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diff --git a/22283.txt b/22283.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16f1b5d --- /dev/null +++ b/22283.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4454 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Mind and Motion and Monism, by George John Romanes + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Mind and Motion and Monism + +Author: George John Romanes + +Release Date: August 9, 2007 [EBook #22283] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Janet Blenkinship +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + + MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM + + BY THE LATE + + GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S. + + HONORARY FELLOW OF GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE + + + LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. AND NEW YORK 1895 + Oxford + HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY + + + + WORKS BY _GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S._ + + =DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN=: an Exposition of the Darwinian Theory, + and a Discussion on Post-Darwinian Questions. + + PART I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. With Portrait of Darwin and 125 + Illustrations. _Crown 8vo_, 10s. 6d. + + PART II. POST-DARWINIAN QUESTIONS: HEREDITY AND UTILITY. _Crown + 8vo_. + + =AN EXAMINATION OF WEISMANNISM.= _Crown 8vo_, 6s. + + =MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM.= _Crown 8vo_. + + =THOUGHTS ON RELIGION=. Edited, with a Preface, by CHARLES GORE, + M.A., Canon of Westminster. _Crown 8vo_, 4s. 6d. + + London + LONGMANS, GREEN & CO. + + + + +PREFACE + + +Of the contents of this little volume the section on _Mind and Motion_ +which forms, in accordance with a suggestion of the author's, a general +introduction, was delivered at Cambridge as the Rede Lecture in 1885, +and was printed in the _Contemporary Review_ for June in that year. The +chapter on The _World as an Eject_ was published, almost as it now +stands, in the _Contemporary Review_ for July, 1886. A paper on _The +Fallacy of Materialism_, of which Mr. Romanes incorporated the more +important parts in the Essay on Monism, was contributed to the +_Nineteenth Century_ for December, 1882. The rest was left in MS. and +was probably written in 1889 or 1890. + +The subjects here discussed frequently occupied Mr. Romanes' keen and +versatile mind. Had not the hand of death fallen upon him while so much +of the ripening grain of his thought still remained to be finally +garnered, some modifications and extensions of the views set forth in +the Essay on Monism would probably have been introduced. Attention may +be drawn, for example, to the sentence on p. 139, italicized by the +author himself, in which it is contended that the will as agent _must be +identified with the principle of Causality_. I have reason to believe +that the chapter on _The World as an Eject_ would, in a final revision +of the Essay as a whole, have been modified so as to lay stress on this +identification of the human will with the principle of Causality in the +world at large--a doctrine the relation of which to the teachings of +Schopenhauer will be evident to students of philosophy. + +But the hand of death closed on the thinker ere his thought had received +its full and ultimate expression. When in July, 1893, I received from +Mr. Romanes instructions with regard to the publication of that which +now goes forth to the world in his name, his end seemed very near; and +he said with faltering voice, in tones the pathos of which lingers with +me still, that this and much besides must, he feared, be left +unfinished. He suggested that perhaps I might revise the parts in the +light of the whole. But I have thought it best to leave what he had +written as he wrote it, save for quite unimportant emendations, lest in +revising I should cast over it the shadow of my own opinions. + +It only remains to add that the conclusions reached in this Essay should +be studied in connection with the later _Thoughts on Religion_ which +Canon Gore has recently edited. + C. LL. M. + BRISTOL, + _May, 1895._ + + + + + CONTENTS + PAGE + + MIND AND MOTION 1 + + MONISM 39 + + INTRODUCTION 41 + + CHAPTER I. SPIRITUALISM 47 + + " II. MATERIALISM 55 + + " III. MONISM 79 + + " IV. THE WORLD AS AN EJECT 88 + + " V. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 119 + + " VI. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM 129 + + + + +MIND AND MOTION + +[REDE LECTURE, 1885.] + + +The earliest writer who deserves to be called a psychologist is Hobbes; +and if we consider the time when he wrote, we cannot fail to be +surprised at what I may term his prevision of the most important results +which have now been established by science. He was the first clearly to +sound the note which has ever since constituted the bass, or fundamental +tone, of scientific thought. Let us listen to it through the clear +instrumentality of his own language:-- + + 'All the qualities called sensible are, in the object which causeth + them, but so many motions of the matter by which it presseth on our + organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything + else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but + motion.... The cause of sense is the external body or object, which + presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in + taste and touch, or mediately, as in hearing, seeing, and smelling; + which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings + and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and + heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or + endeavour.... And because _going_, _speaking_, and the like + voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of + _whither_, _which way_, and _what_; it is evident that the + imagination [or idea] is the first internal beginning of all + voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any + motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or + the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; + yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. These small + beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in + walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are + commonly called ENDEAVOUR[1].' + +These quotations are sufficient to show that the system of Hobbes was +prophetic of a revelation afterwards declared by two centuries of +scientific research. For they show how plainly he taught that all our +knowledge of the external world is a knowledge of motion; and, again, +that all our acquisitions of knowledge and other acts of mind themselves +imply, as he elsewhere says, some kind of 'motion, agitation, or +alteration, which worketh in the brain.' That he conceived such motion, +agitation, or alteration to be, from its extreme minuteness, 'invisible' +and 'insensible,' or, as we should now say, molecular, is likewise +evident. I can therefore imagine the delight with which he would hear me +speak when I say, that it is no longer a matter of keen-sighted +speculation, but a matter of carefully demonstrated fact, that all our +knowledge of the external world is nothing more than a knowledge of +motion. For all the forms of energy have now been proved to be but modes +of motion; and even matter, if not in its ultimate constitution vortical +motion, at all events is known to us only as changes of motion: all that +we perceive in what we call matter is change in modes of motion. We do +not even know what it is that moves; we only know that when some modes +of motion pass into other modes, we perceive what we understand by +matter. It would take me too long to justify this general statement so +that it should be intelligible to every one; but I am confident that all +persons who understand such subjects will, when they think about it, +accept this general statement as one which is universally true. And, if +so, they will agree with Hobbes that all our knowledge of the external +world is a knowledge of motion. + +Now, if it would have been thus a joy to Hobbes to have heard to-day how +thoroughly he has been justified in his views touching the external +world, with no less joy would he have heard that he has been equally +justified in his views touching the internal world. For it has now been +proved, beyond the possibility of dispute, that it is only in virtue of +those invisible movements which he inferred that the nervous system is +enabled to perform its varied functions. + +To many among the different kinds of movement going on in the external +world, the animal body is adapted to respond by its own movements as +best suits its own welfare; and the mechanism whereby this is effected +is the neuro-muscular system. Those kinds of movement going on in the +external world which are competent to evoke responsive movements in the +animal body are called by physiologists stimuli. When a stimulus falls +upon the appropriate sensory surface, a wave of molecular movement is +sent up the attached sensory nerve to a nerve-centre, which thereupon +issues another wave of molecular movement down a motor nerve to the +group of muscles over whose action it presides; and when the muscles +receive this wave of nervous influence they contract. This kind of +response to stimuli is purely mechanical, or non-mental, and is +ordinarily termed reflex action. The whole of the spinal cord and lower +part of the brain are made up of nerve-centres of reflex action; and, in +the result, we have a wonderfully perfect machine in the animal body +considered as a whole. For while the various sensory surfaces are +severally adapted to respond to different kinds of external +movement--the eye to light, the ear to sound, and so on--any of these +surfaces may be brought into suitable relation with any of the muscles +of the body by means of the cerebro-spinal nerve-centres and their +intercommunications. + +So much, then, for the machinery of the body. We must now turn to +consider the corporeal seat of the mind, or the only part of the nervous +system wherein the agitation of nervous matter is accompanied with +consciousness. This is composed of a double nerve-centre, which occurs +in all vertebrated animals, and the two parts of which are called the +cerebral hemispheres. In man this double nerve-centre is so large that +it completely fills the arch of the skull, as far down as the level of +the eyebrows. The two hemispheres of which it consists meet face to face +in the middle line of the skull, from the top of the nose backwards. +Each hemisphere is composed of two conspicuously distinct parts, called +respectively the grey matter and the white matter. The grey matter is +external, enveloping the white matter like a skull-cap, and is composed +of an inconceivable number of nerve-cells connected together by +nerve-fibres. It is computed that in a human brain there cannot be less +than a thousand millions of cells, and five thousand millions of fibres. +The white matter is composed only of nerve-fibres, which pass downwards +in great strands of conducting tissue to the lower centres of the brain +and spinal cord. So that the whole constitutes one system, with the grey +matter of the cerebral hemispheres at the apex or crown. + +That the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres is the exclusive seat +of mind is proved in two ways. In the first place, if we look to the +animal kingdom as a whole, we find that, speaking generally, the +intelligence of species varies with the mass of this grey matter. Or, in +other words, we find that the process of mental evolution, on its +physical side, has consisted in the progressive development of this +grey matter superimposed upon the pre-existing nervous machinery, until +it has attained its latest and maximum growth in man. + +In the second place, we find that when the grey matter is experimentally +removed from the brain of animals, the animals continue to live; but are +completely deprived of intelligence. All the lower nerve-centres +continue to perform their mechanical adjustments in response to suitable +stimulation; but they are no longer under the government of the mind. +Thus, for instance, when a bird is mutilated in this way, it will +continue to perform all its reflex adjustments--such as sitting on a +perch, using its wings when thrown into the air, and so forth; but it no +longer remembers its nest or its young, and will starve to death in the +midst of its food, unless it be fed artificially. + +Again, if the grey matter of only one hemisphere be removed, the mind is +taken away from the corresponding (i. e. the opposite) side of the body, +while it remains intact on the other side. For example, if a dog be +deprived of one hemisphere, the eye which was supplied from it with +nerve-fibres continues able to see, or to transmit impressions to the +lower nerve-centre called the optic ganglion; for this eye will then +mechanically follow the hand waved in front of it. But if the hand +should hold a piece of meat, the dog will show no mental recognition of +the meat, which of course it will immediately seize if exposed to the +view of its other eye. The same thing is found to happen in the case of +birds: on the injured side _sensation_, or the power of responding to a +stimulus, remains intact; while _perception_, or the power of mental +recognition, is destroyed. + +This description applies to the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres +as a whole. But of course the question next arises whether it only acts +as a whole, or whether there is any localization of different +intellectual faculties in different parts of it. Now, in answer to this +question, it has long been known that the faculty of speech is +definitely localized in a part of the grey matter lying just behind the +forehead; for, when this part is injured, a man loses all power of +expressing even the most simple ideas in words, while the ideas +themselves remain as clear as ever. It is remarkable that in each +individual only this part of one hemisphere appears to be used; and +there is some evidence to show that left-handed persons use the opposite +side from right-handed. Moreover, when the side which is habitually in +use is destroyed, the corresponding part of the other hemisphere begins +to learn its work, so that the patient may in time recover his use of +language. + +Within the last few years the important discovery has been made, that by +stimulating with electricity the surface of the grey matter of the +hemispheres, muscular movements are evoked; and that certain patches of +the grey matter, when thus stimulated, always throw into action the same +groups of muscles. In other words, there are definite local areas of +grey matter, which, when stimulated, throw into action definite groups +of muscles. The surface of the cerebral hemispheres has now been in +large measure explored and mapped out with reference to these so-called +motor-centres; and thus our knowledge of the neuro-muscular machinery of +the higher animals (including man) has been very greatly furthered. Here +I may observe parenthetically that, as the brain is insentient to +injuries inflicted upon its own substance, none of the experiments to +which I have alluded entail any suffering to the animals experimented +upon; and it is evident that the important information which has thus +been gained could not have been gained by any other method. I may also +observe that as these motor-centres occur in the grey matter of the +hemispheres, a strong probability arises that they are not only the +motor-centres, but also the volitional centres which originate the +intellectual commands for the contraction of this and that group of +muscles. Unfortunately we cannot interrogate an animal whether, when we +stimulate a motor-centre, we arouse in the animal's mind an act of will +to throw the corresponding group of muscles into action; but that these +motor-centres are really centres of volition is pointed to by the fact, +that electrical stimuli have no longer any effect upon them when the +mental faculties of the animal are suspended by anaesthetics, nor in the +case of young animals where the mental faculties have not yet been +sufficiently developed to admit of voluntary co-ordination among the +muscles which are concerned. On the whole, then, it is not improbable +that on stimulating artificially these motor-centres of the brain, a +physiologist is actually playing from without, and at his own pleasure, +upon the volitions of the animal. + +Turning, now, from this brief description of the structure and leading +functions of the principal parts of the nervous system, I propose to +consider what we know about the molecular movements which go on in +different parts of this system, and which are concerned in all the +processes of reflex adjustment, sensation, perception, emotion, +instinct, thought, and volition. + +First of all, the rate at which these molecular movements travel through +a nerve has been measured, and found to be about 100 feet per second, or +somewhat more than a mile a minute, in the nerves of a frog. In the +nerves of a mammal it is just about twice as fast; so that if London +were connected with New York by means of a mammalian nerve instead of an +electric cable, it would require nearly a whole day for a message to +pass. + +Next, the time has also been measured which is required by a +nerve-centre to perform its part in a reflex action, where no thought or +consciousness is involved. This time, in the case of the winking reflex, +and apart from the time required for the passage of the molecular waves +up and down the sensory and motor nerves, is about 1/20 of a second. +Such is the rate at which a nerve-centre conducts its operations when no +consciousness or volition is involved. But when consciousness and +volition are involved, or when the cerebral hemispheres are called into +play, the time required is considerably greater. For the operations on +the part of the hemispheres which are comprised in perceiving a simple +sensation (such as an electrical shock) and the volitional act of +signalling the perception, cannot be performed in less than 1/12 of a +second, which is nearly twice as long as the time required by the lower +nerve-centres for the performance of a reflex action. Other experiments +prove that the more complex an act of perception, the more time is +required for its performance. Thus, when the experiment is made to +consist, not merely in signalling a perception, but in signalling one of +two or more perceptions (such as an electrical shock on one or other of +the two hands, which of five letters is suddenly exposed to view, &c.), +a longer time is required for the more complex process of distinguishing +which of the two or more expected stimuli is perceived, and in +determining which of the appropriate signals to make in response. The +time consumed by the cerebral hemispheres in meeting a 'dilemma' of this +kind is from 1/5 to 1/20 of a second longer than that which they consume +in the case of a simpler perception. Therefore, whenever mental +operations are concerned, a relatively much greater time is required for +a nerve-centre to perform its adjustments than when a merely mechanical +or non-mental response is needed; and the more complex the mental +operation the more time is necessary. Such may be termed the physiology +of deliberation. + +So much, then, for the rate at which molecular movements travel through +nerves, and the times which nerve-centres consume in performing their +molecular adjustments. We may next consider the researches which have +been made within the last few months upon the rates of these movements +themselves, or the number of vibrations per second with which the +particles of nervous matter oscillate. + +If, by means of a suitable apparatus, a muscle is made to record its own +contraction, we find that during all the time it is in contraction, it +is under-going a vibratory movement at the rate of about nine pulsations +per second. What is the meaning of this movement? The meaning is that +the act of will in the brain, which serves as a stimulus to the +contraction of the muscle, is accompanied by a vibratory movement in the +grey matter of the brain; that this movement is going on at the rate of +nine pulsations per second; and that the muscle is giving a separate or +distinct contraction in response to every one of these nervous +pulsations. That such is the true explanation of the rhythm in the +muscle is proved by the fact that if, instead of contracting a muscle by +an act of the will, it be contracted by means of a rapid series of +electrical shocks playing upon its attached nerve, the record then +furnished shows a similar trembling going on in the muscle as in the +previous case; but the tremors of contraction are now no longer at the +rate of nine per second: they correspond beat for beat with the +interruptions of the electrical current. That is to say, the muscle is +responding separately to every separate stimulus which it receives +through the nerve; and further experiment shows that it is able thus to +keep time with the separate shocks, even though these be made to follow +one another so rapidly as 1,000 per second. Therefore we can have no +doubt that the slow rhythm of nine per second under the influence of +volitional stimulation, represents the rate at which the muscle is +receiving so many separate impulses from the brain: the muscle is +keeping time with the molecular vibrations going on in the cerebral +hemispheres at the rate of nine beats per second. Careful tracings show +that this rate cannot be increased by increasing the strength of the +volitional stimulus; but some individuals--and those usually who are of +quickest intelligence--display a somewhat quicker rate of rhythm, which +may be as high as eleven per second. Moreover, it is found that by +stimulating with strychnine any of the centres of reflex action, pretty +nearly the same rate of rhythm is exhibited by the muscles thus thrown +into contraction; so that all the nerve-cells in the body are thus shown +to have in their vibrations pretty nearly the same period, and not to be +able to vibrate with any other. For no matter how rapidly the electrical +shocks are allowed to play upon the grey matter of the cerebral +hemispheres, as distinguished from the nerve-trunks proceeding from them +to the muscles, the muscles always show the same rhythm of about nine +beats per second: the nerve-cells, unlike the nerve-fibres, refuse to +keep time with the electric shocks, and will only respond to them by +vibrating at their own intrinsic rate of nine beats per second. + +Thus much, then, for the rate of molecular vibration which goes on in +nerve-centres. But the rate of such vibration which goes on in sensory +and motor nerves may be very much more rapid. For while a nerve-centre +is only able to _originate_ a vibration at the rate of about nine beats +per second, a motor-nerve, as we have already seen, is able to +_transmit_ a vibration of at least 1,000 beats per second; and a sensory +nerve which at the surface of its expansion is able to respond +differently to differences of musical pitch, of temperature, and even of +colour, is probably able to vibrate very much more rapidly even than +this. We are not, indeed, entitled to conclude that the nerves of +special sense vibrate in actual unison, or synchronize, with these +external sources of stimulation; but we are, I think, bound to conclude +that they must vibrate in some numerical proportion to them (else we +should not perceive objective differences in sound, temperature, or +colour); and even this implies that they are probably able to vibrate at +some enormous rate. + +With further reference to these molecular movements in sensory nerves, +the following important observation has been made--viz. that there is a +constant ratio between the amount of agitation produced in a sensory +nerve, and the intensity of the corresponding sensation. This ratio is +not a direct one. As Fechner states it, 'Sensation varies, not as the +stimulus, but as the logarithm of the stimulus.' Thus, for instance, if +1,000 candles are all throwing their light upon the same screen, we +should require ten more candles to be added before our eyes could +perceive any difference in the amount of illumination. But if we begin +with only 100 candles shining upon the screen, we should perceive an +increase in the illumination by adding a single candle. And what is true +of sight is equally true of all the other senses: if any stimulus is +increased, the smallest increase of sensation first occurs when the +stimulus rises one per cent, above its original intensity. Such being +the law on the side of sensation, suppose that we place upon the optic +nerve of an animal the wires proceeding from a delicate galvanometer, we +find that every time we stimulate the eye with light, the needle of the +galvanometer moves, showing electrical changes going on in the nerve, +caused by the molecular agitations. Now these electrical changes are +found to vary in intensity with the intensity of the light used as a +stimulus, and they do so very nearly in accordance with the law of +sensation just mentioned. So we say that in sensation the cerebral +hemispheres are, as it were, acting the part of galvanometers in +appreciating the amount of molecular change which is going on in sensory +nerves; and that they record their readings in the mind as faithfully as +a galvanometer records its readings on the dial. + + * * * * * + +Hitherto we have been considering certain features in the physiology of +nervous action, so far as this can be appreciated by means of +physiological instruments. But we have just seen that the cerebral +hemispheres may themselves be regarded as such instruments, which record +in our minds their readings of changes going on in our nerves. Hence, +when other physiological instruments fail us, we may gain much +additional insight touching the movements of nervous matter by attending +to the thoughts and feelings of our own minds; for these are so many +indices of what is going on in the cerebral hemispheres. I therefore +propose next to contemplate the mind, considered thus as a physiological +instrument. + +The same scientific instinct which led Hobbes so truly to anticipate the +progress of physiology, led him not less truly to anticipate the +progress of psychology. For just as he was the first to enunciate the +fundamental principle of nerve-action in the vibration of molecules, so +was he likewise the first to enunciate the fundamental principle of +psychology in the association of ideas. And the great advance of +knowledge which has been made since his day with respect to both these +principles, entitles us to be much more confident than even he was that +they are in some way intimately united. Moreover, the manner in which +they are so united we have begun clearly to understand. For we know from +our study of nerve-action in general, that when once a wave of invisible +or molecular movement passes through any line of nerve-structure, it +leaves behind it a change in the structure such that it is afterwards +more easy for a similar wave, when started from the same point, to +pursue the same course. Or, to adopt a simile from Hobbes, just as water +upon a table flows most readily in the lines which have been wetted by a +previous flow, so the invisible waves of nerve-action pass most readily +in the lines of a previous passage. This is the reason why in any +exercise requiring muscular co-ordination, or dexterity, 'practice makes +perfect:' the nerve-centres concerned learn to perform their work by +frequently repeating it, because in this way the needful lines of +wave-movement in the structure of the nerve-centre are rendered more and +more permeable by use. Now we have seen that in the nerve-centres called +the cerebral hemispheres, wave-movement of this kind is accompanied with +feeling. Changes of consciousness follow step by step these waves of +movement in the brain, and therefore when on two successive occasions +the waves of movement pursue the same pathway in the brain, they are +attended with a succession of the same ideas in the mind. Thus we see +that the tendency of ideas to _re_cur in the same order as that in +which they have previously _oc_curred, is merely an obverse expression +of the fact that lines of wave-movement in the brain become more and +more permeable by use. So it comes that a child can learn its lessons by +frequently repeating them; so it is that all our knowledge is +accumulated; and so it is that all our thinking is conducted. + +A wholly new field of inquiry is thus opened up. By using our own +consciousness as a physiological instrument of the greatest delicacy, we +are able to learn a great deal about the dynamics of brain-action +concerning which we should otherwise remain in total ignorance. But the +field of inquiry thus opened up is too large for me to enter upon +to-day. I will therefore merely observe, in general terms, that although +we are still very far from understanding the operations of the brain in +thought, there can be no longer any question that in these operations of +the brain we have what I may term the objective machinery of thought. +'Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,' said +Hobbes. Starting from this fact, modern physiology has clearly shown why +it is a fact; and looking to the astonishing rate at which the science +of physiology is now advancing, I think we may fairly expect that within +a time less remote than the two centuries which now separate us from +Hobbes, the course of ideas in a given train of thought will admit of +having its footsteps tracked in the corresponding pathways of the brain. +Be this, however, as it may, even now we know enough to say that, +whether or not these footsteps will ever admit of being thus tracked in +detail, they are all certainly present in the cerebral structures of +each one of us. What we know on the side of mind as logical sequence, is +on the side of the nervous system nothing more than a passage of nervous +energy through one series of cells and fibres rather than through +another: what we recognize as truth is merely the fact of the brain +vibrating in tune with Nature. + + * * * * * + +Such being the intimate relation between nerve-action and mind-action, +it has become the scientifically orthodox teaching that the two stand to +one another in the relation of cause to effect. One of the most +distinguished of my predecessors in this place, the President of the +Royal Society, has said in one of the most celebrated of his +lectures:--'We have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of +the nervous system as the cause of the state of consciousness, as we +have for regarding any event as the cause of another.' And, by way of +perfectly logical deduction from this statement, Professor Huxley argues +that thought and feeling have nothing whatever to do with determining +action: they are merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he +expresses it, the indices of changes which are going on in the brain. +Under this view we are all what he terms conscious automata, or machines +which happen, as it were by chance, to be conscious of some of their own +movements. But the consciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears +the same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as a +steam-whistle bears to the activity of a locomotive, or the striking of +a clock to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. Here, again, +we meet with an echo of Hobbes, who opens his work on the Commonwealth +with these words:-- + + 'Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by + the _art_ of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated, + that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a + motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in the principal part + within; why may we not say, that all _automata_ (engines that move + themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch), have an + artificial life? For what is the _heart_, but a _spring_; and the + _nerves_, but so many _strings_; and the _joints_, but so many + _wheels_, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by + the artificer[2]?' + +Now, this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a legitimate +outcome of the theory that nervous changes are the causes of mental +changes, but it is logically the only possible outcome. Nor do I see any +way in which this theory can be fought on grounds of physiology. If we +persist in regarding the association between brain and thought +exclusively from a physiological point of view, we must of necessity be +materialists. Further, so far as we are physiologists our materialism +can do us no harm. On the contrary, it is to us of the utmost service, +as at once the simplest physiological explanation of facts already +known, and the best working hypothesis to guide us in our further +researches. But it does not follow from this that the theory of +materialism is true. The bells of St. Mary's over the way always ring +for a quarter of an hour before the University sermon; yet the ringing +of the bells is not the cause of the sermon, although, as long as the +association remains constant, there would be no harm in assuming, for +any practical purposes, that it is so. But just as we should be wrong in +concluding, if we did not happen to know so much about the matter as we +do, that the University sermon is produced by the vibration of bells in +the tower of St. Mary's Church, so we may be similarly wrong if we were +definitely to conclude that the sermon is produced by the vibration of a +number of little nerve-cells in the brain of the preacher. + +Now, if time permitted, and if I supposed that you would all care to go +with me into matters of some abstruseness, I could certainly prove that +whatever the connexion between body and mind may be, we have the best +possible reasons for concluding that it is not a causal connexion. These +reasons are, of course, extra-physiological; but they are not on this +account less conclusive. Within the limits of a lecture, however, I can +only undertake to give an outline sketch of what I take to be the +overwhelming argument against materialism. + +We have first the general fact that all our knowledge of motion, and so +of matter, is merely a knowledge of the modifications of mind. That is +to say, all our knowledge of the external world--including the knowledge +of our own brains--is merely a knowledge of our own mental states. Let +it be observed that we do not even require to go so far as the +irrefutable position of Berkeley, that the existence of an external +world without the medium of mind, or of being without knowing, is +inconceivable. It is enough to take our stand on a lower level of +abstraction, and to say that whether or not an external world can exist +apart from mind in any absolute or inconceivable sense, at any rate it +cannot do so _for us_. We cannot think any of the facts of external +nature without presupposing the existence of a mind which thinks them; +and therefore, so far at least as we are concerned, mind is necessarily +prior to everything else. It is for us the only mode of existence which +is real in its own right; and to it, as to a standard, all other modes +of existence which may be _in_ferred must be _re_ferred. Therefore, if +we say that mind is a function of motion, we are only saying, in +somewhat confused terminology, that mind is a function of itself. + +Such, then, I take to be a general refutation of materialism. To use but +a mild epithet, we must conclude that the theory is unphilosophical, +seeing that it assumes one thing to be produced by another thing, in +spite of an obvious demonstration that the alleged effect is necessarily +prior to its cause. Such, I say, is a general refutation of +materialism. But this is far from being all. 'Motion,' says Hobbes, +'produceth nothing but motion;' and yet he immediately proceeds to +assume that in the case of the brain it produces, not only motion, but +mind. He was perfectly right in saying that with respect to its +movements the animal body resembles an engine or a watch; and if he had +been acquainted with the products of higher evolution in watch-making, +he might with full propriety have argued, for instance, that in the +compensating balance, whereby a watch adjusts its own movements in +adaptation to external changes of temperature, a watch is exhibiting the +mechanical aspect of volition. And, similarly, it is perhaps possible to +conceive that the principles of mechanism might be more and more +extended in their effects, until, in so marvellously perfected a +structure as the human brain, all the voluntary movements of the body +might be originated in the same mechanical manner as are the +compensating movements of a watch; for this, indeed, as we have seen, is +no more than happens in the case of all the nerve-centres other than the +cerebral hemispheres. If this were so, motion would be producing nothing +but motion, and upon the subject of brain-action there would be nothing +further to say. Without consciousness I should be delivering this +lecture; without consciousness you would be hearing it; and all the busy +brains in this University would be conducting their researches, or +preparing for their examinations, mindlessly. Strange as such a state +of things might be, still motion would be producing nothing but motion; +and, therefore, if there were any mind to contemplate the facts, it +would encounter no philosophical paradox: it would merely have to +conclude that such were the astonishing possibilities of mechanism. But, +as the facts actually stand, we find that this is not the case. We find, +indeed, that up to a certain level of complexity mechanism alone is able +to perform all the compensations or adjustments which are performed by +the animal body; but we also find that beyond this level such +compensations or adjustments are never performed without the +intervention of consciousness. Therefore, the theory of automatism has +to meet the unanswerable question--How is it that in the machinery of +the brain motion produces this something which is not motion? Science +has now definitely proved the correlation of all the forces; and this +means that if any kind of motion could produce anything else that is not +motion, it would be producing that which science would be bound to +regard as in the strictest sense of the word a miracle. Therefore, if we +are to take our stand upon science--and this is what materialism +professes to do--we are logically bound to conclude, not merely that the +evidence of causation from body to mind is not so cogent as that of +causation in any other case, but that in this particular case causation +may be proved, again in the strictest sense of the term, a physical +impossibility. + +To adduce only one other consideration. Apart from all that I have said, +is it not in itself a strikingly suggestive fact that consciousness +only, yet always, appears upon the scene when the adjustive actions of +any animal body rise above the certain level of intricacy to which I +have alluded? Surely this large and general fact points with +irresistible force to the conclusion, that in the performance of these +more complex adjustments, consciousness--or the power of feeling and the +power of willing--is of some _use_. Assuredly on the principles of +evolution, which materialists at all events cannot afford to disregard, +it would be a wholly anomalous fact that so wide and important a class +of faculties as those of mind should have become developed in constantly +ascending degrees throughout the animal kingdom, if they were entirely +without use to animals. And, be it observed, this consideration holds +good whatever views we may happen to entertain upon the special theory +of natural selection. For the consideration stands upon the general fact +that all the organs and functions of animals are of use to animals: we +never meet, on any large or general scale, with organs and functions +which are wholly adventitious. Is it to be supposed that this general +principle fails just where its presence is most required, and that the +highest functions of the highest organs of the highest animals stand out +of analogy with all other functions in being themselves functionless? To +this question I, for one, can only answer, and answer unequivocally, +No. As a rational being who waits to take a wider view of the facts than +that which is open to the one line of research pursued by the +physiologist, I am forced to conclude that not without a reason does +mind exist in the frame of things; and that apart from the activity of +mind, whereby motion is related to that which is not motion, this planet +could never have held the wonderful being, who in multiplying has +replenished the earth and subdued it--holding dominion over the fish of +the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that +moveth. + +What, then, shall we say touching this mysterious union of mind and +motion? Having found it physically impossible that there should be a +causal connexion proceeding from motion to mind, shall we try to reverse +the terms, and suppose a causal connexion proceeding from mind to +motion? This is the oldest and still the most popular theory--the theory +of spiritualism. And, no doubt, in one important respect it is less +unphilosophical than the opposite theory of materialism. For +spiritualism supposes the causation to proceed from that which is the +source of our idea of causality--the mind: not from that into which this +idea has been read--the brain. Therefore, if causation were to be +accepted as a possibility either way, it would be less unreasonable to +suppose mental changes the causes of material changes than _vice versa_; +for we should then at least be starting from the basis of immediate +knowledge, instead of from the reflection of that knowledge in what we +call the external world. Seeing that the external world is known to us +only as motion, it is logically impossible for the mind to infer its own +causation from the external world; for this would be to infer that it is +an effect of motion, which would be the same as saying that it is an +effect of its own knowledge; and this would be absurd. But, on the other +hand, it is not thus logically impossible for the mind to infer that it +may be the cause of some of its own knowledge, or, in other words, that +it may have in some measure the power of producing what it knows as +motion. And when the mind does infer this, no logic on earth is able to +touch the inference; the position of pure idealism is beyond the reach +of argument. Nevertheless, it is opposed to the whole momentum of +science. For if mind is supposed, on no matter how small a scale, to be +a cause of motion, the fundamental axiom of science is impugned. This +fundamental axiom is that energy can neither be created nor +destroyed--that just as motion can produce nothing but motion, so, +conversely, motion can be produced by nothing but motion. Regarded, +therefore, from the stand-point of physical science, the theory of +spiritualism is in precisely the same case as the theory of materialism: +that is to say, if the supposed causation takes place, it can only be +supposed to do so by way of miracle. + +And this is a conclusion which the more clear-sighted of the idealists +have expressly recognized. That subtle and most entertaining thinker, +for example, the late Professor Green of Oxford, has said that the +self-conscious volition of man 'does not consist in a series of natural +events, ... is not natural in the ordinary sense of that term; not +natural at any rate in any sense in which naturalness would imply its +determination by antecedent events, or by conditions of which it is not +itself the source.' + +Thus the theory of spiritualism, although not directly refutable by any +process of logic, is certainly enfeebled by its collision with the +instincts of physical science. In necessarily holding the facts of +consciousness and volition super-natural, extra-natural, or non-natural, +the theory is opposed to the principle of continuity. + +Spiritualism being thus unsatisfactory, and materialism impossible, is +there yet any third hypothesis in which we may hope to find intellectual +rest? In my opinion there is. If we unite in a higher synthesis the +elements both of spiritualism and of materialism, we obtain a product +which satisfies every fact of feeling on the one hand, and of +observation on the other. The manner in which this synthesis may be +effected is perfectly simple. We have only to suppose that the +antithesis between mind and motion--subject and object--is itself +phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have only to suppose +that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of apprehension; and, +therefore, that any change taking place in the mind, and any +corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not two +changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a musical +sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings. +Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of +changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in +an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity +in consciousness is created only by the difference in our modes of +perceiving the same event--whether we see or whether we hear the +vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of +nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same +event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of +perceiving it. + +The great advantage of this theory is that it supposes only one stream +of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously +concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and +contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset. +Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion; +mind-changes nothing but mind-changes: both producing both +simultaneously, neither could be what it is without the other, because +without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is. +Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that +consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind changes +of brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very causation of +these changes that they should have a mental side. The use of mind to +animals is thus rendered apparent; for intelligent volition is thus +shown to be a true cause of adjustive movement, in that the cerebration +which it involves could not otherwise be possible: the causation would +not otherwise be complete. + +A simple illustration may serve at once to render this doctrine more +easily intelligible, and to show that, if accepted, the doctrine, as it +appears to me, terminates the otherwise interminable controversy on the +freedom of the will. + +In an Edison lamp the light which is emitted from the burner may be said +indifferently to be caused by the number of vibrations per second going +on in the carbon, or by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of +vibration could not take place in the carbon without constituting that +degree of temperature which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a +train of thought may be said indifferently to be caused by brain-action +or by mind-action; for, _ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place +without the other. Now, when we contemplate the phenomena of volition by +themselves, it is as though we were contemplating the phenomena of light +by themselves: volition is produced by mind in brain, just as light is +produced by temperature in carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of +light as the cause, say, of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of +volition as the cause of bodily movement. That particular kind of +physical activity which takes place in the carbon could not take place +without the light which causes a photograph; and, similarly, that +particular kind of physical activity which takes place in the brain +could not take place without the volition which causes a bodily +movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of bodily movement as is +the physical activity of the brain; seeing that, in an absolute sense, +the cause is one and the same. But if we once clearly perceive that what +in a relative sense we know as volition is, in a similar sense, the +cause of bodily movement, we terminate the question touching the freedom +of the will. For this question in its last resort--and apart from the +ambiguity which has been thrown around it by some of our +metaphysicians--is merely the question whether the will is to be +regarded as a cause of Nature. And the theory which we have now before +us sanctions the doctrine that it may be so regarded, if only we +remember that its causal activity depends upon its identity with the +obverse aspect known as cerebration, without which identity in apparent +duality neither volition nor cerebration could be the cause which in +fact they are. It thus becomes a mere matter of phraseology whether we +speak of the will determining, or being determined by, changes going on +in the external world; just as it is but a matter of phraseology whether +we speak of temperature determining, or being determined by, molecular +vibration. All the requirements alike of the free-will and of the +bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a synthesis which comprises +them both. On the one hand, it would be as impossible for an +_un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform the adjustments of +a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp to give out light +and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric current. On the +other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to originate bodily +movement without the occurrence of a strictly physical process of +cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison lamp which +had been deprived of its carbon-burner. + +It may be said of this theory that it is highly speculative, not +verifiable by any possible experiment, and therefore at best is but a +mere guess. All which is, no doubt, perfectly true; but, on the other +hand, we must remember that this theory comes to us as the only one +which is logically possible, and at the same time competent to satisfy +the facts alike of the outer and of the inner world. It is a speculation +in the sense of not being verifiable by experiment; but it has much more +value than ordinarily attaches to an unverifiable speculation, in that +there is really no alternative hypothesis to be considered: if we choose +to call it a guess, we must at the same time remember it is a guess +where it does not appear that any other is open. Once more to quote +Hobbes, who, as we have seen, was himself a remarkable instance of what +he here says: 'The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the +best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he +guesses at.' In this case, therefore, the best prophet is not the +physiologist, whose guess ends in materialism; nor the purely mental +philosopher, whose guess ends in spiritualism; but rather the man who, +being 'versed and studied' in all the facts appertaining to both sides +of the matter, ends in the only alternative guess which remains open. +And if that most troublesome individual, the 'plain man' of Locke, +should say it seems at least opposed to common sense to suppose that +there is anything in a burning candle or a rolling billiard-ball +substantially the same as mind, the answer is that if he could look into +my brain at this moment he would see nothing there but motion of +molecules, or motion of masses; and apart from the accident of my being +able to tell him so, his 'common sense' could never have divined that +these motions in my brain are concerned in the genesis of my spoken +thoughts. + + * * * * * + +It is obvious that from this hypothesis as to the substantial identity +of mind and motion, two important questions arise; and I feel that some +reference to these questions is in present circumstances forced upon me, +because they have both been considered in precisely the same connexion +by one of the most powerful intellects that was ever sent out into the +world by this University. I mean the late Professor Clifford. As my +intimate and valued friend, I desire to mention his name in this place +with all the affection, as well as with all the admiration, to which I +well know it is so fully entitled; and if I appear to mention him only +in order to disagree with him, this is only because I know equally well +that in his large and magnanimous thought differences of philosophical +opinion were never felt to weaken the bonds of friendship. + +In his well-known lecture on Body and Mind, Professor Clifford adopted +the hypothesis of identity which we are now considering, and from it was +led to the conclusion that if in the case of cerebral processes motion +is one with mind, the same must be true of motion wherever it occurs; +or, as he expressed it subsequently, the whole universe must be made of +mind-stuff. But in his view, although matter in motion presents what may +be termed the raw material of mind, it is only in the highly elaborated +constitution of the human brain that this raw material is sufficiently +wrought up to yield a self-conscious personality. Hence the dissolution +of a human brain implies the dissolution of a human mind; and hence also +the universe, although entirely composed of mind-stuff, is itself +mindless. Now, all I have to say about these two deductions is +this--they do not necessarily follow from the theory which is before us. +In holding that the mind of man perishes with his body, and that above +the mind of man there is no other, Clifford may have been right, or may +have been wrong. I am not here to discuss at length any questions of +such supreme importance. But I feel that I am here to insist upon the +one point which is immediately connected with my subject; and this is, +that whether or not Clifford was right in his conclusions, these +conclusions certainly did not follow by way of any logical sequence from +his premises. Because within the limits of human experience mind is only +known as associated with brain, it clearly does not follow that mind +cannot exist in any other mode. It does not even follow that any +probability upon this matter can be thus established. The basis of +analogy on which Clifford sought to rear an inference of cosmical +extent, was restricted to the one instance of mind as known upon one +planet; and, therefore, it is hard to imagine a more precarious use of +that precarious method which is called by logicians simple enumeration. +Indeed, even for what it is worth, the inference may be pointed with +quite as much effect in precisely the opposite direction. For we have +seen how little it is that we understand of the one mode in which we +certainly know that mind does exist; and if from this little we feel +impelled to conclude that there is a mode of mind which is not +restricted to brain, but co-extensive with motion, is consubstantial and +co-eternal with all that was, and is, and is to come; have we not at +least a suggestion, that high as the heavens are above the earth, so +high above our thoughts may be the thoughts of such a mind as this? I +offer no opinion upon the question whether the general order of Nature +does not require some one explanatory cause; nor upon the question +whether the mind of man itself does not point to something kindred in +the self-existing origin of things. I am not concerned to argue any +point upon which I feel that opinions may legitimately differ. I am only +concerned to show that, in so far as any deductions can be drawn from +the theory which is before us, they make at least as much against as in +favour of the cosmical conclusions arrived at by Clifford. + +On February 17, in the year 1600, when the streets of Rome were thronged +with pilgrims from all the quarters of Christendom, while no less than +fifty cardinals were congregated for the Jubilee; into the densely +crowded Campo di Fiori a man was led to the stake, where, 'silent and +self-sustained,' before the eyes of all nations, he perished in the +flames. That death was the death of a martyr: it was met voluntarily in +attestation of truth. But most noble of all the noble army to which he +belonged, the name of that man is written large in history, as the name +of one who had fortitude to die, not in the cause of religious belief, +but in that of scientific conviction. For why did Bruno suffer? He +suffered, as we all know, because he refused to recant his persuasion of +the truth of the Copernican theory. Why, then, do I adduce the name of +Bruno at the close of this lecture? I do so because, as far as I have +been able to ascertain, he was the first clearly to enunciate the +monistic theory of things to which the consideration of my subject has +conducted us. This theory--or that as to the substantial identity of +mind and motion--was afterwards espoused, in different guises, by sundry +other writers; but to Bruno belongs the merit of its original +publication, and it was partly for his adherence to this publication +that he died. To this day Bruno is ordinarily termed a pantheist, and +his theory, which in the light of much fuller knowledge I am advocating, +Pantheism. I do not care to consider a difference of terms, where the +only distinction resides in so unintelligible an idea as that of the +creation of substance. It is more to the purpose to observe that in the +mind of its first originator--and this a mind which was sufficiently +clear in its thought to die for its perception of astronomical +truth--the theory of Pantheism was but a sublime extension of the then +contracted views of Theism. And I think that we of to-day, when we look +to the teaching of this martyr of science, will find that in his theory +alone do we meet with what I may term a philosophically adequate +conception of Deity. If the advance of natural science is now steadily +leading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must +we not see how the independent conclusion of mental science is thus +independently confirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being +without knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come +when we may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study +of Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of +possible truths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without +mind, no being without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that +universal being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that +most stupendous of questions--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If +there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not +rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the +medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being? + +This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we are +careful to set the logical conditions with complete impartiality. But +the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as science is concerned, +it is here possible to point any inference at all: the whole orbit of +human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a parallax for measurements +so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the voice of science must +thus of necessity speak the language of agnosticism, at least let us see +to it that the language is pure; let us not tolerate any barbarisms +introduced from the side of aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this +new grammar of thought does not admit of any constructions radically +opposed to more venerable ways of thinking; even if we do not find that +the often-quoted words of its earliest formulator apply with special +force to its latest dialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology +and a little knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper +knowledge of both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their +relations to one another, will lead men back to some form of religion, +which, if it be more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier +days. + + 'It is a beauteous evening, calm and free; + The holy time is quiet as a nun, + Breathless with adoration; the broad sun + Is sinking down in its tranquillity; + The gentleness of heaven is on the sea: + Listen! the mighty being is awake, + And doth with his eternal motion make + A sound like thunder, everlastingly.' + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: _Leviathan_, pt. i. chaps, i. and vi.] + +[Footnote 2: _Leviathan_, Introduction.] + + + + +MONISM + + + 'Das Ich ist nicht aus Leib und Seele zusammengesetzt, sondern es + ist eine bestimmte Entwicklungsstufe des Wesens, das von + verschiedenem Standpunkt betrachtet in koerperliches und geistiges + Dasein auseinanderfaellt.'--Wundt, _Vorlesungen ueber die + Menschen-und Thierseele_, i. 293. + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +In no respect has the progress of physical science exercised a more +profound influence upon philosophical thought than it has by proving an +apparently quantitative relation between material changes and mental +changes. It has always been known that there is qualitative relation. +Even long before mankind suspected that the brain was in any way +connected with thought, it was well understood that alcohol and other +poisons exercised their sundry influences on the mind in virtue of +influences which they exercised upon the body; and even the lowest +savages must always have been aware that a blow on the head is followed +by insensibility. But it was not until the rise of Physiology that this +qualitative relation between corporeal changes and mental changes was +gradually found to be a quantitative one--or that every particular +change of mind had an exact and invariable counterpart in some +particular change of body. It is needless for me to detail the +successive steps in the long course of physiological discovery whereby +this great fact has been established; it is enough to say that the fact +_is_ established to the satisfaction of every physiologist. + +Now, when once the relation between material changes and mental changes +has been thus recognized as quantitative--or, which is the same thing, +when once the association has been recognized as both invariable and +exact--there arises the question as to how this relation is to be +explained. Formally considered--or considered as a matter of logical +statement irrespective of the relative probabilities which they may +present, either to the minds of different individuals or to the general +intelligence of the race--it appears to me that the possible hypotheses +are here seven in number. + + I. The mental changes may cause the material changes. + + II. The material changes may cause the mental changes. + + III. There may be no causation either way, because the association + may be only a phenomenal association--the two apparently diverse + classes of phenomena being really one and the same. + + IV. There may be no causation either way, because the association + may be due to a harmony pre-established by a superior mind. + + V. There may be no causation either way, because the association + may always be due to chance. + + VI. There may be no causation either way, because the material + order may not have any real existence at all, being merely an ideal + creation of the mental order. + + VII. Whether or not there be any causation either way, the + association may be one which it is necessarily beyond the power of + the human mind to explain. + +So far as I can see, this list of possible answers to the question +before us is exhaustive. I will next show why, in my opinion, the last +four of them may be excluded _in limine_. + +The suggestion of pre-established harmony (IV) merely postpones the +question: it _assumes_ a higher _mind_ as adjusting correspondencies +between known minds and animal bodies with respect to the activities of +each; and, therefore, it either leaves untouched the ultimate question +concerning the relation of mind (as such) to matter, or else it answers +this question in terms of spiritualism (I). + +The suggestion of chance (V) is effectually excluded by the doctrine of +chances: even in any one individual mind, the association between mental +changes and material changes is much too intimate, constant, and +detailed to admit of any one reasonably supposing that it can be due +only to chance. + +The suggestion of pure idealism (VI) ultimately implies that the +thinking Ego is itself the sole existence--a position which cannot, +indeed, be turned by any assault of logic; but one which is +nevertheless too obviously opposed to common sense to admit of any +serious defence; its immunity from direct attack arises only from the +gratuitous nature of its challenge to prove a negative (namely, that the +thinking Ego is _not_ the sole existence), and this a negative which is +necessarily beyond the region of proof. + +Lastly, the suggestion that the problem is necessarily insoluble (VII) +does not deserve to be regarded as an hypothesis at all; for to suppose +that the problem is necessarily insoluble is merely to exclude the +supposition of there being any hypothesis available. + +In view of these several considerations, it appears to me that, although +in a formal sense we may say there are altogether seven possible answers +to the question before us, in reality, or for the purposes of practical +discussion, there are nowadays but three--namely those which head the +above list, and which I will now proceed to consider. + +I have named these three hypotheses in the order of their appearance +during the history of philosophical thought. The earliest is the +spiritualistic. As far back as we can trace the conceptions of primitive +man, we meet with an unquestioning belief that it is his spirit which +_animates_ his body; and, starting from this belief as explanatory of +the movements of his own body, he readily attributes movements elsewhere +to analogous agencies--the theory of _animism_ in Nature thus becoming +the universal theory in all early stages of culture. It also appears to +be the theory most natural to our own children during the early years of +their dawning intelligence, and would doubtless continue through life in +the case of every individual human being, were he not subsequently +instructed in the reasons which have led to its rejection by many other +members of his race. These reasons, as already observed, have been +furnished in their entirety only within comparatively recent times; not +until Physiology was able to prove how intimate is the association +between cerebral processes and mental processes did it become possible +for materialism to turn the tables upon spiritualism, by simply +inverting the hypothesis. Lastly, although the theory of Monism (III) +may be traced back at least as far as the pantheistic thought of +Buddhism, it there had reference to theology as distinguished from +psychology. And even as presented in the writings of Bruno, Spinoza, and +other so-called monists prior to the present century, the hypothesis +necessarily lacked completeness on account of the absence of knowledge +afterwards supplied by physiology. For Monism, in the sense of this term +as I shall use it, may be metaphorically regarded as the child of the +two pre-existing theories, Spiritualism and Materialism. The birth of +this child was necessarily impossible before both its parents had +reached mature age. On the one hand it was necessary that the theory of +Spiritualism should have outgrown its infancy as Animism, its childhood +as Polytheism, before it entered upon its youth as Monotheism--or before +it was able to supply material for the conception of Monism as a theory +of cosmical extent. On the other hand, Materialism required to grow into +the fullness of manhood, under the nursing influence of Science, before +it was possible to engender this new-born offspring; for this offspring +is new-born. The theory of Monism, as we are about to consider it, is a +creature of our own generation; and it is only as such that I desire to +call attention to the child. In order, however, to do this, I must +follow the example of biographers in general, and begin by giving a +brief sketch of both the parents. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +SPIRITUALISM. + + +In proceeding to consider the opposite theories of Spiritualism and +Materialism, it is before all else desirable to be perfectly clear upon +the point of theory whereby they are essentially distinguished. This +point is that which is raised by the question whether mind is the cause +or the effect of motion. Both theories are dualistic, and therefore +agree in holding that there is causation as between mind and motion: +they differ only in their teaching as to the direction in which the +causation proceeds. Of course, out of this fundamental difference there +arise many secondary differences. The most important of these secondary +differences has reference to the nature of the eternal or self-existing +substance. Both theories agree that there is such a substance; but on +the question whether this substance be mental or material, the two +theories give contradictory answers, and logically so. For, if mind as +we directly know it (namely, in ourselves) is taken to be a cause of +motion, within our experience mind is accredited with priority; and +hence the inference that elsewhere, or universally, mind is prior to +motion. Furthermore, as motion cannot take place without something which +moves, this something is likewise supposed to have been the result of +mind: hence the doctrine of the creation by mind both of matter and of +energy. On the other hand, the theory of materialism, by refusing to +assign priority to mind as known directly in ourselves, naturally +concludes that mind is elsewhere, or universally, the result of matter +in motion--in other words, that matter in motion is the eternal or +self-existing substance, and, as such, the cause of mind wherever mind +occurs. + +I may observe, in passing, that although this cosmical deduction from +the theory of materialism is, as I have said, natural, it is not (as is +the case with the corresponding deduction from the theory of +spiritualism) inevitable. For it is logically possible that even though +all known minds be the results of matter in motion, matter in motion may +nevertheless itself be the result of an unknown mind. This, indeed, is +the position virtually adopted by Locke in his celebrated controversy +with the Bishop of Worcester. Having been taken to task by this divine +for the materialistic tendency of his writings, Locke defends himself by +denying the necessary character of the deduction which we are now +considering. For example, he insists, 'I see no contradiction in it that +the first eternal thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain +systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some +degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have +proved (lib. IV, ch. 10 and 14 &c.), it is no less than a contradiction +to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense +and thought) should be that eternal first thinking being.' Under this +view, it will be observed, mind is supposed to have the ultimate +priority, and thus to have been the original or creating cause of matter +in motion, which, in turn, becomes the cause (or, at least, the +conditional condition) of mind of a lower order. This view, however, +need not detain us, inasmuch as it can only be held by those who, on +grounds independent of philosophical thinking, already believe in mind +as the First Cause or Eternal Being: this belief granted, there is, of +course, an end of any question as between Spiritualism and Materialism. +I have, therefore, only mentioned this possible phase of spiritualistic +theory, in order to show that the theory of Materialism as applied to a +human being does not _necessarily_ involve an extension of that theory +to the cosmos. But I hold this distinction as of no practical value: it +merely indicates a logical possibility which no one would be likely to +entertain except on grounds independent of those upon which the +philosophical dispute between Spiritualism and Materialism must be +confined. + +Of more practical importance is the remark already made, namely, that +the fundamental or diagnostic distinction between these two species of +theory consists _only_ in the views which they severally take on the +question of causality. This remark is of practical importance, because +in the debate between spiritualists and materialists it is often lost +sight of: nay, in some cases, it is even expressly ignored. Obviously, +when it is either intentionally or unintentionally disregarded, the +debate ceases to be directed to the question under discussion, and may +then wander aimlessly over the whole field of collateral speculation. +Throughout the present essay, therefore, the discussion will be +restricted to the only topic which we have to discuss--namely, whether +mind is the cause of motion, motion the cause of mind, or neither the +cause of the other. + +The view to be first considered--namely, that mind is the cause of +motion--obviously has one great advantage over the opposite view: it +supposes the causality to proceed from that which is the source of our +idea of causality (the mind); not from that into which this idea has +been read by the mind. Hence, it is so far less difficult to imagine +that mental changes are the cause of bodily changes than _vice versa_; +for upon this hypothesis we are starting at least from the substance of +immediate knowledge, and not from the reflection of that knowledge in +what we call the external world. + +On the other hand, the theory of Spiritualism labours under certain +speculative difficulties which appear to me overwhelming. The most +formidable of these difficulties arises from the inevitable collision of +the theory with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy. +Whether or not we adopt the view that all causation of a physical kind +is ultimately an expression of the fact that matter and energy are +indestructible[3], it is equally certain that this indestructibility is +a necessary condition to the occurrence of causation as natural. +Therefore, if the mind of man is capable of breaking in as an +independent cause upon the otherwise uniform system of natural +causation, the only way in which it could do so would be by either +destroying or creating certain _quanta_ of either matter or energy or +both. But to suppose the mind capable of doing any of these things would +be to suppose that the mind is a cause in some other sense than a +physical or a natural cause; it would be to suppose that the mind is a +super-natural cause, or, more plainly, that all mental activity, so far +as it is an efficient cause of bodily movement, is of the nature of a +miracle. + +This conclusion, which appears to me unavoidably implicated in the +spiritualistic hypothesis, is not merely improbable _per se_, but admits +of being shown virtually impossible if we proceed to consider the +consequences to which it necessarily leads. A sportsman, for example, +pulls the trigger of a gun, thereby initiating a long train of physical +causes, which we may take up at the point where the powder is +discharged, the shot propelled, and the bird dropped. Here the man's +volition is supposed to have broken in upon the otherwise continuous +stream of physical causes--first by modifying the molecular movements of +his brain, so as to produce the particular co-ordination of +neuro-muscular movement required to take accurate aim and to fire at the +right moment; next by converting a quantity of gunpowder into gas, +propelling a quantity of lead through the air; and finally, by killing a +bird. Now, without tracing the matter further than this, let us consider +how enormous a change the will of the man has introduced, even by so +trivial an exercise of its activity. No doubt the first change in the +material world was exceedingly slight: the molecular movement in the +cortex of his brain was probably not more than might be dynamically +represented by some small fraction of a foot-pound. But so intricate is +the _nexus_ of physical causality throughout the whole domain of Nature, +that the intervention of even so minute a disturbance _ab extra_ is +obviously bound to continue to assert an influence of ever-widening +extent as well as of everlasting duration. The heat generated by the +explosion of the powder, the changed disposition of the shot, the death +of the bird--leading to innumerable physical changes as to stoppage of +many mechanical processes previously going on in the bird's body, loss +of animal heat, &c., and also to innumerable vital changes, leading to +a stoppage of all the mechanical changes which the bird would have +helped to condition had it lived to die some other death, to propagate +its kind, and thus indirectly condition an incalculable number of future +changes that would have been brought about by the ever increasing number +of its descendants--these and an indefinite number of other physical +changes must all be held to have followed as a direct consequence of the +man's volition thus suddenly breaking in as an independent cause upon +the otherwise uniform course of Nature. Now, I say that, apart from some +system of pre-established harmony, it appears simply inconceivable that +the order of Nature could be maintained at all, if it were thus liable +to be interfered with at any moment in any number of points. And if the +spiritualist takes refuge in the further hypothesis of a pre-established +harmony between acts of human (not to add brute) volition and causes of +a natural kind, we have only to observe that he thus lands himself in a +speculative position which is practically identical with that occupied +by the materialist. For the only difference between the two positions +then is that the necessity which the materialist takes to be imposed on +human volition by the system of natural causation, is now taken by the +spiritualist to be equally imposed by a super-natural volition. The +necessity which binds the human volition must be equally rigid in +either case; and therefore it can make no practical difference whether +the source of it be regarded as natural or super-natural, material or +mental: so that a man be fated to will only in certain ways--and this +with all the rigour which belongs to causation as physical--it is +scarcely worth while to dispute whether the predestination is of God or +of Nature. There can be no question, however, that in this matter the +possibility which I have supposed to be suggested by the spiritualist is +more far-fetched than that which obviously lies to the hand of the +materialist; and, moreover, that it too plainly wears the appearance of +a desperate device to save a hollow theory. + +It remains to add that this great difficulty against the spiritualistic +theory has been revealed in all its force only during the present +generation. Since the days of fetishism, indeed, the difficulty has +always been an increasing one--growing with the growth of the perception +of uniformity on the one hand, and of mechanical as distinguished from +volitional agency on the other. But it was not until the correlation of +all the physical forces had been proved by actual experiment, and the +scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy became as a +consequence firmly established, that the difficulty in question assumed +the importance of a logical barrier to the theory of mental changes +acting as efficient causes of material changes. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 3: In the opinion of some modern writers the indestructibility +of matter and the conservation of energy are alone sufficient to explain +all the facts of natural causation. 'For,' it is urged, 'if in any case +similar antecedents did not determine similar consequents, on one or +other of these occasions some _quantum_ of force, or of matter, or of +both, must have disappeared--or, which is the same thing, the law of +causation cannot have been constant.' In a future chapter I shall have +to recur to this view. Meanwhile I have only to observe that whether or +not the law of causation is nothing more than a re-statement of the fact +that matter and energy are indestructible, it is equally true that this +fact is at least a necessary _condition_ to the operation of that law.] + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +MATERIALISM. + + +This is the theory which presents great fascination to the student of +physical science. By laborious investigation physiology has established +the fact beyond the reach of rational dispute, that there is a constant +relation of concomitancy between cerebral action and thought. Within +experience mind is found in constant and definite association with that +highly complex and peculiar disposition of matter called a living brain. +The size and elaboration of this peculiar structure throughout the +animal kingdom stand in conspicuous proportion to the degree of +intelligence displayed; while the impairment of this structure, whether +by congenital defect, mutilation, anaemia, decay, or appropriate poison, +entails corresponding impairment of mental processes. Thus much being +established, no reasonable man can hesitate in believing the relation +between neurosis and psychosis to be a constant and concomitant +relation, so that the step between this, and regarding it as a causal +relation, seems indeed a small one. For, in all matters of physical +inquiry, whenever we have proved a constant relation of concomitancy in +a sequence _A B_, we call _A_ the cause of _B_; and, therefore, it has +been frequently said that the evidence of causation between neurosis and +psychosis is recognized causation. Lastly, to fortify this hypothesis, +materialists point to the doctrine of the conservation of energy, which +is supplied by the science of physics as a sort of buttress in this +matter to the teachings of physiology. For, as this doctrine compels us +to believe that the chain of physical causation involved in cerebral +processes can nowhere be broken or deflected _ab extra_, we are +compelled to believe that the mental processes, which are correlatively +associated with these cerebral processes, can nowhere escape from 'the +charmed circle of the forces,' so that whether we look to the detailed +teachings of physiology, or to the more general teachings of physics, we +alike perceive that natural science appears to leave no locus for mind +other than as a something which is in some way a result of motion. + +The position of Materialism being thus at first sight so naturally +strong, and having been in recent years so fortified by the labours of +physiology, it is not surprising that in the present generation +Materialism should be in the ascendant. It is the simple truth, as a +learned and temperate author, speaking from the side of theology, has +recently said, that + + 'Materialism is a danger to which individuals and societies will + always be more or less exposed. The present generation, however, + and especially the generation which is growing up, will obviously + be very especially exposed to it; as much so, perhaps, as any + generation in the history of the world. Within the last thirty + years the great wave of spiritualistic or idealistic thought ... + has been receding and decreasing; and another, which is in the main + driven by materialistic forces, has been gradually rising behind, + vast and threatening. It is but its crest that we at present see; + it is but a certain vague shaking produced by it that we at present + feel; but we shall probably soon enough fail not both to see and + feel it fully and distinctly[4].' + +Such being the present importance of Materialism, I shall devote the +present chapter to a consideration of this theory. Each of the points in +the argument for Materialism which I have mentioned above admits, of +course, of elaboration; but I think that their enumeration contains all +that is essential to the theory in question. It now devolves upon us to +inquire whether this theory is adequate to meet the facts. + +And here I may as well at once give it as my own opinion that, of +however much service the theory of Materialism may be, up to a certain +point, it can never be accepted by any competent mind as a final +explanation of the facts with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as +its use may be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine, +it is wholly inadequate as a hypothesis in philosophy. That is to say, +so long as there is a constant relation of concomitancy found by +experience to obtain between neural processes and mental processes, so +long no harm can accrue to physical science by assuming, for its own +purposes, that this relation is a causal one. But as soon as the +question concerning the validity of this assumption is raised into the +region of philosophy, it receives the answer that the assumption cannot +be allowed to pass. For where the question becomes one not as to the +_fact_ of the association but as to its _nature_, philosophy, which must +have regard to the facts of mind no less than to those of matter, must +pronounce that the hypothesis is untenable; for the hypothesis of this +association being one of causality acting from neurosis to psychosis, +cannot be accepted without doing violence, not merely to our faculty of +reason, but to our very idea of causation itself. + +A very small amount of thinking is enough to show that what I call my +knowledge of the external world, is merely a knowledge of my own mental +modifications. A step further and I find that my idea of causation as a +principle in the external world is derived from my knowledge of this +principle in the internal world. For I find that my idea of force and +energy in the external world is a mere projection of the idea which I +have of effort within the region of my own consciousness; and therefore +my only idea of causation is that which is originally derived from the +experience which I have of this principle as obtaining among my own +mental modifications. + +If once we see plainly that the idea of causation is derived from +within, and that what we call the evidence of physical causation is +really the evidence of mental modifications following one another in a +definite sequence, we shall then clearly see, not merely that we have no +evidence, but that we _can have_ no evidence of causation as proceeding +from object to subject. However cogent the evidence may appear at first +sight to be, it is found to vanish like a cloud as soon as it is exposed +to the light of adequate contemplation. In the very act of thinking the +evidence, we are virtually denying its possibility as evidence; for as +evidence it appeals only to the mind, and since the mind can only know +its own sequences, the evidence must be presenting to the mind an +account of its own modifications; from the mere fact, therefore, of its +being accepted as thinkable, the evidence is proved to be illusory. + +To uneducated men it appears an indisputable fact of 'common sense' that +the colour of a flower exists as perceived in the flower, apart from any +relation to the percipient mind. A physiologist has gone further into +the thicket of things, and finds that the way is not so simple as this. +He regards the quality of colour as necessarily related to the faculty +of visual perception; does not suppose that the colour exists _as such_ +in the flower, but thinks of the something there as a certain order of +vibrations which, when brought into relation with consciousness through +the medium of certain nerves, gives rise to the perception experienced; +and in order to account for the translation into visual feeling of an +event so unlike that feeling as is the process taking place in the +flower, physiologists have recourse to an elaborate theory, such as that +of Helmholtz or Hering. In other words, physiologists here fully +recognize that colour, or any other thing perceived, only exists _as +perceived_ in virtue of a subjective element blending with an objective; +the thing _as perceived_ is recognized as having no existence apart from +its relation to a percipient mind. Now, although physiologists are at +one with the philosophers thus far, it is to be feared that very +frequently they are in the same position as the above-mentioned +'uneducated men,' when it becomes needful to press still further into +the thicket. For after having distinguished the necessity of recognizing +a mind-element in any possible theory of perception, they forthwith +proceed to disregard this element when passing from the ground of +perception to that of thought. Although the ideas of matter, motion, +causation, and so on, are themselves as much the offspring of a thinking +mind, with its environment, as the perception of colour is a conceiving +of the percipient mind, with _its_ environment, these ideas are +inconsistently supposed to stand for equivalent realities of the +external world--to truly represent things that are virtually independent +of any necessary relation to mind. Or, as the case has recently been +well put by Principal Caird: + + 'You cannot get mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the + very attempt to do so you have already begun with mind. The + easiest step of any such inquiry involves categories of thought, + and it is in terms of thought that the very problem you are + investigating can be so much as stated. You cannot start in your + investigations with a bare, self-identical, objective fact, + stripped of every ideal element or contribution from thought. The + least and lowest part of outward observation is not an independent + entity--fact _minus_ mind, and out of which mind may, somewhere or + other, be seen to emerge; but it is fact or object as it appears to + an observing mind, in the medium of thought, having mind or thought + as an inseparable factor of it. Whether there be such a thing as an + absolute world outside of thought, whether there be such things as + matter and material atoms existing in themselves before any mind + begins to perceive or think about them, is not the question before + us. If it were possible to conceive of such atoms, at any rate you, + before you begin to make anything of them, must think them; and you + can never, by thinking about atoms, prove that there is no such + thing as thought other than as an ultimate product of atoms. Before + you could reach thought or mind as a last result you must needs + eliminate from it the data of the problem with which you start, and + that you can never do, any more than you can stand on your own + shoulders or outstrip your own shadow.... In one word, to + constitute the reality of the outward world--to make possible the + minimum of knowledge, nay, the very existence for us of molecules + and atoms--you must needs presuppose that thought or thinking self, + which some would persuade us is to be educed or evolved from + them.... To make thought a function of matter is thus, simply, to + make thought a function of itself[5].' + +From this reasoning there can be no escape; and it is more rational for +a man to believe that colour exists as such in a flower than, after +having plainly seen that such cannot be the case, forthwith to +disregard the teaching of this analogy, and to imagine that any apparent +evidence of mind as a result of matter or motion can possibly be +entertained as real evidence. + +Remembering, then, that from the nature of this particular case it is as +impossible for mind to prove its own causation as it is for water to +rise above its source, it may still be well, for the sake of further +argument, to sink this general consideration, and to regard such +spurious evidence of causation as is presented by Materialism, without +prejudice arising from its being _prima facie_ inadmissible. + +Materialists, as already observed, are fond of saying that the evidence +of causation from neurosis to psychosis is as good as such evidence can +be proved to be in any other case. Now, quite apart from the general +considerations just adduced to show that from the peculiar nature of +this case there can here be no such evidence at all--quite apart from +this, and treating the problem on the lower ground of the supposed +analogy, it may be clearly shown that the statement is untrue. For a +little thought will show that in point of fact the only resemblance +between this supposed case of causation and all other cases of +recognized causation, consists in the invariability of the correlation +between cerebral processes and mental processes; in all other points the +analogy fails. For in all cases of recognized causation there is a +perceived _connexion_ between the cause and the effect; the antecedents +are physical, and the consequents are physical. But in the case before +us there is no perceived, or even conceivable, connexion between the +cause and the effect; for the causes are supposed to be physical and the +effects mental. And the antithesis thus posited is alone sufficient to +separate _toto coelo_ the case of causation supposed from that of all +cases of causation recognized. From the singularly clear and +well-balanced statement of this subject given by Professor Allman in his +Presidential Address before the British Association, I may here fitly +quote the following:-- + + 'If we could see any analogy between thought and any one of the + admitted phenomena of matter, we should be justified in the first + of these conclusions (i. e. that of Materialism) as the simplest, + and as affording a hypothesis most in accordance with the + comprehensiveness of natural laws; but between thought and the + physical phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but no + conceivable analogy; and the obvious and continuous path which we + have hitherto followed up in our reasonings from the phenomena of + lifeless matter through those of living matter here comes suddenly + to an end. The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep + and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by + which, as by a bridge, we may span it over[6].' + +And, not unduly to multiply quotations, I shall only adduce one more +from another of the few eminent men of science who have seen their way +clearly in this matter, and have expressed what they have seen in +language as clear as their vision. Professor Tyndall writes:-- + + 'The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding + facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite + thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur + simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor + apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to + pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one phenomenon to the + other. They appear together but we do not know why. Were our minds + and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable + us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable + of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their + electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately + acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we + should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem. How are + these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness? + The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain + intellectually impassable[7].' + +Next, in all cases of recognized causation there is a perceived +_equivalency_ between cause and effect, such equivalency belonging to +the very essence of that in which we conceive causation to consist. But +as between matter and motion on the one side, and feeling and thought on +the other, there can be no such equivalency conceivable. That no such +equivalency is conceivable may be rendered apparent on grounds of +Materialism itself. For Materialism is bound to accept the fundamental +doctrine of modern physics--that, viz. as to the conservation of +energy--and therefore it becomes evident that unless we assimilate +thought with energy, there is no possibility of a causal relation, or a +relation of equivalency, as obtaining between the one and the other. +For however little we may know about brain-dynamics, materialists, at +least, must take it for granted that in every process of cerebration the +matter and force concerned are indestructible quantities, and therefore +that all their possible equations are fully satisfied, could we but +follow them out. Howsoever complex we may suppose the flux and reflux of +forces to be within the structure of a living brain, it is no more +possible for any one of the forces concerned to escape from brain to +mind, than it would be for such an escape to occur in a steam-engine or +a watch; the doctrine of the conservation of energy forms an insuperable +bar to the supposition that any equation in the region of physics can be +left unsatisfied, in order to pass over and satisfy some other equation +in the region of psychics. + +Of course in saying this I am aware that some of the more clear-sighted +of the materialists have plainly perceived this difficulty in all its +magnitude, and so have felt that unless it can be met, any theory of +Materialism must necessarily contain a radical contradiction of +principles. Some few materialists have therefore sought to meet the +difficulty in the only way it can be met, viz. by boldly asserting the +possibility of thought and energy being transmutable. On this view +thought becomes a mode of motion, and takes its rank among the forces as +identical in nature with heat, light, electricity, and the rest. But +this view is also inherently impossible. For suppose, as a matter of +argument, that physiologists should discover a mechanical equivalent of +thought, so that we might estimate the value of a calculation in thermal +units, or the 'labour of love' in foot-pounds: still we should not be +out of our difficulties; we should only have to cut a twist of flax to +find a lock of iron. For by thus assimilating thought with energy, we +should in no wise have explained the fundamental antithesis between +subject and object. The fact would remain, if possible, more +unaccountable than ever, that mind should present absolutely no point of +real analogy with motion. Involved with the essential idea of motion is +the idea of extension; suppress the latter and the former must +necessarily vanish, for motion only means transition in space of +something itself extended. But thought, as far as we can possibly know +it, is known and distinguished by the very peculiarity of not having +extension. Therefore, even if we were to find a mechanical equivalent of +thought, thought would still not be proved a mode of motion. On the +contrary, what would be proved would be that, in becoming transformed +into thought, energy had ceased to be energy; in passing out of its +relation to space it would cease to exist as energy, and if it again +passed into that relation it would only be by starting _de novo_ on a +new course of history. Therefore the proof that thought has a mechanical +equivalent would simply amount to the proof, not that thought _is_ +energy, but that thought _destroys_ energy. And if Materialism were to +prove this, Materialism would commit suicide. For if once it were +proved that the relation of energy to thought is such that thought is +able to absorb or temporarily to annihilate energy, the whole argument +of Materialism would be inverted, and whatever evidence there is of +causation as between mind and matter would become available in all its +force on the side of Spiritualism. This seems plain, for if it even were +conceivable--which most distinctly it is not--that a motor could ever +become a motive, and so pass from the sphere of dynamics into the sphere +of consciousness, the fact would go to prove, not that the motor was the +cause of the motive, but rather that the motive was the cause of +destroying the motor; so that at that point the otherwise unbroken chain +of physical sequences was interrupted by the motive striking in upon it, +and in virtue of the mysterious power supposed to have been proved by +physiology, cancelling the motor, so allowing the nerve-centre to act as +determined by the motive. + +Of course I wish it to be understood that I believe we are here dealing +with what I may call, in perhaps suitably contradictory terms, +inconceivable conceptions. But let it be remembered that I am not +responsible for this ambiguity; I am only showing what must be the +necessary outcome of analysis if we begin by endeavouring phenomenally +to unite the most antithetical of elements--mind and motion. +Materialism, at least, will not be the gainer should it ever be proved +that in the complex operations of the brain a unique exception occurs +to the otherwise universal law of the conservation of energy in space. + +We may, therefore, quit the suggestion that the difficulty experienced +by Materialism of showing an equivalency between neurosis and psychosis +can ever be met by assuming that some day mental processes may admit of +being expressed in terms of physical. But before leaving this difficulty +with regard to equivalency, I may mention one other point that seems to +me of importance in connexion with it. I have already said that if we +suppose causation to proceed from brain to mind, we must suppose this +essential requirement of equivalency between the cerebral causes and the +mental effects to be satisfied somewhere. + +But where are we to say that it is satisfied? Even if we suppose that +thought has a mechanical equivalent, and that causation proceeds in the +direction from energy to thought, still, when we have regard to the +supposed effects, we find that even yet they bear no kind of equivalency +to their supposed causes. The brain of a Shakespeare probably did not, +as a system, exhibit so much energy as does the brain of an elephant; +and the cerebral operations of a Darwin may not have had a very +perceptibly larger mechanical equivalent than those of a banker's clerk. +Yet in the world of thought the difference between our estimate of the +results, or 'work done,' in these cases is such as to drive all ideas of +equivalency to the winds. Doubtless, a materialist will answer that it +is not fair to take our estimate of 'work done' in the world of mind as +the real equivalent of the energy supposed to have passed over from the +world of motion, seeing that our estimate is based, not on the +quantitative amount of thought produced, but rather on its qualitative +character with reference to the social requirements of the race. But to +this it is enough to answer that we have no means of gauging the +quantity of thought produced other than by having regard to _its_ +effects in the world of mind, and this we cannot do except by having +regard to its qualitative character. Many a man, for instance, must have +consumed more than a thousand times the brain-substance and brain-energy +that Shelley expended over his 'Ode to a Skylark,' and yet as a result +have produced an utterly worthless poem. Now, in what way are we to +estimate the 'work done' in two such cases, except by looking to the +relative effects produced in the only region where they are produced, +viz. in the region of mind? Yet, when we do so estimate them, what +becomes of the evidence of equivalency between the physical causes and +the psychical effects? + +Now if thus, whether or not we try to form an estimate, it is impossible +to show any semblance of equivalency between the supposed causes and the +alleged effects, how can any one be found to say that the evidence of +causation is here as valid as it is in any other case? The truth rather +is that the alleged effects stand out of every relation to the supposed +causes, with the exception only of being associated in time. + +There still remains one other enormous difficulty in the way of the +theory of Materialism; it necessarily embodies the theory of _conscious +automatism_, and is therefore called upon to explain why consciousness +and thought have ever appeared upon the scene of things at all. That +this is the necessary position of Materialism is easily proved as +follows. We have already seen that Materialism would commit suicide by +supposing that energy could be transmuted into thought, for this would +amount to nothing short of supposing the destruction of energy as such; +and to suppose energy thus destructible would be to open wide the door +of spiritualism. Materialism, therefore, is logically bound to argue in +this way: We cannot conceive of a conscious idea, or mental change, as +in any way affecting the course of a cerebral reflex, or material +change; while, on the other hand, our knowledge of the conservation of +energy teaches us as an axiom that the cerebral changes must determine +each other in their sequence as in a continuous series. Nowhere can we +suppose the physical process to be interrupted or diverted by the +psychical process; and therefore we must conclude that thought and +volition really play no part whatever in determining action. Thoughts +and feelings are but indices which show in the mirror of the mind +certain changes that are proceeding in the matter of the brain, and are +as inefficient in influencing those changes as the shadow of a cloud is +powerless to direct the movements of that of which it is the shadow. + +But when Materialism reaches, in a clear and articulate manner, this +inference as a conclusion necessary from its premises, it becomes +opposed at once to common sense and to the requirements of methodical +reason. It becomes opposed to common sense because we all feel it is +practically impossible to believe that the world would now have been +exactly what it is even if consciousness, thought, and volition had +never appeared upon the scene--that railway trains would have been +running filled with mindless passengers, or that telephones would have +been invented by brains that could not think to speak to ears that could +not hear. And the conclusion is opposed to the requirements of +methodical reason, because reason to be methodical is bound to have an +answer to the question that immediately arises from the conclusion. This +question simply is, Why have consciousness, thought, and volition ever +been called into existence; and why are they related, as they are +related, to cerebral action? Materialism, by here undertaking to prove +that these things stand uselessly isolated from all other things, is +bound to show some reason why they ever came to be, and to be what they +are. For observe, it is not merely that these things exist in a supposed +unnecessary relation to all other things; the fact to be explained is +that they exist in a most intimately woven and invariable connexion with +certain highly complex forms of organic structure and certain highly +peculiar distributions of physical force. Yet these unique and +extraordinary things are supposed by automatism to be always results and +never causes; in the theatre of things they are supposed to be always +spectators and never actors; in the laboratory of life they are supposed +to be always by-products; and therefore in the order of nature they are +supposed to have no _raison d'etre_. Such a state of matters would be +accountable enough if the stream of mental changes were but partly, +occasionally, and imperfectly associated with the stream of material +changes; but as the association is so minute, invariable, and precise, +the hypothesis of the association being merely accidental, or _not +requiring explanation_, becomes, at the bar of methodical reasoning, +self-convicted of absurdity. + +The state of the case, then, simply is that two distinct facts stand to +be explained by the theory of conscious automatism--first, why psychosis +should ever have been developed as a mysterious appendage to neurosis; +and, secondly, why the association between these things should be so +intimate and precise. Assuredly, on the principles of evolution, which +materialists at least cannot afford to disregard, it would be a wholly +anomalous fact that so wide and general a class of phenomena as those of +mind should have become developed in constantly ascending degrees +throughout the animal kingdom, if they are entirely without use to +animals. If psychosis is, as supposed, a function of neurosis, the +doctrine of natural selection alone would forbid us to imagine that this +function differs from all other functions in being itself functionless. +If it would be detrimental to the theory of natural selection that any +one isolated structure--such as the tail of a rattlesnake--should be +adapted to perform a function useless to the animal possessing it, how +utterly destructive of that theory would be the fact that all the +phenomena of mind have been elaborated as functions of nerve-tissue +without any one of them ever having been of any use either to the +individual or to the species. And the difficulty that thus arises is +magnified without limit when we remember that the phenomena of mind are +invariable in their association with cerebral structure, grade for +grade, and process for process. + +It is of no argumentative use to point to the fact that many adaptive +movements in animals are performed by nerve-centres apart from any +association with consciousness or volition, because all the facts on +this head go to prove that consciousness and volition come in most +suggestively just where adaptive movements begin to grow varied and +complex, and then continue to develop with a proportional reference to +the growing variety and complexity of these movements. The facts, +therefore, irresistibly lead to the conclusion (if we argue here as we +should in the case of any other function) that consciousness and +volition are functions of nerve-tissue super-added to its previous +functions, in order to meet new and more complex demands on its powers +of adaptation. + +Neither is it of any argumentative use to point to the fact that +adaptive actions which originally are performed with conscious volition +may by practice come to be performed without conscious volition. For it +is certain that no adaptive action of quite a novel kind is ever +performed from the first without consciousness of its performance, and +therefore, although it is true that by repetition its performance may +become mechanical or unconscious, this does not prove that consciousness +was without use in producing the adaptive action. It only proves that +after a nervous mechanism has been elaborated by the help of +consciousness, consciousness may be withdrawn and leave the finished +mechanism to work alone; the structure having been completed, the +scaffolding necessary to its completion may be removed. + +But passing over this difficulty which the theory of conscious +automatism seems bound to encounter in its collision with the theory of +natural selection, the most insuperable of all its difficulties arises +from the bare fact, which it cannot explain, that conscious intelligence +exists, and exists in the most intimate relation with one peculiar kind +of material structure. For automatists must concede that the evidence +of causation in the region of mind is at least as cogent as it is in the +region of matter, seeing that the whole science of psychology is only +rendered possible as a science by the fundamental fact of observation +that mental antecedents determine mental consequents. Therefore, if we +call a physical sequence _A, B, C_, and a mental sequence _a, b, c_ +automatists have to explain, not merely why there should be such a thing +as a mental sequence at all, but also why the sequence _a, b, c_ should +always proceed, link for link, with the sequence _A, B, C_. It clearly +is no answer to say that the sequence _A, B, C_ implies the successive +activity of certain definite nerve-centres _A', B', C'_ which have for +their subjective effects the sequence _a, b, c_ so that whenever the +sequence _A, B, C_ occurs the sequence _a, b, c_ must likewise occur. +This is no answer, because it merely restates the hypothesis of +automatism, and begs the whole question to be discussed. What methodical +reason demands as an answer is simply why the sequence _A, B, C_ even +though we freely grant it due to the successive activity of certain +definite nerve-centres, should be attended by the sequence _a, b, c_. +Reason perceives clearly enough that the sequence _a, b, c_ belongs to a +wholly different category from the sequence _A, B, C_ the one being +immediately known as a process taking place in a something which is +without extension or physical properties of any kind, and the other +taking place in a something which when, translated by the previous +something, we recognize as having extension and the other antithetical +properties which we class together as physical. There would of course be +no difficulty if the sequence _A, B, C_ continued through any amount of +complexity in the same conceivable category of being; so that there +would be nothing actually inconceivable in cerebral sequence--changes +running through _D, E, F_, &c., to an extent sufficient to cause +unconscious automatism of any degree of complexity. But that which does +require explanation from automatists is why automatism should have +become associated with consciousness, and this so intimately that every +change in the sequence _A, B, C_, &c., is accompanied by a particular +and corresponding change in the sequence _a, b, c_, &c. Thus, to take a +definite illustration, if on seeing the sun I think of a paper on solar +physics, and from this pass to thinking of Mr. Norman Lockyer, and from +this to speculating on the probability of certain supposed elements +being really compounds, there is here a definite causal connexion in the +sequence of my _thoughts_. But it is the last extravagance of absurdity +to tell me that the accompanying causal sequences going on in my brain +happen to have exactly corresponded to the sequences which were taking +place in the mind, the two trains of sequences being each definite and +coherent in themselves, and yet each proceeding link for link in lines +parallel with the other. Without some theory of pre-established +harmony--which, of course, it is no part of automatism to entertain--it +would, on the doctrine of chances alone, be impossible to suppose that +the causal sequences in the brain always happen to be just those which, +by running link for link with another set of causal sequences taking +place in the mind, enable both the series to be definite and coherent in +themselves. Therefore, before reason can allow the theory of automatism +to pass, it must be told how this wonderful fact of parallelism is to be +explained. There must be _some_ connexion between the intrinsically +coherent series _A, B, C_ and the no less intrinsically coherent +sequence _a, b, c_, which may be taken as an explanation why they +coincide each to each. What is this connexion? We do not know; but we +have now seen that, whatever it is, it cannot be an ordinary causal +connexion--first, because the doctrine of the conservation of energy +makes it incumbent on us to believe that the procession of physical +cause and effect is complete within the region of brain--a closed +circle, as it were, from which no energy can, without argumentative +suicide, be supposed to escape into the region of mind; and next, +because, even were this difficulty disregarded, it is unaccountable that +the causative influence (whatever it is supposed to be), which passes +over from the region of physics into that of psychics, should be such as +to render the psychical series coherent in itself, when on the physical +side the series must be determined by purely physical conditions, +having no reference whatsoever to psychical requirements. + +Thus it is argumentatively impossible for Materialism to elude the +necessity of explaining the kind of connexion which it supposes to +subsist between neurosis and psychosis; and forasmuch as the above +considerations clearly show this connexion cannot be accepted as one of +ordinary causality without some answer being given to the questions +which reason has to ask, Materialism must be ruled out of court if she +fails to respond to the demand. But it is no less clearly impossible +that she can respond to the demand, and therefore at the bar of +Philosophy Materialism must be pronounced, for this as well as for the +reasons previously cited, conspicuously inadequate to account for the +facts. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 4: Professor Flint, _Antitheistic Theories_, p. 99.] + +[Footnote 5: _Philosophy of Religion_, pp. 95, 99, and 101.] + +[Footnote 6: British Association Report, 1879, p. 28.] + +[Footnote 7: British Association Report, 1868. Trans. of Sections, p. +5.] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +MONISM. + + +We have seen, then, that both the alternative theories of Spiritualism +and Materialism are found, when carefully examined, to be so beset with +difficulties of a necessary and fundamental kind, that it is impossible +to entertain either without closing our eyes to certain contradictions +which they severally and inherently present. We may, indeed, go even +further than this, and affirm that to suppose mind the cause of motion +or motion the cause of mind is equally to suppose that which in its very +nature as a supposition is neither true nor untrue, but nonsensical. +For, as Prof. Clifford has said in his essay on _Body and Mind_,-- + + 'It may be conceived that, at the same time with every exercise of + volition, there is a disturbance of the physical laws; but this + disturbance, being perceptible to me, would be a physical fact + accompanying the volition, and could not be volition itself, which + is not perceptible to me. Whether there is such a disturbance of + the physical laws or no is a question of fact to which we have the + best of reasons for giving a negative answer; but the assertion + that another man's volition, a feeling in his consciousness which + I cannot perceive, is part of the train of physical facts which I + may perceive,--this is neither true nor untrue, but nonsense; it is + a combination of words whose corresponding ideas will not go + together[8].' + +And seeing that the correlatives are in each case the same, it is +similarly 'nonsense' to assert the converse proposition: or, in other +words, it is equally nonsense to speak of mental action causing cerebral +action, or of cerebral action causing mental action--nonsense of the +same kind as it would be to speak of the _Pickwick Papers_ causing a +storm at sea, or the eruption of a volcano causing the forty-seventh +proposition in the first book of Euclid. + +We see, then, that two of the three possible theories of things contain +the elements of their own destruction: when carefully analyzed, both +these theories are found to present inherent contradictions. On this +account the third, or only alternative theory, comes to us with a large +antecedent presumption in its favour. For it comes to us, as it were, on +a clear field, or with the negative advantage of having no logical +rivals to contend with. The other two suggestions having been weighed in +the balance and found wanting, we are free to look to the new-comer as +quite unopposed. This new-comer must, indeed, be interrogated as +carefully as his predecessors, and, like them, must be judged upon his +own merits. But as he constitutes our last possible hope of solving the +question which he professes himself able to solve, the absolute failure +of his predecessors entitles him to a patient hearing. By the method of +exclusion his voice is now the only voice that remains to be heard, and +unless it can speak to better purpose than the others, we shall have no +alternative but to abandon the facts as inexplicable, or to confess that +it is necessarily impossible for the human mind ever to arrive at any +theory of things. + +Before proceeding to state or to examine this third and last of the +suggested theories, it is desirable--in order still further to define +its _status a priori_--that I should exhibit the reason why the two +other suggestions have necessarily failed. For to my mind it is +perfectly obvious that this reason is to be found, and found only, in +the fact that they are both dualistic. The inherent, the fatal, and the +closely similar difficulties which attach to both the dualistic +theories, attach to them merely because they _are_ dualistic. The +'nonsense' of each of them is really identical, and arises only because +they both make the same irrational attempt to find more in the effect +than they have put into the cause. In other words, both the dualistic +theories suppose that the physical chains of causation is complete +within itself, and that the mental chain is also complete within itself: +yet they both proceed to the contradiction that one of these chains is +able to allow some of its causal influence to escape, as it were, in +order to constitute the other chain. It makes no difference, in point +of logic, whether such an escape is supposed to take place from the +physical chain (materialism) or from the mental chain (spiritualism): in +either case the fundamental principle of causality is alike +impugned--the principle, that is, of there being an equivalency between +cause and effect, such that you cannot get more out of your effect than +you have put into your cause. Both these dualistic theories, although +they take opposite views as to which of the two chains of causation is +the cause of the other, nevertheless agree in supposing that there _are_ +two chains of causation, and that one of them _does_ act causally upon +the other: and it is in this matter of their common consent that they +both commit suicide. Every process in the physical sphere must be +supposed to have its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the +doctrine of the conservation of energy would be contravened, and thus +the causation contemplated could no longer be contemplated as physical. +Similarly, every process in the mental sphere must be supposed to have +its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the causation +contemplated could no longer be contemplated as mental: some of the +equations must be supposed not to have been satisfied within the mental +sphere, but to have been carried over into the physical sphere--thus to +have either created or destroyed certain quantities of energy within +that sphere, and thus, also, to have introduced elements of endless +confusion into the otherwise orderly system of Nature. + +From this vice of radical contradiction, to which both the dualistic +theories are committed, the monistic theory is free. Moreover, as we +shall immediately find, it is free to combine the elements of truth +which severally belong to both the other theories. These other theories +are each concerned with what they see upon different sides of the same +shield. The facts which they severally receive they severally report, +and their reports appear to contradict each other. But truth can never +be really in contradiction with other truth; and it is reserved for +Monism, by taking a simultaneous view of both sides, to reconcile the +previously apparent contradictions. For these and other reasons, which +will unfold themselves as we proceed, I fully agree with the late +Professor Clifford where he says of this theory--'It is not merely a +speculation, but is a result to which all the greatest minds that have +studied this question (the relation between body and mind) in the right +way have gradually been approximating for a long time.' This theory is, +as we have already seen, that mental phenomena and physical phenomena, +although apparently diverse, are really identical. + +If we thus unite in a higher synthesis the elements both of spiritualism +and of materialism, we obtain a product which satisfies every fact of +feeling on the one hand, and of observation on the other. We have only +to suppose that the antithesis between mind and motion--subject and +object--is itself phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have +only to suppose that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of +apprehension: and, therefore, that any change taking place in the mind, +and any corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not +two changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a +musical sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings. +Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of +changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in +an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity +in consciousness is created only by the difference in our mode of +perceiving the same events--whether we see or whether we hear the +vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of +nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same +event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of +perceiving it. + +Or, to take another and a better illustration, in an Edison lamp the +light which is emitted from the burner may be said indifferently to be +caused by the number of vibrations per second going on in the carbon, or +by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of vibration could not +take place in the carbon without constituting that degree of temperature +which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a train of thought may be +said indifferently to be caused by brain-action or by mind-action; for, +_ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place without the other. Now when +we contemplate the phenomena of volition by themselves, it is as though +we were contemplating the phenomena of light by themselves: volition is +produced by mind in brain, just as light is produced by temperature in +carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of light as the cause, say, +of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of volition as the cause of +bodily movement. That particular kind of physical activity which takes +place in the carbon could not take place without the light which causes +a photograph; and, similarly, that particular kind of physical activity +which takes place in the brain could not take place without the volition +which causes a bodily movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of +bodily movement as is the physical activity of the brain; seeing that, +in an absolute sense, the cause is one and the same. But if we once +clearly perceive that what in a relative sense we know as volition is, +in a similar sense, the cause of bodily movement, we terminate the +question touching the freedom of the will. It thus becomes a mere matter +of phraseology whether we speak of the will determining, or being +determined by, changes going on in the external world; just as it is but +a matter of phraseology whether we speak of temperature determining, or +being determined by, molecular vibration. All the requirements alike of +the free-will and of the bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a +synthesis which comprises them both. On the one hand, it would be as +impossible for an _un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform +the adjustments of a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp +to give out light and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric +current. On the other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to +originate bodily motion without the occurrence of a strictly physical +process of cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison +lamp which had been deprived of its carbon-burner. + +The great advantage of this theory is, that it supposes only one stream +of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously +concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and +contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset. +Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion; +mind-changes nothing but mind-changes--both producing both +simultaneously: neither could be what it is without the other, because +without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is. +Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that +consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind the +changes of the brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very +causation of these movements that they should have a mental side. And +equally impossible is the supposition of the spiritualist that the +cerebral processes are adventitious, or that in the absence of brain the +changes of the mind could be what they are; for it belongs to the very +causation of these changes that they should have a material side. +Furthermore, the use of mind to animals and to men is thus rendered +apparent; for intelligent volition is thus shown to be a true cause of +adjustive movement, in that the cerebration which it involves could not +otherwise be possible: the causation would not otherwise be complete. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 8: _Lectures and Essays_, vol. ii. pp. 56-7.] + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE WORLD AS AN EJECT. + + +In the Introduction to this essay I have sought to show that there are, +for the purposes of practical discussion, but three theories of the +World of Being. There is, first, the theory of Materialism, which +supposes matter in motion to be the ultimate or self-existing Reality, +and, therefore, the cause of mind. Next, there is the theory of +Spiritualism, which supposes mind to be the ultimate Reality, and, +therefore, the cause of matter in motion. Lastly, there is the theory of +Monism which supposes matter in motion to be substantially identical +with mind, and, therefore, that as between mind and matter in motion +there is no causal relation either way. In the foregoing chapters I have +considered these three theories, and argued that of them the +last-mentioned is the only one which satisfies all the facts of feeling +on the one hand, and of observation on the other. The theory of Monism +alone is able to explain, without inherent contradiction, the phenomena +both of the subjective and objective spheres. + +It is my present purpose to extend the considerations already presented. +Assuming the theory of Monism, I desire to ascertain the result to which +it will lead when applied to the question whether we ought to regard the +external world as of a character mental or non-mental. As observed in my +Rede Lecture (_supra_, p. 33), this question has already been considered +by the late Professor Clifford, who decided that on the monistic theory +the probability pointed towards the external world being of a character +non-mental; that, although the whole universe is composed of +'mind-stuff,' the universe as a whole is mindless. This decision I then +briefly criticized; it is now my object to contemplate the matter +somewhat more in detail. + +I will assume, on account of reasons previously given, that when we +speak of matter in motion we do not at all know what it is that moves, +nor do we know at all what it is that we mean by motion. Therefore if, +as unknown quantities, we call matter _a_ and motion _b_, all we are +entitled to affirm is that _a + b = z_, where _z_ is a known quantity, +or mind. Obversely stated, we may say that the known quantity _z_ is +capable of being resolved into the unknown _a + b_. But, inasmuch as +both _a_ and _b_ are unknown, we may simplify matters by regarding their +sum as a single unknown quantity _x_, which we take to be substantially +identical with its obverse aspect known as _z_. + +Here, then, are our data. The theory of Monism teaches that what we +perceive as matter in motion, _x_, is the obverse of what we know as +mind, _z_. What, then, do we know of _z_? In the first place, we well +know that this is the only entity with which we are acquainted, so to +speak, at first hand; all our knowledge of _x_ (which is the only other +knowledge we possess) is possible only in so far as we are able to +translate it into terms of _z_. In the next place, we know that _z_ is +itself an entity of the most enormous complexity. Standing as a symbol +of the whole range of individual subjectivity, it may be said to +constitute for each individual the symbol of his own personality--or the +sum total of his conscious life. Now each individual knows by direct +knowledge that his conscious life is, as I have said, of enormous +complexity, and that numberless ingredients of feeling, thought, and +volition are therein combined in numberless ways. Therefore the symbol +_z_ may be considered as the sum of innumerable constituent parts, +grouped _inter se_ in numberless systems of more or less complexity. + +From these considerations we arrive at the following conclusions. The +theory of Monism teaches that all _z_ is _x_; but it does not, +therefore, necessarily teach that all _x_ is _z_. Nevertheless, it does +teach that if all _x_ is not _z_, this must be because _x_ is _z_, +_plus_ something more than _z_, as a little thought will be sufficient +to show. Thus, the four annexed diagrams exhaust the logical +possibilities of any case, where the question is as to the inclusion or +exclusion of one quantity by another. In Fig. 1 the two quantities are +coincident; in Fig 2 the one is wholly included by the other; in Fig. 3 +it is partially included; and in Fig. 4 wholly excluded. Now in the +present case, and upon the data supplied, the logical possibilities are +exhausted by Figs. 1 and 2. For, upon these data, Figs. 3 and 4 +obviously represent logical impossibilities; no part of Mind can, +according to these data, stand outside the limits of Matter and Motion. +Therefore, if the Ego is not coincident with the Non-ego (or if all _x_ +is not _z_, as in Fig. 1), this can only be because the Ego is less +extensive than the Non-ego (or because _x_ is _z plus_ something more +than _z_, as in Fig. 2). + +[Illustration: Fig. 1] + +[Illustration: Fig. 2] + +[Illustration: Fig. 3] + +[Illustration: Fig. 4] + +Of these two logical possibilities Idealism, in its most extreme form, +may adopt the first. For Idealism in this form may hold that apart from +the Ego there is no external world; that outside of _z_ there is no _x_; +that the only _esse_ is the _percipi_. But, as very few persons +nowadays are prepared to go the length of seriously maintaining that in +actual fact there is no external world save in so far as this is +perceived by the individual mind, I need not wait to consider this +possibility. We are thus practically shut up to a consideration of the +possibility marked 2. + +[Illustration: Fig. 5] + +[Illustration: Fig. 6] + +[Illustration: Fig. 7] + +The theory of Monism, then, teaches that _x_ is _z_ _plus_ something +more than _z_; and therefore it becomes a matter of great moment to +consider the probable nature of the overplus. For it obviously does not +follow that because _x_ is greater than _z_ in a logical sense, +therefore _x_ must be greater than _z_ in a psychological sense. Save +upon the theory of Idealism (with which Monism is not specially +concerned) the amount (whatever it may be) wherein _x_ is greater than +_z_, may not present any psychological signification at all. We may find +that the surface of our globe is considerably larger than that of the +dry land, and yet it may not follow that the mental-life to be met with +in the sea is psychologically superior to that which occurs on dry land. +If, therefore, we represent by comparative shading degrees of +psychological excellence, it is evident that the theory of Monism must +entertain the three possibilities indicated diagrammatically in Figs. 5, +6, and 7. It makes no difference what the comparative areas of _x_ and +_z_ may be, or whether _x_ be uniformly shaded throughout its extent. +All we have so far to notice is that the fact of logical inclusion does +not necessarily carry with it the implication of psychological +superiority. + +Next we must notice that besides our own subjectivities, we have +cognizance of being surrounded by many other inferred subjectivities +more or less like in kind (i. e. other human minds); and also yet many +other inferred subjectivities more or less unlike, but all inferior (i. +e. the minds of lower animals, young children, and idiots). Following +Clifford, I will call these inferred subjectivities by the name of +ejects, and assign to them the symbol _y_. Thus, in the following +discussion, _x_ = the objective world, _y_ = the ejective world, and _z_ += subjective world. Now, the theory of Monism supposes that _x_, _y_, +and _z_ are all alike in kind, but present no definite teaching as to +how far they may differ in degree. We may, however, at once allow that +between the psychological value of _z_ and that of _y_ there is a wide +difference of degree; and also that, while the value of _z_ is a fixed +quantity, that of _y_ varies greatly in the different parts of the area +_y_. Our scheme, therefore, will now adopt this form-- + +[Illustration] + +But the important question remains how we ought to shade _x_. According +to Clifford, this ought scarcely to be shaded at all, while according to +theologians (and theists generally) it ought to be shaded so much more +deeply than either _y_ or _z_, that the joint representation in one +diagram would only be possible by choosing for the shading of _x_ a +colour different from that employed for _y_ and _z_, and assigning to +that colour a representative value higher than that assigned to the +other in the ratio of one to infinity. It will be my object to estimate +the relative probability of these rival estimates of the psychological +value of _x_. + +Starting from _z_ as our centre, we know that this is an isolated system +of subjectivity, and hence we infer that all _y_ is composed of +analogous systems, resembling one another as to their isolation, and +differing only in their degrees of psychological value. Now this, +translated into terms of _x_ (or into terms of objectivity) means that +_z_ is an isolated system of matter in motion, and that the same has to +be said of all the constituent parts of _y_. In other words, both +subjectivity and ejectivity are only known under the condition of being +isolated from objectivity; which, obversely considered, means that the +matter in motion here concerned is temporarily separated off from the +rest of the objective world, in such wise that it forms a distinct +system of its own. If any part of the objective world rudely forces its +way within the machinery of that system, it is at the risk of +disarranging the machinery and stopping its work--as is the case when a +bullet enters the brain. Such converse as the brain normally holds with +the external world, is held through the appointed channels of the +senses, whereby appropriate causation is supplied to keep the otherwise +isolated system at work. We know, from physiological evidence, that when +such external causation is withheld, the isolated system ceases to work; +therefore, the isolation, although complete under one point of view, +under another point of view is incomplete. It is complete only in the +sense in which the isolation of a machine is complete--i. e. it is in +itself a working system, yet its working is ultimately dependent upon +causation supplied from without in certain appropriate ways. This truth +is likewise testified to on the obverse aspect of psychology. For +analysis shows that all our mental processes (however complex they may +be internally) are ultimately dependent on impressions of the external +world gained through the senses. Whether regarded objectively or +subjectively, therefore, we find that it is the business of the isolated +system to elaborate, by its internal processes, the raw materials which +are supplied to it from without. Seeing, then, that the isolation of the +system is thus only partial, we may best apply to it the term +circumscribed. Such partial isolation or circumscription of matter in +motion--so that it shall in itself constitute a little working +microcosm--appears to be the first condition to the being of a +subjective personality. Why, then, does not the working of a machine +present a subjective side? + +Our answer to this question is to be found in the following +considerations. We are going upon the hypothesis that all mind is matter +in motion, and that all matter in motion is mind--or, as Clifford +phrased it, that all the external world is composed of mind-stuff. No +matter how lightly we may shade _x_, we are assuming that it must be +shaded, and not left perfectly white. Now, both mind and matter in +motion admit of degrees: first as to quantity, next as to velocity, and +lastly as to complexity. But the degrees of matter in motion are found, +in point of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind, save +in the last particular of complexity, where there is unquestionably an +evident correspondence. Therefore it is that a machine, although +conforming to the prime condition of subjectivity in being a +circumscribed system of matter in motion, nevertheless does not attain +to subjectivity: the _x_ does not rise to _z_ because the internal +processes of _x_ are not sufficiently intricate, or their intricacy is +not of the appropriate kind. From which it follows that although, as I +have said, all matter in motion is mind, merely as matter in motion (or +irrespective of the kinds and degrees of both) it may not necessarily be +mind in the elaborated form of consciousness: it may only be the raw +material of mind--or, as Clifford called it, mind-stuff. Thus, although +all conscious volition is matter in motion, it does not follow that all +matter in motion is conscious volition. Which serves to restate the +question as to how far it is probable, or improbable, that all matter in +motion is conscious volition--i.e. how deeply we ought to shade _x_. + +Well, the first thing to be considered in answering this question is +that, according to the theory of Monism, we _know_ that it is within the +range of possibility for matter in motion to reach a level of intricacy +which shall yield conscious volition, and even self-conscious thought of +an extremely high order of development. Therefore, the only question is +as to whether it is possible, or in any way probable, that matter in +motion as occurring in _x_ resembles, in point of intricacy, matter in +motion as occurring in _z_. Professor Clifford perceived that this is +the core of the question, and staked the whole answer to it on an +extremely simple issue. He said that unless we can show in the +disposition of heavenly bodies some morphological resemblance to the +structure of a human brain, we are precluded from rationally +entertaining any probability that self-conscious volition belongs to the +universe. Obviously, this way of presenting the case is so grossly +illogical that even the exigencies of popular exposition cannot be held +to justify the presentation. For aught that we can know to the contrary, +not merely the highly specialized structure of the human brain, but even +that of nervous matter in general, may only be one of a thousand +possible ways in which the material and dynamical conditions required +for the apparition of self-consciousness can be secured. To imagine that +the human brain of necessity exhausts these possibilities is in the last +degree absurd. Therefore, we may suggest the following presentation of +Clifford's case as one that is less obviously inadequate:--if any +resemblance to the material and dynamical conditions of the microcosm +can be detected in the macrocosm, we should have good reason to ascribe +to the latter those attributes of subjectivity which we know as +belonging to the former; but if no such resemblance can be traced, we +shall have some reason to suppose that these attributes do not belong to +the universe. Even this, however, I should regard as much too wide a +statement of the case. To take the particular conditions under which +alone subjectivity is known to occur upon a single planet as exhausting +the possibilities of its occurrence elsewhere, is too flagrant a use of +the method of simple enumeration to admit of a moment's countenance. +Even the knowledge that we have of the two great conditions under which +terrestrial subjectivities occur--circumscription and complexity--is +only empirical. It may well be that elsewhere (or apart from the +conditions imposed by nervous tissue) subjectivity is possible +irrespective both of circumscription and of complexity. Therefore, +properly or logically regarded, the great use of the one exhibition of +subjectivity furnished to human experience, is the proof thus furnished +that subjectivity is possible under _some_ conditions; and the utmost +which on the grounds of such proof human experience is entitled to argue +is, that _probably_, if subjectivity is possible elsewhere, its +possibility is given by those conditions of circumscription and +complexity in the material and dynamical relations concerned, which we +find to be the invariable and quantitative concomitants of subjectivity +within experience. But this is a widely different thing from saying that +the only kind of such circumscription and complexity--or the only +disposition of these relations--which can present a subjective side is +that which is found in the structures and functions of a nervous system. + +Now, if we fix our attention merely on this matter of complexity, and +refuse to be led astray by obviously false analogies of a more special +kind, I think there can be no question that the macrocosm does furnish +amply sufficient opportunity, as it were, for the presence of +subjectivity, even if it be assumed that subjectivity can only be +yielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous system. +For, considering the material and dynamical system of the universe as a +whole, it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater than that +of any of its parts. Not only is it true that all these parts are +included in the whole, and that even the visible sidereal system alone +presents movements of enormous intricacy[9], but we find, for instance, +that even within the limits of this small planet there is presented to +actual observation a peculiar form of circumscribed complex, fully +comparable with that of the individual brain, and yet external to each +individual brain. For the so-called 'social organism,' although composed +of innumerable individual personalities, is, with regard to each of its +constituent units, a part of the objective world--just as the human +brain would be, were each of its constituent cells of a construction +sufficiently complex to yield a separate personality. + +If to this it be objected that, as a matter of fact, the social organism +does not possess a self-conscious personality, I will give a twofold +answer. In the first place, Who told the objector that it has not? For +aught that any one of its constituent personalities can prove to the +contrary, this social organism may possess self-conscious personality of +the most vivid character: its constituent human minds may be born into +it and die out of it as do the constituent cells of the human body: it +may feel the throes of war and famine, rejoice in the comforts of peace +and plenty: it may appreciate the growth of civilization as its passage +from childhood to maturity. If this at first sight appears a grotesque +supposition, we must remember that it would appear equally so to ascribe +such possibilities to the individual brain, were it not for the +irrelevant accident of this particular form of complex standing in such +relation to our own subjectivity that we are able to verify the fact of +its ejectivity. Thus, for aught that we can tell to the contrary, Comte +may have been even more justified than his followers suppose, in +teaching the personification of Humanity. + +But, in the next place, if the social organism is not endowed with +personality, this may be for either one of two reasons. All the +conditions required for attaining so high a level of psychical +perfection may not be here present; or else the level of psychical +perfection may be higher than that which we know as personality. This +latter alternative will be considered in another relation by-and-by, so +I will not dwell upon it now. But with reference to all these possible +contingencies, I may observe that we are not without clear indications +of the great fact that the high order of complexity which has been +reached by the social organism _is_ accompanied by evidence of something +which we may least dimly define as resembling subjectivity. In +numberless ways, which I need not wait to enumerate, we perceive that +society exhibits the phenomena both of thought and conduct. And these +phenomena cannot always be explained by regarding them as the sum of the +thoughts and actions of its constituent individuals--or, at least, they +can only be so regarded by conceding that the thoughts and actions of +the constituent individuals, when thus _summated_, yield a different +product from that which would be obtained by a merely arithmetical +computation of the constituent parts: the composite product differs from +its component elements, as H_2O differs from 2H + O. The general truth +of this remark will, I believe, be appreciated by all historians. +Seeing that ideas are often, as it is said, 'in the air' before they are +condensed in the mind of individual genius, we habitually speak of the +'Zeit-geist' as the product of a kind of collective psychology, which is +something other than the mere sum of all the individual minds of a +generation. That is to say, we regard society as an eject, and the more +that a man studies the thought and conduct of society, the more does he +become convinced that we are right in so regarding it. Of course this +eject is manifestly unlike that which we form of another individual +mind: it is much more general, vague, and so far unlike the pattern of +our own subjectivity that even to ascribe to it the important attribute +of personality is felt, as we have just seen, to approach the grotesque. +Still, in this vague and general way we do ascribe to society ejective +existence: we habitually think of the whole world of human thought and +feeling as a psychological complex, which is other than, and more than, +a mere shorthand enumeration of all the thoughts and feelings of all +individual human beings. + +The ejective existence thus ascribed to society serves as a +stepping-stone to the yet more vague and general ascription of such +existence to the Cosmos. At first, indeed, or during the earliest stages +of culture, the ascription of ejective existence to the external world +is neither vague nor general: on the contrary, it is most distinct and +specific. Beginning in the rudest forms of animism, where every natural +process admits of being immediately attributed to the volitional agency +of an unseen spirit, anthropomorphism sets out upon its long course of +development, which proceeds _pari passu_ with the development of +abstract thought. Man, as it has been truly said, universally makes God +in his own image; and it is difficult to see how the case could be +otherwise. Universally the eject must assume the pattern of the subject, +and it is only in the proportion that this pattern presents the features +of abstract thinking that the image which it throws becomes less and +less man-like. Hence, as Mr. Fiske has shown in detail, so soon as +anthropomorphism has assumed its highest state of development, it begins +to be replaced by a continuous growth of 'deanthropomorphism,' which, +passing through polytheism into monotheism, eventually ends in a +progressive 'purification' of theism--by which is meant a progressive +metamorphosis of the theistic conception, tending to remove from Deity +the attributes of Humanity. The last of these attributes to disappear is +that of personality, and when this final ecdysis has been performed, the +eject which remains is so unlike its original subject, that, as we shall +immediately find, it is extremely difficult to trace any points of +resemblance between them. + +Now it is with this perfect, or imago condition of the world-eject, that +we have to do. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in what I consider the profoundest +reaches of his philosophic thought, has well shown, on the one hand, +how impossible it is to attribute to Deity any of the specific +attributes of mind as known to ourselves subjectively; and, on the other +hand, how it is possible to conceive 'symbolically' that the universe +may be instinct with a 'quasi-psychical' principle, as greatly +transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical +motion[10]. Accepting, then, the world-eject in this its highest +conceivable stage of evolution, I desire to contemplate it under the +light of the monistic theory. + +We have seen that, whether we look upon the subjective or objective face +of personality, we find that personality arises from limitation--or, as +I have previously termed it, circumscription. Now, we have no evidence, +nor are we able to conceive, of the external world as limited; +consequently we are not able to conceive, of the world-eject as +personal. But, inasmuch as personality arises only from limitation, the +conclusion that the world-eject is impersonal does not tend to show that +it is of lower psychical value than conscious personality: on the +contrary, it tends to show that it is probably of higher psychical +value. True, we are not able to conceive actually of mind as impersonal; +but we can see that this merely arises from our only experience of mind +being given under conditions of personality; and, as just observed, it +is possible to conceive symbolically that there may be a form of mind as +greatly transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical +motion. + +Now, although we cannot conceive of such a mind actually, we may most +probably make the nearest approach to conceiving of it truly, by +_provisionally_ ascribing to it the highest attributes of mind as known +to ourselves, or the attributes which belong to human personality. Just +as a thinking insect would derive a better, or more true, conception of +human personality by considering it ejectively than by considering it +objectively (or by considering the mind-processes as distinguished from +the brain-processes), so, if there is a form of mind immeasurably +superior to our own, we may probably gain a more faithful--howsoever +still inadequate--conception of it by contemplating its operations +ejectively than by doing so objectively. I will, therefore, speak of the +world-eject as presenting conscious volition, on the understanding that +if _x_ does not present either consciousness or volition, this must +be--according to the fundamental assumption of psychism on which we are +now proceeding--because _x_ presents attributes at least as much higher +than consciousness or volition as these are higher than mechanical +motion. For when we consider the utmost that our conscious volition is +able to accomplish in the way of contrivance--how limited its knowledge, +how short its duration, how restricted its range, and how imperfect its +adaptations--we can only conclude that _if_ the ultimate constitution of +all things is pyschical, the philosophy of the Cosmos becomes a +'philosophy of the Unconscious' only because it is a philosophy of the +Superconscious. + +Now, if once we feel ourselves able to transcend the preliminary--and +doubtless very considerable--difficulty of symbolically conceiving the +world-eject as super-conscious, and (because not limited) also +super-personal, I think there can be no question that the world-object +furnishes overwhelming proof of psychism. I candidly confess that I am +not myself able to overcome the preliminary difficulty in question. By +discharging the elements of personality and conscious volition from the +world-eject, I appear to be discharging from my conception of mind all +that most distinctively belongs to that conception; and thus I seem to +be brought back again to the point from which we started: the +world-eject appears to have again resolved itself into the unknown +quantity _x_. But here we must distinguish between actual conception and +symbolical conception. Although it is unquestionably true that I can +form no actual conception of Mind save as an eject of personality and +conscious volition, it is a question whether I am not able to form a +symbolical conception of Mind as thus extended. For I know that +consciousness, implying as it does continual change in serial order of +circumscribed mental processes, is not (symbolically considered) the +highest conceivable exhibition of Mind; and just as a mathematician is +able to deal symbolically with space of _n_ dimensions, while only able +really to conceive of space as limited to three dimensions, so I feel +that I ought not to limit the abstract possibilities of mental being by +what I may term the accidental conditions of my own being. + +I need scarcely wait to show why it appears to me that if this position +is granted, the world-object furnishes, as I have said, overwhelming +proof of psychism; for this proof has been ably presented by many other +writers. There is first the antecedent improbability that the human mind +should be the highest manifestation of subjectivity in this universe of +infinite objectivity. There is next the fact that throughout this +universe of infinite objectivity--so far, at least, as human observation +can extend--there is unquestionable evidence of some one integrating +principle, whereby all its many and complex parts are correlated with +one another in such wise that the result is universal order. And if we +take any part of the whole system--such as that of organic nature on +this planet--to examine in more detail, we find that it appears to be +instinct with contrivance. So to speak, wherever we tap organic nature, +it seems to flow with purpose; and, as we shall presently see, upon the +monistic theory the evidence of purpose is here in no way attenuated by +a full acceptance of any of the 'mechanical' explanations furnished by +science. Now, these large and important facts of observation +unquestionably point, as just observed, to some one integrating +principle as pervading the Cosmos; and, if so, we can scarcely be wrong +in supposing that among all our conceptions it must hold nearest kinship +to that which is our highest conception of an integrating cause--viz., +the conception of psychism. Assuredly no human mind could either have +devised or maintained the working of even a fragment of Nature; and, +therefore, it seems but reasonable to conclude that the integrating +principle of the whole--the Spirit, as it were, of the Universe--must be +something which, while as I have said holding nearest kinship with our +highest conception of disposing power, must yet be immeasurably superior +to the psychism of man. The world-eject thus becomes invested with a +psychical value as greatly transcending in magnitude that of the human +mind, as the material frame of the universe transcends in its magnitude +the material frame of the human body. Therefore, without in any way +straining the theory of Monism, we may provisionally shade _x_ more +deeply than _z_, and this in some immeasurable degree. + + * * * * * + +One other matter remains to be considered with reference to this +world-eject as sanctioned by Monism. It leaves us free to regard all +natural causation as a direct exhibition of psychism. The prejudice +against anything approaching a theistic interpretation of the Universe +nowadays arises chiefly from the advance of physical science having +practically revealed the ubiquity of natural causes. It is felt that +when a complete explanation of any given phenomenon has been furnished +in terms of these causes, there is no need to go further; the phenomenon +has been rendered intelligible on its mechanical side, and therefore it +is felt that we have no reason to suppose that it presents a mental +side--any supplementary causation of a mental kind being regarded as +superfluous. Even writers who expressly repudiate this reasoning prove +themselves to be habitually under its influence; for we constantly find +that such writers, after conceding the mechanical explanations as far as +these have been _proved_, take their stand upon the more intricate +phenomena of Nature where, as yet, the mechanical explanations are not +forthcoming. Whether it be at the origin of life, the origin of +sentiency, of instinct, of rationality, of morality, or of religion, +these writers habitually argue that here, at least, the purely +mechanical interpretations fail; and that here, consequently, there is +still room left for a psychical interpretation. Of course the pleading +for theism thus supplied is seen by others to be of an extremely feeble +quality; for while, on the one hand, it rests only upon ignorance of +natural causation (as distinguished from any knowledge of super-natural +causation), on the other hand, abundant historical analogies are +available to show that it is only a question of time when pleading of +this kind will become more and more restricted in its subject-matter, +till eventually it be altogether silenced. But the pleading which Monism +is here able to supply can never be silenced. + +For, according to Monism, all matter in motion is mind; and, therefore, +matter in motion is merely the objective revelation, _to_ us and _for_ +us, of that which in its subjective aspect--or in its ultimate +reality--is mind. Just as the operations of my friend's mind can only be +revealed to me through the mechanical operations of his body, so it may +very well be that the operations of the Supreme Mind (supposing such to +exist) can only be revealed to me through the mechanical operations of +Nature. The only difference between the two cases is that while I am +able, in the case of my friend's mind, to elicit responses of mechanical +movement having a definite and intended relation to the operations of my +own mind, similarly expressed to him; such is not the case with Nature. +With the friend-eject I am able to _converse_; but not so with the +world-eject[11]. This great difference, however, although obviously +depriving me of any such direct corroboration of psychism in the +world-eject as that which I thus derive of psychism in the friend-eject, +ought not to be regarded by me as amounting, in the smallest degree, to +_disproof_ of psychism in the world-eject. The fact that I am not able +to converse with the world-eject is merely a negative fact, and should +not be allowed to tell against any probability (otherwise derived) in +favour of psychism as belonging to that eject. There may be a thousand +very good reasons why I should be precluded from such converse--some of +which, indeed, I can myself very clearly perceive. + +The importance of Monism in thus enabling us rationally to contemplate +all processes of physical causation as possibly immediate exhibitions +of psychism, is difficult to overrate. For it entirely discharges all +distinction between the mechanical and the mental; so that if physical +science were sufficiently advanced to yield a full natural explanation +of all the phenomena within human experience, mankind would be in a +position to gain as complete a knowledge as is theoretically possible of +the psychological character of the world-eject. Already we are able to +perceive the immense significance of being able to regard any sequence +of natural causation as the merely phenomenal aspect of the ontological +reality--the merely outward manifestation of an inward meaning. Thus, +for example, I am listening to a sonata of Beethoven's played by Madame +Schumann. Helmholtz tells me all that he knows about the physics and +physiology of the process, both beyond and within my brain. But I feel +that, even if Helmholtz were able to tell me very much more than he can, +so long as he is dealing with these objective explanations, he is at +work only upon the outer skin of the whole matter. The great reality is +the mind of Beethoven communicating to my mind through the complex +intervention of three different brains with their neuro-muscular +systems, and an endless variety of aerial vibrations proceeding from a +pianoforte. The method of communication has nothing more to do with the +reality communicated than have the paper and ink of this essay to do +with the ideas which they serve to convey. In each case a vehicle of +symbols is necessary in order that one mind should communicate with +another; but in both cases this is a vehicle of _symbols_, and nothing +more. Everywhere, therefore, the reality may be psychical, and the +physical symbolic; everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and +visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace. + +Take again the case of morality and religion. Because science, by its +theory of evolution, appears to be in a fair way of explaining the +genesis of these things by natural causes, theists are taking alarm; it +is felt by them that if morality can be fully explained by utility, and +religion by superstition, the reality of both is destroyed. But Monism +teaches that such a view is entirely erroneous. For, according to +Monism, the natural causation of morality and religion has nothing +whatever to do with the ultimate truth of either. The natural causation +is merely a record of physical processes, serving to manifest the +psychical processes. Nor can it make any difference, as regards the +ultimate veracity of the moral and religious feelings, that they have +been developed slowly by natural causes; that they were at first grossly +selfish on the one hand, and hideously superstitious on the other; that +they afterwards went through a long series of changes, none of which +therefore can have fully corresponded with external truth; or that even +now they may be both extremely far from any such correspondence. All +that such considerations go to prove is, that it belongs to the natural +method of mental evolution in man that with advancing culture his +ejective interpretations of Nature should more and more nearly +_approximate_ the truth. The world-eject must necessarily vary with the +character of the human subject; but this does not prove that the +ejective interpretation has throughout been wrong in _method_: it only +proves that such interpretation has been imperfect--and necessarily +imperfect--in _application_. + +Such, then, I conceive to be one of the most important consequences of +the monistic theory. Namely, that by regarding physical causation as +everywhere but the objective or phenomenal aspect of an ejective or +ontological reality, it furnishes a logical basis for a theory of things +which is at the same time natural and spiritual. On the objective +aspect, the explanations furnished by reason are of necessity physical, +while, on the ejective aspect, such explanations are of necessity +metaphysical--or rather, let us say, hyper-physical. But these two +orders of explanation are different only because their modes of +interpreting the same events are different. The objective explanation +which was given (as we supposed) by Helmholtz of the effects produced on +the human brain by hearing a sonata, was no doubt perfectly sound within +its own category; but the ejective explanation of these same effects +which is given by a musician is equally sound within _its_ category. And +similarly, if instead of the man-object we contemplate the world-object +physical causation becomes but the phenomenal aspect of psychical +causation; the invariability of its sequence becomes but the expression +of intentional order; the iron rigidity of natural law becomes the +sensuous manifestation of an unalterable consistency as belonging to the +Supreme Volition. + +My object in this paper has been to show that the views of the late +Professor Clifford concerning the influence of Monism on Theism are +unsound. I am in full agreement with him in believing that Monism is +destined to become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that +it is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction of +science on the one hand and of feeling on the other. But I disagree with +him in holding that this theory is fraught with implications of an +anti-theistic kind. In my opinion this theory leaves the question of +Theism very much where it was before. That is to say, while not +furnishing any independent proof of Theism, it likewise fails to furnish +any independent disproof. The reason why in Clifford's hands this theory +appeared to furnish independent disproof, was because he persisted in +regarding the world only as an object: he did not entertain the +possibility that the world might also be regarded as an eject. Yet, that +the world, under the theory of Monism, is at least as susceptible of an +ejective as it is of an objective interpretation, I trust that I have +now been able to show. And this is all that I have endeavoured to show. +As a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that Monism alone +can only lead to Agnosticism. That is to say, it leaves a clear field of +choice as between Theism and Atheism; and, therefore, to a carefully +reasoning Monist, there are three alternatives open. He may remain a +Monist, and nothing more; in which case he is an agnostic. He may +entertain what appears to him independent evidence in favour of Theism, +and thus he may become a theist. Or he may entertain what appears to him +independent evidence in favour of Atheism, and thus he may become an +atheist. But, in any case, so far as his Monism can carry him, he is +left perfectly free either to regard the world as an object alone, or to +regard the world as also an eject[12]. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 9: If we imagine the visible sidereal system compressed within +the limits of a human skull, so that all its movements which we now +recognize as molar should become molecular, the complexity of such +movement would probably be as great as that which takes place in a human +brain. Yet to this must be added all the molecular movements which are +now going on in the sidereal system, visible and invisible.] + +[Footnote 10: _Principles of Psychology_, vol. i. pp. 159-61; _Essays_, +vol. iii. pp. 246-9; and _First Principles_, p. 26.] + +[Footnote 11: It is, however, the belief of all religious persons that +even this distinction does not hold. If they are right in their belief, +the distinction would then become one as to the mode of converse. In +this case what is called communion with the Supreme Mind must be +supposed to be a communion _sui generis_: the converse of mind with mind +is here _direct_, or does not require to be translated into the language +of mechanical signs: it is subjective, not ejective. Still, even here we +must believe that the physical aspect accompanies the psychical, +although not necessarily observed. An act of prayer, for example, is, on +its physical aspect, an act of cerebration: so is the answer (supposing +it genuine), in as far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus prayer and +its answer (according to Monism) resemble all the other processes of +Nature in presenting an objective side of strictly physical causation. +Nor is it possible that the case could be otherwise, if _all_ mental +processes consist in physical process, and vice versa. It is obvious +that this consideration has important bearings on the question as to the +physical efficacy of prayer. From a monistic point of view both those +who affirm and those who deny such efficacy are equally in the right, +and equally in the wrong; they are merely quarrelling upon different +sides of the same shield. For, according to Monism, if the theologians +are right in supposing that the Supreme Mind is the hearer of prayer in +any case, they are also right in supposing that the Mind must +necessarily be able to grant what is called physical answers, seeing +that in order to grant _any_ answer (even of the most apparently +spiritual kind) some physical change must be produced, if it be only in +the brain of the petitioner. On the other hand, the scientists are +equally right in maintaining that no physical answer to prayer can be of +the nature of a miracle, or produced independently of strictly physical +causation; for, if so, the physical and the psychical would no longer be +coincident. But, until the scientists are able to perform the hopeless +task of proving where the possibilities of physical causation end, as a +mere matter of abstract speculation and going upon the theory of Monism, +it is evident that the theologians may have any latitude they choose to +claim, both as regards this matter and that of so-called miracles.] + +[Footnote 12: It may be explained that by Agnosticism I understand a +theory of things which abstains from either affirming or denying the +existence of God. It thus represents, with regard to Theism, a state of +suspended judgement; and all it undertakes to affirm is, that, upon +existing evidence, the being of God is unknown. But the term Agnosticism +is frequently used in a widely different sense, as implying belief that +the being of God is not merely now unknown, but must always remain +unknowable. It is therefore often represented that Mr. Herbert Spencer, +in virtue of his doctrine of the Unknowable, is a kind of apostle of +Agnosticism. This, however, I conceive to be a great mistake. The +distinctive features of Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable are not +merely non-agnostic, but anti-agnostic. For the doctrine affirms that we +have this much knowledge of God--namely, that if He exists, He must for +ever be unknown. Without question, this would be a most important piece +of definite knowledge with regard to Deity, negative though it be; and, +therefore, any man who holds it has no right to be called an agnostic. + +To me it has always seemed that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so +far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is highly +unphilosophical. By what right can it be affirmed that Deity, if He +exists, may not reveal the fact of His existence to-morrow--and this to +the whole human race without the possibility of doubt? Or, if there be a +God, who is to say that there certainly cannot be a future life, in +which each individual man may have unquestionable proof of Theism? It is +a perfectly philosophical statement for any one to make that, as matters +now stand, he can see no evidence of Theism; but to say that he knows +the human race never can have such evidence, is a most unphilosophical +statement, seeing that it could only be justified by absolute knowledge. +And, on this account, I say that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so +far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is the very reverse +of agnostic. + +Now, the theory of Monism alone, as observed in the text, appears to be +purely agnostic in the sense just explained. If in some parts of the +foregoing essay I appear to have been arguing in favour of theistic +implications, this has only been in order to show (as against Clifford) +that the world does admit of being regarded as an eject. But inasmuch +as--religious faith apart--we are not able to verify any such ejective +interpretation, we are not able to estimate its value. Monism sanctions +the shading of _x_ as deeply as we choose; but the shading which it +sanctions is only provisional.] + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM. + + +In the foregoing chapters I have considered the theory of Monism, first +in contrast with the theories of Materialism and of Spiritualism, and +next in relation to the theory of Theism. In this chapter and that which +succeeds it I propose to consider Monism in relation to the Will. To do +this it is needful to begin by considering the problems which are +presented by the Will in relation to the older theories of Materialism +on the one hand and of Spiritualism on the other. + +Although the phenomena of volition have occupied so large a province of +philosophical literature, the fundamental problems which arise in +connexion with them are only two in number, and both admit of being +stated in extremely simple terms. The historical order in which these +two problems have arisen is the inverse of their logical order. For +while in logical order the two problems would stand thus--Is the Will an +agent? If so, is it a free agent?--in actual discussion it was long +taken for granted that the Will is an agent, and hence the only +controversy gathered round the question whether the Will is a free +agent. Descartes, indeed, seems to have entertained the prior question +with regard to animals, and there are passages in the _Leviathan_ which +may be taken to imply that Hobbes entertained this question with regard +to man. But it was not until recent years that any such question could +stand upon a basis of science as distinguished from speculation; the +question did not admit of being so much as stated in terms of science +until physiology was in a position openly to challenge our right to +assume that the Will is an agent. Such a challenge physiology has now +given, and even declared that any assumption of volitional agency is, in +the presence of adequate physiological knowledge, impossible. + +The two problems which I thus state separately are often, and indeed +generally, confused together; but for the purpose of clear analysis it +is of the first importance that they should be kept apart. In order to +show the wide distinction between them, we may best begin with a brief +consideration of what it is that the two problems severally involve; and +to do this we may best take the problems in what I have called their +logical order. + +First, then, as regards the question whether the Will is an agent, the +rival theories of Materialism and Spiritualism stand to one another in a +relation of contradiction. For it is of the essence of Spiritualism to +regard the Will as an agent, or as an original cause of bodily movement, +and therefore as a true cause in Nature. On the other hand, it is of the +essence of Materialism to deny that the Will is an agent. Hitherto, +indeed, materialists as a body have not expressly recognized this +implication as necessarily belonging to their theory; but that this +implication does necessarily belong to their theory--or rather, I should +say, really constitutes its most distinctive feature--admits of being +easily shown. For the theory that material changes are the causes of +mental changes necessarily terminates in the so-called theory of +conscious automatism--or the theory that so far as the conditions to +bodily action are concerned, consciousness is adventitious, bearing the +same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as the striking +of a clock bears to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. From +this conclusion there is no possibility of escape, if once we accept the +premises of Materialism; and therefore I say it belongs to the essence +of Materialism to deny the agency of Will. + +Just as necessarily does it belong to the essence of Monism to affirm +the agency of Will. For, according to this theory, while motion is +producing nothing but motion, mind-change nothing but mind-change, both +are producing both simultaneously; neither could be what it is without +the other, for each is to the other a necessary counterpart or +supplement, in the absence of which the whole causation (whether +regarded from the physical or mental side) would not be complete. + +Now, in my opinion the importance of the view thus presented by the +theory of Monism is, for all purposes of psychological analysis, +inestimable. It is impossible nowadays that such analysis can proceed +very far in any direction without confronting the facts presented by +physiology: hence it is impossible for such analysis to confine itself +exclusively to the spiritual or subjective side of psychology. On the +other hand, in so far as such analysis has regard to the material or +objective side, it has hitherto appeared to countenance--in however +disguised a form--the dogmatic denial of the Will as an agent. Hence the +supreme importance to psychology of reconciling the hitherto rival +theories of Spiritualism and Materialism in the higher synthesis which +is furnished by the theory of Monism. For, obviously, in the absence of +any philosophical justification of the Will as an agent, we are without +any guarantee that all psychological inquiry is not a vain beating of +the air. If, as Materialism necessarily implies, the Will is not a cause +in Nature, there would be no reason in Nature for the agency either of +feeling or of intelligence. Feeling and intelligence would, therefore, +stand as ciphers in the general constitution of things; and any inquiry +touching their internal system of causation could have no reference to +any scientific inquiry touching causation in general. I am aware that +this truth is habitually overlooked by psychologists; but it is none +the less a truth of fundamental importance to the whole superstructure +of this science. Or, in other words, unless psychologists will expressly +consent to rear their science on the basis provided by the philosophical +theory of Monism, there is nothing to save it from logical +disintegration; apart from this basis, the whole science is, so to +speak, built in the air, like an unsubstantial structure of clouds. +Psychologists, I repeat, habitually ignore this fact, and constantly +speak of feeling and intelligence as true causes of adjustive action; +but by so doing they merely beg from this contradictory theory of +Spiritualism a flat denial of the fundamental postulate on which they +elsewhere proceed--the postulate, namely, that mental changes are +determined by cerebral changes. Consider, for example, the following +passage from Mr. Spencer's _Principles of Psychology_ (Sec. 125), which +serves to show in brief compass the logical incoherency which in this +matter runs through his whole work:-- + + 'Those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the + average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities + conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and + habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or + indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been, + other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals + among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were + the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.' + +The argument here is that the 'adjustments of feelings to actions,' when +once attained, leads in turn to an adjustment of actions to +feelings--or, as I have myself stated the argument in my _Mental +Evolution in Animals_, 'the _raison d'etre_ of Pleasure and Pain has +been that of furnishing organisms with guides to adjustive action: +moreover, as in the case of direct sensation dictating any simple +adjustment for the sake of securing an immediate good, so in the case of +instinct dictating a more intricate action for the sake of eventually +securing a more remote good (whether for self, progeny, or community); +and so, likewise, in the case of reason dictating a still more intricate +adjustment for the sake of securing a good still more remote--in all +cases, that is, where volition is concerned, pleasures and pains are the +guides of action.' But thus to affirm that pleasures and pains are the +guides of action is merely another way of affirming that the Will is an +agent--a cause of bodily movement, and, as such, a cause in Nature. Now, +as we have seen, Mr. Spencer not only affirms this--or rather assumes +it--but proceeds to render an _a priori_ explanation of the accuracy of +the guidance. Yet he nowhere considers the fundamental question--Why +should we suppose that the Will is an agent at all? Assuredly the answer +given by physiology to this question is a simple denial that we have any +justification so to regard the Will: in view of her demonstration of +conscious automatism, she can see no reason why there should be any +connexion at all between a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain +and an objective fact of 'agreement or disagreement with the +environment'--nay, one of the most eminent of her priesthood has +declared that there _is_ no more connexion between the ambition of a +Napoleon and a general commotion of Europe, than there is between the +puff of a steam-whistle and the locomotion of a train. And, as I have +now repeatedly insisted, on grounds of physiology alone this is the only +logical conclusion at which it is possible to arrive. Yet Mr. Spencer, +while elsewhere proceeding on the lines of physiology, whenever he +encounters the question of the agency of Will, habitually jumps the +whole gulf that separates Materialism from Spiritualism. And this +wonderful feat of intellectual athletics is likewise performed, so far +at least as I am aware, by every other psychologist who has proceeded on +the lines of physiology. Indeed, the logical incoherency is not so +serious in Mr. Spencer's case as it is in that of many other writers +whom I need not wait to name. For Mr. Spencer does not seek to found his +system on a basis of avowed Materialism, and, therefore, he may be said +to have left this fundamental question of volitional agency in abeyance. +But all those writers who have reared their systems of psychology on a +basis of avowed Materialism--or, which is the same thing, on a basis of +physiology alone--lay themselves open to the charge of grossest +inconsistency when they thus assume that the Will is an agent. It is +impossible that these writers can both have their cake and eat it. +Either they must forego their Materialism, or else they must cease to +speak of 'motives determining action,' 'conduct being governed by +pleasures and pains,' 'voluntary movements in their last resort being +all due to bodily feelings,' 'the highest morality and the lowest vice +being alike the result of a pursuit of happiness,' &c. &c. And, so far +as I can see, it is only in the way above indicated, or on the theory of +Monism, that it is possible, without ignoring the facts of physiology on +the one hand or those of psychology on the other, philosophically to +save the agency of Will. + +From this brief exposition it may be gathered that on the materialistic +theory it is impossible that the Will can be, in any sense of the term, +an agent; that on the spiritualistic theory the Will is regarded as an +agent, but only in the sense of a non-natural or miraculous cause; and, +lastly, that on the monistic theory the Will is saved as an agent, or +may be properly regarded and as properly denominated a true cause, in +the ordinary sense of that term. For this, as well as for other reasons +which need not here be specified, I accept in philosophy the theory of +Monism; and am thus entitled in psychology to proceed upon the doctrine +that the Will is an agent. We have next to consider the ulterior +question whether upon this theory the Will may be properly regarded as a +free agent. + +By a free agent is understood an agent that is able to act without +restraint, or spontaneously. The word 'free,' therefore, bears a very +different meaning when applied exclusively to the Will, and when +applied more generally to the living organism. For we may properly say +that a man, or an animal, is free when he, or it, is at liberty to act +in accordance with desire. Touching the fact of freedom in this sense +there is, of course, no question. We have not to consider the possible +freedom of man, but the possible freedom of Will; we have not to +contemplate whether a man may be free to do what he wills, but whether +he can be free to will what he wills. Such being the question, we have +to consider it in relation to the three philosophical theories already +stated--Materialism, Spiritualism, and Monism. + +For the theory of Materialism the present question has no existence. If +this announcement appears startling, it can only be because no +materialist has ever taken the trouble to formulate his own theory with +distinctness. For, as previously shown, Materialism necessarily involves +the doctrine of conscious automatism; but, if so, the Will is concluded +not to be an agent at all, and therefore it becomes idle to discuss +whether, in any impossible exercise of its agency, it is free or subject +to restraint. The most that in this connexion could logically stand to +be considered by the advocates of Materialism would be whether or not +the adventitious and inefficacious feelings of subjectivity which are +associated with cerebral activity are determinate or free; but this +would probably be regarded on all hands as a somewhat useless topic of +discussion, and certainly in any case would have no reference to the +question of free _agency_. The point to be clearly understood is that, +according to the materialistic theory, a motor is distinct from a +motive, although in some unaccountable manner the motor is able to cause +the motive. But the motive, when thus caused, is not supposed to exert +any causal influence on bodily action; it is supposed to begin and end +as a motive, or never itself to become a motor. In other words, as +before stated, the Will is not supposed to be an agent; and, therefore, +to this theory the doctrine of free-will and of determinism are alike +irrelevant. We need not wait to prove that this important fact is +habitually overlooked by materialists themselves, or that whenever a +materialist espouses the cause of determinism, he is thereby and for the +time being vacating his position as a materialist; for if, according to +his theory, the Will is not an agent, he is merely impugning his own +doctrines by consenting to discuss the conditions of its agency. + +The theory of Spiritualism and the theory of Monism agree in holding +that the Will is an agent; and, therefore, to both of these theories the +question whether the Will is a free agent is a real question. Here, +then, it devolves upon us to consider carefully the logical status of +the rival doctrines of so-called Liberty and Necessity. For convenience +of arrangement in what follows, we may best begin with the doctrine of +Necessity, or Determinism. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM. + + +We have now seen that, according to Materialism, the Will is not an +agent, while according both to Spiritualism and to Monism the Will is an +agent. Touching the further question, whether the Will is a free agent, +we have seen that while the question does not exist for Materialism, it +appears to require a negative answer both from Spiritualism and from +Monism. For, as regards its relation to Spiritualism, when once the +ground is cleared of certain errors of statement and fallacies of +reasoning, we appear to find that unless the will is held to be +motiveless--which would be to destroy not only the doctrine of moral +responsibility, but likewise that of universal causation--it must be +regarded as subject to law, or as determined in its action by the nature +of its past history and present circumstances. Lastly, the theory of +Monism appears likewise to deny the possibility of freedom as an +attribute of Will; for, according to this theory, mental processes are +one and the same with physical processes, and hence it does not appear +that the doctrine of determinism could well be taught in a manner more +emphatic. + +Thus far, then, the doctrine of determinism is seen to be victorious +over the doctrine of freedom all along the line. By Materialism the +question of freedom is excluded _ab initio_; by Spiritualism and by +Monism, so far as yet seen, it can be logically answered only in the +negative. From which it follows that the sense of moral responsibility +is of the nature of a vast illusion, the historical genesis of which +admits of being easily traced, and the authority of which is thus +destroyed. Although it may still serve to supply motives to conduct, it +seems that it can do so only in the way that belongs to +superstition--that Conscience, as I have before said, is the bogey of +mankind, and that belief in its authority is like belief in witchcraft, +destined to dwindle and to fade before the advance of a better or more +complete knowledge of natural causation. + +But the discussion must not end here. Hitherto I have presented the case +Liberty _versus_ Necessity with all the impartiality of which I am +capable; but I have done so without travelling an inch beyond those +limits of discussion within which the question has been debated by +previous writers. I believe, indeed, that I have pointed out several +important oversights which have been made on both sides of the question; +but in doing this I have not gone further than the philosophical basis +upon which the question has been hitherto argued. My object, however, +in publishing these papers is not that of destructive criticism; and +what I have done in this direction has been done only in order to +prepare the way for what is now to follow. Having shown, as it appears +to me conclusively, that upon both the rival theories of Materialism and +Spiritualism--the doctrine of Liberty, and therefore of Moral +Responsibility--must logically fall, I now hope to show that this +doctrine admits of being re-established on a basis furnished by the +theory of Monism. + +It often happens that an elaborate structure of argument, which is +perfectly sound and complete upon the basis furnished by a given +hypothesis, admits of being wholly disintegrated when the fundamental +hypothesis is shown to be either provisional or untrue. And such, I +believe, is the case with the issue now before us. For the issue Liberty +_versus_ Necessity has hitherto been argued on the common assumption +that natural causation is not merely the most ultimate principle which +the human mind can reach; but also a principle which is, in some way or +another, external to that mind. It has been taken for granted by both +sides in the controversy that if our volitions can be proved to depend +upon natural causation, as rigid in its sequences within the sphere of a +human mind as within that of a calculating machine, there must be an end +of the controversy; seeing that our volitions would be thus proved to be +rigidly determined by those same principles of fixed order, or 'natural +law,' which are external to, or independent of, the human mind--quite as +much as they are external to, or independent of, the calculating +machine. Now, it is this assumption which I challenge. The theory of +Monism entitles one to deny that when we have driven the question down +to the granite bed of natural causation, nothing more remains to be +done; according to this theory it still remains to be asked, What is the +nature of this natural causation? Is it indeed the ultimate datum of +experience, below which the human mind cannot go? And is it indeed so +far external to, or independent of, the human mind, that the latter +stands to it in the relation of a slave to a master--coerced as to +action by the conditions which that master has laid down? + +Now these questions are all virtually answered in the affirmative by the +dualistic theory of Spiritualism. For the Will is here regarded as an +agent bound to act in accordance with those conditions of external +necessity which dualism recognizes as natural causation. Its internal +causation thus becomes but the reflex of external; and the reflection +becomes known internally as the consciousness of motive. Hence, the Will +cannot be philosophically liberated from the toils of this external +necessity, so long as dualism recognizes that necessity as existing +independently of the Will, and thus imposing its conditions on +volitional activity. But the theory of Monism, by identifying external +with internal causation--or physical processes with psychical +processes--philosophically saves the doctrine of freedom, and with it +the doctrine of moral responsibility. Moreover, it does so without +relying upon any precarious appeal to the direct testimony of +consciousness itself. As this view of the subject is one by no means +easy of apprehension, I will endeavour to unfold it part by part. + +To begin with, Monism excludes the possibility of volition being +determined by cerebration. Let us suppose, for example, that a sequence +of ideas, _A, B, C, D_, occurs in the mind, which on its obverse or +cerebral aspect may be represented by the sequence _a, b, c, d_. Here +the parallelism is not due, as supposed by Materialism, to _a_ +determining _Ab_, _b_ determining _Bc_, &c.; it is due to _Aa_ +determining _Bb_, _Bb_ determining _Cc_, &c.--the two apparently diverse +causal sequences being really but one causal sequence. If the +determinist should rejoin that a causal sequence of some kind is all +that he demands--that the Will is equally proved to be unfree, whether +it be bound by the causal sequence _a, b, c, d_, or by the causal +sequence _Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd_--I answer that this is a point which we have +to consider by-and-by. Meanwhile I am only endeavouring to make clear +the essential distinction between the philosophical theories of Monism +and Materialism. And the effect of this distinction is to show that, for +the purposes of clear analysis, we may wholly neglect either side of the +double reality. If we happen to be engaged on any physiological +inquiry, we may altogether neglect the processes of ideation with which +any process of cerebration may be concerned; while, if we happen to be +engaged upon any psychological inquiry, we may similarly neglect the +processes of cerebration with which any process of ideation may be +concerned. Seeing that each is equally an index of a common sequence, it +can make no difference which of them we take as our guide, although for +purposes of practical inquiry it is of course expedient to take the +cerebral index when we are dealing with the objective side of the +problem, and the mental index when dealing with the subjective. In the +following pages, therefore, I shall altogether neglect the cerebral +index. The inquiry on which we are engaged belongs to the region of +mind, and, therefore, after what has just been said, it will be apparent +that I am entitled to adopt the standpoint of a spiritualist, to the +extent of fastening attention only upon the mental side of the problem. +For although the theory of Monism teaches, as against Spiritualism, that +no one of the mental sequences could take place without a corresponding +physical sequence, the theory also teaches the converse proposition; and +therefore it makes no difference which of the two phenomenal sequences +is taken as our index of the ontological. + +Now, it clearly makes a great difference whether the mental changes +concerned in volition are regarded as effects or as causes. According +to Materialism, the mental changes are the effects of cerebral changes, +which were themselves the effects of precedent cerebral changes. +According to Spiritualism, these mental changes are the causes, not only +of the cerebral changes, but also of one another. According to Monism, +the mental changes may be regarded as the causes of the cerebral, or +_vice versa_, seeing that in neither case are we stating a real +truth--the real truth being that it is only a cerebro-mental change +which can cause any change either of cerebration or of mentation. Now it +is evident that if the mental processes were always the effects of +cerebral processes (Materialism), there could be no further question +with regard to Liberty and Necessity; while, if the mental processes are +the causes both of the cerebral processes and of one another +(Spiritualism), the question before us becomes raised to a higher level. +The causality in question being now regarded as purely mental, the will +is no longer regarded as a passive slave of the brain, and the only +thing to be considered is whether freedom is compatible with causation +of a purely mental kind. Now, at an earlier stage of our enquiry I have +argued that it is not; but this argument was based entirely upon +spiritualistic premises, or upon the assumption that the principle of +causality is everywhere external to, or independent of, the human +mind--under which assumption I cannot see that it makes much difference +whether the coercion comes from the brain alone, or from the whole +general system of things external to the human mind. And here it is that +I think the theory of Monism comes to the rescue. + +For, if physical and mental processes are everywhere consubstantial, or +identical in kind, it can make no difference whether we regard their +sequences as objective or ejective, physical or spiritual. Hence, we are +free to regard all causation as of a character essentially psychical. +But, if so, it must be self-contained as psychical; it cannot be in any +way determined by anything from without, seeing that outside itself +there is nothing in the Universe. Now, if this is true of the +World-eject, it must also be true of the Man-eject, as well as of the +Man-subject, or Ego. If all causation is psychical, that portion of it +which belongs to, or is manifested by, my own personality is not laid +upon me by anything from without; it is merely the expression of my own +psychical activity, as this is taking place within the circumscribed +area of my own personality. And this activity is spontaneous, in the +sense that it is not coerced from without. All the sequences which that +activity displays within this region are self-determined, in the sense +that they are determined by the self, and not by any agency external to +it. The only influence which any external agency can here exert, is that +of insisting that bodily action--the physical outcome of my psychical +processes--shall be in accordance with the conditions imposed by the +internal system of causation; but this does not influence in any degree +those mental processes which do not express themselves in bodily action. +Hence, it may be perfectly true that my bodily action in the past might +have been different from what it actually was; for as this action was +the outcome of my mentation at the time (according to the spiritual +index, which is now our guide), and as this mentation was not coerced +from without, it might very well have been different from what it was. +Each of the mental sequences at that time was a result of those +preceding and a cause of those succeeding; but behind all this play of +mental causation there all the while stood that Self, which was at once +the condition of its occurrence, and the _First Cause_ of its action. It +is not true that that Self was nothing more than the result of all this +play of mental causation; it can only have been the First Cause of it. +For, otherwise, the mental causation must have been the cause of that +causation, which is absurd. Who or What it was that originally caused +this First Cause is, of course, another question, which I shall +presently hope to show is not merely unanswerable, but unmeaning. As a +matter of fact, however, we know that this Self is here, and that it can +thus be proved to be a substance, _standing under_ the whole of that +more superficial display of mental causation which it is able to look +upon introspectively--and this almost as _impersonally_ as if it were +regarding the display as narrated by another mind. I say, then, that +the theory of Monism entitles us to regard this Self as the _fons et +origo_ of our mental causation, and thus restores to us the doctrine of +Liberty with its attendant consequence of Moral Responsibility. + +It may help to elucidate this matter if we regard it from another point +of view. According to Hobbes, 'Liberty is the absence of all impediments +to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical qualities +of the agent.' Now, if we accept this definition, it is easy to show +that the theory of Monism is really at one with the doctrine of Liberty. +For, in the first place, according to the theory of Monism, the neurosis +of the brain could not be what it is without the psychosis of the mind. +Consequently, as above shown, it would be equally incorrect to say that +the neurosis governs the psychosis, as it would be to say that the +psychosis governs the neurosis. But, if so, the Will is free in +accordance with Hobbes' definition of freedom. Suppose, for example, +that on seeing a bone I think of Professor Flower, then remember that a +long time ago I lent his book on Osteology to a friend, and forthwith +resolve to ask my friend what has become of it; here my ultimate +volition would be unfree if it were the effect of physical processes +going on in my brain. But the volition might be free if each of these +mental processes were the result of the preceding one, seeing that there +may then have been 'an absence of all impediments' to the occurrence of +these processes. + +Of course it will be objected--as I have myself urged in the preceding +chapter--that causal action of any kind is incompatible with freedom of +volition--that if there be any such causal action, even though it be +wholly restricted within the sphere of mind, the Will is really +compelled to will as it does will, is determined to determine as it does +determine, and hence that its apparent freedom is illusory. Hobbes' +definition, it may be urged, when applied to the case of the Will, is +equivocal. No doubt a man is free as to his _action_, if there be an +'absence of all impediments' to his action--or, in other words, if he is +able to act as he wills to act. But it does not follow that he is free +as to his _will_, even though there be an absence of all impediments to +his willing as he wills to will. For here the very question is as to +whether there are any impediments to his willing otherwise than he does +will. The fact that he wills to will as he does will proves that there +are no impediments to his willing in that direction; but is there a +similar absence of impediments to his willing to will in any other +direction? If so, we are still within the lines of determinism. Thus +Hobbes' definition of freedom really applies only to freedom of bodily +action; not to freedom of volition, seeing that if my will is caused I +could not have willed to will otherwise than I did will. Now, the answer +which Monism supplies to this objection is that the will itself is here +the ultimate agent, and _therefore an agent which must be identified +with the principle of causality_. In other words, the very reason why we +feel that Hobbes' definition of liberty, while perfectly valid as +regards bodily action, seems to lack something when applied to volition, +is because volition belongs to the sphere of mind--belongs, therefore, +to that sphere which the theory of Monism regards as identical with +causality itself. Although it is true that volitions are caused by +motives, yet it is the mind which conditions the motives, and therefore +its own volitions. It is not true that the mind is always the passive +slave of causes, known to it as motives. The human mind is itself a +causal agent, having the same kind of priority within the microcosm as +the World-eject has in the macrocosm. Therefore its motives are in large +part matters of its own creation. In the intricate workings of its own +internal machinery innumerable patterns of thought are turned out, some +of which it selects as good, while others it rejects as bad; but no one +of which could have come into being at all without this causal agency of +the mind itself. + +It will probably be objected that even though all this were granted, we +cannot thus save the doctrine of moral responsibility. For it may appear +that the liberty which is thus accorded to the Will is nothing better +than liberty to will at random, as argued in my previous essay. But here +we must observe that although we are thus shown free to will at random, +it does not follow that we are likewise free to act in accordance with +our volitions. And this is a most important distinction, which +libertarians have hitherto failed to notice. If we are free to will in +any direction, it follows, indeed, that we are free to will at random; +but it follows also, and for this very reason, that we are free to will +the _impossible_. True, when we will what is known to be impossible of +execution, we call the act an act of desire; but it is clearly the same +in kind as an act of will, and differs only in not admitting of being +translated into an act of body. Therefore I say that the restriction +which is imposed upon us by the conditions of causality, whether +external or internal, is not any restriction as to willing, but merely +as to doing. It is not in the subjective, but in the objective world +that we encounter the 'bondage of necessity.' + +Now, the knowledge that we are thus restricted as to bodily action +imposes that kind of restraint upon volition which is termed rational. +There is nothing in the nature of things to prevent our willing anything +that we wish; but there is something in the nature of things to prevent +our doing everything that we will; and as the practical object of our +volition is that of determining bodily action, we find it expedient to +will only such things as we believe that we can do. To this extent, +therefore, the Will is bound--namely, by the executive capacity of the +body. But, strictly speaking, this is not a binding of the Will _qua_ +Will. Even in such cases, as St. Paul says, to will may be present with +us, but how to perform that which is good we find not. I say then that +although the Will is free to will whatever it wills, nevertheless it +would fail in its essential use or object did it refuse to will in +accordance with the conditions which are imposed upon its executive +capacity. Again, to quote St. Paul, the Will might say, All things for +me are lawful; but all things are not expedient. Now, this consideration +of expediency is one of constant and far-reaching importance. For not +only, as already observed, does it lead to volition on the one hand as +rational; but it also leads to volition on the other hand as moral. Let +us take the two points separately. + +Do we say that a man is not free to conduct a scientific research, +because in conducting it he must employ the needful apparatus? Or do we +say that a man is not free to marry, because in order to do so he must +go through a marriage ceremony? Obviously, to say such things would +sound very like talking nonsense. It is true that in neither case is a +man free to gain his object without adopting the means which are seen to +be necessary under the system of external causation in which he finds +himself; but this does not mean that he is not free to do as he wills, +unless it so happens that he wills to do the impossible. Thus, within +the limits that are set by the conditions of causation, a man is +understood to be free to act as he wills so long as he is not 'impeded' +by some of those conditions. To say that he is not free because he +cannot get beyond those conditions would be absurd, since, apart from +these conditions, action of any kind would be _a priori_ impossible, +and the man would have, as his only alternative, no-action. + +Hence, in doing we must conform to the law of causation--which, indeed, +is all that can be meant by doing--and if in willing what we do we must +also conform to the law of causation, where is the difference with +respect to freedom? Such restraint as there may be is here a restraint +upon bodily action; not at all upon the mental action which we call +volition. The Will may will in any way that it wills to will; but the +body cannot act in every way that the Will may will it to act; therefore +the Will finds it expedient to will only in such ways as the body can +act--i. e. to conform in _its_ action to the external system of +causation. If this condition of all action is held to be compatible with +freedom in the one case, so in consistency must it be held in the other. +Equally in either case the agent can only be properly said to be unfree, +if he be subject to causal restraint from without. And in neither case +does the universal condition of acting under the law of causation +constitute bondage, in any other sense than that of furnishing the agent +with his conditions to acting in any way at all. Therefore, unless it be +said that a man is not free to do as he wills because he wills to do the +impossible, it cannot be denied that he is free to will as he wills +because he wills according to law. For no action of any kind is possible +contrary to law--a general fact which goes to constitute an argument _a +posteriori_ for the rationality of the World-eject--and if volition +constituted an exception to this general statement, it could only do so +by becoming no-action. Now, it is by thus willing according to law--or +with due reference to those external conditions of causality with which +the executive capacity has to do--that volition is rendered rational. +The restraint laid upon volition is not laid upon it _as_ volition, but +only in respect of execution. A man may will to marry as long and as +hard as he chooses; but only if he further wills to take the necessary +means can his volition become rational; it is irrational if he wills to +marry, and at the same time wills not to go through the marriage +ceremony. But although irrational, it is none the less free. Considered +merely as an act of volition it is equally free, whether it be rational +or irrational. + +And, similarly, it is equally free whether it be moral or immoral. The +objection that an uncaused volition cannot be a responsible volition +depends for its validity on the meaning which we attach to the term +'uncaused.' If it be meant that the volition arises without any regard +at all to the surrounding conditions of life, and is carried into effect +without the agent being able to control it by means of any other +voluntary act; then, indeed, whatever else such an agent may be, he +certainly is not moral. But if it be meant that among a number of +uncompleted volitions drawing in different directions--and all +'uncaused' in the sense of belonging immediately to the Ego--one of +them gains an advantage by a conscious reference of the mind to it as +good or evil, then the agent who is capable of giving this advantage to +that member of the system may properly be called moral. The man who +willed to marry, and yet willed not to go through the marriage ceremony, +was, as we have seen, irrational. Similarly, if any agent wills an +action without being able to consider any of the consequences which it +may involve as either moral or immoral, such an agent is what we must +properly call unmoral. Even in such an agent, however, the Will may be +free; only it would act without reference to any moral environment, just +as the lunatic above supposed might endeavour to act without reference +to any social environment. + +Let us look at the whole matter in yet another light. We have repeatedly +seen that the question of free-will, and therefore of moral +responsibility, depends upon the question as to whether a man's action +in the past might have been other than it was, notwithstanding that all +the conditions under which he was placed remained the same. Now, to this +question only one answer can be given by a dualistic theory of things, +whether materialistic or spiritualistic. For it belongs to the essence +of a dualistic theory to regard the principle of causation as a +principle external to, and independent of, the human mind; consequently, +all the conditions of mental causation being given, a certain result in +the way of volition is necessarily bound to ensue--or, in other words, +at any given time in a man's mental history, his action cannot have +been other than it was. But now, according to the monistic theory, all +causation has a psychical basis--being but the objective expression to +us of the psychical activity of the World-eject. Consequently, according +to this theory, the course of even strictly physical causation is +inevitable or necessary only in so far as the psychical activity of the +World-eject is held to be uniform, or consistent within itself. And +forasmuch as all our knowledge of physical causation is necessarily +empirical, we have but very inadequate means of judging how far this +empirical index is a true gauge of the reality. We can, indeed, predict +an eclipse centuries in advance; but we can only do so on the +supposition that such and such physical conditions remain constant, and +we have no right to affirm that such must be the case. Our knowledge of +physical causation, being but empirical, is probably but a very +inadequate translation of the psychical activity of the World-eject; and +hence, not only have we no right to predict a future eclipse with +certainty, but we have not so much as the right to affirm that even a +past eclipse must have taken place of necessity. For we have no right to +affirm that at any one period of cosmic history the action of the +World-eject must have been what it was, or could not have been other +than it was. Our knowledge of the obverse aspect of this action (in the +course of physical causation) is, as I have said, purely empirical; and +this is merely another way of saying that although we do know what the +action of the World-eject has been at such and such a period of cosmic +history, we can have no means of knowing what else it might have been. +For anything that we can tell to the contrary, the whole history of the +solar system, for example, might have been quite different from what it +has been; the course which it actually has run may have been but one out +of an innumerable number of possible alternatives, any other of which +might just as well have been adopted by the World-eject. + +Now, if this is true of natural causation in the case of the macrocosm, +it would appear to be equally so of natural causation in the case of the +microcosm. Indeed, prediction in the case of human activity is so much +less certain than in the case of cosmic activity, that the attribute of +free-will is generally ascribed to the former, while rarely suggested as +possibly belonging to the latter. And similarly as regards past action. +If we are unable to say that at any period in the past history of the +solar system the World-eject might not have deflected the whole stream +of events into some other channel, how can we be able to say that at any +given period of his past history the Man-eject could not have performed +an analogous act? Obviously, the only reason why we are not accustomed +to entertain this supposition in either case, is because our judgements +are beset with the assumption that the principle of causality is prior +to that of mind--something of the nature of Fate superior even to the +gods. And, no less obviously, if once we see any reason to regard the +principle of causality as merely co-extensive with that of mind, the +whole question as between Necessity and Free-will lapses; there is +nothing to show that a man's action in the past might not have been +other than it was. The only outward restraint placed upon the exercise +of his Will is then seen to be imposed by the conditions of its +executive capacity, and this restraint it is that constitutes man a +rational agent. On the other hand, the structure of conscience--however +we may suppose this to have been formed--imposes that further and inward +restraint upon his Will, which constitutes man a moral agent. But +neither of these restraints can properly be said to constitute bondage +in the sense required by Necessitarianism, because neither of them +requires that the man's Will must will as it does will; they require +merely that his Will should act in certain ways if it is to accomplish +certain results; and to this extent only is it subject to law, or to the +incidence of those external influences which help to shape our motives. + +But if this is so, is it not obvious that the sense of moral +responsibility is rationally justified? This sense goes upon the +supposition that a man's conduct in the past might have been different +from what it was. Clearly, therefore, no question of moral +responsibility can ever obtain in cases where the general system of +external causation, or natural law, rendered an alternative line of +action physically impossible. _The question of moral responsibility can +only obtain in cases where two or more lines of conduct were alike +possible, so far as the external system of causation is concerned--or +where the Will was equally free to choose between two or more courses of +bodily action._ In other words, the question of moral responsibility has +nothing to do with the only kind of bondage to which, according to our +present point of view, the Will is subject--namely the bondage of being +rationally obliged to will only what is capable of performance. The +question of moral responsibility has only to do with the system of +causation which is inherent in the mind itself; not with the system that +is external to the mind. And as the theory of Monism identifies the mind +with this its own inherent system of causation--or regards a man's Will +as the originator of a particular portion of general causality--it +follows from the theory that a man is justly liable to moral praise or +blame as the case may be: the moral sense no longer appears as a +gigantic illusion: conscience is justified at the bar of reason. + +It appears to me impossible that any valid exception can be taken to the +above reasoning, if once the premiss is granted--namely, that the +principle of Causality admits of being regarded as identical with that +of Volition. For if Cause is but another name for Will--whether the Will +be subjective or ejective--it follows that my will is a first cause, +which is determined by other causes only in so far as the executive +capacity of my body is so determined. As the whole stress of any +objection to the present argument must thus be brought to bear upon the +validity of this its fundamental premiss, a few words may now be said to +show that the premiss is not wholly gratuitous. Of course the reason why +at first sight it is apt to appear, not only gratuitous, but even +grotesque, is because in these days of physical science the minds of +most of us are dominated by the unthinking persuasion that the principle +of causality is the most ultimate principle which our minds can reach. +Most of us accept this persuasion as almost of the nature of an axiom, +and hence the mere suggestion that our own volitions are really uncaused +appears to us of the nature of a self-evident absurdity. A little +thought, however, is enough to show that the only ground of reason which +this strong prepossession can rest upon, is the assumption that the +principle of causality is logically prior to that of mind. Therefore it +is the validity of this assumption that we have here to investigate. + +In the first place, then, the assumption is _ipso facto_ irrational. For +it is evident that in order to make the assumption there must already be +a mind to make it. In other words, the very conception of the principle +of causality implies a thinking substance wherein that conception +arises, and therefore, as a mere matter of formal statement, it is +impossible to assign logical priority to this conception over the thing +whereby it is conceived. + +In the next place, when we carefully analyze the nature of this +conception itself, we find that it arises immediately out of our +conception of Being as Being. This is shown by the idea of _equivalency_ +between cause and effect, which is an essential feature of the +conception of causality as such. In other words, the statement of any +causal relation is merely a statement of the fact that both the matter +and the energy concerned in the event were of a permanent nature and +unalterable amount. Therefore, _if_ the ultimate Reality is mental, +Causation _must_ be ontologically identical with Volition. And that the +ultimate Reality is either mental, or something greater, seems to be +proved by the consideration that if it be supposed anything _less_, +there must be an end of the conception of equivalency as between cause +and effect, and so of the conception of causality itself; for, clearly, +if my mind has been caused by anything less than itself, there is an end +of any possible equivalency between the activity of that thing as a +cause, and the occurrence of my mind as an effect[13]. + +Lastly, the conception of causality essentially involves the idea of +finality as existing somewhere. Here I cannot do better than quote some +extracts from Canon Mozley's essay on 'The Principle of Causation,' as +he manages very tersely to convey the gist of previous philosophizing +upon this subject. + + 'He (Clarke) brings out simply at bottom the meaning and + significance of an idea in the human mind, that there is implied in + the very idea itself of cause, firstly, that it causes something + else; and secondly, that it is uncaused itself.... An infinite + series of causes does not make a cause; ... an infinite succession + of causes rests, by the very hypothesis, upon no cause; each + particular one rests on the one which follows it, but the whole + rests upon nothing.... If from one cause we have to go back to + another, that which we go back from is not the cause, but that + which we go back to is. The very idea of cause, as I have said, + implies a stop; and wherever we stop is the cause.... A true cause + is a First Cause.... The atheistic idea thus does not correspond to + the idea of reason. The atheist appears to acknowledge the + necessity of a cause, and appears to provide for it; but when we + come to his scheme it fails exactly in that part of the idea which + clenches it, and which is essential to its integrity; it fails in + providing a stop; ... One might say to him, Why do you give + yourself the trouble to supply causation at all? You do so because + you consider yourself obliged in reason to do it, but if you supply + causation at all, why not furnish such a cause as reason has + impressed upon you, and which is inherent in your mind--a cause + which stands still, an original cause? If you never intended to + supply this, it must have been because you thought a real cause was + not wanted; but if you thought a cause not wanted, why not have + said from the first that causes were not wanted, and said from the + first that events could take place without causes?' + +Or, to quote a more recent authority, and one speaking from the side of +physical science, Prof. Huxley writes:-- + + 'The student of nature who starts from the axiom of the + universality of the law of causation, cannot refuse to admit an + eternal existence; if he admits the conservation of energy, he + cannot deny the possibility of an eternal energy; if he admits the + existence of immaterial phenomena in the form of consciousness, he + must admit the possibility, at any rate, of an eternal series of + such phenomena; and, if his studies have not been barren of the + best fruit of the investigation of nature, he will have enough + sense to see that, when Spinoza says, "Per Deum intelligo ens + absolute infinitum, hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis + attributis," the God so conceived is one that only a very great + fool would deny, even in his heart. Physical science is as little + Atheistic as it is Materialistic[14].' + +Now, if it thus belongs to the essence of our idea of causation that +finality must be reached somewhere, I do not know where this is so +likely to be reached as at that principle wherein the idea itself takes +its rise--viz. Mind. But, if so, the statement that any particular acts +of mind are uncaused ceases to present any character of self-evident +absurdity. + +And the argument need not end here. For Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown +that our idea of causation, not merely requires a mind for its +occurrence, but that in every mind where it does occur it has been +directly formed out of experiences of effort in acts of volition. So +that whether we analyze the idea of cause as we actually discover it in +our own minds, or investigate the history of its genesis, we alike find, +as we might have antecedently expected, that it is dependent on our more +ultimate idea of mind as mind; the conception of causality is not, as a +matter of fact, original or primal, but derivative or secondary. +Therefore, if this conception necessarily involves the postulation of a +first cause, there can be no doubt that such a cause can only be +conceived as of the nature of mind. From which it follows that each +individual mind requires to be regarded--if it is regarded at all--as of +the nature of a first cause. + +From this, however, it does not follow that each individual mind +requires to be regarded as wholly independent of all other causes, or as +never subject to any causal influence which may be exercised by other +minds. Although each mind presents the feature of finality or +spontaneity, this does not hinder that it also presents the feature of +relation to other minds, which, therefore, are able to act upon it in +numberless ways. Now, whether these minds are the minds of other men, of +other intelligent beings, or of the whole World-eject, the causal +activity which is exerted upon my mind expresses itself in that mind as +a consciousness of motives. But although these motives may help to +determine my volitions, there is no reason to suppose that they are +themselves the volitions, or that without them my mind would cease to be +itself a causal agent. On the contrary, if this were supposed, the +supposition would amount to destroying the causal agency of my own mind, +which, as we have just seen, must either be original or not at all. + +The way, therefore, that the matter stands is this. In so far as the +microcosm is a circumscribed system of being--a thinking substance, a +personality--it is of the nature of a first cause, free to act in any +direction as to its thinking and willing, even though its thinking +should be irrational as to truth, and its willing impossible as to +execution. But in so far as the microcosm enters into relation with the +macrocosm, the system of external causation which it encounters +determines the character of its volitions. For although these volitions +are themselves of the nature of first causes, it is no contradiction to +say that they are--at all events in large measure--determined by other +and external causes. This is no contradiction because, although they are +thus determined, it does not follow that they are thus determined +_necessarily_, and this makes all the difference between the theory of +will as bond or free. In any stream of secondary causation each member +of the series is understood to determine the next member of necessity; +and it is because this notion is imported into psychology that the +theory of determinism regards it as axiomatic that, if our volitions are +in any way caused at all, they can only be caused by way of necessity; +and hence that under the operation of any given set of motives the +action of the will can only take place in the direction of the +resultant. But any such axiom is valid only within the region of second +causes. On the hypothesis that volitions are first causes, the axiom is +irrelevant to them; for although it may be true that they are determined +by causes from without, it may not be true that they are thus determined +of necessity: their intrinsic character as themselves first causes, +although not isolating them from any possible contact with other causes, +nevertheless does protect them from being necessarily coerced by these +causes, and therefore from becoming but the mere effects of them. Such +influence, or determination, as is exerted upon the Will by these +external causes is exerted only because any individual mind is not +itself a macrocosm, but a microcosm in relation to a macrocosm. If it +were itself a macrocosm, standing out of relation to all other being, +its prime causation would, of course, be wholly uninfluenced by any +other causation; its volitions would then be concerned only with the +determination of its own thoughts in a constant stream of purely +subjective contemplation, such as that which the Hindoo philosophy +attributes to God. But as the human mind discovers itself as existing in +close and complex relations with an external world of an orderly +character, the human mind finds that it is, as before said, _expedient_ +to adapt the course of its own causal activity so as to bring it into +harmony with the external order. For, although its own causal activity +is primal, it by no means follows that on this account it is almighty; +hence, even although it be primal, it is nevertheless under the +necessity of adopting means in order to secure its ends--or, in other +words, of adjusting its volitions (if they are to be practically +efficient) to the conditions which are imposed upon its activity by the +orderly system of the external world. Which is merely another way of +stating the conclusion previously reached--viz. that the only necessity +which can be proved to govern our volitions is the necessity which is +imposed by our own considerations of reason and morality. Although we +find that it is expedient to adapt our own causal activity to that +larger system of causal activity by which we are surrounded--seeing that +we must do so necessarily if we are to act at all--it by no means +follows that we are bound to will what is expedient. In other words, the +necessity laid upon us by the system of external causation is a +necessity to adopt means for the attainment of ends; not a necessity to +will the ends. And although in many cases this distinction may appear to +be practically unmeaning--seeing that no man wills what he knows to be +impossible of execution, and therefore that to say he is necessarily +prevented from doing a certain thing seems practically equivalent to +saying that he is necessarily prevented from willing that thing--in all +cases where any question of moral responsibility can possibly obtain, +the distinction is one of fundamental importance. For, as already shown, +any question of moral responsibility can only obtain where two or more +lines of action are alike possible, and therefore where no necessity is +laid upon the man in respect of carrying out his volitions, in whichever +direction they may eventually proceed. Although in any event he is +necessarily bound to adopt means in order to secure his ends, the moral +quality of his choice has reference only to the ends which he chooses; +not at all to the fact that he has to employ means for the purpose of +attaining them. And even though his choice be influenced by his physical +and social environment--as it must be if it be either rational on the +one hand or moral on the other--it does not follow that this influence +is of a kind to neutralize or destroy the causal nature of his own +volition. For the influence which is thus exerted cannot be exerted +necessarily, unless we suppose that the Will is not a first cause, which +is the possibility now under consideration. If the Will is a first +cause, the influences brought to bear upon it by its relation to other +causes--and in virtue of which it is constituted, not only a cause +primal, but also a cause rational and moral--these influences differ +_toto coelo_ from those which are exercised by any members in a series +of secondary causes upon the next succeeding causes. And the difference +consists in the absence of necessary or unconditional sequence in the +one case, and its presence in the other. However strong the determining +influence of a motive may be, if the Will is a first cause, the motive +must belong to a different order of causal relation from a motor; for, +no matter how strong the determining influence may be, _ex hypothesi_ it +can never attain to the strength of necessity; the Will must ever remain +free to overcome such influence by an adequate exercise of its own power +of spontaneous action, or of supplying _de novo_ an additional access of +strength to some other motive. Of course, as a general rule, the Will +allows itself to be influenced by motives supplied immediately by its +relations with the external world; but this is so only because the +thinking substance well knows that it is expedient so to fall in with +the general stream of external causation. Hence, as a general rule, it +is only in cases where the stream of external causation is drawing the +will in different directions that the causal activity of the Will itself +is called into play. Or rather, I should say, it is only in such cases +that we become conscious of the fact. In the case of every voluntary +movement the primal activity of Will must be concerned (and this even in +the case of the lower animals); but as the vast majority of such +movements are performed by way of response to frequently recurring +circumstances, the response which experience has shown to be most +expedient is given, as it were, automatically, or without the occurrence +of any adverse motive. But in cases where motives are drawing in +different directions, we become conscious of an effort of Will in +choosing one or other line of conduct, and, according to our present +hypothesis, this consciousness of effort is an expression of the work +which the Will is doing in the way of spontaneous causation. + +Thus, upon the whole, if we identify the principle of causation with the +principle of mind--as we are bound to do by the theory of Monism--we +thereby draw a great and fundamental distinction between causation as +this occurs in the external world, and as it occurs within the limits of +our own subjectivity. And the distinction consists in the unconditional +nature of a causal sequence in the external world, as against the +conditional nature of it in the other case; the condition to the +effective operation of a motive--as distinguished from a motor--is the +acquiescence of the first cause upon which that motive is operating. + +To the foregoing argument it may be objected that by expressly regarding +the human mind as a first cause of its own volitions, I imply that that +mind can itself have had no cause, which appears to be self-evidently +absurd. But here again the absurdity only arises from our inveterate +habit of regarding the principle of causation as logically prior to that +of mind. If we expressly refuse to do this, there is nothing absurd in +supposing the principle of mind wherever it occurs, as itself uncaused. +For if, as we are now supposing, this principle is identical with that +of causation, to say that any mind is caused would be to say that a +cause is the cause of itself, which would be really absurd. Under the +present point of view, therefore, it would be a meaningless question to +ask for the cause of a human mind, since, _ex hypothesi_, a human mind +is a part of the self-existing substance, although not on this account +self-existing as to its individual personality. As argued in a previous +chapter, the personality appears to arise on account of circumscription, +or the isolation of a constituent part of the World-eject. Therefore, +although it may be reasonable to ask for a cause of this +circumscription--or of the personality--it is not reasonable to ask for +a cause of the substance which is thus circumscribed, or of the quality +of spontaneity which that substance exhibits. + +I will now state the whole case in another way. When we regard the facts +of volition from the stand-point of psychology, the only theory of them +which is open to us is, as we have before seen, that of determinism. +Moreover, within these limits that theory is perfectly true. Psychology, +as such, cannot recognize any principle more ultimate than natural +causation, seeing that, like any other of her sisters in the family of +sciences, her whole work and duty are confined to the investigation of +this principle. But, just as in the case of all the other sciences, when +her investigations have been pushed to the point where they encounter +the problem of explaining this principle itself, her investigations +must necessarily cease; this principle is for all the sciences the +ultimate datum, behind which they cannot go without ceasing to be +sciences. But it does not follow that because the area of science is +limited by that of causation, therefore we are precluded from asking any +questions as to the nature of this ultimate datum. Of course any +questions which we may thus ask cannot possibly be answered by science; +they are questions of philosophy, in the consideration of which science, +from her very nature and essential limitation of her office, can have no +voice. Now, if on taking up the principle of causation where this is +left by science--viz. as the ultimate or unanalyzable _datum_ of +experience, upon which all her investigations are founded, and by which +they are all limited--philosophy finds any reason to surmise that it is +resolvable into the principle of mind, philosophy is thus able to +suggest that any distinction between mental processes as determinate or +free, is really a meaningless distinction. For, according to this +suggestion, the issue is no longer as to whether these processes are +caused or uncaused; the very idea of cause has been abolished as one +which belongs only to that lower level of inquiry with which science, or +sensuous experience, is concerned. Here, no doubt, the question is a +thoroughly real one, and, as shown in previous chapters, can only be +answered in the way of determinism. But so soon as we ascend to the +philosophical theory of Monism, and so transcend the conditions of +sensuous experience, the question whether volitions are caused or +uncaused becomes, as I have said, a meaningless question, or a question +the terms of which are not correctly stated. If it be the case that all +causality is of a nature psychical, volition and causation are one and +the same thing, differing only in relation to our modes of apprehension. +It would therefore be equally meaningless to say that either is the +cause of the other--just as it would be equally meaningless to say that +neurosis is the cause of psychosis, or that psychosis is the cause of +neurosis. Or thus, if volition and causation are one and the same thing, +the only reason why they ever appear diverse is because the one is known +ontologically, while the other is known phenomenally. Were it possible +that the orbit of my own personality could be widened so as to include +within my own subjectivity the whole universe of causality, I should +find--according to Monism--that all causation would become transformed +into volition. Hence, the only reason why there now appears to be so +great an antithesis between these two principles, is because the +volition which is going on outside of my own consciousness can only be +known to me objectively,--or at most ejectively,--on which account the +principle of causality appears to me phenomenally as the most ultimate, +or most unanalyzable, principle in the phenomenal universe. + +Upon the whole, then, I conclude that this is the teaching of Monism. If +we view the facts of human volition relatively, or within the four +corners of psychological science, there is no escape from the conclusion +that they are determined with all the rigour which belongs to natural +causation in general. For every sequence of mental changes and every +sequence of cerebral changes, although phenomenally so diverse, are +taken by this theory to be ontologically identical; and therefore the +sequence of mental changes must be determined with the same degree of +'necessity' as is that of the cerebral changes. In short, mental +causation is taken to be but the obverse aspect of physical causation, +and, as previously remarked, it is impossible that the doctrine of +determinism could be taught in a manner more emphatic. But, on the other +hand, the theory of Monism is bound to go further than this. From the +very fact of its having gone so far as to identify all physical +processes with psychical processes, it cannot refuse to take the further +and final step of identifying the most ultimate known principle of the +one with the most ultimate known principle of the other; it is bound to +recognize in natural causation the phenomenal aspect of that which is +known ontologically as volition. But if these two principles are thus +regarded as identical, it clearly becomes as unmeaning to ask whether +the one is the cause of the other, as it would be to ask whether the one +wills the other. For, _ex hypothesi_, the two things being one thing, +or but different modes of viewing the same thing, it becomes mere +nonsense to speak of either determining the other; they are both but +different expressions of the same ultimate fact, namely the fact of +Being as Being. + +If this result should be deemed unsatisfactory on account of its +vagueness, let it be remembered that nothing is gained on the side of +clearness by the converse supposition--viz. that priority should be +assigned to the principle of causality. For, if we say it is +inconceivable that anything should come into existence without a +cause--not even excepting the principle of mind itself--then the +question immediately arises--If all volition is caused, what is the +cause of volition? What caused this cause? And so on till we arrive at +the question, What caused the principle of causality? which is absurd. +So that whether we regard mind as prior to cause, or cause as prior to +mind, or neither as prior to the other, we arrive at precisely the same +difficulty. And the difficulty is a hopeless one, because it concerns +the ultimate question of Being as Being, or the final mystery of things. + +Or, to state the matter in another way. An explanation means the +reference of observed effects to known causes, or the inclusion of +previously unknown causes among causes better known. Hence it is +obvious, from the very meaning of what we call an explanation, that at +the base of all possible explanations there must lie a great +Inexplicable, which, just because more ultimate than any of our +possible explanations, does not itself require to be explained. To +suppose that it does require to be explained, would be to suppose, that +there is something still more ultimate into which, if known, this +Inexplicable could be merged. Hence, unless we postulate an infinite +series of possible explanations, there must be a basal mystery +somewhere, which, in virtue of its constituting the ground of all +possible explanations, cannot be, and does not require to be, itself +explained. What is this basal mystery? Materialism supposes it to be +lodged in Matter to the exclusion of Mind, while Idealism in its extreme +forms takes the converse view. Theism supposes that it is an intelligent +Person, who is held--and logically enough--not to be able to give any +explanation of his own existence; he is, as it is said, self-existent, +and, if asked to give any account of his being, would only be able to +restate the fact of his being in the words, 'I am that I am.' Lastly, +Pantheism, or Monism, supposes the ultimate mystery to be lodged in the +universe as a whole. Now, in the present connexion the question before +us is simply this--Are we to regard the principle of causality or the +principle of mind as the ultimate mystery? And to this question I answer +that to me it appears most reasonable to assign priority to mind. For, +on the one hand, our only knowledge of causation is empirical, while +even as such it is only possible in the same way as our knowledge of +objective existence in general is possible--namely, by way of inference +from our own mental modifications, which therefore must necessarily have +priority so far as we are ourselves concerned. Next, on the other hand, +even if we were to grant that the principle of causality is the prius, +or the ultimate and inexplicable mystery, I cannot see that it is really +available to explain the fact of personality. To me it appears that, +within the range of human observation, this is the fact that most wears +the appearance of finality, or of that unanalyzable and inexplicable +nature which we are bound to believe must belong to the ultimate mystery +of Being. But, be this as it may, the speculative difficulty of +assigning priority to mind is certainly no greater than that of +assigning it to causality; and this, as above remarked, is a sufficient +answer to the question before us. According to Monism, however, there is +no need to assign priority to either principle, seeing that one is but a +phenomenal expression of the other. + +Only one further question remains to be considered. From what I have +just said on the subject of Personality, it will be apparent that the +theory of Monism is in conflict with that of Theism only in so far as +personality appears to imply limitation. This is a point which I have +previously considered in these pages (Chapter iv, p. 109), with the +result of appearing to show that the conflict is one which would +probably vanish could we rise above the necessary limitations of human +thought. Therefore, it here seems worth while to ask, What can be said +by the philosophical theory of Monism to the old theological dilemma +touching free-will and predestination? Or, even apart from any question +of Theism, what position does Monism suppose the psychical activity of +man to hold in relation to that of the universe? Of course the latter +statement of the question is included in the former; and, therefore, we +may present it thus;--If the human will is free, and the theory of +Theism substantially true, how are we to reconcile the fact with the +theory? + +According to the theory of Theism as sanctioned by Monism, what we +apprehend as natural causation is the obverse of a part of a _summum +genus_--i.e. the part falling within human observation whose whole is +the Absolute Volition. This Volition, being absolute, can nowhere meet +with restraint; it is therefore absolutely free, and can never +contradict itself. Thus, those circumscribed portions of it which we +know as human minds--and which, on account of being so circumscribed, +are free within themselves--do not in their freedom conflict with the +Absolute Volition. The Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition are +always in unison. It is not that the Absolute Volition unconditionally +determines the Relative Volition--else the Relative Volition would not +be free; but it is that the Absolute Volition invariably assents to the +Relative Volition as to the activity of an integral part of itself. This +will be at once evident if we consider that our only idea of +determination--i.e. causation--is, upon the theistic theory, derived +from our observing the consistency of the Divine Will, whether as +revealed subjectively in the causal operations of our own minds, or +objectively in the causal operations of Nature. Therefore, the idea of +causation as between the Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition is +an idea destitute of meaning. One Relative Volition may act causally on +another. Relative Volition, because each is wholly external to each. But +all Relative Volitions are constituent parts of the Absolute Volition, +which, therefore, cannot act causally _on_ them, though it always acts +substantially _with_ them. Or, otherwise phrased, if the subject is a +constituent part of its own World-eject--the volition of which is always +self-consistent--it follows that the volition of the subject must always +be coincident with that of its World-eject; and this without being +determined in any other sense than the smaller size of a part can be +said to be determined by the larger size of its whole: i.e. the +determination--if we choose so to call it--is not a causal one, but +arises immediately from the inherent nature of the case. The Absolute +Volition within itself is free; the Relative Volition within itself is +free; but there can be no conflict between these two freedoms. For, if +there were a conflict, it must be caused; but where is the cause of this +conflict to come from? Not from the Absolute Volition, which is +everywhere self-consistent; not from the Relative Volition, which is +wholly contained within the Absolute. Thus, regarded from within its own +system, the Relative Volition is free; while, regarded from the system +of its World-eject, the Relative Volition is predestined. But the +freedom is not incompatible with the predestination, nor the +predestination with the freedom. They stand to each other in the +relation of complementary truths, the apparent contradiction of which +arises only from the apparently fundamental antithesis between mind and +cause which it is the privilege of Monism to abolish. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 13: 'Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily +contain it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can +ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it +hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree' (Locke). To +this argument Mill answers, 'How vastly nobler and more precious, for +instance, are the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of +which, and by the properties of which, they are raised up! But this +stricture is not worthy of Mill. The soil and manure do not constitute +the whole cause of the plants and animals. We must trace these and many +other con-causes (conditions) back and back till we come to 'whatsoever +is first of all things': it is merely childish to choose some few of the +conditions, and arbitrarily to regard them as alone the efficient +causes.] + +[Footnote 14: _Collected Essays_, vol. ix. 'Evolution and Ethics,' p. +140.] + + * * * * * + ++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ +|Transcriber's note: In this text this H_2O represents a subscript 2| ++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + * * * * * + +Oxford HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Mind and Motion and Monism, by George John Romanes + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM *** + +***** This file should be named 22283.txt or 22283.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/2/2/8/22283/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Janet Blenkinship +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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