+flagship, well ahead of his own line, and fought for five hours with
+Tromp's flagship and several others. The English were outnumbered
+about three to one, and Blake might have been annihilated had not
+the English admiral, Bourne, brought his squadron out from Dover
+at the sound of the firing and fallen upon Tromp's flank. As the
+Dutch Admiral's main business was to get his convoy home, he fell
+back slowly toward the coast of France, both sides maintaining a
+cannonade until they lost each other in the darkness. Apparently
+there was little attempt at formation after the first onset; it
+was close quarters fighting, and only the wild gunnery of the day
+saved both fleets from enormous losses. As it was, Blake's flagship
+was very severely hammered.
+
+Following this action, Tromp reappeared with 100 ships, but failed
+to keep Blake from attacking and ruining the Dutch herring fisheries
+for that year. This mistake temporarily cost Tromp his command.
+He was superseded by DeWith, an able man and brave, but no match
+for Blake. On September 28, 1652, Blake met him off the "Kentish
+Knock" shoal at the mouth of the Thames. In order to keep the weather
+gage, which would enable him to attack at close quarters, Blake
+took the risk of grounding on the shoal. His own ship and a few
+others did ground for a time, but they served as a guide to the
+rest. In the ensuing action Blake succeeded in putting the Dutch
+between two fires and inflicting a severe defeat. Only darkness
+saved the Dutch from utter destruction.
+
+The effect of this victory was to give the English Council of State
+a false impression of security. In vain Blake urged the upkeep of
+the fleet. Two months later, November 30, 1652, Tromp, now restored
+to command, suddenly appeared in the Channel with 80 ships and a
+convoy behind him. Blake had only 45 and these only partly manned,
+but he was no man to refuse a challenge and boldly sailed out to
+meet him. It is said that during the desperate struggle--the "battle
+of Dungeness"--Blake's flagship, supported by two others, fought
+for some time with twenty of the Dutch. As Blake had the weather
+gage and retained it, he was able to draw off finally and save his
+fleet from destruction. All the ships were badly knocked about and
+two fell into the hands of the enemy. Blake came back so depressed
+by his defeat that he offered to resign his command, but the Council
+of State would not hear of such a thing, handsomely admitted their
+responsibility for the weakness of the fleet, and set at work to
+refit. Meanwhile for the next three months the Channel was in Tromp's
+hands. This is the period when the legend describes him as hoisting
+a broom to his masthead.
+
+By the middle of February the English had reorganized their fleet
+and Blake took the sea with another famous Roundhead soldier, Monk,
+as one of his divisional commanders. At this time Tromp lay off
+Land's End waiting for the Dutch merchant fleet which he expected
+to convoy to Holland. On the 18th the two forces sighted each other
+about 15 miles off Portland. Then followed the "Three Days' Battle,"
+or the battle of Portland, one of the most stubbornly contested
+fights in the war and its turning point.
+
+In order to be sure to catch Tromp, Blake had extended his force
+of 70 or 80 ships in a cross Channel position. Under cover of a
+fog Tromp suddenly appeared and caught the English fleet divided.
+Less than half were collected under the immediate command of Blake,
+only about ten were in the actual vicinity of his flagship, and
+the rest were to eastward, especially Monk's division which he
+had carelessly permitted to drift to leeward four or five miles.
+As the wind was from the west and very light, Monk's position made
+it impossible for him to support his chief for some time. Tromp saw
+his opportunity to concentrate on the part of the English fleet
+nearest him, the handful of ships with Blake. The latter had the
+choice of either bearing up to make a junction with Monk and the
+others before accepting battle or of grappling with Tromp at once,
+trusting to his admirals to arrive in time to win a victory. It
+was characteristic of Blake that he chose the bolder course.
+
+The fighting began early in the afternoon and was close and furious
+from the outset. Again Blake's ship was compelled to engage several
+Dutch, including Tromp's flagship. De Ruyter, the brilliant lieutenant
+of Tromp, attempted to cut Blake off from his supports on the north,
+and Evertsen steered between Blake and Penn's squadron on the south.
+(See diagram 1.) Blake's dozen ships might well have been surrounded
+and taken if his admirals had not known their business. Penn tacked
+right through Evertsen's squadron to come to the side of Blake,
+and Lawson foiled de Ruyter by bearing away till he had enough
+southing to tack in the wake of Penn and fall upon Tromp's rear
+(diagram 2). Evertsen then attempted to get between Monk and the
+rest of the fleet and two hours after the fight in the center began
+Monk also was engaged. When the lee vessels of the "red" or center
+squadron came on the scene about four o'clock, they threatened to
+weather the Dutch and put them between two fires. To avoid this
+and to protect his convoy, Tromp tacked his whole fleet together--an
+exceedingly difficult maneuver under the circumstances--and drew
+off to windward. Darkness stopped the fighting for that day. All
+night the two fleets sailed eastward watching each other's lights,
+and hastily patching up damages.
+
+[Illustration: Based on diagram of Mahan's in Clowes, _The Royal
+Navy_, Vol. II, p. 180-1.
+
+THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEB. 18, 1653]
+
+Morning discovered them off the Isle of Wight, with the English
+on the north side of the Channel. As Tromp's chief business was to
+save his convoy and as the English force was now united, he took
+a defensive position. He formed his own ships in a long crescent,
+with the outward curve toward his enemy, and in the lee of this
+line he placed his convoy. The wind was so light that the English
+were unable to attack until late. The fighting, though energetic,
+had not proved decisive when darkness fell.
+
+The following day, the 20th, brought a fresh wind that enabled
+the English to overhaul the Dutch, who could not move faster than
+the heavily laden merchantmen, and force a close action. Blake
+tried to cut off Tromp from the north so as to block his road home.
+Vice Admiral Penn, leading the van, broke through the Dutch battle
+line and fell upon the convoy, but Blake was unable to reach far
+enough to head off his adversary before he rounded Cape Gris Nez
+under cover of darkness and found anchorage in Calais roads. That
+night, favored by the tide and thick weather, Tromp succeeded in
+carrying off the greater part of his convoy unobserved. Nevertheless
+he had left in Blake's hand some fifty merchantmen and a number
+of men of war variously estimated from five to eighteen. At the
+same time the English had suffered heavily in men and ships. On
+Blake's flagship alone it is said that 100 men had been killed
+and Blake and his second in command, Deane, were both wounded, the
+former seriously.
+
+The result of this three days' action was to encourage the English
+to press the war with energy and take the offensive to the enemy's
+own coast. English crews had shown that they could fight with a
+spirit fully equal to that of the Dutch, and English ships and
+weight of broadside, as de Ruyter frankly declared to his government,
+were decidedly superior. The fact that the shallow waters of the
+Dutch coast made necessary a lighter draft man of war than that
+of the English proved a serious handicap to the Dutch in all their
+conflicts with the British. Both fleets were so badly shot up by
+this prolonged battle that there was a lull in operations until
+May.
+
+In that month Tromp suddenly arrived off Dover and bombarded the
+defenses. The English quickly took the sea to hunt him down. As
+Blake was still incapacitated by his wound, the command was given
+to Monk. The latter, with a fleet of over a hundred ships, brought
+Tromp to action on June 2 (1653) in what is known as the "Battle
+of the Gabbard" after a shoal near the mouth of the Thames, where
+the action began. Tromp was this time not burdened with a convoy
+but his fleet was smaller in numbers than Monk's and, as he well
+knew, inferior in other elements of force. Accordingly, he adapted
+defensive tactics of a sort that was copied afterwards by the French
+as a fixed policy. He accepted battle to leeward, drawing off in a
+slanting line from his enemy with the idea of catching the English
+van as it advanced to the attack unsupported by the rest of the
+fleet, and crippling it so severely that the attack would not be
+pressed. As it turned out, a shift of the wind gave him the chance
+to fall heavily upon the English van, but a second shift gave back
+the weather gage to the English and the two fleets became fiercely
+engaged at close quarters. Blake, hearing the guns, left his sick
+bed and with his own available force of 18 ships sailed out to join
+battle. The sight of this fresh squadron flying Blake's flag, turned
+the fortune of battle decisively. The Dutch escaped destruction
+only by finding safety in the shallows of the Flemish coast, where
+the English ships could not follow.
+
+After this defeat the Dutch were almost at the end of their resources
+and sued far peace, but Cromwell's ruthless demands amounted to
+a practical loss of independence, which even a bankrupt nation
+could not accept. Accordingly, every nerve was strained to build
+a fleet that might yet beat the English. The latter, for their
+part, were equally determined not to lose the fruits of their hard
+won victories. Since Blake's active share in the battle of the
+Gabbard aggravated his wound so severely that he was carried ashore
+more nearly dead than alive, Monk retained actual command.
+
+Monk attempted to maintain a close blockade of the Dutch coast
+and to prevent a junction between Tromp's main fleet at Flushing
+and a force of thirty ships at Amsterdam. In this, however, he was
+outgeneraled by Tromp, who succeeded in taking the sea with the
+greatest of all Dutch fleets, 120 men of war. The English and the
+Dutch speedily clashed in the last, and perhaps the most furiously
+contested, battle of the war, the "Battle of Scheveningen." The
+action began at six in the morning of July 30, 1653. Tromp had the
+weather gage, but Monk, instead of awaiting his onslaught, tacked
+towards him and actually cut through the Dutch line. Tromp countered
+by tacking also, in order to keep his windward position, and this
+maneuver was repeated three times by Tromp and Monk, and the two
+great fleets sailed in great zigzag courses down the Dutch coast a
+distance of forty miles, with bitter fighting going on at close
+range between the two lines. Early in the action the renowned Tromp
+was killed, but his flag was kept flying and there was no flinching
+on the part of his admirals. About one o'clock a shift of the wind
+gave the weather gage to the English. Some of the Dutch captains
+then showed the white feather and tried to escape. This compelled
+the retirement of DeWith, who had succeeded to the command, and
+who, as he retreated, fired on his own fugitives as well as on
+the English. As usual in those battles with the Dutch, the English
+had been forced to pay a high price for their victory. Their fleet
+was so shattered that they were obliged to lift the blockade and
+return home to refit. But for the Dutch it was the last effort.
+Again they sued for peace. Cromwell drove a hard bargain; he insisted
+on every claim England had ever made against the Netherlands before
+the war, but on this occasion he agreed to leave Holland her
+independence.
+
+Thus in less than two years the First Dutch War came to an end. In
+the words of Mr. Hannay,[1] the English historian, its "importance
+as an epoch in the history of the English Navy can hardly be
+exaggerated. Though short, for it lasted barely twenty-two months,
+it was singularly fierce and full of battles. Yet its interest is
+not derived mainly from the mere amount of fighting but from the
+character of it. This was the first of our naval wars conducted
+by steady, continuous, coherent campaigns. Hitherto our operations
+on the sea had been of the nature of adventures by single ships
+and small squadrons, with here and there a great expedition sent
+out to capture some particular port or island."
+
+[Footnote 1: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. I, p. 217.]
+
+As to the intensity of the fighting, it is worth noting that in this
+short period six great battles took place between fleets numbering
+as a rule from 70 to 120 ships on a side. By comparison it may be
+remarked that at Trafalgar the total British force numbered 27
+ships of the line and the Allies, 33. Nor were the men of war of
+Blake and Tromp the small types of an earlier day. In 1652 the
+ship of the line had become the unit of the fleet as truly as it
+was in 1805. It is true that Blake's ships were not the equal of
+Nelson's huge "first rates," because the "two-decker" was then
+the most powerful type. The first three-decker in the English navy
+was launched in the year of Blake's death, 1657. The fact remains,
+however, that these fleet actions of the Dutch Wars took place
+on a scale unmatched by any of the far better known engagements
+of the 18th or early 19th century.
+
+A curious naval weapon survived from the day when Howard drove
+Medina Sidonia from Calais roads, the fireship, or "brander." This
+was used by both English and Dutch. Its usefulness, of course, was
+confined to the side that held the windward position, and even
+an opponent to leeward could usually, if he kept his head, send
+out boats to grapple and tow the brander out of harm's way. In the
+battle of Scheveningen, however, Dutch fireships cost the English
+two fine ships, together with a Dutch prize, and very nearly destroyed
+the old flagship of Blake, the _Triumph_. She was saved only by
+the extraordinary exertions of her captain, who received mortal
+injury from the flames he fought so courageously.
+
+This First Dutch War is interesting in what it reveals of the advance
+in tactics. Tromp well deserves his title as the "Father of Naval
+Tactics," and he undoubtedly taught Blake and Monk a good deal by
+the rough schooling of battle, but they proved apt pupils. From
+even the brief summary of these great battles just given, it is
+evident that Dutch and English did not fight each other in helter
+skelter fashion. In fact, there is revealed a great advance in
+coordination over the work of the English in the campaign of the
+Armada. These fleets worked as units. This does not mean that they
+were not divided into squadrons. A force of 100 ships of the line
+required division and subdivision, and considerable freedom of
+movement was left to division and squadron commanders under the
+general direction of the commander in chief, but they were all
+working consciously together. Just as at Trafalgar Nelson formed
+his fleet in two lines (originally planned as three) and allowed
+his second in command a free hand in carrying out the task assigned
+him, so Tromp and Blake operated their fleets in squadrons--Tromp
+usually had five--and expected of their subordinates responsibility
+and initiative. All this is in striking contrast with the practice
+that paralyzed tactics in the latter 17th and 18th centuries, which
+sacrificed everything to a rigid line of battle in column ahead,
+and required every movement to emanate from the commander in chief.
+
+Although details about the great battles of the First Dutch War
+are scanty, there is enough recorded to show that both sides used
+the line ahead as the normal battle line. It is equally clear,
+however, that they repeatedly broke through each other's lines
+and aimed at concentration, or destroying in detail. These two
+related principles, which had to be rediscovered toward the end of
+the 18th century, were practiced by Tromp, de Ruyter, and Blake.
+Their work has not the advantage of being as near our day as the
+easy, one-sided victories over the demoralized French navy in the
+Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, but the day may come when the
+British will regard the age of Blake as the naval epoch of which
+they have the most reason to be proud. Then England met the greatest
+seamen of the day led by one of the greatest admirals of history
+and won a bitterly fought contest by virtue of better ships and
+the spirit of Cromwell's "Ironsides."
+
+_Porto Farina and Santa Cruz_
+
+Nor did the age of Blake end with the First Dutch War. As soon
+as the admiral was able to go aboard ship, Cromwell sent him with
+a squadron into the Mediterranean to enforce respect for the
+Commonwealth from the Italian governments and the Barbary states.
+He conducted his mission with eminent success. Although the Barbary
+pirates did not course the sea in great fleets as in the palmy
+days of Barbarossa, they were still a source of peril to Christian
+traders. Blake was received civilly by the Dey of Algiers but
+negotiations did not result satisfactorily. At Tunis he was openly
+flouted. The Pasha drew up his nine cruisers inside Porto Farina
+and defied the English admiral to do his worst. Blake left for a
+few days to gain the effect of surprise and replenish provisions.
+On April 4, 1655, he suddenly reappeared and stood in to the attack.
+
+The harbor of Porto Farina was regarded as impregnable. The entrance
+was narrow and the shores lined with castles and batteries. As Blake
+foresaw, the wind that took him in would roll the battle smoke upon
+the enemy. In a short time he had silenced the fire of the forts
+and then sent boarding parties against the Tunisian ships, which
+were speedily taken and burnt. Then he took his squadron out again,
+having destroyed the entire Tunisian navy, shattered the forts, and
+suffered only a trifling loss. This exploit resounded throughout
+the Mediterranean. Algiers was quick to follow Tunis in yielding
+to Blake's demands. It is characteristic of this officer that he
+should have made the attack on Tunis entirely without orders from
+Cromwell, and it is equally characteristic of the latter that he
+was heartily pleased with the initiative of his admiral in carrying
+out the spirit rather than the letter of his instructions.
+
+Meanwhile Cromwell had been wavering between a war against France
+or Spain. The need of a capture of money perhaps influenced him to
+turn against Spain, for this country still drew from her western
+colonies a tribute of gold and silver, which naturally would fall a
+prey to the power that controlled the sea. One month after Blake's
+exploit at Tunis, another English naval expedition set out to the
+West Indies to take Santo Domingo. Although Jamaica was seized and
+thereafter became an English possession, the expedition as a whole
+was a disgraceful failure, and the leaders, Penn and Venables, were
+promptly clapped by Cromwell into the Tower on their return. This
+stroke against Spain amounted to a declaration of war, and on Blake's
+return to England he was ordered to blockade Cadiz. One detachment
+of the plate fleet fell into the hands of his blockading ships and
+the silver ingots were dispatched to London. Blake continued his
+blockade in an open roadstead for six months, through autumn and
+winter, an unheard of thing in those days and exceedingly difficult.
+Blake was himself ill, his ships were not the copper-bottomed ones
+of a hundred years later, and there was not, as in later days, an
+English base at Gibraltar. But he never relaxed his vigilance.
+
+In April (1657) he learned that another large plate fleet had arrived
+at Santa Cruz, Teneriffe. Immediately he sailed thither to take or
+destroy it. If Porto Farina had been regarded as safe from naval
+attack, Santa Cruz was far more so. A deep harbor, with a narrow,
+funnel entrance, and backed by mountains, it is liable to dead
+calms or squally bursts of wind from the land. In addition to its
+natural defenses it was heavily fortified. Blake, however, reckoned
+on coming in with a flowing tide and a sea breeze that, as at Porto
+Farina, would blow his smoke upon the defenses. He rightly guessed
+that if he sailed close enough under the castles at the harbor
+entrance their guns could not be sufficiently depressed to hit
+his ships, and as he saw the galleons and their escorts lined up
+along the shore he perceived also that they were masking the fire
+of their own shore batteries. For the most difficult part of his
+undertaking, the exit from the harbor, he trusted to the ebbing
+tide with the chance of a shift in the wind in his favor.
+
+Early on the morning of April 20th (1657) he sailed in. As he had
+judged, the fire of the forts did little damage. By eight o'clock
+the English ships were all at their appointed stations and fighting.
+During the entire day Blake continued his work of destruction till
+it was complete, and at dusk drifted out on the ebb. Some writers
+mention a favoring land breeze that helped to extricate the English,
+but according to Blake's own words, "the wind blew right into the
+bay." In spite of this head wind the ships that were crippled were
+warped or towed out and not one was lost. The English suffered
+in the entire action only 50 killed and 120 wounded, and repairs
+were so easily made that Blake returned to his blockading station
+at once.
+
+This was the greatest of Blake's feats as it also was his last.
+All who heard of it--friend or enemy--pronounced it as without
+parallel in the history of ships. A few months later Blake was
+given leave to return home. He had long been a sick man, but his
+name alone was worth a fleet and Cromwell had not been able to spare
+him. As it happened, he did not live long enough to see England
+again. Cromwell, who knew the worth of his faithful admiral, gave
+him a funeral of royal dignity and interment in Westminster Abbey.
+
+Blake never showed, perhaps, great strategic insight--Tromp and
+de Ruyter were his superiors there, as was also Nelson--but he,
+more than any other, won for England her mastery of the sea, and
+no other can boast his record of great victories. These he won
+partly by skill and forethought but chiefly by intrepidity. We
+can do no better than leave his fame in the words of the Royalist
+historian, Clarendon--a political enemy--who says: "He quickly made
+himself signal there (on the sea) and was the first man who declined
+the old track ... and disproved those rules that had long been in
+practice, to keep his ships and men out of danger, which had been
+held in former times a point of great ability and circumspection,
+as if the principal requisite in the captain of a ship had been
+to come home safe again. He was the first man who brought ships
+to contemn castles on shore, which had been thought ever very
+formidable.... He was the first that infused that proportion of
+courage into the seamen by making them see what mighty things they
+could do if they were resolved, and taught them to fight in fire
+as well as on water. And though he hath been very well imitated
+and followed, he was the first that drew the copy of naval courage
+and bold resolute achievement."
+
+The chaos that followed the death of the Protector resulted in
+Monk's bringing over the exiled Stuart king--Charles II. Thereafter
+Round Head and Royalist served together in the British navy. An
+important effect of the Restoration was organization of a means of
+training the future officers of the fleet. The Navy as a profession
+may be said to date from this time, in contrast with the practice of
+using merchant skippers and army officers, which had prevailed to
+so great a degree hitherto. Under the new system "young gentlemen"
+were sent to sea as "King's Letter Boys"--midshipmen--to learn
+the ways of the navy and to grow up in it as a preparation for
+command. This was an excellent reform but it resulted in making
+the navy the property of a social caste from that day to this,
+and it made promotion, for a century and more, largely subject to
+family influence.
+
+Another effect of the Restoration was to break down the fighting
+efficiency of the fleet as it had been in the days of Blake. The
+veterans of the First Dutch War fought with their old time courage
+and discipline, but the newer elements did not show the same devotion
+and initiative. The effect on the material was still worse, for
+the fleet became a prey to the cynical dishonesty that Charles
+II inspired in every department of his government.
+
+_The Second Dutch War_
+
+Five years after Charles II became king, England was involved in
+another war with the Netherlands. There was still bad feeling between
+the two peoples, and trading companies in the far east or west
+kept up a guerilla warfare which flooded both governments with
+complaints. The chief cause seems to have been the desire of the
+English Guinea Company to get rid of their Dutch competitors who
+persistently undersold them in the slave markets of the West Indies.
+Before there was any declaration of war an English squadron was sent
+out to attack the Dutch company's settlement on the West African
+coast. After this it crossed the Atlantic and took New Amsterdam,
+which thereafter became New York. The Dutch retaliated by sending
+out one of their squadrons to retake their African post and threaten
+the Atlantic colonies. In March, 1665, war was declared.
+
+In this conflict the relative strengths of the two navies were about
+the same as in the previous war. The Dutch had made improvements
+in their ships, but they still suffered from the lack of unity
+in organization and spirit. The first engagement was the battle
+of Lowestoft, on June 3, 1665. The English fleet was under the
+personal command of the Duke of York, later James II; the Dutch
+were led by de Ruyter. The two forces numbered from 80 to 100 ships
+each, and strung out as they were, must have extended over nearly
+ten miles of sea. The Duke of York formed his fleet in the pattern
+that he set by his own "Fighting Instructions," which governed the
+tactics of all navies thereafter for a hundred years, namely, the
+entire force drawn up in single line. This line bore down abreast
+toward the enemy until it reached gunshot, then swung into line
+ahead and sailed on a course parallel to that of the enemy. De
+Ruyter arranged his fleet accordingly, and the two long lines passed
+each other on opposite tacks three times, cannonading furiously
+at close range. This meant that the force was distributed evenly
+along the enemy's line and as against an evenly matched force these
+tactics could result, as a rule, only in mere inconclusive artillery
+duels which each side would claim as victories. In the battle of
+Lowestoft, however, several of the captains in the Dutch center
+flinched at the third passing and bore up to leeward, leaving a
+wide gap in de Ruyter's line. The English broke through at this
+point and hammered the weakened Dutch line in the center with a
+superior force. This was the decisive point in the battle and de
+Ruyter was forced to retreat. The Dutch would have suffered even
+greater loss than they did had it not been for the masterly fashion
+in which Cornelius Tromp--son of the famous Martin Tromp--covered
+the retreat.
+
+The defeat of the Dutch was due to the bad conduct of the captains
+in the center, four of whom were shot by order of de Ruyter and
+others dismissed from the service. It is interesting to note that
+while the first half of the battle was fought on the formal lines
+that were soon to be the cast iron rule of conduct for the British
+navy, and led to nothing conclusive; the second half was characterized
+by the breaking of the enemy's line, in the older style of Blake,
+and led to a pronounced victory.
+
+At this time Louis XIV had pledged himself to give aid to the
+Netherlands in case of attack by a third Power. But when the Dutch
+and his own ministers called on him to make good his promise he
+offered more promises and no fulfillment. The rumor of an approaching
+French squadron which was to make junction with de Ruyter, who had
+now been placed in command of the Dutch fleet, caused the English
+government to make the grave mistake of detaching Prince Rupert
+with 20 ships to look for the mythical French force. This division
+left Monk, who was again in command of the fleet, with only 57
+ships. Hearing that de Ruyter was anchored on the Flanders coast,
+Monk went out to find him. De Ruyter left his anchorage to meet the
+English, and on June 1, 1666, the two forces met in mid-Channel,
+between Dunkirk and the Downs. As the Dutch force heavily outnumbered
+him--nearly two to one--Monk might have been expected to avoid
+fighting, but he acted in the spirit of Blake. Having the windward
+position he decided that he could strike the advanced division
+under Tromp and maul it severely before the rest of the Dutch could
+succor it. Accordingly he boldly headed for the enemy's van. When
+Monk attacked he had only about 35 ships in hand, for the rest were
+straggling behind too far to help. Thus began the famous "Four
+Days' Battle," characterized by Mahan as "the most remarkable, in
+some of its aspects that has ever been fought upon the ocean."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, p. 125.]
+
+The fighting was close and furious and in its unparalleled duration
+numbers were bound to tell. On the third day Monk retreated to
+the Thames, but on being joined by Rupert's squadron immediately
+sallied forth to do battle again. On this day, June 4, the Dutch
+succeeded in cutting through his formation and putting him between
+two fires. Indeed Monk escaped destruction only by breaking through
+his ring of enemies and finding refuge in the Thames. The Dutch had
+won a great victory, for the English had lost some twenty ships
+and 5000 in killed and wounded. But Monk was right in feeling a
+sense of pride in the fight that he had made against great odds.
+The losses that he had inflicted were out of all proportion to the
+relative strength of the two forces. Unfortunately the new spirit
+that was coming into the navy of the Restoration was evidenced by
+the fact that a number of English captains, finding the action too
+hot for them, deserted their commander in chief. On the Dutch side
+de Ruyter's handling of his fleet was complicated by the conduct
+of Cornelius Tromp. This officer believed that he, not de Ruyter,
+should have been made commander of the Dutch fleet and in this
+action as in the next, acted with no regard for his chief's orders.
+
+As a consequence of the Four Days' Battle, Dutchmen again controlled
+the Channel and closed the mouth of the Thames to trade. The English
+strained every nerve to create a fleet that should put an end to
+this humiliating and disastrous situation. The preparations were
+carried out with such speed that on July 22 (1666), Monk and Rupert
+anchored off the end of the Gunfleet shoal with a fleet of about
+80 ships of the line and frigates. On the 25th the English sighted
+de Ruyter, with a fleet slightly larger in numbers, in the broad
+part of the Thames estuary. Monk, forming his fleet in the long
+line ahead, sailed to the attack. The action that followed is called
+the "Battle of St. James's Day" or the "Gunfleet."
+
+[Illustration: THE THAMES ESTUARY]
+
+Whether or not Monk was influenced by his princely colleague it
+is impossible to say, but the tactics of this engagement do not
+suggest the Monk of earlier battles. He followed the "Fighting
+Instructions" and in spite of them won a victory, but it might
+have been far more decisive. The English bore down in line abreast,
+then formed line ahead on reaching gunshot, the van, center, and
+rear, engaging respectively the Dutch van, center, and rear. In these
+line ahead attacks the rear usually straggled. Tromp, commanding
+the Dutch rear, saw his chance to attack Smith, commanding the
+English rear, before his squadron was in proper formation. Smith
+retreated, and Tromp, eager to win a victory all by himself, abandoned
+the rest of the Dutch fleet and pursued Smith. Thus the action
+broke into two widely separated parts. The English van and center
+succeeded in forcing the corresponding Dutch divisions to retreat,
+and if Monk had turned to the help of Smith he might have taken
+or destroyed all of the 39 ships in Tromp's division. Instead,
+he and Rupert went careering on in pursuit of the enemy directly
+ahead of them. Eventually de Ruyter's ships found refuge in shallow
+water and then Monk turned to catch Tromp. But the latter proved too
+clever for his adversaries and slipped between them to an anchorage
+alongside of de Ruyter.
+
+Although the victory was not nearly so decisive as it should have
+been with the opportunity offered, nevertheless it served the need
+of the hour. De Ruyter was no longer able to blockade the Thames and
+the Straits of Dover. And Monk, following up his success, carried
+the war to the enemy's coast, where he burned a merchant fleet
+of 160 vessels in the roadstead of the island of Terschelling,
+and destroyed one of the towns. Early in 1666 active operations
+on both sides dwindled down, and Charles, anxious to use naval
+appropriations for other purposes, allowed the fleet to fall into
+a condition of unreadiness for service. One of the least scandals in
+this corrupt age was the unwillingness or inability of the officials
+to pay the seamen their wages. In consequence large numbers of
+English prisoners in Holland actually preferred taking service
+in the Dutch navy rather than accepting exchange, on the ground
+that the Dutch government paid its men while their own did not.
+
+Early in June, 1667, de Ruyter took advantage of the condition of
+the English fleet by inflicting perhaps the greatest humiliation on
+England that she has ever suffered. Entering the Thames unopposed,
+he was prevented from attacking London only by unfavorable wind and
+tide. He then turned his attention to the dockyards of Chatham and
+burnt or captured seven great ships of the line, besides numerous
+smaller craft, carried off the naval stores at Sheerness, and then
+for the next six weeks kept a blockade on the Thames and the eastern
+and southern coasts of England. This mortifying situation continued
+until the signing of the "Peace of Breda" concluded the war.
+
+_The Third Dutch War_
+
+Less than five years later Charles again made war on the Netherlands.
+For this there was not the shadow of excuse, but Louis XIV saw
+fit to attack the Dutch, and Charles was ever his willing vassal.
+The English began hostilities without any declaration of war by
+a piratical attack on a Dutch convoy.
+
+At this juncture Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Attacked
+on her land frontiers by France, then the dominating military power,
+and on her sea frontiers by England, the strongest naval power, she
+seemed to have small chance to survive. But her people responded
+with a heroism worthy of her splendid history. They opened their
+dykes to check the armies of invasion and strained every nerve to
+equip a fleet large enough to cope with the combined navies of
+France and England. In this Third Dutch War four great naval battles
+were fought: that of Solebay, May 28, 1672, the two engagements
+off Schooneveldt, May 28 and June 4, 1673, and that of the Texel,
+August 11, 1673.
+
+In all of these the honors go to the Dutch and their great admiral,
+de Ruyter. Since these actions did not restore the Netherlands to
+their old-time position or check the ascendancy of England, they
+need not be discussed individually here. The outstanding feature
+of the whole story is the surpassing skill and courage of de Ruyter
+in the face of overwhelming odds. In this war he showed the full
+stature of his genius as never before, and won his title as the
+greatest seaman of the 17th century. After his death one must wait
+till the day of Suffren and Nelson to find men worthy to rank with
+him.
+
+In this campaign de Ruyter showed his powers not only as a tactician
+but as a strategist. In the words of Mahan, the Dutch "made a strategic
+use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based their
+sea operations. To this they were forced by the desperate odds under
+which they were fighting; but they did not use their shoals as a
+mere shelter,--the warfare they waged was the defensive-offensive.
+When the wind was fair for the allies to attack, de Ruyter kept
+under cover of his islands, or at least on ground where the enemy
+dared not follow; but when the wind served so that he might attack
+in his own way he turned and fell upon them."[1] That is, instead of
+accepting the tame role of a "fleet in being" and hiding in a safe
+harbor, de Ruyter took and held the sea, always on the aggressive,
+always alert to catch his enemy in a position of divided forces
+or exposed flank and strike hard. His master, Martin Tromp, is
+regarded as the father of the line ahead formation for battle, but
+he undoubtedly taught de Ruyter its limitations as well as its
+advantages, and there is no trace of the stupid formalism of the
+Duke of York's regulations in de Ruyter's brilliant work.
+
+[Footnote 1: INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, p. 144.]
+
+At this time he had no worthy opponent. As Monk was dead, the Duke of
+York had again assumed active command with Rupert as his lieutenant.
+Although the Duke was honestly devoted to the navy he was dull-witted,
+and in spite of the advantage of numbers and the dogged courage of
+officers and men which so often in English history has made up for
+stupid leadership, he was wholly unable to cope with de Ruyter's
+genius. As for the French navy, their ships were superb, the best
+in Europe, but their officers had no experience and apparently
+small desire for close fighting. At all events, despite the odds
+against him, de Ruyter defeated the allies in all four battles,
+prevented their landing an army of invasion, and broke up their
+attempt to blockade the coast.
+
+The war was unpopular in England and as it met with ill success
+it became more so. After the battle of the Texel, in 1673, active
+operations died down to practically nothing, and at the beginning
+of the year England made peace. By this time Holland had managed
+to find other allies on the Continent--Spain and certain German
+states--and while she had to continue her struggle against Louis
+XIV by land she was relieved of the menace of her great enemy on
+the sea. Fifteen years later, by a curious freak of history, a
+Dutch prince became King William III of England, and the two old
+enemies became united in alliance. But the Netherlands had exhausted
+themselves by their protracted struggle. They had saved their
+independence, but after the close of the 17th century they ceased
+to be a world power of any consequence.
+
+The persistent enmity of the French king for the Dutch gained nothing
+for France but everything for England. Unwittingly he poured out his
+resources in money and men to the end that England should become
+the great colonial and maritime rival of France. As a part of her
+spoils England had gained New York and New Jersey, thus linking her
+northern and southern American colonies, and she had taken St. Helena
+as a base for her East Indies merchantmen. She had tightened her
+hold in India, and by repeatedly chastising the Barbary pirates had
+won immunity for her traders in the Mediterranean. At the beginning
+of the Second Dutch War Monk had said with brutal frankness, "What
+matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade
+which the Dutch have." This, the richest prize of all, fell from
+the hands of the Dutch into those of the English. During the long
+drawn war which went on after the English peace of 1674, while
+Holland with her allies fought against Louis XIV, the great bulk
+of the Dutch carrying trade passed from the Dutch to the English
+flag. The close of the 17th century, therefore, found England fairly
+started on her career as an ocean empire, unified by sea power.
+Her navy, despite the vices it had caught from the Stuart regime,
+had become firmly established as a permanent institution with a
+definite organization. By this time every party recognized its
+essential importance to England's future.
+
+Nevertheless, whatever satisfaction may be felt by men of English
+speech in this rapid growth of England's power and prestige as
+a result of the three wars with the Dutch, one cannot avoid the
+other side of the picture. A people small in numbers but great
+in energy and genius was hounded to the point of extinction by
+the greed of its powerful neighbors. Peace-loving, asking merely
+to be let alone, the only crime of the Dutch was to excite the
+envy of the English and the French.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+See next chapter, page 221.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER [_Continued_]. WARS WITH FRANCE TO THE
+FRENCH REVOLUTION
+
+The effect of the expulsion of James II from the throne of England
+coupled with the accession of the Dutch prince, William of Orange,
+was to make England change sides and take the leadership in the
+coalition opposed to Louis XIV. From this time on, for over 125
+years, England was involved in a series of wars with France. They
+began with the threat of Louis to dominate Europe and ended with
+the similar threat on the part of Napoleon. In all this conflict
+the sea power of England was a factor of paramount importance. Even
+when the fighting was continental rather than naval, the ability
+of Great Britain to cut France off from her overseas possessions
+resulted in the transfer of enormous tracts of territory to the
+British Empire. During the 18th century, the territorial extent
+of the expire grew by leaps and bounds, with the single important
+loss of the American colonies. And even this brought no positive
+advantage to France for it did not weaken her adversary's grip
+on the sea.
+
+_The War of the League of Augsburg_
+
+The accession of William III was the signal for England's entry
+into the war of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) against France,
+and the effort of the French king to put James II back again upon
+the English throne. By this time the French navy had been so greatly
+strengthened that at the outset it outnumbered the combined fleets of
+the English and the Dutch. It boasted the only notable admiral of this
+period, Tourville, but it missed every opportunity to do something
+decisive. It failed to keep William from landing in England with an
+army; it failed also to keep the English from landing and supplying
+an army in Ireland, where they raised the siege of Londonderry and
+won the decisive victory of the Boyne. On the other hand the British
+navy was handled with equal irresolution and blindness in strategy.
+It accomplished what it did in keeping communications open with
+Ireland through the mistakes of the French, and its leaders seemed
+to be equally unaware of the importance of winning definitely the
+control of the sea.
+
+[Illustration: THREE-DECKED SHIP OF THE LINE, 18TH CENTURY]
+
+If the naval strategy on both sides was feeble the tactics were
+equally so. The contrast between the fighting of Blake, Monk, Tromp
+and de Ruyter and that of the admirals of this period is striking.
+For example, on May 1, 1689, the English admiral Herbert and the
+French admiral Chateaurenault fought an indecisive action in Bantry
+Bay, Ireland. After considerable powder had been shot away without
+the loss of a ship on either side, the French went back to protect
+their transports in the bay; Herbert also withdrew, and was made
+Earl of Torrington for his "victory." This same officer commanding
+a Dutch and English fleet encountered the French under Tourville
+off Beachy Head on the south coast of England (July 10, 1690).
+It is true that Tourville's force was stronger, but Torrington
+acted with no enterprise and was thoroughly beaten. At the same
+time the French admiral showed lack of push in following up his
+victory, which might have been crushing. By this time the line
+ahead order of fighting had become a fetich on both sides. The
+most noted naval battle of this war is that of La Hogue (May 29,
+1692), which has been celebrated as a great British victory. In
+this action an allied fleet of 99 were opposed to a French fleet
+of 44 under Tourville. Tourville offered battle under such odds
+only because he had imperative orders from his king to fight the
+enemy. During the action the French did not lose a single ship, but
+in the four days' retreat the vessels became separated in trying
+to find shelter and fifteen were destroyed or taken. This was a
+severe blow to the the French navy but by no means decisive. The
+subsequent inactivity of the fleet was due to the demands of the
+war on land.
+
+As the war became more and more a continental affair, Louis was
+compelled to utilize all his resources for his military campaigns.
+For this reason the splendid fleet with which he had begun the
+war gradually disappeared from the sea. Some of these men of war
+were lent to great privateersmen like Jean Bart and Du Guay Trouin,
+who took out powerful squadrons of from five to ten ships of the
+line, strong enough to overcome the naval escorts of a British
+convoy, and ravaged English commerce. In this matter of protecting
+shipping the naval strategy was as vacillating and blind as in
+everything else. Nevertheless no mere commerce destroying will
+serve to win the control of the sea, and despite the losses in
+trade and the low ebb to which English naval efficiency had sunk,
+the British flag still dominated the ocean routes while the greater
+part of the French fleet rotted in port.
+
+In this war of the League of Augsburg, Louis XIV was fighting
+practically all Europe, and the strain was too great for a nation
+already weakened by a long series of wars. By the terms of peace
+which he found himself obliged to accept, he lost nearly everything
+that he had gained by conquest during his long reign.
+
+_Wars of the Spanish and the Austrian Succession_
+
+After a brief interval of peace war blazed out again over the question
+whether a French Bourbon should be king of Spain,--the War of the
+Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. England's aim in this war was to
+acquire some of the Spanish colonies in America and to prevent
+any loss of trading privileges hitherto enjoyed by the English
+and the Dutch. But as it turned out nothing of importance was
+accomplished in the western hemisphere except by the terms of peace.
+The French and Spanish attempted no major operations by sea. But
+the English navy captured Minorca, with its important harbor of
+Port Mahon, and Rooke, with more initiative than he had ever shown
+before in his career, took Gibraltar (August 4, 1704). These two
+prizes made Great Britain for the first time a Mediterranean power,
+and the fact that she held the gateway to the inland sea was of
+great importance in subsequent naval history.
+
+In addition to these captures the terms of peace (the Treaty of
+Utrecht) yielded to England from the French Newfoundland, the Hudson
+Bay territory, and Nova Scotia. All that the French had left on the
+eastern coast of Canada was Cape Breton Island, with Louisburg,
+which was the key to the St. Lawrence. As for commercial privileges,
+England had gained from the Portuguese, who had been allies in
+the war, a practical monopoly of their carrying trade; and from
+France she had taken the entire monopoly of the slave trade to
+the Spanish American colonies which had been formerly granted by
+Spain to France. Holland got nothing out of the war as affecting
+her interests at sea,--not even a trading post. Her alliance with
+Great Britain had become as some one has called it, that of "the
+giant and the dwarf." At the conclusion of the War of the Spanish
+Succession, to quote the words of Mahan, "England was _the_ sea
+power; there was no second."
+
+In this war as in the preceding, French privateersmen made great
+inroads on British commerce, and some of these privateering operations
+were conducted on a grand scale. For example, Du Guay Trouin took
+a squadron of six ships of the line and two frigates, together
+with 2000 troops, across the Atlantic and attacked Rio Janeiro.
+He had little difficulty in forcing its submission and extorting
+a ransom of $400,000. The activities of the privateers led to a
+clause in the treaty of peace requiring the French to destroy the
+fortifications of the port of Dunkirk, which was notorious as the
+nest of these corsairs.
+
+The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748, was another of the
+dynastic quarrels of this age, with France and Spain arrayed against
+England. It has no naval interest for our purposes here. The peace
+of 1748, however, leaving things exactly as they were when the war
+began, settled none of the existing grudge between Great Britain
+and France. Eight years later, hostilities began again in the Seven
+Years' War, 1756-1763, in which Great Britain entered on the side
+of Prussia against a great coalition of Continental powers headed
+by France.
+
+_The Seven Years' War_
+
+The naval interest of this war is centered in the year 1759, when
+France, having lost Louisburg on account of England's control of
+the sea, decided to concentrate naval and military forces on an
+invasion of England. Before the plans for this projected thrust
+were completed, Quebec also had fallen to the British. The attempted
+invasion of 1759 is not so well known as that of Napoleon in 1805,
+but it furnished the pattern that Napoleon copied and had a better
+chance of success than his. In brief, a small squadron under the
+famous privateer Thurot was to threaten the Scotch and Irish coasts,
+acting as a diversion to draw off the British fleet. Meanwhile
+the squadron at Toulon was to dodge the British off that port,
+pass the Straits and join Conflans, who had the main French fleet
+at Brest. The united forces were then to cover the crossing of
+the troops in transports and flatboats to the English coast.
+
+This plan was smashed by Admiral Hawke in one of the most daring
+feats in British naval annals. Thurot got away but did not divert
+any of the main force guarding the Channel. The Toulon fleet also
+eluded the English for a time but went to pieces outside the Straits
+largely on account of mismanagement on the part of its commander.
+The remnants were either captured or driven to shelter in neutral
+ports by the English squadron under Boscawen. On November 9, a
+heavy gale and the necessities of the fleet compelled Hawke to lift
+his blockade of Brest and take shelter in Torbay, after leaving
+four frigates to watch the port. On the 14th, Conflans, discovering
+that his enemy was gone, came out, with the absurd idea of covering
+the transportation of the French army before Hawke should appear
+again. That very day Hawke returned to renew the blockade, and
+learning that Conflans had been seen heading southeast, decided
+rightly that the French admiral was bound for Quiberon Bay to make
+an easy capture of a small British squadron there under Duff before
+beginning the transportation of the invading army.
+
+For five days pursuer and pursued drifted in calms. On the 19th
+a stiff westerly gale enabled Hawke to overtake Conflans, who was
+obliged to shorten sail for fear of arriving at his destination in
+the darkness. The morning of the 20th found the fleets in sight
+of each other but scattered. All the forenoon the rival admirals
+made efforts to gather their units for battle. A frigate leading
+the British pursuit fired signal guns to warn Duff of the enemy's
+presence, and the latter, cutting his cables, was barely able to
+get out in time to escape the French fleet and join Hawke. Conflans
+then decided that the English were too strong for him, and abandoning
+his idea of offering battle, signaled a general retreat and led
+the way into Quiberon Bay.
+
+Hawke instantly ordered pursuit. The importance of this signal
+can be realized only by taking into account the tremendous gale
+blowing and the exceedingly dangerous character of the approach to
+Quiberon Bay, lined as it was with sunken rocks. Hawke had little
+knowledge of the channels but he reasoned that where a French ship
+could go an English one could follow, and the perils of the entry
+could not outweigh in his mind the importance of crushing the navy
+of France then and there. The small British superiority of numbers
+which Conflans feared was greatly aggravated by the conditions
+of his flight. The slower ships in his rear were crushed by the
+British in superior force and the English coming alongside the
+French on their lee side were able to use their heaviest batteries
+while the French, heeled over by the gale, had to keep their lowest
+tier of ports closed for fear of being sunk. One of their ships tried
+the experiment of opening this broadside and promptly foundered.
+
+Darkness fell on a scene of wild confusion. Two of the British
+vessels were lost on a reef, but daylight revealed the fact that
+the French had scattered in all directions. Only five of their
+ships had been destroyed and one taken, but the organization and
+the morale were completely shattered. The idea of invasion thus
+came to a sudden end in Quiberon Bay. The daring and initiative
+of Hawke in defying weather and rocks in his pursuit of Conflans
+is the admirable and significant fact of this story, for the actual
+fighting amounted to little. It is the sort of thing that marked
+the spirit of the Dutch Wars and of Blake at Santa Cruz, and is
+strikingly different from the tame and stupid work of other admirals,
+English or French, in his own day.
+
+The Seven Years' War ended in terms of the deepest humiliation
+for France--a "Carthaginian peace." She was compelled to renounce
+to England all of Canada with the islands of the St. Lawrence, the
+Ohio valley and the entire area east of the Mississippi except
+New Orleans. Spain, which had entered the war on the side of France
+in 1761, gave up Florida in exchange for Havana, captured by the
+English, and in the West Indies several of the Lesser Antilles
+came under the British flag. It is hardly necessary to point out
+that the loss of these overseas possessions on such a tremendous
+scale was due to the ability of the British navy to cut the
+communications between them and the mother country.
+
+Naval administration in England at this time was corrupt, and the
+admirals, with the notable exception of Hawke, were lacking in
+enterprise; they were still slaves to the "Fighting Instructions."
+But in all these respects the French were far worse, and the British
+government never lost sight of the immense importance of sea power.
+Its strategy was sound.
+
+_The War of American Independence_
+
+The peace of 1763 was so humiliating that every patriotic Frenchman
+longed for the opportunity of revenge. This offered itself in the
+revolt of the American colonies against the North Ministry in 1775.
+From the outset French neutrality as regards the American rebels
+was most benevolent; nothing could be more pleasing to France than
+to see her old enemy involved in difficulties with the richest and
+most populous of her colonies. For the first two or three years
+France gave aid surreptitiously, but after the capture of Burgoyne
+in 1777, she decided to enter the war openly and draw in allies
+as well. She succeeded in enlisting Spain in 1779 and Holland the
+year following. The entrance of the latter was of small military
+value, perhaps, but at all events France so manipulated the rebellion
+in the colonies as to bring on another great European war. In this
+conflict for the first time she had no enemies to fight on the
+Continent; hence she was free to throw her full force upon the
+sea, attacking British possessions in every quarter of the world.
+The War of the American Revolution became therefore a maritime war,
+the first since the conflicts with the Dutch in the 17th century.
+
+While Paul Jones was in Paris waiting for his promised command,
+he forwarded to the Minister of Marine a plan for a rapid descent
+in force on the American coast. If his plan had been followed and
+properly executed the war might have been ended in America at one
+blow. But this project died in the procrastination and red tape of
+the Ministry of Marine, and a subsequent proposal for an attack
+on Liverpool dwindled into the mere commerce-destroying cruise
+which is memorable only for Jones's unparalleled fight with the
+_Serapis_. Eventually the navy of France was thrown into the balance
+to offset that of Great Britain, and it is largely to this fact
+that the United States owes its independence; men and munitions
+came freely from overseas and on one momentous occasion, the Battle
+of the Virginia Capes, the French navy performed its part decisively
+in action. But on a score of other occasions it failed pitiably on
+account of the lack of a comprehensive strategic plan and the want
+of energy and experience on the part of the commanding officers.
+
+It is true that the French navy had made progress since the Seven
+Years' War. In 1778, it possessed 80 good line of battle ships.
+To this force, a year later, Spain was able to contribute nearly
+sixty. But England began the war with 150. Thus even if the French
+and Spanish personnel had been as well trained and as energetic
+as the British they would have had a superior force to contend
+with, particularly as the allied fleet was divided between the
+ports of Spain and France, and under dual command. But in efficiency
+the French and Spanish navies were vastly inferior to the British.
+Spanish efficiency may be dismissed at the outset as worthless. For
+the French officer the chief requisite was nobility of birth. The
+aristocracy of England furnished the officers for its service also,
+but in the French navy, considerations of social grade outweighed
+those of naval rank, a condition that never obtained in the British.
+In consequence, discipline--the principle of subordination animated
+by the spirit of team work--was conspicuously wanting in the French
+fleets. Individual captains were more concerned about their own
+prerogatives than about the success of the whole. This condition
+is illustrated by the conduct of the captains under Suffren in
+the Bay of Bengal, where the genius of the commander was always
+frustrated by the wilfulness of his subordinates. Finally in the
+matter of tactics the French were brought up on a fatally wrong
+theory, that of acting on the defensive, of avoiding decisive action,
+of saving a fleet rather than risking it for the sake of victory.
+Hence, though they were skilled in maneuvering, and ahead of the
+British in signaling, though their ships were as fine as any in
+the world, this fatal error of principle prevented their taking
+advantage of great opportunities and sent them to certain defeat
+in the end.
+
+Thus it is clear that the sea power of France and Spain was not
+formidable if the English had taken the proper course of strategy.
+This should have been to bottle up French and Spanish fleets in
+their own ports from Brest to Cadiz. Such a policy would have left
+enough ships to attend to the necessities of the army in America
+and the pursuit of French and American privateers, and accomplished
+the primary duty of preventing the arrival of French squadrons and
+French troops on the scene of war. Here the British government
+made its fatal mistake. Instead of concentrating on the coast of
+France and Spain, it tried to defend every outlying post where
+the flag might be threatened. Thus the superior English fleet was
+scattered all over the world, from Calcutta to Jamaica, while the
+French fleets came and went at will, sending troops and supplies
+to America and challenging the British control of the sea. Had the
+French navy been more efficient and energetic in its leadership
+France might have made her ancient enemy pay far more dearly for
+her strategic blunder. As it was, England lost her colonies in
+America.
+
+Instead of the swift stroke on the American coast which Paul Jones
+had contemplated, a French fleet under d'Estaing arrived in the
+Delaware about five months after France had entered the war and
+after inexcusable delays on the way. In spite of the loss of precious
+time he had an opportunity to beat an inferior force under Howe
+at New York and seize that important British base, but his
+characteristic timidity kept him from doing anything there. From
+the American coast he went to the West Indies, where he bungled
+every opportunity of doing his duty. He allowed St. Lucia to fall
+into British hands and failed to capture Grenada. Turning north
+again, he made a futile attempt to retake Savannah, which had fallen
+to the English. Then at the end of 1779, at about the darkest hour
+of the American cause, he returned to France, leaving the colonists
+in the lurch. D'Estaing was by training an infantry officer, and
+his appointment to such an important naval command is eloquent of
+the effect of court influence in demoralizing the navy. "S'il avait
+ete aussi marin que brave," was the generous remark of Suffren on
+this man. It is true that on shore, where he was at home, d'Estaing
+was personally fearless, but as commander of a fleet, where he was
+conscious of inexperience, he showed timidity that should have
+brought him to court martial.
+
+In March, 1780, the French fleet in the West Indies was put under
+the command of de Guichen, a far abler man than d'Estaing, but
+similarly indoctrinated with the policy of staying on the defensive.
+His rival on the station was Rodney, a British officer of the old
+school, weakened by years and illness, but destined to make a name
+for himself by his great victory two years later. In many respects
+Rodney was a conservative, and in respect to an appetite for prize
+money he belonged to the 16th century, but his example went a long
+way to cure the British navy of the paralysis of the Fighting
+Instructions and bring back the close, decisive fighting methods
+of Blake and de Ruyter.
+
+In this same year in which Rodney took command of the West Indies
+station, a Scotch gentleman named Clerk published a pamphlet on
+naval tactics which attracted much attention. It is a striking
+commentary on the lack of interest in the theory of the profession
+that no British naval officer had ever written on the subject. This
+civilian, who had no military training or experience, worked out
+an analysis of the Fighting Instructions and came to the conclusion
+that the whole conception of naval tactics therein contained was
+wrong, that decisive actions could be fought only by concentrating
+superior forces on inferior. One can imagine the derision heaped
+on the landlubber who presumed to teach admirals their business,
+but there was no dodging the force of his point. Of course the
+mathematical precision of his paper victories depended on the enemy's
+being passive while the attack was carried out, but fundamentally
+he was right. The history of the past hundred years showed the
+futility of an unbroken line ahead, with van, center, and rear
+attempting to engage the corresponding divisions of the enemy.
+Decisive victories could be won only by close, concentrated fighting.
+It may be true, as the British naval officers asserted, that they
+were not influenced by Clerk's ideas, but the year in which his
+book appeared marks the beginning of the practice of his theory
+in naval warfare.
+
+At the time of the American Revolution the West Indies represented
+a debatable ground where British interests clashed with those of
+her enemies, France, Spain, and Holland. It was very rich in trade
+importance; in fact, about one fourth of all British commerce was
+concerned with the Caribbean. Moreover, it contained the rival
+bases for operations on the American coast. Hence it became the
+chief theater of naval activity. Rodney's business was to make the
+area definitely British in control, to protect British possessions
+and trade and to capture as much as possible of enemy possessions
+and trade. On arriving at his station in the spring of 1780, he
+sought de Guichen. The latter had shown small enterprise, having
+missed one opportunity to capture British transports and another
+to prevent the junction of Rodney's fleet with that of Parker who
+was awaiting him. Even when the junction was effected, the British
+total amounted to only 20 ships of the line to de Guichen's 22,
+and the French admiral might still have offered battle. Instead
+he followed the French strategy of his day, by lying at anchor
+at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting for the British to sail away
+and give him an opportunity to capture an island without having
+to fight for it.
+
+Rodney promptly sought him out and set a watch of frigates off
+the port. When de Guichen came out on April 15 (1780) to attend
+to the convoying of troops, Rodney was immediately in pursuit,
+and on the 17th the two fleets were in contact. Early that morning
+the British admiral signaled his plan "to attack the enemy's rear,"
+because de Guichen's ships were strung out in extended order with
+a wide gap between rear and center. De Guichen, seeing his danger,
+wore together and closed the gap. This done, he again turned northward
+and the two fleets sailed on parallel courses but out of gunshot.
+
+[Illustration: THE WEST INDIES]
+
+About eleven 0' clock, some four hours after his first signal,
+Rodney again signaled his intention to engage the enemy, and shortly
+before twelve he sent up the order, "for every ship to bear down
+and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeable to the
+21st article of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Rodney had
+intended to concentrate his ships against their _actual_ opposites at
+the time,--the rear of the French line, which was still considerably
+drawn out; but the captain of the leading ship interpreted the
+order to mean the _numerical_ opposites in the enemy's line, after
+the style of fighting provided for by the Instructions from time
+immemorial. Rodney's first signal informing the fleet that he intended
+to attack the enemy's rear meant nothing to his captain at this
+time. Accordingly he sailed away to engage the first ship in the
+French van, followed by the vessels immediately astern of him,
+and thus wrecked the plan of his commander in chief.
+
+Nothing could illustrate better the hold of the traditional style
+of fighting on the minds of naval officers than this blunder, though
+it is only fair to add that there was some excuse in the ambiguity
+Of the order. Rodney was infuriated and expressed himself with
+corresponding bitterness. He always regarded this battle as the one
+on which his fame should rest because of what it might have been
+if his subordinates had given him proper support. The interesting
+point lies in the fact that he designed to throw his whole force
+on an inferior part of the enemy's force--the principle of
+concentration. In a later and much more famous battle, as we shall
+see, Rodney departed still further from the traditional tactics
+by "breaking the line," his own as well as that of the French,
+and won a great victory.
+
+Meanwhile there occurred another operation not so creditable. Rodney
+had spent a large part of his life dodging creditors, and it was
+due to the generous loan of a French gentleman in Paris that he
+did not drag out the years of this war in the Bastille for debt.
+When Holland entered the war he saw an opportunity to make a fortune
+by seizing the island of St. Eustatius, which had been the chief
+depot in the West Indies for smuggling contraband into America.
+To this purpose he subordinated every other consideration. The
+island was an easy prize, but the quarrels and lawsuits over the
+distribution of the booty broke him down and sent him back to England
+at just the time when he was most needed in American waters, leaving
+Hood in acting command.
+
+In March, 1781, de Grasse sailed from Brest with a fleet of 26
+ships of the line and a large convoy. Five of his battleships were
+detached for service in the East, under Suffren, of whom we shall
+hear more later. The rest proceeded to the Caribbean. On arriving
+at Martinique de Grasse had an excellent opportunity to beat Hood,
+who had an inferior force; but like his predecessors, d'Estaing and
+de Guichen, he was content to follow a defensive policy, excusing
+himself on the ground of not exposing his convoy. While at Cape
+Haitien he received messages from Rochambeau and Washington urging
+his cooperation with the campaign in America. To his credit be
+it said that on this occasion he acted promptly and skillfully,
+and the results were of great moment.
+
+At this time the British had subdued Georgia and South Carolina,
+and Cornwallis was attempting to carry the conquest through North
+Carolina. In order to keep in touch with his source of supplies
+the sea, however, he was compelled to fall back to Wilmington.
+From there, under orders from General Clinton, he marched north
+to Yorktown, Virginia, where he was joined by a small force of
+infantry. Washington and Rochambeau had agreed on the necessity of
+getting the cooperation of the West Indies fleet in an offensive
+directed either at Clinton in New York or at Cornwallis at Yorktown.
+Rochambeau preferred the latter alternative, because it involved
+fewer difficulties, and the message to de Grasse was accompanied
+by a private memorandum from him to the effect that he preferred
+the Chesapeake as the scene of operations. Accordingly de Grasse
+sent the messenger frigate back with word of his intention to go to
+Chesapeake Bay. He then made skillful arrangements for the transport
+of all available troops, and set sail with every ship he could
+muster, steering by the less frequented Old Bahama Channel in order
+to screen his movement.
+
+[Illustration: SCENE OF THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN]
+
+On August 30 (1781) de Grasse anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just inside
+the Chesapeake Capes, with 28 ships of the line. The two British
+guard frigates were found stupidly at anchor inside the bay; one
+was taken and the other chased up the York river. De Grasse then
+landed the troops he had brought with him, and these made a welcome
+reenforcement to Lafayette, who was then opposing Cornwallis. At
+the same time Washington was marching south to join Lafayette,
+and word had been sent to the commander of a small French squadron
+at Newport to make junction with de Grasse, bringing the siege
+artillery necessary to the operations before Yorktown. Thus the
+available farces were converging on Cornwallis in superior strength,
+and his only route for supplies and reenforcements lay by sea.
+All depended on whether the British could succeed in forcing the
+entrance to Chesapeake Bay.
+
+Hood, with 14 ships of the line, had followed on the trail of de
+Grasse, and as it happened looked into Chesapeake Bay just three
+days before the French admiral arrived. Finding no sign of the
+French, Hood sailed on to New York and joined Admiral Graves, who
+being senior, took command of the combined squadrons. As it was
+an open secret at that time that the allied operations would be
+directed at Cornwallis, Graves immediately sailed for the Capes,
+hoping on the way to intercept the Newport squadron which was known
+to be bound far the same destination. On reaching the Capes, September
+5, he found de Grasse guarding the entrance to the bay with 24 ships
+of the line, the remaining four having been detailed to block the
+mouths of the James and York rivers. To oppose this force Graves
+had only 19 ships of the line, but he did not hesitate to offer
+battle.
+
+In de Grasse's mind there were two things to accomplish: first,
+to hold the bay, and secondly, to keep the British occupied far
+enough at sea to allow the Newport squadron to slip in. Of course
+he could have made sure of both objects and a great deal more by
+defeating the British fleet in a decisive action, but that was not
+the French naval doctrine. The entrance to the Chesapeake is ten
+miles wide but the main channel lies between the southern promontory
+and a shoal called the Middle Ground three miles north of it. The
+British stood for the channel during the morning and the French,
+taking advantage of the ebbing tide at noon, cleared the bay, forming
+line of battle as they went. As they had to make several tacks to
+clear Cape Henry, the ships issued in straggling order, offering
+an opportunity for attack which Graves did not appreciate. Instead
+he went about, heading east an a course parallel to that of de
+Grasse, and holding the windward position. When the two lines were
+nearly opposite each other the British admiral ware down to attack.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, SEPT. 5, 1781
+
+(After diagram in Mahan's _Major Operations in the War of American
+Independence,_ p. 180.)]
+
+Graves's method followed the orthodox tradition exactly, and with
+the unvarying result. As the attacking fleet bore down in line ahead
+at an angle, the van of course came into action first, unsupported for
+some time by the rest. As the signal for close action was repeated,
+this angle was made sharper, and in attempting to close up the line
+several ships got bunched in such a way as to mask their fire.
+Meanwhile the rear, the seven ships under Hood, still trailing
+along in line ahead, never got into the action at all. Graves had
+signaled for "close action," but Hood chose to believe that the
+order for line ahead still held until the signal was repeated,
+whereupon he bore down. As the French turned away at the same time,
+to keep their distance, Hood contributed nothing to the fighting
+of the day. At sunset the battle ended. The British had lost 90
+killed and 246 wounded; the French, a total of 200. Several of the
+British ships were badly damaged, one of which was in a sinking
+condition and had to be burned. The two fleets continued on an
+easterly course about three miles apart, and for five days more
+the two maneuvered without fighting. Graves was too much injured by
+the first day's encounter to attack again and de Grasse was content
+to let him alone. Graves still had an opportunity to cut back and
+enter the bay, taking a position from which it would have been
+hard to dislodge him and effecting the main object of the expedition
+by holding the mouth of the Chesapeake. But this apparently did not
+occur to him. De Grasse, who had imperiled Washington's campaign
+by cruising so far from the entrance, finally returned on the 11th,
+and found that the Newport squadron had arrived safely the day
+before. When Graves saw that the French fleet was now increased to
+36 line-of-battle ships, he gave up hope of winning the bay and
+returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis to his fate. A little
+over a month later, October 19, the latter surrendered, and with
+his sword passed the last hope of subduing the American revolution.
+
+This battle of the Capes, or Lynnhaven, has never until recent
+times been given its true historical perspective, largely because
+in itself it was a rather tame affair. But as the historian Reich[1]
+observes, "battles, like men, are important not for their dramatic
+splendor but for their efficiency and consequences.... The battle
+off Cape Henry had ultimate effects infinitely more important than
+Waterloo." Certainly there never was a more striking example of
+the "influence of sea power" on a campaign. Just at the crisis of
+the American Revolution the French navy, by denying to the British
+their communications by sea, struck the decisive blow of the war.
+This was the French _revanche_ for the humiliation of 1763.
+
+[Footnote 1: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPE, p. 24.]
+
+The British failure in this action was due to a dull commander
+in chief carrying out a blundering attack based on the Fighting
+Instructions. Blame must fall also on his second in command, Hood,
+who, though a brilliant officer, certainly failed to support his
+chief properly when there was an obvious thing to do. Perhaps if
+the personal relations between the two had been more cordial Hood
+would have taken the initiative. But in those days the initiative
+of a subordinate was not encouraged, and Hood chose to stand on
+his dignity.
+
+Although the war was practically settled by the fall of Yorktown,
+it required another year or so to die out. In this final year a
+famous naval battle was fought which went far toward establishing
+British predominance in the West Indies, and which revealed something
+radically different in naval tactics from the practice of the time.
+
+In the spring of 1782, Rodney was back in command of the West Indian
+station, succeeding Hood, who continued to serve as commander of a
+division. The British base was Gros Islet Bay in Santa Lucia. De
+Grasse was at Fort Royal, Martinique, waiting to transport troops
+to Santo Domingo, where other troops and ships were collected. There,
+joining with a force of Spaniards from Cuba, he was to conduct a
+campaign against Jamaica. It was Rodney's business to break up this
+plan. During a period of preparation on both sides, reenforcements
+joined the rival fleets, that of the British amounting to enough to
+give Rodney a marked superiority in numbers. Moreover his ships
+were heavier, as he had five 3-deckers to the French one, and about
+200 more guns. The superiority of speed, as well, lay with Rodney
+because more of his ships had copper sheathing. A still further
+advantage lay in the fact that he was not burdened with the problem
+of protecting convoys and transports as was de Grasse. Thus, in the
+event of conflict, the advantages lay heavily with the British.
+
+On the morning of April 8, the English sentry frigate off Fort
+Royal noted that the French were coming out, and hastened with
+the news to Rodney at Santa Lucia. The latter put to sea at once.
+He judged rightly that de Grasse would steer for Santo Domingo, in
+order to get rid of his transports at their destination as soon
+as possible, and on the morning of the 9th he sighted the French
+off the west coast of the island of Dominica. On the approach of
+the English fleet, de Grasse signaled his transports to run to
+the northwest, while he took his fleet on a course for the channel
+between the islands of Dominica and Guadeloupe. As the British would
+be sure to pursue the fleet, this move would enable the convoy to
+escape.
+
+The channel toward which de Grasse turned his fleet is known as
+the Saints' Passage from a little group of islands, "les isles des
+Saintes," lying to the north of it. In the course of the pursuit,
+Hood, with the British van division of nine ships, had got ahead of
+the rest and offered a tempting opening for attack in superior force.
+If de Grasse had grasped his opportunity he might have inflicted a
+crushing blow on Rodney and upset the balance of superiority. But
+the lack of aggressiveness in the French doctrine was again fatal
+to French success. De Grasse merely sent his second in command
+to conduct a skirmish at long range--and thus threw his chance
+away.
+
+The light winds and baffling calms kept both fleets idle for a day.
+On the 11th de Grasse tried to work his fleet through the channel
+on short tacks. Just as he had almost accomplished his purpose he
+discovered several of his vessels still so far to westward as to
+be in danger of capture. In order to rescue these he gave up the
+fruits of laborious beating against the head wind and returned.
+The following morning, April 12 (1782), discovered the two fleets
+to the west of the strait and so near that the French could no
+longer evade battle. The French came down on the port tack and the
+British stood toward them, with their admiral's signal flying to
+"engage to leeward." When the two lines converged to close range,
+the leading British ship shifted her course slightly so as to run
+parallel with that of the French, and the two fleets sailed past each
+other firing broadsides. So far the battle had followed traditional
+line-ahead pattern.
+
+Just as the leading ship of the British came abreast of the rearmost
+of the French, the wind suddenly veered to the southward, checking
+the speed of the French ships and swinging their bows over toward
+the English line. At best a line of battle in the sailing ship
+days was an uneven straggling formation, and the effect of this
+flaw of wind, dead ahead, was to break up the French line into
+irregular groups separated by wide gaps. One of these opened up
+ahead as Rodney's flagship, the _Formidable_, forged past the French
+line. His fleet captain, Douglas, saw the opportunity and pleaded
+with Rodney to cut through the gap. "No," he replied, "I will not
+break my line." Douglas insisted. A moment later, as the _Formidable_
+came abreast of the opening, the opportunity proved too tempting
+and Rodney gave his consent. His battle signal, "engage the enemy
+to leeward," was still flying, but the _Formidable_ luffed up and
+swung through the French line followed by five others. The ship
+immediately ahead of the _Formidable_ also cut through a gap, and
+the sixth astern of the flagship went through as well, followed by
+the entire British rear. As each vessel pierced the broken line
+she delivered a terrible fire with both broadsides at close range.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, APRIL 12, 1782
+
+After diagram in Mahan's _Influence of Sea Power Upon History_,
+p. 486.]
+
+The result of this maneuver was that the British fleet found itself
+to windward of the French in three groups, while the French ships
+were scattered to leeward and trying to escape before the wind,
+leaving three dismasted hulks between the lines. An isolated group
+of six ships in the center, including de Grasse's _Ville de Paris_,
+offered a target for attack, but the wind was light and Rodney
+indolent in pursuit. Of these, one small vessel was overhauled
+and the French flagship was taken after a heroic defense, that
+lasted until sunset, against overwhelming odds. De Grasse's efforts
+to reform his fleet after his line was broken had met with failure,
+for the van fled to the southwest and the rear to the northwest,
+apparently making little effort to succor their commander in chief
+or retrieve the fortunes of the day.
+
+Rodney received a peerage for this day's work but he certainly
+did not make the most of his victory. Apparently content with the
+five prizes he had taken, together with the person of de Grasse,
+he allowed the bulk of the French fleet to escape when he had it in
+his power to capture practically all. On this point his subordinate,
+Hood, expressed himself with great emphasis:
+
+"Why he (Rodney) should bring the fleet to because the _Ville de
+Paris_ was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under easy
+sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy, in the night,
+which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled him to have
+taken almost every ship the next day.... Had I had the honor of
+commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the 12th, I may, without
+much imputation of vanity, say the flag of England should now have
+graced the sterns of _upwards_ of twenty sail of the enemy's ships
+of the line."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Quoted by Mahan, THE ROYAL NAVY (Clowes), Vol. III,
+p. 535.]
+
+Sir Charles Douglas, who had been responsible for Rodney's breaking
+the line, warmly agreed with Hood's opinion on this point. Nevertheless,
+although the victory was not half of what it might have been in younger
+hands, it proved decisive enough to shatter the naval organization
+of the French in the West Indies. It stopped the projected campaign
+against Jamaica and served to write better terms for England in
+the peace treaty of January 20, 1783.
+
+Tactically this battle has become famous for the maneuver of "breaking
+the line," contrary to the express stipulations of the Fighting
+Instructions. Certainly the move was not premeditated. Rodney may
+well be said to have been pushed into making it, and two of his
+captains made the same move on their own initiative. Indeed it
+is quite likely that, after the event, too much has been made of
+this as a piece of deliberate tactics, for the sudden shift of
+wind had paid off the bows of the French ships so that they were
+probably heading athwart the course of the British line, and the
+British move was obviously the only thing to do. But the lesson of
+the battle was clear,--the decisive effect of close fighting and
+concentrated fire. In the words of Hannay, "It marked the beginning
+of that fierce and headlong yet well calculated style of sea fighting
+which led to Trafalgar and made England undisputed mistress of the
+sea."[1] It marked, therefore, the end of the Fighting Instructions,
+which had deadened the spirit as well as the tactics of the British
+navy for over a hundred years.
+
+[Footnote 1: Rodney (ENGLISH MEN OF ACTION SERIES), p. 213.]
+
+The tactical value of "breaking the line" is well summarized by
+Mahan in the following passage:
+
+"The effect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle, depends
+upon several conditions. The essential idea is to divide the opposing
+force by penetrating through an interval found, or made, in it,
+and then to concentrate upon that one of the fractions which can
+be least easily helped by the other. In a column of ships this
+will usually be the rear. The compactness of the order attacked,
+the number of the ships cut off, the length of time during which
+they can be isolated and outnumbered, will all affect the results.
+A very great factor in the issue will be the moral effect, the
+confusion introduced into a line thus broken. Ships coming up toward
+the break are stopped, the rear doubles up, while the ships ahead
+continue their course. Such a moment is critical, and calls for
+instant action; but the men are rare who in an unforeseen emergency
+can see, and at once take the right course, especially if, being
+subordinates, they incur responsibility. In such a scene of confusion
+the English, without presumption, hoped to profit by their better
+seamanship; for it is not only 'courage and devotion,' but skill,
+which then tells. All these effects of 'breaking the line' received
+illustration in Rodney's great battle in 1782."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, pp. 380-381.]
+
+Before we leave the War of American Independence mention should
+be made of Commodore Suffren who, as we have seen, left de Grasse
+with five ships of the line to conduct a campaign in the Indian
+Ocean in the spring of 1781. His purpose was to shake the British
+hold on India, which had been fastened by the genius of Clive in
+the Seven Years' War. But the task given to Suffren was exceedingly
+difficult. His squadron was inadequate--for instance, he had only
+two frigates for scout and messenger duty--and he had no port that
+he could use as a base in Indian waters. To conduct any campaign
+at all he was compelled to live off his enemy and capture a base.
+These were risky prospects for naval operations several thousand
+miles from home, and for the faintest hope of success required an
+energy and initiative which had never before appeared in a French
+naval commander. In addition to these handicaps of circumstance Suffren
+soon discovered that he had to deal with incorrigible slackness
+and insubordination in his captains.
+
+In spite of everything, however, Suffren achieved an amazing degree
+of success. He succeeded in living off the prizes taken from the
+British, and he took from them the port of Trincomalee for a base. He
+fought five battles off the coast of India against the British Vice
+Admiral Hughes, in only one of which was the latter the assailant,
+and in all of which Suffren bore off the honors. He was constantly
+hampered, however, by the inefficiency and insubordination of his
+captains. On four or five occasions, including an engagement at the
+Cape Verde Islands on his way to India, it was only this misconduct
+that saved the British from the crushing attack that Suffren had
+planned. Unfortunately for him his victories were barren of result,
+for the terms of peace gave nothing in India to the French which
+they had not possessed before. As Trincomalee had belonged to the
+Dutch before the British captured it, this port was turned back
+to Holland.
+
+Nevertheless Suffren deserves to be remembered both for what he
+actually accomplished under grave difficulties and what he might
+have done had he been served by loyal and efficient subordinates.
+Among all the commanders of this war he stands preeminent for naval
+genius, and this eminence is all the more extraordinary when one
+realizes that his resourcefulness, tenacity, aggressiveness, his
+contempt of the formal, parade tactics of his day, were notoriously
+absent in the rest of the French service. Such was the admiration
+felt for him by his adversaries that after the end of the war,
+when the French squadron arrived at Cape Town on its way home and
+found the British squadron anchored there, all the British officers,
+from Hughes down, went aboard the French flagship to tender their
+homage.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: "If ever a man lived who justified Napoleon's maxim
+that war is an affair not of men but of a man, it was he. It was
+by his personal merit that his squadron came to the very verge of
+winning a triumphant success. That he failed was due to the fact
+that the French Navy... was honeycombed by the intellectual and moral
+vices which were bringing France to the great Revolution--corruption,
+self-seeking, acrid class insolence, and skinless, morbid vanity."--THE
+ROYAL NAVY, David Hannay, II, 287.]
+
+Although the War of American Independence was unsuccessfully fought
+by Great Britain and she was compelled to recognize the independence
+of her rebellious colonies, she lost comparatively little else by the
+terms of peace. As we have seen, her hold in India was unchanged.
+The stubborn defense of Gibraltar throughout the war, aided by
+occasional timely relief by a British fleet, saved that stronghold
+for the English flag. To Spain England was forced to surrender
+Florida and Minorca. France got back all the West Indian islands
+she had lost, with the exception of Tobago, but gained nothing
+besides. The war therefore did not restore to France her colonial
+empire of former days or make any change in the relative overseas
+strength of the two nations. Despite the blunders of the war no
+rival sea power challenged that of Great Britain at the conclusion
+of peace.
+
+Meanwhile, just before the war and during its early years, an English
+naval officer was laying the foundation for an enormous expansion
+of the British empire in the east. This was James Cook, a man who
+owed his commission in the navy and his subsequent fame to nothing
+in family or political influence, but to sheer genius. Of humble
+birth, he passed from the merchant service into the navy and rose
+by his extraordinary abilities to the rank of master. Later he
+was commissioned lieutenant and finally attained the rank of post
+captain.[1] Such rank was hardly adequate recognition of his great
+powers, but it was unusually high for a man who was not born a
+"gentleman."
+
+[Footnote 1: Full captain's rank, held only by a captain in command
+of a vessel of at least 20 guns.]
+
+At the end of the Seven Years' War he distinguished himself, by
+his work in surveying and sounding an the coasts of Labrador and
+Newfoundland, as a man of science. In consequence, he was detailed
+to undertake expeditions for observing the transit of Venus and
+for discovering the southern continent which was supposed to exist
+in the neighborhood of the Antarctic circle. In the course of this
+work Cook practically established the geography of the southern half
+of the globe as we know it to-day. And by his skill and study of
+the subject he conquered the great enemy of exploring expeditions,
+scurvy. Thirty years before, another British naval officer, Anson,
+had taken a squadron into the Pacific and lost about three-fourths
+of his men from this disease. When the war of the American Revolution
+broke out, Cook was abroad on one of his expeditions, but the French
+and American governments issued orders to their captains not to
+molest him on account of his great service to the cause of scientific
+knowledge. Unfortunately he was killed by savages at the Sandwich
+Islands in 1779.
+
+The bearing of his work on the British empire lies chiefly in his
+careful survey of the east coast of Australia, which he laid claim
+to in the name of King George, and the circumnavigation of New
+Zealand, which later gave title to the British claim on those islands.
+Thus, while the American colonies in the west were winning their
+independence, another territory in the east, far more extensive,
+was being brought under British sway, destined in another century
+to become important dominions of the empire. The Dutch had a claim
+of priority in discovery through the early voyages of Tasman, but
+they attempted no colonization and Dutch sea power was too weak
+to make good a technical claim in the face of England's navy.
+
+Finally, when the results of a century of wars between France and
+England are summarized, we find that France had lost all her great
+domain in America except a few small islands in the West Indies.
+In brief, it is due to British control of the sea during the 18th
+century that practically all of the continent north of the Rio
+Grande is English in speech, laws, and tradition.
+
+This control of the sea exercised by England was not the gift of
+fortune. It was a prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in
+peace and hard fighting in war. France had the opportunity to wrest
+from England the control of the sea as England had won it from
+Holland, for France at the close of the 17th century dominated
+Europe. In population and in wealth she was superior to her rival.
+But the arrogance of her king kept her embroiled in futile wars on
+the Continent, with little energy left for the major issue, the
+conquest of the sea. Finally, when the war of American Independence
+left her a free hand to concentrate on her navy as against that of
+England, France lost through the fatal weakness of policy which
+corrupted all her officers with the single brilliant exception of
+Suffren. The French naval officer avoided battle on principle,
+and when he could not avoid it he accepted the defensive. To the
+credit of the English officer be it said that, as a rule, he sought
+the enemy and took the aggressive; he had the "fighting spirit."
+This difference between French and British commanders had as much
+to do with the ultimate triumph of England on the sea as anything
+else. It retrieved many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer
+hard hitting.
+
+The history of the French navy points a moral applicable to any
+service and any time. When a navy encourages the idea that ships
+must not be risked, that a decisive battle must be avoided because
+of what might happen in case of defeat, it is headed for the same
+fate that overwhelmed the French.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, A. T. Mahan, 1890.
+A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, David Hannay, 1909.
+THE ROYAL NAVY (vols. II, III), W. L. Clowes et al., 1903.
+ADMIRAL BLAKE, English Men of Action Series, David Hannay, 1909.
+RODNEY, English Men of Action Series, David Hannay, 1891.
+MONK, English Men of Action Series, Julian Corbett, 1907.
+ENGLAND IN THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR, J. S. Corbett, 1907.
+THE GRAVES PAPERS, F. E. Chadwick, 1916.
+STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY, BIOGRAPHIES, J. K. Laughton, 1887.
+FROM HOWARD TO NELSON, ed. by J. K. Laughton, 1899.
+MAJOR OPERATIONS IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, A. T.
+  Mahan, 1913.
+SEA KINGS OF BRITAIN, Geoffrey Callender, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE FIRST OF JUNE AND CAMPERDOWN
+
+Ten years after the War of American Independence, British sea power
+was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with France.
+This time it was with a France whose navy, demoralized by revolution,
+was less able to dispute sea control, but whose armies, organized
+into an aggressive, empire-building force by the genius of Napoleon,
+threatened to dominate Europe, shaking the old monarchies with
+dangerous radical doctrines, and bringing all Continental nations
+into the conflict either as enemies or as allies. The dismissal
+of the French envoy from England immediately after the execution
+of Louis XVI (Jan. 21, 1793) led the French Republic a week later
+to a declaration of war, which continued with but a single
+intermission--from October, 1801, to May, 1803--through the next
+22 years.
+
+The magnitude of events on land in this period, during which French
+armies fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew kingdoms, and
+remade the map of Europe, obscures the importance of the warfare
+on the sea. Yet it was Great Britain by virtue of her navy and
+insular position that remained Napoleon's least vulnerable and
+most obstinate opponent, forcing him to ever renewed and exhausting
+campaigns, reviving continental opposition, and supporting it with
+subsidies made possible by control of sea trade. In Napoleon's own
+words the effect of this pressure is well summarized: "To live
+without ships, without trade, without colonies, is to live as no
+Frenchman can consent to do." The Egyptian campaign, conceived as
+a thrust at British sources of wealth in the East, and defeated
+at the Nile; the organization of the northern neutrals against
+England, overthrown at Copenhagen; the direct invasion of the British
+Isles, repeatedly planned and thwarted at St. Vincent, Camperdown,
+and Trafalgar; the final and most nearly successful effort to ruin
+England by closing her continental markets and thus, in Napoleon's
+phrase, "defeating the sea by the land"--these were the successive
+measures by which he sought to shake the grip of sea power.
+
+The following narrative of these events is in three divisions:
+the first dealing with the earlier engagements of the First of
+June and Camperdown, fought by squadrons based on home ports; the
+second with the war in the Mediterranean and the rise of Nelson as
+seen in the campaigns of St. Vincent, the Nile, and Copenhagen;
+the third with the Trafalgar campaign and the commercial struggle
+to which the naval side of the war was later confined. The career
+of Nelson is given an emphasis justified by his primacy among naval
+leaders and the value of his example for later times.
+
+The effect of land events in obscuring the naval side of the war,
+already mentioned, is explained not merely by their magnitude, but
+by the fact that, though Great Britain was more than once brought
+to the verge of ruin, this was a consequence not of the enemy's power
+on the sea, but of his victories on land. Furthermore, the slow
+process which ended in the downfall of Napoleon and the reduction of
+France to her old frontiers was accomplished, not so conspicuously
+by the economic pressure of sea power, as by the efforts of armies
+on battlefields from Russia to Spain. On the sea British supremacy
+was more firmly established, and the capacities of France and her
+allies were far less, than in preceding conflicts of the century.
+
+_The French Navy Demoralized_
+
+The explanation of this weakness of the French navy involves an
+interesting but somewhat perplexing study of the influences which
+make for naval growth or decay. That its ineffectiveness was due
+largely to an inferior national instinct or genius for sea warfare,
+as compared with England, is discredited by the fact that the disparity
+was less obvious in previous wars; for, as Lord Clowes has insisted,
+England won no decisive naval victory against superior forces from
+the second Dutch War to the time of Nelson. The familiar theory
+that democracy ruined the French navy will be accepted nowadays
+only with some qualifications, especially when it is remembered
+that French troops equally affected by the downfall of caste rule
+were steadily defeating the armies of monarchical powers. It is
+true, however, that navies, as compared with armies, are more
+complicated and more easily disorganized machines, and that it
+would have taxed even Napoleonic genius to reorganize the French
+navy after the neglect, mutiny, and wholesale sweeping out of trained
+personnel to which it was subjected in the first furies of revolution.
+Whatever the merits of the officers of the old regime, selected as
+they were wholly from the aristocracy and dominated by the defensive
+policy of the French service, three-fourths of them were driven out
+by 1791, and replaced by officers from the merchant service, from
+subordinate ratings, and from the crews. Suspicion of aristocracy
+was accompanied in the navy by a more fatal suspicion of skill. In
+January, 1794, the regiments of marine infantry and artillery, as
+well as the corps of seamen-gunners, were abolished on the ground
+that no body of men should have "the exclusive privilege of fighting
+the enemy at sea," and their places were filled by battalions of
+the national guard. Figures show that as a result, French gunnery
+was far less efficient than in the preceding war.
+
+The strong forces that restored discipline in the army had more
+difficulty in reaching the navy; and Napoleon's gift for discovering
+ability and lifting it to command was marked by its absence in
+his choice of leaders for the fleets. Usually he fell back on
+pessimistic veterans of the old regime like Brueys, Missiessy, and
+Villeneuve. An exception, Allemand, showed by his cruise out of
+Rochefort in 1805 what youth, energy, and daring could accomplish
+even with inferior means. Considering the importance of leadership
+as a factor in success, we may well believe that, had a French
+Nelson, or even a Suffren, been discovered in this epoch, history
+would tell a different tale. If further reasons for the decadence
+of the navy are needed, they may be found in the extreme difficulty
+of securing naval stores and timber from the Baltic, and in the
+fact that, though France had nearly three times the population of
+the British Isles, her wealth, man-power, and genius were absorbed
+in the war on land.
+
+Aside from repulsion at the violence of the French revolution and
+fear of its contagion, England had a concrete motive for war in
+the French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands and the Scheldt,
+the possession of which by an ambitious maritime nation England has
+always regarded as a menace to her safety and commercial prosperity.
+"This government," declared the British Ministry in December, 1792,
+"will never view with indifference that France shall make herself,
+directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries or general
+arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe."
+
+In prosecuting the war, Great Britain fought chiefly with her main
+weapon, the navy, leaving the land war to her allies. A contemporary
+critic remarked that she "worked with her navy and played with her
+army"; though the latter did useful service in colonial conquests
+and in Egypt, the two expeditionary forces to the Low Countries in
+1793 and 1799 were ill-managed and ineffective. The tasks of the
+fleet were to guard the British Isles from raids and invasion,
+to protect British commerce in all parts of the world, and, on
+the offensive, to seize enemy colonies, cut off enemy trade, and
+cooperate in the Mediterranean with allied armies. To accomplish
+these aims, which called for a wide dispersion of forces, the British
+naval superiority over France was barely adequate. According to
+the contemporary naval historian James, the strength of the two
+fleets at the outbreak of war was as follows:
+
+           Ships of the               Aggregate
+               line         Guns      broadsides
+------------------------------------------------
+British         115        8,718        88,957
+French           76        6,002        73,057
+
+Of her main fighting units, the ships-of-the-line, England could put
+into commission about 85, which as soon as possible were distributed
+in three main spheres of operation: in the Mediterranean and its
+western approaches, from 20 to 25; in the West Indies, from 10 to
+12; in home waters, from the North Sea to Cape Finisterre, from
+20 to 25, with a reserve of some 25 more in the home bases on the
+Channel. Though this distribution was naturally altered from time
+to time to meet changes in the situation, it gives at least an
+idea of the general disposition of the British forces throughout
+the war. France, with no suitable bases in the Channel, divided
+her fleet between the two main arsenals at Brest and Toulon, with
+minor squadrons at Rochefort and, during the Spanish alliance,
+in the ports of Spain.
+
+_Distant Operations_
+
+In the West Indies and other distant waters, France could offer
+but little effective resistance, and operations there may hence
+be dismissed briefly, but with emphasis on the benefit which naval
+control conferred upon British trade, the main guaranty of England's
+financial stability and power to keep up the war. Fully one-fifth
+of this trade was with the West Indies. Consequently, both to swell
+the volume of British commerce and protect it from privateering,
+the seizure of the French West Indian colonies--"filching the sugar
+islands," as Sheridan called it--was a very justifiable war measure,
+in spite of the scattering of forces involved. Hayti was lost to
+France as a result of the negro uprising under Toussaint l'Ouverture.
+Practically all the French Antilles changed hands twice in 1794,
+the failure of the British to hold them arising from a combination
+of yellow fever, inadequate forces of occupation, and lax blockade
+methods on the French coast, which permitted heavy reenforcements
+to leave France. General Abercromby, with 17,000 men, finally took
+all but Guadaloupe in the next year. As Holland, Spain, and other
+nations came under French control, England seized their colonies
+likewise--the Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon
+in 1795; the Moluccas and other Dutch islands in the East Indies in
+1796; Trinidad (Spanish) in 1797; Curacao (Dutch) in 1800; and the
+Swedish and Danish West Indies in 1801. By the Treaty of Amiens in
+1802 all these except Trinidad and Ceylon were given back, and had
+to be retaken in the later period of the war, Guadaloupe remaining
+a privateers' nest until its final capture in 1810. Though French
+trade was ruined, it was impossible to stamp out privateering,
+which grew with the growth of British commerce which it preyed
+upon, and the extent of which is indicated by the estimate that
+in 1807 there were from 200 to 300 privateers on the coasts of
+Cuba and Hayti alone. As for the captured islands, Great Britain
+in 1815 retained only Malta, Heligoland, and the Ionian Islands in
+European waters; Cape Colony, Mauritius, and Ceylon on the route
+to the East; and in the Caribbean, Demerara on the coast, Santa
+Lucia, Trinidad, and Tobago--some of them of little intrinsic value,
+but all useful outposts for an empire of the seas.
+
+In the Channel and Bay of Biscay, the first year of war passed
+quietly. Lord Howe, commanding the British Channel fleet, had behind
+him a long, fine record as a disciplinarian and tactician; he had
+fought with Hawke at Quiberon Bay, protected New York and Rhode
+Island against d'Estaing in 1778, and later thrown relief into
+Gibraltar in the face of superior force. Now 68 years of age, he
+inclined to cautious, old-school methods, such as indeed marked
+activities on both land and sea at this time, before Napoleon had
+injected a new desperateness into war. Both before and after the
+"Glorious First of June" the watch on the French coast was merely
+nominal; small detachments were kept off Brest, but the main fleet
+rested in Portsmouth throughout the winter and took only occasional
+cruises during the remainder of the year.
+
+_The Battle of the First of June_
+
+Though there had been no real blockade, the interruption of her
+commerce, the closure of her land frontiers, and the bad harvest
+of 1793, combined to bring France in the spring following to the
+verge of famine, and forced her to risk her fleet in an effort to
+import supplies from overseas. On April 11 an immense flotilla
+of 120 grain vessels sailed from the Chesapeake under the escort
+of two ships-of-the-line, which were to be strengthened by the
+entire Brest fleet at a rendezvous 300 miles west of Belleisle.
+Foodstuffs having already been declared subject to seizure by both
+belligerents, Howe was out on May 2 to intercept the convoy. A
+big British merchant fleet also put to sea with him, to protect
+which he had to detach 8 of his 34 ships, but with orders to 6 of
+these that they should rejoin his force on the 20th off Ushant.
+Looking into Brest on the 19th, Howe found the French battle fleet
+already at sea. Not waiting for the detachment, and thus losing its
+help in the battle that was to follow, he at once turned westward
+and began sweeping with his entire fleet the waters in which the
+convoy was expected to appear.
+
+The French with 26 ships-of-the-line--and thus precisely equal to
+Howe in numbers--had left Brest two days before. The crews were
+largely landsmen; of the flag officers and captains, not one had
+been above the grade of lieutenant three years before, and nine of
+them had been merchant skippers with no naval experience whatever.
+On board were two delegates of the National Convention, whose double
+duties seem to have been to watch the officers and help them command.
+To take the place of experience there was revolutionary fervor,
+evidenced in the change of ship-names to such resounding appellations
+as _La Montagne, Patriote, Vengeur du Peuple, Tyrannicide_, and
+_Revolutionnaire_. There was also more confidence than was ever felt
+again by French sailors during the war. "Intentionally disregarding
+subtle evolutions," said the delegate Jean Bon Saint Andree, "perhaps
+our sailors will think it more appropriate and effective to resort
+to the boarding tactics in which the French were always victorious,
+and thus astonish the world by new prodigies of valor." "If they
+had added to their courage a little training," said the same
+commissioner after the battle, "the day might have been ours."
+
+The commander in chief, Villaret de Joyeuse, who had won his lieutenancy
+and the esteem of Suffren in the American war, was no such scorner
+of wary tactics. Thus when the two fleets, more by accident than
+calculation on either side, came in contact on the morning of May
+28, 1794, about 400 miles west of Ushant, it would have been quite
+possible for him to have closed with the British, who were 10 miles
+to leeward in a fresh southerly wind. But his orders were not to
+fight unless it were essential to protect the convoy, and since
+this was thought to be close at hand, he first drew away to the
+eastward, with the British in pursuit.
+
+The chase continued during the remainder of this day and the day
+following, with partial engagements and complicated maneuvering,
+the net result of which was that in the end Howe, in spite of the
+superior sailing qualities of the French ships, had kept in touch
+with them, driven his own vessels through their line to a windward
+position, and forced the withdrawal of four units, with the loss of
+but one of his own. Two days of thick weather followed, during which
+both fleets stood to the northwest in the same relative positions,
+the French, very fortunately indeed, securing a reenforcement of
+four fresh ships from detachments earlier at sea.
+
+Now 26 French to 25 British, the two fleets on the morning of the
+final engagement were moving to westward on the still southerly wind,
+in two long, roughly parallel lines. Confident of the individual
+superiority of his ships, the British admiral had no wish for further
+maneuvering, in which his own captains had shown themselves none
+too reliable and the enemy commander not unskilled. Possibly also
+he feared the confusion of a complicated plan, for it was notorious
+(as may be verified by looking over his correspondence) that Howe
+had the greatest difficulty in making himself intelligible with
+tongue or pen. His orders were therefore to bear up together toward
+the enemy and attack ship to ship, without effort at concentration,
+and with but one noteworthy departure from the time-honored tactics
+in which he had been schooled. This was that the battle should be
+close and decisive. The instructions were that each ship should
+if possible break through the line astern of her chosen opponent,
+raking the ships on each side as she went through, and continue
+the action to leeward, in position to cut off retreat. "I don't
+want the ships to be bilge to bilge," said Howe to the officers
+of his flagship, the _Queen Charlotte_, "but if you can lock the
+yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be the quicker decided."
+The approach was leisurely, nearly in line abreast, on a course
+slightly diagonal to that of the enemy. At 10 A. M. the _Queen
+Charlotte_, in the center of the British line, shoved past just
+under the stern of Villaret's flagship, the _Montagne_, raking
+her with a terrible broadside which is said to have struck down
+300 of her men. As was likely to result from the plan of attack,
+the ships in the van of the attacking force were more closely and
+promptly engaged than those of the rear; only six ships actually
+broke through, but there was hot fighting all along the line.
+
+Famous among the struggles in the melee was the epic three-hour
+combat of the _Brunswick_, next astern of Howe, and the _Vengeur_,
+both 74's. With the British vessel's anchors hooked in her opponent's
+port forechannels, the two drifted away to leeward, the _Brunswick_
+by virtue of flexible rammers alone able to use her lower deck guns,
+which were given alternately extreme elevation and depression and
+sent shot tearing through the _Vengeur's_ deck and hull; whereas
+the _Vengeur_, with a superior fire of carronades and musketry,
+swept the enemy's upper deck. When the antagonists wrenched apart,
+the _Brunswick_ had lost 158 of her complement of 600 men. The
+_Vengeur_ was slowly sinking and went down at 6 P. M., with a loss
+of 250 killed and wounded and 100 more drowned. "As we drew away,"
+wrote a survivor, "we heard some of our comrades still offering
+prayers for the welfare of their country; the last cries of these
+unfortunates were, 'Vive la Republique!' They died uttering them."
+
+Out of the confusion, an hour after the battle had begun, Villaret
+was able to form a column of 16 ships to leeward, and though ten of
+his vessels lay helpless between the lines, three drifted or were
+towed down to him and escaped. Howe has been sharply criticized
+for letting these cripples get away; but the battered condition
+of his fleet and his own complete physical exhaustion led him to
+rest content with six prizes aside from the sunken _Vengeur_. The
+criticism has also been made that he should have further exerted
+himself to secure a junction with the detachment on convoy duty,
+which on May 19 was returning and not far away. If he had at that
+time held his 32 ships between Brest and Rochefort, with scouts
+well distributed to westward, he would have been much more certain
+to intercept both Villaret's fleet and the convoy, which would have
+approached in company, and both of which, with the British searching
+in a body at sea, stood a good chance of escape. Howe's hope, no
+doubt, was to meet the convoy unguarded. The latter, protected by
+fog, actually crossed on May 30 the waters fought over on the 29th,
+and twelve days later safely reached the French coast. Robespierre
+had told Villaret that if the convoy were captured he should answer
+for it with his life. Hence the French admiral declared years later
+that the loss of his battleships troubled him relatively little.
+"While Howe amused himself refitting them, I saved the convoy,
+and I saved my head."
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1794
+
+Based on diagram in Mahan's _Influence of Sea Power upon the French
+Revolution,_ Vol. I, p. 136.]
+
+Though the escape of the convoy enabled the French to boast a "strategic
+victory," the First of June in reality established British prestige
+and proved a crushing blow to French morale. A British defeat,
+on the other hand, might have brought serious consequences, for
+within a year's time the Allied armies, including the British under
+the Duke of York, were driven out of Holland, the Batavian Republic
+was established in league with France (February, 1795), and both
+Spain and Prussia backed out of the war. Austria remained England's
+only active ally.
+
+During the remainder of 1794 and the year following only minor or
+indecisive encounters occurred in the northern theater of war, lack
+of funds and naval supplies hampering the recovery of the French
+fleet from the injuries inflicted by Howe. Ill health forcing the
+latter's retirement from sea duty, he was succeeded in the Channel by
+Lord Bridport, who continued his predecessor's easy-going methods
+until the advent of Jervis in 1798, instituted a more rigorous
+regime. It was not yet recognized that the wear and tear on ships
+and crews during sea duty was less serious than the injurious effect
+of long stays in port upon sea spirit and morale.
+
+_French Projects of Invasion_
+
+With their fleets passive, the French resorted vigorously to commerce
+warfare, and at the same time kept England constantly perturbed by
+rumors, grandiose plans, and actual undertakings of invasion. That
+these earlier efforts failed was due as much to ill luck and bad
+management as to the work of Bridport's fleet. Intended, moreover,
+primarily as diversions to keep England occupied at home and sicken
+her of the war, they did not altogether fail of their aim. Some
+of these projects verged on the ludicrous, as that of corraling
+a band of the criminals and royalist outlaws that infested France
+and dropping them on the English coast for a wild campaign of murder
+and pillage. Fifteen hundred of these _Chouans_ were actually landed
+at Fishguard in February of 1798, but promptly surrendered, and
+France had to give good English prisoners in exchange for them on
+the threat that they would be turned loose again on French soil.
+
+Much more serious was General Hoche's expedition to Ireland of
+the winter before. Though Hoche wished to use for the purpose the
+army of over 100,000 with which he had subdued revolt in the Vendee,
+the Government was willing to venture a force of only 15,000, which
+set sail from Brest, December 15, 1796, in 17 ships-of-the-line,
+together with a large number of smaller war-vessels and transports.
+Heavy weather and bad leadership, helped along by British frigates
+with false signals, scattered the fleet on the first night out. It
+never again got together; and though a squadron with 6,000 soldiers
+on board was actually for a week or more in the destination, Bantry
+Bay, not a man was landed, and by the middle of January nearly all of
+the flotilla was back in France. The British squadron under Colport,
+which had been on the French coast at the time of the departure, had
+in the meanwhile been obliged to make port for supplies. Bridport
+with the main fleet left Portsmouth, 250 miles from the scene of
+operations, four days after news of the French departure. During
+the whole affair neither he nor Colport took a single prize.
+
+Even so small a force cooperating with rebellion in Ireland might
+have proved a serious annoyance, though not a grave danger. Invasion
+on a grand scale, which Napoleon's victorious campaign in Italy
+and the peace with Austria (preliminaries at Loeben, April, 1797)
+now made possible, was effectually forestalled by two decisive
+victories at sea. Bonaparte, who was to lead the invasion, did not
+minimize its difficulties. "To make a descent upon England without
+being master of the sea," he wrote at this time, "is the boldest and
+most difficult operation ever attempted." Yet the flotilla of small
+craft necessary was collected, army forces were designated, and in
+February of 1798 Bonaparte was at Dunkirk. All this served no doubt
+to screen the Egyptian preparations, which amid profound secrecy
+were already under way. The Egyptian campaign was an indirect blow
+at England; but the direct blow would certainly have been struck
+had not the naval engagements of Cape St. Vincent (February, 1797)
+and Camperdown (October, 1797) settled the question of mastery
+of the sea by removing the naval support of Spain and Holland on
+the right and left wings.
+
+_The Battle of Camperdown_
+
+Admiral Duncan's victory of Camperdown, here taken first as part
+of the events in northern waters, is noteworthy in that it was
+achieved not only against ever-dangerous opponents, but with a
+squadron which during the preceding May and June had been in the
+very midst of the most serious mutiny in the history of the British
+navy. In Bridport's fleet at Portsmouth this was not so much a
+mutiny as a well organized strike, the sailors it is true taking
+full control of the ships, and forcing the Admiralty and Parliament
+to grant their well justified demands for better treatment and better
+pay. Possibly a secret sympathy with their grievances explains the
+apparent helplessness of the officers. The men on their part went
+about the business quietly, and even rated some of their former
+officers as midshipmen, in special token of esteem. At the Nore,
+however, and in Duncan's squadron at Yarmouth, the mutiny was marked
+by bloodshed and taint of disloyalty, little surprising in view of
+the disaffected Irish, ex-criminals, impressed merchant sailors,
+and other unruly elements in the crews. In the end 18 men were
+put to death and many others sentenced.
+
+Duncan faced the trouble with the courage but not the mingling of
+fair treatment and sharp justice which marked its suppression by
+that great master of discipline, Jervis, in the fleet off Spain.
+On his own ship and another, Duncan drew up the loyal marines under
+arms, spoke to the sailors, and won their allegiance, picking one
+troublesome spirit up bodily and shaking him over the side. But
+the rest of the squadron suddenly sailed off two days later to
+join the mutineers at the Nore, where all the ships were then in
+the hands of the crews. With his two faithful ships, Duncan made
+for the Texel, swearing that if the Dutch came out he would go
+down with colors flying. Fortunately he was rejoined before that
+event by the rest of his squadron, the mutinous ships having been
+either retaken by the officers or voluntarily surrendered by the
+men.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN, OCTOBER 11, 1797, ABOUT 12:30
+P.M.
+
+British, 16 of the line; Dutch, 15 of the line.]
+
+The whole affair, among the ships in Thames mouth, was over in a
+month's time, from mid-May to mid-June, so quickly that the enemy had
+little chance to seize the advantage. The Dutch, driven willy-nilly
+into alliance with France and not too eager to embark upon desperate
+adventures in the new cause, were nevertheless not restrained from
+action by any kind feeling for England, who had seized their ships
+and colonies and ruined their trade. When at last, during a brief
+withdrawal of Duncan, their fleet under Admiral de Winter attempted
+a cruise, it was in a run-down condition. Aside from small units,
+it consisted of 15 ships (4 of 74 guns, 5 of 68, 2 of 64, and 4
+under 60), against Duncan's stronger force of 16 (7 of 74, 7 of 64
+and 2 of 50). The Dutch ships were flat-bottomed and light-draft for
+navigation in their shallow coastal waters, and generally inferior
+to British vessels of similar rating, even though the latter were
+left-overs from the Channel Fleet.
+
+On the morning of the Battle of Camperdown, October 11, 1797, the
+Dutch were streaming along their coast on a northwest wind bent on
+return into the Texel. Pressing forward in pursuit, Duncan when
+in striking distance determined to prevent the enemy's escape into
+shallow water by breaking through their line and attacking to leeward.
+The signal to this effect, however, was soon changed to "Close
+action," and only the two leading ships eventually broke through.
+The two British divisions--for they were still in cruising formation
+and strung out by the pursuit--came down before the wind. Onslow,
+the second in command, in the _Monarch_, struck the line first
+at 12:30 and engaged the Dutch _Jupiter_, fourth from the rear.
+Eighteen minutes later Duncan in the _Venerable_ closed similarly
+to leeward of the _Staten Generaal_, and afterward the _Vrijheid_,
+in the Dutch van.
+
+The two leaders were soon supported--though there was straggling
+on both sides; and the battle that ensued was the bloodiest and
+fiercest of this period of the war. The British lost 825 out of a
+total of 8221 officers and men,[1] more than half the loss occurring
+in the first four ships in action. The British ships were also
+severely injured by the gruelling broadsides during the onset,
+but finally took 11 prizes, all of them injured beyond repair.
+Though less carefully thought out and executed, the plan of the
+attack closely resembles that of Nelson at Trafalgar. The head-on
+approach seems not to have involved fatal risks against even such
+redoubtable opponents as the Dutch, and it insured decisive results.
+
+[Footnote 1: As compared with this loss of 10%, the casualties
+in Nelson's three chief battles were as follows: Nile, 896 out of
+7401, or 12.1%; Copenhagen, 941 out of 6892, or 13.75%; Trafalgar,
+1690 out of 17,256, or 9.73%.]
+
+Duncan's otherwise undistinguished career, and the somewhat unstudied
+methods of his one victory, may explain why he has not attained the
+fame which the energy displayed and results achieved would seem
+to deserve. "He was a valiant officer," writes his contemporary
+Jervis, "little versed in subtleties of tactics, by which he would
+have been quickly confused. When he saw the enemy, he ran down upon
+them, without thinking of a fixed order of battle. To conquer,
+he counted on the bold example he gave his captains, and the event
+completely justified his hopes."
+
+Whatever its tactical merits, the battle had the important strategic
+effect of putting the Dutch out of the war. The remnants of their fleet
+were destroyed in harbor during an otherwise profitless expedition
+into Holland led by the Duke of York in 1799. By this time, when
+naval requirements and expanding trade had exhausted England's
+supply of seamen, and forced her to relax her navigation laws,
+it is estimated that no less than 20,000 Dutch sailors had left
+their own idle ships and were serving on British traders and
+men-of-war.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: For references, see end of Chapter XIII, page 285.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+THE NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Continued_]: THE RISE OF NELSON
+
+In the Mediterranean, where the protection of commerce, the fate
+of Italy and all southern Europe, and the exposed interests of
+France gave abundant motives for the presence of a British fleet,
+the course of naval events may be sufficiently indicated by following
+the work of Nelson, who came thither in 1793 in command of the
+_Agamemnon_ (64) and remained until the withdrawal of the fleet at
+the close of 1796. Already marked within the service, in the words
+of his senior, Hood, as "an officer to be consulted on questions
+relative to naval tactics," Nelson was no doubt also marked as
+possessed of an uncomfortable activity and independence of mind.
+Singled out nevertheless for responsible detached service, he took
+a prominent part in the occupation of Corsica, where at the siege
+of Calvi he lost the sight of his right eye, and later commanded
+a small squadron supporting the left flank of the Austrian army
+on the Riviera.
+
+In these latter operations, during 1795 and 1796, Nelson felt that
+much more might have been done. The Corniche coast route into Italy,
+the only one at first open to the French, was exposed at many points
+to fire from ships at sea, and much of the French army supplies as
+well as their heavy artillery had to be transported in boats along
+the coast. "The British fleet could have prevented the invasion
+of Italy," wrote Nelson five years later, "if our friend Hotham
+[who had succeeded Hood as commander in chief in the Mediterranean]
+had kept his fleet on that coast."[1] Hotham felt, perhaps rightly,
+that the necessity of watching the French ships at Toulon made this
+impossible. But had the Toulon fleet been destroyed or effectually
+crippled at either of the two opportunities which offered in 1795, no
+such need would have existed; the British fleet would have dominated
+the Mediterranean, and exercised a controlling influence on the
+wavering sympathies of the Italian states and Spain. At the first
+of these opportunities, on the 13th and 14th of March, Hotham said
+they had done well enough in capturing two French ships-of-the-line.
+"Now," remarked Nelson, whose aggressive pursuit had led to the
+capture, "had we taken 10 sail and allowed the 11th to escape,
+when it had been possible to have got at her, I should not have
+called it well done." And again of the second encounter: "To say how
+much we wanted Lord Hood on the 13th of July, is to say, 'Will you
+have all the French fleet, or no action?'" History, and especially
+naval history, is full of might-have-beens. Aggressive action
+establishing naval predominance might have prevented Napoleon's
+brilliant invasion and conquest of Italy; Spain would then have
+steered clear of the French alliance; and the Egyptian campaign
+would have been impossible.
+
+[Footnote 1: DISPATCHES, June 6, 1800.]
+
+The succession of Sir John Jervis to the Mediterranean command
+in November, 1795, instituted at once a new order of things, in
+which inspiring leadership, strict discipline, and closest attention
+to the health of crews, up-keep vessels, and every detail of ship
+and fleet organization soon brought the naval forces under him to
+what has been judged the highest efficiency attained by any fleet
+during the war. Jervis had able subordinates--Nelson, Collingwood
+and Troubridge, to carry the list no further; but he may claim a
+kind of paternal share in molding the military character of these
+men.
+
+Between Jervis and Nelson in particular there existed ever the
+warmest mutual confidence and admiration. Yet the contrast between
+them well illustrates the difference between all-round professional
+and administrative ability, possessed in high degree by the older
+leader, and supreme fighting genius, which, in spite of mental
+and moral qualities far inferior, has rightly won Nelson a more
+lasting fame. As a member of parliament before the war, as First
+Lord of the Admiralty from 1801 to 1803, and indeed in his sea
+commands, Jervis displayed a breadth of judgment, a knowledge of
+the world, a mastery of details of administration, to which Nelson
+could not pretend. In the organization of the Toulon and the Brest
+blockades, and in the suppression of mutiny in 1797, Jervis better
+than Nelson illustrates conventional ideals of military discipline.
+When appointed to the Channel command in 1799 he at once adopted
+the system of keeping the bulk of the fleet constantly on the enemy
+coast "well within Ushant with an easterly wind." Captains were to
+be on deck when ships came about at whatever hour. In port there
+were no night boats and no night leave for officers. To one officer
+who ventured a protest Jervis wrote that he "ought not to delay
+one day his intention to retire." "May the discipline of the
+Mediterranean never be introduced in the Channel," was a toast on
+Jervis's appointment to the latter squadron. "May his next glass
+of wine choke the wretch," was the wish of an indignant officer's
+wife. Jervis may have been a martinet, but it was he, more than
+any other officer, who instilled into the British navy the spirit
+of war.
+
+In the Mediterranean, however, he arrived too late. There, as in
+the Atlantic, the French Directory after the experiments of 1794
+and 1795 had now abandoned the idea of risking their battleships;
+and while these still served effectively in port as a fleet in
+being, their crews were turned to commerce warfare or transport
+flotilla work for the army. Bonaparte's ragged heroes were driving
+the Austrians out of Italy. Sardinia made peace in May of 1796.
+Spain closed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French
+Republic in August, putting a fleet of 50 of the line (at least
+on paper) on Jervis's communications and making further tenure
+of the Mediterranean a dangerous business. By October, 26 Spanish
+ships had joined the 12 French then at Toulon. Even so, Jervis with
+his force of 22 might have hazarded action, if his subordinate Mann,
+with a detached squadron of 7 of these, had not fled to England.
+Assigning to Nelson the task of evacuating Corsica and later Elba,
+Jervis now took station outside the straits, where on February 13,
+1797, Nelson rejoined his chief, whose strength still consisted
+of 15 of the line.
+
+_The Battle of Cape St. Vincent_
+
+The Spanish fleet, now 27, was at this time returning to Cadiz,
+as a first step toward a grand naval concentration in the north. A
+stiff Levanter having thrown the Spanish far beyond their destination,
+they were returning eastward when on February 14, 1797, the two
+fleets came in contact within sight of Cape St. Vincent. In view
+of the existing political situation, and the known inefficiency of
+the Spanish in sea fighting, Jervis decided to attack. "A victory,"
+he is said to have remarked, "is very essential to England at this
+hour."
+
+As a fresh westerly wind blew away the morning fog, the Spanish
+were fully revealed to southward, running before the wind, badly
+scattered, with 7 ships far in advance and thus to leeward of the
+rest. After some preliminary pursuit, the British formed in a single
+column (Troubridge in the _Culloden_ first, the flagship _Victory_
+seventh, and Nelson in the _Captain_ third from the rear), and
+took a southerly course which would carry them between the two
+enemy groups. As soon as they found themselves thus separated,
+the Spanish weather division hauled their wind, opened fire, and
+ran to northward along the weather side of the British line; while
+the lee division at first also turned northward and made some effort
+to unite with the rest of their company by breaking through the
+enemy formation, but were thrown back by a heavy broadside from
+the _Victory_. Having accomplished his first purpose, Jervis had
+already, at about noon, hoisted the signal to "tack in succession,"
+which meant that each ship should continue her course to the point
+where the _Culloden_ came about and then follow her in pursuit
+of the enemy weather division. This critical and much discussed
+maneuver appears entirely justified. The British by tacking in
+succession kept their column still between the parts of the enemy,
+its rear covering the enemy lee division, and the whole formation
+still in perfect order and control, as it would not have been had
+the ships tacked simultaneously. Again, if the attack had been
+made on the small group to leeward, the Spanish weather division
+could easily have run down into the action and thus brought their
+full strength to bear.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14, 1797
+
+BRITISH: 15 ships, 1232 guns.  SPANISH: 27 ships, 2286 guns.]
+
+But against an enemy so superior in numbers more was needed to keep
+the situation in hand. Shortly before one o'clock, when several
+British vessels had already filled away on the new course, Nelson
+from his position well back in the column saw that the leading
+ships of the main enemy division were swinging off to eastward
+as if to escape around the British rear. Eager to get into the
+fighting, of which his present course gave little promise, and
+without waiting for orders, he wore out of the column, passed between
+the two ships next astern, and threw himself directly upon the three
+big three-deckers, including the flagship _Santisima Trindad_ (130
+guns), which headed the enemy line. Before the fighting was over, his
+ship was badly battered, "her foretopmast and wheel shot away, and
+not a sail, shroud or rope left";[1] but the _Culloden_ and other
+van ships soon came up, and also Collingwood in the _Excellent_
+from the rear, after orders from Jervis for which Nelson had not
+waited. Out of the melee the British emerged with four prizes,
+Nelson himself having boarded the _San Nicolas_ (80), cleared her
+decks, and with reenforcements from his own ship passed across
+her to receive the surrender of the _San Josef_ (112). The swords
+of the vanquished Spanish, Nelson says, "I gave to William Fearney,
+one of my bargemen, who placed them with the greatest _sangfroid_
+under his arm."
+
+[Footnote 1: Nelson's DISPATCHES, Vol. II, p. 345.]
+
+For Nelson's initiative (which is the word for such actions when
+they end well) Jervis had only the warmest praise, and when his
+fleet captain, Calder, ventured a comment on the breach of orders,
+Jervis gave the tart answer, "Ay, and if ever you offend in the
+same way I promise you a forgiveness beforehand." Jervis was made
+Earl St. Vincent, and Nelson, who never hid his light under a bushel,
+shared at least in popular acclaim. It was not indeed a sweeping
+victory, and there is little doubt that had the British admiral
+so chosen, he might have done much more. But enough had been
+accomplished to discourage Spanish naval activities in the French
+cause for a long time to come. They were hopelessly outclassed;
+but in their favor it should be borne in mind that their ships
+were miserably manned, the crews consisting of ignorant peasants
+of whom it is reported that they said prayers before going aloft,
+and with whom their best admiral, Mazzaredo, had refused to sail.
+Moreover, they were fighting half-heartedly, lacking the inspiration
+of a great national cause, without which victories are rarely won.
+
+The defeat of the Spanish, as Jervis had foreseen, was timely.
+Mantua had just capitulated; British efforts to secure an honorable
+peace had failed; consols were at 51, and specie payments stopped
+by the Bank of England; Austria was on the verge of separate
+negotiations, the preliminaries of which were signed at Loeben on
+April 18; France, in the words of Bonaparte, could now "turn all
+her forces against England and oblige her to a prompt peace."[1]
+The news of St. Vincent was thus a ray of light on a very dark
+horizon. Its strategic value, along with the Battle of Camperdown,
+has already been made clear.
+
+[Footnote 1: CORRESPONDENCE, III, 346.]
+
+The British fleet, after refitting at Lisbon, took up a blockade
+of the Spanish at Cadiz which continued through the next two years.
+Discontent and mutiny, which threatened with each fresh ship from
+home, was guarded against by strict discipline, careful attention to
+health and diet, and by minor enterprises which served as diversions,
+such as the bombardment of Cadiz and the unsuccessful attack on Santa
+Cruz in the Canary Islands, July 24-25, 1797, in which Nelson lost
+his right arm.
+
+[Illustration: THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST 1798]
+
+_The Battle of the Nile_
+
+Nelson's return to the Cadiz blockade in May, 1798, after months
+of suffering in England, was coincident with the gathering of a
+fresh storm cloud in the Mediterranean, though the direction in
+which it threatened was still completely concealed. While Sicily,
+Greece, Portugal and even Ireland were mentioned by the British
+Admiralty as possible French objectives, Egypt was apparently not
+thought of. Yet its strategic position between three continents
+remained as important as in centuries past, controlling the trade
+of the Levant and threatening India by land or sea. "The time is
+not far distant," Bonaparte had already written, "when we shall feel
+that truly to destroy England we must take possession of Egypt."
+In point of fact the strength of England rested not merely on the
+wealth of the Indies, but on her merchant fleets, naval control,
+home products and manufactures, in short her whole industrial and
+commercial development, too strong to be struck down by a blow in
+this remote field. Still, if the continued absence of a British
+fleet from the Mediterranean could be counted on, the Egyptian
+campaign was the most effective move against her that offered at
+the time. It was well that the British Admiralty rose to the danger.
+Jervis, though he pointed out the risks involved, was directed to
+send Nelson with an advance squadron of 3 ships, later strengthened
+to 14, to watch the concentration of land and naval forces at Toulon.
+"The appearance of a British fleet in the Mediterranean," wrote
+the First Lord, Spencer, in urging the move, "is a condition on
+which the fate of Europe may be stated to depend."
+
+Before a strong northwest wind the French armada on May 19 left
+Toulon--13 of the line, 13 smaller vessels, and a fleet of transports
+which when joined by contingents from Genoa, Corsica, and Civita
+Vecchia brought the total to 400 sail, crowded with over 30,000
+troops. Of the fighting fleet there is the usual tale of ships
+carelessly fitted out, one-third short-handed, and supplied with
+but two months' food--a tale which simply points the truth that
+the winning of naval campaigns begins months or years before.
+
+The gale from which the French found shelter under Sardinia and
+Corsica fell later with full force on Nelson to the westward of
+the islands. His flagship the _Vanguard_ lost her foremast and
+remaining topmasts, while at the same time his four frigates, so
+essential in the search that followed, were scattered and failed
+to rejoin. Having by extraordinary exertions refitted in Sardinia
+in the short space of four days, he was soon again off Toulon,
+but did not learn of the enemy's departure until May 31, and even
+then he got no clue as to where they had gone. Here he was joined
+on June 7 by the promised reenforcements, bringing his squadron
+to 13 74's and the _Leander_ of 50 guns.
+
+The ensuing search continued for two months, until August 1, the
+date of the Battle of the Nile. During this period, Nelson appears
+to best advantage; in the words of David Hannay, he was an "embodied
+flame of resolution, with none of the vulgar bluster that was to
+appear later."
+
+Moving slowly southward, the French flotilla had spent ten days
+in the occupation of Malta--the surrender of which was chiefly
+due to French influence among the Knights of St. John who held the
+island--and departed on June 19 for their destination, following
+a circuitous route along the south side of Crete and thence to
+the African coast 70 miles west of Alexandria.
+
+Learning off Cape Passaro on the 22d of the enemy's departure from
+Malta, Nelson made direct for Alexandria under fair wind and press
+of sail. He reached the port two days ahead of Bonaparte, and finding
+it empty, at once set out to retrace his course, his impetuous
+energy betraying him into what was undoubtedly a hasty move. The
+two fleets had been but 60 miles apart on the night of the 25th.
+Had they met, though Bonaparte had done his utmost by organization
+and drill to prepare for such an emergency, a French disaster would
+have been almost inevitable, and Napoleon, in the amusingly partisan
+words of Nelson's biographer Southey, "would have escaped those
+later crimes that have incarnadined his soul." Nelson had planned
+in case of such an encounter to detach three of his ships to attack
+the transports.
+
+The trying month that now intervened, spent by the British fleet
+in a vain search along the northern coast of the Mediterranean,
+a brief stop at Syracuse for water and supplies, and return, was
+not wholly wasted, for during this time the commander in chief
+was in frequent consultation with his captains, securing their
+hearty support, and familiarizing them with his plans for action
+in whatever circumstances a meeting might occur. An interesting
+reference to this practice of Nelson's appears in a later
+characterization of him written by the French Admiral Decres to
+Napoleon. "His boastfulness," so the comment runs, "is only equalled
+by his ineptitude, but he has the saving quality of making no pretense
+to any other virtues than boldness and good nature, so that he is
+accessible to the counsels of those under him." As to who dominated
+these conferences and who profited by them we may form our own
+opinion. It was by such means that Nelson fostered a spirit of
+full cooperation and mutual confidence between himself and his
+subordinates which justified his affectionate phrase, "a band of
+brothers."
+
+The result was seen at the Nile. If rapid action lost the chance
+of battle a month before, it did much to insure victory when the
+opportunity came, and it was made possible by each captain's full
+grasp of what was to be done. "Time is everything," to quote a
+familiar phrase of Nelson; "five minutes may spell the difference
+between victory and defeat." It was two in the afternoon when the
+British, after looking into Alexandria, first sighted the French
+fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, and it was just sundown when the
+leading ship _Goliath_ rounded the _Guerrier's_ bows. The battle
+was fought in darkness. In the face of a fleet protected by shoals
+and shore batteries, with no trustworthy charts or pilots, with ships
+still widely separated by their varying speeds, a less thoroughly
+drilled force under a less ardent leader would have felt the necessity
+of delaying action until the following day. Nelson never hesitated.
+His ships went into action in the order in which they reached the
+scene.
+
+The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion
+which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the repeated letters
+from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor,
+in spite of repeated soundings which showed this course possible,
+the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of despondent inertia still
+lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.
+Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was
+known that their range did not cover the head of the French line.
+The frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely
+warning were at anchor in the bay. Numerous water parties were
+on shore and with them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables
+from one vessel to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had
+been vaguely planned. At a hurried council it was proposed to put
+to sea, but this was given up for the sufficient reason that there
+was no time. The French were cleared for action only on the out-board
+side. Their admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a
+fear reasonable enough if his ships had been sailing before the
+wind at sea; but at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective
+and the wind blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van
+would be far more dangerous, since support could less easily be
+brought up from the rear.
+
+[Illustration: COAST MAP
+
+From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth of the Nile]
+
+It was on the head of the line that the attack came. Nelson had
+given the one signal that "his intention was to attack the van
+and center as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before
+developed." This plan called for doubling, two ships to the enemy's
+one. With a fair wind from the north-northwest Captain Foley in
+the _Goliath_ at 6 p.m. reached the _Guerrier_, the headmost of
+the thirteen ships in the enemy line. Either by instant initiative,
+or more likely in accordance with previous plans in view of such an
+opportunity, he took his ship inside the line, his anchor dragging
+slightly so as to bring him up on the quarter of the second enemy
+vessel, the _Conquerant_. The _Zealous_, following closely,
+anchored on the bows of the _Guerrier_; the _Orion_ engaged inside
+the fifth ship; the _Theseus_ inside the third; and the _Audacious_,
+passing between the first two of the enemy, brought up on the
+_Conquerant's_ bow. With these five engaged inside, Nelson in the
+_Vanguard_ and the two ships following him engaged respectively
+outside the third, fourth and fifth of the enemy. Thus the concentration
+on the van was eight to five.
+
+About a half hour later the _Bellerophon_ and the _Majestic_
+attacked respectively the big flagship _Orient_ (110) in the
+center and the _Tonnant_ (80) next astern, and against these superior
+antagonists suffered severely, losing in killed and wounded 390
+men divided about equally between them, which was nearly half the
+total loss of 896 and greater than the total at Cape St. Vincent.
+Both later drifted almost helpless down the line. The _Culloden_
+under Troubridge, a favorite of both Jervis and Nelson, had
+unfortunately grounded and stuck fast on Aboukir shoal; but the
+_Swiftsure_ and the _Alexander_ came up two hours after the battle
+had begun as a support to the ships in the centre, the _Swiftsure_
+engaging the _Orient_, and the _Alexander_ the _Franklin_ next
+ahead, while the smaller _Leander_ skillfully chose a position
+where she could rake the two. By this time all five of the French
+van had surrendered; the _Orient_ was in flames and blew up about
+10 o'clock with the loss of all but 70 men. Admiral Brueys, thrice
+wounded, died before the explosion. Of the four ships in the rear,
+only two, the _Guillaume Tell_ under Admiral Villeneuve and the
+_Genereux_, were able to cut their cables next morning and get
+away. Nelson asserted that, had he not been incapacitated by a
+severe scalp wound in the action, even these would not have escaped.
+Of the rest, two were burned and nine captured. Among important
+naval victories, aside from such one-sided slaughters as those of
+our own Spanish war, it remains the most overwhelming in history.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE NILE]
+
+The effect was immediate throughout Europe, attesting dearly the
+contemporary importance attached to sea control. "It was this battle,"
+writes Admiral de la Graviere, "which for two years delivered over
+the Mediterranean to the British and called thither the squadrons
+of Russia, which shut up our army in the midst of a hostile people
+and led the Porte to declare against us, which put India beyond
+our reach and thrust France to the brink of ruin, for it rekindled
+the hardly extinct war with Austria and brought Suvaroff and the
+Austro-Russians to our very frontiers."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: GUERRES MARITIMES, II, 129.]
+
+The whole campaign affords an instance of an overseas expedition
+daringly undertaken in the face of a hostile fleet (though it should
+be remembered that the British were not in the Mediterranean when
+it was planned), reaching its destination by extraordinary good
+luck, and its possibilities then completely negatived by the
+reestablishment of enemy naval control. The efforts of the French
+army to extricate itself northward through Palestine were later
+thwarted partly by the squadron under Commodore Sidney Smith, which
+captured the siege guns sent to Acre by sea and aided the Turks in
+the defense of the fortress. In October of 1799 Bonaparte escaped
+to France in a frigate. French fleets afterwards made various futile
+efforts to succor the forces left in Egypt, which finally surrendered
+to an army under Abercromby, just too late to strengthen the British
+in the peace negotiations of October, 1801.
+
+Nelson's subsequent activities in command of naval forces in Italian
+waters need not detain us. Physically and nervously weakened from
+the effects of his wound and arduous campaign, he fell under the
+influence of Lady Hamilton and the wretched court of Naples, lent
+naval assistance to schemes of doubtful advantage to his country,
+and in June of 1800 incurred the displeasure of the Admiralty by
+direct disobedience of orders to send support to Minorca. He returned
+to England at the close of 1800 with the glory of his victory somewhat
+tarnished, and with blemishes on his private character which
+unfortunately, as will be seen, affected also his professional
+reputation.
+
+_The Copenhagen Campaign_
+
+Under the rapid scene-shifting of Napoleon, the political stage
+had by this time undergone another complete change from that which
+followed the battle of the Nile. Partly at least as a consequence
+of that battle, the so-called Second Coalition had been formed by
+Great Britain, Russia, and Austria, the armies of the two latter
+powers, as already stated, carrying the war again to the French
+frontiers. It required only the presence of Bonaparte, in supreme
+control after the _coup d'etat_ of the Eighteenth _Brumaire_
+(9 Nov., 1799), to turn the tide, rehabilitate the internal
+administration of France, and by the victories of Marengo in June
+and Hohenlinden in December of 1800 to force Austria once more to
+a separate peace. Paul I of Russia had already fallen out with his
+allies and withdrawn his armies and his great general, Suvaroff,
+a year before. Now, taken with a romantic admiration for Napoleon,
+and angry when the British, after retaking Malta, refused to turn
+it over to him as Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, he was
+easily manipulated by Napoleon into active support of the latter's
+next move against England.
+
+This was the Armed Neutrality of 1800, the object of which, from
+the French standpoint, was to close to England the markets of the
+North, and combine against her the naval forces of the Baltic.
+Under French and Russian pressure, and in spite of the fact that
+all these northern nations stood to suffer in one way or another
+from rupture of trade relations with England, the coalition was
+accomplished in December, 1800; Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark
+pledging themselves to resist infringements of neutral rights,
+whether by extension of contraband lists, seizure of enemy goods
+under neutral flag, search of vessels guaranteed innocent by their
+naval escort, or by other methods familiar then as in later times.
+These were measures which England, aiming both to ruin the trade
+of France and to cut off her naval supplies, felt bound to insist
+upon as the belligerent privileges of sea power.
+
+To overcome this new danger called for a mixture of force and diplomacy,
+which England supplied by sending to Denmark an envoy with a 48-hour
+ultimatum, and along with him 20 ships-of-the-line, which according
+to Nelson were "the best negotiators in Europe." The commander in
+chief of this squadron was Sir Hyde Parker, a hesitant and mediocre
+leader who could be trusted to do nothing (if that were necessary),
+and Nelson was made second in command. Influence, seniority, a clean
+record, and what-not, often lead to such choices, bad enough at
+any time but indefensible in time of war. Fortunately for England,
+when the reply of the Danish court showed that force was required,
+the two admirals virtually changed places with less friction than
+might have been expected, and Nelson "Lifted and carried on his
+shoulders the dead weight of his superior,"[1] throughout the ensuing
+campaign.
+
+[Footnote 1: Mahan, INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON FRENCH REVOLUTION
+AND EMPIRE, II, 52.]
+
+When the envoy on March 23 returned to the fleet, then anchored in
+the Cattegat, he brought an alarming tale of Danish preparations,
+and an air of gloom pervaded the flagship when Nelson came aboard
+for a council of war. Copenhagen, it will be recalled, is situated
+on the eastern coast of Zealand, on the waterway called the Sound
+leading southward from the Cattegat to the Baltic. Directly in
+front of the city, a long shoal named the Middle Ground separates
+the Sound into two navigable channels, the one nearer Copenhagen
+known as the King's Deep (_Kongedyb_). The defenses of the Danish
+capital, so the envoy reported, were planned against attack from
+the northward. At this end of the line the formidable Trekroner
+Battery (68 guns), together with two ships-of-the-line and some
+smaller vessels, defended the narrow entrance to the harbor; while
+protecting the city to the southward, along the flats at the edge
+of the King's Deep, was drawn up an array of about 37 craft ranging
+from ships-of-the-line to mere scows, mounting a total of 628 guns,
+and supported at some distance by batteries on land. Filled with
+patriotic ardor, half the male population of the city had volunteered
+to support the forces manning these batteries afloat and ashore.
+
+Nelson's plan for meeting these obstacles, as well as his view of
+the whole situation, as presented at the council, was embodied in
+a memorandum dated the following day, which well illustrates his
+grasp of a general strategic problem. The Government's instructions,
+as well as Parker's preference, were apparently to wait in the
+Cattegat until the combined enemy forces should choose to come
+out and fight. Instead, the second in command advocated immediate
+action. "Not a moment," he wrote, "should be lost in attacking the
+enemy; they will every day and hour be stronger." The best course,
+in his opinion, would be to take the whole fleet at once into the
+Baltic against Russia, as a "home stroke," which if successful
+would bring down the coalition like a house of cards. If the Danes
+must first be dealt with, he proposed, instead of a direct attack,
+which would be "taking the bull by the horns," an attack from the
+rear. In order to do so, the fleet could get beyond the city either
+by passing through the Great Belt south of Zealand, or directly
+through the Sound. Another resultant advantage, in case the five
+Swedish sail of the line or the 14 Russian ships at Revel should
+take the offensive, would be that of central position, between
+the enemy divisions.
+
+"Supposing us through the Belt," the letter concludes, "with the
+wind northwesterly, would it not be possible to either go with
+the fleet or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one
+Bomb and two Fireships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron
+at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment,
+and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The
+measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion that the boldest
+measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous
+assertion of her force, directed with judgment."
+
+Here was a striking plan of aggressive warfare, aimed at the heart of
+the coalition. The proposal to leave part of the fleet at Copenhagen
+was indeed a dangerous compromise, involving divided forces and
+threatened communications, but was perhaps justified by the known
+inefficiency of the Russians and the fact that the Danes were actually
+fought and defeated with a force no greater than the plan provided.
+In the end the more conservative course was adopted of settling
+with Denmark first. Keeping well to the eastern shore, the fleet
+on March 30 passed into the Sound without injury from the fire of
+the Kronenburg forts at its entrance, and anchored that evening
+near Copenhagen.
+
+Three days later, on April 2, 1801, the attack was made as planned,
+from the southward end of the Middle Ground. Nelson in the _Elephant_
+commanded the fighting squadron, which consisted of seven 74's,
+three 64's and two of 50 guns, with 18 bomb vessels, sloops, and
+fireships. The rest of the ships, under Parker, were anchored at
+the other end of the shoal and 5 miles north of the city; it seems
+they were to have cooperated, but the south wind which Nelson needed
+made attack impossible for them. Against the Danish total of 696
+guns on the ships and Trekroner fortification, Nelson's squadron
+had 1014, but three of his main units grounded during the approach
+and were of little service. There was no effort at concentration,
+the British when in position engaging the whole southern part of
+the Danish line. "Here," in the words of Nelson's later description,
+"was no maneuvering; it was downright fighting"--a hotly contested
+action against ships and shore batteries lasting from 10 a. m., when
+the _Elephant_ led into position on the bow of Commodore Fischer's
+flagship _Dannebroge_, until about one.
+
+In the midst of the engagement, as Nelson restlessly paced the
+quarterdeck, he caught sight of the signal "Leave off action" flown
+from Sir Hyde's flagship. Instead of transmitting the signal to the
+vessels under him, Nelson kept his own for "Close action" hoisted.
+Colonel Stewart, who was on board at the time, continues the story as
+follows: "He also observed, I believe to Captain Foley, 'You know,
+Foley, I have only one eye--I have a right to be blind sometimes';
+and then with an archness peculiar to his character, putting the
+glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not see the
+signal.'" It was obeyed, however, by the light vessels under Captain
+Riou attacking the Trekroner battery, which were suffering severely,
+and which could also more easily effect a retreat.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, APRIL 2, 1801]
+
+Shortly afterward the Danish fire began to slacken and several
+of the floating batteries surrendered, though before they could
+be taken they were frequently remanned by fresh forces from the
+shore. Enough had been accomplished; and to end a difficult
+situation--if not to extricate himself from it--Nelson sent the
+following summons addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen, the
+Danes": "Lord Nelson has orders to spare Denmark when no longer
+resisting; if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord
+Nelson will be obliged to set fire to the floating batteries he
+has taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who
+have defended them."
+
+A truce followed, during which Nelson removed his ships. Next day
+he went ashore to open negotiations, while at the same time he
+brought bomb vessels into position to bombard the city. The cessation
+of hostilities was the more readily agreed to by the Danes owing
+to the fact that on the night before the battle they had received
+news, which they still kept concealed from the British, of the
+assassination of the Czar Paul. His successor, they knew, would be
+forced to adopt a policy more favorable to the true interests of
+Russian trade. The league in fact was on the verge of collapse. A
+fourteen weeks' armistice was signed with Denmark. On April 12 the
+fleet moved into the Baltic, and on May 5, Nelson having succeeded
+Parker in command, it went on to Revel, whence the Russian squadron
+had escaped through the ice to Kronstadt ten days before. On June
+17 a convention was signed with Russia and later accepted by the
+other northern states, by which Great Britain conceded that neutrals
+might engage in trade from one enemy port to another, with the
+important exception of _colonial_ ports, and that naval stores
+should not be contraband; whereas Russia agreed that enemy goods
+under certain conditions might be seized in neutral ships, and
+that vessels under naval escort might be searched by ships-of-war.
+In the meantime, Nelson, realizing that active operations were
+over with, resigned his command.
+
+In the opinion of the French naval critic Graviere, the campaign
+thus ended constitutes in the eyes of seamen Nelson's best title to
+fame--"_son plus beau titre gloire._"[1] Certainly it called forth
+the most varied talents--grasp of the political and strategical
+situation; tact and force of personality in dealing with an inert
+commander in chief; energy in overcoming not only military obstacles
+but the doubts and scruples of fellow officers; aggressiveness in
+battle; and skill in negotiations. In view of the Czar's murder--of
+which the British Government would seem to have had an inkling
+beforehand--it may be thought that less strenuous methods would
+have served. On the contrary, however, hundreds of British merchant
+vessels had been seized in northern ports, trade had been stopped,
+and the nation was threatened with a dangerous increment to her
+foes. Furthermore, after a brief interval of peace, Great Britain
+had to face ten years more of desperate warfare, during which nothing
+served her better than that at Copenhagen the northern neutrals
+had had a sharp taste of British naval power. Force was needed.
+That it was employed economically is shown by the fact that, when a
+renewal of peace between France and Russia in 1807 again threatened
+a northern confederation, Nelson's accomplishment with 12 ships
+was duplicated, but this time with 25 of the line, 40 frigates,
+27,000 troops, the bombardment of Copenhagen, and a regular land
+campaign.
+
+[Footnote 1: GUERRES MARITIMES, Vol. II, p. 43.]
+
+Upon Nelson's return to England, popular clamor practically forced
+his appointment to command the Channel defense flotilla against
+the French armies which were now once more concentrated on the
+northern coast. This service lasted for only a brief period until
+the signing of peace preliminaries in October, 1801.
+
+During the eight years of hostilities thus ended Great Britain, it
+is true, had been fighting largely on the defensive, but on a line
+of defense carried to the enemy's sea frontiers and comparable to
+siege lines about a city or fortress, which, when once established,
+thrust upon the enemy the problem of breaking through. The efforts
+of France to pierce this barrier, exerted in various directions
+and by various means, were, as we have seen, defeated by naval
+engagements, which insured to England the control of the sea. During
+this period, France lost altogether 55 ships-of-the-line, Holland
+18, Spain 10, and Denmark 2, a total of 85, of which at least 50
+were captured by the enemy. Great Britain lost 20, but only 5 by
+capture. The British battle fleet at the close of hostilities had
+increased to 189 capital ships; that of France had shrunk to 45.
+
+For purposes of commerce warfare the French navy had suffered the
+withdrawal of many of its smaller fighting vessels and large numbers
+of its best seamen, attracted into privateering by the better promise
+of profit and adventure. As a result of this warfare, about 3500
+British merchantmen were destroyed, an average of 500 a year,
+representing an annual loss of 2-1/2 per cent of all the ships of
+British register. But in the meantime the French merchant marine
+and commerce had been literally swept off the seas. In 1799 the
+Directory admitted there was "not a single merchant ship on the seas
+carrying the French flag." French imports from Asia, Africa, and
+America in 1800 amounted to only $300,000, and exports to $56,000,
+whereas England's total export and import trade had nearly doubled,
+from 44-1/2 million pounds sterling in 1792 to nearly 78 million in
+1800. It is true that, owing to the exigencies of war, the amount of
+British shipping employed in this trade actually fell off slightly,
+and that of neutrals increased from 13 to 34%. But the profits
+went chiefly to British merchants. England had become the great
+storehouse and carrier for the Continent, "Commerce," in the phrase
+engraved on the elder Pitt's monument, "being united with and made
+to flourish by war."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Figures on naval losses from Graviere, GUERRES MARITIMES,
+Vol. II, ch. VII, and on commerce, from Mahan, FRENCH REVOLUTION
+AND EMPIRE, Vol. II, ch. XVII.]
+
+REFERENCES
+
+See end of Chapter XIII, page 285.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+THE NAPOLEONIC WAR [_Concluded_]: TRAFALGAR AND AFTER
+
+The peace finally ratified at Amiens in March, 1802, failed to
+accomplish any of the purposes for which England had entered the
+war. France not only maintained her frontiers on the Scheldt and
+the Rhine, but still exercised a predominant influence in Holland
+and western Italy, and excluded British trade from territories
+under her control. Until French troops were withdrawn from Holland,
+as called for by the treaty, England refused to evacuate Malta.
+Bonaparte, who wished further breathing space to build up the French
+navy, tried vainly to postpone hostilities by threatening to invade
+England and exclude her from all continental markets. "It will be
+England," he declared, "that forces us to conquer Europe." The
+war reopened in May of 1803.
+
+With no immediate danger on the Continent and with all the resources
+of a regenerated France at his command, Bonaparte now undertook
+the project of a descent upon England on such a scale as never
+before. Hazardous as he always realized the operation to be--it
+was a thousand to one chance, he told the British envoys, that he
+and his army would end at the bottom of the sea--he was definitely
+committed to it by his own threats and by the expectation of France
+that he would now annihilate her hereditary foe.
+
+_Napoleon's Plan of Invasion_
+
+An army of 130,000 men, with 400 guns and 20 days' supplies, was
+to embark from four ports close to Boulogne as a center, and cross
+the 36 miles of Channel to a favorable stretch of coast between
+Dover and Hastings, distant from London some 70 miles. The transport
+flotilla, as finally planned, was to consist of 2000 or more small
+flat-bottomed sailing vessels with auxiliary oar propulsion-_chaloupes_
+and _bateaux canonnieres_, from 60 to 80 feet over all, not over 8
+feet in draft, with from two to four guns and a capacity for 100
+to 150 men. Large open boats (_peniches_) were also to be used,
+and all available coast craft for transport of horses and supplies.
+Shipyards from the Scheldt to the Gironde were soon busy building
+the special flotilla, and as fast as they were finished they skirted
+the shores to the points of concentration under protection of coast
+batteries. Extensive harbor and defense works were undertaken at
+Boulogne and neighboring ports, and the 120 miles from the Scheldt
+to the Somme was soon bristling with artillery, in General Marmont's
+phrase, "a coast of iron and bronze."
+
+The impression was spread abroad that the crossing was to be effected
+by stealth, in calm, fog, or the darkness of a long winter night,
+without the protection of a fleet. Almost from the first, however,
+Bonaparte seems to have had no such intention. The armament of the
+flotilla itself proved of slight value, and he was resolved to
+take no uncalled-for risks, on an unfamiliar element, with 100,000
+men. An essential condition, which greatly complicated the whole
+undertaking, became the concentration of naval forces in the Channel
+sufficient to secure temporary control. "Let us be masters of the
+Strait for 6 hours," Napoleon wrote to Latouche-Treville in command
+of the Toulon fleet, "and we shall be masters of the world." In
+less rhetorical moments he extended the necessary period to from
+two to fifteen days.
+
+Up to the spring of 1804 neither army nor flotilla was fully ready,
+and thereafter the crossing was always definitely conditioned upon a
+naval concentration. But the whole plan called for swift execution.
+As time lapsed, difficulties multiplied. Harbors silted up, transports
+were wrecked by storms, British defense measures on land and sea grew
+more formidable, the Continental situation became more threatening.
+The Boulogne army thus became more and more--what Napoleon perhaps
+falsely declared later it had always been--an army concentrated
+against Austria. To get a fleet into the Channel without a battle
+was almost impossible, and once in, its position would be dangerous
+in the extreme. Towards the end, in the opinion of the French student
+Colonel Desbriere, Napoleon's chief motive in pressing for fleet
+cooperation was the belief that it would lead to a decisive naval
+action which, though a defeat, would shift from his own head the
+odium of failure.
+
+Whether this theory is fully accepted or not, the fact remains that
+the only sure way of conquering England was by a naval contest.
+Her first and main defense was the British fleet, which, spread out
+to the limits of safety to watch French ships wherever harbored,
+guarded not only against a concentration in the Channel, but against
+incursions into other fields. The immediate defense of the coasts was
+intrusted to flotillas of armed boats, over 700 in all, distributed
+along the coast from Leith south-about to Glasgow, with 100 on the
+coast of Ireland. Naval men looked upon these as of slight value,
+a concession, according to Earl St. Vincent, to "the old women
+in and out" (of both sexes) at home. The distribution of the main
+battle squadrons varied, but in March, 1805, at the opening of the
+Trafalgar campaign they were stationed as follows: Boulogne and the
+Dutch forces were watched by Admiral Keith with 11 of the line and
+150 smaller units scattered from the Texel to the Channel Islands.
+The 21 French ships under Ganteaume at Brest, the strategic center,
+were closely blockaded by Cornwallis, whose force, by Admiralty
+orders, was not to fall below 18 of the line. A small squadron had
+been watching Missiessy's 5 ships at Rochefort and upon his escape
+in January had followed him to the West Indies. The 5 French and 10
+Spanish at Ferrol and the 6 or more ready for sea at Cadiz were
+held in check by forces barely adequate. In the Gulf of Lyons Nelson
+with 13 ships had since May, 1803, stood outside the distant but
+dangerous station of Toulon. Owing to the remoteness from bases,
+a close and constant blockade was here impossible; moreover, it
+was the policy to let the enemy get out in the hope of bringing
+him to action at sea.
+
+[Illustration: POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, 1805]
+
+To effect a concentration in the Channel in the face of these obstacles
+was the final aim of all Napoleon's varied naval combinations of
+1804 and 1805--combinations which impress one with the truth of
+Graviere's criticism that the Emperor lacked "_le sentiment exact
+des difficultes de la marine_," and especially, one should perhaps
+add, _de la marine francaise_. The first plan, the simplest and,
+therefore, most promising, was that Latouche Treville with the
+Toulon fleet should evade Nelson and, after releasing ships on
+the way, enter the Channel with 16 of the line, while Cornwallis
+was kept occupied by Ganteaume. This was upset by the death of
+Latouche, France's ablest and most energetic admiral, in August
+of 1804, and by the accession, two months later, of Spain and the
+Spanish navy to the French cause. After many misgivings Napoleon
+chose Villeneuve to succeed at Toulon. Skilled in his profession,
+honest, and devoted, he was fatally lacking in self-confidence
+and energy to conquer difficulties. "It is sad," wrote an officer
+in the fleet, "to see that force which under Latouche was full of
+activity, now without faith in either their leader or themselves."
+
+The final plan, though still subject to modifications, was for
+a concentration on a larger scale in the West Indies. Villeneuve
+was to go thither, picking up the Cadiz ships on the way, join
+the Rochefort squadron if it were still there, and wait 40 days
+for the Brest fleet. Upon its arrival the entire force of 40 ships
+was to move swiftly back to the Channel. It was assumed that the
+British squadrons, in alarm for the colonies, would in the meantime
+be scattered in pursuit.
+
+_The Pursuit of Villeneuve_
+
+Villeneuve put to sea in a rising gale on January 17, 1805, but
+was soon back in port with damaged ships, the only effect being
+to send Nelson clear to Egypt in search of him. A successful start
+was made on March 30. Refusing to wait for 5 Spanish vessels at
+Carthagena, Villeneuve with 11 sail reached Cadiz on April 9, picked
+up one French vessel and two Spanish under Admiral Gravina, and
+leaving 4 more to follow was off safely on the same night for the
+West Indies.
+
+From Gibraltar to the Admiralty in London, Villeneuve's appearance
+in the Atlantic created a profound stir. His departure from Cadiz
+was known, but not whither he had gone. The five ships on the Cadiz
+blockade fell back at once to the Channel. A fast frigate from
+Gibraltar carried the warning to Calder off Ferrol and to the Brest
+blockade, whence it reached London on April 25. A convoy for Malta
+and Sicily with 6000 troops under Gen. Craig--a pledge which Russia
+called for before sending her own forces to southern Italy--was already
+a week on its way and might fall an easy victim. In consequence of
+an upheaval at the Admiralty, Lord Barham, a former naval officer
+now nearly 80 years of age, had just begun his memorable 9 months'
+administration as First Lord of the Admiralty and director of the
+naval war. Immediately a whole series of orders went out to the
+fleets to insure the safety of the troop ships, the maintenance of
+the Ferrol blockade, an eventual strengthening of forces outside
+the Channel, and the safety of the Antilles in case Villeneuve
+had gone there.
+
+Where was Nelson? His scout frigates by bad judgment had lost Villeneuve
+on the night of March 31 east of Minorca, with no clue to his future
+course. Nelson took station between Sardinia and the African coast,
+resolved not to move till he "knew something positive." In the
+absence of information, the safety of Naples, Sicily, and Egypt
+was perhaps not merely an obsession on his part, but a proper
+professional concern; but it is strange that no inkling should
+have reached him from the Admiralty or elsewhere that a western
+movement from Toulon was the only one Napoleon now had in mind.
+It was April 18 before he received further news of the enemy, and
+not until May 5 was he able to get up to and through the Straits
+against steady head winds; even then he could not, as he said,
+"run to the West Indies without something beyond mere surmise."
+Definite reports from Cadiz that the enemy had gone thither reached
+him through an Admiral Campbell in the Portuguese service, and were
+confirmed by the fact that they had been seen nowhere to northward.
+On the 12th, leaving the _Royal Sovereign_ (100) to strengthen
+the escort of Craig's convoy, which had now appeared, he set out
+westward with 10 ships in pursuit of the enemy's 18.
+
+He reached Barbados on June 4, only 21 days after Villeneuve's
+arrival at Martinique. The latter had found that the Rochefort
+squadron--as a result of faulty transmission of Napoleon's innumerable
+orders--was already back in Europe, and that the Brest squadron had
+not come. In fact, held tight in the grip of Cornwallis, it was
+destined never to leave port. But a reenforcement of 2 ships had
+reached Villeneuve with orders to wait 35 days longer and in the
+meantime to harry the British colonies. Disgruntled and despondent, he
+had scarcely got troops aboard and started north on this mission when
+he learned that Nelson was hot on his trail. The troops were hastily
+thrown into frigates to protect the French colonies. Without other
+provision for their safety, and in disregard of orders, Villeneuve
+at once turned back for Europe, hoping the Emperor's schemes would
+still be set forward by his joining the ships at Ferrol.
+
+Nelson followed four days later, on June 13, steering for his old
+post in the Mediterranean, but at the same time despatching the
+fast brig _Curieux_ to England with news of the French fleet's
+return. This vessel by great good fortune sighted Villeneuve in
+mid-ocean, inferred from his northerly position that he was bound
+for Ferrol, and reached Portsmouth on July 8. Barham at the Admiralty
+got the news the next morning, angry that he had not been routed out
+of bed on the arrival of the captain the night before. By 9 o'clock
+the same morning, orders were off to Calder on the Ferrol station
+in time so that on the 22d of July he encountered the enemy, still
+plowing slowly eastward, some 300 miles west of Cape Finisterre.
+
+As a result of admirable communication work and swift administrative
+action the critic of Nelson at Cape St. Vincent now had a chance
+to rob the latter of his last victory and end the campaign then
+and there. His forces were adequate. Though he had only 14 ships
+to 20, his four three-deckers, according to the estimates of the
+time, were each worth two of the enemy 74's, and on the other hand,
+the 6 Spanish ships with Villeneuve could hardly be counted for
+more than three. In the ensuing action, fought in foggy weather,
+two of the Spanish were captured and one of Calder's three-deckers
+was so injured that it had to be detached. The two fleets remained
+in contact for three days following, but neither took the aggressive.
+In a subsequent court martial Calder was reprimanded for "not having
+done his utmost to renew the said engagement and destroy every
+ship of the enemy."
+
+[Illustration: NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE, MARCH-SEPTEMBER,
+1805]
+
+On July 27 the Allied fleet staggered into Vigo, and a week later,
+after dropping three ships and 1200 sick men, it moved around to
+Corunna and Ferrol. Instead of being shaken down and strengthened
+by the long cruise, it was, according to the commander's plaintive
+letters, in worse plight than when it left Toulon. Nevertheless,
+ten days later he was ready to leave port, with 29 units, 14 of them
+raw vessels from Ferrol, and 11 of them Spanish. If, as Napoleon
+said, France was not going to give up having a navy, something
+might still be done. His orders to Villeneuve were to proceed to
+Brest and thence to Boulogne. "I count," he ended, "on your zeal
+in my service, your love of your country, and your hatred of that
+nation which has oppressed us for 40 generations, and which a little
+preseverance on your part will now cause to reenter forever the
+ranks of petty powers."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Orders of 26 July, Desbriere, PROJETS, Vol. V, p. 672.]
+
+Such were Villeneuve's instructions, the wisdom or sincerity of
+which it was scarcely his privilege to question (though it may
+be ours). In passing judgment on his failure to execute them it
+should be remembered that two months later, to avoid the personal
+disgrace of being superseded, he took his fleet out to more certain
+disaster than that which it now faced in striking northward from
+Corunna. "_Un poltron du tete et non de la coeur_"[2] the French
+Admiral was handicapped throughout by a paralyzing sense of the
+things he could not do.
+
+[Footnote 2: Graviere II, 136.]
+
+If he had sailer northward he would have found the British fleet
+divided. Nelson, it is true, after returning to Cadiz had fallen
+back from Gibraltar to the Channel, where he left his eleven ships
+with the Brest squadron in remarkable condition after more than two
+years at sea. Calder had also joined, bringing Cornwallis' total
+strength to 39. These stood between the 21 French at Brest and
+the 29 at Ferrol. But on August 16 Cornwallis divided his forces,
+keeping 18 (including 10 three-deckers) and sending Calder back to
+the Spanish coast with the rest. Napoleon called this a disgraceful
+blunder (_insigne betise_), and Mahan adds, "This censure was just."
+Sir Julian Corbeh says it was a "master stroke... in all the campaign
+there is no movement--not even Nelson's chase of Villeneuve--that
+breathes more deeply the true spirit of war." According to Napoleon,
+Villeneuve might have "played prisoners' base with Calder's squadron
+and fallen upon Cornwallis, or with his 30 of the line have beaten
+Calder's 20 and obtained a decisive superiority."
+
+So perhaps a Napoleonic admiral. Villeneuve left Ferrol on August
+13 and sailed northwest on a heavy northeast wind till the 15th.
+Then, his fixed purpose merely strengthened by false news from a
+Danish merchantman of 25 British in the vicinity, he turned before
+the wind for Cadiz. As soon as he was safely inside, the British
+blockaders again closed around the port.
+
+_The Battle of Trafalgar_
+
+After twenty-five days in England, Nelson took command off Cadiz
+on September 28, eager for a final blow that would free England for
+aggressive war. There was talk of using bomb vessels, Congreve's
+rockets, and Francis's (Robert Fulton's) torpedoes to destroy the
+enemy in harbor, but it soon became known that Villeneuve would
+be forced to put to sea. On October 9, Nelson issued the famous
+Memorandum, or battle plan, embodying what he called "the Nelson
+touch," and received by his captains with an enthusiasm which the
+inspiration of the famous leader no doubt partly explains. This
+plan, which had been formulating itself in Nelson's mind as far
+back as the pursuit of the French fleet to the West Indies, may
+be regarded as the product of his ripest experience and genius;
+the praise is perhaps not extravagant that "it seems to gather
+up and coordinate every tactical principle that has ever proved
+effective."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Corbett. THE CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR, p. 349.]
+
+[Illustration: NELSON'S VICTORY
+
+Built in 1765. 2162 tons.]
+
+Though the full text of the Memorandum will repay careful study,
+its leading principles may be sufficiently indicated by summary.
+Assuming 40 British ships to 46 of the enemy (the proportions though
+not the numbers of the actual engagement), it provides first that
+"the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the
+fleet in two lines of 16 ships each, with an advanced squadron of
+8 of the fastest sailing two-decked ships." This made for speed
+and ease in maneuvering, and was based on the expressed belief
+that so many units could not be formed and controlled in the
+old-fashioned single line without fatal loss of time. The ships
+would now come into action practically in cruising formation, which
+was commonly in two columns. The only noteworthy change contemplated
+was that the flagships of the first and second in command should
+shift from first to third place in their respective columns, and
+even this change was not carried out. Perhaps because the total
+force was smaller than anticipated, the advance squadron was merged
+with the two main divisions on the night before the battle, and
+need not be further regarded. Collingwood, the second in command,
+was given freedom of initiative by the provision that "after my
+intentions are made known to him he will have entire direction
+of his line."
+
+The plan next provides, first for attack from to leeward, and second
+for attack from to windward. In either case, Collingwood's division
+was to bring a superior force to bear on 12 ships of the enemy rear,
+while Nelson would "cut two, three or four ships ahead of their
+center so far as to ensure getting at their commander in chief."
+"Something must be left to chance... but I look with confidence
+to a victory before the van of the enemy can succor their rear."
+And further, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship
+alongside that of an enemy."
+
+Of the attack from the windward a very rough diagram is given, thus:
+
+[Illustration]
+
+But aside from this diagram, the lines of which are not precisely
+straight or parallel in the original, and which can hardly be reconciled
+with the instructions in the text, there is no clear indication that
+the attack from the windward (as in the actual battle) was to be
+delivered in line abreast. What the text says is: "The divisions
+of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the
+enemy's center. The signal will most probably then be given for the
+lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering
+sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line
+and to cut through." Thus, if we assume a convergent approach in
+column, there was to be no slow deployment of the rear or leeward
+division into line abreast to make the attack of all its ships
+simultaneous; rather, in the words of a captain describing what
+really happened, they were simply to "scramble into action" at
+best speed. Nor is there any suggestion of a preliminary shift
+from line ahead in the case of Nelson's division. Though endless
+controversy has raged over the point, the prescribed approach seems
+to have been followed fairly closely in the battle.
+
+The concentration upon the rear was not new; in fact, it had become
+almost conventional, and was fully anticipated by the enemy. More
+originality lay in the manner of "containing" the center and van.
+For this purpose, in the first place, the approach was to be at
+utmost speed, not under "battle canvas" but with all sail spread.
+In the second place, the advance of Nelson's division in column,
+led by the flagship, left its precise objective not fully disclosed
+to the enemy until the last moment, and open to change as advantage
+offered. It could and did threaten the van, and was finally directed
+upon the center when Villeneuve's presence there was revealed.
+Finally, the very serious danger of enemy concentration upon the head
+of the column was mitigated not only by the speed of the approach,
+but by the concentration there of three heavy three-deckers. The
+plan in general had in view a particular enemy, superior in numbers
+but weak in gunnery, slow in maneuver, and likely to avoid decisive
+action. It aimed primarily at rapidity of movement, but combined
+also the merits of concentration, simplicity, flexibility, and
+surprise.
+
+In this discussion of the scheme of the battle, around which interest
+chiefly centers, the actual events of the engagement have been
+in some measure anticipated, and may now be told more briefly.
+Driven to desperation by the goadings of Napoleon and the news
+that Admiral Rosily was approaching to supersede him, Villeneuve
+at last resolved to put to sea. "The intention of His Majesty,"
+so the Minister of Marine had written, "is to seek in the ranks,
+wherever they may be found, officers best suited for superior command,
+requiring above all a noble ambition, love of glory, decision of
+character, and unbounded courage. His Majesty wishes to destroy that
+circumspection which is the reproach of the navy; that defensive
+system which paralyzes our fleet and doubles the enemy's. He counts
+the loss of vessels nothing if lost with honor; he does not wish
+his fleet blockaded by an enemy inferior in strength; and if that
+is the situation at Cadiz he advises and orders you to attack."
+
+The Allied fleet worked out of Cadiz on the 19th of October and
+on the 20th tacked southward under squally westerly winds. On the
+21st, the day of the battle, the wind was still from the west, light
+and flawy, with a heavy swell and signs of approaching storm. At dawn
+the two fleets were visible to each other, Villeneuve about 9 miles
+northeast and to leeward of the British and standing southward from
+Cape Trafalgar. The French Admiral had formed his main battle line
+of 21 ships, French and Spanish intermingled, with the _Santisima
+Trinidad_ (128) in the center and his flagship _Bucentaure_ next;
+the remaining 12 under the Spanish Admiral Gravina constituted
+a separate squadron stationed to windward to counter an enemy
+concentration, which was especially expected upon the rear.
+
+As the British advance already appeared to threaten this end of
+their line, the Allied fleet wore together about 9 o'clock, thus
+reversing their order, shifting their course northward, and opening
+Cadiz as a refuge. The maneuver, not completed until an hour later,
+left their line bowed in at the center, with a number of ships slightly
+to leeward, while Gravina's squadron mingled with and prolonged
+the rear in the new order.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCT. 21, 1805
+
+Position of ships about noon, when _Royal Sovereign_ opened fire.
+
+(From plan by Capt. T. H. Tizard, R.N., British Admiralty Report,
+1913.)]
+
+The change, though it aroused Nelson's fear lest his quarry should
+escape, facilitated his attack as planned, by exposing the enemy rear
+to Collingwood's division. As rapidly as the light airs permitted,
+the two British columns bore down, Nelson in the _Victory_ (100)
+leading the windward division of 12 ships, closely followed by
+the heavy _Neptune_ and _Temeraire_, while Collingwood in the
+freshly coppered and refitted _Royal Sovereign_ set a sharp pace
+for the 15 sail to leeward. Of the forty ships Nelson had once
+counted on, some had not come from England, and a half dozen others
+were inside the straits for water. While the enemy were changing
+course, Collingwood had signaled his division to shift into a line
+of bearing, an order which, though rendered almost ineffective by
+his failure to slow down, served to throw the column off slightly
+and bring it more nearly parallel to the enemy rear. (See plan.)
+Both commanders clung to the lead and pushed ahead as if racing
+into the fray, thus effectually preventing deployment and leaving
+trailers far behind. Nelson went so far as to try to jockey his
+old friend out of first place by ordering the _Mars_ to pass him,
+but Collingwood set his studding sails and kept his lead. Possibly
+it was then he made the remark that he wished Nelson would make no
+more signals, as they all knew what they had to do, rather than
+after Nelson's famous final message: "England expects that every
+man will do his duty."
+
+Nelson, uncertain of Villeneuve's place in the line and anxious to
+prevent escape northward, steered for a gap ahead of the _Santisima
+Trinidad_, as if to threaten the van. But at 12:00 noon, as the
+first shots were fired at the _Royal Sovereign_, flags were broken
+from all ships, and Villeneuve's location revealed. Swinging to
+southward under heavy fire, the _Victory_ passed under the stern
+of the _Bucentaure_ and then crashed into the _Redoutable_, which
+had pushed close up to the flagship. The relative effectiveness
+of the gunnery in the two fleets is suggested by the fact that
+the _Victory_ while coming in under the enemy's concentrated fire
+had only 50 killed and wounded, whereas the raking broadside she
+finally poured into the _Bucentaure's_ stern is said to have swept
+down 400 men. Almost simultaneously with the leader, the _Temeraire_
+and _Neptune_ plunged into the line, the former closing with the
+_Bucentaure_ and the latter with the _Santisima Trinidad_ ahead.
+Other ships soon thrust into the terrific artillery combat which
+centered around the leaders in a confused mingling of friend and
+foe.
+
+At about 12:10, nearly half an hour before the _Victory_ penetrated
+the Allied line, the _Royal Sovereign_ brought up on the leeward
+side of the _Santa Ana_, flagship of the Spanish Admiral Alava,
+after raking both her and the _Fougueux_ astern. The _Santa Ana_
+was thirteenth in the actual line, but, as Collingwood knew, there
+were 16, counting those to leeward, among the ships he had thus
+cut off for his division to subdue. As a combined effect of the
+light breeze and the manner of attack, it was an hour or more before
+the action was made general by the advent of British ships in the
+rear. All these suffered as they closed, but far less than those
+near the head of the line. Of the total British casualties fully
+a third fell upon the four leading ships--_Victory, Temeraire,
+Royal Sovereign_ and _Belleisle_.
+
+Not until about three o'clock were the shattered but victorious
+British in the center threatened by the return of the ten ships in
+the Allied van. Culpably slow, however hindered by lack of wind,
+several of these joined stragglers from Gravina's division to leeward;
+the _Intrepide_, under her brave skipper Infernet, set an example all
+might well have followed by steering straight for the _Bucentaure_,
+and surrendered only to overwhelming odds; five others under Rear
+Admiral Dumanoir skirted to windward and escaped with the loss of
+one of their number, cut off by two British late-comers, _Spartiate_
+and _Minotaur_.
+
+"Partial firing continued until 4:30, when a victory having been
+reported to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Nelson, he died of
+his wound." So reads the _Victory's_ log. The flagship had been
+in deadly grapple with the _Redoutable_, whose complement, like
+that of many another French and Spanish ship in the action, showed
+that the decadence of their navies was not due to lack of fighting
+spirit in the rank and file. Nelson was mortally wounded by a musket
+shot from the mizzen-top soon after the ships closed. In his hour
+of supreme achievement death came not ungraciously, giving final
+assurance of the glory which no man ever faced death more eagerly
+to win.
+
+Of the Allied fleet, four fled with Dumanoir, but were later engaged
+and captured by a British squadron near Corunna. Eleven badly battered
+survivors escaped into Cadiz. Of the 18 captured, 11 were wrecked or
+destroyed in the gales that swept the coast for several days after
+the battle; three were recaptured or turned back to their crews
+by the prize-masters, and only four eventually reached Gibraltar.
+
+[Illustration: TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30
+
+From plan attached to report of Capt. Prigny, Villeneuve's Chief
+of Staff (Deshriere, _Trafalgar_, App. p. 128.)]
+
+The Trafalgar victory did not indeed reduce France to terms, and
+it thus illustrates the limitations of naval power against an enemy
+not primarily dependent upon the sea. But it freed England from
+further threat of invasion, clinched her naval predominance, and
+opened to her the prospect of taking a more aggressive part in
+the land war. Even this prospect was soon temporarily thrust into
+the background. On the very day of Trafalgar Napoleon's bulletins
+announced the surrender of 60,000 Austrians at Ulm, and the Battle
+of Austerlitz a month later crushed the Third Coalition. The small
+British contingents in Germany and southern Italy hastened back to
+their transports. It was only later, when France was approaching
+exhaustion, that British forces in the Spanish peninsula and elsewhere
+took a conspicuous part in the Continental war.
+
+_The Continental System_
+
+England's real offensive strength lay not in her armies but in
+her grip on Europe's intercourse with the rest of the world. And
+on the other hand, the only blow that Napoleon could still strike
+at his chief enemy was to shut her from the markets of Europe--to
+"defeat the sea by the land." This was the aim of his Continental
+System. It meant a test of endurance--whether he could force France
+and the rest of Europe to undergo the tremendous strain of commercial
+isolation for a sufficient period to reduce England to ruin.
+
+The Continental System came into being with Napoleon's famous Berlin
+Decree of November, 1806, which, declaring a "paper" blockade of the
+British Isles, put all trade with England under the ban. Under this
+decree and later supplementary measures, goods of British origin,
+whatever their subsequent ownership, were confiscated or destroyed
+wherever French agents could lay hands on them; and neutral vessels
+were seized and condemned for entering British ports, accepting
+British convoy, or even submitting to British search.
+
+England's chief retaliatory measure was the Orders in Council of
+November, 1807. Her object in these orders and later modifications
+was not to cut off trade with the Continent, but to control it to
+her own profit and the injury of the enemy--in short, "no trade
+except through England." The orders aimed to compel the aid of
+neutrals by excluding neutral ships from the Continent unless they
+should first enter British ports, pay British dues, and (as would
+be an inevitable consequence) give covert assistance in carrying
+on British trade.
+
+The Continental System reached its greatest efficiency during the
+apogee of Napoleon's power in 1809 and 1810. To check forbidden
+traffic, which continued on an enormous scale, he annexed Holland
+to his empire, and threw a triple cordon of French troops along
+Germany's sea frontier. As a result, in the critical year of 1811
+goods piled up in British warehouses, factories closed, bankruptcies
+doubled, and her financial system tottered.[1] But to bar the tide
+of commerce at every port from Trieste to Riga was like trying
+to stem the sea. At each leak in the barrier, sugar, coffee, and
+British manufactures poured in, and were paid for at triple or
+tenfold prices, not in exports, but in coin. Malta, the Channel
+Islands, and Heligoland (seized by England from Denmark in 1807)
+became centers of smuggling. The beginning of the end came when
+the Czar, tired of French dictation and a policy ruinous to his
+country, opened his ports, first to colonial products (December,
+1810), and a year later to all British wares. Six hundred vessels,
+brought under British convoy into the Baltic, docked at Libau,
+and caravans of wagons filled the roads leading east and south.
+
+[Footnote 1: In spite of this crisis, British trade showed progressive
+increase in each half decade from 1800 to 1815, and did not fall off
+again until the five years after the war. The figures (in millions
+of pounds sterling) follow: 1801-05, 61 million; 1806-10, 67 million;
+1811-15, 74 million; 1816-20, 60 million.--Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE,
+p. 355.]
+
+In June of 1812 Napoleon gathered his "army of twenty nations" for
+the fatal Russian campaign. Now that they had served their purpose,
+England on June 23 revoked her Orders in Council. The Continental
+System had failed.
+
+_The War of 1812_
+
+In the same month, on June 18, the United States declared war on
+Great Britain. Up to 1807 her commerce and shipping, in the words
+of President Monroe, had "flourished beyond example," as shown by
+the single fact that her re-export trade (in West Indies products)
+was greater in that year than ever again until 1915.[1] Later they
+had suffered from the coercion of both belligerents, and from her
+own futile countermeasures of embargo and non-intercourse. Her
+final declaration came tardily, if not indeed unwisely as a matter
+of practical policy, however abundantly justified by England's
+commercial restrictions and her seizure of American as well as
+British seamen on American ships. An additional motive, which had
+decisive weight with the dominant western faction in Congress,
+was the hope of gaining Canada or at least extending the northern
+frontier.
+
+[Footnote 1: United States exports rose from a value of 56 million
+dollars in 1803 to 108 million in 1807; then fell to 22 million in
+1808, and after rising to about 50 million before the war, went
+down to 6 million in 1814.--_Ibid._, p 480.]
+
+A subordinate episode in the world conflict, the War of 1812 cannot
+be neglected in naval annals. The tiny American navy retrieved
+the failures of American land forces, and shook the British navy
+out of a notorious slackness in gunnery and discipline engendered
+by its easy victories against France and Spain.
+
+In size the British Navy in 1812 was more formidable than at any
+earlier period of the general war. Transport work with expeditionary
+forces, blockade and patrol in European waters, and commerce protection
+from the China Sea to the Baltic had in September, 1812, increased
+the fleet to 686 vessels in active service, including 120 of the
+line and 145 frigates. There were 75 in all on American stations,
+against the total American Navy of 16, of which the best were the fine
+44-gun frigates _Constitution, President_ and _United States_.
+In the face of such odds, and especially as England's European
+preoccupations relaxed, the result was inevitable. After the first
+year of war, while a swarm of privateers and smaller war vessels
+still took heavy toll of British commerce, the frigates were blockaded
+in American ports and American commerce was destroyed.
+
+But before the blockade closed down, four frigate actions had been
+fought, three of them American victories. In each instance, as will
+be seen from the accompanying table, the advantage in weight of
+broadside was with the victor. The American frigates were in fact
+triumphs of American shipbuilding, finer in lines, more strongly
+timbered, and more heavily gunned than British ships of their class.
+But that good gunnery and seamanship figured in the results is
+borne out by the fact that of the eight sloop actions fought during
+the war, with a closer approach to equality of strength, seven
+were American victories. The British carronades that had pounded
+French ships at close range proved useless against opponents that
+knew how to choose and hold their distance and could shoot straight
+with long 24'S.
+
+------------------+----------+----+------+----+------+-------------------
+                  |          |    |Wt. of|    |Casu- |
+     Ship[1]      |Commander |Guns|broad-|Crew|alties|  Place and date
+                  |          |    |side  |    |      |
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+Constitution[2]   |Hull      | 54 |  684 |456 |  14  |750 miles east of
+                  |          |    |      |    |      | Boston, Aug. 19,
+Guerriere (Brit.) |Dacres    | 49 |  556 |272 |  79  | 1812.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+United States[2]  |Decatur   | 54 |  786 |478 |  12  |Off Canary Islands,
+Macedonian (Brit.)|Carden    | 49 |  547 |301 | 104  | Oct. 25. 1812.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+Constitution[2]   |Bainbridge| 52 |  654 |475 |  34  |Near Bahia, Dec.
+Java (Brit.)      |Lambert   | 49 |  576 |426 | 150  | 29, 1812.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+Chesapeake        |Lawrence  | 50 |  542 |379 | 148  |Off Boston, June 1,
+Shannon (Brit.)[2]|Broke     | 52 |  550 |330 |  83  | 1813.
+------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
+
+[Footnote 1: The figures are from Roosevelt's NAVAL WAR OF 1812,
+in which 7% is deducted for the short weight of American shot.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Victorious.]
+
+"It seems," said a writer in the London _Times_, "that the Americans
+have some superior mode of firing." But when Broke with his crack
+crew in the _Shannon_ beat the _Chesapeake_ fresh out of port, he
+demonstrated, as had the Americans in other actions, that the
+superiority was primarily a matter of training and skill.
+
+On the Great Lakes America's naval efforts should have centered,
+for here was her main objective and here she was on equal terms.
+Both sides were tremendously hampered in communications with their
+main sources of supply. But with an approach from the sea to Montreal,
+the British faced no more serious obstacle in the rapids of the St.
+Lawrence above than did the Americans on the long route up the
+Mohawk, over portages into Oneida Lake, and thence down the Oswego
+to Ontario, or else from eastern Pennsylvania over the mountains to
+Lake Erie. The wilderness waterways on both sides soon saw the
+strange spectacle of immense anchors, cables, cannon, and ship
+tackle of all kinds, as well as armies of sailors, shipwrights,
+and riggers, making their way to the new rival bases at Sackett's
+Harbor and Kingston, both near the foot of Lake Ontario.
+
+Of the whole lake and river frontier, Ontario was of the most vital
+importance. A decisive American victory here, including the capture
+of Kingston, would cut enemy communications and settle the control
+of all western Canada. Kingston as an objective had the advantage
+over Montreal that it was beyond the direct reach of the British
+navy. The British, fully realizing the situation, made every effort
+to build up their naval forces on this lake, and gave Commodore Yeo,
+who was in command, strict orders to avoid action unless certain
+of success. On the other hand, the American commander, Chauncey,
+though an energetic organizer, made the mistake of assuming that his
+mission was also defensive. Hence when one fleet was strengthened by
+a new ship it went out and chased the other off the lake, but there
+was little fighting, both sides engaging in a grand shipbuilding
+rivalry and playing for a sure thing. Naval control remained unsettled
+and shifting throughout the war. It was fortunate, indeed, says
+the British historian, James, that the war ended when it did, or
+there would not have been room on the lake to maneuver the two
+fleets. The _St. Lawrence_, a 112-gun three-decker completed at
+Kingston in 1814, was at the time the largest man-of-war in the
+world.
+
+Possibly a growing lukewarmness about the war, manifested on both
+sides, prevented more aggressive action. But it did not prevent two
+brilliant American victories in the lesser theaters of Lake Erie
+and Lake Champlain. Perry's achievement on Lake Erie in building
+a superior flotilla in the face of all manner of obstacles was even
+greater than that of the victory itself. The result of the latter,
+won on September 10, 1813, is summed up in his despatch: "We have
+met the enemy and they are ours--2 ships, 2 brigs, 1 schooner, and
+1 sloop." It assured the safety of the northwestern frontier.
+
+On Lake Champlain Macdonough's successful defense just a year later
+held up an invasion which, though it would not have been pushed
+very strenuously in any case, might have made our position less
+favorable for the peace negotiations then already under way. In
+this action, as in the one on Lake Erie, the total strength of each
+of the opposing flotillas, measured in weight of broadsides (1192
+pounds for the British against 1194 far the Americans), was about
+that of a single ship-of-the-line. But the number of units employed
+raised all the problems of a squadron engagement. Macdonough's
+shrewd choice of position in Plattsburg Bay, imposing upon the
+enemy a difficult approach under a raking fire, and his excellent
+handling of his ships in action, justify his selection as the ablest
+American naval leader developed by the war.
+
+At the outbreak of the American War, France and England had been
+engaged in a death grapple in which the rights of neutrals were
+trampled under foot. Napoleon, by his paper blockade and confiscations
+on any pretext, had been a more glaring offender. But America's
+quarrel was after all not with France, who needed American trade,
+but with England, a commercial rival, who could back her restrictions
+by naval power. Once France was out of the war, the United States
+found it easy to come to terms with England, whose commerce was
+suffering severely from American privateers.[1] At the close of the
+war the questions at issue when it began had dropped into abeyance,
+and were not mentioned in the treaty terms.
+
+[Footnote 1: According to figures cited in Mahan's WAR OF 1812, (Vol.
+II, p. 224), 22 American naval vessels took 165 British prizes, and
+526 privateers took 1344 prizes. In the absence of adequate motives
+on either side for prolonging the war, these losses, though not
+more severe than those inflicted by French cruisers, were decisive
+factors for peace.]
+
+The view taken of the aggressions of sea power in the Napoleonic
+Wars will depend largely on the view taken regarding the justice of
+the cause in which it fought. It saved the Continent from military
+conquest. It preserved the European balance of power, a balance
+which statesmen of that age deemed essential to the safety of Europe
+and the best interests of America and the rest of the world. On
+the other hand, but for the sacrifices of England's land allies,
+the Continental System would have forced her to make peace, though
+still undefeated at sea. Even if her territorial accessions were
+slight, England came out of the war undisputed "mistress of the
+seas" as she had never been before, and for nearly a century to come
+was without a dangerous rival in naval power and world commerce.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+For general history of the period see: HISTORIES OF THE BRITISH NAVY
+by Clowes (Vols. V, VI, 1900) and Hannay (1909), Mahan's INFLUENCE
+OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE (1892) and WAR
+OF 1812 (1905), Chevalier's HISTOIRE DE LA MARINE FRANcAISE
+SOUS LA PREMIeRE RePUBLIQUE (1886), Graviere's GUERRES MARITIMES
+(1885), Callender's SEA KINGS OF BRITAIN (Vol. III, 1911),
+and Maltzahn's NAVAL WARFARE (tr. Miller, 1908).
+
+Among biographies: Mahan's and Laughton's lives of Nelson, Anson's
+LIFE OF JERVIS (1913), Clark Russell's LIFE OF COLLINGWOOD (1892),
+and briefer sketches in FROM HOWARD TO NELSON, ed. Laughton (1899).
+
+For the Trafalgar campaign see:
+
+British Admiralty blue-book on THE TACTICS OF TRAFALGAR (with
+bibliography, 1913), Corbett's CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR (1910), Col.
+Desbriere's PROJETS ET TENTATIVES DE DeBARQUEMENT AUX ILES BRITANNIQUES
+(1902) and CAMPAGNE MARITIME DE TRAFALGAR (1907).
+
+See also Col. C. E. Callwell's MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MARITIME
+PREPONDERANCE (1913), and Professor Clive Day's HISTORY OF COMMERCE
+(revised edition, 1911, with bibliography).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE: HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA.
+
+During the 19th century, from 1815 to 1898, naval power, though
+always an important factor in international relations, played in
+general a passive role. The wars which marked the unification of
+Germany and Italy and the thrusting back of Turkey from the Balkans
+were fought chiefly on land. The navy of England, though never
+more constantly busy in protecting her far-flung empire, was not
+challenged to a genuine contest for mastery of the seas. In the
+Greek struggle for independence there were two naval engagements
+of some consequence--Chios (1822), where the Greeks with fireships
+destroyed a Turkish squadron and gained temporary control of the
+AEgean, and Navarino (1827), in which a Turkish force consisting
+principally of frigates was wiped out by a fleet of the western
+powers. But both of these actions were one-sided, and showed nothing
+new in types or tactics. In the American Civil War control of the
+sea was important and even decisive, but was overwhelmingly in the
+hands of the North. Hence the chief naval interest of the period
+lies not so much in the fighting as in the revolutionary changes in
+ships, weapons, and tactics--changes which parallel the extraordinary
+scientific progress of the century; and the engagements may be
+studied now, as they were studied then, as testing and illustrating
+the new methods and materials of naval war.
+
+_Changes in Ships and Weapons_
+
+Down to the middle of the 19th century there had been only a slow
+and slight development in ships and weapons for a period of nearly
+300 years. A sailor of the Armada would soon have felt at home in
+a three-decker of 1815. But he would have been helpless as a child
+in the fire-driven iron monsters that fought at Hampton Roads. The
+shift from sail to steam, from oak to iron, from shot to shell, and
+from muzzle-loading smoothbore to breech-loading rifle began about
+1850; and progress thereafter was so swift that an up-to-date ship
+of each succeeding decade was capable of defeating a whole squadron
+of ten years before. Success came to depend on the adaptability
+and mechanical skill of personnel, as well as their courage and
+discipline, and also upon the progressive spirit of constructors
+and naval experts, faced with the most difficult problems, the
+wrong solution of which would mean the waste of millions of dollars
+and possible defeat in war. Every change had to overcome the spirit
+of conservatism inherent in military organizations, where seniority
+rules, errors are sanctified by age, and every innovation upsets
+cherished routine. Thus in the contract for Ericsson's _Monitor_
+it was stipulated that she should have masts, spars, and sails!
+
+The first successful steamboat for commerce was, as is well known,
+Robert Fulton's flat-bottomed side-wheeler _Clermont_, which in
+August, 1807, made the 150 miles from New York to Albany in 32
+hours. During the war of 1812 Fulton designed for coast defense
+a heavily timbered, double-ender floating battery, with a single
+paddle-wheel located inside amidships. On her trial trip in 1815
+this first steam man-of-war, the U. S. S. _Fulton_, carried 26 guns
+and made over 6 knots, but she was then laid up and was destroyed
+a few years later by fire. Ericsson's successful application of
+the screw propeller in 1837 made steam propulsion more feasible
+for battleships by clearing the decks and eliminating the clumsy
+and exposed side-wheels. The first American screw warship was the
+U. S. S. _Princeton_, of 1843, but every ship in the American Navy
+at the outbreak of the Civil War had at least auxiliary sail rig.
+Though by 1850 England had 30 vessels with auxiliary steam, the
+_Devastation_ of 1869 was the first in the British service to use
+steam exclusively. Long after this time old "floating museums"
+with sail rig and smoothbores were retained in most navies for
+motives of economy, and even the first ships of the American "White
+Squadron" were encumbered with sails and spars.
+
+[Illustration: EARLY IRONCLADS]
+
+Progress in ordnance began about 1822, when explosive shells, hitherto
+used only in mortars, were first adopted for ordinary cannon with
+horizontal fire. At the time of the Crimean War shells were the
+usual ammunition for lower tier guns, and at Sinope in 1853 their
+smashing effect against wooden hulls was demonstrated when a Russian
+squadron destroyed some Turkish vessels which fired only solid
+shot. The great professional cry of the time, we are told, became
+"For God's sake, keep out the shell."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Custance, THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 9.]
+
+In 1851 Minie rifles supplanted in the British army the old smoothbore
+musket or "Brown Bess," with which at ranges above 200 yards it was
+difficult to hit a target 11 feet square. This change led quickly
+to the rifling of heavy ordnance as well. The first Armstrong rifles
+of 1858--named after their inventor, Sir William Armstrong, head
+of the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich--included guns up to 7-inch
+diameter of bore. The American navy, however, depended chiefly
+on smoothbores throughout the Civil War.
+
+Breech-loading, which had been used centuries earlier, came in
+again with these first rifles, but after 1865 the British navy
+went back to muzzle-loading and stuck to it persistently for the
+next 15 years. By that time the breech-loading mechanism had been
+simplified, and its adoption became necessary to secure greater length
+of gun barrel, increased rapidity of fire, and better protection for
+gun-crews. About 1880 quick-fire guns of from 3 to 6 inches, firing
+12 or 15 shots a minute, were mounted in secondary batteries.
+
+As already suggested, the necessity for armor arose from the smashing
+and splintering effect of shell against wooden targets and the
+penetrating power of rifled guns. To attack Russian forts in the
+Crimea, the French navy in 1855 built three steam-driven floating
+batteries, the _Tonnant, Lave_, and _Devastation_, each protected
+by 4.3-inch plates and mounting 8 56-lb. guns. In the reduction of
+the Kinburn batteries, in October of the same year, these boats
+suffered little, but were helped out by an overwhelming fire from
+wooden ships, 630 guns against 81 in the forts.
+
+The French armored ship _Gloire_ of 1859 caused England serious worry
+about her naval supremacy, and led at once to H. M. S. _Warrior_,
+like the _Gloire_, full rigged with auxiliary steam. The _Warrior's_
+4.5-inch armor, extending from 6 feet below the waterline to 16 feet
+above and covering about 42 per cent of the visible target, was
+proof against the weapons of the time. At this initial stage in
+armored construction, naval experts turned with intense interest
+to watch the work of ironclads against ships and forts in the
+American Civil War.
+
+_The American Civil War_
+
+The naval activities of this war are too manifold to follow in
+detail. For four years the Union navy was kept constantly occupied
+with the tasks of blockading over 3000 miles of coast-line, running
+down enemy commerce destroyers, cooperating with the army in the
+capture of coast strongholds, and opening the Mississippi and other
+waterways leading into the heart of the Confederacy. To make the
+blockade effective and cut off the South from the rest of the world,
+the Federal Government unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of
+"continuous voyage," seizing and condemning neutral ships even when
+bound from England to Bermuda or the Bahamas, if their cargo was
+ultimately destined for Southern ports. The doctrine was declared
+inapplicable when the last leg of the journey was by land,[1] doubtless
+because there was little danger of heavy traffic across the Mexican
+frontier. Blockade runners continued to pour goods into the South
+until the fall of Fort Fisher in 1865; but as the blockade became
+more stringent, it crippled the finances of the Confederacy, shut
+out foodstuffs and munitions, and shortened, if it did not even
+have a decisive effect in winning the war.
+
+[Footnote 1: Peterhoff Case, 1866 (5 Wall, 28).]
+
+To meet these measures the South was at first practically without
+naval resources, and had to turn at once to new methods of war. Its
+first move was to convert the steam frigate _Merrimac_, captured
+half-burned with the Norfolk Navy Yard, into an ironclad ram. A
+casemate of 4 inches of iron over 22 inches of wood, sloping 35
+degrees from the vertical, was extended over 178 feet, or about
+two-thirds of her hull. Beyond this structure the decks were awash.
+The _Merrimac_ had an armament of 6 smoothbores and 4 rifles, two
+of the latter being pivot-guns at bow and stern, and a 1500-lb.
+cast-iron beak or ram. With her heavy load of guns and armor she
+drew 22 feet aft and could work up a speed of barely 5 knots.
+
+Faced with this danger, the North hurriedly adopted Ericsson's
+plan for the _Monitor_,[2] which was contracted for on October
+4, 1861, and launched after 100 days. Old marlin-spike seamen
+pooh-poohed this "cheesebox on a raft." As a naval officer said,
+it might properly be worshiped by its designer, for it was an image
+of nothing in the heavens above, or the earth beneath, or the waters
+under the earth. It consisted of a revolving turret with 8-inch
+armor and two 11-inch smoothbore guns, set on a raft-like structure
+142 feet in length by 41-1/2 feet in beam, projecting at bow, stern,
+and sides beyond a flat-bottomed lower hull. Though unseaworthy,
+the _Monitor_ maneuvered quickly and drew only 10-1/2 feet. She
+was first ordered to the Gulf, but on March 6 this destination
+was suddenly changed to the Chesapeake.
+
+[Footnote 2: So called by Ericsson because it would "admonish"
+the South, and also suggest to England "doubts as to the propriety
+of completing four steel-clad ships at three and one-half millions
+apiece."]
+
+The South in fact won the race in construction and got its ship
+first into action by a margin of just half a day. At noon on March
+8, with the iron-workers still driving her last rivets, the _Merrimac_
+steamed out of Norfolk and advanced ponderously upon the three sail
+and two steam vessels then anchored in Hampton Roads.
+
+In the Northern navy there had been much skepticism about the ironclad
+and no concerted plan to meet her attack. Under a rain of fire
+from the Union ships, and from share fortifications too distant
+to be effective, the _Merrimac_ rammed and sank the sloop-of-war
+_Cumberland_, and then, after driving the frigate _Congress_ aground,
+riddled her with shells. Towards nightfall the Confederate vessel
+moved dawn stream, to continue the slaughter next day.
+
+About 12 o'clock that night, after two days of terrible buffeting
+on the voyage down the coast, the little _Monitor_ anchored on
+the scene lighted up by the burning wreck of the _Congress_. The
+first battle of ironclads began next morning at 8:30 and continued
+with slight intermission till noon. It ended in a triumph, not
+for either ship, but for armor over guns. The _Monitor_ fired 41
+solid shot, 20 of which struck home, but merely cracked some of
+the _Merrimac's_ outer plates. The _Monitor_ was hit 22 times by
+enemy shells. Neither craft was seriously harmed and not a man was
+killed on either side, though several were stunned or otherwise
+injured. Lieut. Worden, in command of the _Monitor_, was nearly
+blinded by a shell that smashed in the pilot house, a square iron
+structure then located not above the turret but on the forward
+deck.
+
+The drawn battle was hailed as a Northern victory. Imagination
+had been drawing dire pictures of what the _Merrimac_ might do. At
+a Cabinet meeting in Washington Sunday morning, March 9, Secretary
+of War Stanton declared: "The _Merrimac_ will change the course of
+the war; she will destroy _seriatim_ every naval vessel; she will
+lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution. I have no
+doubt that the enemy is at this minute on the way to Washington, and
+that we shall have a shell from one of her guns in the White House
+before we leave this room." The menace was somewhat exaggerated. With
+her submerged decks, feeble engines, and general awkwardness, the
+_Merrimac_ could scarcely navigate in Hampton Roads. In the first
+day's fighting her beak was wrenched off and a leak started, two
+guns were put out of action, and her funnel and all other top-hamper
+were riddled. As was shown by Farragut in Mobile Bay, and again by
+Tegetthoff at Lissa, even wooden vessels, if in superior numbers,
+might do something against an ironclad in an aggressive melee.
+
+Both the antagonists at Hampton Roads ended their careers before
+the close of 1862; the _Merrimac_ was burned by her crew at the
+evacuation of Norfolk, and the _Monitor_ was sunk under tow in a
+gale off Hatteras. But turret ships, monitors, and armored gunboats
+soon multiplied in the Union navy and did effective service against
+the defenses of Southern harbors and rivers. Under Farragut's energetic
+leadership, vessels both armored and unarmored passed with relatively
+slight injury the forts below New Orleans, at Vicksburg, and at the
+entrance to Mobile Bay. Even granting that the shore artillery was
+out of date and not very expertly served, it is well to realize that
+similar conditions may conceivably recur, and that the superiority
+of forts over ships is qualified by conditions of equipment and
+personnel.
+
+Actually to destroy or capture shore batteries by naval force is
+another matter. As Ericsson said, "A single shot will sink a ship,
+while 100 rounds cannot silence a fort."[1] Attacks of this kind
+against Fort McAllister and Charleston failed. At Charleston, April
+7, 1863, the ironclads faced a cross-fire from several forts, 47
+smoothbores and 17 rifles against 29 smoothbores and 4 rifles in
+the ships, and in waters full of obstructions and mines.
+
+[Footnote 1: Wilson, IRONCLADS IN ACTION, Vol. I, p. 91.]
+
+The capture of Fort Fisher, commanding the main entrance to Wilmington,
+North Carolina, was accomplished in January, 1865, by the combined
+efforts of the army and navy. The fort, situated on a narrow neck
+of land between the Cape Fear River and the sea, had 20 guns on
+its land face and 24 on its sea face, 15 of them rifled. Against
+it were brought 5 ironclads with 18 guns, backed up by over 200
+guns in the rest of the fleet. After a storm of shot and shell
+for three successive days, rising at times to "drum-fire," the
+barrage was lifted at a signal and troops and sailors dashed forward
+from their positions on shore. Even after this preparation the
+capture cost 1000 men. As at Kinhurn in the Crimean War, the
+effectiveness of the naval forces was due less to protective armor
+than to volume of fire.
+
+_Submarines and Torpedoes_
+
+In the defense of Southern harbors, mines and torpedoes for the
+first time came into general use, and the submarine scored its
+first victim. Experiments with these devices had been going on
+for centuries, but were first brought close to practical success
+by David Bushnell, a Connecticut Yankee of the American Revolution.
+His tiny submarine, resembling a mud-turtle standing on its tail,
+embodied many features of modern underwater boats, including a
+primitive conning tower, screw propulsion (by foot power), a vertical
+screw to drive the craft down, and a detachable magazine with 150
+pounds of gunpowder. The _Turtle_ paddled around and even under
+British men-of-war off New York and New London, but could not drive
+a spike through their copper bottoms to attach its mine.
+
+Robert Fulton, probably the greatest genius in nautical invention,
+carried the development of bath mines and submarines much further.
+His _Nautilus_, so-called because its collapsible sail resembled
+that of the familiar chambered nautilus, was surprisingly ahead of
+its time; it had a fish-like shape, screw propulsion (by a two-man
+hand winch), horizontal diving rudder, compressed air tank, water
+tank filled or emptied by a pump, and a torpedo[1] consisting of
+a detachable case of gunpowder. A lanyard ran from the torpedo
+through an eye in a spike, to be driven in the enemy hull, and
+thence to the submarine, which as it moved away brought the torpedo
+up taut against the spike and caused its explosion. Fulton interested
+Napoleon in his project, submerged frequently for an hour or more,
+and blew up a hulk in Brest harbor. But the greybeards in the French
+navy frowned on these novel methods, declaring them "immoral" and
+"contrary to the laws of war."
+
+[Footnote 1: This name, coined by Fulton, was from the _torpedo
+electricus_, or cramp fish, which kills its victim by electric
+shock.]
+
+[Illustration: BUSHNELL'S TURTLE]
+
+Later the British Government entered into negotiations with the
+inventor, and in October, 1804, used his mines in an unsuccessful
+attack an the French flotilla of invasion at Boulogne. Only one
+pinnace was sunk. Fulton still maintained that he could "sweep
+all military marines off the ocean."[2] But Trafalgar ended his
+chances. As the old Admiral Earl St. Vincent remarked, "Pitt [the
+Prime Minister] would be the greatest fool that ever existed to
+encourage a mode of war which they who command the sea do not want
+and which if successful would deprive them of it." So Fulton took
+L15,000 and dropped his schemes.
+
+[Footnote 2: Letter to Pitt, Jan. 6, 1806.]
+
+[Illustration: FULTON'S NAUTILUS]
+
+Much cruder than the _Nautilus_, owing to their hurried construction,
+were the Confederate "Davids" of the Civil War. One of these launches,
+which ran only semi-submerged, drove a spar torpedo against the
+U. S. S. _New Ironsides_ off Charleston, but it exploded on the
+rebound, too far away. The C. S. S. _Hunley_ was a real submarine,
+and went down readily, but on five occasions it failed to emerge
+properly, and drowned in these experiments about 35 men. In August,
+1864, running on the surface, it sank by torpedo the U. S. Corvette
+_Housatonic_ off Charleston, but went down in the suction of the
+larger vessel, carrying to death its last heroic crew.
+
+By the end of the century, chiefly owing to the genius and patient
+efforts of two American inventors, John P. Holland and Simon Lake,
+the submarine was passing from the experimental to the practical
+stage. Its possibilities were increased by the Whitehead torpedo
+(named after its inventor, a British engineer established in Fiume,
+Austria), which came out in 1868 and was soon adopted in European
+navies. With gyroscopic stabilizing devices and a "warmer" for the
+compressed air of its engine, the torpedo attained before 1900
+a speed of 28 knots and a possible range of 1000 yards. Its first
+victim was the Chilean warship _Blanco_, sunk in 1891 at 50 yards
+after two misses. Thornycroft in England first achieved speed for
+small vessels, and in 1873 began turning out torpedo boats. Destroyers
+came in twenty years later, and by the end of the century were
+making over 30 knots.
+
+Long before this time the lessons of the Civil War had hastened the
+adoption of armor, the new ships ranging from high-sided vessels
+with guns in broadside, as in the past, to low freeboard craft
+influenced by the _Monitor_ design, with a few large guns protected
+by revolving turrets or fixed barbettes, and with better provision
+for all-around fire. Ordnance improved in penetrating power, until
+the old wrought-iron armor had to be 20 inches thick and confined
+to waterline and batteries. Steel "facing" and the later plates of
+Krupp or Harveyized steel made it possible again to lighten and
+spread out the armor, and during the last decade of the century
+it steadily increased its ascendancy over the gun.
+
+_The Battle of Lissa_
+
+The adoption of armor meant sacrifice of armament, and a departure
+from Farragut's well-tried maxim, "The best protection against the
+enemy's fire is a well-sustained fire from your own guns." Thus
+the British _Dreadnought_ of 1872 gave 35% of its displacement to
+armor and only 5% to armament. Invulnerability was secured at the
+expense of offensive power. That aggressive tactics and weapons
+retained all their old value in warfare was to receive timely
+illustration in the Battle of Lissa, fought in the year after the
+American war. The engagement illustrated also another of Farragut's
+pungent maxims to the effect that iron in the ships is less important
+than "iron in the men"--a saying especially true when, as with the
+Austrians at Lissa, the iron is in the chief in command.
+
+In 1866 Italy and Prussia attacked Austria in concert, Italy having
+secured from Bismarck a pledge of Venetia in the event of victory.
+Though beaten at Custozza on June 24, the Italians did their part
+by keeping busy an Austrian army of 80,000. Moltke crushed the
+northern forces of the enemy at Sadowa on July 3, and within three
+weeks had reached the environs of Vienna and practically won the
+war. Lissa was fought on July 20, just 6 days before the armistice.
+This general political and military situation should be borne in
+mind as throwing some light on the peculiar Italian strategy in
+the Lissa campaign.
+
+Struggling Italy, her unification under the House of Piedmont as
+yet only partly achieved, had shown both foresight and energy in
+building up a fleet. Her available force on the day of Lissa consisted
+of 12 armored ships and 16 wooden steam vessels of same fighting
+value. The ironclads included 7 armored frigates, the best of which
+were the two "kings," _Re d'Italia_ and _Re di Portogallo_, built
+the year before in New York (rather badly, it is said), each armed
+with about 30 heavy rifles. Then there was the new single-turret
+ram _Affondatore_, or "Sinker," with two 300-pounder 10-inch rifles,
+which came in from England only the day before the battle. Some
+of the small protected corvettes and gunboats were of much less
+value, the _Palestro_, for instance, which suffered severely in
+the fight, having a thin sheet of armor over only two-fifths of
+her exposed hull.
+
+The Austrian fleet had the benefit of some war experience against
+Denmark in the North Sea two years before, but it was far inferior
+and less up-to-date, its armored ships consisting of 7 screw frigates
+armed chiefly with smoothbores. Of the wooden ships, there were
+7 screw frigates and corvettes, 9 gunboats and schooners, and 3
+little side-wheelers--a total of 19. The following table indicates
+the relative strength:
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+        |Armored | Wooden |Small craft|  Total |  Rifles  |Total w't
+        |--------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|of metal
+        |No.|Guns|No.|Guns| No.| Guns |No.|Guns|No.|Weight|
+--------|---|----|---|----|----|------|---|----|---|------|---------
+Austria |  7| 176|  7| 304| 12 |  52  | 22| 532|121| 7,130| 23,538
+Italy   | 12| 243| 11| 382|  5 |  16  | 28| 641|276|28,700| 53,236
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Thus in general terms the Italians were nearly twice as strong
+in main units, could fire twice as heavy a weight of metal from
+all their guns, and four times as heavy from their rifles. Even
+without the _Affondatore_, their advantage was practically as great
+as this from the beginning of the war.
+
+With such a preponderance, it would seem as if Persano, the Italian
+commander in chief, could easily have executed his savage-sounding
+orders to "sweep the enemy from the Adriatic, and to attack and
+blockade them wherever found." He was dilatory, however, in assembling
+his fleet, negligent in practice and gun drill, and passive in his
+whole policy to a degree absolutely ruinous to morale. War was
+declared June 20, and had long been foreseen; yet it was June 25
+before he moved the bulk of his fleet from Taranto to Ancona in
+the Adriatic. Here on the 27th they were challenged by 13 Austrian
+ships, which lay off the port cleared for action for two hours, while
+Persano made no real move to fight. It is said that the Italian
+defeat at Custozza three days before had taken the heart out of
+him. On July 8 he put to sea for a brief three days' cruise and
+went through some maneuvers and signaling but no firing, though
+many of the guns were newly mounted and had never been tried by
+their crews.
+
+At this time Napoleon III of France had already undertaken mediation
+between the hostile powers. In spite of the orders of June 8, quoted
+above, which seem sufficiently definite, and urgent orders to the
+same effect later, Persano was unwilling to take the offensive,
+and kept complaining of lack of clear instructions as to what he
+should do. He was later convicted of cowardice and negligence;
+but the campaign he finally undertook against Lissa was dangerous
+enough, and it seems possible that some secret political maneuvering
+was partly responsible for his earlier delay.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: In July Persano wrote to the Deputy Boggio: "Leave the
+care of my reputation to me; I would rather be wrongly dishonored
+than rightly condemned. Patience will bring peace; I shall be called
+a traitor, but nevertheless Italy will have her fleet intact, and
+that of Austria will be rendered useless." Quoted in Bernotti,
+IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, p. 177.]
+
+It is significant at least that the final proposal to make a descent
+upon the fortified island of Lissa came not from Persana but from
+the Minister of Marine. On July 15 the latter took up the project
+with the fleet chief of staff, d'Amico, and with Rear Admiral Vacca,
+but not until later with Persano. All agreed that the prospect
+of a truce allowed no time for a movement against Venice or the
+Austrian base at Pola, but that they should strike a swift stroke
+elsewhere. Lissa commanded the Dalmatian coast, was essential to
+naval control in the Adriatic, and was coveted by Italy then as
+in later times. It would be better than trying to crush the enemy
+fleet at the risk of her own if she could enter the peace conference
+with possession of Lissa a _fait accompli_.
+
+Undertaken in the face of an undefeated enemy fleet, this move has
+been justly condemned by naval strategists. But with a less alert
+opponent the coup might have succeeded. Tegetthoff, the Austrian
+commander, was not yet 41 years of age, but had been in active
+naval service since he was 18, and had led a squadron bravely in
+a fight with the Danes two years before off Heligoland. He had
+his heterogeneous array of fighting craft assembled at Pola at
+the outbreak of war. "Give me everything you have," he told the
+Admiralty when they asked him what ships he wanted; "I'll find
+some use for them." His crews were partly men of Slav and Italian
+stock from the Adriatic coast, including 600 from Venice; there
+is no reason for supposing them better than those of Persano. The
+influence of their leader, however, inspired them with loyalty and
+fighting spirit, and their defiance of the Italians at Ancona on
+June 27 increased their confidence. When successive cable messages
+from Lissa satisfied him that the Italian fleet was not attempting
+a diversion but was actually committed to an attack on the island,
+Tegetthoff set out thither on July 19 with his entire fighting
+force. His order of sailing was the order of battle. "Every captain
+knew the admiral's intention as well as the admiral himself did;
+every officer knew what had to be done, and every man had some
+idea of it, and above all knew that he had to fight."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Laughton, STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY, Tegetthoff, p. 164.]
+
+In the meantime the Italian drive on Lissa had gone ahead slowly.
+The island batteries were on commanding heights and manned by marines
+and artillerymen resolved to fight to the last ditch. During the
+second day's bombardment the _Affondatore_ appeared, and also some
+additional troops needed to complete the landing force. Two-thirds
+of the guns on shore were silenced that day, and if the landing
+operations had been pushed, the island captured, and the fleet
+taken into the protected harbor of St. Giorgio, Tegetthoff would
+have had a harder problem to solve. But as the mist blew away with
+a southerly wind at 10 o'clock on the next day, July 20, the weary
+garrison on the heights of the island gave cheer after cheer as
+they saw the Austrian squadron plunging through the head seas at
+full speed from the northeastward, while the Italian ships hurriedly
+drew together north of the island to meet the blow.
+
+The Austrians advanced in three successive divisions, ironclads,
+wooden frigates, and finally the smaller vessels, each in a wedge-shaped
+formation (shown by the diagram), with the apex toward the enemy.
+The object was to drive through the Italian line if possible near
+the van and bring on a close scrimmage in which all ships could
+take part, ramming tactics could be employed, and the enemy would
+profit less by their superiority in armor and guns. Like Nelson's at
+Trafalgar, Tegetthoff's formation was one not likely to be imitated,
+but it was at least simple and well understood, and against a passive
+resistance it gave the results planned.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866]
+
+"_Ecco i pescatori!_" (Here come the fishermen), cried Persana,
+with a scorn he was far from actually feeling. The Italians were
+in fact caught at a disadvantage. One of their best ships, the
+_Formidabile_, had been put _hors de combat_ by the batteries
+on the day before. Another, coming in late from the west end of
+the island, took no part in the action. The wooden ships, owing
+to the cowardice of their commander, Albini, also kept out of the
+fight, though Persano signaled desperately to them to enter the
+engagement and "surround the enemy rear." With his remaining ironclads
+Persano formed three divisions of three ships each and swung across
+the enemy's bows in line ahead. Just at the critical moment, and
+for no very explicable motive, he shifted his flag from the _Re
+d'Italia_ in the center to the _Affondatore_, which was steaming
+alone on the starboard side of the line. The change was not noted
+by all his ships, and thus caused confusion of orders. The delay
+involved also left a wider gap between van and center, and through
+this the Austrians plunged, Tegetthoff in his flagship _Erzherzog
+Ferdinand Max_ leading the way.
+
+Here orderly formation ended, and only the more striking episodes
+stand out in a desperate close combat, during which the black ships
+of Austria and the gray of Italy rammed or fired into each other
+amid a smother of smoke and spray. The Austrian left flank and
+rear held up the Italian van; the Austrian ironclads engaged the
+Italian center; and the wooden ships of the Austrian middle division,
+led by the 92-gun _Kaiser_, smashed into the Italian rear. Of all
+the Austrian ships, the big _Kaiser_, a relic of other days, saw
+the hardest fighting. Twice she avoided the _Affondatore's_ ram,
+and she was struck by one of her 300-pound projectiles. Then the
+_Re di Portogallo_ bore down, but Petz, the _Kaiser's_ captain,
+rang for full speed ahead and steered for the ironclad, striking
+a glancing blow and scraping past her, while both ships poured in
+a heavy fire. The _Kaiser_ soon afterward drew out of the action,
+her foremast and funnel down, and a bad blaze burning amidships.
+Altogether she fired 850 rounds in the action, or about one-fifth
+of the total fired by the Austrians, and she received 80 hits,
+again one-fifth of the total. Of the 38 Austrians killed and 138
+wounded in the battle, she lost respectively 24 and 75.
+
+The _Kaiser's_ combat, though more severe, was typical of what
+was going on elsewhere. The Italian gunboat _Palestro_ was forced
+to withdraw to fight a fire that threatened her magazines. The
+_Re d'Italia_, which was at first supposed by the Austrians to be
+Persano's flagship, was a center of attack and had her steering
+gear disabled. As she could go only straight ahead or astern, the
+Austrian flagship seized the chance and rammed her squarely amidships
+at full speed, crashing through her armor and opening an immense
+hole. The Italian gunboat heeled over to starboard, then back again,
+and in a few seconds went down, with a loss of 381 men.
+
+This spectacular incident practically decided the battle. After
+an hour's fighting the two squadrons drew apart about noon, the
+Austrians finally entering St. Giorgio harbor and the Italians
+withdrawing to westward. During the retreat the fire on the _Palestro_
+reached her ammunition and she blew up with a loss of 231 of her
+crew. Except in the two vessels destroyed, the Italian losses were
+slight--8 killed and 40 wounded. But the armored ships were badly
+battered, and less than a month later the _Affondatore_ sank in a
+squall in Ancona harbor, partly, it was thought, owing to injuries
+received at Lissa.
+
+For a long time after this fight, an exaggerated view was held
+regarding the value of ramming, line abreast formation, and bow
+fire. Weapons condition tactics, and these tactics of Tegetthoff
+were suited to the means he had to work with. But they were not
+those which should have been adopted by his opponents; nor would
+they have been successful had the Italians brought their broadsides
+to bear on a parallel course and avoided a melee. What the whole
+campaign best illustrates--and the lesson has permanent interest--is
+how a passive and defensive policy, forced upon the Italian fleet
+by the incompetence of its admiral or otherwise, led to its
+demoralization and ultimate destruction. After a long period of
+inactivity, Persano weakened his force against shore defenses before
+he had disposed of the enemy fleet, and was then taken at a
+disadvantage. His passive strategy was reflected in his tactics.
+He engaged with only a part of his force, and without a definite
+plan; "A storm of signals swept over his squadron" as it went into
+action. What really decided the battle was not the difference in
+ships, crews, or weapons, but the difference in aggressiveness
+and ability of the two admirals in command.
+
+_The Battle of the Yalu_
+
+Twenty-eight years elapsed after Lissa before the next significant
+naval action, the Battle of the Yalu, between fleets of China and
+Japan. Yet the two engagements may well be taken together, since
+at the Yalu types and tactics were still transitional, and the
+initial situation at Lissa was duplicated--line abreast against
+line ahead. The result, however, was reversed, for the Japanese
+in line ahead took the initiative, used their superior speed to
+conduct the battle on their own terms, and won the day.
+
+Trouble arose in the Far East over the dissolution of the decrepit
+monarchy of Korea, upon which both Japan and China cast covetous
+eyes. As nominal suzerain, China in the spring of 1894 sent 2000
+troops to Korea to suppress an insurrection, without observing
+certain treaty stipulations which required her to notify Japan. The
+latter nation despatched 5000 men to Chemulpo in June. Hostilities
+broke out on July 25, when four fast Japanese cruisers, including the
+_Naniwa Kan_ under the future Admiral Togo, fell upon the Chinese
+cruiser _Tsi-yuen_ and two smaller vessels, captured the latter
+and battered the cruiser badly before she got away, and then to
+complete the day's work sank a Chinese troop transport, saving
+only the European officers on board.
+
+After this affair the Chinese Admiral Ting, a former cavalry officer
+but with some naval experience, favored taking the offensive, since
+control of the sea by China would at once decide the war. But the
+Chinese Foreign Council gave him orders not to cruise east of a
+line from Shantung to the mouth of the Yalu. Reverses on land soon
+forced him to give all his time to troop transportation, and this
+occupied both navies throughout the summer.
+
+On September 16, the day before the Battle of the Yalu, the Chinese
+battleships escorted transports with 5000 troops to the mouth of
+the Yalu, and on the following morning they were anchored quietly
+outside the river. "For weeks," writes an American naval officer
+who was in command of one of the Chinese battleships, "we had
+anticipated an engagement, and had had daily exercise at general
+quarters, etc., and little remained to be done.... The fleet went
+into action as well prepared as it was humanly possible for it
+to be with the same officers and men, handicapped as they were
+by official corruption and treachery ashore."[1] As the midday
+meal was in preparation, columns of black smoke appeared to
+southwestward. The squadron at once weighed anchor, cleared for
+action, and put on forced draft, while "dark-skinned men, with
+queues tightly coiled around their heads, and with arms bare to the
+elbow, clustered along the decks in groups at the guns, waiting to
+kill or be killed." Out of the smoke soon emerged 12 enemy cruisers
+which, with information of the Chinese movements, had entered the
+Gulf intent on battle.
+
+[Footnote 1: Commander P. N. McGiffin, THE BATTLE OF THE YALU,
+_Century Magazine_, August, 1895, pp. 585-604.]
+
+The forces about to engage included the best ships of both nations.
+There were 12 on each side, excluding 4 Chinese torpedo boats, and
+10 actually in each battle line. The main strength of the Chinese
+was concentrated in two second-class battleships, the _Ting-yuen_
+and the _Chen-yuen_, Stettin-built in 1882, each of 7430 tons, with
+14-inch armor over half its length, four 12-inch Krupp guns in two
+barbettes, and 6-inch rifles at bow and stern. The two barbettes
+were _en echelon_ (the starboard just ahead of the port), in such a
+way that while all four guns could fire dead ahead only two could bear
+on the port quarter or the starboard bow. These ships were designed
+for fighting head-on; and hence to use them to best advantage Admiral
+Ting formed his squadron in line abreast, with the _Ting-yuen_ and
+_Chen-yuen_ in the center. The rest of the line were a "scratch
+lot" of much smaller vessels--two armored cruisers (_Lai-yuen_ and
+_King-yuen_) with 8 to 9-inch armored belts; three protected
+cruisers (_Tsi-yuen, Chi-yuen_, and _Kwang-ping_) with 2 to 4-inch
+armored decks; on the left flank the old corvette _Kwang-chia_;
+and opposite her two other "lame ducks" of only 1300 tons, the
+_Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_. Ting had properly strengthened his
+center, but had left his flanks fatally weak. On board the flagship
+_Ting-yuen_ was Major von Hannekin, China's military adviser, and
+an ex-petty officer of the British navy named Nichols. Philo N.
+McGiffin, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, commanded
+the _Chen-yuen_.
+
+The Japanese advanced in column, or line ahead, in two divisions.
+The first, or "flying squadron," was led by Rear Admiral Tsuboi
+in the _Yoshino_, and consisted of four fast protected cruisers.
+Four similar ships, headed by Vice Admiral Ito in the _Matsushima_,
+formed the chief units of the main squadron, followed by the older
+and slower ironclads, _Fuso_ and _Hiyei_. The little gunboat
+_Akagi_ and the converted steamer _Saikio Maru_ had orders not
+to engage, but nevertheless pushed in on the left of the line.
+Aside from their two battleships, the Chinese had nothing to compare
+with these eight new and well-armed cruisers, the slowest of which
+could make 17-1/2 knots.
+
+In armament the Japanese also had a marked advantage, as the following
+table, from Wilsan's _Ironclads in Action_, will show:
+
+---------------------------------------------------------------
+      |SHIPS |         GUNS                |SHOTS IN 10 MINUTES
+      |------|-----------------------------|-------------------
+      |      |      |  Large   |Small q. f.|       | Weight of
+      |Number|6-inch|quick fire|and machine|Number |   metal
+------|------|------|----------|-----------|-------|-----------
+China |  12  |  40  |    2     |    130    |   33  |   4,885
+Japan |  10  |  34  |   66     |    154    |  185  |  11,706
+---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The smaller quick-fire and machine guns proved of slight value
+on either side, but the large Japanese quick-firers searched all
+unprotected parts of the enemy ships with a terrific storm of shells.
+After the experience of July 25, the Chinese had discarded much
+of their woodwork and top hamper, including boats, thin steel
+gun-shields, rails, needless rigging, etc., and used coal and sand
+bags an the upper decks; but the unarmored ships nevertheless suffered
+severely. From the table it is evident that the Japanese could
+pour in six times as great a volume of fire. The Chinese had a
+slight advantage in heavier guns, and their marksmanship, it is
+claimed, was equally accurate (possibly 10% hits on each side), but
+their ammunition was defective and consisted mostly of non-bursting
+projectiles. They had only 15 rounds of shell for each gun.
+
+During the approach the Japanese steered at first for the enemy
+center, thus concealing their precise objective, and then swung to
+port, with the aim of attacking on the weaker side of the Chinese
+battleships (owing to their barbette arrangement) and on the weaker
+flank of the line. In the meantime the Chinese steamed forward at
+about 6 knots and turned somewhat to keep head-on, thus forcing the
+Japanese to file across their bows. At 12.20 p.m. the _Chen-yuen_
+and _Ting-yuen_ opened at 5800 yards on Tsuboi's squadron, which
+held its fire until at 3000 yards or closer it swung around the
+Chinese right wing.
+
+The main squadron followed. Admiral Ito has been criticized for thus
+drawing his line across the enemy's advance, instead of attacking
+their left flank. But he was previously committed to the movement,
+and executed it rapidly and for the most part at long range. Had
+the Chinese pressed forward at best speed, Lissa might have been
+repeated. As it was, they cut off only the _Hiyei_. To avoid ramming,
+this old ironclad plunged boldly between the _Chen-yuen_ and
+_Ting-yuen_. She was hit 22 times and had 56 killed and wounded,
+but managed to pull through.
+
+Before this time the _Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_ on the right
+flank of the Chinese line had crumpled under a heavy cross-fire
+from the flying squadron. These ships had wooden cabins on deck
+outboard, and the whole superstructure soon became roaring masses
+of flames. Both dropped out of line and burned to the water's edge.
+The two ships on the opposite flank had seized an early opportunity
+to withdraw astern of the line, and were now off for Port Arthur
+under full steam, "followed," writes McGiffin, "by a string of
+Chinese anathemas from our men at the guns."
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPT. 17, 1894]
+
+The Japanese van turned to port and was thus for some time out
+of action. The main division turned to starboard and circled the
+Chinese rear. Of the 6 Chinese ships left in the line, the four
+smaller seem now to have moved on to southward, while both Japanese
+divisions concentrated on the two battleships _Chen-yuen_ and
+_Ting-yuen_. These did their best to keep head to the enemy, and
+stood up doggedly, returning slowly the fire of the circling
+cruisers. Tsuboi soon turned away to engage the lighter vessels.
+Finally, at 3.26, as the _Matsushima_ closed to about 2000 yards,
+the _Chen-yuen_ hit her fairly with a last remaining 12-inch shell.
+This one blow put Ito's flagship out of action, exploding some
+ammunition, killing or wounding 50 or more men, and starting a
+dangerous fire. The Japanese hauled off, while according to Chinese
+accounts the battleships actually followed, but at 4.30 came again
+under a severe fire. About 5.30, when the Chinese were practically
+out of ammunition, Ito finally withdrew and recalled his van.
+
+Of the other Chinese ships, the _Chi-yuen_ made a desperate attempt
+to approach the Japanese van and went down at 3.30 with screws
+racing in the air. The _King-yuen_, already on fire, was shot to
+pieces and sunk an hour later by the _Yoshino's_ quick-firers.
+As the sun went down, the _Lai-yuen_ and _Kwang-ping_, with two
+ships from the river mouth, fell in behind the battleships and
+staggered off towards Port Arthur, unpursued. The losses on the
+two armored ships had been relatively slight--56 killed and
+wounded. The Japanese lost altogether 90 killed and 204 wounded,
+chiefly on the _Matsushima_ and _Hiyei_.
+
+Though China saved her best ships from the battle, her fighting
+spirit was done for. The battleships were later destroyed by Japanese
+torpedo operations after the fall of Wei-hai-wei. Her crews had on
+the whole fought bravely, handicapped as they were by their poor
+materials and lack of skill. For instance, when McGiffin called
+for volunteers to extinguish a fire on the _Chen-yuen's_ forecastle,
+swept by enemy shells, "men responded heartily and went to what
+seemed to them certain death." It was at this time that the commander
+himself, leading the party, was knocked over by a shell explosion
+and then barely escaped the blast of one of his own 12-inch guns
+by rolling through an open hatch and falling 8 feet to a pile of
+debris below.
+
+In the way of lessons, aside from the obvious ones as to the value
+of training and expert leadership and the necessity of eliminating
+inflammables in ship construction, the battle revealed on the one
+hand the great resisting qualities of the armored ship, and on
+the other hand the offensive value of superior gunfire. Admiral
+Mahan said at the time that "The rapid fire gun has just now fairly
+established its position as the greatest offensive weapon in naval
+warfare."[1] Another authority has noted that, both at Lissa and
+the Yalu, "The winning fleet was worked in divisions, as was the
+British fleet in the Dutch wars and at Trafalgar, and the Japanese
+fleet afterwards at Tsushima." Remarking that experiments with
+this method were made by the British Channel Fleet in 1904, the
+writer continues: "The conception grew out of a study of Nelson's
+Memorandum. Its essence was to make the fleet flexible in the hands
+of the admiral, and to enable any part to be moved by the shortest
+line to the position where it was most required."[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: LESSONS FROM THE YALU FIGHT, _Century Magazine_, August,
+1895, p. 630.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Custance, THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 103.]
+
+By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) which closed the war,
+Japan won Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Pescadores
+Islands and Formosa, and China's withdrawal from Korea. But just as
+she was about to lay hands on these generous fruits of victory,
+they were snatched out of her grasp by the European powers, which
+began exploiting China for themselves. Japan had to acquiesce and
+bide her time, using her war indemnity and foreign loans to build
+up her fleet. The Yalu thus not only marks the rise of Japan as
+a formidable force in international affairs, but brings us to a
+period of intensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far
+East and elsewhere which gave added significance to naval power
+and led to the war of 1914.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Aside from those already cited see:
+ROBERT FULTON, ENGINEER AND ARTIST, H. W. Dickinson, 1913.
+THE STORY OF THE GUNS, J. E. Tennant, 1864.
+THE BRITISH NAVY, Sir Thomas Brassey, 1884.
+CLOWES' HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. VII (p. 20, bibliography).
+NAVAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 19TH CENTURY, N. Barnaby, 1904.
+THE TORPEDO IN PEACE AND WAR, F. T. Jane, 1898.
+SUBMARINE WARFARE, H. C. Fyfe, 1902.
+THE SUBMARINE IN WAR AND PEACE, Simon Lake, 1918.
+FOUR MODERN NAVAL CAMPAIGNS, Lissa, W. L. Clowes, 1902.
+THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN NAVAL WAR, Journal of the United Service
+  Institution, Vol. XI, pp. 104ff.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
+
+Even more significant in its relation to sea power than the revolution
+in armaments during the 19th century was the extraordinary growth
+of ocean commerce. The total value of the world's import and export
+trade in 1800 amounted in round numbers to 1-1/2 billion dollars,
+in 1850 to 4 billion, and in 1900 to nearly 24 billion. In other
+words, during a period in which the population of the world was not
+more than tripled, its international exchange of commodities was
+increased 16-fold. This growth was of course made possible largely
+by progress in manufacturing, increased use of steam navigation,
+and vastly greater output of coal and iron.[1] At the end of the
+Napoleonic wars England was the only great commercial and industrial
+state. At the close of the century, though with her colonies she
+still controlled one-fourth of the world's foreign trade, she faced
+aggressive rivals in the field. The United States after her Civil
+War, and Germany after her unification and the Franco-Prussian
+War, had achieved an immense industrial development, opening up
+resources in coal and iron that made them formidable competitors.
+Germany in particular, a late comer in the colonial field, felt
+that her future lay upon the seas, as a means of securing access on
+favorable terms to world markets and raw materials. Other nations
+also realized that their continued growth and prosperity would
+depend upon commercial expansion. This might be accomplished in a
+measure by cheaper production and superior business organization,
+but could be greatly aided by political means--by colonial activity,
+by securing control or special privileges in unexploited areas
+and backward states, by building up a merchant fleet under the
+national flag. Obviously, since the seas join the continents and
+form the great highways of trade, this commercial and political
+expansion would give increased importance to naval power.
+
+[Footnote 1: Coal production increased during the century from
+11.6 million tons to 610 million, and pig iron from half a million
+tons to 37 million. Figures from Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Ch.
+XXVIII.]
+
+Admiral Mahan, an acute political observer as well as strategist,
+summed up the international situation in 1895 and again in 1897 as
+"an equilibrium on the [European] Continent, and, in connection
+with the calm thus resulting, an immense colonizing movement in
+which all the great powers were concerned."[1] Later, in 1911, he
+noted that colonial rivalries had again been superseded by rivalries
+within Europe, but pointed out that the European tension was itself
+largely the product of activities and ambitions in more distant
+spheres. In fact the international developments of recent times,
+whether in the form of colonial enterprises, armament competition,
+or actual warfare, find a common origin in economic and commercial
+interests. Commerce and quick communications have drawn the world
+into closer unity, yet by a kind of paradox have increased the
+possibilities of conflict. Both by their common origin and by their
+far-reaching consequences, it is thus possible to connect the story
+of naval events from the Spanish-American to the World War, and to
+gather them up under the general title, "rivalry for world power."
+
+1. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
+
+To this rivalry the United States could hardly hope or desire to
+remain always a passive spectator, yet, aside from trying to stabilize
+the western hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine, she cherished down
+to the year 1898 a policy of isolation from world affairs. During
+the first half of the 19th century, it is true, her interests were
+directed outward by a flourishing merchant marine. In 1860 the
+American merchant fleet of 2,500,000 tons was second only to Great
+Britain's and nearly equal to that of all other nations combined.
+But its decay had already begun, and continued rapidly. The change
+from wood to iron construction enabled England to build cheaper
+ships; and American shipping suffered also from lack of government
+patronage, diversion of capital into mare profitable projects of
+Western development, and loss of a third of its tonnage by destruction
+or shift to foreign register during the Civil War. At the outbreak
+of that war 72 per cent of American exports were carried in American
+bottoms; only 9 per cent in 1913. Thus the United States had reached
+the unsatisfactory condition of a nation with a large and rapidly
+growing foreign commerce and an almost non-existent merchant marine.
+
+[Footnote 1: NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 104.]
+
+This was the situation when the nation was thrust suddenly and
+half unwillingly into the main stream of international events by
+the Spanish-American War. Though this war made the United States
+a world power, commercial or political aggrandizement played no
+part in her entry into the struggle. It arose solely from the
+intolerable conditions created by Spanish misrule in Cuba, and
+intensified by armed rebellion since 1895. Whatever slight hope
+or justification for non-intervention remained was destroyed by
+the blowing up of the _U. S. S. Maine_ in Havana harbor, February
+15, 1898, with the loss of 260 of her complement of 354 officers
+and men. Thereafter the United States pushed her preparations for
+war; but the resolution of Congress, April 19, 1898, authorizing
+the President to begin hostilities expressly stated that the United
+States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba,
+and after its pacification would "leave the government and control
+of the island to its people."
+
+It was at once recognized that the conflict would be primarily
+naval, and would be won by the nation that secured control of the
+sea. The paper strength of the two navies left little to choose,
+and led even competent critics like Admiral Colomb in England to
+prophesy a stalemate--a "desultory war." Against five new American
+battleships, the _Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon_ and _Texas_,
+the first four of 10,000 tons, and the armored cruisers _Brooklyn_
+and _New York_ of 9000 and 8000 tans, Spain could oppose the
+battleship _Pelayo_, a little better than the _Texas_ and five
+armored cruisers, the _Carlos V, Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante
+Oquendo_, and _Vizcaya_, each of about 7000 tons, and the somewhat
+larger and very able former Italian cruiser _Cristobal Colon_.
+Figures and statistics, however, give no idea of the actual weakness
+of the Spanish navy, handicapped by shiftless naval administration,
+by dependence on foreign sources of supply, and by the incompetence
+and lack of training of personnel. Of the squadron that came to
+Cuba under Admiral Cervera, the _Colon_ lacked two 10-inch guns
+for her barbettes, and the _Vizcaya_ was so foul under water that
+with a trial speed of 18-1/2 knots she never made above 13--Cervera
+called her a "buoy." There was no settled plan of campaign; to
+Cervera's requests for instructions came the ministerial reply
+that "in these moments of international crisis no definite plans
+can be formulated."[1] The despairing letters of the Spanish Admiral
+and his subordinates reveal how feeble was the reed upon which
+Spain had to depend for the preservation of her colonial empire.
+The four cruisers and two destroyers that sailed from the Cape
+Verde Islands on April 29 were Spain's total force available. The
+_Pelayo_ and the _Carlos V_, not yet ready, were the only ships of
+value left behind.
+
+[Footnote 1: Bermejo to Cervera, April 4, 1898.]
+
+On the American naval list, in addition to the main units already
+mentioned, there were six monitors of heavy armament but indifferent
+fighting value, a considerable force of small cruisers, four converted
+liners for scouts, and a large number of gunboats, converted yachts,
+etc., which proved useful in the Cuban blockade. Of these forces
+the majority were assembled in the Atlantic theater of war. The
+_Oregon_ was on the West Coast, and made her famous voyage of 14,700
+miles around Cape Horn in 79 days, at an average speed of 11.6
+knots, leaving Puget Sound on March 6 and touching at Barbados in
+the West Indies an May 18, just as the Spanish fleet was steaming
+across the Caribbean. The cruise effectively demonstrated the danger
+of a divided navy and the need of an Isthmian canal. Under Commodore
+Dewey in the Far East were two gunboats and four small cruisers,
+the best of them the fast and heavily armed flagship _Olympia_,
+of 5800 tons.
+
+_The Battle of Manila Bay_
+
+[Illustration: APPROACHES TO MANILA]
+
+With this latter force the first blow of the war was struck on May
+1 in Manila Bay. Dewey, largely through the influence of Assistant
+Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, had been appointed to the eastern
+command the autumn before. On reaching his station in January, he
+took his squadron to Hong Kong to be close to the scene of possible
+hostilities. On February 25 he received a despatch from Roosevelt,
+then Acting Secretary: "Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration
+of war Spain, your duty will be to see that Spanish squadron does
+not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the
+Philippine Islands." On April 25 came the inspiring order: "Proceed
+at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly
+against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use
+utmost endeavor." The Commodore had already purchased a collier and
+a supply ship for use in addition to the revenue cutter _McCulloch_,
+overhauled his vessels and given them a war coat of slate-gray, and
+made plans for a base at Mirs Bay, 30 miles distant in Chinese
+waters, where he would be less troubled by neutrality rules in time
+of war. On April 22 the _Baltimore_ arrived from San Francisco
+with much-needed ammunition. On the 27th Consul Williams joined
+with latest news of preparations at Manila, and that afternoon
+the squadron put to sea.
+
+On the morning of the 30th it was off Luzon, and two ships scouted
+Subig Bay, which the enemy had left only 24 hours before. At 12 that
+night Dewey took his squadron in column through the entrance to Manila
+Bay, just as he had steamed past the forts on the Mississippi with
+Farragut 35 years before. Only three shots were fired by the guns
+on shore. The thoroughness of Dewey's preparations, the rapidity
+of his movements up to this point, and his daring passage through a
+channel which he had reason to believe strongly defended by mines
+and shore batteries are the just titles of his fame. The entrance to
+Manila is indeed 10 miles wide and divided into separate channels by
+the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile. The less frequented
+channel chosen was, as Dewey rightly judged, too deep for mining
+except by experts. Yet the Spanish had news of his approach the
+day before; they had 17 guns, including 6 modern rifles, on the
+islands guarding the entrance; they had plenty of gunboats that
+might have been fitted out as torpedo launches for night attack.
+It does not detract from the American officer's accomplishment
+that he drew no false picture of the obstacles with which he had
+to deal.
+
+At daybreak next morning, having covered slowly the 24 miles from
+the mouth of the bay up to Manila, the American ships advanced
+past the city to attack the Spanish flotilla drawn up under the
+Cavite batteries 6 miles beyond. Here was what an American officer
+described as "a collection of old tubs scarcely fit to be called
+men-of-war." The most serviceable was Admiral Montojo's flagship
+_Reina Cristina_, an unarmored cruiser of 3500 tons; the remaining
+half dozen were older ships of both wood and iron, some of them
+not able to get under way. They mounted 31 guns above 4-inch to
+the Americans' 53. More serious in prospect, though not in reality,
+was the danger from shore batteries and mines. The United States
+vessels approached in column, led by the _Olympia_, which opened
+fire at 5.40. In the words of Admiral Dewey's report, "The squadron
+maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5000
+to 2000 yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel
+to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but
+generally ineffective. Three runs were made from the eastward and
+three from the westward, so that both broadsides were brought to
+bear." One torpedo launch which dashed out was sunk and another
+driven ashore. The _Cristina_ moved out as if to ram, but staggered
+back under the _Olympia's_ concentrated fire. At 7.35, owing to a
+mistaken report that only 15 rounds of ammunition were left for the
+5-inch guns, the American squadron retired temporarily, but renewed
+action at 11.16 and ended it an hour later, when the batteries were
+silenced and "every enemy ship sunk, burned or deserted."
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898]
+
+As reported by Admiral Montojo, the Spanish lost 381 men. The American
+ships were hit only 15 times and had 7 men slightly injured. Volume
+and accuracy of gunfire won the day. Somewhat extravagant language
+has been used in describing the battle, which, whatever the perils
+that might naturally have been expected, was a most one-sided affair.
+But it is less easy to overpraise Admiral Dewey's energetic and
+aggressive handling of the entire campaign.
+
+Manila thereafter lay helpless under the guns of the squadron,
+and upon the arrival and landing of troops surrendered on August
+13, after a merely formal defense. In the interim, Spain sent out
+a relief force under Admiral Camara consisting of the _Pelaya,
+Carlos V_ and other smaller units, before encountering which Dewey
+planned to leave Manila and await the arrival of two monitors then
+on their way from San Francisco. After getting through the Suez
+Canal, Camara was brought back (July 8) by an American threat against
+the coast of Spain.
+
+Soon after the battle a number of foreign warships congregated
+at Manila, including 5 German ships under Admiral von Diedrichs,
+a force superior to Dewey's, and apparently bent on learning by
+persistent contravention all the rules of a blockaded port. The
+message finally sent to the German Admiral is reticently described
+by Dewey himself, but is said to have been to the effect that, if
+the German admiral wanted a fight, "he could have it right now."
+On the day of the surrender of Manila the British and the Japanese
+ships in the harbor took a position between the American and the
+German squadrons. This was just after the seizure of Kiao-chau,
+at a time when Germany was vigorously pushing out for "a place in
+the sun." But for the American commander's quiet yet firm stand,
+with British support, the United States might have encountered
+more serious complications in taking over 127,000 square miles of
+archipelago in the eastern world, with important trade interests,
+a lively insurrection, and a population of 7 million.
+
+_The Santiago Campaign_
+
+In the Atlantic, where it was the American policy not to carry
+their offensive beyond Spain's West Indies possessions, events
+moved more slowly. Rear Admiral Sicard, in command of the North
+Atlantic squadron based on Key West, was retired in March for physical
+disability and succeeded by William T. Sampson, who stepped up
+naturally from senior captain in the squadron and was already
+distinguished for executive ability and knowledge of ordnance. Sampson's
+first proposal was, in the event of hostilities, a bombardment of
+Havana, a plan approved by all his captains and showing a confidence
+inspired perhaps by coastal operations in the Civil War; but this
+was properly vetoed by the Department on the ground that no ships
+should be risked against shore defenses until they had struck at
+the enemy's naval force and secured control of the sea. An earlier
+memorandum from Secretary Long, outlining plans for a blockade
+of Cuba, had been based on suggestions from Rear Admiral (then
+Captain) Mahan,[1] and his strategic insight may have guided this
+decision. On April 22, Sampson, now acting rear admiral, placed
+his force off Havana and established a close blockade over 100
+miles on the northern coast.
+
+[Footnote 1: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 19.]
+
+The problem for American strategy was now Cervera's "fleet in
+being,"--inferior in force but a menace until destroyed or put out
+of action--which, as before stated, left the Cape Verde Islands
+on April 29, for a destination unknown. A bombardment of cities on
+the American coast or a raid on the North Atlantic trade routes
+was within the realm of possibilities. Difficulties of coaling
+and an inveterate tendency to leave the initiative to the enemy
+decided the Spanish against such a project. But its bare possibility
+set the whole east coast in a panic, which has been much ridiculed,
+but which arose naturally enough from a complete lack of instruction
+in naval matters and from lack of a sensible control of the press.
+The result was an unfortunate division of the fleet. A so-called
+Flying squadron under Commodore Schley, consisting of the _Brooklyn,
+Massachusetts, Texas,_ and 3 small cruisers, was held at Hampton
+Roads; whereas, if not thus employed, these ships might have blockaded
+the south side of Cuba from the beginning of the war. A northern
+patrol squadron, of vessels not of much use for this or any other
+purpose, was also organized to guard the coast from Hampton Roads
+north.
+
+On May 4, with Cervera still at large, Sampson lifted his guard of
+Havana--unwisely in the opinion of Mahan--and took his best ships,
+the _New York, Indiana, Iowa,_ and two monitors, to reconnoiter San
+Juan, Porto Rico, where it was thought the missing fleet might
+first appear. Just as he was bombarding San Juan, on the morning
+of May 12, the Navy Department received a cable from Martinique
+announcing Cervera's arrival there. Havana and Cienfuegos (on the
+south side of Cuba and connected with Havana by rail) were considered
+the only two ports where the Spanish fleet could be of value to
+the forces on the island; and from these two ports both American
+squadrons were at this time a thousand miles away. Schley hastened
+southward, left Key West on the 19th, and was off Cienfuegos by
+daylight on the 21st. It was fairly quick work; but had the Spanish
+fleet moved thither at its usual speed of 6 knots from its last
+stopping-place, it would have got there first by at least 12 hours.
+The Spanish admiral, finding no coal at Martinique, had left a
+crippled destroyer there and moved on to the Dutch island of Curacao,
+where on the 14th and 15th he secured with difficulty about 500
+tons of fuel. Thence, in all anxiety, he made straight for the
+nearest possible refuge, Santiago, where he put in at daybreak on
+the 19th and was soon receiving congratulations on the completion
+of a successful cruise.
+
+[Illustration: WEST INDIES
+
+Movements in the Santiago campaign.]
+
+By the next day Sampson, having hurried back from San Juan and
+coaled, was again in force off Havana. There he received news of
+Cervera's arrival in Santiago. Since Havana could not be uncovered,
+he sent instructions to Schley--at first discretionary, and then,
+as the reports were confirmed, more imperative--to blockade the
+eastern port. Though the commander of the Flying Squadron received
+the latter orders on the 23d, he had seen smoke in Cienfuegos harbor
+and still believed he had Cervera cornered there. Accordingly he
+delayed until evening of the next day. Then, after reaching Santiago,
+he cabled on the 27th that he was returning to Key West to coal,
+though he had a collier with him and stringent orders to the contrary;
+and it was not until the 29th that he actually established the
+Santiago Blockade. Sampson, his superior in command (though not
+his senior in the captains' list), later declared his conduct at
+this time "reprehensible"[1]--possibly too harsh a term, for the
+circumstances tried judgment and leadership in the extreme. Cervera
+found Santiago destitute of facilities for refitting. Yet the fact
+remains that he had 10 days in which to coal and get away. "We
+cannot," writes Admiral Mahan, "expect ever again to have an enemy
+so inept as Spain showed herself to be."[1*]
+
+[Footnote 1: Letter to Secretary, July 10, 1898, SAMPSON-SCHLEY
+DOCUMENTS, p. 136: "Had the commodore left his station at that
+time he probably would have been court-martialed, so plain was
+his duty.... This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from
+his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him
+ample justice on this occasion." A court of inquiry later decided
+that Commodore Schley's service up to June 1 was characterized
+by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise."]
+
+[Footnote 1*: LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, p. 157.]
+
+The "bottling up" of Cervera cleared the situation, and the navy
+could now concentrate on a task still difficult but well defined.
+Sampson brought his force to Santiago on June 1, and assumed immediate
+command. A close blockade was instituted such as against adequate
+torpedo and mine defenses would have been highly dangerous even
+at that day. Three picket launches were placed about a mile off
+shore, three small vessels a mile further out, and beyond these
+the 5 or 6 major units, under steam and headed toward the entrance
+in a carefully planned disposition to meet any attempt at escape.
+At night a battleship stood in and played its searchlight directly
+on the mouth of the channel. The latter was six miles in length,
+with difficult turns, and at the narrowest point only 300 feet
+wide. Lieut. Hobson's gallant effort on June 3 to sink the collier
+_Merrimac_ across the channel had made its navigation even more
+difficult, though the vessel did not lie athwart-stream. Mine barriers
+and batteries on the high hills at the harbor mouth prevented forcing
+the channel, but the guns were mostly of ancient type and failed to
+keep the ships at a distance. On the other hand, bombardments from
+the latter did little more than to afford useful target practice.
+
+The despatch of troops to Santiago was at once decided upon, and
+the subsequent campaign, if it could be fully studied, would afford
+interesting lessons in combined operations. On June 22, 16,000 men
+under General Shafter landed at Daiquiri, 15 miles east of Santiago,
+in 52 boats provided by the fleet, though the War Department had
+previously stated that the general would "land his own troops."[2]
+"It was done in a scramble," writes Col. Roosevelt; and there was
+great difficulty in getting the skippers of army transports to bring
+their vessels within reasonable distance of the shore. Since the sole
+object of the campaign was to get at and destroy the enemy fleet,
+the navy fully expected and understood that the army would make its
+first aim to advance along the coast and capture the batteries at
+the entrance, so that the mines could be lifted and the harbor
+forced. Army authorities declare this would have involved division
+of forces on both sides of the channel and impossibilities of
+transportation due to lack of roads. But these difficulties applied
+also in a measure to the defenders, and might perhaps have been
+surmounted by full use of naval aid.
+
+[Footnote 2: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 182.]
+
+Instead, the army set out with some confidence to capture the city
+itself. El Caney and San Juan Hill were seized on July 2 after
+a bloody struggle in which the Spanish stuck to their defenses
+heroically and inflicted 1600 casualties. By their own figures the
+Spanish on this day had only 1700 men engaged, though there were
+36,500 Spanish troops in the province and 12,000 near at hand. In
+considerable discouragement, Shafter now spoke of withdrawal, and
+urged Sampson "immediately to force the entrance"[1]--in spite of
+the fact that the main purpose in sending troops had been to avoid
+this very measure. In view of threatening foreign complications
+and the impossibility of replacing battleships, it was imperative
+not to risk them against mines.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, p. 190.]
+
+Food conditions were serious in Santiago, but Cervera was absolutely
+determined not to assume responsibility for taking his fleet out to
+what he regarded as certain slaughter. A night sortie, with ships
+issuing one by one out of an intricate channel into the glare of
+searchlights, he declared more difficult than one by day. Fortunately
+for the Americans, in view of the situation ashore, the decision was
+taken out of his hands, and Governor General Blanco from Havana
+peremptorily ordered him to put to sea. The time of his exit, Sunday
+morning, July 3, was luckily chosen, for Sampson, in the _New York_,
+was 10 miles to eastward on his way to a conference with Shafter,
+and the _Massachusetts_ was at Guantanamo for coal. The flagship
+_Maria Teresa_ led out at 9.35, followed 10 minutes later by the
+_Vizcaya_, and then by the _Colon, Oquendo_, and the destroyers
+_Furor_ and _Pluton_, each turning westward at top speed.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898]
+
+Simultaneously the big blockaders crowded toward them and opened a
+heavy fire, while stokers shoveled desperately below to get up steam.
+To the surprise of other vessels, Schley's ship, the _Brooklyn_,
+after heading towards the entrance, swung round, not with the enemy,
+but to starboard, just sliding past the _Texas'_ bow. This much
+discussed maneuver Schley afterward explained as made to avoid
+blanketing the fire of the rest of the squadron. The _Oregon_,
+which throughout the blockade had kept plenty of steam, "rushed
+past the _Iowa_," in the words of Captain Robley Evans, "like an
+express train," in a cloud of smoke lighted by vicious flashes from
+her guns. In ten minutes the _Maria Teresa_ turned for shore, hit
+by 30 projectiles, her decks, encumbered with woodwork, bursting
+into masses of flame. The concentration upon her at the beginning
+had shifted to the _Oquendo_ in the rear, which ran ashore with
+guns silenced 5 minutes after the leader.
+
+Shortly before 11, the _Vizcaya_, with a torpedo ready in one of
+her bow tubes, turned towards the _Brooklyn_, which had kept in
+the lead of the American ships. A shell hitting squarely in the
+_Vizcaya's_ bow caused a heavy explosion and she sheered away, the
+guns of the _Brooklyn, Oregon_, and _Iowa_ bearing on her as she
+ran towards the beach. The _Colon_, with a trial speed of 20 knots,
+and 6 miles ahead of the _Brooklyn_ and _Oregon_, appeared to
+stand a good chance of getting finally away. The _New York_, rushing
+back toward the battle, was still well astern. But the _Colon's_
+speed, which had averaged 13.7 knots, slackened as her fire-room
+force played out; and shortly after 1 p.m. she ran shoreward, opened
+her Kingston valves, and went down after surrender. She had been
+hit only 6 times.
+
+In the first stage of the fight the little yacht _Gloucester_,
+under Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, had dashed pluckily upon
+the two destroyers, which were also under fire from the secondary
+batteries of the big ships. The _Furor_ was sunk and the _Pluton_
+driven ashore.
+
+There is hardly a record in naval history of such complete destruction.
+Of 2300 Spaniards, 1800 were rescued as prisoners from the burning
+wrecks or from the Cuban guerillas on shore, 350 met their death,
+and the rest escaped towards Santiago. The American loss consisted
+of one man killed and one wounded on the _Brooklyn_. This ship,
+which owing to its leading position had been the chief enemy target,
+received 20 hits from shells or fragments, and the other vessels
+altogether about as many more. An examination of the half-sunken
+and fire-scarred Spanish hulks showed 42 hits out of 1300 rounds
+from the American main batteries, or 3.2 per cent, and 73 from
+secondary batteries. Probably these figures should be doubled to
+give the actual number, but even so they revealed the need of
+improvement in gunnery.
+
+Sampson was right when he stated earlier in the campaign that the
+destruction of the Spanish fleet would end the war. Santiago surrendered
+a fortnight later without further fighting. An expeditionary force
+under General Miles made an easy conquest of Puerto Rico. On August
+12, a protocol of peace was signed, by the terms of which the United
+States took over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (upon payment
+of 20 million dollars), and Cuba became independent under American
+protection. The war greatly strengthened the position of the United
+States in the Caribbean, and gave her new interests and responsibilities
+in the Pacific. In the possession of distant dependencies the nation
+found a new motive for increased naval protection and for more
+active concern in international affairs.
+
+2. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
+
+At the time when the United States acquired the Philippines, the
+Far East was a storm center of international disturbance. Russia,
+with the support of Germany and France, had, as already noted,
+combined to prevent Japan from fully exploiting her victory over
+China. The latter country, however, had every appearance of a melon
+ripe for cutting; and under guise of security for loans, indemnity
+for injuries, railroad and treaty-port concessions, and special
+spheres of influence, each European nation endeavored to mark out
+its prospective share. Russia, in return for protecting China against
+Japan, gained a short-cut for her Siberian Railway across Northern
+Manchuria, with rail and mining concessions in that province and
+prospects of getting hold of both Port Arthur and Kiao-chau. But,
+at an opportune moment for Germany, two German missionaries were
+murdered in 1897 by Chinese bandits. Germany at once seized Kiao-chau,
+and in March, 1898, extorted a 99-year lease of the port, with
+exclusive development privileges throughout the peninsula of Shantung.
+"The German Michael," as Kaiser Wilhelm said at a banquet on the
+departure of his fleet to the East, had "firmly planted his shield
+upon Chinese soil"; and "the gospel of His Majesty's hallowed person,"
+as Admiral Prince Heinrich asserted in reply, "was to be preached
+to every one who will hear it and also to those who do not wish
+to hear." "Our establishment on the coast of China," writes
+ex-Chancellor van Buelow, "was in direct and immediate connection
+with the progress of the fleet, and a first step into the field
+of world politics... giving us _a place in the sun_ in Eastern
+Asia."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: From London _Spectator_, Dec. 26, 1897, quoted in
+Morse, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, Vol. III,
+p. 108.]
+
+[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR]
+
+Thus forestalled at Kiao-chau, Russia at once pushed through a
+25-year lease of Port Arthur, and proceeded to strengthen it as
+a fortified port and naval base. England, though preoccupied with
+the Boer War, took Wei-hai-wai as a precautionary measure, "for as
+long a time as Port Arthur shall remain a possession of Russia."[1]
+France secured a new base in southern China on Kwang-chau Bay, and
+Italy tried likewise but failed. Aroused by the foreign menace,
+the feeling of the Chinese masses burst forth in the summer of 1900
+in the massacres and uprisings known as the Boxer Rebellion. In
+the combined expedition to relieve the legations at Peking Japanese
+troops displayed superior deftness, discipline, and endurance,
+and gained confidence in their ability to cope with the armies of
+European powers.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, III, 118.]
+
+In the period following, Germany in Shantung and Russia in Manchuria
+pursued steadily their policy of exploitation. Against it, the
+American Secretary of State John Hay advanced the policy of the
+_Open Door_, "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
+entity... and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and
+impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."[1] To this
+the powers gave merely lip-service, realizing that her fixed policy
+of isolation would restrain the United States from either diplomatic
+combinations or force. "The open hand," wrote Hay in discouragement,
+"will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinese as the
+raised club,"[2] nor was it so efficacious in dealing with other
+nations concerned. Japan, however, had strained every energy to
+build up her army and navy for a conflict that seemed inevitable,
+and was ready to back her opposition to European advances by force
+if need be. In 1902 she protected herself against a combination of
+foes by defensive alliance with England. She demanded that Russia
+take her troops out of Manchuria and recognize Japanese predominance
+in Korea. Russia hoped to forestall hostilities until she could
+further strengthen her army and fleet in the East, but when the
+transfer of ships reached the danger point, Japan declared war,
+February 8, 1904, and struck viciously that same night.
+
+[Footnote 1: NOTE TO THE EUROPEAN POWERS, July 3, 1900.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Thayer, LIFE OF HAY, II, 369.]
+
+As in the Spanish-American War, control of the sea was vital, since
+Japan must depend upon it to move her troops to the continental
+theater of war. Nor could she hold her army passive while awaiting
+the issue of a struggle for sea control. Delay would put a greater
+relative strain on her finances, and give Russia, handicapped by
+long communications over the single-track Siberian Railway, a better
+chance to mass in the East her troops and supplies. Japan's plan
+was therefore to strike hard for naval advantage, but to begin
+at once, in any event, the movement of troops overseas. At the
+outbreak of war her fleet of 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers,
+with light cruiser and destroyer flotillas, was assembled at Sasebo
+near the Straits of Tsushima, thoroughly organized for fighting
+and imbued with the spirit of war. Japan had an appreciable naval
+superiority, but was handicapped by the task of protecting her
+transports and by the necessity--which she felt keenly--of avoiding
+losses in battle which would leave her helpless upon the possible
+advent of Russia's Baltic reserves.
+
+Russia's main naval strength in the East consisted of 7 battleships
+and 3 armored cruisers, presenting a combined broadside of 100
+guns against Japan's 124. The support of the Black Sea fleet was
+denied by the attitude of England, which would prevent violation
+of the agreement restricting it from passing the Dardanelles. The
+Baltic fleet, however, was an important though distant reserve
+force, a detachment from which was actually in the Red Sea on its
+way east at the outbreak of war.
+
+Just as clearly as it was Japan's policy to force the fighting on
+land, so it should have been Russia's to prevent Japan's movement
+of troops by aggressive action at sea. This called for concentration
+of force and concentration of purpose. But neither was evident in
+the Russian plan of campaign, which betrayed confusion of thought
+and a traditional leaning toward the defensive--acceptance on the
+one hand of what has been called "fortress fleet" doctrine, that
+fleets exist to protect bases and can serve this purpose by being
+shut up in them; and on the other hand of exaggerated "fleet in
+being" theory, that the mere presence of the Russian fleet, though
+inactive, would prevent Japan's use of the sea. Thus in October,
+1903, Witjeft, chief of the Port Arthur naval staff, declared that
+a landing of Japanese troops either in the Liao-tung or the Korean
+Gulf was "impossible so long as our fleet is not destroyed." Just
+as Russia's total force was divided between east and west, so her
+eastern force was divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with
+the Japanese in central position between. Three armored cruisers
+were in the northern port, and 7 battleships in the other; and all
+Russia's efforts after war broke out were vainly directed toward
+remedying this faulty disposition before it began. The whole Russian
+fleet in the East, moreover, was, it is said, badly demoralized and
+unready for war, owing chiefly to bureaucratic corruption and to
+the fact that not merely its strategical direction but its actual
+command was vested in the Viceroy, Alexieff, with headquarters on
+shore.
+
+_Operations Around Port Arthur_
+
+On January 3, 1904, Japan presented practically an ultimatum; on
+February 6 broke off diplomatic relations; on February 8 declared
+war; and on the same night--just as the Czar was discussing with
+his council what should be done--she delivered her first blow. By
+extraordinary laxity, though the diplomatic rupture was known,
+the Port Arthur squadron remained in the outer anchorage, "with
+all lights burning, without torpedo nets out, and without any guard
+vessels."[1] Ten Japanese destroyers attacked at close quarters,
+fired 18 torpedoes, and put the battleship _Tsarevitch_ and two
+cruisers out of action for two months. It was only poor torpedo
+work, apparently, that saved the whole fleet from destruction. A
+Russian light cruiser left isolated at Chemulpa was destroyed the
+next day. The transportation of troops to Korea and Southern Manchuria
+was at once begun. Though not locked in by close blockade, and not
+seriously injured by the frequent Japanese raids, bombardments,
+and efforts to block the harbor entrance, the Port Arthur squadron
+made no move to interfere.
+
+[Footnote 1: Semenoff, RASPLATA, p. 45.]
+
+Both fleets suffered from mines. Vice Admiral Makaroff, Russia's
+foremost naval leader, who took command at Port Arthur in March,
+went down with the _Petropavlosk_ on April 13, when his ship struck
+a mine laid by the Japanese. On May 14, on the other hand, the
+Russian mine-layer _Amur_ slipped out in a fog, spread her mines
+in the usual path of Japanese vessels off the port, and thus on
+the same day sank two of their best ships, the _Hatsuse_ and
+_Yashima_. Mining, mine-sweeping, an uneventful Russian sortie
+an June 23, progress of Japanese land forces down the peninsula
+and close investment of Port Arthur--this was the course of events
+down to the final effort of the Russian squadron on August 10.
+
+[Illustration: HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR]
+
+By this time Japanese siege guns were actually reaching ships in
+the harbor. Action of any kind, especially if it involved some
+injury to the enemy navy, was better than staying to be shot to
+pieces from the shore. Yet Makaroff's successor, Witjeft, painfully
+and consciously unequal to his responsibilities, still opposed
+an exit, and left port only upon imperative orders from above.
+Scarcely was the fleet an hour outside when Togo appeared on the
+scene. The forces in the Battle of August 10 consisted of 6 Russian
+battleships and 4 cruisers, against 6 Japanese armored vessels and
+9 cruisers; the combined large-caliber broadsides of the armored
+ships being 73 to 52, and of the cruisers 55 to 21, in favor of
+Togo's squadron. In spite of this superiority in armament, and of
+fully a knot in speed, Togo hesitated to close to decisive range.
+Five hours or more of complicated maneuvering ensued, during which
+both squadrons kept at "long bowls," now passing each other, now
+defiling across van or rear, without marked advantage for either
+side.
+
+At last, at 5.40 p.m., the Japanese got in a lucky blow. Two 12-inch
+shells struck the flagship _Tsarevitch_, killing Admiral Witjeft,
+jamming the helm to starboard, and thus serving to throw the whole
+Russian line into confusion. Togo now closed to 3000 yards, but
+growing darkness enabled his quarry to escape. The battle in fact
+was less one-sided than the later engagement at Tsushima. On both
+sides the percentage of hits was low, about 1% for the Russians
+and 6 or 7% for their opponents. Togo's flagship _Mikasa_ was hit
+30 times and lost 125 men; the total Japanese loss was about half
+that of the enemy--236 to 478.
+
+Much might still have been gained, in view of the future coming of
+the Baltic fleet, had the Russians still persisted in pressing onward
+for Vladivostok; but owing to loss of their leader and ignorance of
+the general plan, they scattered. The cruiser _Novik_ was caught and
+sunk, another cruiser was interned at Shanghai, a third at Saigon,
+and the _Tsarevitch_ at Kiao-chau. The rest, including 5 of the 6
+battleships, fled back into the Port Arthur death-trap. Largely in
+order to complete their destruction, the Japanese sacrificed 60,000
+men in desperate assaults on the fortress, which surrendered January
+2, 1905. As at Santiago, the necessity of saving battleships, less
+easily replaced, led the Japanese to the cheaper expenditure of
+men.
+
+On news of the Port Arthur sortie, the Vladivostok squadron, which
+hitherto had made only a few more or less futile raids on Japanese
+shipping, advanced toward Tsushima Straits, and met there at dawn
+of August 14 a slightly superior force of 4 cruisers under Kamimura.
+The better shooting of the Japanese soon drove the slowest Russian
+ship, the _Rurik_, out of line; the other two, after a plucky fight,
+managed to get away, with hulls and funnels riddled by enemy shells.
+
+The complete annulment of Russia's eastern fleet in this first
+stage of hostilities had enabled Japan to profit fully by her easier
+communications to the scene of war. Its final destruction with the
+fall of Port Arthur gave assurance of victory. The decisive battle
+of Mukden was fought in March, 1905. Close to their bases, trained
+to the last degree, inspired by success, the Japanese navy could
+now face with confidence the approach of Russia's last fleet.
+
+_Rojdestvensky's Cruise_
+
+After a series of accidents and delays, the Baltic fleet under
+Admiral Rojdestvensky--8 battleships, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and
+numerous auxiliaries--left Libau Oct. 18, 1904, on its 18,000-mile
+cruise. Off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, the ships fired into
+English trawlers under the impression that they were enemy torpedo
+craft, and thus nearly stirred England to war. Off Tangier some of
+the lighter vessels separated to pass by way of Suez, and a third
+division from Russia followed a little later by the same route.
+Hamburg-American colliers helped Rojdestvensky solve his logistical
+problem on the long voyage round Africa, and German authorities
+stretched neutrality rules upon his arrival in Wahlfish Bay, for
+the engrossment of Russia in eastern adventures was cheerfully
+encouraged by the neighbor on her southern frontier. France also
+did her best to be of service to the fleet of her ally, though
+she had "paired off" with England to remain neutral in the war.
+
+With the reunion of the Russian divisions at Nossi Be, Madagascar,
+January 9, 1905, came news of the fall of Port Arthur. The home
+government now concluded to despatch the fag-ends of its navy,
+though Rojdestvensky would have preferred to push ahead without
+waiting for such "superfluous encumbrances" to join. Ships, as
+his staff officer Semenoff afterward wrote, were needed, but not
+"old flatirons and galoshes"; guns, but not "holes surrounded by
+iron."[1] After a tedious 10 weeks' delay in tropical waters, the
+fleet moved on to French Indo-China, where, after another month
+of waiting, the last division under Nebogatoff finally joined--a
+slow old battleship, 3 coast defense ironclads, and a cruiser.
+Upon these, Rojdestvensky's officers vented their vocabulary of
+invective, in which "war junk" and "auto-sinkers" were favorite
+terms.
+
+[Footnote 1: RASPLATA, p. 426.]
+
+Having already accomplished almost the impossible, the armada of
+50 units on May 14 set forth on the last stage of its extraordinary
+cruise. Of three possible routes to Vladivostok--through the Tsugaru
+Strait between Nippon and Yezo, through the Strait of La Perouse
+north of Yezo, or through the Straits of Tsushima--the first was
+ruled out as too difficult of navigation; the second, because it
+would involve coaling off the coast of Japan. Tsushima remained.
+To avoid torpedo attack, the Russian admiral planned to pass the
+straits by day, and fully expected battle. But the hope lingered
+in his mind that fog or heavy weather might enable him to pass
+unscathed. He had been informed that owing to traffic conditions
+on the Siberian railway, he could get nothing at Vladivostok in
+the way of supplies. Hence, as a compromise measure which weakened
+fighting efficiency, he took along 3 auxiliary steamers, a repair
+ship, 2 tugs, and 2 hospital ships, the rest of the train on May
+25 entering Shanghai; and he so filled the bunkers and piled even
+the decks with fuel, according to Nebogatoff's later testimony,
+that they went into action burdened with coal for 3,000 miles.[2]
+
+[Footnote 2: Mahan, NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 412.]
+
+[Illustration: ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCT. 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905]
+
+The main Russian fighting force entered the battle in three divisions
+of 4 ships each: (1) the _Suvaroff_ (flagship), _Alexander III,
+Borodino_ and _Orel_, each a new battleship of about 13,600 tons;
+(2) the _Ossliabya_, a slightly smaller battleship, and three
+armored cruisers; (3) Nebogatoff's division as given above, with the
+exception of the cruiser. Then there was a squadron of 4 smaller
+cruisers, 4 other cruisers as scouts, and 9 destroyers. The Japanese
+engaged in two main divisions of 6 ships each (4 battleships and
+8 armored cruisers), backed by four light cruiser divisions of 4
+ships each. The Russian line had the advantage in heavy ordnance,
+as will appear from the following table, but this was more than
+compensated for by the enemy's superiority in 8-inch guns and
+quick-firers, which covered the Russians with an overwhelming rain
+of shells. Of guns in broadside, the Japanese ships-of-the-line
+had 127 to 98; and the cruisers 89 to 43.
+
+--------------------------------------------------
+       |       |   MAIN BATTERIES    |   Q.F.
+       |       |---------------------|------------
+       | Ships | 12" | 10" | 9" | 8" |  6" | 4.7"
+-------|-------|-----|-----|----|----|-----|------
+Japan  |   12  | 16  |  1  |    | 30 | 160 |
+Russia |   12  | 26  | 15  |  4 |  3 |  90 |  20
+
+On the basis of these figures, and the 50% superiority of the Japanese
+in speed, the issue could hardly be in doubt. Admiral Togo, moreover,
+had commanded his fleet in peace and war for 8 years, and had veteran
+subordinates on whom he could depend to lead their divisions
+independently yet in coordination with the general plan. Constant
+training and target practice had brought his crews to a high degree
+of skill. The Japanese shells were also superior, with fuses that
+detonated their charges on the slightest contact with an explosive
+force like that of mines. Between the enemy and their base, the
+Japanese could wait quietly in home waters, while the Russian fleet
+was worn out by its eight months' cruise. At best, the latter was
+a heterogeneous assemblage of new ships hastily completed and old
+ships indifferently put in repair, which since Nebogatoff joined
+had had but one opportunity for maneuvers and had operated as a
+unit for only 13 days.
+
+On the night of May 26-27, as the Russian ships approached Tsushima
+through mist and darkness, half the officers and men were at their
+posts, while the rest slept beside the guns. Fragments of wireless
+messages--"Last night" ... "nothing" ... "eleven lights" ... "but
+not in line"--revealed enemy patrols in the waters beyond. Semenoff
+on the _Suvaroff_ describes vividly "the tall, somewhat bent figure
+of the Admiral on the side of the bridge, the wrinkled face of
+the man at the wheel stooping over the compass, the guns' crews
+chilled at their posts." In the brightly lighted engine-rooms,
+"life and movement was visible on all sides; men were nimbly running
+up and down ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and buzzing
+of voices; orders were being transmitted loudly; but, on looking
+more intently, the tension and anxiety--that same peculiar frame
+of mind so noticeable on deck--could also be observed."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, p. 28.]
+
+_The Battle of Tsushima_
+
+At dawn (4.45) the Japanese scout _Sinano Maru_, which for an hour
+or more had been following in the darkness, made them out clearly
+and communicated the intelligence at once to Togo in his base at
+Masampho Bay, on the Korean side of the straits, and to the cruiser
+divisions off the Tsushima Islands. This was apparently the first
+definite news that Togo had received for several days, and the fact
+suggests that his scouting arrangements were not above criticism,
+for it took fast steaming to get to the straits by noon. Cruiser
+divisions were soon circling towards the Russians through the mist
+and darting as swiftly away, first the 5th and 6th under Takeomi
+and Togo (son of the admiral), then the 3d under Dewa, all reporting
+the movements of the enemy fleet and shepherding it till the final
+action began. Troubled by their activity, Rojdestvensky made several
+shifts of formation, first placing his 1st and 2d divisions in
+one long column ahead of the 3d, then at 11.20 throwing the 1st
+division again to starboard, while the cruisers protected the
+auxiliaries which were steaming between the lines in the rear.
+
+This was the disposition when, shortly after one o'clock, the Japanese
+main divisions appeared to northward about 7 miles distant, steaming
+on a westerly course across the enemy's bows. Since morning Togo
+had covered a distance of 90 miles. From his signal yards fluttered
+the stirring message: "The fate of the empire depends upon to-day's
+battle. Let every man do his utmost." Ordering all his cruisers to
+circle to the Russian rear, and striking himself for their left
+flank, which at the moment was the weaker, Togo first turned southward
+as if to pass on opposite courses, and then at about two o'clock
+led his two divisions around to east-northeast, so as to "cross
+the T" upon the head of the enemy line.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905
+
+_Japanese_
+  I Division (Togo)        II Division (Kamimura)
+     Mikasa, B.S.              Idzumo
+     Shikishima, B.S.          Iwate
+     Asahi, B.S.               Adzumo
+     Fuji, B.S.                Asama
+     Nisshin, A.C.             Tokiwa
+     Kasuga                    Yakumo
+
+_Russians_
+  I Division               II Division
+     Suvaroff                  Ossliabya (flag)
+     Alexander III
+     Borodino             III Division
+     Orel]
+
+Just as Togo's flagship _Mikasa_ straightened on her new course,
+nearly north of the _Suvaroff_, and 6400 yards distant, the _Suvaroff_
+opened fire. It has been suggested that at this critical moment the
+Russian admiral should have closed with the enemy, or, leading
+his ships on a northwesterly course, laid his starboard broadsides
+on the knuckle formed by the Japanese turn. But the position of
+the enemy cruisers and destroyers, and worry over his transports,
+guided his movements. Moreover, he had not yet completed an awkwardly
+executed maneuver to get his ships back into single column with
+the 1st division ahead. The _Ossliabya_ and other ships of the
+2d division were thrown into confusion, and forced to slow down
+and even stop engines. Under these difficulties, the _Suvaroff_
+sheered more to eastward. As they completed their turn the Japanese
+secured a "capping" position and could concentrate on the leading
+ships of both the 1st and the 2d Russian divisions, 4 ships on
+the _Suvaroff_ and 7 on the _Ossliabya_. Under this terrible fire
+the _Ossliabya_ went down, the first modern battleship (in the
+narrow sense of the word) ever sunk by gunfire, and the _Suvaroff_
+a few moments later fell out of line, torn by shells, her forward
+funnel down, and steering gear jammed. "She was so battered," wrote
+a Japanese observer, "that scarcely any one would have taken her
+for a ship."
+
+With an advantage in speed of 15 knots to 9, the Japanese drew
+ahead. The _Alexander_, followed by other Russian ships in much
+confusion, about three o'clock made an effort to pass northward
+across the enemy rear, but they were countered by the Japanese first
+division turning west together and the 2d division in succession at
+3.10. The first and decisive phase of the action thus ended. Both
+fleets eventually resumed easterly and then southerly courses,
+for considerable periods completely lost to each other in smoke
+and haze.
+
+Plunging through heavy seas from the southwest, the Japanese cruisers
+had in the meantime punished the Russian rear less severely than
+might have been expected. Two transports went down in flames, two
+cruisers were badly damaged, and the high-sided ex-German liner
+_Ural_ was punctured with shells. On the other hand, Dewa's flagship
+_Kasagi_ was driven to port with a bad hole under water, and Toga's
+old ship _Naniwa Kan_ had to cease action for repairs. Hits and
+losses in fact were considerable in both the main and the cruiser
+divisions of the Japanese, their total casualties numbering 465.
+Late in the afternoon the Russian destroyer _Buiny_ came up to
+the wreck of the _Suvaroff_, and lurched alongside long enough for
+Rojdestvensky, wounded and almost unconscious, to be practically
+thrown on board. He was captured with the destroyer next day. In
+spite of her injuries, the _Suvaroff_ held off a swarm of cruisers
+and destroyers until at last torpedoed at 7.20 p. m.
+
+The Russian battleships had meanwhile described a large circle to
+southward, and at 5 p. m. were again steaming north, accompanied
+by some of their cruisers and train. Attacked once more between
+6 and 7 o'clock, and almost incapable of defense, the _Alexander
+III_ and _Borodino_ went down, making 4 ships lost out of the 5 new
+vessels that had formed the backbone of Rojdestvensky's forces. In
+the gathering darkness. Nebogatoff collected the survivors and
+staggered northward.
+
+Of slight value in the day engagement, 21 Japanese destroyers,
+with about 40 torpedo boats which had sheltered under Tsushima
+Island, now darted after the fleeing foe. In the fog and heavy
+weather they were almost as great a menace to each other as to
+the enemy. Russian ships without searchlights escaped harm. Of
+three or perhaps four Russian vessels struck, all but the _Navarin_
+stayed afloat until the next day. Admiral Custance estimates 8 hits,
+or 9% of the torpedoes fired. There were at least 6 collisions
+among the flotillas, and 4 boats destroyed.
+
+On the morning of the 28th the remains of the Russian fleet were
+scattered over the sea. Nebagatoff with 4 battleships and 2 cruisers
+surrendered at 10.30. Of the 37 ships all told that entered Tsushima
+Straits, only the following escaped: the cruisers _Oleg, Aurora_,
+and _Jemschug_ reached Manila on June 3; a tug and a supply ship
+entered Shanghai, and another transport with plenty of coal went
+clear to Madagascar; only the fast cruiser _Almaz_ and two
+destroyers made Vladivostok.
+
+Among the lessons to be drawn from Tsushima, one of the clearest is
+the weakening effect of divided purpose. With all honor to Admiral
+Rojdestvensky for his courage and persistence during his cruise,
+it is evident that at the end he allowed the supply problem to
+interfere with his preparations for battle, and that he fought
+"with one eye on Vladivostok." It is evident also that only by a
+long period of training and operating as a unit can a collection
+of ships and men be welded into an effective fighting force. Torpedo
+results throughout the war, whether due to faulty materials or
+unskilled employment, were not such as to increase the reliance upon
+this weapon. The gun retained its supremacy; and the demonstrated
+advantage conferred by speed and heavy armament in long range fighting
+was reflected in the "all-big-gun" _Dreadnought_ of 1906 and the
+battle cruisers of 1908.
+
+Immediately after the Russian navy had been swept out of existence,
+President Roosevelt offered to mediate, and received favorable replies
+from the warring nations. By the treaty signed at Portsmouth, New
+Hampshire, on September 5, 1905, Russia withdrew from Manchuria
+in favor of China, recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea
+(annexed by Japan in 1910), and surrendered to Japan her privileges
+in Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. In lieu of indemnity,
+Japan after a long deadlock was induced by pressure on the part
+of England and the United States to accept that portion of the
+island of Saghalien south of the parallel of 50 deg.. Thus the war
+thwarted Russia's policy of aggressive imperialism in the East,
+and established Japan firmly on the mainland at China's front door.
+At the same time, by the military debacle of Russia, it dangerously
+disturbed the balance of power in Europe, upon which the safety
+of that continent had long been made precariously to depend.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+_Spanish-American War_
+
+NOTES ON THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (a series of publications issued
+  by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department, 1900).
+SAMPSON-SCHLEY OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE U. S. SENATE, Gov't
+  Printing Office, 1899.
+THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN, H. W. Wilson, 1900.
+WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, W. A. M. Goode, 1899.
+A HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, R. H. Tetherington, 1900.
+
+_Russo-Japanese War_
+
+INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, 3 vols., H. B.
+  Morse, 1918.
+THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA (1906), RASPLATA (1910), Captain Vladimir
+  Semenoff.
+JAPANESE OFFICIAL HISTORY, translated in U. S. Naval Institute
+  Proceedings, July-August, September-October, 1914.
+THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, Admiral Reginald Custance, 1912.
+THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, Captain N. Klado, 1905.
+OFFICIAL BRITISH HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 3 vols., 1910.
+THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE, Debaters' Handbook Series,
+  N. Y., 1916 (with bibliography).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+THE WORLD WAR: THE FIRST YEAR (1914-1915)
+
+The Russo-Japanese war greatly weakened Russia's position in Europe,
+and left the Dual Alliance of France and Russia overweighted by the
+military strength of the Teutonic Empires, Germany and Austria,
+whether or not Italy should adhere to the Triple Alliance with
+these nations. To Great Britain, such a disturbance of the European
+balance was ever a matter of grave concern, and an abandonment
+of her policy of isolation was in this instance virtually forced
+upon her by Germany's rivalry in her own special sphere of commerce
+and sea power.
+
+The disturbing effect of Germany's naval growth during the two
+decades prior to 1914 affords in fact an excellent illustration
+of the influence of naval strength in peace as well as in war.
+Under Bismarck Germany had pushed vigorously though tardily into
+the colonial field, securing vast areas of rather doubtful value
+in East and West Africa, and the Bismarck Archipelago, Marshall
+Islands, and part of New Guinea in the Pacific. With the accession
+of William II in 1888 and the dropping of the pilot, Bismarck,
+two years later, she embarked definitely upon her quest for world
+power. The young Kaiser read eagerly Mahan's _Influence of Sea
+Power Upon History_ (1890), distributed it among the ships of his
+still embryonic navy, and fed his ambition on the doctrines of
+this epoch-making work.
+
+Naval development found further stimulus and justification in the
+rapid economic growth of Germany. In 1912 her industrial production
+attained a value of three billion dollars, as compared with slightly
+over four billion for England and seven billion for the United
+States. Since 1893 her merchant marine had tripled in size and
+taken second place to that of England with a total of over five
+million tons. During the same period she surpassed France and the
+United States in volume of foreign commerce, and in this respect
+also reached a position second to Great Britain, with a more rapid
+rate of increase. An emigration of 220,000 a year in the early
+eighties was cut down to 22,000 in 1900.[1] To assure markets for
+her manufactures, and continued growth in population and industry,
+Germany felt that she must strive to extend her political power.
+
+[Footnote 1: Figures from Priest, GERMANY SINCE 1840, p. 150 ff.]
+
+Though Germany's commercial expansion met slight opposition even
+in areas under British control, it undoubtedly justified measures
+of political and naval protection; and it was this motive that was
+advanced in the preface to the German Naval Bill of 1900, which
+declared that, "To protect her sea trade and colonies ... Germany
+must have a fleet so strong that a war, even with the greatest naval
+power, would involve such risks as to jeopardize the position of that
+power."[2] Furthermore, Germany's quest for colonies and points of
+vantage such as Kiao-chau, her scheme for a Berlin-Bagdad railroad
+with domination of the territories on the route, had parallel in
+the activities of other nations. Unfortunately, however, Germany's
+ambitions grew even more rapidly than her commerce, until her true
+aim appeared to be destruction of rivals and domination of the
+world.
+
+[Footnote 2: Hurd and Castle, GERMAN SEA POWER, Appendix II.]
+
+The seizure of Kiao-chau in 1897-98 coincided with the appointment
+of Admiral von Tirpitz as Imperial Minister of Marine. Under his
+administration, the Naval Bill of 1900, passed in a heat of anglophobia
+aroused by the Boer War, doubled the program of 1898, and contained
+ingenious provisions by which the Reichstag was bound to steady
+increases covering a long period of years, and by which the Navy
+Department was empowered to replace worthless old craft, after 20
+or 25 years' service, with new ships of the largest size. As the
+armament race grew keener, this act was amended in the direction
+of further increases, but its program was never cut down.
+
+International crises and realignments marked the growing tension of
+these years. In 1905 England extended for ten years her understanding
+with Japan. By the _Entente Cordiale_ with France in 1904 and a
+later settlement of outstanding difficulties with Russia, she also
+practically changed the Dual Alliance into a Triple Entente, though
+without positively binding herself to assistance in war. To the
+agreement of 1904 by which England and France assured each other
+a free hand in Egypt and Morocco, respectively, the Kaiser raised
+strenuous objections, and forced the resignation of the anglophile
+French Foreign Minister, Delcasse; but at the Algeciras Convention
+of 1906, assembled to settle the Morocco question, Germany and
+Austria stood virtually alone. Even the American delegates, sent
+by President Roosevelt at the Kaiser's invitation, voted generally
+with the Western Powers. When Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina
+in 1909, the Kaiser shook the mailed fist to better effect than at
+Algeciras, with the result that Russia had to accept this extension
+of Austro-German influence in the Balkan sphere. Still again two years
+later, when the German cruiser _Panther_ made moves to establish a
+base at Agadir on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Europe approached
+the verge of war; but Germany found the financial situation against
+her, backed down, and eventually took a strip of land on the Congo
+in liquidation of her Morocco claims.
+
+For all her resolute saber-rattling in these years, Germany found
+herself checkmated in almost every move. The Monroe Doctrine, for
+which the United States showed willingness to fight in the Venezuela
+affair of 1902, balked her schemes in the New World. In the Far
+East she faced Japan; in Africa, British sea power. A "_Drang nach
+Osten_," through the Balkans and Turkey toward Asia Minor, offered
+on the whole the best promise; and it was in this quarter that
+Austria's violent demands upon Serbia aroused Russia and precipitated
+the World War.
+
+Great Britain's foreign agreements, already noted, had as a primary
+aim the concentration of her fleet in home waters. Naval predominance
+in the Far East she turned over to Japan; in the western Atlantic,
+to the United States (at least by acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine
+and surrender of treaty rights to share in the construction of the
+Panama Canal); and in the Mediterranean, to France, though England
+still kept a strong cruiser force in this field. The old policy of
+showing the flag all over the world was abandoned, 160 old ships
+were sent to the scrap heap as unable "either to fight or to run
+away," and 88% of the fleet was concentrated at home, so quietly
+that it "was found out only by accident by Admiral Mahan."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Admiral Fisher, MEMORIES, p. 185.]
+
+These and other changes were carried out under the energetic regime
+of Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910. The British
+_Dreadnought_ of 1906, completed in 10 months, and the battle cruisers
+of 1908--_Indefatigable, Invincible_ and _Indomitable_--came as
+an unpleasant surprise to Germany, necessitating construction of
+similar types and enlargement of the Kiel Canal. Reforms in naval
+gunnery urged by Admiral Sir Percy Scott were taken up, and plans
+were made for new bases in the Humber, in the Forth at Rosyth, and
+in the Orkneys, necessitated by the shift of front from the Channel
+to the North Sea. But against the technical skill, painstaking
+organization, and definitely aggressive purpose of Germany, even more
+radical measures were needed to put the tradition-ridden British
+navy in readiness for war.
+
+Naval preparedness was vital, for the conflict was fundamentally,
+like the Napoleonic Wars, a struggle between land power predominant
+on the Continent and naval power supreme on the seas. As compared
+with France in the earlier struggle, Germany was more dependent
+on foreign commerce, and in a long war would feel more keenly the
+pressure of blockade. On the other hand, while the naval preponderance
+of England and her allies was probably greater than 100 years before,
+England had to throw larger armies into the field and more of her
+shipping into naval service, and found her commerce not augmented
+but cut down.
+
+Indeed, Germany was not without advantage in the naval war. As
+she fully expected, her direct sea trade was soon shut off, and
+her shipping was driven to cover or destroyed. But Germany was
+perhaps 80% self-supporting, was well supplied with minerals and
+munitions, and could count on trade through neutral states on her
+frontiers. Her shallow, well-protected North Sea coast-line gave
+her immunity from naval attack and opportunity to choose the moment
+in which to throw her utmost strength into a sortie. So long as her
+fleet remained intact, it controlled the Baltic by virtue of an
+interior line through the Kiel Canal, thus providing a strangle hold
+on Russia and free access to northern neutrals. Only by dangerous
+division of forces, or by leaving the road to England and the Atlantic
+open, could the British fleet enter the Baltic Sea. England it is
+true had a superior navy (perhaps less superior than was commonly
+thought), and a position of singular advantage between Germany and
+the overseas world. But for her the maintenance of naval superiority
+was absolutely essential. An effective interference with her sea
+communications would quickly put her out of the war.
+
+The importance (for Germany as well as for England) of preserving
+their main fighting fleets, may explain the wariness with which
+they were employed. Instead of risking them desperately, both sides
+turned to commerce warfare--the Western Powers resorting to blockade
+and the Germans to submarines. Each of these forms of warfare played
+a highly important part in the war, and the submarine campaign in
+particular, calling for new methods and new instruments, seems
+almost to have monopolized the naval genius and energies of the
+two groups of belligerents. It may be noted, however, that but
+for the cover given by the High Seas Fleet, the submarine campaign
+could hardly have been undertaken; and but for the Grand Fleet,
+it would have been unnecessary.
+
+The naval strength of the various belligerents in July, 1914, appears
+in the table on the following page.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: From table prepared by U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence,
+July 1, 1916.]
+
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
+               | Great |Ger-| U.S. |      |     |      |     |
+               |Britain|many|(1916)|France|Japan|Russia|Italy|Austria
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Dreadnoughts   |   20  | 13 |  12  |   4  |   2 |  ..  |   3 |   3
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Pre-dreadn'ts  |   40  | 20 |  21  |  18  |  13 |   7  |   8 |   6
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Battle Cruisers|    9  |  4 |  ..  |  ..  |   2 |  ..  |  .. |  ..
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Armored Cr's   |   34  |  9 |  10  |  20  |  13 |   6  |   9 |   2
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Cruisers       |   74  | 41 |  14  |   9  |  13 |   9  |   6 |   5
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Destroyers     |  167  |130 |  54  |  84  |  50 |  91  |  36 |  18
+---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
+Submarines     |   78  | 30 |  44  |  64  |  13 |  30  |  19 |   6
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Owing to new construction, these figures underwent rapid change.
+Thus England added 4 dreadnoughts (2 built for Turkey) in August,
+1914; the battle cruiser _Tiger_ in November; the dreadnought _Canada_
+and 5 _Queen Elizabeths_ in 1915; and 5 _Royal Sovereigns_ in
+1915-1916. In comparisons, full account is not always taken of
+the naval support of England's allies; it is true, however, that
+the necessity of protecting coasts, troop convoys, and commerce
+prevented her from throwing her full strength into the North Sea.
+Her capital ships were in two main divisions--the 1st or Grand
+Fleet in the Orkneys, and the 2d fleet, consisting at first of
+16 pre-dreadnoughts, in the Channel. Admiral Jellico[1] gives the
+strength of the Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, on
+August 4, 1914, as follows:
+
+[Footnote 1: THE GRAND FLEET, p. 31.]
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+       |       | Pre-  |        |        |          |     |
+       |Dread- |Dread- | Battle | Light  |Destroyers| Air-|Cruisers
+       |noughts|noughts|cruisers|cruisers|          |ships|
+-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-----|---------
+British|   20  |   8   |    4   |   12   |    42    |  .. |    9
+German |   13  |  16   |    3   |   15   |    88    |   1 |    2
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Of submarines, according to the same authority, England had 17 of
+the D and E classes fit for distant operations, and 37 fit only for
+coast defense, while Germany had 28 U boats, all but two or three
+of which were able to cruise overseas. The British admiral's account
+of the inferiority of the British navy in submarines, aircraft,
+mines, destroyers, director firing (installed in only 8 ships in
+1914), armor-piercing shells, and protection of bases, seems to
+justify the caution of British operations, but is a severe indictment
+of the manner in which money appropriated for the navy was used.
+
+To open a war with England by surprise naval attack was no doubt
+an element in German plans; but in 1914 this was negatived by the
+forewarning of events on the Continent, by Germany's persistent delusion
+that England would stay neutral, and by the timely mobilization of
+the British fleet. This had been announced the winter before as
+a practical exercise, was carried out according to schedule from
+July 16 to July 23 (the date of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia),
+and was then extended until July 29, at which date the Grand Fleet
+sailed for Scapa Flow.
+
+At midnight of August 4 the British ultimatum to Germany expired
+and hostilities began. During the same night the Grand Fleet swept
+the northern exit of the North Sea to prevent the escape of enemy
+raiders, only one of which, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, actually
+reached the Atlantic in this first stage of the war. On a similar
+sweep further south, the Harwich light cruiser and destroyer force
+under Commodore Tyrwhitt sank by gunfire the mine layer _Koenigin
+Luise_, which a trawler had reported "throwing things overboard";
+but the next morning, August 6, the cruiser _Amphion_, returning
+near the same position, was destroyed by two mines laid by her
+victim of the day before. On the same date five cables were cut
+leading from Germany overseas. From August 10 to 23 all British
+forces were busy covering the transit of the first troops sent to
+the Continent. Such, in brief summary, and omitting more distant
+activities for the present, were the opening naval events of the
+war.
+
+_The Heligoland Bight Action_
+
+On the morning of August 28 occurred a lively action in Heligoland
+Bight, which cost Germany 3 light cruisers and a destroyer, and
+seemed to promise further aggressive action off the German shores.
+The British plan called for a destroyer and light cruiser sweep
+southward to a point about 12 miles west of Heligoland, and thence
+westward, with submarines disposed off Heligoland as decoys, the
+object being to cut off German destroyers and patrols. Commodore
+Tyrwhitt's force which was to execute the raid consisted of the
+1st and 3rd flotillas of 16 destroyers each, led by the new light
+cruiser _Arethusa_, flagship (28.5 knots, two 6", six 4" guns),
+and the _Fearless_ (25-4 knots, ten 4" guns). These were to be
+supported about 50 miles to westward by two battle cruisers from
+the Humber. This supporting force was at the last moment joined
+by three battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty and 6 cruisers under
+Commodore Goodenough from the Grand Fleet; but news of the accession
+never reached Commodore Keyes of the British submarines, who was
+hence puzzled later by the appearance of Goodenough's cruisers
+on the scene.
+
+[Illustration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, AUG. 28, 1914]
+
+The Germans, it appears, had got wind of the enemy plan, and arranged
+a somewhat similar counter-stroke. As Commodore Tyrwhitt's flotillas
+swept southward, they engaged and chased 10 German destroyers straight
+down upon Heligoland. Here the _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_ were
+sharply engaged with two German light cruisers, the _Stettin_, and
+the _Frauenlob_ (ten 4.1" guns each), until actually in sight of
+the island. Both sides suffered, the _Frauenlob_ withdrawing to
+Wilhelmshaven with 50 casualties, and the _Arethusa_ having her
+speed cut down and nearly every gun put temporarily out of
+commission.
+
+Whipping around to westward, the flotillas caught the German destroyer
+_V 187_, which at 9.10, after an obstinate resistance, was reduced to
+a complete wreck enveloped in smoke and steam. As British destroyers
+picked up survivors, they were driven off by the _Stettin_; but two
+boats with British crews and German prisoners were rescued later by
+the British submarine _E 4_, which had been lurking nearby.
+
+Extraordinary confusion now developed from the fact that Commodore
+Keyes in his submarine flotilla leader _Lurcher_ sighted through
+the mist two of Goodenough's cruisers (which had chased a destroyer
+eastward), and reported them as enemies. The call was picked up
+by Goodenough himself, who brought his remaining four ships to
+Keyes' assistance; but when these appeared, Keyes thought that
+he had to deal with four enemies more! Tyrwhitt was also drawn
+backward by the alarm. Luckily the situation was cleared up without
+serious consequences.
+
+German cruisers, darting out of the Ems and the Jade, were now
+entering the fray. At 10.55 the _Fearless_ and the _Arethusa_ with
+their flotillas were attacked by the _Stralsund_, which under a
+heavy fire made off toward Heligoland. Then at 11.15 the _Stettin_
+engaged once more, and five minutes later the _Mainz_. Just as
+this last ship was being finished up by destroyer attack, and the
+_Stettin_ and two fresh cruisers, _Koeln_ and _Ariadne_, were
+rushing to her assistance, Beatty's five battle cruisers appeared
+to westward and rose swiftly out of the haze.
+
+Admiral Beatty's opportune dash into action at this time, from
+his position 40 miles away, was in response to an urgent call from
+Tyrwhitt at 11.15, coupled with the fact that, as the Admiral states
+in his report, "The flotillas had advanced only 2 miles since 8
+a.m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases." "Our high
+speed," the report continues, "made submarine attack difficult,
+and the smoothness of the sea made their detection fairly easy. I
+considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie
+except by a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in
+time, provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid."
+
+The _Stettin_ broke backward just in the nick of time. The _Koeln_
+flagship of the German commodore, was soon staggering off in a
+blaze, and was later sunk with her total complement of 380 officers
+and men. The _Ariadne_, steaming at high speed across the bows of
+the British flagship _Lion_, was put out of action by two well-placed
+salvos. At 1.10 the _Lion_ gave the general signal "Retire."
+
+[Illustration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, 12:30-1:40
+From 20 to 40 miles slightly S. of W. from Heligoland.]
+
+Though the German cruisers had fought hard and with remarkable
+accuracy of fire, their movements had been tardy and not well concerted.
+The British losses amounted altogether to only 33 killed and 40
+wounded; while the enemy lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners
+over 1000 men. Very satisfactory, from the British standpoint, was
+the effect of the victory upon their own and upon enemy morale.
+
+Encouragement of this kind was desirable, for German submarines
+and mines were already beginning to take their toll. Off the Forth
+on September 5, a single torpedo sank the light cruiser _Pathfinder_
+with nearly all hands. This loss was avenged when a week later the
+_E 9_, under Lieut. Commander Max Harton, struck down the German
+cruiser _Hela_ within 6 miles of Heligoland. But on September 22,
+at 6.30 a.m., a single old-type German craft, the _U 9_, dealt a
+staggering blow. With a total of 6 torpedoes Commander Weddigen sank
+first the _Aboukir_, and then in quick succession the _Hogue_
+and the _Cressy_, both dead in the water at the work of rescue.
+The loss of these rather antiquated vessels was less serious than
+that of over 1400 trained officers and men. A shock to British
+traditions came with the new order that ships must abandon injured
+consorts and make all speed away.
+
+In the bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, which at the outbreak of
+war were totally unprotected against submarines and thought to
+be beyond their reach, the Grand Fleet felt less secure than when
+cruising on the open sea. Safer refuges were sought temporarily
+on the west coast of Scotland and at Lough Swilly in the north
+of Ireland, but even off this latter base on October 27, the big
+dreadnought _Audacious_ was sunk by mines laid by the German auxiliary
+cruiser _Berlin_. In view of the impending Turkish crisis, the loss
+was not admitted by the Admiralty, though since pictures of the
+sinking ship had actually been taken by passengers on the White
+Star liner _Olympic_, it could not long remain concealed. Mines and
+submarines had seemingly put the British navy on the defensive,
+even if consolation could be drawn from the fact that troops and
+supplies were crossing safely to France, the enemy had been held
+up at the Marne, the German surface fleet was passive, and the
+blockade was closing down.
+
+_Escape of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau"_
+
+In distant waters Germany at the outbreak of the war had only ten
+cruisers--_Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Nuernberg_, and _Leipzig_
+in the Pacific, _Koenigsberg_ on the east coast of Africa,
+_Karlsruhe_ and _Dresden_ in the West Indies, and _Goeben_
+and _Breslau_ in the Mediterranean. Within six months' time,
+these, together with a few auxiliary cruisers fitted out abroad,
+were either destroyed or forced to intern in neutral ports. Modern
+wireless communication, difficulties of coaling and supply, and
+the overwhelming naval strength of the Allies made the task of
+surface raiders far more difficult than in previous wars. They
+were nevertheless skillfully handled, and, operating in the wide
+ocean areas, created a troublesome problem for the Western Powers.
+
+The battle cruiser _Goeben_ and the light cruiser _Breslau_
+alone, operating under Admiral Souchon in Mediterranean waters,
+accomplished ultimate results which would have easily justified
+the sacrifice of ten times the number of ships lost by Germany in
+distant seas. To hunt down these two vessels, and at the same time
+contain the Austrian Navy, the Entente had in the Mediterranean
+not only the bulk of the French fleet but also 3 battle cruisers, 4
+armored cruisers, and 4 light cruisers of Great Britain. Early on
+August 4, as he was about to bombard the French bases of Bona and
+Philippeville in Algiers, Admiral Souchon received wireless orders
+to make for the Dardanelles. Germany and England were then on the
+very verge of war. Knowing the British ships to be concentrated near
+Malta, and actually passing the _Indomitable_ and the _Invincible_ in
+sullen silence as he turned eastward, the German commander decided
+to put in at Messina, Sicily.
+
+At the end of the 24 hours granted in this port, the prospects
+for the German ships appeared so desperate that the officers, it
+is said, made their final testaments before again putting to sea.
+Slipping eastward through the Straits of Messina at twilight of
+the 6th, they were sighted by the British scout _Gloucester_, which
+stuck close at their heels all that night and until 4.40 p.m. the
+next day. Then, under orders to turn back, and after boldly engaging
+the _Breslau_ to check the flight, Captain Kelly of the _Gloucester_
+gave up the pursuit as the enemy rounded the Morea and entered
+the Greek Archipelago.
+
+The escape thus apparently so easy was the outcome of lack of
+coordination between French and British, slow and poor information
+from the British Admiralty, and questionable disposition of the
+British forces on the basis of information actually at hand. Prior
+to hostilities, it was perhaps unavoidable that the British commander,
+Admiral Milne, should be ignorant of French plans; but even on August
+5 and 6 he still kept all his battle cruisers west and north of
+Sicily to protect the French troop transports, though by this time
+he might have felt assured that the French fleet was at sea. At
+the time of the escape Admiral Troubridge with 4 armored cruisers
+and a destroyer force barred the Adriatic; though he caught the
+_Gloucester's_ calls, he was justified in not moving far from his
+station without orders, in view of his inferior strength and speed.
+Not until August 10 did British forces enter the AEgean; and at
+5 p.m. that day the two German ships steamed uninvited up the
+Dardanelles. Since the Turkish situation was still somewhat dubious,
+Admiral Souchon had been ordered to delay his entrance; but on
+the 10th, hearing British wireless signals steadily approaching
+his position in the Greek islands, he took the decision into his
+own hands. Germany had "captured Turkey," as an Allied diplomat
+remarked upon seeing the ships in the Golden Horn.
+
+In this affair the British, it is true, had many preoccupations--the
+hostile Austrian fleet, the doubtful neutrality of Italy, the French
+troop movement; the safety of Egypt and Suez. Yet the Admiralty were
+well aware that the German Ambassador von Wangenheim was dominant
+in Turkish councils and that the Turkish army was mobilized under
+German officers. It seems strange, therefore, that an escape into
+Constantinople was, in the words of the British Official History,
+"the only one that had not entered into our calculations." The whole
+affair illustrates the immense value political information may have
+in guiding naval strategy. The German ships, though ostensibly
+"sold" to the Turks, retained their German personnel. Admiral Souchon
+assumed command of the Turkish Navy, and by an attack on Russian
+ships in the Black Sea later succeeded in precipitating Turkey's
+entrance into the war, with its long train of evil consequences
+for the Western Powers.
+
+_Coronel and the Falkland Islands_
+
+In the Pacific the German cruisers were at first widely scattered,
+the _Emden_ at Kiao-chau, the _Leipzig_ on the west coast of
+Mexico, the _Nuernberg_ at San Francisco, and the armored cruisers
+_Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ under Admiral von Spee in the Caroline
+Islands. The two ships at the latter point, after being joined by
+the _Nuernberg_, set out on a leisurely cruise for South America,
+where, in view of Japan's entry into the war, the German Admiral may
+have felt that he would secure a clearer field of operations and,
+with the aid of German-Americans, better facilities for supplies.
+After wrecking on their way the British wireless and cable station at
+Fanning Island, and looking into Samoa for stray British cruisers,
+the trio of ships were joined at Easter Island on October 14 by the
+_Leipzig_ and also by the _Dresden_, which had fled thither from the
+West Indies.
+
+The concentration thus resulting seems of doubtful wisdom, for,
+scattered over the trade routes, the cruisers would have brought
+about greater enemy dispersion and greater injury to commerce; and,
+as the later course of the war was to show, the loss of merchant
+tonnage was even more serious for the Entente than loss of fighting
+ships. It seems evident, however, that Admiral van Spee was not
+attracted by the tame task of commerce destroying, but wished to
+try his gunnery, highly developed in the calm waters of the Far
+East, against enemy men-of-war.
+
+In its present strength and position, the German "fleet in being"
+constituted a serious menace, for to assemble an adequate force
+against it on either side of Cape Horn would mean to leave the
+other side dangerously exposed. It was with a keen realization of
+this dilemma that Admiral Cradock in the British armored cruiser
+_Good Hope_ left the Falklands on October 22 to join the _Monmouth,
+Glasgow_, and auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_ in a sweep along the west
+coast. The old battleship _Canopus_, with 12-inch guns, but only 12
+knots cruising speed, was properly judged too slow to keep with the
+squadron. It is difficult to say whether the failure to send Cradock
+reenforcements at this time from either the Atlantic or the Pacific
+was justified by the preoccupations in those fields. Needless to
+say, there was no hesitation, _after_ Coronel, in hurrying ships to
+the scene. On November 1, when the Admiralty Board was reorganized
+with Admiral Fisher in his old place as First Sea Lord, orders
+at once went out sending the _Defense_ to Cradock and enjoining
+him not to fight without the _Canopus_. But these orders he never
+received.
+
+The composition of the two squadrons now approaching each other
+off the Chilean coast was as follows:
+
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+   Name      |      Type       |Displace-| Belt |       Guns         |Speed
+             |                 |  ment   |armor |                    |
+-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
+Scharnhorst  |Armored cruiser  |  11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6"        | 23.5
+Gneisenau    |Armored cruiser  |  11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6"        | 23.5
+Leipzig      |Protected cruiser|   3,250 |none  |10-4"               | 23
+Nuernberg     |Light cruiser    |   3,450 |none  |10-4"               | 24
+Dresden      |Light cruiser    |   3,600 |none  |10-4"               | 24
+-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
+Good Hope    |Armored cruiser  |  14,000 |6-inch|2-9.2", 16-6", 14-3"| 24
+Monmouth     |Armored cruiser  |   9,800 |4-inch|14-6", 8-3"         | 24
+Glasgow      |Light cruiser    |   4,800 |none  |2-6", 10-4"         | 26.5
+-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
+Canopus      |                 |         |      |                    |
+(not engaged)|Coast defense    |  12,950 |6-inch|4-35 cal. 12", 12-6"| 16.5
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Without the _Canopus_, the British had perhaps a slight advantage
+in squadron speed, but only the two 9.2-inch guns of the _Good
+Hope_ could match the sixteen 8.2-inch guns of the Germans. Each
+side had information of the other's strength; but on the afternoon
+of November 1, the date of the Battle of Coronel, each supposed
+that only one enemy cruiser was in the immediate vicinity. Hence
+there was mutual surprise when the two squadrons, spread widely
+on opposite courses, came in contact at 4.40 p. m.
+
+While concentrating and forming his squadron, Admiral Cradock must
+have pondered whether he should fight or retreat. The _Canopus_ he
+knew was laboring northward 250 miles away. It was highly doubtful
+whether he could bring the enemy into action later with his slow
+battleship in line. His orders were to "search and protect trade."
+"Safety," we are told, "was a word he hardly knew." But his best
+justification lay in the enemy's menace to commerce and in the
+comment of Nelson upon a similar situation, "By the time the enemy
+has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no more harm that year."
+It was perhaps with this thought that Admiral Cradock signaled to
+the _Canopus_, "I am going to fight the enemy now."
+
+At about 6 p.m. the two columns were 18,000 yards distant on southerly
+converging courses. The British, to westward and slightly ahead, tried
+to force the action before sunset, when they would be silhouetted
+against the afterglow. Their speed at this time, however, seems
+to have been held up by the auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_, which
+later retreated southwestward, and their efforts to close were
+thwarted by the enemy's turning slightly away. Admiral von Spee
+in fact secured every advantage of position, between the British
+and the neutral coast, on the side away from the sun, and on such
+a course that the heavy seas from east of south struck the British
+ships on their engaged bows, showering the batteries with spray
+and rendering useless the lower deck guns.
+
+At 7 o'clock the German ships opened fire at 11,260 yards. The
+third salvo from the _Scharnhorst_ disabled the _Good Hope's_
+forward 9.2-inch gun. The _Monmouth's_ forecastle was soon on fire.
+It seems probable indeed that most of the injury to the British was
+inflicted by accurate shooting in this first stage of the action.
+On account of the gathering darkness, Admiral von Spee allowed the
+range to be closed to about 5500 yards, guiding his aim at first
+by the blaze on the Monmouth, and then for a time ceasing fire.
+Shortly before 8 o'clock a huge column of flame shooting up between
+the stacks of the _Good Hope_ marked her end. The _Monmouth_
+sheered away to westward and then northward with a heavy list that
+prevented the use of her port guns. An hour later, at 9.25, with
+her flag still flying defiantly, she was sunk by the _Nuernberg_
+at point blank range. The _Glasgow_, which had fought throughout
+the action, but had suffered little from the fire of the German
+light cruisers, escaped in the darkness.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOV. 1, 1914
+
+From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.]
+
+"It is difficult," writes an American officer, "to find fault with
+the tactics of Admiral van Spee; he appears to have maneuvered so
+as to secure the advantage of light, wind, and sea, and to have
+suited himself as regards the range."[1] The _Scharnhorst_ was hit
+twice, the _Gneisenau_ four times, and the German casualties
+were only two men wounded.
+
+[Footnote 1: Commander C. C. Gill, NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, p. 51.]
+
+[Illustration: ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS]
+
+This stinging blow and the resultant danger aroused the new Board
+of Admiralty to energetic moves. Entering the Atlantic, the German
+squadron might scatter upon the trade routes or support the rebellion
+in South Africa. Again, it might double westward or northward in the
+Pacific, or pass in groups of three, as permitted by American rules,
+through the Panama Canal into the West Indies. Concerted measures
+were taken against these possibilities. Despite the weakening of the
+Grand Fleet, the battle cruisers _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_
+under Admiral Sturdee, former Chief of Admiralty Staff, sailed on
+November 11 for the Falkland Islands. Their destination was kept
+a close secret, for had the slightest inkling of their mission
+reached German ears it would at once have been communicated to von
+Spee.
+
+After the battle, the German admiral moved slowly southward, coaling
+from chartered vessels and prizes; and it was not until December
+1 that he rounded the Horn. Even now, had he moved directly upon
+the Falklands, he would have encountered only the _Canopus_, but he
+again delayed several days to take coal from a prize. On December
+7 the British battle cruisers and other ships picked up in passage
+arrived at the island base and at once began to coal.
+
+Their coming was not a moment too soon. At 7.30 the next morning,
+while coaling was still in progress and fires were drawn in the
+_Bristol_, the signal station on the neck of land south of the harbor
+reported two strange vessels, which proved to be the _Gneisenau_ and
+the _Nuernberg_, approaching from the southward. As they eased down
+to demolish the wireless station, the _Canopus_ opened on them at
+about 11,000 yards by indirect fire. The two ships swerved off,
+and at 9.40, perceiving the dense clouds of smoke over the harbor
+and what appeared to be tripod masts, they fell back on their main
+force.
+
+Hull down, and with about 15 miles' start, the Germans, had they
+scattered at this time might, most of them at least, have escaped,
+as they certainly would have if their approach had been made more
+cautiously and at a later period in the day. The British ships
+were now out, with the fast _Glasgow_ well in the lead. In the
+chase that followed, Admiral van Spee checked speed somewhat to
+keep his squadron together. Though Admiral Sturdee for a time did
+the same, he was able at 12.50 to open on the rear ship _Leipzig_
+at 16,000 yards. At 1.20 the German light cruisers scattered to
+southwestward, followed by the _Cornwall, Kent_, and _Glasgow_.
+The 26-knot _Bristol_, had she been able to work up steam in time,
+would have been invaluable in this pursuit; she was sent instead
+to destroy three enemy colliers or transports reported off the
+islands.
+
+Between the larger ships the action continued at long range, for
+the superior speed of the battle cruisers enabled Admiral Sturdee
+to choose his distance, and his proper concern was to demolish the
+enemy with his own ships unscathed. At 2.05 he turned 8 points
+to starboard to clear the smoke blown down from the northwest and
+reduce the range, which had increased to 16,000 yards. Admiral
+von Spee also turned southward, and the stern chase was renewed
+without firing until 2.45. At this point both sides turned to port,
+the Germans now slightly in the rear and working in to 12,500 yards
+to use their 5.9-inch guns.
+
+At 3.15 the British came completely about to avoid the smoke, and
+the Germans also turned, a little later, as if to cross their bows.
+(See diagram.) The _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, though fighting
+gamely, were now beaten ships, the latter with upper works a "shambles
+of torn and twisted iron," and holes in her sides through which could
+be seen the red glow of flames. She turned on her beam-ends at 4.17
+and sank with every man an board. At 6 o'clock, after a fight of
+extraordinary persistence, the _Gneisenau_ opened her sea-cocks and
+went down. All her 8-inch ammunition had been expended, and 600 of
+her 850 men were disabled or killed. Some 200 were saved.
+
+Against ships with 12-inch guns and four times their weight of
+broadside the _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ made a creditable
+record of over 20 hits. The British, however, suffered no casualties
+or material injury. While Admiral Sturdee's tactics are thus justified,
+the prolongation of the battle left him no time to join in the light
+cruiser chase, and even opened the possibility, in the rain squalls
+of the late afternoon, that one of the armored cruisers might get
+away. In spite of a calm sea and excellent visibility during most
+of the action, the gunnery of the battle cruisers appears to have
+been less accurate at long range than in the later engagement off
+the Dogger Bank.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, DEC. 8, 1914
+
+From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.
+
+                   _British Squadron_
+  _Name          Type               Guns         Speed_
+Invincible   Battle Cruiser     8--12", 16--4"    26.5
+Inflexible   Battle Cruiser     8--12", 16--4"    26.5
+Carnarvon    Armored Cruiser    4--7.5", 6--6"    23.0
+Cornwall     Armored Cruiser   14--6"             23.5
+Kent         Armored Cruiser   14--6"             23.0
+Bristol      Scout Cruiser      2--6", 10--4"     26.5
+Glasgow      Scout Cruiser      2--6", 10--4"     26.5
+Canopus      Coast Defense      4--12", 12--6"    16.5
+
+                   _German Squadron_
+Scharnhorst  Armored Cruiser    8--8.2", 6--6"    23.5
+Gneisenau    Armored Cruiser    8--8.2", 6--6"    23.5
+Leipzig      Protected Cruiser  10--4"            23.0
+Nuernberg     Scout Cruiser      10--4"            24.0
+Dresden      Scout Cruiser      10--4"            24.0]
+
+Following similar tactics, the _Glasgow_ and _Cornwall_ overtook
+and finally silenced the _Leipzig_ at 7 p.m., four hours after
+the _Glasgow_ had first opened fire. Defiant to the last, like
+the _Monmouth_ at Coronel, and with her ammunition gone, she sank
+at 9.25, carrying down all but 18 of her officers and crew. The
+_Kent_, stoking all her woodwork to increase steam, attained at
+5 o'clock a position 12,000 yards from the _Nuernberg_, when the
+latter opened fire. At this late hour a long range action was out
+of the question. As the _Nuernberg_ slowed down with two of her
+boilers burst, the _Kent_ closed to 3000 yards and at 7.30 finished
+off her smaller opponent. The _Dresden_, making well above her
+schedule speed of 24 knots, had disappeared to southwestward early
+in the afternoon. Her escape entailed a long search, until, on
+March 14, 1915, she was destroyed by the _Kent_ and _Glasgow_
+off Juan Fernandez, where she had taken refuge for repairs.
+
+_Cruise of the "Emden"_
+
+Among the German cruisers other than those of Admiral van Spee's
+squadron, the exploits of the _Emden_ are best known, and reminiscent
+of the _Alabama's_ famous cruise in the American Civil War. It
+may be noted, however, as indicative of changed conditions, that
+the _Emden's_ depredations covered only two months instead of two
+years. A 3600 ton ship with a speed of 25 knots, the _Emden_ left
+Kiao-chau on August 6, met von Spee's cruisers in the Ladrones
+on the 12th, and on September 10 appeared most unexpectedly on
+the west side of the Bay of Bengal. Here she sank five British
+merchantmen, all following the customary route with lights aglow.
+On the 18th she was off the Rangoon River, and 6 days later across
+the bay at Madras, where she set ablaze two tanks of the Burma Oil
+Company with half a million gallons of kerosene. From September 26
+to 29 she was at the junction of trade routes west of Ceylon, and
+again, after an overhaul in the Chagos Archipelago to southward,
+spent October 16-19 in the same profitable field. Like most raiders,
+she planned to operate in one locality not more than three or four
+days, and then, avoiding all vessels on her course, strike suddenly
+elsewhere. During this period, British, Japanese, French, and Russian
+cruisers--the Germans assert there were 19 at one time--followed
+her trail.
+
+The most daring adventure of Captain von Mueller, the _Emden's_
+skipper, was now carried out in the harbor of Penang, on the west
+side of the Malay Peninsula. With an additional false funnel to
+imitate British county-class cruisers, the _Emden_ at daybreak
+of October 28 passed the picket-boat off the harbor unchallenged,
+destroyed the Russian cruiser _Jemtchug_ by gunfire and two torpedoes,
+and, after sinking the French destroyer _Mousquet_ outside, got
+safely away. The Russian commander was afterward condemned for
+letting his ship lie at anchor with open lights, with only an anchor
+watch, and with strangers at liberty to visit her.
+
+Steaming southward, the raider made her next and last appearance
+on the morning of November 9 off the British cable and wireless
+station on the Cocos Islands. As she approached, word was promptly
+cabled to London, Adelaide, and Singapore, and--more profitably--was
+wirelessed to an Australian troop convoy then only 45 miles away. The
+_Emden_ caught the message, but nevertheless sent a party ashore,
+and was standing outside when the armored cruiser _Sydney_ came
+charging up. Against the _Emden's_ ten 4.1-inch guns, the _Sydney_
+had eight 6-inch guns, and she was at least 4 knots faster. Outranged
+and outdone in speed, the German ship was soon driven ashore in a
+sinking condition, with a funnel down and steering gear disabled.
+During her two months' activity thus ended, the _Emden_ had made
+21 captures, destroying ships and cargoes to the value of over
+$10,000,000.
+
+The other German cruisers were also short-lived. The _Karlsruehe_,
+after arming the liner _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ off the Bahamas (August
+6) and narrowly escaping the _Suffolk_ and the _Bristol_ by
+superior speed, operated with great success on the South American
+trade routes. Her disappearance--long a mystery to the Allies--was
+due to an internal explosion, just as she was about to crown her
+exploits by a raid on the island of Barbados. The _Koenigsberg_,
+on the east coast of Africa, surprised and sank the British light
+cruiser _Pegasus_ while the latter lay at Mombasa, Zanzibar, making
+repairs. She was later bottled up in the Rufigi River (October
+30) and finally destroyed there (July 11, 1915) by indirect fire
+from monitors, "spotted" by airplanes.
+
+[Illustration: THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPT. 1-NOV. 9, 1914]
+
+Of the auxiliary cruisers, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_ was
+sunk by the _Highflyer_ (August 26), and the _Cap Trafalgar_
+went down after a hard fight with the _Carmania_ (September 14).
+The _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_, which had entered the Atlantic with
+von Spee, interned at Newport News, Virginia, in March, 1915, and
+was followed thither a month later by the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_.
+
+The results of this surface warfare upon commerce amounted to 69
+merchant vessels, totaling 280,000 tons. With more strict concentration
+upon commerce destruction, and further preparations for using German
+liners as auxiliaries, the campaign might have been prolonged and made
+somewhat more effective. But for the same purpose the superiority
+of the submarine was soon demonstrated. To take the later surface
+raiders: the _Wolf_ sank or captured 20 ships in 15 months at sea;
+the _Seeadler_, 23 in 7 months; the _Moewe_ 15 in 2 months. But
+many a submarine in one month made a better record than these.
+The opening of Germany's submarine campaign, to be treated later,
+was formally announced by her blockade proclamation of February
+4, 1915.
+
+_The Dogger Bank Action_
+
+The strategic value of the battle cruiser, as a means of throwing
+strength quickly into distant fields, was brought out in the campaign
+against von Spee. As an outcome of German raids on the east coast of
+England, its tactical qualities, against units of equal strength,
+were soon put to a sharper trial. Aside from mere _Schrecklichkeit_--a
+desire to carry the terrors of war to English soil--these raids had
+the legitimate military objects of helping distant cruisers by
+holding British ships in home waters, of delaying troop movements
+to France, and of creating a popular clamor that might force a
+dislocation or division of the Grand Fleet. The first incursion,
+on November 3, inflicted trifling damage; the second, on December
+16, was marked by the bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and
+Whitby, in which 99 civilians were killed and 500 wounded. The
+third, on January 24 following, brought on the Dogger Bank action,
+the first encounter between battle cruisers, and one of the two
+capital ship actions of the war.
+
+At dawn on this date, the _Derfflinger, Seydlitz_ (flagship of
+Admiral von Hipper), _Moltke_, and armored cruiser _Bluecher_,
+with 4 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas, were moving
+westward about midway in the North Sea on a line between Heligoland
+and the scene of their former raids. Five battle cruisers under
+Admiral Beatty were at the same time approaching a rendezvous with
+the Harwich Force for one of their periodical sweeps in the southern
+area. The Harwich Force first came in contact with the enemy about
+7 a.m. Fortunately for the Germans, they had already been warned
+of Beatty's approach by one of their light cruisers, and had just
+turned back at high speed when the British battle cruisers made
+them out to southeastward 14 miles away. The forces opposed were
+as follows:
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+           | Dis- |     |       | Best |           |Dis-  |     |       | Best
+British    |place-|Armor|  Guns |recent|German     |place-|Armor| Guns  |recent
+           | ment |     |       |speed*|           |ment  |     |       |speed
+-----------|------|-----|-------|------|-----------|------|-----|-------|------
+Lion       |26,350|  9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Derfflinger|26,180| 13" | 8 12" | 30
+Tiger      |28,500|  9" |8 13.5"| 32   |Seydlitz   |24,610| 11" |10 11" | 29
+Princess   |28,350|  9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Moltke     |22,640| 11" |10 11" | 28.4
+  Royal    |      |     |       |      |           |      |     |       |
+New Zealand|18,800|  8" |8 12"  | 29   |Bluecher    |15,550|  6" |12 8.2"| 25.3
+Indomitable|17,250|  7" |8 12"  | 28.7 |           |      |     |       |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+[Footnote *: Jane's FIGHTING SHIPS, 1914.]
+
+[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA]
+
+Settling at once to a stern chase, the British ships increased
+speed to 28.5 knots; while the Germans, handicapped by the slower
+_Bluecher_, were held down to 25. At 8.52 the _Lion_ was within
+20,000 yards of the _Bluecher_, and, after deliberate ranging shots,
+scored her first hit at 9.09. As the range further decreased, the
+_Tiger_ opened on the rear ship, and the _Lion_ shifted to the
+third in line at 18,000 yards. The enemy returned the fire at
+9.14. Thus the action continued, both squadrons in lines of
+bearing, and Beatty's ships engaged as a rule with their opposites
+in the enemy order.
+
+[Illustration: DOGGER BANK ACTION, JAN. 24, 1915]
+
+At 9.45 the German armored cruiser had suffered severely, and ships
+ahead also showed the effects of the heavier enemy fire. Under
+cover of a thick smoke screen from destroyers on their starboard
+bow, and a subsequent destroyer attack, the Germans now shifted
+course away from the enemy and the rear ships hauled out on the
+port quarter of their leader to increase the range. The British
+cruisers, according to Admiral Beatty's report, "were ordered to
+form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed."
+An hour later the _Bluecher_ staggered away to northward. Badly
+crippled, she was assigned by Beatty to the _Indomitable_, and was
+sunk at 12.37. At 10.54 submarines were reported on the British
+starboard bows.
+
+Just after 11 the flagship _Lion_, having received two hits under
+water which burst a feed tank and thus put the port engine out of
+commission, turned northward out of the line. Though the injury
+was spoken of as the result of a "chance shot," the _Lion_ had been
+hit 15 times. About an hour later Admiral Beatty hoisted his flag
+in the _Princess Royal_, but during the remainder of the battle Rear
+Admiral Moore in the _Tiger_ had command. Judging from the fact
+that the _Tiger_ was hit only 8 times in the entire action
+and the _Princess Royal_ and the _New Zealand_ not at all, there
+seems to have been little effort at this time to press the attack.
+The British lost touch at 11.50, and turned back at noon.
+
+In the lively discussion aroused by the battle, the question was
+raised why the _Bluecher_ was included in the German line. Any encounter
+that developed on such an excursion was almost certain to be with
+superior forces, against which the armored cruiser would be of
+slight value. In a retreat, the "lame duck" would slow down the
+whole squadron, or else must be left behind.
+
+During the first hour of the battle, the British gained about three
+knots, and brought the range to 17,500 yards. The range after 9.45
+is not given, but was certainly not lowered in a corresponding
+degree. This may have been due to increased speed on the part of
+the German leaders, or to the interference of German destroyers,
+which now figured for the first time as important factors in day
+action. Two of these attacks were delivered, one at 9.40 and another
+about an hour later, and though repulsed by British flotillas,
+they both caused interference with the British course and fire.
+
+The injury to the _Lion_, in the words of Admiral Beatty, "undoubtedly
+deprived us of a greater victory." The British wireless caught
+calls from Hipper to the High Seas Fleet, which (though this seems
+strange at the time of a battle cruiser sortie) is declared by
+the Germans to have been beyond reach at Kiel.[1] Worried by the
+danger to the _Lion_ in case of retreat before superior forces, and
+in the belief that he was being led into submarine traps and mine
+fields, Admiral Moore gave up the chase. The distance to Heligoland
+was still at least 70 miles; the German ships were badly injured;
+the course since 9.45 had been more to the northward; the Grand
+Fleet was rapidly approaching the scene. The element of caution,
+seen again in the Jutland battle 15 months later, seems to have
+prevented pressing the engagement to more decisive results.
+
+[Footnote 1: Capt. Persius, _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 10,
+1919.]
+
+The conditions of flight and pursuit obtaining at the Dogger Bank
+emphasized the importance of speed and long range fire. Owing to
+the fact that they had twice the angle of elevation (30 degrees),
+the German 11-inch and 12-inch guns were not outranged by the British
+13.5-inch guns; and at 17,000 yards their projectiles had no greater
+angle of fall. The chief superiority of the larger ordnance therefore
+lay in their heavier bursting charges and greater striking energy,
+12,800 foot-tons to 8,900 foot-tons. According to a German report,
+the first salvo that hit the _Seydlitz_ knocked out both after-turrets
+and annihilated their crews; and the ship was saved only by flooding
+the magazines.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Admiral van Scheer, quoted in _Naval and Military Record_,
+London, March 24, 1920.]
+
+_The Dardanelles Campaign_
+
+Throughout the war a difference of opinion existed in Allied councils
+as to whether it was better to concentrate all efforts in the western
+sphere of operations, or to assail the Central Powers in the Near
+East as well, where the accession of Turkey (and later of Bulgaria)
+threatened to put the resources of all southeastern Europe under
+Teutonic control, and even opened a gateway into Asia. Such a division
+of effort was suggested not only by the necessity of protecting the
+Suez Canal, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, but by the difficulty of breaking
+the stalemate on the western front, and by the opportunity that
+would be offered of utilizing Allied control of sea communications.
+Furthermore, the Allies had a margin of predreadnoughts and cruisers
+ready for action and of no obvious value elsewhere.
+
+On November 3, 1914, three days after Turkey entered the war, an
+Allied naval force that had been watching off the Dardanelles engaged
+the outer forts in a 10-minute bombardment, of no significance
+save perhaps as a warning to the Turks of trouble later on. In the
+same month the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Winston
+Churchill, proposed an attack on the Straits as "an ideal method
+of defending Egypt"; but it was not seriously considered until, on
+January 2, Russia sent an urgent appeal for a diversion to relieve
+her forces in the Caucasus. Lord Kitchener, the British Minister
+of War, answered favorably, but, feeling that he had no troops
+to spare, turned the solution over to the Navy.
+
+From the first the decision was influenced by political considerations.
+Russia needed assurance of Allied solidarity--and it is significant
+that in February Lord Grey announced that England no longer opposed
+Russia's ambition to control Constantinople. Nine-tenths of Russia's
+exports were blocked by the closing of the Straits; their reopening
+would afford not only access to her vast stores of foodstuffs,
+but an entry--infinitely more convenient than Vladivostok or
+Archangel--for munitions and essential supplies. The Balkan States
+were wavering. In Turkey there was a strong neutral or pro-Ally
+sentiment. Victory would give an enormous material advantage, help
+Russia in the impending German drive on her southwestern frontier,
+and bolster Allied prestige throughout the eastern world.
+
+Faced with the problem, the Admiralty sent an inquiry to Admiral
+Carden, in command on the scene, as to the practicability of forcing
+the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone, assuming that old ships
+would be employed, and "that the importance of the results would
+justify severe loss." He replied on January 5: "I do not think the
+Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended
+operations with a large number of ships." In answer to further
+inquiries, accompanied by not altogether warranted assurance from
+the First Lord that "High authorities here concur in your opinion,"
+Admiral Carden outlined four successive operations:
+
+(a) The destruction of defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles.
+
+(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defenses up to
+and including Cephez Point battery N8.
+
+[Illustration: THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE]
+
+(c) Destruction of defenses of the Narrows.
+
+(d) Sweeping of a dear channel through the mine-field and advance
+through the Narrows; followed by a reduction of the forts further
+up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.
+
+This plan was presented at a meeting of the British War Council
+on January 13. It may be noted at this point that the War Council,
+though composed of 7 members of the Cabinet, was at this time dominated
+by a triumvirate--the Premier (Mr. Asquith), the Minister of War
+(General Kitchener), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr.
+Churchill); and in this triumvirate, despite the fact that England's
+strength was primarily naval, the head of the War Office played a
+leading role. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher) and one or two
+other military experts attended the Council meetings, but they were
+not members, and their function, at least as they saw it, was "to
+open their mouths when told to." Staff organizations existed also
+at both the War Office and the Admiralty, at the latter consisting
+of the First Lord, First Sea Lord and three other officers not
+on the Admiralty Board. The working of this improvised and not
+altogether ideal machinery for the supreme task of conducting the
+war is interestingly revealed in the report[1] of the commission
+subsequently, appointed to investigate the Dardanelles Campaign.
+
+[Footnote 1: British ANNUAL REGISTER, 1918, Appendix, pp. 24 ff.,
+from which quotations here are taken.]
+
+"Mr. Churchill," according to this report, "appears to have advocated
+the attack by ships alone before the War Council on a certain amount
+of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion." Encouraged by his
+sanguine and aggressive spirit, the Council decided that "the Admiralty
+should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and
+take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."
+In view of the fact that the operation as then conceived was to be
+purely naval, the word "take" suggests an initial misconception
+of what the navy could do. The support for the decision, especially
+from the naval experts, was chiefly on the assumption that if Admiral
+Carden's first operation were unpromising, the whole plan might
+be dropped.
+
+Admiral Fisher's misgivings as to the wisdom of the enterprise
+soon increased, owing primarily to his desire to employ the full
+naval strength in the home field. He did not believe that "cutting
+off the enemy's big toe in the East was better than stabbing him
+to the heart." He had begun the construction of 612 new vessels
+ranging from "hush-hush" ships of 33 knots and 20-inch guns to
+200 motor-boats, and he wished to strike for access to the Baltic,
+with a threat of invasion on Germany's Baltic coast. The validity
+of his objections to the Dardanelles plan appears to depend on the
+practicability of this alternative, which was not attempted later
+in the war. The First Lord and the First Sea Lord presented their
+difference of opinion to the Premier, but it appears that there was
+no ill feeling; Admiral Fisher later writes that "Churchill had
+courage and imagination--he was a war man."
+
+At a Council meeting on January 28, when the decision was made
+definite, Admiral Fisher was not asked for an opinion and expressed
+none. (The Investigation Commission declare that the naval experts
+should have been asked, and should have expressed their views whether
+asked or not.) But there was a dramatic moment when, after rising as
+if to leave the Council, he was quickly followed by Lord Kitchener,
+who pointed out that all the others were in favor of the plan, and
+induced him once more to take his seat. After the decision, Mr.
+Churchill testifies, "I never looked back. We had left the region
+of discussion and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The
+matter had now passed into the domain of action."
+
+To turn to the scene of operations, there were now assembled at
+the Dardanelles 10 British and 4 French predreadnoughts, together
+with the new battleship _Queen Elizabeth_, the battle cruiser
+_Inflexible_, and many cruisers and torpedo craft. On February
+19, 1915, again on February 25-26, and on March 1-7, this force
+bombarded the outer forts at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr and the
+batteries 10 miles further up at Cephez Point. These were in part
+silenced and demolished by landing parties. Bad weather, however,
+interfered with operations, and there was also some shortage of
+ammunition. The batteries, and especially the mobile artillery of
+the Turks, still greatly hampered the work of mine sweeping, which
+at terrible hazards was carried on at night within the Straits.
+
+In the meantime the Government, to quote General Callwell, the
+Director of Military Operations, had "drifted into a big military
+attack." But the despatch from England of the 29th Division, which
+was to join the forces available in Egypt, was delayed; owing to
+Lord Kitchener's concern about the western situation, from Feb. 22
+to March 16--an unfortunate loss of time. By March 17, however, the
+troops from Egypt and most of the French contingent were assembled
+at the island of Lemnos, and General Sir Ian Hamilton had arrived
+to take command. His instructions included the statement that
+"employment of military forces on any large scale at this juncture
+is only contemplated in the event of the fleet failing to get through
+after every effort has been exhausted. Having entered on the project
+of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning the
+scheme."
+
+On March 11 the First Lord sent to Admiral Carden a despatch asking
+whether the time had not arrived when "you will have to press hard
+for a decision," and adding: "Every well-conceived action for forcing
+a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive
+our support." The Admiral replied concurring, but expressing the
+opinion that "in order to insure my communication line immediately
+fleet enters Sea of Marmora, military operations should be opened
+at once." On March 16 he resigned owing to ill health, and his
+second in command, Admiral de Robeck, succeeded, with the feeling
+that he had orders to force the Straits.
+
+The attack of March 18 was the crucial and, as it proved, the final
+action of the purely naval campaign. At this time the mines had
+been swept as far up as Cephez Point, and a clear channel opened
+for some distance beyond. During the morning the _Queen Elizabeth_
+and 5 other ships bombarded the Narrows forts at 14,000 yards.
+Then at 12.22 the French predreadnoughts _Suffren, Gaulois,
+Charlemagne_, and _Bouvet_ approached to about 9000 yards and by
+1.25 had for the time being silenced the batteries of the Narrows.
+Six British battleships now advanced (2.36) to relieve the French.
+In the maneuvering and withdrawal, the _Biouvet_ was sunk by a
+drifting mine[1] with a loss of over 600 men, and the _Gaulois_
+was hit twice under water and had to be beached on an island
+outside the Straits. About 4 o'clock the _Irresistible_ also
+ran foul of a mine and was run ashore on the Asiatic side, where
+most of her men were taken off under fire. The _Ocean_, after going
+to her assistance, struck a mine and went down about 6 o'clock.
+Not more than 40 per cent. of the injuries sustained in the action
+were attributable to gunfire, the rest to mines sent adrift from
+the Narrows. Of the 16 capital ships engaged, three were sunk,
+one had to be beached, and some of the others were hardly ready
+for continuing the action next day.
+
+[Footnote 1: It is stated that an ingenious device caused these
+mines to sink after a certain time and come back on an under-current
+that flows _up_ the Dardanelles, and then rise at the Narrows for
+recovery. This may have enabled the Turks to keep up their presumably
+limited supply of mines; but how well the automatic control worked
+is not known.]
+
+[Illustration: DARDANELLES DEFENSES]
+
+There is some military support for the opinion that if, on the
+18th or at some more suitable time, the fleet had acted in the
+spirit of Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!" and,
+protected by dummy ships, bumpers, or whatever other devices naval
+ingenuity could devise, had steamed up to and through the Narrows
+in column, it would not have suffered much more severely than during
+the complicated maneuvering below. Of such an attack General von
+der Goltz, in command of the Turkish army, said that, "Although
+he thought it was almost impossible to force the Dardanelles, if
+the English thought it an important move in the general war, they
+could by sacrificing ten ships force the entrance, and do it very
+fast, and be up in Marmora within 10 hours from the time they forced
+it."[l] Admiral Fisher estimated that the loss would be 12 ships.
+
+[Footnote 1: Repeated by Baron van Wangenheim to Ambassador Morgenthau,
+prior to the attack of March 18, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY,
+_World's Work_, September, 1918. See also Col. F. N. Maude, Royal
+Engineers, _Contemporary Review_, June, 1915.]
+
+After such deductions, there would be no great surplus to deal with
+the _Goeben_, which would fight desperately, and with the defenses of
+Constantinople. Indeed, such losses would seem absolutely prohibitive,
+if viewed only from the narrow standpoint of the force engaged,
+and without taking into fullest account the limited value of the
+older ships and the fact that the Government was fully committed
+to a prosecution of the campaign. It is of course easy to see that
+victory purchased by the loss of 10 predreadnoughts and 10,000 men
+would be cheap, as compared with the sacrifice of over 100,000
+men killed and wounded and 10,000 invalided in the later campaign
+on land.
+
+General Callwell has pointed out that the naval commanders were
+properly worried about what would happen after they got through
+the Straits, if the Sublime Porte should not promptly "throw up
+the sponge." "The communications would have remained closed to
+colliers and small craft by movable armament, if not also by mines.
+Forcing the pass would in fact have resembled bursting through a
+swing door. Sailors and soldiers alike have an instinctive horror
+of a trap, and they are in the habit of looking behind them as
+well as before them."[1] But according to Ambassador Morgenthau,
+who was probably in a better position than any one else to form
+an opinion, "The whole Ottoman State on the 18th day of March,
+1915, was on the brink of dissolution." The Turkish Government
+was divided into factions and restive under German domination, and
+there was thus an excellent prospect that it would have capitulated
+under the guns of the Allied fleet. If not, then there might have
+been nothing left for the latter but to try to get back the way
+it came.
+
+[Footnote 1: NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, March, 1919, p. 486.]
+
+Feeling in Constantinople during the month from February 19th to
+March 19th has already been suggested; it was nervous in the extreme.
+Neither Turks nor Germans felt assured that the Dardanelles could
+withstand British naval power. Plans were made for a general exit
+to Asia Minor, and there was a conviction that in a few days Allied
+ships would be in the Golden Horn. At the forts, if we may believe
+evidence not as yet definitely disproved, affairs were still more
+desperate. The guns, though manned largely by Germans, were not of
+the latest type, and for a month had been engaged in almost daily
+bombardment. Ammunition was running short. "Fort Hamadie, the most
+powerful defense on the Asiatic side, had just 17 armor-piercing
+projectiles left, while at Killid-ul-Bahr, the main defense on
+the European side, there were precisely 10."[2] To this evidence
+may be added the statement of Enver Pasha: "If the English had
+only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles
+they could have got to Constantinople, but their delay enabled us
+to fortify the peninsula, and in 6 weeks' time we had taken down
+there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."
+
+[Footnote 2: AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY, _World's Work_, September,
+1918, p. 433, corroborating the statement of the correspondent G.
+A. Schreiner, in FROM BERLIN TO BAGDAD.]
+
+If Mr. Churchill was chiefly responsible for undertaking the campaign,
+he was not responsible for the delay after March 18. "It never
+occurred to me," he states, "that we should not go on." Admiral
+de Robeck in his first despatches appeared to share this view. On
+March 26, however, he telegraphed: "The check on March 18 is not,
+in my opinion, decisive, but on March 22 I met General Hamilton and
+heard his views, and I now think that, to obtain important results
+and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation
+will be essential." This despatch, Mr. Churchill says, "involved a
+complete change of plan and was a vital decision. I regretted it
+very much. I believed then, as I believe now, that we were separated
+by very little from complete success." He proposed that the Admiral
+should be directed to renew the attack; but the First Sea Lord did
+not agree, nor did Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, nor Admiral Sir Henry
+Jackson. So it was decided to wait for the army, and some satire
+has been directed at Mr. Churchill and those other "acknowledged
+experts in the technicalities of amphibious warfare," Mr. Balfour
+and Mr. Asquith, who were inclined to share his views. The verdict
+of the Dardanelles Commission was that, "Had the attack been renewed
+within a day or two there is no reason to suppose that the proportion
+of casualties would have been less; and, if so, even had the second
+attack succeeded, a very weak force would have been left for subsequent
+naval operations."
+
+Once decided upon, it was highly essential that the combined operation
+should begin without further delay. But it was now found that the
+army transports had been loaded, so to speak, up-side-down, with
+guns and munitions buried under tents and supplies. Sending them
+back to Alexandria for reloading involved a six weeks' delay, though
+Lord Kitchener wired, "I think you had better know at once that
+I regard such postponement as far too long." The landing on the
+tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was nearest the forts in
+the Straits and said to be the only feasible place, actually began
+on April 25, and was achieved under the guns of the fleet, and by
+almost unexampled feats of heroism by boats' crews and the first
+parties on shore.
+
+Henceforth the navy played a subordinate though not insignificant
+part in the campaign. "By our navy we went there and were kept
+there," writes Mr. John Masefield in _Gallipoli_, "and by our navy
+we came away. During the nine months of our hold on the peninsula
+over 300,000 men were brought by the navy from places three, four,
+or even six thousand miles away. During the operations some half
+of these were removed by our navy, as sick and wounded, to ports
+from 800 to 3000 miles away. Every day, for 11 months, ships of
+our navy moved up and down the Gallipoli coast bombarding the Turk
+positions. Every day during the operations our navy kept our armies
+in food, drink and supplies. Every day, in all that time, if weather
+permitted, ships of our navy cruised in the Narrows and off
+Constantinople, and the seaplanes of our navy raided and scouted
+within the Turk lines."
+
+On May 12 the predreadnought _Goliath_ was torpedoed by a Turkish
+destroyer; and on May 25-26 the German submarine _U 23_, which
+had made the long voyage by way of Gibraltar, sank the _Triumph_
+and the _Majestic_. It was upon a forewarning of this attack that
+Admiral Fisher, according to his own statement, resigned as a protest
+against the retention of the _Queen Elizabeth_ and other capital
+units in this unpromising field. British and French submarines, on
+the other hand, worked their way into the Sea of Marmora, entered
+the harbor of Constantinople, and inflicted heavy losses, including
+two Turkish battleships, 8 transports, and 197 supply vessels.
+
+So almost unprecedented were the problems of a naval attack on the
+Dardanelles that it appears rash to condemn either the initiation
+or the conduct of an operation that ended in failure when seemingly
+on the verge of success. Clearly, the campaign was handicapped
+by lack of unanimous support and whole-hearted faith on the part
+of authorities at home. It was not thoroughly thought out at the
+start, and was subjected to trying delays. No advantage was ever
+taken of the invaluable factor of surprise. Even so, it was not
+wholly barren of results. It undoubtedly relieved Russia, kept
+Bulgaria neutral for at least five months, and immobilized 300,000
+Turks, according to Lord Kitchener's estimate, for nine months'
+time. Nevertheless, the final failure was a tremendous blow to
+Allied prestige. Upon the withdrawal, in January of 1916, some
+of the troops were transferred to Salonika; and it is noteworthy
+that in Macedonia, as at Gallipoli, the army was dependent on the
+navy for the transport of troops, munitions, and in fact virtually
+everything needed in the campaign.
+
+Aside from the Dardanelles failure, the naval situation at the end
+of 1915 was such as to give assurance to the Western Powers. They
+had converted potential control of the sea into actual control, save
+in limited areas on the enemies' sea frontiers. Germany had lost
+her cruisers and her colonies, and her shipping had been destroyed
+or driven from the seas. Though losses from submarines averaged
+150,000 tons a month in 1915, they had not yet caused genuine alarm.
+The German fleet was still a menace, but, in spite of attrition
+warfare, the Grand Fleet was decidedly stronger than in 1914.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+BRITISH OFFICIAL NAVAL HISTORY, Sir Julian Corbett, London, 1920.
+THE GRAND FLEET, Admiral Jellicoe, London, 1918.
+THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, Arthur H. Pollen, London, 1919.
+MY MEMOIRS, Admiral van Tirpitz, 1919.
+THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral van
+  Scheer, 1920.
+U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, WAR NOTES, 1914-1918.
+LES ENSEIGNEMENTS MARITIMES DE LA GUERRE ANTI-GERMANIQUE,
+  Admiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919.
+IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, Captain Romeo Bernotti,
+  Leghorn, 1920.
+NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, Commander C. C. Gill, New York, 1918.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+
+There was only one action between the British Grand Fleet and the
+German High Seas Fleet in the World War, the battle of Jutland.
+This was indecisive, but even in a history with the limits of this
+book it deserves a chapter of its own. In the magnitude of the
+forces engaged, a magnitude less in numbers of ships--great as
+that was--than in the enormous destructive power concentrated in
+those ships, it was by far the greatest naval battle in history.
+Moreover, this was the one fleet battle fought with the weapons
+of to-day. Any discussion of modern tactics, therefore, must be
+based for some time to come on an analysis of Jutland. Finally, the
+indecisiveness of the action has resulted in a controversy among
+naval critics that is likely to continue indefinitely. Meanwhile
+the debatable points are rich in interest and suggestion.
+
+In earlier wars the nation with a more powerful fleet blockaded
+the ports of the enemy. In this war the sea mine, the submarine,
+the aircraft and the long-range gun of coast defenses made the
+old-fashioned close blockade impossible. Such blockade as could
+be maintained under modern conditions had to be "distant." The
+British made a base in the Orkneys, Scapa Flow, which had central
+position with relation to a possible sortie of the German fleet
+toward either the North Atlantic or the Channel. The intervening
+space of North Sea was patrolled by a scouting force of light vessels
+of various sorts and periodical sweeps by the Grand Fleet. On May
+30, 1916, the Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, set out from
+its base at Scapa Flow for one of these patrolling cruises. On
+the same day Vice Admiral Beatty left his base at Rosyth (in the
+Firth of Forth) with his advance force of battle cruisers and
+battleships, under orders to join Jellicoe at sea. On the following
+day the High Seas Fleet took the sea and the two great forces came
+together in battle.
+
+It is not certain why the German fleet should have been cruising
+at this time. Having declined to offer battle in the summer of
+1914, on account of the British superiority of force, the High
+Command could hardly have contemplated attacking in 1916 when the
+odds were much heavier. From statements published by German officers
+since the war, the objects seem to have been, first, to prevent a
+suspected attempt to force an entrance into the Baltic; secondly,
+to fall upon Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron, during its frequent
+patrolling cruises, when it was detached from the main force; and,
+thirdly, to destroy the British trading fleets which were conducting
+an important volume of commerce from the ports of Norway with England
+and Russia. It is not easy to see, however, why the High Seas Fleet
+should be sent out on a mere commerce destroying raid. The Germans
+had been out twice before, since April 1st of that year, and probably
+it was considered good policy to send the fleet to sea every now
+and then for the moral effect. The people could not relish the idea
+of their navy being condemned to inaction in their own harbors,
+and there was bad feeling over the fact that the government had
+just yielded to President Wilson's protest on ruthless submarine
+warfare. A victory over Beatty's battle cruisers, or some other
+detached unit of the British fleet, would have been very opportune
+in bracing German morale. At the same time Admiral von Scheer had
+probably reckoned on being able to avoid battle with the Grand
+Fleet by means of a swift retreat under cover of smoke screens
+and torpedo attacks. Certainly the odds were too heavy to permit
+of any other policy on his part.
+
+_The First Phase_
+
+[Illustration: CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
+
+(After diagram by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval
+Institute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)
+
+Forces:
+     24 Dreadnought Battleships
+      3 Battle Cruisers
+     12 Light Cruisers
+      8 Armored Cruisers
+     51 Destroyers
+  Note: One destroyer accompanied each armored cruiser.]
+
+At 2 p. m. of the 31st of May, 1916, the British main fleet, under
+Admiral Jellicoe, was in Latitude 57 deg. 57' N., Longitude 3 deg. 45'
+E. (off the coast of Norway), holding a south-easterly course.
+It consisted of 24 battleships formed in a line of six divisions
+screened by destroyers and light cruisers, as indicated in the
+accompanying diagram. Sixteen miles ahead of the battle fleet was
+the First Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Arbuthnot and the
+Second Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Heath; these consisted of
+four armored cruisers each. They were spread out at intervals of six
+miles, with the _Hampshire_ six miles astern of the _Minotaur_
+to serve as link ship for signals to and from the main fleet. Four
+miles ahead was the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron of three ships
+under Rear Admiral Hood. These were steaming in column, screened by
+four destroyers and two light cruisers (_Chester_ and _Canterbury_).
+The diagram on p. 388 shows the complete formation of the Battle
+Fleet and Cruiser Squadrons, under Admiral Jellicoe's personal
+command. It is interesting as an example of the extreme complexity
+of fleet formation under modern conditions, especially when it is
+realized that the whole fleet was proceeding on its base course
+by zigzagging.
+
+[Illustration: BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION, 2 P. M.
+
+(After diagrams by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval
+Institute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)]
+
+Seventy-seven miles to the southward Vice Admiral Beatty, commanding
+the scouting force, was heading on a northeasterly course. His force
+was spread out in scouting formation. The First Battle Cruiser
+Squadron of four ships, headed by the flagship _Lion_, was flanked
+three miles to the eastward by the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron of
+two ships, and five miles to the north by the Fifth Battle Squadron,
+consisting of four of the finest battleships in the fleet, 25-knot
+_Queen Elizabeths_, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. Each of these
+squadrons had its screen of destroyers and light cruisers. Eight miles
+to the south the First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons
+were spread out in line at five-mile intervals. The formation is
+made clear by the accompanying diagram.
+
+At the same hour, 2 p. m., Vice Admiral Hipper, with the German
+scouting force, was heading north about 15 to 20 miles to the southeast
+of Beatty. Hipper commanded the First Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+consisting of the _Luetzow_ (flag), _Derflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke_,
+and _Van der Tann_, accompanied by a screening force of four or
+five light cruisers and about 15 destroyers. Fifty miles south
+of this advance force was the main body of the High Seas Fleet under
+Vice Admiral von Scheer. It consisted of three battle squadrons
+arranged apparently in one long column of 22 ships escorted by
+a screen of 62 destroyers, eight or ten light cruisers, and the
+one remaining armored cruiser in the German navy, the _Roon_.
+
+Thus the stage was set and the characters disposed for the great
+naval drama of that day.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLE CRUISER: THE DERFFLINGER
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships, 1918_
+
+Normal displacement, 26,600 to 28,000 tons.
+
+Length (waterline), 689 to 700 feet. Beam, 95 to 96 feet. Mean draught,
+27-1/2 feet.
+
+Guns:                                    Some (4.7 inch?) anti-aircraft
+   8--1.2 inch, 50 cal. (A5)               2 machine
+  14--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in M. & H.       Torpedo tubes (21.7 inch):
+            but only                        2 or 4 submerged (broadside)
+  12--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in D.               1 submerged (bow)
+ (1.2 or less--3.4 inch, 22 pdr. ?)]
+
+At 2.20 the light cruiser _Galatea_ (v. diagram), which lay farthest
+to the east of Beatty's force, reported two German light cruisers
+engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Beatty thereupon changed
+course toward Horn Reef Lightship in order to cut them off from
+their base, his light cruisers of the first and third divisions
+spreading out as a screen to the eastward. It would be interesting
+to know why, at this point, he did not draw in his battleships and
+thus concentrate his force, for when he did establish contact with
+the Germans, Evan-Thomas's squadron was too far away for effective
+support. Ten minutes later Hipper got word of British light cruisers
+and destroyers sighted to the westward and, changing course to
+northwest, he headed for them at high speed. At 2.45 Beatty sent
+out a seaplane from the _Engadine_ to ascertain the enemy's position.
+This is the first instance in naval history of a fleet scouting by
+means of aircraft. The airplane came close enough to the enemy
+to draw the fire of four light cruisers, and returning reported
+their position. Meanwhile the _Galatea_ had reported heavy smoke
+"as from a fleet."
+
+At the first report from the _Galatea_, which had been intercepted
+on the flagship, _Iron Duke_, Jellicoe ordered full speed, and
+despatched ahead the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Hood,
+to cut off the escape of the Germans to the Skagerrak, as Beatty
+was then heading to cut them off from their bases to the south.
+Admiral Scheer, also, on getting report of the English cruisers,
+quickened the speed of his main fleet.
+
+At 3.30 Beatty and Hipper discovered each other's battle cruiser
+forces. Hipper turned about and headed on a southerly course to lead
+the British toward the advancing main fleet. Beatty also turned,
+forming his battle cruisers on a line of bearing to clear the smoke,
+and the two forces approached each other on converging courses as
+indicated in the diagram.
+
+At this point it is worth while to compare the two battle cruiser
+forces:[1]
+
+              BRITISH                            GERMAN
+                   Displace-                          Displace-
+Name          Armor   ment    Guns   Name        Armor   ment    Guns
+Queen Mary      9"  26,350  8 13.5"  Luetzow       13"  26,180   8 12"
+Lion            9"  26,350  8 13.5"  Derfflinger  13"  26,180   8 12"
+Tiger           9"  28,500  8 13.5"  Seydlitz     11"  24,610  10 11"
+Princess Royal  9"  28,350  8 13.5"  Moltke       11"  22,640  10 11"
+Indefatigable   8"  18,800  8 12"    VonderTann   10"  19,100     11"
+New Zealand     8"  18,800  8 12"
+                   -------                            -------
+                   145,150                            118,710
+
+[Footnote 1: Table from Lieut. Comdr. H. H. Frost, U. S. N., _U.
+S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, Nov., 1919, p. 850.]
+
+A glance shows the superiority of the British in guns and the German
+superiority in armor. The British had six ships to the German five,
+and if the four new battleships of Evan-Thomas's division could
+be effectively brought into action, the British superiority in
+force would be reckoned as considerably more than two to one. These
+battleships had 13" armor, eight 15" guns each, and a speed of 25
+knots. They were the most powerful ships afloat.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER: THE LION
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1918
+
+Normal displacement, 26,350 tons. Full load, 29,700.
+Length (w. l.). 675 feet. Beam, 88-1/2, feet.
+
+Mean draught, 27-2/3 feet. Max. draught, 31-2/3 feet.
+Length over all, 700 feet. Length, p. p., 660 feet.
+
+Guns:                                    (P. R. 2--2 pdr. pom-pom)
+   8--13.5 inch (M. V.). Dir. Con.       5 M. G. (1 landing)
+  16--4 inch, 50 cal, Dir. Con.        Torpedo tubes (21 inch):
+   2--3 inch (anti-aircraft)             2 submerged (broadside)
+   4--3 pdr.]
+
+In speed, Beatty had a marked advantage. He could make 29 knots with
+all six of his cruisers and 32 knots with his four best,--_Queen
+Mary, Tiger, Lion_, and _Princess Royal_. Hipper's squadron
+could make but 28 knots, though the _Luetzow_ and _Derfflinger_
+were probably capable of 30.
+
+At 3.48 British and German battle cruisers opened fire. According
+to Beatty's report the range at this moment was 18,500 yards. Beatty
+then turned to starboard, assuming a course nearly parallel to
+that of Hipper. Almost immediately, three minutes after the first
+salvo, the _Lion_, the _Tiger_, and the _Princess Royal_ were
+hit by shells. In these opening minutes the fire of the Germans
+seems to have been fast and astonishingly accurate. The _Lion_
+was hit repeatedly, and at four o'clock the roof of one of her
+turrets was blown off. It is said that the presence of mind and
+heroic self-sacrifice of an officer saved the ship from the fate
+that subsequently overwhelmed two of her consorts. By this time
+the range had decreased to 16,000 yards (British reckoning) and
+Beatty shifted his course more to the south to confuse the enemy's
+fire control. Apparently this move did not succeed in its purpose
+for at 4.06 a salvo struck the _Indefatigable_ on a line with her
+after turret, and exploded a magazine. As she staggered out of
+column and began sinking, another salvo smashed into her forward
+decks and she rolled over and sank like a stone.
+
+About this time the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action, but
+it was not able to do effective service. The range was extreme,
+about 20,000 yards, and being some distance astern of the battle
+cruisers, on account of its inferior speed, it had to contend with
+the battle smoke of the squadron ahead as well as the gradually
+thickening atmospheric conditions. In addition the Germans frequently
+laid smoke screens and zigzagged. Evan-Thomas's division never saw
+more than two enemy ships at a time.
+
+The shift of course taken by Beatty at four o'clock, accompanied
+possibly by a corresponding shift of Hipper, opened the range so
+far in a few minutes that fire slackened on both sides. Beatty
+then swung to port in order to close to effective range. At 4.15
+twelve of his destroyers, acting on the general order to attack
+when conditions were favorable, dashed out toward the German line.
+At the same instant German destroyers, to the number of fifteen
+accompanied by the light cruiser _Regensburg_, advanced toward
+the British line, both forces maneuvering to get on the bows of
+the opposing battle cruisers. For this purpose the British flotilla
+was better placed because their battle cruisers were well ahead of
+the Germans. The German destroyers, therefore, concentrated their
+efforts on the battleship division, which turned away to avoid
+the torpedoes. In numbers the advantage lay with the Germans, and a
+fiercely contested action took place between the lines conducted with
+superb gallantry on both sides. The Germans succeeded in breaking up
+the British attack at a cost of two destroyers. Two of the British
+destroyers also were rendered unmanageable and sank later when the
+High Seas Fleet arrived on the scene.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, FIRST PHASE
+
+Action Between Battle Cruiser Forces.]
+
+Meanwhile, at 4.26, just before the destroyers clashed, a salvo
+struck the _Queen Mary_, blew up a magazine, and she disappeared
+with practically all on board. Thus the second of Beatty's battle
+cruisers was sent to the bottom with tragic suddenness.
+
+At 4.38, Commodore Goodenough, commanding the Second Light Cruiser
+Squadron, who was scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported
+that the German battle fleet was in sight steering north, and gave
+its position. Beatty at once called in his destroyers and turned
+his ships in succession, sixteen points to starboard, ordering
+Evan-Thomas to turn similarly. Thus the capital ships turned right
+about on the opposite course, the battleships following the cruisers
+as before, and all heading for the main fleet which was then about
+fifty miles away to the north. Commodore Goodenough at this point
+used his initiative in commendable fashion. Without orders he kept
+on to the south to establish contact with the German battle fleet
+and hung on its flanks near enough to report its position to the
+commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire, but handled his
+frail ships so skillfully as to escape serious loss. At the same
+time the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect
+in the British system of communication made his reports of bearing
+seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a
+difficulty for the commander in chief, who, fifty miles away, was
+trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet.
+
+_The Second Phase_
+
+The northward run of the British advance force and the German advance
+force, followed by their main fleet, was uneventful. The situation
+was at this stage exactly reversed. Beatty was endeavoring to lead
+the German forces into the guns of the Grand Fleet, while ostensibly
+he was attempting to escape from a superior force, much as Hipper
+had been doing with relation to Scheer during the first phase.
+Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers continued to engage the
+five German battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards, assisted
+by the two leading ships of Evan-Thomas's Battle Squadron. The
+other two battleships engaged the head of the advancing German
+battle fleet at the extreme range of 19,000 yards as often as they
+could make out their enemy. The visibility grew worse and apparently
+neither side scored on the other.
+
+As the British main fleet was reported somewhat to the east of
+Beatty's position, he bore toward that quarter; and Hipper, to avoid
+being "T-d" by his enemy, turned to the eastward correspondingly. The
+mistiness increased to such a degree that shortly after five o'clock
+Beatty lost sight of the enemy's battle cruisers and ceased fire for
+half an hour. Between 5.40 and six o'clock, however, conditions were
+better and firing was opened again by the British ships, apparently
+with good effect. Meanwhile clashes had already taken place between
+the light cruiser _Chester_, attached to the Third Battle Squadron
+of the main fleet, and the light cruisers of the enemy, which were
+far in advance of their battle cruisers.
+
+_The Third Phase_
+
+We have already noted that as soon as Jellicoe learned of the presence
+of the enemy he ordered Hood, with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+to cut off the German retreat to the Skagerrak and to support Beatty.
+Hood's course had taken him well to the east of where the action
+was in progress. At 5.40 he saw the flashes of guns far to the
+northwest, and immediately changed course in that direction. Fifteen
+minutes later he was able to open fire on German light cruisers,
+with his four destroyers darting ahead to attack with torpedoes.
+These light cruisers, which had just driven off the _Chester_ with
+heavy losses, discharged torpedoes at Hood's battle cruisers and
+turned away. The latter shifted helm to avoid them and narrowly
+missed being hit. One torpedo indeed passed under the _Invincible_.
+
+At this point another group of four German light cruisers appeared
+and Hood's destroyers advanced to attack them. The fire of the
+cruisers damaged two destroyers though not before one of them,
+the _Shark_, had torpedoed the German cruiser _Rostock_. The
+_Shark_ herself was in turn torpedoed and sunk by a German
+destroyer. At about the same time action had begun between the
+ships of the armored cruiser squadron under Arbuthnot and another
+squadron of German light cruisers.
+
+A moment later (at 5.56) Beatty sighted the leaders of the Grand
+Fleet and knew that contact with his support was established. At
+once he changed course to about due east and put on full speed
+in order to head off the German line, and by taking position to
+the eastward, allow the battle fleet to form line astern of his
+battle cruisers. Such an overwhelming force was now concentrated
+on the German light cruisers that they turned back. Of their number
+the _Wiesbaden_ had been disabled by a concentration of fire and
+the _Rostock_ torpedoed. Hipper then made a turn of 180 deg. with his
+battle cruisers in order to get back to the support of the battleships
+which he had left far to the rear. Then he turned round again, and
+continued to lead the German advance. All this time he seems to
+have had no suspicion that the Grand Fleet was in the neighborhood.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLESHIP: THE IRON DUKE
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919
+
+Normal displacement, 25,000 tons. Full load, 28,800.
+Length (o. a.), 622-3/4 feet. Beam, 89-1/2 feet.
+
+Mean draught, 28-1/2, feet. Max. draught, 32-3/4 feet.
+Length (p. p.), 580 feet
+
+Guns:                                 5 M. G.
+  10--13.5 inch (M. V.), Dir. Con.    (1 landing)
+  12--6 inch, 50 cal., Dir. Con.    Torpedo tubes (21 inch):
+   2--3 inch (anti-aircraft)          4 submerged (broadside)
+   4--3 pdr.]
+
+As Beatty dashed across the front of the approaching battle fleet
+he sighted Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron ahead of him and
+signaled him to take station ahead. Accordingly Hood countermarched
+and led Beatty's line in the _Invincible_. Evan-Thomas was by this
+time so far in the rear of the speedier battle cruisers that he
+was unable to follow with Beatty, and in order to avoid confusion
+with the oncoming battle fleet he turned left 90 deg. in order to form
+astern of the Sixth Battle Division, by this move, however, leaving
+Beatty's cruisers unsupported. Meanwhile the armored cruisers of
+Arbuthnot were already under fire from Hipper's squadron and suffering
+severely. At 6.16 the _Defense_, the flagship of the squadron, blew
+up; the _Warrior_ was badly disabled, and the _Black Prince_ was
+so crippled as to be sunk during the night action. As Evan-Thomas
+made his turn, one of his battleships, the _Warspite_, was struck
+by a shell that jammed her steering gear in such a way as to send
+her head on toward the Germans. She served to shield the _Warrior_
+from destruction, but suffered thirty hits from heavy projectiles
+before she was brought under control and taken out of action.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MAY 31, 1916
+
+2nd and 3rd phases]
+
+Between six and 6.15 Jellicoe received bearings from Vice Admiral
+Burney (of the Sixth Battle Division), Evan-Thomas, and Beatty
+which enabled him for the first time to plot accurately the position
+of the German battle fleet. This information revealed the fact
+that previous plotting based on bearings coming from Goodenough
+and others was seriously wrong. The Germans were twelve miles to
+the west of where they were supposed to be. Jellicoe then formed
+line of battle, not on the starboard wing, which was nearest the
+head of the German advance, but on the port wing, which was farthest
+away, and speed was reduced to 14 knots in order to enable the
+battle cruisers to take station at the head of the line. Indeed
+some of the ships in the rear or sixth division had to stop their
+engines to avoid collision during deployment. By this time the
+ships of the sixth division began to come under the shells of the
+German battle fleet and they returned the fire. By half past six
+all sixteen of the German dreadnoughts were firing at the British
+lines, the slow predreadnoughts being so far to the rear as to
+be unable to take part. The battleship fire, however, neither at
+this point nor later showed the extraordinary accuracy displayed
+by the battle cruisers at the beginning, but this may possibly
+be attributed to the gathering mistiness that hung over the sea,
+darkened by the low-lying smoke from the host of ships.
+
+As soon as Scheer realized that he had not only run right into the
+arms of the Grand Fleet, but lay in the worst tactical position
+imaginable with an overwhelming force concentrated on the head
+of his line, he turned away to escape. The battle cruisers (at
+6.30) swung away sharply from east to south, the ships turning
+in succession. Meanwhile the torpedo flotillas tried to cover the
+turn by a gallant attack on the British battle line. At the same
+time smoke screens also were laid to cover the retirement. The
+_Invincible_, Hood's flagship, which was leading the British line,
+was at this juncture struck by a shell that penetrated her armor
+and exploded a magazine. The ship instantly broke in two and went
+to the bottom, and only four officers and two men were saved. Almost
+at the same instant the German battle cruiser _Luetzow_, Hipper's
+flagship, was so badly disabled by shells and torpedo that she
+fell out of line helpless. Hipper managed, however, to board a
+destroyer and two hours later succeeded in shifting his flag to
+the _Moltke_.
+
+[Illustration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLESHIP: THE KOENIG
+
+From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919
+
+Normal displacement, 25,800 tons. Length (waterline), 573 feet.
+Beam, 96-3/4 feet. Mean draught, 27-1/4 feet. Length (over all),
+580 feet.
+
+Guns:                             2 machine.
+  10--12 inch, 45 cal.          Torpedo tubes (19.7 inch):
+  14--5.9 inch, .50 cal.          4 (broadside) submerged.
+ (10 or 4--3.4 inch, 22 pdr.?)    1 (bow) submerged.
+ (2 anti-aircraft?)]
+
+At 6.35 Scheer performed a difficult maneuver that the fleet had
+practiced for just the situation that existed at this time. He
+wheeled his battleships simultaneously to starboard, forming line
+again on a westerly course. Twenty minutes later, finding that he
+was no longer under fire from the Grand Fleet, he repeated the
+maneuver, the ships turning again to starboard and forming line
+ahead again on an easterly, then southerly course. These changes of
+course were made under cover of smoke screens and were not observed
+by the British.
+
+By this time the Grand Fleet had formed line of battle on a
+southeasterly course and by 7.10 its leaders were concentrating
+their fire on the head of the German line, which was now caught
+under an overwhelming superiority of force. Unfortunately for the
+Germans the visibility conditions at this time were worse for them
+than for their enemy, for while the British ships were nearly or
+quite invisible, the Germans every now and then stood silhouetted
+against the western sky. The British fire at this time was heavy
+and accurate. The German fleet seemed marked for destruction.
+
+For Scheer it was now imperative to withdraw if he could. Accordingly
+at this juncture he sent out a flotilla of destroyers in a desperate
+effort to cover the retreat of his fleet. They fired a number of
+torpedoes at the English battle line, and retired with the loss
+of one boat. Their stroke succeeded, for Jellicoe turned his whole
+line of battleships away to avoid the torpedoes. Beatty, holding
+his course at the head of the line, signaled Admiral Jerram of
+the _King George V_ to follow astern, but he was evidently bound
+to the orders of his commander in chief. For the second time that
+day Beatty was left unsupported in his fight at the head of the
+line.
+
+Meanwhile Scheer's capital ships had simultaneously wheeled away
+in line to the westward under cover of the torpedo attacks and
+smoke screens made by the destroyers. This was the third time within
+an hour that they had effected this maneuver, and the skill with
+which the battleships managed these turns in line under a rain of
+fire speaks well for German seamanship. Meanwhile, to reenforce
+the covering movement made by the destroyers, Scheer sent out his
+battle cruisers in a sortie against Beatty, who was pressing hard
+on the head of the German line. The following account from Commander
+von Hase of the _Derfflinger_, which led this sortie, is interesting
+not only for its description of what occurred at this time but
+also as a picture of a personal experience of the terrific fire
+that the battle cruisers of both sides had to sustain throughout
+the greater part of the engagement. It was on them that the brunt
+of the fighting fell. The narrative is quoted from the pages of
+the _Naval and Military Record_:
+
+"By now our Commander-in-Chief had realized the danger threatening
+our fleet, the van of which was enclosed in a semicircle by the
+hostile fleet. We were, in fact, absolutely 'in the soup' (in absoluten
+Wurstkessel)! There was only one way to get clear of this tactically
+disadvantageous position: to turn the whole fleet about and steer on
+an opposite course. First to evade this dangerous encirclement. But
+the maneuver must be unobserved and executed without interference.
+The battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats must cover the movement of the
+fleet. At about[1] 9.12 the Commander-in-Chief made the signal to
+alter course, and almost simultaneously made by W/T [wireless] the
+historic signal to the battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats: 'Charge the
+enemy!' (Ran an den Feind!) Without turning a hair the captain ordered
+'Full speed ahead, course south-east.' Followed by the _Seydlitz,
+Molke_, and _Von der Tann_, we steamed at first south-east, then,
+from 9.15 onward, directly towards the head of the enemy's line.
+
+[Footnote 1: There was a difference of two hours in time between
+the German and the English standard.]
+
+"And now an infernal fire was opened on us, especially on the
+_Derfflinger_, as leading ship. Several ships were concentrating
+their fire upon us. I selected a target and fired as rapidly as
+possible. The range closed from 12,000 to 8,000 meters, and still
+we steamed full speed ahead into this inferno of fire, presenting
+a splendid target to the enemy, while he himself was very difficult
+to see. Salvo after salvo fell in our immediate vicinity, and shell
+after shell struck our ship. They were the most exciting minutes.
+I could no longer communicate with Lt. von Stosch (who was in the
+foretop control), as the telephone and voice-pipes had been shot
+away, so I had to rely an my own observations to direct the fire.
+At 9.13, previous to which all four 12 in. turrets were in action,
+a serious catastrophe occurred. A 15 in. shell penetrated the armor
+of No. 3 turret and exploded inside. The gallant turret captain, Lt.
+von Boltenstern, had both his legs torn off, and with him perished
+practically the entire guns' crew. The explosion ignited three
+cartridges, flames from which reached the working chamber, where
+eight more cartridges were set on fire, and passed down to the
+magazine, igniting still more cartridges. They burned fiercely,
+the flames roaring high above the turret--but they burned only,
+they did not explode--as our enemy's cartridges had done--and that
+saved the ship! Still, the effect of the burning cartridges was
+catastrophic; the flames killed everything within their reach.
+Of the 78 men of the turret crew only five escaped, some badly
+wounded, by crawling out through the holes for expelling empty
+cartridge cases. The remaining 73 men died instantly. A few seconds
+after this catastrophe another disaster befell us. A 15 in. shell
+pierced the shield of No. 4 turret and burst inside, causing frightful
+destruction. With the exception of one man, who was blown out of
+the turret hatch by the blast of air, the entire crew, including
+all the men in the magazines and shell-rooms, 80 souls in all,
+were instantly killed. All the cartridges which had been taken out
+of their metal cases were ignited, so that flames were now shooting
+sky-high from both the after turrets....
+
+"The enemy's shooting was splendid. Shell after shell crashed into
+us, and my heart stood still as I thought of what must be happening
+inside the ship. My thoughts were rudely disturbed. Suddenly it
+was to us as if the world had come to an end. A terrific roar, a
+mighty explosion, and then darkness fell upon us. We shook under
+a tremendous blow, which lifted the conning-tower bodily off its
+base, to which it sank back vibrating. A heavy shell had struck
+the gunnery control station about 20 inches from me. The shell
+burst, but did not penetrate because it had hit the thick armor at
+an angle, but huge pieces of plating were torn away.... We found,
+however, that all the artillery connections were undamaged. Splinters
+had penetrated the lookout slits of the conning-tower, wounding
+several people inside. The explosion had forced open the door,
+which jammed, and two men were unable to move it. But help from an
+unexpected quarter was at hand. Again we heard a terrific roar and
+crash, and with the noise of a thunderbolt a 15 in. shell exploded
+beneath the bridge. The blast of air swept away everything that was
+not firmly riveted down, and the chart-house disappeared bodily.
+But the astounding thing was that this same air pressure closed
+the door of the conning-tower! The Englishman was polite; having
+first opened the door, he carefully shut it again for us. I searched
+with my glass for the enemy, but, although the salvos were still
+falling about us, we could see practically nothing of him; all
+that was really visible were the huge, golden-red flames from the
+muzzles of his guns.... Without much hope of hurting the enemy I
+fired salvo after salvo from the forward turrets. I could feel
+how our shooting was calming the nerves of the crew. Had we not
+fired at this moment the whole ship's company would have been
+overpowered by a great despair, for everyone knew that a few minutes
+more of this would finish us. But so long as we fired things could
+not be so bad with us. The medium guns fired also, but only two
+of the six 5.9's on one side were still in action. The fourth gun
+was split from end to end by a burst in the muzzle, and the third
+was shot to pieces...."
+
+The battle-cruisers were recalled just in time--so it would appear--to
+save them from annihilation, and Com. von Hase proceeds:
+
+"All hands were now busy quelling the fires. Thick clouds of yellow
+gas still poured from both after turrets, but the flooding of the
+magazines soon got rid of this. None of us had believed that a
+ship could stand so many heavy hits. Some twenty 15 in. hits were
+counted after the battle, and about the same number of bad hits
+from smaller calibers. The _Luetzow_ was out of sight (she sank
+later), but the _Seydlitz, Moltke_, and _Von der Tann_ were
+still with us. They, too, had been badly punished, the _Seydlitz_
+worst of all. Flames still roared from one of her turrets, and
+all the other ships were burning. The bow of the _Seydlitz_ was
+deep in the water. Every battle-cruiser had suffered severe
+casualties.... But the death charge had achieved its purpose by
+covering the retreat of the battle fleet.... Our ship was very
+heavily battered, and in many places the compartments were mere
+heaps of debris. But vital parts were not hit, and, thanks to the
+strong armor, the engines, boilers, steering gear, and nearly all
+auxiliaries were undamaged. For a long time the engine-room was
+filled with noxious fumes, necessitating the use of gas masks.
+The entire ship was littered with thousands of large and small
+shell splinters, among which we found two practically undamaged
+15 in. shell caps, which were later used in the wardroom as wine
+coolers. The belt armour was pierced several times, but either
+the leaks were stopped or the inflow of water was localized in
+small compartments. In Wilhelmshaven we buried our dead, nearly
+200 in all."
+
+By 8 o'clock the German battleships had vanished, with the British
+steering westward by divisions in pursuit. But never again did
+the two battle fleets regain touch with each other. Occasional
+contact with an enemy vessel was made by other units of Jellicoe's
+force. About 8.20 another destroyer attack was threatened, and
+again Jellicoe swerved away, at the same time, however, sending
+the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and two destroyer flotillas,
+which succeeded in breaking up the attempt. At 8.30 he reformed
+his fleet in column and continued on a southwesterly course until
+9 o'clock.
+
+_Fourth Phase_
+
+As darkness came on, Jellicoe, declining to risk his ships under
+conditions most favorable to torpedo attack, arranged his battleships
+in four squadrons a mile apart, with destroyer flotillas five miles
+astern, and sent a mine-layer to lay a mine field in the neighborhood
+of the Vyl lightship, covering the route over which the Germans
+were expected to pass if they attempted to get home via the Horn
+Reef. He then headed southeast. Beatty also drew off from pursuit
+with his battle cruisers. Jellicoe's plan was to avoid a general
+night action, but to hold such a position as to compel the Germans
+to fight again the following morning in order to reach their bases.
+During the night (between ten and 2.35) there were several sharp
+conflicts, mainly between the destroyers and light cruisers of
+the opposing fleets, with considerable loss on both sides. On the
+British side, two armored cruisers, _Black Prince_ and _Warrior_,
+went down--both crippled by damages sustained during the day--and
+five destroyers. Six others were severely damaged. On the German
+side, the battle cruiser _Luetzow_ sank as a result of her injuries,
+the predreadnought battleship _Pommern_ was blown up by a torpedo,
+three light cruisers were sunk, and four or five other ships suffered
+from torpedo or mine.
+
+The contacts made by British destroyers and cruisers confirm the
+accounts of the Germans as to the course of their fleet during
+the night. About nine o'clock Scheer changed course sharply from
+west to southeast and cut through the rear of the British fleet.
+At dawn, about 2.40, he was twenty miles to eastward of Jellicoe on
+the road to Wilhelmshaven. At noon the greater part of the German
+fleet was safe in port. Some of the lighter ships, to escape the
+assaults of the British destroyers during the night, headed north
+and got home by way of the Skagerrak and the Kiel Canal.
+
+Jellicoe had avoided a night pursuit for the sake of fighting on
+better terms the next morning, but at dawn he found his destroyers
+scattered far and wide. Judging it unwise to pursue the High Seas
+Fleet without a screening force, and discovering by directional
+wireless that it was already south of Horn Reef and in the neighborhood
+of the mine fields, he gave up the idea of renewing the engagement
+and turned north. He spent the forenoon in sweeping the scene of
+the previous day's fighting, collecting his dispersed units, and
+then returned to his bases.
+
+The claim of victory, which was promptly and loudly made by the
+German press, is absurd enough. After the Grand Fleet arrived there
+could be only one thought for the Germans and that was a fighting
+retreat. Nevertheless, they had every reason to be proud of what
+they had done. They had met a force superior by a ratio of about 8
+to 5 and had escaped after inflicting nearly twice as much damage
+as they had sustained. These losses may be compared by means of
+the following table[1]:
+
+BRITISH, Three Battle Cruisers,  QUEEN MARY     26,350 tons
+                                 INDEFATIGABLE  18,800  "
+                                 INVINCIBLE     17,250  "
+
+         Three Armored Cruisers, DEFENSE        14,600  "
+                                 WARRIOR        13,550  "
+                                 BLACK PRINCE   13,350  "
+
+         Eight Destroyers,       TIPPERARY       1,430  "
+                                 NESTOR            890  "
+                                 NOMAD             890  "
+                                 TURBULENT       1,100  "
+                                 FORTUNE           965  "
+                                 ARDENT            935  "
+                                 SHARK             935  "
+                                 SPARROWHAWK       935  "
+                                               ------------
+                                 Total         111,980 tons
+
+GERMANS, One Battle Cruiser      LUETZOW        26,180 tons
+         One Pre-dreadnought,    POMMERN        13,200  "
+         Four Light Cruisers,    WIESBADEN       5,400  "
+                                 ELBING          4,500  "
+                                 ROSTOCK         4,900  "
+                                 FRAUENLOB       2,700  "
+
+         Five Destroyers,        V-4               570  "
+                                 V-48              750  "
+                                 V-27              640  "
+                                 V-29              640  "
+                                 S-33              700  "
+                                               ------------
+                                 Total          60,180 tons
+
+Personnel, killed and wounded: BRITISH, about 6,600: GERMANS, 3,076.
+
+[Footnote 1: Figures in these tables taken from Lieut. Comdr. H.
+H. Frost, U. S. N., _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, Jan.,
+1920, p. 84.]
+
+With all allowance for the poor visibility conditions and the deepening
+twilight, it must be admitted also that Scheer handled his ships
+with great skill. Caught in a noose by an overwhelming force, he
+disentangled himself by means of the torpedo attacks of his destroyer
+flotillas and turned away under cover of their smoke screens. After
+nightfall he boldly cut through the rear of the British fleet in
+battle line, and reached his base in safety with the great bulk
+of his ships. Meanwhile at practically all stages of the fighting
+German gunnery was both rapid and accurate, the seamanship was
+admirable, and there was no lack of courage of the highest order.
+
+As to material, Admiral Jellicoe notes the superiority of the German
+fleet in range-finding devices, searchlights, smoke screens, a star
+shell--unknown to the British and invaluable for night fighting--and
+in the armor piercing quality of the shells. Moreover the Germans
+were completely equipped with systems of director firing, while
+the British were not. According to Admiral Sir Percy Scott,[1]
+"at the Battle of Jutland ... the commander in chief had only six
+ships of his fleet completely fitted with director firing ... he
+had not a single cruiser in the fleet fitted for director firing."
+
+[Footnote 1: FIFTY YEARS IN THE ROYAL NAVY, p. 278.]
+
+The greatest superiority of all probably lay in the structural
+features of the newer German ships. For some years prior to the
+war Admiral von Tirpitz had devoted himself to the problem of under
+water protection, to localize the effect of torpedo and mine on
+the hull of a ship. To quote the words of von Tirpitz:[2]
+
+[Footnote 2: MY MEMOIRS, Vol. I, p. 171.]
+
+"We built a section of a modern ship by itself and carried out
+experimental explosions on it with torpedo heads, carefully testing
+the result every time. We tested the possibility of weakening the
+force of the explosion by letting the explosive gases burst in
+empty compartments without meeting any resistance. We ascertained
+the most suitable steel for the different structural parts, and
+found further that the effect of the explosion was nullified if
+we compelled it to pulverize coal in any considerable quantity.
+This resulted in a special arrangement of the coal bunkers. We
+were then able to meet the force of the explosion ... by a strong,
+carefully constructed steel wall which finally secured the safety
+of the interior of the ship."
+
+The only German armored ship that succumbed to the blow of a single
+torpedo was the _Pommern_, an old vessel, built before the fruits
+of these experiments were embodied in the German fleet. The labor
+of von Tirpitz was well justified by the results, as may be seen
+by the instantaneous fashion in which the three British battle
+cruisers went to the bottom, compared with the ability of the German
+battle cruisers to stand terrific pounding and yet stay afloat and
+keep going. According to the testimony of a German officer,[1] the
+_Luetzow_ was literally shot to pieces in the battle and even then
+it took three torpedoes to settle her. Actually she was sunk by
+opening her seacocks to prevent her possible capture. The remarkable
+ability of the battle cruiser _Goeben_, in Turkish waters, to survive
+shell, mines, and torpedo, bears the same testimony, as does the
+_Mainz_, which, in the action of the Heligoland Bight had to be
+sunk by one of her own officers, as in the case of the _Luetzow_.
+It is possible that Jellicoe assumed an inferiority of the British
+armor piercing shell because of this power of the German ships to
+stay afloat. But photographs published after the armistice showed
+that British shells penetrated the 11-inch turret armor of the
+_Seydlitz_ and the 13-inch of the _Derfflinger_ with frightful
+effect. The difference was in the fact that they did not succeed
+in sinking those ships, which, after all is the chief object of a
+shell, and this must be attributed to better under-water construction.
+
+[Footnote 1: Quoted in _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 24, 1919,
+p. 822.]
+
+The only criticism it seems possible to suggest on Scheer's tactics
+is the unwariness of his pursuit, which might so easily have led
+to the total destruction of the German fleet. Strangely enough,
+although a Zeppelin hovered over the British fleet at dawn of the
+day after the battle, no aircraft of any kind scouted ahead of the
+Germans the day before. In pursuing Beatty, Scheer had to take
+a chance, well aware that if the Grand Fleet were within reach,
+Beatty's wireless would bring it upon him. But Scheer was evidently
+perfectly willing to risk the encounter. Such criticism as arose in
+Germany--from Captain Persius, for example--centered on "Tirpitz's
+faulty constructional methods"; which, in the light of the facts
+of the battle would seem to be the very last thing to hit upon.
+
+As for types and weapons it is clear that the armored cruisers
+served only as good targets and death traps. The British would
+have been better off if every armored cruiser had been left at
+home. The dominating feature of the story is the influence of the
+torpedo on Jellicoe's tactics. It is fair to say that it was the
+Parthian tactics of the German destroyer, both actual and potential,
+that saved the High Seas Fleet and robbed the British of a greater
+Trafalgar. At every crisis in the battle it was either what the
+German destroyer did or might do that governed the British commander's
+maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather
+than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers
+might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost
+all contact with their enemy for the rest of the battle, it was
+because of a destroyer attack. At this time eleven destroyers
+accomplished the feat of driving 27 dreadnoughts from the field!
+Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril
+of destroyer attacks under cover of darkness, and finally Jellicoe
+decided not to risk an action the following morning because his
+capital ships had no screening forces against the torpedo of the
+enemy. It is worth noting in this connection that although the
+Admiralty were aware of the battle in progress, they held back the
+Harwich force of destroyers and light cruisers which would have
+proved a welcome reenforcement in pursuing the retreating fleet.
+The reason for this decision has never been published.
+
+In connection with the important part played by the German destroyers
+at Jutland it is worth remarking that before the war it was the
+Admiralty doctrine that destroyers could not operate successfully
+by day, and they were accordingly painted black for night service.
+The German destroyers were painted gray. After Jutland the British
+flotillas also were painted the battleship gray.
+
+Naturally the failure of the superior fleet to crush the inferior one
+aroused a storm of criticism, the most severe emanating from English
+naval writers. The sum and substance is the charge of overcaution
+on the part of the British Commander in Chief. It is held that
+Jellicoe should have formed his battle line on his starboard instead
+of his port wing, thus turning toward the enemy and concentrating
+on the head of their column at once. Forming on the port division
+caused the battle fleet to swerve away from the enemy and open
+the range just at the critical moment of contact, leaving Beatty
+unsupported in his dash across the head of the enemy's line. It
+is said that the latter even sent a signal to the _Marlborough_
+for the battleships to fall in astern of him, and the failure to
+do so made his maneuver fruitless. Apparently this message was
+not transmitted to the flagship at the time. In answer Jellicoe
+explains in great detail that the preliminary reports received
+from Goodenough and others as to the position of the High Seas
+Fleet were so meager and conflicting that he could not form line
+of battle earlier than he did, and secondly that deploying on the
+starboard division at the moment of sighting the enemy would have
+thrown the entire battle fleet into confusion, blanketed their
+fire, and created a dangerous opening for torpedo attack from the
+destroyers at the head of the German column. On this point Scheer
+agrees with the critics. Deploying on the starboard division instead
+of the port, he says, "would have greatly impeded our movements and
+rendered a fresh attack on the enemy's line extremely difficult."
+
+The second point of criticism rested on the turning away of the
+battleships at the critical point of the torpedo attack at 7.20,
+under cover of which the German battleships wheeled to westward and
+disappeared. Jellicoe's reply is that if he had swung to starboard,
+turning toward the enemy, he would have headed into streams of
+approaching torpedoes under conditions of mist and smoke that were
+ideal for torpedo attack, and if he had maintained position in line
+ahead he would have courted heavy losses. In connection with this
+turn he calls attention to the fact that British light cruisers and
+destroyers could not be used to deliver a counter attack because,
+on account of the rapid changes of course and formation made by the
+battlefleet, they had been unable to reach their proper station
+in the van.
+
+Thirdly, if conditions for night battle were too risky why did
+the Grand Fleet fail to keep sufficient touch with the enemy by
+means of its light flotillas so as to be informed of his movements
+and prevent his escape? There were frequent contacts during that
+short night, and the Germans were sighted steering southeast. The
+attacks made by British destroyers certainly threw the German line
+into confusion, and some of the light vessels were driven to the
+north, reaching German bases by way of the Baltic. Nevertheless
+the fleet succeeded in cutting through without serious loss. To
+this there seems to be no answer.
+
+Lastly, to the query why Jellicoe did not seek another action in
+the morning, as originally intended, he replies that he discovered
+by directional wireless that the Germans were already safe between
+the mine fields and the coast, and that he could not safely proceed
+without his screening force of destroyers and light cruisers, which,
+after their night operations, were widely scattered. From German
+accounts, however, we find no mention of a shelter behind mine
+fields, but astonishment at the fact that they were permitted to go
+on their way unmolested. Morning found the two fleets only twenty
+miles apart, and the Germans had a half day's steaming before they
+could reach port. They were in no condition to fight. The battleship
+_Ostfriesland_ had struck a mine and had to be towed. The battle
+cruiser _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to keep her from sinking, and
+other units were limping along with their gun decks almost awash.
+
+Certainly the tactics of Jellicoe do not suggest those of Blake,
+Hawke, or Nelson. They do not fit Farragut's motto--borrowed from
+Danton[1]--"l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace," or
+Napoleon's "frappez vite, frappez fort." War, as has been observed
+before, cannot be waged without taking risks. The British had a
+heavy margin to gamble on. As it happened, 23 out of the entire 28
+battleships came out of the fight without so much as a scratch on
+their paint; and, after deployment, only one out of the battle line
+of 27 dreadnoughts received a single hit. This was the _Colossus_,
+which had four men wounded by a shell.
+
+[Footnote 1: And borrowed by Danton from Cicero.]
+
+The touchstone of naval excellence is Nelson. As Mahan has so ably
+pointed out, while weapons change principles remain. Dewey, in
+deciding to take the chances involved in a night entry of Manila
+Bay did so in answer to his own question, "What would Farragut
+do?" Hence in considering Jutland one may take a broader view than
+merely a criticism of tactics. In a word, does the whole conduct
+of the affair reveal the method and spirit of Nelson?
+
+At Trafalgar there was no need for a deployment after the enemy
+was sighted because in the words of the famous Memorandum, "the
+order of sailing is to be the order of battle." The tactics to
+be followed when the French appeared had been carefully explained
+by Nelson to his commanders. No signal was needed--except the fine
+touch of inspiration in "England expects every man to do his duty."
+In brief, the British fleet had been so thoroughly indoctrinated,
+and the plan was so simple, that there was no room for hesitation,
+uncertainty, or dependence on the flagship for orders at the last
+minute. It is hard to see evidence of any such indoctrination of
+the Grand Fleet before Jutland.
+
+Again, Nelson was, by example and precept, constantly insisting
+on the initiative of the subordinate. "The Second in Command will
+... have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon
+the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
+destroyed.... Captains are to look to their particular line as
+their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor
+perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his
+ship alongside that of an enemy." At Jutland, despite the urgent
+signals of Beatty at two critical moments, neither Burney of the
+sixth division nor Jerram of the first felt free to act independently
+of the orders of the Commander in Chief. The latter tried, as Nelson
+emphatically did not, to control from the flagship every movement
+of the entire fleet.
+
+Further, if naval history has taught anything it has established
+a point so closely related to the responsibility and initiative
+of the subordinate as to be almost a part of it; namely, a great
+fleet that fights in a single rigid line ahead never achieves a
+decisive victory. Blake, Tromp, and de Ruyter fought with squadrons,
+expecting--indeed demanding--initiative on the part of their flag
+officers. That was the period when great and decisive victories
+were won. The close of the 17th century produced the "Fighting
+Instructions," requiring the unbroken line ahead, and there followed
+a hundred years of indecisive battles and bungled opportunities. Then
+Nelson came and revived the untrammeled tactics of the days of Blake
+with the added glory of his own genius. It appears that at Jutland
+the battleships were held to a rigid unit of fleet formation as in
+the days of the Duke of York or Admiral Graves. And concentration
+with a long line of dreadnoughts is no more possible to-day than
+it was with a similar line of two-decked sailing ships a century
+and a half ago.
+
+Finally, in the matter of spirit, the considerations that swayed
+the movements of the Grand Fleet at all stages were apparently
+those of what the enemy might do instead of what might be done
+to the enemy, the very antithesis of the spirit of Nelson. It is
+no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander in Chief
+that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his ships.
+The existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the
+Allied cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging
+on its use. But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the
+British fleet exist merely to maintain a numerical preponderance
+over its enemy or to crush that enemy--whatever the cost? If the
+battle of Jutland receives the stamp of approval as the best that
+could have been done, then the British or the American officer of
+the future will know that he is expected primarily to "play safe."
+But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or Nelson, the
+men who made the traditions of the Service and forged the anchors
+of the British Empire.
+
+Thus the great battle turned out to be indecisive; in fact, it
+elated the Germans with a feeling of success and depressed the
+British with a keen sense of failure. Nevertheless, the control of
+the sea remained in the hands of the English, and never again did
+the High Seas Fleet risk another encounter. The relative positions
+at sea of the two adversaries therefore remained unaltered.
+
+On the other hand, if the British had destroyed the German fleet
+the victory would have been priceless. As Jervis remarked at Cape
+St. Vincent, "A victory is very essential to England at this hour."
+The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in Allied prospects. The Verdun
+offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the
+Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians
+had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation
+of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic
+suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of the
+war. Without a German battle fleet, the British could have forced
+the fighting almost to the very harbors of the German coast--bottling
+up every exit by a barrage of mines. The blockade, therefore, could
+have been drawn close to the coast defenses. Moreover, with the High
+Seas Fleet gone, the British fleet could have entered and taken
+possession of the Baltic, which throughout the war remained a German
+lake. By this move England would have threatened the German Baltic
+coast with invasion and extended her blockade in a highly important
+locality, cutting off the trade between Sweden and Germany. She
+would also have come to the relief of Russia, which was suffering
+terrible losses from the lack of munitions. Indeed it would have
+saved that ally from the collapse that withdrew her from the war.
+With no German "fleet in being" great numbers of workers in English
+industry and vast quantities of supplies might have been transferred
+to the support of the army. The threat of invasion would have been
+removed, and the large army that was kept in England right up to
+the crisis of March, 1918,[1] would have been free to reenforce
+the army at the front. Finally, without the personnel of the German
+fleet there could have been no ruthless submarine campaign the year
+after, such as actually came so near to winning the war. Thus,
+while the German claim to a triumph that drove the British from
+the seas is ridiculous, it is equally so to argue, as the First
+Lord of the Admiralty did, that there was no need of a British
+victory at Jutland, that all the fruits of victory were gained as
+it was. The subsequent history of the war tells a different tale.
+
+[Footnote 1: A quarter of a million men were sent from England at
+this time.]
+
+REFERENCES
+
+THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916, Admiral Viscount Lord Jellicoe of
+  Scapa, 1919.
+THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral
+  von Scheer, 1920.
+THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Commander Carlyon Bellairs, M. P., 1920.
+THE NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919, Earl Brassey.
+A DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Lieut. Commander H.
+  H. Frost, U. S. N., in U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, vol.
+  45, pp. 1829 ff, 2019 ff; vol. 46, pp. 61 ff.
+THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, A. H. Pollen, 1919.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: COMMERCE WARFARE
+
+Interdiction of enemy trade has always been the great weapon of
+sea power; and hence, though mines, submarines, and the menace
+of the High Seas Fleet itself made a close blockade of the German
+coast impossible, Great Britain in the World War steadily extended
+her efforts to cut off Germany's intercourse with the overseas
+world. Germany, on the other hand, while unwilling or unable to
+take the risks of a contest for surface control of the sea, waged
+cruiser warfare on British and Allied commerce, first by surface
+vessels, and, when these were destroyed, by submarines. In the
+policies adopted by each belligerent there is an evident analogy to
+the British blockade and the French commerce destroying campaigns
+of the Napoleonic Wars. And just as in the earlier conflict British
+sea power impelled Napoleon to a ruinous struggle for the domination
+of Europe, so in the World War, though in a somewhat different
+fashion, the blockade worked disaster for Germany.
+
+"The consequences of the blockade," writes the German General von
+Freytag-Loringhoven, "showed themselves at once. Although we succeeded
+in establishing our war economics by our internal strength, yet
+the unfavorable state of the world economic situation was felt by
+us throughout the war. That alone explains why our enemies found
+ever fresh possibilities of resistance, because the sea stood open
+to them, and why victories which would otherwise have been absolutely
+decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not bring us
+nearer peace."
+
+For each group of belligerents, indeed, the enemy's commerce warfare
+assumed a vital significance. "No German success on land," declares
+the conservative British Annual Register for 1919, "could have
+ruined or even very gravely injured the English-speaking powers.
+The success of the submarine campaign, on the other hand, would
+have left the United States isolated and have placed the Berlin
+Government in a position to dominate most of the rest of the world."
+"The war is won for us," declared General von Hindenburg on July 2,
+1917, "if we can withstand the enemy attacks until the submarine
+has done its work."
+
+Commerce warfare at once involves a third party, the neutral; and
+it therefore appears desirable, before tracing the progress of
+this warfare, to outline briefly the principles of international
+law which, by a slow and tortuous process, have grown up defining
+the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents in naval war.
+_Blockade_ is among the most fundamental of these rights accorded
+to the belligerent, upon the conditions that the blockade shall be
+limited to enemy ports or coasts, confined within specified limits,
+and made so effective as to create evident danger to traffic. It
+assumes control of the sea by the blockading navy, and, before the
+days of mines and submarines, it was enforced by a cordon of ships
+off the enemy coast. A blockade stops direct trade or intercourse
+of any kind.
+
+Whether or not a blockade is established, a belligerent has the
+right to attempt the prevention of _trade in contraband_. A neutral
+nation is under no obligation whatever to restrain its citizens from
+engaging in this trade. In preventing it, however, a belligerent
+warship may stop, visit, and search any merchant vessel on the
+high seas. If examination of the ship's papers and search show
+fraud, contraband cargo, offense in respect to blockade, enemy
+ownership or service, the vessel may be taken as a prize, subject
+to adjudication in the belligerent's prize courts. The right of
+merchant vessels to carry defensive armament is well established;
+but resistance justifies destruction. Under certain circumstances
+prizes may be destroyed at sea, after removal of the ship's papers
+and full provision for the safety of passengers and crew.
+
+The Declaration of London,[1] drawn up in 1909, was an attempt to
+restate and secure general acceptance of these principles, with
+notable modifications. Lists were drawn up of _absolute_ contraband
+(munitions, etc., adapted obviously if not exclusively for use in
+war), _conditional_ contraband (including foodstuffs, clothing,
+rolling stock, etc., susceptible of use in war but having non-warlike
+uses as well), and free goods (including raw cotton and wool, hides,
+and ores). The most significant provision of the Declaration was that
+the doctrine of _continuous voyage_ should apply only to absolute
+contraband. This doctrine, established by Great Britain in the
+French wars and expanded by the United States in the American Civil
+War, holds that the ultimate enemy destination of a cargo determines
+its character, regardless of transshipment in a neutral port and
+subsequent carriage by sea or land. The Declaration of London was
+never ratified by Great Britain, and was observed for only a brief
+period in the first months of the war. Had it been ratified and
+observed, Germany would have been free to import all necessary
+supplies, other than munitions, through neutral states on her frontiers.
+
+[Footnote 1: Printed in full in INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS of the
+U. S. Naval War College, 1910, p. 169 ff.]
+
+_The Blockade of Germany_
+
+Unable to establish a close blockade, and not venturing at once to
+advance the idea of a "long range" blockade, England was nevertheless
+able to impose severe restrictions upon Germany by extending the
+lists of contraband, applying the doctrine of continuous voyage
+to both absolute and conditional contraband, and throwing upon the
+owners of cargoes the burden of proof as to destination. Cotton
+still for a time entered Germany, and some exports were permitted.
+But on March 1, 1915, in retaliation for Germany's declaration
+of a "war area" around the British Isles, Great Britain asserted
+her purpose to establish what amounted to a complete embargo on
+German trade, holding herself free, in the words of Premier Asquith,
+"to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed
+enemy destination, ownership, or origin." In a note of protest on
+March 30, the United States virtually recognized the legitimacy of a
+long-range blockade--an innovation of seemingly wide possibilities--and
+confined its objections to British interference with lawful trade
+between neutrals, amounting in effect to a blockade of neutral
+ports.
+
+As a matter of fact, in spite of British efforts, there had been an
+immense increase of indirect trade with Germany through neutrals.
+While American exports to Germany in 1915 were $154,000,000 less
+than in 1913, and in fact practically ceased altogether, American
+exports to Holland and the Scandinavian states increased by
+$158,000,000. This trade continued up to the time when the United
+States entered the war, after which all the restrictions which
+England had employed were given a sharper application. By a simple
+process of substitution, European neutrals had been able to import
+commodities for home use, and export their own products to Germany.
+Now, in order to secure supplies at all, they were forced to sign
+agreements which put them on rations and gave the Western Powers
+complete control of their exports to Germany.
+
+The effect of the Allied blockade upon Germany is suggested by the
+accompanying chart. In the later stages of the war it created a
+dearth of important raw materials, crippled war industries, brought
+the country to the verge of starvation, and caused a marked lowering
+of national efficiency and morale.
+
+Germany protested vigorously to the United States for allowing
+her foodstuffs to be shut out of Germany while at the same time
+shipping to England vast quantities of munitions. Throughout the
+controversy, however, Great Britain profited by the fact that while
+her methods caused only financial injury to neutrals, those employed
+by Germany destroyed or imperiled human lives.
+
+_The Submarine Campaign_
+
+[Illustration: From _The Blockade of Germany_, Alonzo E. Taylor,
+WORLD'S WORK, Oct. 1919.
+
+EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY
+
+Decreased supply of commodities in successive years of the war.]
+
+The German submarine campaign may be dated from February 18, 1915,
+when Germany, citing as a precedent Great Britain's establishment
+of a military area in the North Sea, proclaimed a _war zone_ "in
+the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole
+English Channel," within which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk
+without assurance of safety to passengers or crew. Furthermore, as
+a means of keeping neutrals out of British waters, Germany declared
+she would assume no responsibility for destruction of neutral ships
+within this zone. What this meant was to all intents and purposes a
+"paper" submarine blockade of the British Isles. Its illegitimacy
+arose from the fact that it was conducted surreptitiously over a
+vast area, and was only in the slightest degree effective, causing
+a destruction each month of less than one percent of the traffic.
+Had it been restricted to narrow limits, it would have been still
+less effective, owing to the facility of countermeasures in a small
+area.
+
+Determined, however, upon a spectacular demonstration of its
+possibilities, Germany first published danger notices in American
+newspapers, and then, on May 7, 1915, sank the unarmed Cunard liner
+_Lusitania_ off the Irish coast, with a loss of 1198 lives, including
+102 Americans. In spite of divided American sentiment and a strong
+desire for peace, this act came little short of bringing the United
+States into the war. Having already declared its intention to hold
+Germany to "strict accountability," the United States Government
+now stated that a second offense would be regarded as "deliberately
+unfriendly," and after a lengthy interchange of notes secured the
+pledge that "liners will not be sunk without warning and without
+safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do
+not try to escape or offer resistance." Violations of this pledge,
+further controversies, and increased friction with neutrals marked the
+next year or more, during which, however, sinkings did not greatly
+exceed the level of about 150,000 tons a month already attained.
+
+During this period Allied countermeasures were chiefly of a defensive
+character, including patrol of coastal areas, diversion of traffic
+from customary routes, and arming of merchantmen. This last measure,
+making surface approach and preliminary warning a highly dangerous
+procedure for the submarine, led Germany to the announcement that,
+after March 1, 1916, all armed merchant vessels would be torpedoed
+without warning. But how were U-boat commanders to distinguish
+between enemy and neutral vessels? Between vessels with or without
+guns? The difficulty brings out clearly the fact that while the
+submarines made good pirates, they were hampered in warfare on
+legitimate lines.
+
+Germany redoubled U-boat activities to lend strength to her peace
+proposals at the close of 1916, and when these failed she decided
+to disregard altogether the cobwebs of legalism that had hitherto
+hindered her submarine war. On February 1, 1917, she declared
+unrestricted warfare in an immense barred zone within limits extending
+from the Dutch coast through the middle of the North Sea to the
+Faroe Islands and thence west and south to Cape Finisterre, and
+including also the entire Mediterranean east of Spain. An American
+ship was to be allowed to enter and leave Falmauth once a week,
+and there was a crooked lane leading to Greece.
+
+[Illustration: GERMAN BARRED ZONES
+
+British mined area and North Sea mine barrage.]
+
+In thus announcing her intention to sink all ships on sight in
+European waters, Germany burned her bridges behind her. She staked
+everything on this move. Fully anticipating the hostility of the
+United States, she hoped to win the war before that country could
+complete its preparations and give effective support to the Allies.
+General von Hindenburg's statement has already been quoted. It meant
+that the army was to assume the defensive, while the navy carried
+out its attack on Allied communications. Admiral von Capelle, head
+of the German Admiralty, declared that America's aid would be
+"absolutely negligible." "My personal view," he added, "is that
+the U-boat will bring peace within six months."
+
+As it turned out, Germany's disregard of neutral rights in 1917,
+like the violation of Belgium in 1914, reacted upon her and proved
+the salvation of the Western Powers. After the defection of Russia,
+France was in imperative need of men. Great Britain needed ships.
+Neither of these needs could have been supplied save by America's
+throwing her utmost energies into active participation in the war.
+This was precisely the result of the proclamation of Feb. 1, 1917.
+The United States at once broke off diplomatic relations, armed
+her merchant vessels in March, and on April 6 declared a state
+of war.
+
+Having traced the development of submarine warfare to this critical
+period, we may now turn to the methods and weapons employed by
+both sides at a time when victory or defeat hinged on the outcome
+of the war at sea.
+
+Germany's submarine construction and losses appear in the following
+table from official German sources, the columns showing first the
+total number built up to the date given, next the total losses to
+date, and finally the remainder with which Germany started out
+at the beginning of each year.
+
+After 1916 Germany devoted the facilities of her shipyards entirely
+to submarine construction, and demoralized the surface fleet to
+secure personnel. Of the entire number built, not more than a score
+were over 850 tons. The U C boats were small mine-layers about 160
+feet in length, with not more than two weeks' cruising period.
+The U B'g were of various sizes, mostly small, and some of them
+were built in sections for transportation by rail. The U boats
+proper, which constituted the largest and most important class,
+had a speed of about 16 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged,
+and could remain at sea for a period of 5 or 6 weeks, the duration
+of the cruise depending chiefly upon the supply of torpedoes. In
+addition there were a half dozen large submarine merchantmen of
+the type of the _Deutschland_, which made two voyages to America
+in 1916; and a similar number of big cruisers of 2000 tons or more
+were completed in 1918, mounting two 6-inch guns and capable of
+remaining at sea for several months. The 372 boats built totaled
+209,000 tons and had a personnel of over 11,000 officers and men.
+There were seldom more than 20 or 30 submarines in active operation
+at one time. One third of the total number were always in port,
+and the remainder in training.
+
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+            | Boats |        |         Remainder
+            | built | Losses |(On Jan. 1 of year following)
+------------|-------|--------|-----------------------------
+End of 1914 |   31  |     5  |             26
+       1915 |   93  |    25  |             68
+       1916 |  188  |    50  |            138
+       1917 |  291  |   122  |            169
+       1918 |  372  |   202  |            170
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+
+It is evident from her limited supply of submarines at the outbreak
+of war that Germany did not contemplate their use as commerce
+destroyers. To the Allied navies also, in spite of warnings from
+a few more far-sighted officers, their use for this purpose came
+as a complete surprise. New methods had to be devised, new weapons
+invented, new types of ship built and old ones put to uses for which
+they were not intended--in short, a whole new system of warfare
+inaugurated amidst the preoccupations of war. As usual in such
+circumstances, the navy taking the aggressive with a new weapon
+gained a temporary ascendancy, until effective counter-measures
+could be contrived. It is easy to say that all this should have
+been foreseen and provided for, but it is a question to what extent
+preparations could profitably have been made before Germany began her
+campaign. It has already been pointed out in the chapter preceding
+that, had the German fleet been destroyed at Jutland, subsequent
+operations on the German coast might have made the submarine campaign
+impossible, and preparations unnecessary.
+
+[Illustration: U 71-80 OCEAN-GOING MINE-LAYERS
+
+U B 48-149
+
+U C 80 CLASS OF MINE-LAYERS
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES U 30 TO U 39
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM ABOUT U 51 to U 70
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM U 19 TO U 28
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM ABOUT U 30 UP TO U 39
+
+U 151-157 (OCEAN-GOING)
+
+OCEAN-GOING TYPES OF GERMAN SUBMARINES]
+
+_Anti-Submarine Tactics_
+
+Of the general categories of anti-submarine tactics,--detection,
+evasion, and destruction--it was naturally those of evasion that
+were first employed. Among these may be included suspension of
+sailings upon warning of a submarine in the vicinity, diversion
+of traffic from customary routes, camouflage, and zigzag courses
+to prevent the enemy from securing favorable position and aim.
+The first method was effective only at the expense of a severe
+reduction of traffic, amounting in the critical months of 1917
+to 40 per cent of a total stoppage. The second sometimes actually
+aided the submarine, for in confined areas such as the Mediterranean
+it was likely to discover the new route and reap a rich harvest.
+Camouflage was discarded as of slight value; but shifts of course were
+employed to advantage by both merchant and naval vessels throughout
+the war.
+
+Methods of detection depended on both sight and sound. Efficient
+lookout systems on shipboard, with men assigned to different sectors
+so as to cover the entire horizon, made it possible frequently
+to detect a periscope or torpedo wake in time to change course,
+bring guns to bear, and escape destruction. According to a British
+Admiralty estimate, in case a submarine were sighted the chances
+of escape were seven to three, but otherwise only one to four.
+Aircraft of all kinds proved of great value in detecting the presence
+of U-boats, as well as in attacking them. Hydrophones and other
+listening devices, though at first more highly perfected by the
+enemy, were so developed during the war as to enable patrol vessels
+to discover the presence and even determine the course and speed of
+a submerged foe. Along with these devices, a system of information
+was organized which, drawing information from a wide variety of
+sources, enabled Allied authorities to trace the cruise of a U-boat,
+anticipate its arrival in a given locality, and prophesy the duration
+of its stay.
+
+Among methods of destruction, the mounting of guns on merchantmen
+was chiefly valuable, as already suggested, because of its effect
+in forcing submarines to resort to illegal and barbarous methods
+of warfare. Hitherto, submarines had been accustomed to operate an
+the surface, board vessels, and sink them by bombs or gunfire. Visit
+and search, essential in order to avoid injury to neutrals, was now
+out of the question, for owing to the surface vulnerability of the
+submarine it might be sent to the bottom by a single well-directed
+shot. In brief, the guns on the merchant ship kept submarines beneath
+the surface, forced them to draw upon their limited and costly
+supply of torpedoes, and hindered them from securing good position
+and aim for torpedo attack.
+
+Much depended, of course, upon the range of the ship's guns and
+the size and experience of the gun-crews. When the United States
+began arming her ships in March, 1917, she was able to put enough
+trained men aboard to maintain lookouts and man guns both night
+and day. A dozen or more exciting duels ensued between ships and
+U-boats before the latter learned that such encounters did not
+repay the risks involved. On October 19, 1917, the steamer _J.
+L. Luckenbach_ had a four-hour running battle with a submarine in
+which the ship fired 202 rounds and the pursuer 225. The latter
+scored nine hits, but was at last driven off by the appearance of
+a destroyer. To cite another typical engagement, the _Navajo_, in
+the English Channel, July 4, 1917, was attacked first by torpedo
+and then by gunfire. The 27th shot from the ship hit the enemy's
+conning tower and caused two explosions. "Men who were on deck
+at the guns and had not jumped overboard ran aft. The submarine
+canted forward at an angle of almost 40 degrees, and the propeller
+could be plainly seen lashing the air."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: For more detailed narratives of this and other episodes
+of the submarine campaign, see Ralph D. Payne, THE FIGHTING FLEETS,
+1918.]
+
+In coastal waters where traffic converged, large forces of destroyers
+and other craft were employed for purposes of escort, mine sweeping,
+and patrol. Yet, save as a means of keeping the enemy under water
+and guarding merchant ships, these units had only a limited value
+owing to the difficulty of making contact with the enemy. During
+the later stages of the war destroyers depended chiefly upon the
+depth bomb, an invention of the British navy, which by means of
+the so-called "Y guns" could be dropped in large numbers around
+the supposed location of the enemy. It was in this way that the
+United States Destroyers _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_, while engaged
+as convoy escorts, sank the _U-58_ and captured its crew.
+
+The "mystery" or "Q" ships (well-armed vessels disguised as harmless
+merchantmen) were of slight efficacy after submarines gave up surface
+attack. In fact, it was the submarine itself which, contrary to all
+pre-war theories, proved the most effective type of naval craft against
+its own kind. Whereas fuel economy compelled German submarines to
+spend as much time as possible on the surface, the Allied under-water
+boats, operating near their bases, could cruise awash or submerged
+and were thus able to creep up on the enemy and attack unawares.
+According to Admiral Sims, Allied destroyers, about 500 in all, were
+credited with the certain destruction of 34 enemy submarines; yachts,
+patrol craft, etc., over 3000 altogether, sank 31; whereas about 100
+Allied submarines sank probably 20.[1] Since 202 submarines were
+destroyed, this may be an underestimate of the results accomplished
+by each type, but it indicates relative efficiency. Submarines kept
+the enemy beneath the surface, led him to stay farther away from
+the coast, and also, owing to the disastrous consequences that might
+ensue from mistaken identity, prevented the U-boats from operating
+in pairs. The chief danger encountered by Allied submarines was from
+friendly surface vessels. On one occasion an American submarine,
+the AL-10, approaching a destroyer of the same service, was forced
+to dive and was then given a bombardment of depth charges. This
+bent plates, extinguished lights, and brought the submarine again
+to the surface, where fortunately she was identified in the nick
+of time. The two commanders had been roommates at Annapolis.
+
+[Footnote 1: THE VICTORY AT SEA, _World's Work_, May, 1920, p. 56.]
+
+_Work of the United States Navy_
+
+Having borne the brunt of the naval war for three years, the British
+navy welcomed the reenforcements which the United States was able
+to contribute, and shared to the utmost the experience already
+gained. On May 3, 1917, the first squadron of 6 American destroyers
+arrived at Queenstown, and was increased to 50 operating in European
+waters in November, and 70 at the time of the armistice. A flotilla
+of yachts, ill adapted as they were for such service, did hazardous
+duty as escorts in the Bay of Biscay; and a score of submarines
+crossed the Atlantic during the winter to operate off Ireland and
+in the Azores. Five dreadnoughts under Admiral Rodman from the U.
+S. Atlantic fleet became a part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow.
+
+Probably the most notable work of the American navy was in projects
+where American manufacturing resources and experience in large-scale
+undertakings could be brought to bear. In four months, from July
+to November, 1917, the United States Navy constructed an oil pipe
+line from the west to the east coast of Scotland, thus eliminating
+the long and dangerous northern circuit. Five 14-inch naval guns,
+on railway mountings, with a complete train of 16 cars for each gun,
+were equipped by the navy, manned entirely with naval personnel, and
+were in action in France from August, 1918, until the armistice,
+firing a total of 782 rounds on the German lines of communication,
+at ranges up to 30 miles.
+
+The American proposal of a mine barrage across the entrance to the
+North Sea from Scotland to Norway at first met with slight approval
+abroad, so unprecedented was the problem of laying a mine-field 230
+miles in length, from 15 to 30 miles in width, and extending at
+least 240 feet downward in waters the total depth of which was 400
+or more feet. Even the mine barrier at the Straits of Dover had
+proved ineffective owing to heavy tides, currents, and bad bottom
+conditions, until it was strengthened by Admiral Keyes in 1918. By
+employing a large type of mine perfected by the United States Naval
+Bureau of Ordnance, it was found possible, however, to reduce by
+one-third the number of mines and the amount of wire needed for the
+North Sea Barrage. The task was therefore undertaken, and completed
+in the summer of 1918. Out of a total of 70,000 mines, 56,570, or
+about 80 per cent, were planted by American vessels. The barrage
+when completed gave an enemy submarine about one chance in ten of
+getting through. According to reliable records, it accomplished
+the destruction or serious injury of 17 German submarines, and by
+its deterrent effect, must have practically closed the northern
+exit to both under-water and surface craft.
+
+[Illustration: OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA]
+
+_The Attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend_
+
+At the Channel exit of the North Sea, a vigorous blow at the German
+submarine nests on the Belgian coast was finally struck on April
+22-23, 1918, by the Dover Force under Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, in
+one of the most brilliant naval operations of the war. Of the two
+Belgian ports, Ostend and Zeebrugge, the latter was much more useful
+to the Germans because better protected, less exposed to batteries
+on the land front, and connected by a deeper canal with the main
+base 8 miles distant at Bruges. It was planned, however, to attack
+both ports, with the specific purpose of sinking 5 obsolete cruisers
+laden with concrete across the entrances to the canals. The operation
+required extensive reconstruction work on the vessels employed, a
+thorough course of training for personnel, suitable conditions of
+atmosphere, wind, and tide, and execution of complicated movements
+in accordance with a time schedule worked out to the minute.
+
+At Ostend the attack failed owing to a sudden shift of wind which
+blew the smoke screen laid by motor boats back upon the two block
+ships, and so confused their approach that they were stranded and
+blown up west of the entrance.
+
+At Zeebrugge, two of the three block ships, the _Iphigenia_ and
+the _Intrepid_, got past the heavy guns on the mole, through the
+protective nets, and into the canal, where they were sunk athwart
+the channel by the explosion of mines laid all along their keels.
+To facilitate their entrance, the cruiser _Vindictive_ (Commander
+Alfred Carpenter), fitted with a false deck and 18 brows or gangways
+for landing forces, had been brought up 25 minutes earlier--to
+be exact, at a minute past midnight--along the outer side of the
+high mole or breakwater enclosing the harbor. Here, in spite of a
+heavy swell and tide, she was held in position by the ex-ferryboat
+_Daffodill_, while some 300 or 400 bluejackets and marines swarmed
+ashore under a violent fire from batteries and machine guns and
+did considerable injury to the works on the mole. Fifteen minutes
+later, an old British submarine was run into a viaduct connecting
+the mole with the shore and there blown up, breaking a big gap in
+the viaduct. Strange to say, the _Vindictive_ and her auxiliaries,
+after lying more than an hour in this dangerous position, succeeded
+in taking aboard all survivors from the landing party and getting
+safely away. Motor launches also rescued the crews of the blockships
+and the men--all of them wounded--from the submarine. One British
+destroyer and two motor boats were sunk, and the casualties were
+176 killed, 412 wounded, and 49 missing. For a considerable period
+thereafter, all the larger German torpedo craft remained cooped
+up at Bruges, and the Zeebrugge blockships still obstructed the
+channel at the end of the war.
+
+[Illustration: ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND BRITISH
+BLOCKSHIPS]
+
+_The Convoy System_
+
+Of all the anti-submarine measures employed, prior to the North
+Sea Barrage and the Zeebrugge attack, the adoption of the convoy
+system was undoubtedly the most effective in checking the loss
+of tonnage at the height of the submarine campaign. Familiar as
+a means of commerce protection in previous naval wars, the late
+adoption of the convoy system in the World War occasioned very
+general surprise. It was felt by naval authorities, however, that
+great delay would be incurred in assembling vessels, and in restricting
+the speed of all ships of a convoy to that of the slowest unit.
+Merchant captains believed themselves unequal to the task of keeping
+station at night in close order, with all lights out and frequent
+changes of course, and they thought that the resultant injuries
+would be almost as great as from submarines. Furthermore, so long
+as a large number of neutral vessels were at sea, it appeared a
+very doubtful expedient to segregate merchant vessels of belligerent
+nationality and thus distinguish them as legitimate prey.
+
+[Illustration: BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS DESTROYED
+BY GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES
+
+(Figures in thousands of gross tons)
+
+The accompanying chart shows the merchant shipping captured or
+destroyed by Germany in the course of the war. After 1914 the losses
+were inflicted almost entirely by submarines, either by mine laying
+or by torpedoes. According to a British Admiralty statement of
+Dec. 5, 1919, the total loss during the war was 14,820,000 gross
+tons, of which 8,918,000 was British, and 5,918,000 was Allied
+or neutral. The United States lost 354,450 tons. During the same
+period the world's ship construction amounted to 10,850,000 tons,
+and enemy shipping captured and eventually put into Allied service
+totalled 2,393,000 tons, so that the net loss at the close of the
+war was about 1,600,000 tons.]
+
+But in April, 1917, the situation was indeed desperate. The losses
+had become so heavy that of every 100 ships leaving England it was
+estimated that 25 never returned.[1] The American commander in
+European waters, Admiral Sims, reports Admiral Jellicoe as saying
+at this time, "They will win unless we can stop these losses--and
+stop them soon."[2] Definitely adopted in May following, the convoy
+system was in general operation before the end of the summer, with
+a notable decline of sinkings in both the Mediterranean and the
+Atlantic. The following table, based on figures from the Naval
+Annual for 1919, indicates the number of vessels sunk for each
+submarine destroyed. It shows the decreased effectiveness of submarine
+operations after September 1, 1917, which is taken as the date
+when the convoy system had come into full use, and brings out the
+crescendo of losses in 1917.
+
+[Footnote 1: Brassey's NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _World's Work_, Sept., 1919.]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+              |Vessels sunk|           |
+              |     per    | Total No. |
+              |  submarine |   sunk    |
+              |  destroyed |           |
+--------------|------------|-----------|---------------------------------
+Aug. 1, 1914- |    10.4    |           |69 ships sunk, almost entirely by
+Feb., 1915    |            |           |  surface cruisers.
+              |            |           |
+Feb. 1, 1915- |     48     |    544    |Half by torpedo; 148 without
+Feb. 1, 1917  |            |(two years)| warning; 3,066 lives lost.
+              |            |           |
+Feb. 1, 1917- |     67     |    736    |572 by torpedo; 595 (69%) with
+Sept. 1, 1917 |            |(7 months) | out warning.
+              |            |           |
+Sept. 1, 1917-|    20.2    |    548    |448 (82%) without warning.
+April 1, 1918 |            |(7 months) |
+              |            |           |
+April 1, 1918-|     12     |    252    |239 (91%) without warning.
+Nov. 1, 1918  |            |(7 months) |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+From July 26, 1917, to October 26, 1918, 90,000 vessels were convoyed,
+with a total loss from the convoys of 436, or less than half of one
+per cent. The convoy system forced submarines to expose themselves
+to the attacks of destroyer escorts, or else to work close in shore
+to set upon vessels after the dispersion of the convoy. But when
+working close to the coast they were exposed to Allied patrols
+and submarines.
+
+Testifying before a German investigation committee, Captain Bartenbach,
+of the V-boat section of the German Admiralty, gave the chief perils
+encountered by his boats as follows: (1) mines, (2) Allied submarines,
+which "destroyed a whole series of our boats," (3) aircraft of all
+types, (4) armed merchantmen, (5) hydrophones and listening devices.
+Admiral Capelle in his testimony referred to the weakening of their
+efforts due to "indifferent material and second-rate crews."
+
+_Transport Work_
+
+Dependent in large measure upon the anti-submarine campaign for
+its safety and success, yet in itself an immense achievement, the
+transport of over 2,000,000 American troops to France must be regarded
+as one of the major naval operations of the war. Of these forces
+48% were carried in British, and 43% in American transports. About
+83% of the convoy work was under the protection of American naval
+vessels.
+
+The transportation work of the British navy, covering a longer
+period, was, of course, on a far greater scale. Speaking in Parliament
+on October 29, 1917, Premier Lloyd George indicated the extent of
+this service as follows: "Since the beginning of the war the navy
+has insured the safe transportation to the British and Allied armies
+of 13,000,000 men, 12,000,000 horses, 25,000,000 tons of explosives
+and supplies, and 51,000,000 tons of coal and oil. The loss of
+men out of the whole 13,000,000 was 3500, of which only 2700 were
+lost through the action of the enemy. Altogether 130,000,000 tons
+have been transported by British ships." These figures, covering but
+three years of the war, are of significance chiefly as indicating
+the immense transportation problems of the British and Allied navies
+and the use made of sea communications.
+
+These three main Allied naval operations--the blockade of Germany,
+the anti-submarine campaign, and the transportation of American
+troops to France--were unquestionably decisive factors in the war.
+Failure in any one of them would have meant victory for Germany. The
+peace of Europe, it is true, could be achieved only by overcoming
+Germany's military power on land. A breakdown there, with German
+domination of the Continent, would have created a situation which
+it is difficult to envisage, and which very probably would have
+meant a peace of compromise and humiliation for England and America.
+It is obvious, however, that, but for the blockade, Germany could
+have prolonged the war; but for American reenforcements, France
+would have been overrun; but for the conquest of the submarine,
+Great Britain would have been forced to surrender.
+
+In the spring of 1918 Germany massed her troops on the western
+front and began her final effort to break the Allied lines and
+force a decision. With supreme command for the first time completely
+centralized under Marshal Foch, and with the support of American
+armies, the Allies were able to hold up the enemy drives, and on
+July 18 begin the forward movement which pushed the Germans back
+upon their frontiers. Yet when the armistice was signed on November
+11, the German armies still maintained cohesion, with an unbroken
+line on foreign soil. Surrender was made inevitable by internal
+breakdown and revolution, the first open manifestations of which
+appeared among the sailors of the idle High Seas Fleet at Kiel.
+
+On November 21, 1918, this fleet, designed as the great instrument
+for conquest of world empire, and in its prime perhaps as efficient
+a war force as was ever set afloat, steamed silently through two
+long lines of British and Allied battleships assembled off the
+Firth of Forth, and the German flags at the mainmasts went down
+at sunset for the last time.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+BRASSEY'S NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919.
+THE VICTORY AT SEA, Vice-Admiral W. S. Sims, U. S. N., 1920.
+ANNUAL REPORT of the U. S Secretary of the Navy, 1918
+THE DOVER PATROL, 1915-1917, Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, R. N.,
+  1919.
+ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND DISPATCHES, ed. by C. Sanford Terry, 1919.
+LAYING THE NORTH SEA MINE BARRAGE, Captain R. R. Belknap,
+  U. S. N., U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan.-Feb., 1920.
+AMERICAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN THE WORLD WAR, by Prof.
+  C. S. Alden, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. June-July, 1920.
+For more popular treatment see also SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE,
+  Sir Henry Newbolt, 1919; THE FIGHTING FLEETS, Ralph
+  D. Payne, 1918; THE U-BOAT HUNTERS, James B. Connolly, 1918;
+  SEA WARFARE, Rudyard Kipling, 1917; etc.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+The brief survey of sea power in the preceding chapters has shown
+that the ocean has been the highway for the march of civilization and
+empire. Crete in its day became a great island power and distributed
+throughout the Mediterranean the wealth and the arts of its own
+culture and that of Egypt. In turn, Phoenicia held sway on the inland
+sea, and though creating little, she seized upon and developed the
+material and intellectual resources of her neighbors, and carried
+them not only to the corners of the Mediterranean, but far out
+on the unknown sea. Later when Phoenicia was subject to Persia,
+Athens by her triremes saved the growing civilization of Greece,
+and during a brief period of glory planted the seeds of Greek,
+as opposed to Asiatic culture, on the islands and coasts of the
+AEgean. After Athens, Carthage inherited the trident, and in turn
+fell before the energy of a land power, Rome. And as the Roman
+Empire grew to include practically all of the known world, every
+waterway, river and ocean, served to spread Roman law, engineering,
+and ideals of practical efficiency, at the same time bringing back
+to the heart of the Empire not only the products of the colonies,
+but such impalpable treasures as the art, literature, and philosophy
+of Greece. This was the story of the sea in antiquity.
+
+After the dissolution of the Roman empire, as Christian peoples
+were struggling in blood and darkness, a great menace came from
+Arabia, the Saracen invasion, which was checked successfully and
+repeatedly by the navy of Constantinople. To this, primarily, is
+due the preservation of the Christian ideal in the world. Later, the
+cities of Italy began to reestablish sea commerce, which had been
+for centuries interrupted by pirates. Venice gained the ascendancy,
+and Venetian ships carried the Crusading armies during the centuries
+when western peoples went eastward to fight for the Cross and brought
+back new ideas they had learned from the Infidels. Then there arose
+a new Mohammedan threat, the Turk, determined like the earlier
+Saracen to conquer the world for the Crescent. Constantinople,
+betrayed by Christian nations, fell, Christian peoples of the Levant
+were made subject to the Turk, and thereafter till our day the
+AEgean was a Turkish lake. About the same time a new Mohammedan sea
+power arose in the Moors of the African coast, and for a century
+and more the Mediterranean was a no-man's land between the rival
+peoples and the rival religions.
+
+Meanwhile the trade with the East by caravan routes to the Arabian
+Gulf had been stopped by the presence of the Turk. To reach the
+old markets, therefore, new routes had to be found and there came
+the great era of discovery. The new world was only an accidental
+discovery in a search for the westward route to Asia. The claims of
+Spain to this new region called forth her fleets of trading ships.
+But the lure of the West attracted the energies of the English
+also, and England and Spain clashed. As Spain became more and more
+dependent on her western colonies for income, and yet failed to
+establish her ascendancy over the Atlantic routes, she declined
+in favor of her enemies, England and Holland. The latter country,
+being dependent on the sea for sustenance, early captured a large
+part of the world's carrying trade, especially in the Mediterranean
+and the East. Her rich profits excited the envy and rivalry of the
+English, and in consequence, after three hard-fought naval wars,
+the scepter of the sea passed to England. The subsequent wars between
+England and France served only to strengthen England's control of
+trade routes and extend her colonial possessions; with one notable
+exception, when France, denying to her rival the control of the sea
+at a critical juncture in the American Revolution, deprived her
+of her richest and most extensive colony. It was primarily England
+with her navy that broke the power of Napoleon in the subsequent
+conflict, and throughout a century of peace the spread of English
+speech and institutions has extended to the uttermost parts of
+the world. One power in our day challenged Britain's control of
+the sea--now even more essential to her security than it was in
+the 17th century to that of Holland--and the World War was the
+consequence.
+
+In all this story it is interesting to note that insularity in
+position is the reverse of insularity in fact. Crete touched the
+far shores of the Mediterranean because she was an island and her
+people were forced upon the sea. Similarly, Phoenicia, driven to
+sea by mountains and desert at her back, spread her sails beyond
+the Pillars of Hercules. And England, hemmed in by the Atlantic,
+has carried her goods and her language to every nook and cranny of
+the earth. Thus the ocean has served less to separate than to bring
+together. As a common highway it has not only excited quarrels, but
+established common interests between nations. Special agreements
+governing the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, navigation
+regulations and the like, have long since brought nations together in
+peace on a common ground. It has also gone far to create international
+law for the problems of war. Rules governing blockade, contraband,
+and neutral rights have been agreed upon long since. But, as every
+war has proved, international law has needed a higher authority to
+enforce its rules in the teeth of a powerful belligerent. To remedy
+this defect is one of the purposes of a League of Nations.
+
+Such has been the significance of the sea. The nations who have
+used it have made history and have laid the rest of the world under
+their dominion intellectually, commercially, and politically. Indeed,
+the story of the sea is the history of civilization.
+
+At the conclusion of this survey, it is appropriate to pause and
+summarize what is meant by the term "sea power." It is a catch
+phrase, made famous by Mahan and glibly used ever since. What does
+sea power mean? What are its elements?
+
+Obviously it means, in brief, a nation's ability to enforce its will
+upon the sea. This means a navy superior to those of its enemies.
+But it means also strategic bases equipped for supplying a fleet
+for battle or offering refuge in defeat. To these bases there must
+run lines of communication guarded from interruption by the enemy.
+Imagine, for instance, the Suez or the Panama Canal held by a hostile
+force, or a battlefleet cut off from its fuel supply of coal or
+oil.
+
+The relation of shipping to sea power is not what it was in earlier
+days. Merchantmen are indeed still useful in war for transport
+and auxiliary service, but it is no longer true that men in the
+merchant service are trained for man-of-war service. The difference
+between them has widened as the battleship of to-day differs from
+a merchantman of to-day. Nor can a merchantship be transformed
+into a cruiser, as in the American navy of a hundred years ago.
+The place of shipping in sea power is therefore subsidiary. In
+fact, unless a nation can control the sea, the amount of its wealth
+dispersed in merchantmen is just so much loss in time of war.
+
+The major element in sea power is the fleet, but possession of
+the largest navy is no guarantee of victory or even of control
+of the sea. Size is important, but it is an interesting fact that
+most of the great victories in naval history have been won by a
+smaller fleet over a larger. The effectiveness of a great navy
+depends first on its quality, secondly, on how it is handled, and
+thirdly, on its power of reaching the enemy's communications.
+
+The quality of a navy is two-fold, material and personal. In material,
+the great problem of modern days is to keep abreast of the time. The
+danger to a navy lies in conservatism and bureaucratic control. There
+is always the chance that a weaker power may defeat the stronger, not
+by using the old weapons, but by devising some new weapon that will
+render the old ones obsolete. The trouble with the professional man
+in any walk of life has always been that he sticks to the traditional
+ways. In consequence he lays himself open to the amateur, who,
+caring nothing about tradition, beats him with something novel.
+The inventions that have revolutionized naval warfare have come
+from men outside the naval profession. Thus the Romans, unable to
+match the Carthaginians in seamanship, made that seamanship of no
+value by their invention of the corvus. Greek fire not only saved
+the insignificant fleets of the Eastern Empire, but annihilated the
+huge armadas of Saracen and Slav. If the South in our Civil War
+had possessed the necessary resources, her ironclad rams would
+have made an end of the Union navy and of the war. In our own time
+the German submarine came within an ace of winning the war despite
+all the Allied dreadnoughts, because its potentialities had not
+been realized and no counter measures devised. A navy that drops
+behind is lost.
+
+The personal side is a matter of training and morale. The material
+part is of no value unless it is operated by skill and by the will
+to win. Slackness or inexperience or lack of heart in officers
+or men--any of these may bring ruin. Napoleon once spoke of the
+Russian army as brave, but as "an army without a soul." A navy
+must have a soul. Unfortunately, the tendency in recent years has
+been to emphasize the material and the mechanical at the expense of
+the intellectual and spiritual. With all the enormous development
+of the ships and weapons, it must be remembered that the man is,
+and always will be, greater than the machine.
+
+As to handling the navy, first of all the War Staff and the commander
+in chief must solve the strategic problem correctly. The fate of
+the Spanish Armada in the 16th Century and that of the Russian
+navy at the beginning of the 20th are eloquent of the effect of
+bad strategy on a powerful fleet. Secondly, the commander in chief
+must be possessed of the right fighting doctrine--the spirit of the
+offensive. In all ages the naval commander who sought to achieve
+his purpose by avoiding battle went to disaster. The true objective
+must be, now as always, _the destruction of the enemy's fleet_.
+
+Such are the material and the spiritual essentials of sea power.
+The phrase has become so popular that a superior fleet has been
+widely accepted as a talisman in war. The idea is that a nation
+with sea power must win. But with all the tremendous "influence of
+sea power on history," the student must not be misled into thinking
+that sea power is invincible. The Athenian navy went to ruin under
+the catapults of Syracuse whose navy was insignificant. Carthage, the
+sea power, succumbed to a land power, Rome. In modern times France,
+with a navy second to England's, fell in ruin before Prussia, which
+had practically no navy at all. And in the World War it required
+the entry of a new ally, the United States, to save the Entente
+from defeat at the hands of land power, despite an overwhelming
+superiority on the sea.
+
+The significance of sea power is _communications_. Just so far
+as sea control affects lines of communications vital to either
+belligerent, so far does it affect the war. To a sea empire like
+the British, sea control is essential as a measure of defense.
+If an enemy controls the sea the empire will fall apart like a
+house of cards, and the British Isles will be speedily starved
+into submission. It is another thing, however, to make the navy
+a sword as well as a shield. Whenever the British navy could cut
+the communications of the enemy, as in the case of the wars with
+Spain and Holland, it was terribly effective. When it fought a
+nation like Russia in the Crimean War, it hardly touched the sources
+of Russian supplies, because these came by the interior land
+communications. So also the French navy in 1870 could not touch
+a single important line of German communications and its effect
+therefore was negligible. If in 1914 Russia, for example, had been
+neutral, no Allied naval superiority could have saved France from
+destruction by the combined armies of Germany and Austria, just
+as the Grand Fleet was powerless to check the conquest or deny
+the possession of Belgium. It must be borne in mind that a land
+power has the advantages of central position and interior lines, and
+the interior lines of to-day are those of rail and motor transport,
+offering facilities for a rapid concentration on any front.
+
+Of course, modern life and modern warfare are so complex that few
+nations are able to live and wage war entirely on their own resources;
+important communications extend across the sea. In this respect
+the United States is singularly fortunate. With the exception of
+rubber, every essential is produced in our country, and the sea
+power that would attempt to strangle the United States by a blockade
+on two coasts would find it unprofitable even if it were practicable.
+A hostile navy would have to land armies to strike directly at the
+manufacturing cities near the seaboard in order to affect our
+communications. In brief, sea power is decisive just so far as
+it cuts the enemy's communications.
+
+Finally in considering sea power we should note the importance
+of coordinating naval policies with national. The character of a
+navy and the size of a navy depend on what policy a nation expects
+to stand for. It is the business of a navy to stand behind a nation's
+will. For Great Britain, circumstances of position have long made
+her policy consistent, without regard to change of party. She had
+to dominate the sea to insure the safety of the empire. With the
+United States, the situation has been different. The nation has
+not been conscious of any foreign policy, with the single exception
+of the Monroe Doctrine. And even this has changed in character
+since it was first enunciated.
+
+At the present day, for example, how far does the United States
+purpose to go in the Monroe Doctrine? Shall we attempt to police
+the smaller South and Central American nations? Shall we make the
+Caribbean an area under our naval control? What is to be our policy
+toward Mexico? How far are we willing to go to sustain the Open Door
+policy in the Far East? Are we determined to resist the immigration
+of Asiatics? Are we bound to hold against conquest our outlying
+possessions,--the Philippines, Guam, Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska?
+Shall we play a "lone hand" among nations, or join an international
+league? Until there is some answer to these questions of foreign
+policy, our naval program is based on nothing definite. In short,
+the naval policy of a nation should spring from its national policy.
+
+On that national policy must be based not only the types of ships
+built and their numbers, but also the number and locale of the
+naval bases and the entire strategic plan. In the past there has
+been too little mutual understanding between the American navy and
+the American people. The navy--the Service, as it is appropriately
+called--is the trained servant of the republic. It is only fair to
+ask that the republic make clear what it expects that servant to
+do. But before a national policy is accepted, it must be thought
+out to its logical conclusion by both the popular leaders and naval
+advisers. As Mahan has said, "the naval officer must be a statesman
+as well as a seaman." Is the policy accepted going to conflict
+with that of another nation; if so, are we prepared to accept the
+consequences?
+
+The recent history of Germany is a striking example of the effect
+of a naval policy on international relations. The closing decade
+of the 19th century found Great Britain still following the policy
+of "splendid isolation," with France and Russia her traditional
+enemies. Her relations with Germany were friendly, as they always
+had been. At the close of the century, the Kaiser, inspired by
+Mahan's "_Influence of Sea Power on History,_" launched the policy
+of a big navy. First, he argued, German commerce was growing with
+astonishing rapidity. It was necessary, according to Mahan, to have
+a strong navy to protect a great carrying trade. This von Tirpitz[1]
+emphasizes, though he never makes clear just what precise danger
+threatened the German trading fleets, provided Germany maintained a
+policy of friendly relations with England. Secondly, Germany found
+herself with no outlet for expansion. The best colonial fields had
+already been appropriated by other countries, chiefly England. To
+back up German claims to new territory or trading concessions, it
+was necessary to have a strong navy. All this was strictly by the
+book, and it is characteristic of the German mind that it faithfully
+followed the text. "_Unsere Zukunft_," cried the Kaiser, "_liegt
+auf dem Wasser!_" But what was implied in this proposal? A great
+navy increasing rapidly to the point of rivaling that of England
+could be regarded by that country only as a pistol leveled at her
+head. England would be at the mercy of any power that could defeat
+her navy. And this policy coupled with the demand for "a place in
+the sun," threatened the rich colonies that lay under the British
+flag. It could not be taken otherwise.
+
+[Footnote 1: MY MEMOIRS, Chap. xv and _passim._]
+
+These implications began to bear fruit after their kind. In the
+place of friendliness on the part of the English,--a friendliness
+uninterrupted by war, and based on the blood of their royal family
+and the comradeship in arms against France in the days of Louis
+XIV, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon--there developed a growing
+hostility. In vain missions were sent by the British Government
+to promote a better understanding, for the Germans declined to
+accept either a "naval holiday" or a position of perpetual naval
+inferiority. In consequence, England abandoned her policy of isolation,
+and came to an understanding with her ancient enemies, Russia and
+France. Thus Germany arrayed against herself all the resources of
+the British Empire and in this act signed her own death warrant.
+
+A final word as to the future of sea power. The influence of modern
+inventions is bound to affect the significance of the sea in the
+future. Oceans have practically dwindled away as national barriers.
+Wireless and the speed of the modern steamship have reduced the
+oceans to ponds. "Splendid isolation" is now impossible. Modern
+artillery placed at Calais, for instance, could shell London and
+cover the transportation of troops in the teeth of a fleet. Aircraft
+cross land and sea with equal ease. The submersible has come to
+stay. Indeed, it looks as if the navy of the future will tend first
+to the submersible types and later abandon the sea for the air,
+and the "illimitable pathways of the sea" will yield to still more
+illimitable pathways of the sky. The consequence is bound to be a
+closer knitting of the peoples of the world through the conquering
+of distance by time.
+
+This bringing together breeds war quite as easily as peace, and
+the progress of invention makes wars more frightful. The closely
+knit economic structure of Europe did not prevent the greatest
+war in history and there is little hope for the idea that wars
+can never occur again. The older causes of war lay in pressure
+of population, the temptation of better lands, racial hatreds or
+ambitions, religious fanaticism, dynastic aims, and imperialism.
+Some of these remain. The chief modern source of trouble is trade
+rivalry, with which imperialism is closely interwoven and trade
+rivalry makes enemies of old friends. There is, therefore, a place
+for navies still.
+
+At present there are two great naval powers, Great Britain and
+the United States. A race in naval armaments between the two would
+be criminal folly, and could lead to only one disastrous end. The
+immediate way toward guaranteeing freedom of the seas is a closer
+entente between the two English-speaking peoples, whose common
+ground extends beyond their speech to institutions and ideals of
+justice and liberty. The fine spirit of cooperation produced by
+the World War should be perpetuated in peace for the purpose of
+maintaining peace. In his memoirs van Tirpitz mourns the fact that
+now "Anglo-Saxondom" controls the world. There is small danger that
+where public opinion rules, the two peoples will loot the world
+to their own advantage. On the other hand, there is every prospect
+that, for the immediate future, sea power in their hands can be made
+the most potent influence toward peace, and the preservation of
+that inheritance of civilization which has been slowly accumulated
+and spread throughout the world by those peoples of every age who
+have been the pathfinders on the seas.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+A.
+
+Abercromby, British general
+Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy, British cruisers, loss of
+Aboukir Bay, battle of, _see_ Nile
+Actium, campaign of; battle of
+AEgospotami, battle of
+Agrippa, Roman admiral
+Aircraft, in World War
+Albuquerque, Portuguese viceroy
+Alfred, king of England
+Algeciras Convention
+Ali Pasha, Turkish admiral
+Allemand, French admiral
+Almeida, Portuguese leader
+Amboyna
+Amiens, treaty of
+Amsterdam
+Anthony, Roman general, at Actium
+Antwerp
+Arabs, at war with Eastern Empire; as traders; ships of
+Arbuthnot, British admiral
+Ariabignes, Persian admiral
+Aristides
+Armada, _see_ Spanish Armada
+Armed Neutrality, league of
+Armor
+Armstrong, Sir William
+Athens, _see_ Greece
+_Audacious_, British ship
+August 10, battle of
+Austerlitz battle of
+Austria, in Napoleonic Wars; at war with Italy; in Triple Alliance;
+  in World War
+
+B.
+
+Bacon, Roger
+Bagdad Railway
+Bantry Bay, action in; attempted landing in
+Barbarigo, Venetian admiral
+Barbarossa, Turkish admiral
+Barham, First Lord of Admiralty
+Bart, Jean, French naval leader
+Battle cruiser, _see_ Ships of War
+Beachy Head, battle of
+Beatty, British admiral, at Heligoland Bight; at Dogger Bank; at Jutland
+Berlin Decree
+Bismarck
+Blake, British admiral
+Blockade, in American Civil War; in World War
+Boisot, Dutch admiral
+Bonaparte, _see_ Napoleon
+Bossu, Spanish admiral
+Boxer Rebellion
+Boyne, battle of
+Bragadino, Venetian general
+Breda, peace of
+Bridport, British admiral
+Brill, capture of
+Brueys, French admiral
+Burney, British admiral
+Bushnell, David
+
+C.
+
+Cabot, John
+Cadiz, founded; British expeditions to; blockaded by Blake; blockaded
+  by Jervis; Allied fleet in
+Calder, British admiral; in action with Villeneuve
+Camara, Spanish admiral
+Camperdown, battle of
+Canidius, Roman general
+Carden, British admiral
+Carpenter, Alfred, British commander
+Carthage, founded; at war with Greece; in Punic Wars
+Cervantes
+Cervera, Spanish admiral; in Santiago campaign
+Ceylon
+Champlain, battle of Lake
+Charlemagne
+Charles II of England
+Charles V of Spain
+Charleston, attack on
+Chatham, raided by Dutch
+Chauncey, U. S. commodore
+China, in ancient times; first ships to; at war with Japan; in disruption
+Chios, battle of
+Churchill, Winston
+Cinque Ports
+Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, in Actium campaign
+Clerk, John
+Collingwood, British admiral; at Trafalgar
+Colonna, admiral of Papal States
+Colport, British admiral
+Columbus; voyages of
+Commerce, of Phoenicians; under Roman Empire; with the East; in northern
+  Europe; in modern times
+Commerce Warfare, in Dutch War of Independence; in Napoleonic Wars;
+  in War of 1812; in World War,
+Communications, in warfare
+Compass, introduction of
+Condalmiero, Venetian admiral
+Conflans, French admiral
+Constantinople, founded; attacked by Arabs; attacked by Russians;
+  sacked by Crusaders; captured by Turks; in World War
+Continental System
+Continuous Voyage, doctrine of
+Contraband
+Convoy, System in World War
+Cook, Captain James
+Copenhagen, battle of
+Corinthian Gulf, battle of
+Cornwallis, British admiral
+Coronel, battle of
+Corsica
+Corunna, Armada sails from; attacked by Drake; Allied fleet in
+Corvi
+Cradock, British admiral, at Coronel
+Crete
+Cromwell, Oliver
+Custozza, battle of
+Cyprus
+
+D.
+
+Da Gama, Vasco
+Dardanelles, German squadron enters; campaign of
+Darius, king of Persia
+De Grasse, French admiral, at Virginia Capes; at Saints' Passage
+De Guichen, French admiral
+Denmark, in Copenhagen campaign
+De Ruyter, Dutch admiral
+D'Estaing, French admiral
+Destroyer, _see_ Ships of War
+Dewa, Japanese admiral
+Dewey, U. S. admiral, at Manila
+De Witt, Dutch admiral
+Diaz, Bartolomeo
+Diedrichs, German admiral
+Director fire
+Dirkzoon, Dutch admiral
+Diu, battle of
+Dogger Bank, Russian fleet off; action off
+Don Juan of Austria, at Lepanto
+Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral
+Doria, Gian Andrea, Genoese admiral
+Dragut, Turkish commander
+Drake, Sir Francis, British admiral, voyages of; in Armada campaign;
+  last years of
+Dreadnought, _see_ Ships of War
+Drepanum, battle of
+Duguay-Trouin, French commander
+Duilius, Roman consul
+Dumanoir, French admiral
+Duncan, British admiral, at Camperdown
+Dungeness, battle of
+
+E.
+
+East Indies Companies, British and Dutch
+Ecnomus, battle of
+Egypt, early ships of; Napoleon in
+Elizabeth, queen of England
+_Emden_, German cruiser; cruise of
+England, early naval history of; at war with Spain; at war with
+  Holland; at war with France; plans for invasion of.
+  _See_ Great Britain
+Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia
+Ericsson, John
+Erie, battle of Lake
+Eurybiades, Spartan commander
+Evan-Thomas, British admiral
+Evertsen, Dutch admiral
+
+F.
+
+Falkland Islands, battle of
+Farragut, U. S. admiral
+Fighting Instructions, of British Navy
+Fireships
+First of June, battle of
+Fisher, British admiral
+Fisher, Fort, capture of
+Fleet in Being
+Foch, French general
+Foley, British captain
+Four Days' Battle, in Dutch Wars
+France, at war with England in 18th century; in Napoleonic Wars; in
+  Far East; aids Russia; in World War
+Francis I, of France
+Frobisher, Martin
+Fulton, Robert; his submarine
+
+G.
+
+Gabbard, battle of
+_Galleon of Venice_, Venetian ship
+Galley, galleon, galleas, _see_ Ships of War
+Gallipoli Peninsula, operations on; _see_ Dardanelles
+Ganteaume, French admiral
+Genoa; at war with Venice
+Germany, early commerce under Hausa; unification of; in Far East;
+  aids Russia; growth of; in World War.
+Gibraltar, captured by British; blockaded
+_Goeben_, German battle cruiser, escape of
+Goodenough, British naval officer, at Heligoland Bight; at Jutland
+Grand Fleet, British; strength of; at Jutland
+Graves, British admiral
+Gravina, Spanish admiral
+Great Britain, in Napoleonic Wars; in War of 1812; in World War.
+  _See_ England.
+Greece; at war with Persia; in Peloponnesian War
+Greek fire
+Grenville, Sir Richard
+Guns, gunpowder, _see_ Ordnance
+Gunfleet, battle of
+
+H.
+
+Hampton Roads, battle of
+Hannibal
+Hanseatic League
+Hase, German naval officer, quoted
+Hawke, British admiral
+Hawkins, John
+Heath, British admiral
+Heimskirck, Jacob van, Dutch seaman
+Heligoland; battle of
+Heligoland Bight, battle of
+Hellespont
+Henry, Prince, the Navigator
+Henry VIII, of England
+Herbert, Lord Torrington, British admiral
+Hermaea, battle of
+High Seas Fleet, of Germany; strength of; at Jutland; surrender of
+Hindenberg, German general
+Hipper, German admiral, at Dogger Bank; at Jutland
+Hobson, U. S. naval officer
+Hoche, French general
+Holland, _see_ Netherlands
+Holland, John P.
+Hood, British admiral, at Virginia Capes; at Saints' Passage,
+Hood, British rear-admiral, at Jutland
+Horton, Max, British commander
+Hotham, British admiral
+Howard, Thomas, of Effingham
+Howe, British admiral; at First of June
+Hudson, Henry
+Hughes, British admiral
+
+I.
+
+Interior Lines, defined
+Italy, at war with Austria; in World War
+Ito, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu
+
+J.
+
+Jamaica, captured by British
+Janissaries
+Japan, at war with China; at war with Russia
+Jellicoe, British admiral; at Jutland
+Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, British admiral; character of; at Cape
+  St. Vincent
+Jones, Paul, American naval officer
+Juan, _see_ Don Juan
+Jutland, battle of
+
+K.
+
+Kamimura, Japanese admiral
+_Karlsruehe_, German cruiser
+Keith, British admiral
+Kentish Knock, battle of
+Keyes, British naval officer
+Kiao-chau, seized by Germany
+Kiel Canal
+Kitchener, British general
+_Koenigsberg_, German cruiser
+Korea
+
+L.
+
+Lake, Simon
+La Hogue, battle of
+La Touche Treville, French admiral
+Lepanto, campaign of; battle of
+Lepidus, Roman general
+Leyden, siege of
+Lowestoft, battle of
+London, Declaration of
+Louis XIV of France
+_Lusitania_, loss of
+
+M.
+
+McGiffin, American naval officer, at the Yalu
+Macdonough, U. S. commodore
+Magellan, Portuguese navigator
+Mahan, American naval officer, quoted; in Spanish-American War
+_Maine_, U. S. battleship
+Makaroff, Russian admiral
+Malta; siege of
+Manila, battle of
+Marathon, battle of
+Mardonius
+Martel, Charles
+Mary Queen of Scots
+Matelieff, de Jonge, Dutch seaman
+Medina Sidonia, Duke of
+_Merrimac_, Confederate ram; in action with _Monitor_
+Milne, British admiral
+Mine barrage, in North Sea
+Missiessy, French admiral
+Mohammed
+Mohammedans, _see_ Arabs
+_Monitor_, U. S. ironclad-292
+Monk, British admiral
+Monroe Doctrine
+Montojo, Spanish admiral
+Moore, British admiral
+Muaviah, Emir of Syria
+Mukden, battle of
+Mueller, German naval officer
+Muza, Mohammedan general
+Mycale, battle of
+Mylae, battle of
+
+N.
+
+Napoleon, quoted; in Italy; in Egypt; plans northern coalition;
+  attempts invasion of England; instructs Villeneuve; adopts
+  continental system
+Naupaktis, battle of
+Navarino, battle of
+Navigation, progress in
+Navigation Acts
+Navy, British, administration of; under Commonwealth; training of
+  officers for; at Restoration; in 18th century; in French
+  Revolutionary Wars; mutiny in; in War of 1812; size of, in World
+  War. _See_ England, Great
+  Britain.
+  French, in 18th century; in French Revolution. _See_ France.
+  United States, in War of 1812; in Civil War; in World War.
+  _See_ United States
+Nebogatoff, Russian admiral
+Nelson, Horatio, British admiral; in Mediterranean; at Cape St.
+  Vincent; at the Nile; at Copenhagen; in the Channel; in Trafalgar
+  campaign and battle
+Netherlands, at war with Hansa; commerce of; at war with Spain; at
+  war with England; in War of American Revolution; in Napoleonic Wars,
+New York, taken by British; held by Howe
+Nicosia, siege of
+Nile, campaign of; battle of
+Nore, mutiny at
+North Sea Mine Barrage, _see_ Mine Barrage
+
+
+O.
+
+Octavius, Roman emperor, at Actium
+Ontario, campaign on Lake
+Open Door Policy
+Oquendo, Spanish naval officer
+Ordnance, early types of; introduced on ships; at Armada;
+  breech-loading; rifled; long range
+_Oregon_, U. S. battleship, cruise of; at Santiago
+
+P.
+
+Panama Canal
+Parker, British Admiral, at Copenhagen-258
+Parma, Duke of
+Peloponnesian War
+Penn, British admiral
+Perry, U. S. Commodore
+Persano, Italian admiral, at Lissa
+Persia, conquers Phoenicia; at war with Greece
+Pharselis, battle of
+Philip II, of Spain
+Phoenicia, commerce and colonies of; at Salamis
+Phormio, Greek admiral
+Platea, battle of
+Port Arthur; given to Japan; seized by Russia; operations around; fall of
+Portland, battle of
+Portsmouth, Treaty of
+Portugal, commerce and colonies of; decline of
+Prevesa, battle of
+Prussia, in Northern Coalition; at war with Austria
+Ptolemy
+
+Q.
+
+"Q-ships"
+Quiberon Bay, battle of
+
+R.
+
+Raleigh, Sir Walter
+Recalde, Spanish naval officer
+Renaissance
+_Revenge_, Drake's flagship; last fight of
+Robeck, British admiral, at Dardanelles
+Rodman, U. S. admiral
+Rodney, British admiral; at Saints' Passage
+Rojdestvensky, Russian admiral, cruise of; at Tsushima
+Rome, in Punic Wars; in Actium campaign; wars of Eastern Empire
+Rooke, British admiral
+Roosevelt, Theodore
+Rosyth, British base
+Rupert, Prince
+Russia, in Napoleonic Wars; in Far East;
+  at war with Japan, in World War
+Ruyter. _See_ De Ruyter
+
+S.
+
+Saint Andree, Jean Bon
+St. Vincent, battle of Cape
+St. Vincent, Earl of. _See_ Jervis
+Saints' Passage, battle of
+Salamis, battle of; campaign of
+Salonika
+Sampson, U. S. admiral, in Santiago campaign
+San Juan de Ulna, fight at
+Santa Cruz, Spanish admiral
+Santiago, battle of
+Saracens. _See_ Arabs
+Scapa Flow, British base
+Scheer, German admiral, at Jutland
+Scheldt River; battle in; blockaded by Dutch
+Scheveningen, battle of
+Schley, U. S. naval officer, in Santiago campaign
+Schoonevelt, battle of
+Scott, Sir Percy, British admiral
+Sea Beggars
+Sea Power, preserves Greece; England's gains by; in Napoleonic Wars;
+  in World War; influence of; elements of
+Selim the Drunkard, Sultan of Turkey
+Semenoff, Russian naval officer
+Seymour, British admiral, at Armada
+Shafter, U. S. general
+Shimonoseki, Treaty of
+Ships of War, "round" and "long"; trireme; penteconter; liburna;
+  galley; dromon; galleas; junk; Viking craft; galleon; two and
+  three-deckers; steam; submarine; destroyer; battle cruiser;
+  dreadnought
+Sicily; in Punic Wars
+Sims, U. S. admiral
+Sinope, bombardment of
+Sirocco. Turkish admiral
+Sluis, battle of
+Solebay, battle of
+Soliman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey
+Souchon, German admiral
+Spain, at war with Turks; discoveries of; at war with Dutch; at war
+  with England; in Napoleonic Wars; at war with United States
+Spanish Armada
+Sparta. _See_ Greece.
+Spee, German admiral
+Steam navigation, beginnings of
+Sturdee, British admiral
+Submarine, early types of; in World War
+Suez Canal
+Suffren, French admiral
+Syracuse, at war with Athens
+
+T.
+
+Tactics, of galleys; after use of sails and guns; in Dutch wars; in
+  18th century; after use of armor; influenced by Lissa; at Jutland;
+  in submarine warfare
+Takeomi, Japanese naval officer
+Tegetthoff, Austrian admiral, at Lissa
+Teneriffe, attacked by Blake
+Terschelling, raided by English
+Texel, battle of
+Themistocles
+Theophanes
+Thermopylae, battle of
+Ting, Chinese admiral, at the Yalu
+Tirpitz, German admiral
+Togo, Japanese admiral; at battle of 10th of August; at Tsushima
+Togo, Japanese squadron commander
+Tordesillas, Treaty of
+Torpedoes, origin of name; Whitehead; in Russo-Japanese war,
+Torrington, Earl of. _See_ Herbert
+Toscanelli, Paul
+Toulon, French base
+Tourville, French admiral
+Trafalgar, battle of
+Transport service, in World War
+Triple Alliance
+Tromp, Cornelius, Dutch admiral
+Tromp, Martin, Dutch admiral
+Troubridge, British naval officer
+Tsuboi, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu
+Tsushima, battle of
+Tunis; captured by Spanish; attacked by Blake
+Turkey, rise of; at war with Venice and Spain; in World War
+Tyrwhitt, British naval officer
+
+U.
+
+Ulm, battle of
+Uluch Ali, Turkish leader; in Lepanto campaign
+United States, in American Revolution; in War of 1812; in Civil War;
+  in Spanish-American War; in World War; naval problems of. _See_ Navy
+
+V.
+
+Valdes, Pedro de, Spanish naval officer
+Valdes, Pedrode, Spanish naval officer
+Vandals
+Veniero, Venetian admiral
+_Vengeur du Peuple_, French ship
+Venice, early history of; commerce of; at war with Turks; ships of
+Vikings
+Villaret de Joyeuse, French admiral, at First of June
+Villeneuve, French admiral; at the Nile; in Trafalgar campaign and battle
+Virginia Capes, battle of
+
+W.
+
+Wangenheim, Baron von
+Wei-hai-wei
+William II, German emperor
+William III of England
+William, Prince of Orange
+Wilson, Woodrow, President of United States
+Winter, Dutch admiral
+Witjeft, Russian admiral
+
+X.-Y.-Z.
+
+Xerxes
+"Y-guns"
+Yalu, battle of
+York, Duke of, afterward James II of England
+Zama, battle of
+Zeebrugge, attack on
+
+
+
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