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+Project Gutenberg's Mind and Motion and Monism, by George John Romanes
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
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+Title: Mind and Motion and Monism
+
+Author: George John Romanes
+
+Release Date: August 9, 2007 [EBook #22283]
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+Language: English
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+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM ***
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+Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Janet Blenkinship
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+
+  MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM
+
+  BY THE LATE
+
+  GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.
+
+  HONORARY FELLOW OF GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
+
+
+  LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. AND NEW YORK 1895
+  Oxford
+  HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
+
+
+
+    WORKS BY _GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S._
+
+    =DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN=: an Exposition of the Darwinian Theory,
+    and a Discussion on Post-Darwinian Questions.
+
+    PART I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. With Portrait of Darwin and 125
+    Illustrations. _Crown 8vo_, 10s. 6d.
+
+    PART II. POST-DARWINIAN QUESTIONS: HEREDITY AND UTILITY. _Crown
+    8vo_.
+
+    =AN EXAMINATION OF WEISMANNISM.= _Crown 8vo_, 6s.
+
+    =MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM.= _Crown 8vo_.
+
+    =THOUGHTS ON RELIGION=. Edited, with a Preface, by CHARLES GORE,
+    M.A., Canon of Westminster. _Crown 8vo_, 4s. 6d.
+
+    London
+    LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+Of the contents of this little volume the section on _Mind and Motion_
+which forms, in accordance with a suggestion of the author's, a general
+introduction, was delivered at Cambridge as the Rede Lecture in 1885,
+and was printed in the _Contemporary Review_ for June in that year. The
+chapter on The _World as an Eject_ was published, almost as it now
+stands, in the _Contemporary Review_ for July, 1886. A paper on _The
+Fallacy of Materialism_, of which Mr. Romanes incorporated the more
+important parts in the Essay on Monism, was contributed to the
+_Nineteenth Century_ for December, 1882. The rest was left in MS. and
+was probably written in 1889 or 1890.
+
+The subjects here discussed frequently occupied Mr. Romanes' keen and
+versatile mind. Had not the hand of death fallen upon him while so much
+of the ripening grain of his thought still remained to be finally
+garnered, some modifications and extensions of the views set forth in
+the Essay on Monism would probably have been introduced. Attention may
+be drawn, for example, to the sentence on p. 139, italicized by the
+author himself, in which it is contended that the will as agent _must be
+identified with the principle of Causality_. I have reason to believe
+that the chapter on _The World as an Eject_ would, in a final revision
+of the Essay as a whole, have been modified so as to lay stress on this
+identification of the human will with the principle of Causality in the
+world at large--a doctrine the relation of which to the teachings of
+Schopenhauer will be evident to students of philosophy.
+
+But the hand of death closed on the thinker ere his thought had received
+its full and ultimate expression. When in July, 1893, I received from
+Mr. Romanes instructions with regard to the publication of that which
+now goes forth to the world in his name, his end seemed very near; and
+he said with faltering voice, in tones the pathos of which lingers with
+me still, that this and much besides must, he feared, be left
+unfinished. He suggested that perhaps I might revise the parts in the
+light of the whole. But I have thought it best to leave what he had
+written as he wrote it, save for quite unimportant emendations, lest in
+revising I should cast over it the shadow of my own opinions.
+
+It only remains to add that the conclusions reached in this Essay should
+be studied in connection with the later _Thoughts on Religion_ which
+Canon Gore has recently edited.
+                                                C. LL. M.
+  BRISTOL,
+  _May, 1895._
+
+
+
+
+  CONTENTS
+                                                                      PAGE
+
+  MIND AND MOTION                                                        1
+
+  MONISM                                                                39
+
+  INTRODUCTION                                                          41
+
+  CHAPTER     I. SPIRITUALISM                                           47
+
+     "       II. MATERIALISM                                            55
+
+     "      III. MONISM                                                 79
+
+     "       IV. THE WORLD AS AN EJECT                                  88
+
+     "        V. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM  119
+
+     "       VI. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM                        129
+
+
+
+
+MIND AND MOTION
+
+[REDE LECTURE, 1885.]
+
+
+The earliest writer who deserves to be called a psychologist is Hobbes;
+and if we consider the time when he wrote, we cannot fail to be
+surprised at what I may term his prevision of the most important results
+which have now been established by science. He was the first clearly to
+sound the note which has ever since constituted the bass, or fundamental
+tone, of scientific thought. Let us listen to it through the clear
+instrumentality of his own language:--
+
+     'All the qualities called sensible are, in the object which causeth
+     them, but so many motions of the matter by which it presseth on our
+     organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything
+     else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but
+     motion.... The cause of sense is the external body or object, which
+     presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in
+     taste and touch, or mediately, as in hearing, seeing, and smelling;
+     which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings
+     and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and
+     heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or
+     endeavour.... And because _going_, _speaking_, and the like
+     voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of
+     _whither_, _which way_, and _what_; it is evident that the
+     imagination [or idea] is the first internal beginning of all
+     voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any
+     motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or
+     the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible;
+     yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. These small
+     beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in
+     walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are
+     commonly called ENDEAVOUR[1].'
+
+These quotations are sufficient to show that the system of Hobbes was
+prophetic of a revelation afterwards declared by two centuries of
+scientific research. For they show how plainly he taught that all our
+knowledge of the external world is a knowledge of motion; and, again,
+that all our acquisitions of knowledge and other acts of mind themselves
+imply, as he elsewhere says, some kind of 'motion, agitation, or
+alteration, which worketh in the brain.' That he conceived such motion,
+agitation, or alteration to be, from its extreme minuteness, 'invisible'
+and 'insensible,' or, as we should now say, molecular, is likewise
+evident. I can therefore imagine the delight with which he would hear me
+speak when I say, that it is no longer a matter of keen-sighted
+speculation, but a matter of carefully demonstrated fact, that all our
+knowledge of the external world is nothing more than a knowledge of
+motion. For all the forms of energy have now been proved to be but modes
+of motion; and even matter, if not in its ultimate constitution vortical
+motion, at all events is known to us only as changes of motion: all that
+we perceive in what we call matter is change in modes of motion. We do
+not even know what it is that moves; we only know that when some modes
+of motion pass into other modes, we perceive what we understand by
+matter. It would take me too long to justify this general statement so
+that it should be intelligible to every one; but I am confident that all
+persons who understand such subjects will, when they think about it,
+accept this general statement as one which is universally true. And, if
+so, they will agree with Hobbes that all our knowledge of the external
+world is a knowledge of motion.
+
+Now, if it would have been thus a joy to Hobbes to have heard to-day how
+thoroughly he has been justified in his views touching the external
+world, with no less joy would he have heard that he has been equally
+justified in his views touching the internal world. For it has now been
+proved, beyond the possibility of dispute, that it is only in virtue of
+those invisible movements which he inferred that the nervous system is
+enabled to perform its varied functions.
+
+To many among the different kinds of movement going on in the external
+world, the animal body is adapted to respond by its own movements as
+best suits its own welfare; and the mechanism whereby this is effected
+is the neuro-muscular system. Those kinds of movement going on in the
+external world which are competent to evoke responsive movements in the
+animal body are called by physiologists stimuli. When a stimulus falls
+upon the appropriate sensory surface, a wave of molecular movement is
+sent up the attached sensory nerve to a nerve-centre, which thereupon
+issues another wave of molecular movement down a motor nerve to the
+group of muscles over whose action it presides; and when the muscles
+receive this wave of nervous influence they contract. This kind of
+response to stimuli is purely mechanical, or non-mental, and is
+ordinarily termed reflex action. The whole of the spinal cord and lower
+part of the brain are made up of nerve-centres of reflex action; and, in
+the result, we have a wonderfully perfect machine in the animal body
+considered as a whole. For while the various sensory surfaces are
+severally adapted to respond to different kinds of external
+movement--the eye to light, the ear to sound, and so on--any of these
+surfaces may be brought into suitable relation with any of the muscles
+of the body by means of the cerebro-spinal nerve-centres and their
+intercommunications.
+
+So much, then, for the machinery of the body. We must now turn to
+consider the corporeal seat of the mind, or the only part of the nervous
+system wherein the agitation of nervous matter is accompanied with
+consciousness. This is composed of a double nerve-centre, which occurs
+in all vertebrated animals, and the two parts of which are called the
+cerebral hemispheres. In man this double nerve-centre is so large that
+it completely fills the arch of the skull, as far down as the level of
+the eyebrows. The two hemispheres of which it consists meet face to face
+in the middle line of the skull, from the top of the nose backwards.
+Each hemisphere is composed of two conspicuously distinct parts, called
+respectively the grey matter and the white matter. The grey matter is
+external, enveloping the white matter like a skull-cap, and is composed
+of an inconceivable number of nerve-cells connected together by
+nerve-fibres. It is computed that in a human brain there cannot be less
+than a thousand millions of cells, and five thousand millions of fibres.
+The white matter is composed only of nerve-fibres, which pass downwards
+in great strands of conducting tissue to the lower centres of the brain
+and spinal cord. So that the whole constitutes one system, with the grey
+matter of the cerebral hemispheres at the apex or crown.
+
+That the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres is the exclusive seat
+of mind is proved in two ways. In the first place, if we look to the
+animal kingdom as a whole, we find that, speaking generally, the
+intelligence of species varies with the mass of this grey matter. Or, in
+other words, we find that the process of mental evolution, on its
+physical side, has consisted in the progressive development of this
+grey matter superimposed upon the pre-existing nervous machinery, until
+it has attained its latest and maximum growth in man.
+
+In the second place, we find that when the grey matter is experimentally
+removed from the brain of animals, the animals continue to live; but are
+completely deprived of intelligence. All the lower nerve-centres
+continue to perform their mechanical adjustments in response to suitable
+stimulation; but they are no longer under the government of the mind.
+Thus, for instance, when a bird is mutilated in this way, it will
+continue to perform all its reflex adjustments--such as sitting on a
+perch, using its wings when thrown into the air, and so forth; but it no
+longer remembers its nest or its young, and will starve to death in the
+midst of its food, unless it be fed artificially.
+
+Again, if the grey matter of only one hemisphere be removed, the mind is
+taken away from the corresponding (i. e. the opposite) side of the body,
+while it remains intact on the other side. For example, if a dog be
+deprived of one hemisphere, the eye which was supplied from it with
+nerve-fibres continues able to see, or to transmit impressions to the
+lower nerve-centre called the optic ganglion; for this eye will then
+mechanically follow the hand waved in front of it. But if the hand
+should hold a piece of meat, the dog will show no mental recognition of
+the meat, which of course it will immediately seize if exposed to the
+view of its other eye. The same thing is found to happen in the case of
+birds: on the injured side _sensation_, or the power of responding to a
+stimulus, remains intact; while _perception_, or the power of mental
+recognition, is destroyed.
+
+This description applies to the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres
+as a whole. But of course the question next arises whether it only acts
+as a whole, or whether there is any localization of different
+intellectual faculties in different parts of it. Now, in answer to this
+question, it has long been known that the faculty of speech is
+definitely localized in a part of the grey matter lying just behind the
+forehead; for, when this part is injured, a man loses all power of
+expressing even the most simple ideas in words, while the ideas
+themselves remain as clear as ever. It is remarkable that in each
+individual only this part of one hemisphere appears to be used; and
+there is some evidence to show that left-handed persons use the opposite
+side from right-handed. Moreover, when the side which is habitually in
+use is destroyed, the corresponding part of the other hemisphere begins
+to learn its work, so that the patient may in time recover his use of
+language.
+
+Within the last few years the important discovery has been made, that by
+stimulating with electricity the surface of the grey matter of the
+hemispheres, muscular movements are evoked; and that certain patches of
+the grey matter, when thus stimulated, always throw into action the same
+groups of muscles. In other words, there are definite local areas of
+grey matter, which, when stimulated, throw into action definite groups
+of muscles. The surface of the cerebral hemispheres has now been in
+large measure explored and mapped out with reference to these so-called
+motor-centres; and thus our knowledge of the neuro-muscular machinery of
+the higher animals (including man) has been very greatly furthered. Here
+I may observe parenthetically that, as the brain is insentient to
+injuries inflicted upon its own substance, none of the experiments to
+which I have alluded entail any suffering to the animals experimented
+upon; and it is evident that the important information which has thus
+been gained could not have been gained by any other method. I may also
+observe that as these motor-centres occur in the grey matter of the
+hemispheres, a strong probability arises that they are not only the
+motor-centres, but also the volitional centres which originate the
+intellectual commands for the contraction of this and that group of
+muscles. Unfortunately we cannot interrogate an animal whether, when we
+stimulate a motor-centre, we arouse in the animal's mind an act of will
+to throw the corresponding group of muscles into action; but that these
+motor-centres are really centres of volition is pointed to by the fact,
+that electrical stimuli have no longer any effect upon them when the
+mental faculties of the animal are suspended by an�sthetics, nor in the
+case of young animals where the mental faculties have not yet been
+sufficiently developed to admit of voluntary co-ordination among the
+muscles which are concerned. On the whole, then, it is not improbable
+that on stimulating artificially these motor-centres of the brain, a
+physiologist is actually playing from without, and at his own pleasure,
+upon the volitions of the animal.
+
+Turning, now, from this brief description of the structure and leading
+functions of the principal parts of the nervous system, I propose to
+consider what we know about the molecular movements which go on in
+different parts of this system, and which are concerned in all the
+processes of reflex adjustment, sensation, perception, emotion,
+instinct, thought, and volition.
+
+First of all, the rate at which these molecular movements travel through
+a nerve has been measured, and found to be about 100 feet per second, or
+somewhat more than a mile a minute, in the nerves of a frog. In the
+nerves of a mammal it is just about twice as fast; so that if London
+were connected with New York by means of a mammalian nerve instead of an
+electric cable, it would require nearly a whole day for a message to
+pass.
+
+Next, the time has also been measured which is required by a
+nerve-centre to perform its part in a reflex action, where no thought or
+consciousness is involved. This time, in the case of the winking reflex,
+and apart from the time required for the passage of the molecular waves
+up and down the sensory and motor nerves, is about 1/20 of a second.
+Such is the rate at which a nerve-centre conducts its operations when no
+consciousness or volition is involved. But when consciousness and
+volition are involved, or when the cerebral hemispheres are called into
+play, the time required is considerably greater. For the operations on
+the part of the hemispheres which are comprised in perceiving a simple
+sensation (such as an electrical shock) and the volitional act of
+signalling the perception, cannot be performed in less than 1/12 of a
+second, which is nearly twice as long as the time required by the lower
+nerve-centres for the performance of a reflex action. Other experiments
+prove that the more complex an act of perception, the more time is
+required for its performance. Thus, when the experiment is made to
+consist, not merely in signalling a perception, but in signalling one of
+two or more perceptions (such as an electrical shock on one or other of
+the two hands, which of five letters is suddenly exposed to view, &c.),
+a longer time is required for the more complex process of distinguishing
+which of the two or more expected stimuli is perceived, and in
+determining which of the appropriate signals to make in response. The
+time consumed by the cerebral hemispheres in meeting a 'dilemma' of this
+kind is from 1/5 to 1/20 of a second longer than that which they consume
+in the case of a simpler perception. Therefore, whenever mental
+operations are concerned, a relatively much greater time is required for
+a nerve-centre to perform its adjustments than when a merely mechanical
+or non-mental response is needed; and the more complex the mental
+operation the more time is necessary. Such may be termed the physiology
+of deliberation.
+
+So much, then, for the rate at which molecular movements travel through
+nerves, and the times which nerve-centres consume in performing their
+molecular adjustments. We may next consider the researches which have
+been made within the last few months upon the rates of these movements
+themselves, or the number of vibrations per second with which the
+particles of nervous matter oscillate.
+
+If, by means of a suitable apparatus, a muscle is made to record its own
+contraction, we find that during all the time it is in contraction, it
+is under-going a vibratory movement at the rate of about nine pulsations
+per second. What is the meaning of this movement? The meaning is that
+the act of will in the brain, which serves as a stimulus to the
+contraction of the muscle, is accompanied by a vibratory movement in the
+grey matter of the brain; that this movement is going on at the rate of
+nine pulsations per second; and that the muscle is giving a separate or
+distinct contraction in response to every one of these nervous
+pulsations. That such is the true explanation of the rhythm in the
+muscle is proved by the fact that if, instead of contracting a muscle by
+an act of the will, it be contracted by means of a rapid series of
+electrical shocks playing upon its attached nerve, the record then
+furnished shows a similar trembling going on in the muscle as in the
+previous case; but the tremors of contraction are now no longer at the
+rate of nine per second: they correspond beat for beat with the
+interruptions of the electrical current. That is to say, the muscle is
+responding separately to every separate stimulus which it receives
+through the nerve; and further experiment shows that it is able thus to
+keep time with the separate shocks, even though these be made to follow
+one another so rapidly as 1,000 per second. Therefore we can have no
+doubt that the slow rhythm of nine per second under the influence of
+volitional stimulation, represents the rate at which the muscle is
+receiving so many separate impulses from the brain: the muscle is
+keeping time with the molecular vibrations going on in the cerebral
+hemispheres at the rate of nine beats per second. Careful tracings show
+that this rate cannot be increased by increasing the strength of the
+volitional stimulus; but some individuals--and those usually who are of
+quickest intelligence--display a somewhat quicker rate of rhythm, which
+may be as high as eleven per second. Moreover, it is found that by
+stimulating with strychnine any of the centres of reflex action, pretty
+nearly the same rate of rhythm is exhibited by the muscles thus thrown
+into contraction; so that all the nerve-cells in the body are thus shown
+to have in their vibrations pretty nearly the same period, and not to be
+able to vibrate with any other. For no matter how rapidly the electrical
+shocks are allowed to play upon the grey matter of the cerebral
+hemispheres, as distinguished from the nerve-trunks proceeding from them
+to the muscles, the muscles always show the same rhythm of about nine
+beats per second: the nerve-cells, unlike the nerve-fibres, refuse to
+keep time with the electric shocks, and will only respond to them by
+vibrating at their own intrinsic rate of nine beats per second.
+
+Thus much, then, for the rate of molecular vibration which goes on in
+nerve-centres. But the rate of such vibration which goes on in sensory
+and motor nerves may be very much more rapid. For while a nerve-centre
+is only able to _originate_ a vibration at the rate of about nine beats
+per second, a motor-nerve, as we have already seen, is able to
+_transmit_ a vibration of at least 1,000 beats per second; and a sensory
+nerve which at the surface of its expansion is able to respond
+differently to differences of musical pitch, of temperature, and even of
+colour, is probably able to vibrate very much more rapidly even than
+this. We are not, indeed, entitled to conclude that the nerves of
+special sense vibrate in actual unison, or synchronize, with these
+external sources of stimulation; but we are, I think, bound to conclude
+that they must vibrate in some numerical proportion to them (else we
+should not perceive objective differences in sound, temperature, or
+colour); and even this implies that they are probably able to vibrate at
+some enormous rate.
+
+With further reference to these molecular movements in sensory nerves,
+the following important observation has been made--viz. that there is a
+constant ratio between the amount of agitation produced in a sensory
+nerve, and the intensity of the corresponding sensation. This ratio is
+not a direct one. As Fechner states it, 'Sensation varies, not as the
+stimulus, but as the logarithm of the stimulus.' Thus, for instance, if
+1,000 candles are all throwing their light upon the same screen, we
+should require ten more candles to be added before our eyes could
+perceive any difference in the amount of illumination. But if we begin
+with only 100 candles shining upon the screen, we should perceive an
+increase in the illumination by adding a single candle. And what is true
+of sight is equally true of all the other senses: if any stimulus is
+increased, the smallest increase of sensation first occurs when the
+stimulus rises one per cent, above its original intensity. Such being
+the law on the side of sensation, suppose that we place upon the optic
+nerve of an animal the wires proceeding from a delicate galvanometer, we
+find that every time we stimulate the eye with light, the needle of the
+galvanometer moves, showing electrical changes going on in the nerve,
+caused by the molecular agitations. Now these electrical changes are
+found to vary in intensity with the intensity of the light used as a
+stimulus, and they do so very nearly in accordance with the law of
+sensation just mentioned. So we say that in sensation the cerebral
+hemispheres are, as it were, acting the part of galvanometers in
+appreciating the amount of molecular change which is going on in sensory
+nerves; and that they record their readings in the mind as faithfully as
+a galvanometer records its readings on the dial.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Hitherto we have been considering certain features in the physiology of
+nervous action, so far as this can be appreciated by means of
+physiological instruments. But we have just seen that the cerebral
+hemispheres may themselves be regarded as such instruments, which record
+in our minds their readings of changes going on in our nerves. Hence,
+when other physiological instruments fail us, we may gain much
+additional insight touching the movements of nervous matter by attending
+to the thoughts and feelings of our own minds; for these are so many
+indices of what is going on in the cerebral hemispheres. I therefore
+propose next to contemplate the mind, considered thus as a physiological
+instrument.
+
+The same scientific instinct which led Hobbes so truly to anticipate the
+progress of physiology, led him not less truly to anticipate the
+progress of psychology. For just as he was the first to enunciate the
+fundamental principle of nerve-action in the vibration of molecules, so
+was he likewise the first to enunciate the fundamental principle of
+psychology in the association of ideas. And the great advance of
+knowledge which has been made since his day with respect to both these
+principles, entitles us to be much more confident than even he was that
+they are in some way intimately united. Moreover, the manner in which
+they are so united we have begun clearly to understand. For we know from
+our study of nerve-action in general, that when once a wave of invisible
+or molecular movement passes through any line of nerve-structure, it
+leaves behind it a change in the structure such that it is afterwards
+more easy for a similar wave, when started from the same point, to
+pursue the same course. Or, to adopt a simile from Hobbes, just as water
+upon a table flows most readily in the lines which have been wetted by a
+previous flow, so the invisible waves of nerve-action pass most readily
+in the lines of a previous passage. This is the reason why in any
+exercise requiring muscular co-ordination, or dexterity, 'practice makes
+perfect:' the nerve-centres concerned learn to perform their work by
+frequently repeating it, because in this way the needful lines of
+wave-movement in the structure of the nerve-centre are rendered more and
+more permeable by use. Now we have seen that in the nerve-centres called
+the cerebral hemispheres, wave-movement of this kind is accompanied with
+feeling. Changes of consciousness follow step by step these waves of
+movement in the brain, and therefore when on two successive occasions
+the waves of movement pursue the same pathway in the brain, they are
+attended with a succession of the same ideas in the mind. Thus we see
+that the tendency of ideas to _re_cur in the same order as that in
+which they have previously _oc_curred, is merely an obverse expression
+of the fact that lines of wave-movement in the brain become more and
+more permeable by use. So it comes that a child can learn its lessons by
+frequently repeating them; so it is that all our knowledge is
+accumulated; and so it is that all our thinking is conducted.
+
+A wholly new field of inquiry is thus opened up. By using our own
+consciousness as a physiological instrument of the greatest delicacy, we
+are able to learn a great deal about the dynamics of brain-action
+concerning which we should otherwise remain in total ignorance. But the
+field of inquiry thus opened up is too large for me to enter upon
+to-day. I will therefore merely observe, in general terms, that although
+we are still very far from understanding the operations of the brain in
+thought, there can be no longer any question that in these operations of
+the brain we have what I may term the objective machinery of thought.
+'Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,' said
+Hobbes. Starting from this fact, modern physiology has clearly shown why
+it is a fact; and looking to the astonishing rate at which the science
+of physiology is now advancing, I think we may fairly expect that within
+a time less remote than the two centuries which now separate us from
+Hobbes, the course of ideas in a given train of thought will admit of
+having its footsteps tracked in the corresponding pathways of the brain.
+Be this, however, as it may, even now we know enough to say that,
+whether or not these footsteps will ever admit of being thus tracked in
+detail, they are all certainly present in the cerebral structures of
+each one of us. What we know on the side of mind as logical sequence, is
+on the side of the nervous system nothing more than a passage of nervous
+energy through one series of cells and fibres rather than through
+another: what we recognize as truth is merely the fact of the brain
+vibrating in tune with Nature.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Such being the intimate relation between nerve-action and mind-action,
+it has become the scientifically orthodox teaching that the two stand to
+one another in the relation of cause to effect. One of the most
+distinguished of my predecessors in this place, the President of the
+Royal Society, has said in one of the most celebrated of his
+lectures:--'We have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of
+the nervous system as the cause of the state of consciousness, as we
+have for regarding any event as the cause of another.' And, by way of
+perfectly logical deduction from this statement, Professor Huxley argues
+that thought and feeling have nothing whatever to do with determining
+action: they are merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he
+expresses it, the indices of changes which are going on in the brain.
+Under this view we are all what he terms conscious automata, or machines
+which happen, as it were by chance, to be conscious of some of their own
+movements. But the consciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears
+the same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as a
+steam-whistle bears to the activity of a locomotive, or the striking of
+a clock to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. Here, again,
+we meet with an echo of Hobbes, who opens his work on the Commonwealth
+with these words:--
+
+     'Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by
+     the _art_ of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated,
+     that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a
+     motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in the principal part
+     within; why may we not say, that all _automata_ (engines that move
+     themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch), have an
+     artificial life? For what is the _heart_, but a _spring_; and the
+     _nerves_, but so many _strings_; and the _joints_, but so many
+     _wheels_, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by
+     the artificer[2]?'
+
+Now, this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a legitimate
+outcome of the theory that nervous changes are the causes of mental
+changes, but it is logically the only possible outcome. Nor do I see any
+way in which this theory can be fought on grounds of physiology. If we
+persist in regarding the association between brain and thought
+exclusively from a physiological point of view, we must of necessity be
+materialists. Further, so far as we are physiologists our materialism
+can do us no harm. On the contrary, it is to us of the utmost service,
+as at once the simplest physiological explanation of facts already
+known, and the best working hypothesis to guide us in our further
+researches. But it does not follow from this that the theory of
+materialism is true. The bells of St. Mary's over the way always ring
+for a quarter of an hour before the University sermon; yet the ringing
+of the bells is not the cause of the sermon, although, as long as the
+association remains constant, there would be no harm in assuming, for
+any practical purposes, that it is so. But just as we should be wrong in
+concluding, if we did not happen to know so much about the matter as we
+do, that the University sermon is produced by the vibration of bells in
+the tower of St. Mary's Church, so we may be similarly wrong if we were
+definitely to conclude that the sermon is produced by the vibration of a
+number of little nerve-cells in the brain of the preacher.
+
+Now, if time permitted, and if I supposed that you would all care to go
+with me into matters of some abstruseness, I could certainly prove that
+whatever the connexion between body and mind may be, we have the best
+possible reasons for concluding that it is not a causal connexion. These
+reasons are, of course, extra-physiological; but they are not on this
+account less conclusive. Within the limits of a lecture, however, I can
+only undertake to give an outline sketch of what I take to be the
+overwhelming argument against materialism.
+
+We have first the general fact that all our knowledge of motion, and so
+of matter, is merely a knowledge of the modifications of mind. That is
+to say, all our knowledge of the external world--including the knowledge
+of our own brains--is merely a knowledge of our own mental states. Let
+it be observed that we do not even require to go so far as the
+irrefutable position of Berkeley, that the existence of an external
+world without the medium of mind, or of being without knowing, is
+inconceivable. It is enough to take our stand on a lower level of
+abstraction, and to say that whether or not an external world can exist
+apart from mind in any absolute or inconceivable sense, at any rate it
+cannot do so _for us_. We cannot think any of the facts of external
+nature without presupposing the existence of a mind which thinks them;
+and therefore, so far at least as we are concerned, mind is necessarily
+prior to everything else. It is for us the only mode of existence which
+is real in its own right; and to it, as to a standard, all other modes
+of existence which may be _in_ferred must be _re_ferred. Therefore, if
+we say that mind is a function of motion, we are only saying, in
+somewhat confused terminology, that mind is a function of itself.
+
+Such, then, I take to be a general refutation of materialism. To use but
+a mild epithet, we must conclude that the theory is unphilosophical,
+seeing that it assumes one thing to be produced by another thing, in
+spite of an obvious demonstration that the alleged effect is necessarily
+prior to its cause. Such, I say, is a general refutation of
+materialism. But this is far from being all. 'Motion,' says Hobbes,
+'produceth nothing but motion;' and yet he immediately proceeds to
+assume that in the case of the brain it produces, not only motion, but
+mind. He was perfectly right in saying that with respect to its
+movements the animal body resembles an engine or a watch; and if he had
+been acquainted with the products of higher evolution in watch-making,
+he might with full propriety have argued, for instance, that in the
+compensating balance, whereby a watch adjusts its own movements in
+adaptation to external changes of temperature, a watch is exhibiting the
+mechanical aspect of volition. And, similarly, it is perhaps possible to
+conceive that the principles of mechanism might be more and more
+extended in their effects, until, in so marvellously perfected a
+structure as the human brain, all the voluntary movements of the body
+might be originated in the same mechanical manner as are the
+compensating movements of a watch; for this, indeed, as we have seen, is
+no more than happens in the case of all the nerve-centres other than the
+cerebral hemispheres. If this were so, motion would be producing nothing
+but motion, and upon the subject of brain-action there would be nothing
+further to say. Without consciousness I should be delivering this
+lecture; without consciousness you would be hearing it; and all the busy
+brains in this University would be conducting their researches, or
+preparing for their examinations, mindlessly. Strange as such a state
+of things might be, still motion would be producing nothing but motion;
+and, therefore, if there were any mind to contemplate the facts, it
+would encounter no philosophical paradox: it would merely have to
+conclude that such were the astonishing possibilities of mechanism. But,
+as the facts actually stand, we find that this is not the case. We find,
+indeed, that up to a certain level of complexity mechanism alone is able
+to perform all the compensations or adjustments which are performed by
+the animal body; but we also find that beyond this level such
+compensations or adjustments are never performed without the
+intervention of consciousness. Therefore, the theory of automatism has
+to meet the unanswerable question--How is it that in the machinery of
+the brain motion produces this something which is not motion? Science
+has now definitely proved the correlation of all the forces; and this
+means that if any kind of motion could produce anything else that is not
+motion, it would be producing that which science would be bound to
+regard as in the strictest sense of the word a miracle. Therefore, if we
+are to take our stand upon science--and this is what materialism
+professes to do--we are logically bound to conclude, not merely that the
+evidence of causation from body to mind is not so cogent as that of
+causation in any other case, but that in this particular case causation
+may be proved, again in the strictest sense of the term, a physical
+impossibility.
+
+To adduce only one other consideration. Apart from all that I have said,
+is it not in itself a strikingly suggestive fact that consciousness
+only, yet always, appears upon the scene when the adjustive actions of
+any animal body rise above the certain level of intricacy to which I
+have alluded? Surely this large and general fact points with
+irresistible force to the conclusion, that in the performance of these
+more complex adjustments, consciousness--or the power of feeling and the
+power of willing--is of some _use_. Assuredly on the principles of
+evolution, which materialists at all events cannot afford to disregard,
+it would be a wholly anomalous fact that so wide and important a class
+of faculties as those of mind should have become developed in constantly
+ascending degrees throughout the animal kingdom, if they were entirely
+without use to animals. And, be it observed, this consideration holds
+good whatever views we may happen to entertain upon the special theory
+of natural selection. For the consideration stands upon the general fact
+that all the organs and functions of animals are of use to animals: we
+never meet, on any large or general scale, with organs and functions
+which are wholly adventitious. Is it to be supposed that this general
+principle fails just where its presence is most required, and that the
+highest functions of the highest organs of the highest animals stand out
+of analogy with all other functions in being themselves functionless? To
+this question I, for one, can only answer, and answer unequivocally,
+No. As a rational being who waits to take a wider view of the facts than
+that which is open to the one line of research pursued by the
+physiologist, I am forced to conclude that not without a reason does
+mind exist in the frame of things; and that apart from the activity of
+mind, whereby motion is related to that which is not motion, this planet
+could never have held the wonderful being, who in multiplying has
+replenished the earth and subdued it--holding dominion over the fish of
+the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
+moveth.
+
+What, then, shall we say touching this mysterious union of mind and
+motion? Having found it physically impossible that there should be a
+causal connexion proceeding from motion to mind, shall we try to reverse
+the terms, and suppose a causal connexion proceeding from mind to
+motion? This is the oldest and still the most popular theory--the theory
+of spiritualism. And, no doubt, in one important respect it is less
+unphilosophical than the opposite theory of materialism. For
+spiritualism supposes the causation to proceed from that which is the
+source of our idea of causality--the mind: not from that into which this
+idea has been read--the brain. Therefore, if causation were to be
+accepted as a possibility either way, it would be less unreasonable to
+suppose mental changes the causes of material changes than _vice vers�_;
+for we should then at least be starting from the basis of immediate
+knowledge, instead of from the reflection of that knowledge in what we
+call the external world. Seeing that the external world is known to us
+only as motion, it is logically impossible for the mind to infer its own
+causation from the external world; for this would be to infer that it is
+an effect of motion, which would be the same as saying that it is an
+effect of its own knowledge; and this would be absurd. But, on the other
+hand, it is not thus logically impossible for the mind to infer that it
+may be the cause of some of its own knowledge, or, in other words, that
+it may have in some measure the power of producing what it knows as
+motion. And when the mind does infer this, no logic on earth is able to
+touch the inference; the position of pure idealism is beyond the reach
+of argument. Nevertheless, it is opposed to the whole momentum of
+science. For if mind is supposed, on no matter how small a scale, to be
+a cause of motion, the fundamental axiom of science is impugned. This
+fundamental axiom is that energy can neither be created nor
+destroyed--that just as motion can produce nothing but motion, so,
+conversely, motion can be produced by nothing but motion. Regarded,
+therefore, from the stand-point of physical science, the theory of
+spiritualism is in precisely the same case as the theory of materialism:
+that is to say, if the supposed causation takes place, it can only be
+supposed to do so by way of miracle.
+
+And this is a conclusion which the more clear-sighted of the idealists
+have expressly recognized. That subtle and most entertaining thinker,
+for example, the late Professor Green of Oxford, has said that the
+self-conscious volition of man 'does not consist in a series of natural
+events, ... is not natural in the ordinary sense of that term; not
+natural at any rate in any sense in which naturalness would imply its
+determination by antecedent events, or by conditions of which it is not
+itself the source.'
+
+Thus the theory of spiritualism, although not directly refutable by any
+process of logic, is certainly enfeebled by its collision with the
+instincts of physical science. In necessarily holding the facts of
+consciousness and volition super-natural, extra-natural, or non-natural,
+the theory is opposed to the principle of continuity.
+
+Spiritualism being thus unsatisfactory, and materialism impossible, is
+there yet any third hypothesis in which we may hope to find intellectual
+rest? In my opinion there is. If we unite in a higher synthesis the
+elements both of spiritualism and of materialism, we obtain a product
+which satisfies every fact of feeling on the one hand, and of
+observation on the other. The manner in which this synthesis may be
+effected is perfectly simple. We have only to suppose that the
+antithesis between mind and motion--subject and object--is itself
+phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have only to suppose
+that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of apprehension; and,
+therefore, that any change taking place in the mind, and any
+corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not two
+changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a musical
+sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.
+Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of
+changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in
+an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity
+in consciousness is created only by the difference in our modes of
+perceiving the same event--whether we see or whether we hear the
+vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of
+nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same
+event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of
+perceiving it.
+
+The great advantage of this theory is that it supposes only one stream
+of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously
+concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and
+contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.
+Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;
+mind-changes nothing but mind-changes: both producing both
+simultaneously, neither could be what it is without the other, because
+without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.
+Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that
+consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind changes
+of brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very causation of
+these changes that they should have a mental side. The use of mind to
+animals is thus rendered apparent; for intelligent volition is thus
+shown to be a true cause of adjustive movement, in that the cerebration
+which it involves could not otherwise be possible: the causation would
+not otherwise be complete.
+
+A simple illustration may serve at once to render this doctrine more
+easily intelligible, and to show that, if accepted, the doctrine, as it
+appears to me, terminates the otherwise interminable controversy on the
+freedom of the will.
+
+In an Edison lamp the light which is emitted from the burner may be said
+indifferently to be caused by the number of vibrations per second going
+on in the carbon, or by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of
+vibration could not take place in the carbon without constituting that
+degree of temperature which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a
+train of thought may be said indifferently to be caused by brain-action
+or by mind-action; for, _ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place
+without the other. Now, when we contemplate the phenomena of volition by
+themselves, it is as though we were contemplating the phenomena of light
+by themselves: volition is produced by mind in brain, just as light is
+produced by temperature in carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of
+light as the cause, say, of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of
+volition as the cause of bodily movement. That particular kind of
+physical activity which takes place in the carbon could not take place
+without the light which causes a photograph; and, similarly, that
+particular kind of physical activity which takes place in the brain
+could not take place without the volition which causes a bodily
+movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of bodily movement as is
+the physical activity of the brain; seeing that, in an absolute sense,
+the cause is one and the same. But if we once clearly perceive that what
+in a relative sense we know as volition is, in a similar sense, the
+cause of bodily movement, we terminate the question touching the freedom
+of the will. For this question in its last resort--and apart from the
+ambiguity which has been thrown around it by some of our
+metaphysicians--is merely the question whether the will is to be
+regarded as a cause of Nature. And the theory which we have now before
+us sanctions the doctrine that it may be so regarded, if only we
+remember that its causal activity depends upon its identity with the
+obverse aspect known as cerebration, without which identity in apparent
+duality neither volition nor cerebration could be the cause which in
+fact they are. It thus becomes a mere matter of phraseology whether we
+speak of the will determining, or being determined by, changes going on
+in the external world; just as it is but a matter of phraseology whether
+we speak of temperature determining, or being determined by, molecular
+vibration. All the requirements alike of the free-will and of the
+bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a synthesis which comprises
+them both. On the one hand, it would be as impossible for an
+_un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform the adjustments of
+a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp to give out light
+and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric current. On the
+other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to originate bodily
+movement without the occurrence of a strictly physical process of
+cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison lamp which
+had been deprived of its carbon-burner.
+
+It may be said of this theory that it is highly speculative, not
+verifiable by any possible experiment, and therefore at best is but a
+mere guess. All which is, no doubt, perfectly true; but, on the other
+hand, we must remember that this theory comes to us as the only one
+which is logically possible, and at the same time competent to satisfy
+the facts alike of the outer and of the inner world. It is a speculation
+in the sense of not being verifiable by experiment; but it has much more
+value than ordinarily attaches to an unverifiable speculation, in that
+there is really no alternative hypothesis to be considered: if we choose
+to call it a guess, we must at the same time remember it is a guess
+where it does not appear that any other is open. Once more to quote
+Hobbes, who, as we have seen, was himself a remarkable instance of what
+he here says: 'The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the
+best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he
+guesses at.' In this case, therefore, the best prophet is not the
+physiologist, whose guess ends in materialism; nor the purely mental
+philosopher, whose guess ends in spiritualism; but rather the man who,
+being 'versed and studied' in all the facts appertaining to both sides
+of the matter, ends in the only alternative guess which remains open.
+And if that most troublesome individual, the 'plain man' of Locke,
+should say it seems at least opposed to common sense to suppose that
+there is anything in a burning candle or a rolling billiard-ball
+substantially the same as mind, the answer is that if he could look into
+my brain at this moment he would see nothing there but motion of
+molecules, or motion of masses; and apart from the accident of my being
+able to tell him so, his 'common sense' could never have divined that
+these motions in my brain are concerned in the genesis of my spoken
+thoughts.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+It is obvious that from this hypothesis as to the substantial identity
+of mind and motion, two important questions arise; and I feel that some
+reference to these questions is in present circumstances forced upon me,
+because they have both been considered in precisely the same connexion
+by one of the most powerful intellects that was ever sent out into the
+world by this University. I mean the late Professor Clifford. As my
+intimate and valued friend, I desire to mention his name in this place
+with all the affection, as well as with all the admiration, to which I
+well know it is so fully entitled; and if I appear to mention him only
+in order to disagree with him, this is only because I know equally well
+that in his large and magnanimous thought differences of philosophical
+opinion were never felt to weaken the bonds of friendship.
+
+In his well-known lecture on Body and Mind, Professor Clifford adopted
+the hypothesis of identity which we are now considering, and from it was
+led to the conclusion that if in the case of cerebral processes motion
+is one with mind, the same must be true of motion wherever it occurs;
+or, as he expressed it subsequently, the whole universe must be made of
+mind-stuff. But in his view, although matter in motion presents what may
+be termed the raw material of mind, it is only in the highly elaborated
+constitution of the human brain that this raw material is sufficiently
+wrought up to yield a self-conscious personality. Hence the dissolution
+of a human brain implies the dissolution of a human mind; and hence also
+the universe, although entirely composed of mind-stuff, is itself
+mindless. Now, all I have to say about these two deductions is
+this--they do not necessarily follow from the theory which is before us.
+In holding that the mind of man perishes with his body, and that above
+the mind of man there is no other, Clifford may have been right, or may
+have been wrong. I am not here to discuss at length any questions of
+such supreme importance. But I feel that I am here to insist upon the
+one point which is immediately connected with my subject; and this is,
+that whether or not Clifford was right in his conclusions, these
+conclusions certainly did not follow by way of any logical sequence from
+his premises. Because within the limits of human experience mind is only
+known as associated with brain, it clearly does not follow that mind
+cannot exist in any other mode. It does not even follow that any
+probability upon this matter can be thus established. The basis of
+analogy on which Clifford sought to rear an inference of cosmical
+extent, was restricted to the one instance of mind as known upon one
+planet; and, therefore, it is hard to imagine a more precarious use of
+that precarious method which is called by logicians simple enumeration.
+Indeed, even for what it is worth, the inference may be pointed with
+quite as much effect in precisely the opposite direction. For we have
+seen how little it is that we understand of the one mode in which we
+certainly know that mind does exist; and if from this little we feel
+impelled to conclude that there is a mode of mind which is not
+restricted to brain, but co-extensive with motion, is consubstantial and
+co-eternal with all that was, and is, and is to come; have we not at
+least a suggestion, that high as the heavens are above the earth, so
+high above our thoughts may be the thoughts of such a mind as this? I
+offer no opinion upon the question whether the general order of Nature
+does not require some one explanatory cause; nor upon the question
+whether the mind of man itself does not point to something kindred in
+the self-existing origin of things. I am not concerned to argue any
+point upon which I feel that opinions may legitimately differ. I am only
+concerned to show that, in so far as any deductions can be drawn from
+the theory which is before us, they make at least as much against as in
+favour of the cosmical conclusions arrived at by Clifford.
+
+On February 17, in the year 1600, when the streets of Rome were thronged
+with pilgrims from all the quarters of Christendom, while no less than
+fifty cardinals were congregated for the Jubilee; into the densely
+crowded Campo di Fiori a man was led to the stake, where, 'silent and
+self-sustained,' before the eyes of all nations, he perished in the
+flames. That death was the death of a martyr: it was met voluntarily in
+attestation of truth. But most noble of all the noble army to which he
+belonged, the name of that man is written large in history, as the name
+of one who had fortitude to die, not in the cause of religious belief,
+but in that of scientific conviction. For why did Bruno suffer? He
+suffered, as we all know, because he refused to recant his persuasion of
+the truth of the Copernican theory. Why, then, do I adduce the name of
+Bruno at the close of this lecture? I do so because, as far as I have
+been able to ascertain, he was the first clearly to enunciate the
+monistic theory of things to which the consideration of my subject has
+conducted us. This theory--or that as to the substantial identity of
+mind and motion--was afterwards espoused, in different guises, by sundry
+other writers; but to Bruno belongs the merit of its original
+publication, and it was partly for his adherence to this publication
+that he died. To this day Bruno is ordinarily termed a pantheist, and
+his theory, which in the light of much fuller knowledge I am advocating,
+Pantheism. I do not care to consider a difference of terms, where the
+only distinction resides in so unintelligible an idea as that of the
+creation of substance. It is more to the purpose to observe that in the
+mind of its first originator--and this a mind which was sufficiently
+clear in its thought to die for its perception of astronomical
+truth--the theory of Pantheism was but a sublime extension of the then
+contracted views of Theism. And I think that we of to-day, when we look
+to the teaching of this martyr of science, will find that in his theory
+alone do we meet with what I may term a philosophically adequate
+conception of Deity. If the advance of natural science is now steadily
+leading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must
+we not see how the independent conclusion of mental science is thus
+independently confirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being
+without knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come
+when we may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study
+of Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of
+possible truths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without
+mind, no being without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that
+universal being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that
+most stupendous of questions--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If
+there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not
+rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the
+medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?
+
+This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we are
+careful to set the logical conditions with complete impartiality. But
+the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as science is concerned,
+it is here possible to point any inference at all: the whole orbit of
+human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a parallax for measurements
+so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the voice of science must
+thus of necessity speak the language of agnosticism, at least let us see
+to it that the language is pure; let us not tolerate any barbarisms
+introduced from the side of aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this
+new grammar of thought does not admit of any constructions radically
+opposed to more venerable ways of thinking; even if we do not find that
+the often-quoted words of its earliest formulator apply with special
+force to its latest dialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology
+and a little knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper
+knowledge of both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their
+relations to one another, will lead men back to some form of religion,
+which, if it be more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier
+days.
+
+    'It is a beauteous evening, calm and free;
+    The holy time is quiet as a nun,
+    Breathless with adoration; the broad sun
+    Is sinking down in its tranquillity;
+    The gentleness of heaven is on the sea:
+    Listen! the mighty being is awake,
+    And doth with his eternal motion make
+    A sound like thunder, everlastingly.'
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: _Leviathan_, pt. i. chaps, i. and vi.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Leviathan_, Introduction.]
+
+
+
+
+MONISM
+
+
+     'Das Ich ist nicht aus Leib und Seele zusammengesetzt, sondern es
+     ist eine bestimmte Entwicklungsstufe des Wesens, das von
+     verschiedenem Standpunkt betrachtet in k�rperliches und geistiges
+     Dasein auseinanderf�llt.'--Wundt, _Vorlesungen �ber die
+     Menschen-und Thierseele_, i. 293.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+In no respect has the progress of physical science exercised a more
+profound influence upon philosophical thought than it has by proving an
+apparently quantitative relation between material changes and mental
+changes. It has always been known that there is qualitative relation.
+Even long before mankind suspected that the brain was in any way
+connected with thought, it was well understood that alcohol and other
+poisons exercised their sundry influences on the mind in virtue of
+influences which they exercised upon the body; and even the lowest
+savages must always have been aware that a blow on the head is followed
+by insensibility. But it was not until the rise of Physiology that this
+qualitative relation between corporeal changes and mental changes was
+gradually found to be a quantitative one--or that every particular
+change of mind had an exact and invariable counterpart in some
+particular change of body. It is needless for me to detail the
+successive steps in the long course of physiological discovery whereby
+this great fact has been established; it is enough to say that the fact
+_is_ established to the satisfaction of every physiologist.
+
+Now, when once the relation between material changes and mental changes
+has been thus recognized as quantitative--or, which is the same thing,
+when once the association has been recognized as both invariable and
+exact--there arises the question as to how this relation is to be
+explained. Formally considered--or considered as a matter of logical
+statement irrespective of the relative probabilities which they may
+present, either to the minds of different individuals or to the general
+intelligence of the race--it appears to me that the possible hypotheses
+are here seven in number.
+
+     I. The mental changes may cause the material changes.
+
+     II. The material changes may cause the mental changes.
+
+     III. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+     may be only a phenomenal association--the two apparently diverse
+     classes of phenomena being really one and the same.
+
+     IV. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+     may be due to a harmony pre-established by a superior mind.
+
+     V. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+     may always be due to chance.
+
+     VI. There may be no causation either way, because the material
+     order may not have any real existence at all, being merely an ideal
+     creation of the mental order.
+
+     VII. Whether or not there be any causation either way, the
+     association may be one which it is necessarily beyond the power of
+     the human mind to explain.
+
+So far as I can see, this list of possible answers to the question
+before us is exhaustive. I will next show why, in my opinion, the last
+four of them may be excluded _in limine_.
+
+The suggestion of pre-established harmony (IV) merely postpones the
+question: it _assumes_ a higher _mind_ as adjusting correspondencies
+between known minds and animal bodies with respect to the activities of
+each; and, therefore, it either leaves untouched the ultimate question
+concerning the relation of mind (as such) to matter, or else it answers
+this question in terms of spiritualism (I).
+
+The suggestion of chance (V) is effectually excluded by the doctrine of
+chances: even in any one individual mind, the association between mental
+changes and material changes is much too intimate, constant, and
+detailed to admit of any one reasonably supposing that it can be due
+only to chance.
+
+The suggestion of pure idealism (VI) ultimately implies that the
+thinking Ego is itself the sole existence--a position which cannot,
+indeed, be turned by any assault of logic; but one which is
+nevertheless too obviously opposed to common sense to admit of any
+serious defence; its immunity from direct attack arises only from the
+gratuitous nature of its challenge to prove a negative (namely, that the
+thinking Ego is _not_ the sole existence), and this a negative which is
+necessarily beyond the region of proof.
+
+Lastly, the suggestion that the problem is necessarily insoluble (VII)
+does not deserve to be regarded as an hypothesis at all; for to suppose
+that the problem is necessarily insoluble is merely to exclude the
+supposition of there being any hypothesis available.
+
+In view of these several considerations, it appears to me that, although
+in a formal sense we may say there are altogether seven possible answers
+to the question before us, in reality, or for the purposes of practical
+discussion, there are nowadays but three--namely those which head the
+above list, and which I will now proceed to consider.
+
+I have named these three hypotheses in the order of their appearance
+during the history of philosophical thought. The earliest is the
+spiritualistic. As far back as we can trace the conceptions of primitive
+man, we meet with an unquestioning belief that it is his spirit which
+_animates_ his body; and, starting from this belief as explanatory of
+the movements of his own body, he readily attributes movements elsewhere
+to analogous agencies--the theory of _animism_ in Nature thus becoming
+the universal theory in all early stages of culture. It also appears to
+be the theory most natural to our own children during the early years of
+their dawning intelligence, and would doubtless continue through life in
+the case of every individual human being, were he not subsequently
+instructed in the reasons which have led to its rejection by many other
+members of his race. These reasons, as already observed, have been
+furnished in their entirety only within comparatively recent times; not
+until Physiology was able to prove how intimate is the association
+between cerebral processes and mental processes did it become possible
+for materialism to turn the tables upon spiritualism, by simply
+inverting the hypothesis. Lastly, although the theory of Monism (III)
+may be traced back at least as far as the pantheistic thought of
+Buddhism, it there had reference to theology as distinguished from
+psychology. And even as presented in the writings of Bruno, Spinoza, and
+other so-called monists prior to the present century, the hypothesis
+necessarily lacked completeness on account of the absence of knowledge
+afterwards supplied by physiology. For Monism, in the sense of this term
+as I shall use it, may be metaphorically regarded as the child of the
+two pre-existing theories, Spiritualism and Materialism. The birth of
+this child was necessarily impossible before both its parents had
+reached mature age. On the one hand it was necessary that the theory of
+Spiritualism should have outgrown its infancy as Animism, its childhood
+as Polytheism, before it entered upon its youth as Monotheism--or before
+it was able to supply material for the conception of Monism as a theory
+of cosmical extent. On the other hand, Materialism required to grow into
+the fullness of manhood, under the nursing influence of Science, before
+it was possible to engender this new-born offspring; for this offspring
+is new-born. The theory of Monism, as we are about to consider it, is a
+creature of our own generation; and it is only as such that I desire to
+call attention to the child. In order, however, to do this, I must
+follow the example of biographers in general, and begin by giving a
+brief sketch of both the parents.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+SPIRITUALISM.
+
+
+In proceeding to consider the opposite theories of Spiritualism and
+Materialism, it is before all else desirable to be perfectly clear upon
+the point of theory whereby they are essentially distinguished. This
+point is that which is raised by the question whether mind is the cause
+or the effect of motion. Both theories are dualistic, and therefore
+agree in holding that there is causation as between mind and motion:
+they differ only in their teaching as to the direction in which the
+causation proceeds. Of course, out of this fundamental difference there
+arise many secondary differences. The most important of these secondary
+differences has reference to the nature of the eternal or self-existing
+substance. Both theories agree that there is such a substance; but on
+the question whether this substance be mental or material, the two
+theories give contradictory answers, and logically so. For, if mind as
+we directly know it (namely, in ourselves) is taken to be a cause of
+motion, within our experience mind is accredited with priority; and
+hence the inference that elsewhere, or universally, mind is prior to
+motion. Furthermore, as motion cannot take place without something which
+moves, this something is likewise supposed to have been the result of
+mind: hence the doctrine of the creation by mind both of matter and of
+energy. On the other hand, the theory of materialism, by refusing to
+assign priority to mind as known directly in ourselves, naturally
+concludes that mind is elsewhere, or universally, the result of matter
+in motion--in other words, that matter in motion is the eternal or
+self-existing substance, and, as such, the cause of mind wherever mind
+occurs.
+
+I may observe, in passing, that although this cosmical deduction from
+the theory of materialism is, as I have said, natural, it is not (as is
+the case with the corresponding deduction from the theory of
+spiritualism) inevitable. For it is logically possible that even though
+all known minds be the results of matter in motion, matter in motion may
+nevertheless itself be the result of an unknown mind. This, indeed, is
+the position virtually adopted by Locke in his celebrated controversy
+with the Bishop of Worcester. Having been taken to task by this divine
+for the materialistic tendency of his writings, Locke defends himself by
+denying the necessary character of the deduction which we are now
+considering. For example, he insists, 'I see no contradiction in it that
+the first eternal thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain
+systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some
+degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have
+proved (lib. IV, ch. 10 and 14 &c.), it is no less than a contradiction
+to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense
+and thought) should be that eternal first thinking being.' Under this
+view, it will be observed, mind is supposed to have the ultimate
+priority, and thus to have been the original or creating cause of matter
+in motion, which, in turn, becomes the cause (or, at least, the
+conditional condition) of mind of a lower order. This view, however,
+need not detain us, inasmuch as it can only be held by those who, on
+grounds independent of philosophical thinking, already believe in mind
+as the First Cause or Eternal Being: this belief granted, there is, of
+course, an end of any question as between Spiritualism and Materialism.
+I have, therefore, only mentioned this possible phase of spiritualistic
+theory, in order to show that the theory of Materialism as applied to a
+human being does not _necessarily_ involve an extension of that theory
+to the cosmos. But I hold this distinction as of no practical value: it
+merely indicates a logical possibility which no one would be likely to
+entertain except on grounds independent of those upon which the
+philosophical dispute between Spiritualism and Materialism must be
+confined.
+
+Of more practical importance is the remark already made, namely, that
+the fundamental or diagnostic distinction between these two species of
+theory consists _only_ in the views which they severally take on the
+question of causality. This remark is of practical importance, because
+in the debate between spiritualists and materialists it is often lost
+sight of: nay, in some cases, it is even expressly ignored. Obviously,
+when it is either intentionally or unintentionally disregarded, the
+debate ceases to be directed to the question under discussion, and may
+then wander aimlessly over the whole field of collateral speculation.
+Throughout the present essay, therefore, the discussion will be
+restricted to the only topic which we have to discuss--namely, whether
+mind is the cause of motion, motion the cause of mind, or neither the
+cause of the other.
+
+The view to be first considered--namely, that mind is the cause of
+motion--obviously has one great advantage over the opposite view: it
+supposes the causality to proceed from that which is the source of our
+idea of causality (the mind); not from that into which this idea has
+been read by the mind. Hence, it is so far less difficult to imagine
+that mental changes are the cause of bodily changes than _vice versa_;
+for upon this hypothesis we are starting at least from the substance of
+immediate knowledge, and not from the reflection of that knowledge in
+what we call the external world.
+
+On the other hand, the theory of Spiritualism labours under certain
+speculative difficulties which appear to me overwhelming. The most
+formidable of these difficulties arises from the inevitable collision of
+the theory with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy.
+Whether or not we adopt the view that all causation of a physical kind
+is ultimately an expression of the fact that matter and energy are
+indestructible[3], it is equally certain that this indestructibility is
+a necessary condition to the occurrence of causation as natural.
+Therefore, if the mind of man is capable of breaking in as an
+independent cause upon the otherwise uniform system of natural
+causation, the only way in which it could do so would be by either
+destroying or creating certain _quanta_ of either matter or energy or
+both. But to suppose the mind capable of doing any of these things would
+be to suppose that the mind is a cause in some other sense than a
+physical or a natural cause; it would be to suppose that the mind is a
+super-natural cause, or, more plainly, that all mental activity, so far
+as it is an efficient cause of bodily movement, is of the nature of a
+miracle.
+
+This conclusion, which appears to me unavoidably implicated in the
+spiritualistic hypothesis, is not merely improbable _per se_, but admits
+of being shown virtually impossible if we proceed to consider the
+consequences to which it necessarily leads. A sportsman, for example,
+pulls the trigger of a gun, thereby initiating a long train of physical
+causes, which we may take up at the point where the powder is
+discharged, the shot propelled, and the bird dropped. Here the man's
+volition is supposed to have broken in upon the otherwise continuous
+stream of physical causes--first by modifying the molecular movements of
+his brain, so as to produce the particular co-ordination of
+neuro-muscular movement required to take accurate aim and to fire at the
+right moment; next by converting a quantity of gunpowder into gas,
+propelling a quantity of lead through the air; and finally, by killing a
+bird. Now, without tracing the matter further than this, let us consider
+how enormous a change the will of the man has introduced, even by so
+trivial an exercise of its activity. No doubt the first change in the
+material world was exceedingly slight: the molecular movement in the
+cortex of his brain was probably not more than might be dynamically
+represented by some small fraction of a foot-pound. But so intricate is
+the _nexus_ of physical causality throughout the whole domain of Nature,
+that the intervention of even so minute a disturbance _ab extra_ is
+obviously bound to continue to assert an influence of ever-widening
+extent as well as of everlasting duration. The heat generated by the
+explosion of the powder, the changed disposition of the shot, the death
+of the bird--leading to innumerable physical changes as to stoppage of
+many mechanical processes previously going on in the bird's body, loss
+of animal heat, &c., and also to innumerable vital changes, leading to
+a stoppage of all the mechanical changes which the bird would have
+helped to condition had it lived to die some other death, to propagate
+its kind, and thus indirectly condition an incalculable number of future
+changes that would have been brought about by the ever increasing number
+of its descendants--these and an indefinite number of other physical
+changes must all be held to have followed as a direct consequence of the
+man's volition thus suddenly breaking in as an independent cause upon
+the otherwise uniform course of Nature. Now, I say that, apart from some
+system of pre-established harmony, it appears simply inconceivable that
+the order of Nature could be maintained at all, if it were thus liable
+to be interfered with at any moment in any number of points. And if the
+spiritualist takes refuge in the further hypothesis of a pre-established
+harmony between acts of human (not to add brute) volition and causes of
+a natural kind, we have only to observe that he thus lands himself in a
+speculative position which is practically identical with that occupied
+by the materialist. For the only difference between the two positions
+then is that the necessity which the materialist takes to be imposed on
+human volition by the system of natural causation, is now taken by the
+spiritualist to be equally imposed by a super-natural volition. The
+necessity which binds the human volition must be equally rigid in
+either case; and therefore it can make no practical difference whether
+the source of it be regarded as natural or super-natural, material or
+mental: so that a man be fated to will only in certain ways--and this
+with all the rigour which belongs to causation as physical--it is
+scarcely worth while to dispute whether the predestination is of God or
+of Nature. There can be no question, however, that in this matter the
+possibility which I have supposed to be suggested by the spiritualist is
+more far-fetched than that which obviously lies to the hand of the
+materialist; and, moreover, that it too plainly wears the appearance of
+a desperate device to save a hollow theory.
+
+It remains to add that this great difficulty against the spiritualistic
+theory has been revealed in all its force only during the present
+generation. Since the days of fetishism, indeed, the difficulty has
+always been an increasing one--growing with the growth of the perception
+of uniformity on the one hand, and of mechanical as distinguished from
+volitional agency on the other. But it was not until the correlation of
+all the physical forces had been proved by actual experiment, and the
+scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy became as a
+consequence firmly established, that the difficulty in question assumed
+the importance of a logical barrier to the theory of mental changes
+acting as efficient causes of material changes.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 3: In the opinion of some modern writers the indestructibility
+of matter and the conservation of energy are alone sufficient to explain
+all the facts of natural causation. 'For,' it is urged, 'if in any case
+similar antecedents did not determine similar consequents, on one or
+other of these occasions some _quantum_ of force, or of matter, or of
+both, must have disappeared--or, which is the same thing, the law of
+causation cannot have been constant.' In a future chapter I shall have
+to recur to this view. Meanwhile I have only to observe that whether or
+not the law of causation is nothing more than a re-statement of the fact
+that matter and energy are indestructible, it is equally true that this
+fact is at least a necessary _condition_ to the operation of that law.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+MATERIALISM.
+
+
+This is the theory which presents great fascination to the student of
+physical science. By laborious investigation physiology has established
+the fact beyond the reach of rational dispute, that there is a constant
+relation of concomitancy between cerebral action and thought. Within
+experience mind is found in constant and definite association with that
+highly complex and peculiar disposition of matter called a living brain.
+The size and elaboration of this peculiar structure throughout the
+animal kingdom stand in conspicuous proportion to the degree of
+intelligence displayed; while the impairment of this structure, whether
+by congenital defect, mutilation, anaemia, decay, or appropriate poison,
+entails corresponding impairment of mental processes. Thus much being
+established, no reasonable man can hesitate in believing the relation
+between neurosis and psychosis to be a constant and concomitant
+relation, so that the step between this, and regarding it as a causal
+relation, seems indeed a small one. For, in all matters of physical
+inquiry, whenever we have proved a constant relation of concomitancy in
+a sequence _A B_, we call _A_ the cause of _B_; and, therefore, it has
+been frequently said that the evidence of causation between neurosis and
+psychosis is recognized causation. Lastly, to fortify this hypothesis,
+materialists point to the doctrine of the conservation of energy, which
+is supplied by the science of physics as a sort of buttress in this
+matter to the teachings of physiology. For, as this doctrine compels us
+to believe that the chain of physical causation involved in cerebral
+processes can nowhere be broken or deflected _ab extra_, we are
+compelled to believe that the mental processes, which are correlatively
+associated with these cerebral processes, can nowhere escape from 'the
+charmed circle of the forces,' so that whether we look to the detailed
+teachings of physiology, or to the more general teachings of physics, we
+alike perceive that natural science appears to leave no locus for mind
+other than as a something which is in some way a result of motion.
+
+The position of Materialism being thus at first sight so naturally
+strong, and having been in recent years so fortified by the labours of
+physiology, it is not surprising that in the present generation
+Materialism should be in the ascendant. It is the simple truth, as a
+learned and temperate author, speaking from the side of theology, has
+recently said, that
+
+     'Materialism is a danger to which individuals and societies will
+     always be more or less exposed. The present generation, however,
+     and especially the generation which is growing up, will obviously
+     be very especially exposed to it; as much so, perhaps, as any
+     generation in the history of the world. Within the last thirty
+     years the great wave of spiritualistic or idealistic thought ...
+     has been receding and decreasing; and another, which is in the main
+     driven by materialistic forces, has been gradually rising behind,
+     vast and threatening. It is but its crest that we at present see;
+     it is but a certain vague shaking produced by it that we at present
+     feel; but we shall probably soon enough fail not both to see and
+     feel it fully and distinctly[4].'
+
+Such being the present importance of Materialism, I shall devote the
+present chapter to a consideration of this theory. Each of the points in
+the argument for Materialism which I have mentioned above admits, of
+course, of elaboration; but I think that their enumeration contains all
+that is essential to the theory in question. It now devolves upon us to
+inquire whether this theory is adequate to meet the facts.
+
+And here I may as well at once give it as my own opinion that, of
+however much service the theory of Materialism may be, up to a certain
+point, it can never be accepted by any competent mind as a final
+explanation of the facts with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as
+its use may be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine,
+it is wholly inadequate as a hypothesis in philosophy. That is to say,
+so long as there is a constant relation of concomitancy found by
+experience to obtain between neural processes and mental processes, so
+long no harm can accrue to physical science by assuming, for its own
+purposes, that this relation is a causal one. But as soon as the
+question concerning the validity of this assumption is raised into the
+region of philosophy, it receives the answer that the assumption cannot
+be allowed to pass. For where the question becomes one not as to the
+_fact_ of the association but as to its _nature_, philosophy, which must
+have regard to the facts of mind no less than to those of matter, must
+pronounce that the hypothesis is untenable; for the hypothesis of this
+association being one of causality acting from neurosis to psychosis,
+cannot be accepted without doing violence, not merely to our faculty of
+reason, but to our very idea of causation itself.
+
+A very small amount of thinking is enough to show that what I call my
+knowledge of the external world, is merely a knowledge of my own mental
+modifications. A step further and I find that my idea of causation as a
+principle in the external world is derived from my knowledge of this
+principle in the internal world. For I find that my idea of force and
+energy in the external world is a mere projection of the idea which I
+have of effort within the region of my own consciousness; and therefore
+my only idea of causation is that which is originally derived from the
+experience which I have of this principle as obtaining among my own
+mental modifications.
+
+If once we see plainly that the idea of causation is derived from
+within, and that what we call the evidence of physical causation is
+really the evidence of mental modifications following one another in a
+definite sequence, we shall then clearly see, not merely that we have no
+evidence, but that we _can have_ no evidence of causation as proceeding
+from object to subject. However cogent the evidence may appear at first
+sight to be, it is found to vanish like a cloud as soon as it is exposed
+to the light of adequate contemplation. In the very act of thinking the
+evidence, we are virtually denying its possibility as evidence; for as
+evidence it appeals only to the mind, and since the mind can only know
+its own sequences, the evidence must be presenting to the mind an
+account of its own modifications; from the mere fact, therefore, of its
+being accepted as thinkable, the evidence is proved to be illusory.
+
+To uneducated men it appears an indisputable fact of 'common sense' that
+the colour of a flower exists as perceived in the flower, apart from any
+relation to the percipient mind. A physiologist has gone further into
+the thicket of things, and finds that the way is not so simple as this.
+He regards the quality of colour as necessarily related to the faculty
+of visual perception; does not suppose that the colour exists _as such_
+in the flower, but thinks of the something there as a certain order of
+vibrations which, when brought into relation with consciousness through
+the medium of certain nerves, gives rise to the perception experienced;
+and in order to account for the translation into visual feeling of an
+event so unlike that feeling as is the process taking place in the
+flower, physiologists have recourse to an elaborate theory, such as that
+of Helmholtz or Hering. In other words, physiologists here fully
+recognize that colour, or any other thing perceived, only exists _as
+perceived_ in virtue of a subjective element blending with an objective;
+the thing _as perceived_ is recognized as having no existence apart from
+its relation to a percipient mind. Now, although physiologists are at
+one with the philosophers thus far, it is to be feared that very
+frequently they are in the same position as the above-mentioned
+'uneducated men,' when it becomes needful to press still further into
+the thicket. For after having distinguished the necessity of recognizing
+a mind-element in any possible theory of perception, they forthwith
+proceed to disregard this element when passing from the ground of
+perception to that of thought. Although the ideas of matter, motion,
+causation, and so on, are themselves as much the offspring of a thinking
+mind, with its environment, as the perception of colour is a conceiving
+of the percipient mind, with _its_ environment, these ideas are
+inconsistently supposed to stand for equivalent realities of the
+external world--to truly represent things that are virtually independent
+of any necessary relation to mind. Or, as the case has recently been
+well put by Principal Caird:
+
+     'You cannot get mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the
+     very attempt to do so you have already begun with mind. The
+     easiest step of any such inquiry involves categories of thought,
+     and it is in terms of thought that the very problem you are
+     investigating can be so much as stated. You cannot start in your
+     investigations with a bare, self-identical, objective fact,
+     stripped of every ideal element or contribution from thought. The
+     least and lowest part of outward observation is not an independent
+     entity--fact _minus_ mind, and out of which mind may, somewhere or
+     other, be seen to emerge; but it is fact or object as it appears to
+     an observing mind, in the medium of thought, having mind or thought
+     as an inseparable factor of it. Whether there be such a thing as an
+     absolute world outside of thought, whether there be such things as
+     matter and material atoms existing in themselves before any mind
+     begins to perceive or think about them, is not the question before
+     us. If it were possible to conceive of such atoms, at any rate you,
+     before you begin to make anything of them, must think them; and you
+     can never, by thinking about atoms, prove that there is no such
+     thing as thought other than as an ultimate product of atoms. Before
+     you could reach thought or mind as a last result you must needs
+     eliminate from it the data of the problem with which you start, and
+     that you can never do, any more than you can stand on your own
+     shoulders or outstrip your own shadow.... In one word, to
+     constitute the reality of the outward world--to make possible the
+     minimum of knowledge, nay, the very existence for us of molecules
+     and atoms--you must needs presuppose that thought or thinking self,
+     which some would persuade us is to be educed or evolved from
+     them.... To make thought a function of matter is thus, simply, to
+     make thought a function of itself[5].'
+
+From this reasoning there can be no escape; and it is more rational for
+a man to believe that colour exists as such in a flower than, after
+having plainly seen that such cannot be the case, forthwith to
+disregard the teaching of this analogy, and to imagine that any apparent
+evidence of mind as a result of matter or motion can possibly be
+entertained as real evidence.
+
+Remembering, then, that from the nature of this particular case it is as
+impossible for mind to prove its own causation as it is for water to
+rise above its source, it may still be well, for the sake of further
+argument, to sink this general consideration, and to regard such
+spurious evidence of causation as is presented by Materialism, without
+prejudice arising from its being _prim� facie_ inadmissible.
+
+Materialists, as already observed, are fond of saying that the evidence
+of causation from neurosis to psychosis is as good as such evidence can
+be proved to be in any other case. Now, quite apart from the general
+considerations just adduced to show that from the peculiar nature of
+this case there can here be no such evidence at all--quite apart from
+this, and treating the problem on the lower ground of the supposed
+analogy, it may be clearly shown that the statement is untrue. For a
+little thought will show that in point of fact the only resemblance
+between this supposed case of causation and all other cases of
+recognized causation, consists in the invariability of the correlation
+between cerebral processes and mental processes; in all other points the
+analogy fails. For in all cases of recognized causation there is a
+perceived _connexion_ between the cause and the effect; the antecedents
+are physical, and the consequents are physical. But in the case before
+us there is no perceived, or even conceivable, connexion between the
+cause and the effect; for the causes are supposed to be physical and the
+effects mental. And the antithesis thus posited is alone sufficient to
+separate _toto coelo_ the case of causation supposed from that of all
+cases of causation recognized. From the singularly clear and
+well-balanced statement of this subject given by Professor Allman in his
+Presidential Address before the British Association, I may here fitly
+quote the following:--
+
+     'If we could see any analogy between thought and any one of the
+     admitted phenomena of matter, we should be justified in the first
+     of these conclusions (i. e. that of Materialism) as the simplest,
+     and as affording a hypothesis most in accordance with the
+     comprehensiveness of natural laws; but between thought and the
+     physical phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but no
+     conceivable analogy; and the obvious and continuous path which we
+     have hitherto followed up in our reasonings from the phenomena of
+     lifeless matter through those of living matter here comes suddenly
+     to an end. The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep
+     and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by
+     which, as by a bridge, we may span it over[6].'
+
+And, not unduly to multiply quotations, I shall only adduce one more
+from another of the few eminent men of science who have seen their way
+clearly in this matter, and have expressed what they have seen in
+language as clear as their vision. Professor Tyndall writes:--
+
+     'The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding
+     facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite
+     thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur
+     simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor
+     apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to
+     pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one phenomenon to the
+     other. They appear together but we do not know why. Were our minds
+     and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable
+     us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable
+     of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their
+     electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately
+     acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we
+     should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem. How are
+     these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness?
+     The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain
+     intellectually impassable[7].'
+
+Next, in all cases of recognized causation there is a perceived
+_equivalency_ between cause and effect, such equivalency belonging to
+the very essence of that in which we conceive causation to consist. But
+as between matter and motion on the one side, and feeling and thought on
+the other, there can be no such equivalency conceivable. That no such
+equivalency is conceivable may be rendered apparent on grounds of
+Materialism itself. For Materialism is bound to accept the fundamental
+doctrine of modern physics--that, viz. as to the conservation of
+energy--and therefore it becomes evident that unless we assimilate
+thought with energy, there is no possibility of a causal relation, or a
+relation of equivalency, as obtaining between the one and the other.
+For however little we may know about brain-dynamics, materialists, at
+least, must take it for granted that in every process of cerebration the
+matter and force concerned are indestructible quantities, and therefore
+that all their possible equations are fully satisfied, could we but
+follow them out. Howsoever complex we may suppose the flux and reflux of
+forces to be within the structure of a living brain, it is no more
+possible for any one of the forces concerned to escape from brain to
+mind, than it would be for such an escape to occur in a steam-engine or
+a watch; the doctrine of the conservation of energy forms an insuperable
+bar to the supposition that any equation in the region of physics can be
+left unsatisfied, in order to pass over and satisfy some other equation
+in the region of psychics.
+
+Of course in saying this I am aware that some of the more clear-sighted
+of the materialists have plainly perceived this difficulty in all its
+magnitude, and so have felt that unless it can be met, any theory of
+Materialism must necessarily contain a radical contradiction of
+principles. Some few materialists have therefore sought to meet the
+difficulty in the only way it can be met, viz. by boldly asserting the
+possibility of thought and energy being transmutable. On this view
+thought becomes a mode of motion, and takes its rank among the forces as
+identical in nature with heat, light, electricity, and the rest. But
+this view is also inherently impossible. For suppose, as a matter of
+argument, that physiologists should discover a mechanical equivalent of
+thought, so that we might estimate the value of a calculation in thermal
+units, or the 'labour of love' in foot-pounds: still we should not be
+out of our difficulties; we should only have to cut a twist of flax to
+find a lock of iron. For by thus assimilating thought with energy, we
+should in no wise have explained the fundamental antithesis between
+subject and object. The fact would remain, if possible, more
+unaccountable than ever, that mind should present absolutely no point of
+real analogy with motion. Involved with the essential idea of motion is
+the idea of extension; suppress the latter and the former must
+necessarily vanish, for motion only means transition in space of
+something itself extended. But thought, as far as we can possibly know
+it, is known and distinguished by the very peculiarity of not having
+extension. Therefore, even if we were to find a mechanical equivalent of
+thought, thought would still not be proved a mode of motion. On the
+contrary, what would be proved would be that, in becoming transformed
+into thought, energy had ceased to be energy; in passing out of its
+relation to space it would cease to exist as energy, and if it again
+passed into that relation it would only be by starting _de novo_ on a
+new course of history. Therefore the proof that thought has a mechanical
+equivalent would simply amount to the proof, not that thought _is_
+energy, but that thought _destroys_ energy. And if Materialism were to
+prove this, Materialism would commit suicide. For if once it were
+proved that the relation of energy to thought is such that thought is
+able to absorb or temporarily to annihilate energy, the whole argument
+of Materialism would be inverted, and whatever evidence there is of
+causation as between mind and matter would become available in all its
+force on the side of Spiritualism. This seems plain, for if it even were
+conceivable--which most distinctly it is not--that a motor could ever
+become a motive, and so pass from the sphere of dynamics into the sphere
+of consciousness, the fact would go to prove, not that the motor was the
+cause of the motive, but rather that the motive was the cause of
+destroying the motor; so that at that point the otherwise unbroken chain
+of physical sequences was interrupted by the motive striking in upon it,
+and in virtue of the mysterious power supposed to have been proved by
+physiology, cancelling the motor, so allowing the nerve-centre to act as
+determined by the motive.
+
+Of course I wish it to be understood that I believe we are here dealing
+with what I may call, in perhaps suitably contradictory terms,
+inconceivable conceptions. But let it be remembered that I am not
+responsible for this ambiguity; I am only showing what must be the
+necessary outcome of analysis if we begin by endeavouring phenomenally
+to unite the most antithetical of elements--mind and motion.
+Materialism, at least, will not be the gainer should it ever be proved
+that in the complex operations of the brain a unique exception occurs
+to the otherwise universal law of the conservation of energy in space.
+
+We may, therefore, quit the suggestion that the difficulty experienced
+by Materialism of showing an equivalency between neurosis and psychosis
+can ever be met by assuming that some day mental processes may admit of
+being expressed in terms of physical. But before leaving this difficulty
+with regard to equivalency, I may mention one other point that seems to
+me of importance in connexion with it. I have already said that if we
+suppose causation to proceed from brain to mind, we must suppose this
+essential requirement of equivalency between the cerebral causes and the
+mental effects to be satisfied somewhere.
+
+But where are we to say that it is satisfied? Even if we suppose that
+thought has a mechanical equivalent, and that causation proceeds in the
+direction from energy to thought, still, when we have regard to the
+supposed effects, we find that even yet they bear no kind of equivalency
+to their supposed causes. The brain of a Shakespeare probably did not,
+as a system, exhibit so much energy as does the brain of an elephant;
+and the cerebral operations of a Darwin may not have had a very
+perceptibly larger mechanical equivalent than those of a banker's clerk.
+Yet in the world of thought the difference between our estimate of the
+results, or 'work done,' in these cases is such as to drive all ideas of
+equivalency to the winds. Doubtless, a materialist will answer that it
+is not fair to take our estimate of 'work done' in the world of mind as
+the real equivalent of the energy supposed to have passed over from the
+world of motion, seeing that our estimate is based, not on the
+quantitative amount of thought produced, but rather on its qualitative
+character with reference to the social requirements of the race. But to
+this it is enough to answer that we have no means of gauging the
+quantity of thought produced other than by having regard to _its_
+effects in the world of mind, and this we cannot do except by having
+regard to its qualitative character. Many a man, for instance, must have
+consumed more than a thousand times the brain-substance and brain-energy
+that Shelley expended over his 'Ode to a Skylark,' and yet as a result
+have produced an utterly worthless poem. Now, in what way are we to
+estimate the 'work done' in two such cases, except by looking to the
+relative effects produced in the only region where they are produced,
+viz. in the region of mind? Yet, when we do so estimate them, what
+becomes of the evidence of equivalency between the physical causes and
+the psychical effects?
+
+Now if thus, whether or not we try to form an estimate, it is impossible
+to show any semblance of equivalency between the supposed causes and the
+alleged effects, how can any one be found to say that the evidence of
+causation is here as valid as it is in any other case? The truth rather
+is that the alleged effects stand out of every relation to the supposed
+causes, with the exception only of being associated in time.
+
+There still remains one other enormous difficulty in the way of the
+theory of Materialism; it necessarily embodies the theory of _conscious
+automatism_, and is therefore called upon to explain why consciousness
+and thought have ever appeared upon the scene of things at all. That
+this is the necessary position of Materialism is easily proved as
+follows. We have already seen that Materialism would commit suicide by
+supposing that energy could be transmuted into thought, for this would
+amount to nothing short of supposing the destruction of energy as such;
+and to suppose energy thus destructible would be to open wide the door
+of spiritualism. Materialism, therefore, is logically bound to argue in
+this way: We cannot conceive of a conscious idea, or mental change, as
+in any way affecting the course of a cerebral reflex, or material
+change; while, on the other hand, our knowledge of the conservation of
+energy teaches us as an axiom that the cerebral changes must determine
+each other in their sequence as in a continuous series. Nowhere can we
+suppose the physical process to be interrupted or diverted by the
+psychical process; and therefore we must conclude that thought and
+volition really play no part whatever in determining action. Thoughts
+and feelings are but indices which show in the mirror of the mind
+certain changes that are proceeding in the matter of the brain, and are
+as inefficient in influencing those changes as the shadow of a cloud is
+powerless to direct the movements of that of which it is the shadow.
+
+But when Materialism reaches, in a clear and articulate manner, this
+inference as a conclusion necessary from its premises, it becomes
+opposed at once to common sense and to the requirements of methodical
+reason. It becomes opposed to common sense because we all feel it is
+practically impossible to believe that the world would now have been
+exactly what it is even if consciousness, thought, and volition had
+never appeared upon the scene--that railway trains would have been
+running filled with mindless passengers, or that telephones would have
+been invented by brains that could not think to speak to ears that could
+not hear. And the conclusion is opposed to the requirements of
+methodical reason, because reason to be methodical is bound to have an
+answer to the question that immediately arises from the conclusion. This
+question simply is, Why have consciousness, thought, and volition ever
+been called into existence; and why are they related, as they are
+related, to cerebral action? Materialism, by here undertaking to prove
+that these things stand uselessly isolated from all other things, is
+bound to show some reason why they ever came to be, and to be what they
+are. For observe, it is not merely that these things exist in a supposed
+unnecessary relation to all other things; the fact to be explained is
+that they exist in a most intimately woven and invariable connexion with
+certain highly complex forms of organic structure and certain highly
+peculiar distributions of physical force. Yet these unique and
+extraordinary things are supposed by automatism to be always results and
+never causes; in the theatre of things they are supposed to be always
+spectators and never actors; in the laboratory of life they are supposed
+to be always by-products; and therefore in the order of nature they are
+supposed to have no _raison d'�tre_. Such a state of matters would be
+accountable enough if the stream of mental changes were but partly,
+occasionally, and imperfectly associated with the stream of material
+changes; but as the association is so minute, invariable, and precise,
+the hypothesis of the association being merely accidental, or _not
+requiring explanation_, becomes, at the bar of methodical reasoning,
+self-convicted of absurdity.
+
+The state of the case, then, simply is that two distinct facts stand to
+be explained by the theory of conscious automatism--first, why psychosis
+should ever have been developed as a mysterious appendage to neurosis;
+and, secondly, why the association between these things should be so
+intimate and precise. Assuredly, on the principles of evolution, which
+materialists at least cannot afford to disregard, it would be a wholly
+anomalous fact that so wide and general a class of phenomena as those of
+mind should have become developed in constantly ascending degrees
+throughout the animal kingdom, if they are entirely without use to
+animals. If psychosis is, as supposed, a function of neurosis, the
+doctrine of natural selection alone would forbid us to imagine that this
+function differs from all other functions in being itself functionless.
+If it would be detrimental to the theory of natural selection that any
+one isolated structure--such as the tail of a rattlesnake--should be
+adapted to perform a function useless to the animal possessing it, how
+utterly destructive of that theory would be the fact that all the
+phenomena of mind have been elaborated as functions of nerve-tissue
+without any one of them ever having been of any use either to the
+individual or to the species. And the difficulty that thus arises is
+magnified without limit when we remember that the phenomena of mind are
+invariable in their association with cerebral structure, grade for
+grade, and process for process.
+
+It is of no argumentative use to point to the fact that many adaptive
+movements in animals are performed by nerve-centres apart from any
+association with consciousness or volition, because all the facts on
+this head go to prove that consciousness and volition come in most
+suggestively just where adaptive movements begin to grow varied and
+complex, and then continue to develop with a proportional reference to
+the growing variety and complexity of these movements. The facts,
+therefore, irresistibly lead to the conclusion (if we argue here as we
+should in the case of any other function) that consciousness and
+volition are functions of nerve-tissue super-added to its previous
+functions, in order to meet new and more complex demands on its powers
+of adaptation.
+
+Neither is it of any argumentative use to point to the fact that
+adaptive actions which originally are performed with conscious volition
+may by practice come to be performed without conscious volition. For it
+is certain that no adaptive action of quite a novel kind is ever
+performed from the first without consciousness of its performance, and
+therefore, although it is true that by repetition its performance may
+become mechanical or unconscious, this does not prove that consciousness
+was without use in producing the adaptive action. It only proves that
+after a nervous mechanism has been elaborated by the help of
+consciousness, consciousness may be withdrawn and leave the finished
+mechanism to work alone; the structure having been completed, the
+scaffolding necessary to its completion may be removed.
+
+But passing over this difficulty which the theory of conscious
+automatism seems bound to encounter in its collision with the theory of
+natural selection, the most insuperable of all its difficulties arises
+from the bare fact, which it cannot explain, that conscious intelligence
+exists, and exists in the most intimate relation with one peculiar kind
+of material structure. For automatists must concede that the evidence
+of causation in the region of mind is at least as cogent as it is in the
+region of matter, seeing that the whole science of psychology is only
+rendered possible as a science by the fundamental fact of observation
+that mental antecedents determine mental consequents. Therefore, if we
+call a physical sequence _A, B, C_, and a mental sequence _a, b, c_
+automatists have to explain, not merely why there should be such a thing
+as a mental sequence at all, but also why the sequence _a, b, c_ should
+always proceed, link for link, with the sequence _A, B, C_. It clearly
+is no answer to say that the sequence _A, B, C_ implies the successive
+activity of certain definite nerve-centres _A', B', C'_ which have for
+their subjective effects the sequence _a, b, c_ so that whenever the
+sequence _A, B, C_ occurs the sequence _a, b, c_ must likewise occur.
+This is no answer, because it merely restates the hypothesis of
+automatism, and begs the whole question to be discussed. What methodical
+reason demands as an answer is simply why the sequence _A, B, C_ even
+though we freely grant it due to the successive activity of certain
+definite nerve-centres, should be attended by the sequence _a, b, c_.
+Reason perceives clearly enough that the sequence _a, b, c_ belongs to a
+wholly different category from the sequence _A, B, C_ the one being
+immediately known as a process taking place in a something which is
+without extension or physical properties of any kind, and the other
+taking place in a something which when, translated by the previous
+something, we recognize as having extension and the other antithetical
+properties which we class together as physical. There would of course be
+no difficulty if the sequence _A, B, C_ continued through any amount of
+complexity in the same conceivable category of being; so that there
+would be nothing actually inconceivable in cerebral sequence--changes
+running through _D, E, F_, &c., to an extent sufficient to cause
+unconscious automatism of any degree of complexity. But that which does
+require explanation from automatists is why automatism should have
+become associated with consciousness, and this so intimately that every
+change in the sequence _A, B, C_, &c., is accompanied by a particular
+and corresponding change in the sequence _a, b, c_, &c. Thus, to take a
+definite illustration, if on seeing the sun I think of a paper on solar
+physics, and from this pass to thinking of Mr. Norman Lockyer, and from
+this to speculating on the probability of certain supposed elements
+being really compounds, there is here a definite causal connexion in the
+sequence of my _thoughts_. But it is the last extravagance of absurdity
+to tell me that the accompanying causal sequences going on in my brain
+happen to have exactly corresponded to the sequences which were taking
+place in the mind, the two trains of sequences being each definite and
+coherent in themselves, and yet each proceeding link for link in lines
+parallel with the other. Without some theory of pre-established
+harmony--which, of course, it is no part of automatism to entertain--it
+would, on the doctrine of chances alone, be impossible to suppose that
+the causal sequences in the brain always happen to be just those which,
+by running link for link with another set of causal sequences taking
+place in the mind, enable both the series to be definite and coherent in
+themselves. Therefore, before reason can allow the theory of automatism
+to pass, it must be told how this wonderful fact of parallelism is to be
+explained. There must be _some_ connexion between the intrinsically
+coherent series _A, B, C_ and the no less intrinsically coherent
+sequence _a, b, c_, which may be taken as an explanation why they
+coincide each to each. What is this connexion? We do not know; but we
+have now seen that, whatever it is, it cannot be an ordinary causal
+connexion--first, because the doctrine of the conservation of energy
+makes it incumbent on us to believe that the procession of physical
+cause and effect is complete within the region of brain--a closed
+circle, as it were, from which no energy can, without argumentative
+suicide, be supposed to escape into the region of mind; and next,
+because, even were this difficulty disregarded, it is unaccountable that
+the causative influence (whatever it is supposed to be), which passes
+over from the region of physics into that of psychics, should be such as
+to render the psychical series coherent in itself, when on the physical
+side the series must be determined by purely physical conditions,
+having no reference whatsoever to psychical requirements.
+
+Thus it is argumentatively impossible for Materialism to elude the
+necessity of explaining the kind of connexion which it supposes to
+subsist between neurosis and psychosis; and forasmuch as the above
+considerations clearly show this connexion cannot be accepted as one of
+ordinary causality without some answer being given to the questions
+which reason has to ask, Materialism must be ruled out of court if she
+fails to respond to the demand. But it is no less clearly impossible
+that she can respond to the demand, and therefore at the bar of
+Philosophy Materialism must be pronounced, for this as well as for the
+reasons previously cited, conspicuously inadequate to account for the
+facts.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 4: Professor Flint, _Antitheistic Theories_, p. 99.]
+
+[Footnote 5: _Philosophy of Religion_, pp. 95, 99, and 101.]
+
+[Footnote 6: British Association Report, 1879, p. 28.]
+
+[Footnote 7: British Association Report, 1868. Trans. of Sections, p.
+5.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+MONISM.
+
+
+We have seen, then, that both the alternative theories of Spiritualism
+and Materialism are found, when carefully examined, to be so beset with
+difficulties of a necessary and fundamental kind, that it is impossible
+to entertain either without closing our eyes to certain contradictions
+which they severally and inherently present. We may, indeed, go even
+further than this, and affirm that to suppose mind the cause of motion
+or motion the cause of mind is equally to suppose that which in its very
+nature as a supposition is neither true nor untrue, but nonsensical.
+For, as Prof. Clifford has said in his essay on _Body and Mind_,--
+
+     'It may be conceived that, at the same time with every exercise of
+     volition, there is a disturbance of the physical laws; but this
+     disturbance, being perceptible to me, would be a physical fact
+     accompanying the volition, and could not be volition itself, which
+     is not perceptible to me. Whether there is such a disturbance of
+     the physical laws or no is a question of fact to which we have the
+     best of reasons for giving a negative answer; but the assertion
+     that another man's volition, a feeling in his consciousness which
+     I cannot perceive, is part of the train of physical facts which I
+     may perceive,--this is neither true nor untrue, but nonsense; it is
+     a combination of words whose corresponding ideas will not go
+     together[8].'
+
+And seeing that the correlatives are in each case the same, it is
+similarly 'nonsense' to assert the converse proposition: or, in other
+words, it is equally nonsense to speak of mental action causing cerebral
+action, or of cerebral action causing mental action--nonsense of the
+same kind as it would be to speak of the _Pickwick Papers_ causing a
+storm at sea, or the eruption of a volcano causing the forty-seventh
+proposition in the first book of Euclid.
+
+We see, then, that two of the three possible theories of things contain
+the elements of their own destruction: when carefully analyzed, both
+these theories are found to present inherent contradictions. On this
+account the third, or only alternative theory, comes to us with a large
+antecedent presumption in its favour. For it comes to us, as it were, on
+a clear field, or with the negative advantage of having no logical
+rivals to contend with. The other two suggestions having been weighed in
+the balance and found wanting, we are free to look to the new-comer as
+quite unopposed. This new-comer must, indeed, be interrogated as
+carefully as his predecessors, and, like them, must be judged upon his
+own merits. But as he constitutes our last possible hope of solving the
+question which he professes himself able to solve, the absolute failure
+of his predecessors entitles him to a patient hearing. By the method of
+exclusion his voice is now the only voice that remains to be heard, and
+unless it can speak to better purpose than the others, we shall have no
+alternative but to abandon the facts as inexplicable, or to confess that
+it is necessarily impossible for the human mind ever to arrive at any
+theory of things.
+
+Before proceeding to state or to examine this third and last of the
+suggested theories, it is desirable--in order still further to define
+its _status a priori_--that I should exhibit the reason why the two
+other suggestions have necessarily failed. For to my mind it is
+perfectly obvious that this reason is to be found, and found only, in
+the fact that they are both dualistic. The inherent, the fatal, and the
+closely similar difficulties which attach to both the dualistic
+theories, attach to them merely because they _are_ dualistic. The
+'nonsense' of each of them is really identical, and arises only because
+they both make the same irrational attempt to find more in the effect
+than they have put into the cause. In other words, both the dualistic
+theories suppose that the physical chains of causation is complete
+within itself, and that the mental chain is also complete within itself:
+yet they both proceed to the contradiction that one of these chains is
+able to allow some of its causal influence to escape, as it were, in
+order to constitute the other chain. It makes no difference, in point
+of logic, whether such an escape is supposed to take place from the
+physical chain (materialism) or from the mental chain (spiritualism): in
+either case the fundamental principle of causality is alike
+impugned--the principle, that is, of there being an equivalency between
+cause and effect, such that you cannot get more out of your effect than
+you have put into your cause. Both these dualistic theories, although
+they take opposite views as to which of the two chains of causation is
+the cause of the other, nevertheless agree in supposing that there _are_
+two chains of causation, and that one of them _does_ act causally upon
+the other: and it is in this matter of their common consent that they
+both commit suicide. Every process in the physical sphere must be
+supposed to have its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the
+doctrine of the conservation of energy would be contravened, and thus
+the causation contemplated could no longer be contemplated as physical.
+Similarly, every process in the mental sphere must be supposed to have
+its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the causation
+contemplated could no longer be contemplated as mental: some of the
+equations must be supposed not to have been satisfied within the mental
+sphere, but to have been carried over into the physical sphere--thus to
+have either created or destroyed certain quantities of energy within
+that sphere, and thus, also, to have introduced elements of endless
+confusion into the otherwise orderly system of Nature.
+
+From this vice of radical contradiction, to which both the dualistic
+theories are committed, the monistic theory is free. Moreover, as we
+shall immediately find, it is free to combine the elements of truth
+which severally belong to both the other theories. These other theories
+are each concerned with what they see upon different sides of the same
+shield. The facts which they severally receive they severally report,
+and their reports appear to contradict each other. But truth can never
+be really in contradiction with other truth; and it is reserved for
+Monism, by taking a simultaneous view of both sides, to reconcile the
+previously apparent contradictions. For these and other reasons, which
+will unfold themselves as we proceed, I fully agree with the late
+Professor Clifford where he says of this theory--'It is not merely a
+speculation, but is a result to which all the greatest minds that have
+studied this question (the relation between body and mind) in the right
+way have gradually been approximating for a long time.' This theory is,
+as we have already seen, that mental phenomena and physical phenomena,
+although apparently diverse, are really identical.
+
+If we thus unite in a higher synthesis the elements both of spiritualism
+and of materialism, we obtain a product which satisfies every fact of
+feeling on the one hand, and of observation on the other. We have only
+to suppose that the antithesis between mind and motion--subject and
+object--is itself phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have
+only to suppose that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of
+apprehension: and, therefore, that any change taking place in the mind,
+and any corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not
+two changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a
+musical sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.
+Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of
+changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in
+an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity
+in consciousness is created only by the difference in our mode of
+perceiving the same events--whether we see or whether we hear the
+vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of
+nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same
+event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of
+perceiving it.
+
+Or, to take another and a better illustration, in an Edison lamp the
+light which is emitted from the burner may be said indifferently to be
+caused by the number of vibrations per second going on in the carbon, or
+by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of vibration could not
+take place in the carbon without constituting that degree of temperature
+which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a train of thought may be
+said indifferently to be caused by brain-action or by mind-action; for,
+_ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place without the other. Now when
+we contemplate the phenomena of volition by themselves, it is as though
+we were contemplating the phenomena of light by themselves: volition is
+produced by mind in brain, just as light is produced by temperature in
+carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of light as the cause, say,
+of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of volition as the cause of
+bodily movement. That particular kind of physical activity which takes
+place in the carbon could not take place without the light which causes
+a photograph; and, similarly, that particular kind of physical activity
+which takes place in the brain could not take place without the volition
+which causes a bodily movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of
+bodily movement as is the physical activity of the brain; seeing that,
+in an absolute sense, the cause is one and the same. But if we once
+clearly perceive that what in a relative sense we know as volition is,
+in a similar sense, the cause of bodily movement, we terminate the
+question touching the freedom of the will. It thus becomes a mere matter
+of phraseology whether we speak of the will determining, or being
+determined by, changes going on in the external world; just as it is but
+a matter of phraseology whether we speak of temperature determining, or
+being determined by, molecular vibration. All the requirements alike of
+the free-will and of the bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a
+synthesis which comprises them both. On the one hand, it would be as
+impossible for an _un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform
+the adjustments of a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp
+to give out light and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric
+current. On the other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to
+originate bodily motion without the occurrence of a strictly physical
+process of cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison
+lamp which had been deprived of its carbon-burner.
+
+The great advantage of this theory is, that it supposes only one stream
+of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously
+concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and
+contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.
+Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;
+mind-changes nothing but mind-changes--both producing both
+simultaneously: neither could be what it is without the other, because
+without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.
+Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that
+consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind the
+changes of the brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
+causation of these movements that they should have a mental side. And
+equally impossible is the supposition of the spiritualist that the
+cerebral processes are adventitious, or that in the absence of brain the
+changes of the mind could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
+causation of these changes that they should have a material side.
+Furthermore, the use of mind to animals and to men is thus rendered
+apparent; for intelligent volition is thus shown to be a true cause of
+adjustive movement, in that the cerebration which it involves could not
+otherwise be possible: the causation would not otherwise be complete.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 8: _Lectures and Essays_, vol. ii. pp. 56-7.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE WORLD AS AN EJECT.
+
+
+In the Introduction to this essay I have sought to show that there are,
+for the purposes of practical discussion, but three theories of the
+World of Being. There is, first, the theory of Materialism, which
+supposes matter in motion to be the ultimate or self-existing Reality,
+and, therefore, the cause of mind. Next, there is the theory of
+Spiritualism, which supposes mind to be the ultimate Reality, and,
+therefore, the cause of matter in motion. Lastly, there is the theory of
+Monism which supposes matter in motion to be substantially identical
+with mind, and, therefore, that as between mind and matter in motion
+there is no causal relation either way. In the foregoing chapters I have
+considered these three theories, and argued that of them the
+last-mentioned is the only one which satisfies all the facts of feeling
+on the one hand, and of observation on the other. The theory of Monism
+alone is able to explain, without inherent contradiction, the phenomena
+both of the subjective and objective spheres.
+
+It is my present purpose to extend the considerations already presented.
+Assuming the theory of Monism, I desire to ascertain the result to which
+it will lead when applied to the question whether we ought to regard the
+external world as of a character mental or non-mental. As observed in my
+Rede Lecture (_supra_, p. 33), this question has already been considered
+by the late Professor Clifford, who decided that on the monistic theory
+the probability pointed towards the external world being of a character
+non-mental; that, although the whole universe is composed of
+'mind-stuff,' the universe as a whole is mindless. This decision I then
+briefly criticized; it is now my object to contemplate the matter
+somewhat more in detail.
+
+I will assume, on account of reasons previously given, that when we
+speak of matter in motion we do not at all know what it is that moves,
+nor do we know at all what it is that we mean by motion. Therefore if,
+as unknown quantities, we call matter _a_ and motion _b_, all we are
+entitled to affirm is that _a + b = z_, where _z_ is a known quantity,
+or mind. Obversely stated, we may say that the known quantity _z_ is
+capable of being resolved into the unknown _a + b_. But, inasmuch as
+both _a_ and _b_ are unknown, we may simplify matters by regarding their
+sum as a single unknown quantity _x_, which we take to be substantially
+identical with its obverse aspect known as _z_.
+
+Here, then, are our data. The theory of Monism teaches that what we
+perceive as matter in motion, _x_, is the obverse of what we know as
+mind, _z_. What, then, do we know of _z_? In the first place, we well
+know that this is the only entity with which we are acquainted, so to
+speak, at first hand; all our knowledge of _x_ (which is the only other
+knowledge we possess) is possible only in so far as we are able to
+translate it into terms of _z_. In the next place, we know that _z_ is
+itself an entity of the most enormous complexity. Standing as a symbol
+of the whole range of individual subjectivity, it may be said to
+constitute for each individual the symbol of his own personality--or the
+sum total of his conscious life. Now each individual knows by direct
+knowledge that his conscious life is, as I have said, of enormous
+complexity, and that numberless ingredients of feeling, thought, and
+volition are therein combined in numberless ways. Therefore the symbol
+_z_ may be considered as the sum of innumerable constituent parts,
+grouped _inter se_ in numberless systems of more or less complexity.
+
+From these considerations we arrive at the following conclusions. The
+theory of Monism teaches that all _z_ is _x_; but it does not,
+therefore, necessarily teach that all _x_ is _z_. Nevertheless, it does
+teach that if all _x_ is not _z_, this must be because _x_ is _z_,
+_plus_ something more than _z_, as a little thought will be sufficient
+to show. Thus, the four annexed diagrams exhaust the logical
+possibilities of any case, where the question is as to the inclusion or
+exclusion of one quantity by another. In Fig. 1 the two quantities are
+coincident; in Fig 2 the one is wholly included by the other; in Fig. 3
+it is partially included; and in Fig. 4 wholly excluded. Now in the
+present case, and upon the data supplied, the logical possibilities are
+exhausted by Figs. 1 and 2. For, upon these data, Figs. 3 and 4
+obviously represent logical impossibilities; no part of Mind can,
+according to these data, stand outside the limits of Matter and Motion.
+Therefore, if the Ego is not coincident with the Non-ego (or if all _x_
+is not _z_, as in Fig. 1), this can only be because the Ego is less
+extensive than the Non-ego (or because _x_ is _z plus_ something more
+than _z_, as in Fig. 2).
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 1]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 2]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 3]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 4]
+
+Of these two logical possibilities Idealism, in its most extreme form,
+may adopt the first. For Idealism in this form may hold that apart from
+the Ego there is no external world; that outside of _z_ there is no _x_;
+that the only _esse_ is the _percipi_. But, as very few persons
+nowadays are prepared to go the length of seriously maintaining that in
+actual fact there is no external world save in so far as this is
+perceived by the individual mind, I need not wait to consider this
+possibility. We are thus practically shut up to a consideration of the
+possibility marked 2.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 5]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 6]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 7]
+
+The theory of Monism, then, teaches that _x_ is _z_ _plus_ something
+more than _z_; and therefore it becomes a matter of great moment to
+consider the probable nature of the overplus. For it obviously does not
+follow that because _x_ is greater than _z_ in a logical sense,
+therefore _x_ must be greater than _z_ in a psychological sense. Save
+upon the theory of Idealism (with which Monism is not specially
+concerned) the amount (whatever it may be) wherein _x_ is greater than
+_z_, may not present any psychological signification at all. We may find
+that the surface of our globe is considerably larger than that of the
+dry land, and yet it may not follow that the mental-life to be met with
+in the sea is psychologically superior to that which occurs on dry land.
+If, therefore, we represent by comparative shading degrees of
+psychological excellence, it is evident that the theory of Monism must
+entertain the three possibilities indicated diagrammatically in Figs. 5,
+6, and 7. It makes no difference what the comparative areas of _x_ and
+_z_ may be, or whether _x_ be uniformly shaded throughout its extent.
+All we have so far to notice is that the fact of logical inclusion does
+not necessarily carry with it the implication of psychological
+superiority.
+
+Next we must notice that besides our own subjectivities, we have
+cognizance of being surrounded by many other inferred subjectivities
+more or less like in kind (i. e. other human minds); and also yet many
+other inferred subjectivities more or less unlike, but all inferior (i.
+e. the minds of lower animals, young children, and idiots). Following
+Clifford, I will call these inferred subjectivities by the name of
+ejects, and assign to them the symbol _y_. Thus, in the following
+discussion, _x_ = the objective world, _y_ = the ejective world, and _z_
+= subjective world. Now, the theory of Monism supposes that _x_, _y_,
+and _z_ are all alike in kind, but present no definite teaching as to
+how far they may differ in degree. We may, however, at once allow that
+between the psychological value of _z_ and that of _y_ there is a wide
+difference of degree; and also that, while the value of _z_ is a fixed
+quantity, that of _y_ varies greatly in the different parts of the area
+_y_. Our scheme, therefore, will now adopt this form--
+
+[Illustration]
+
+But the important question remains how we ought to shade _x_. According
+to Clifford, this ought scarcely to be shaded at all, while according to
+theologians (and theists generally) it ought to be shaded so much more
+deeply than either _y_ or _z_, that the joint representation in one
+diagram would only be possible by choosing for the shading of _x_ a
+colour different from that employed for _y_ and _z_, and assigning to
+that colour a representative value higher than that assigned to the
+other in the ratio of one to infinity. It will be my object to estimate
+the relative probability of these rival estimates of the psychological
+value of _x_.
+
+Starting from _z_ as our centre, we know that this is an isolated system
+of subjectivity, and hence we infer that all _y_ is composed of
+analogous systems, resembling one another as to their isolation, and
+differing only in their degrees of psychological value. Now this,
+translated into terms of _x_ (or into terms of objectivity) means that
+_z_ is an isolated system of matter in motion, and that the same has to
+be said of all the constituent parts of _y_. In other words, both
+subjectivity and ejectivity are only known under the condition of being
+isolated from objectivity; which, obversely considered, means that the
+matter in motion here concerned is temporarily separated off from the
+rest of the objective world, in such wise that it forms a distinct
+system of its own. If any part of the objective world rudely forces its
+way within the machinery of that system, it is at the risk of
+disarranging the machinery and stopping its work--as is the case when a
+bullet enters the brain. Such converse as the brain normally holds with
+the external world, is held through the appointed channels of the
+senses, whereby appropriate causation is supplied to keep the otherwise
+isolated system at work. We know, from physiological evidence, that when
+such external causation is withheld, the isolated system ceases to work;
+therefore, the isolation, although complete under one point of view,
+under another point of view is incomplete. It is complete only in the
+sense in which the isolation of a machine is complete--i. e. it is in
+itself a working system, yet its working is ultimately dependent upon
+causation supplied from without in certain appropriate ways. This truth
+is likewise testified to on the obverse aspect of psychology. For
+analysis shows that all our mental processes (however complex they may
+be internally) are ultimately dependent on impressions of the external
+world gained through the senses. Whether regarded objectively or
+subjectively, therefore, we find that it is the business of the isolated
+system to elaborate, by its internal processes, the raw materials which
+are supplied to it from without. Seeing, then, that the isolation of the
+system is thus only partial, we may best apply to it the term
+circumscribed. Such partial isolation or circumscription of matter in
+motion--so that it shall in itself constitute a little working
+microcosm--appears to be the first condition to the being of a
+subjective personality. Why, then, does not the working of a machine
+present a subjective side?
+
+Our answer to this question is to be found in the following
+considerations. We are going upon the hypothesis that all mind is matter
+in motion, and that all matter in motion is mind--or, as Clifford
+phrased it, that all the external world is composed of mind-stuff. No
+matter how lightly we may shade _x_, we are assuming that it must be
+shaded, and not left perfectly white. Now, both mind and matter in
+motion admit of degrees: first as to quantity, next as to velocity, and
+lastly as to complexity. But the degrees of matter in motion are found,
+in point of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind, save
+in the last particular of complexity, where there is unquestionably an
+evident correspondence. Therefore it is that a machine, although
+conforming to the prime condition of subjectivity in being a
+circumscribed system of matter in motion, nevertheless does not attain
+to subjectivity: the _x_ does not rise to _z_ because the internal
+processes of _x_ are not sufficiently intricate, or their intricacy is
+not of the appropriate kind. From which it follows that although, as I
+have said, all matter in motion is mind, merely as matter in motion (or
+irrespective of the kinds and degrees of both) it may not necessarily be
+mind in the elaborated form of consciousness: it may only be the raw
+material of mind--or, as Clifford called it, mind-stuff. Thus, although
+all conscious volition is matter in motion, it does not follow that all
+matter in motion is conscious volition. Which serves to restate the
+question as to how far it is probable, or improbable, that all matter in
+motion is conscious volition--i.e. how deeply we ought to shade _x_.
+
+Well, the first thing to be considered in answering this question is
+that, according to the theory of Monism, we _know_ that it is within the
+range of possibility for matter in motion to reach a level of intricacy
+which shall yield conscious volition, and even self-conscious thought of
+an extremely high order of development. Therefore, the only question is
+as to whether it is possible, or in any way probable, that matter in
+motion as occurring in _x_ resembles, in point of intricacy, matter in
+motion as occurring in _z_. Professor Clifford perceived that this is
+the core of the question, and staked the whole answer to it on an
+extremely simple issue. He said that unless we can show in the
+disposition of heavenly bodies some morphological resemblance to the
+structure of a human brain, we are precluded from rationally
+entertaining any probability that self-conscious volition belongs to the
+universe. Obviously, this way of presenting the case is so grossly
+illogical that even the exigencies of popular exposition cannot be held
+to justify the presentation. For aught that we can know to the contrary,
+not merely the highly specialized structure of the human brain, but even
+that of nervous matter in general, may only be one of a thousand
+possible ways in which the material and dynamical conditions required
+for the apparition of self-consciousness can be secured. To imagine that
+the human brain of necessity exhausts these possibilities is in the last
+degree absurd. Therefore, we may suggest the following presentation of
+Clifford's case as one that is less obviously inadequate:--if any
+resemblance to the material and dynamical conditions of the microcosm
+can be detected in the macrocosm, we should have good reason to ascribe
+to the latter those attributes of subjectivity which we know as
+belonging to the former; but if no such resemblance can be traced, we
+shall have some reason to suppose that these attributes do not belong to
+the universe. Even this, however, I should regard as much too wide a
+statement of the case. To take the particular conditions under which
+alone subjectivity is known to occur upon a single planet as exhausting
+the possibilities of its occurrence elsewhere, is too flagrant a use of
+the method of simple enumeration to admit of a moment's countenance.
+Even the knowledge that we have of the two great conditions under which
+terrestrial subjectivities occur--circumscription and complexity--is
+only empirical. It may well be that elsewhere (or apart from the
+conditions imposed by nervous tissue) subjectivity is possible
+irrespective both of circumscription and of complexity. Therefore,
+properly or logically regarded, the great use of the one exhibition of
+subjectivity furnished to human experience, is the proof thus furnished
+that subjectivity is possible under _some_ conditions; and the utmost
+which on the grounds of such proof human experience is entitled to argue
+is, that _probably_, if subjectivity is possible elsewhere, its
+possibility is given by those conditions of circumscription and
+complexity in the material and dynamical relations concerned, which we
+find to be the invariable and quantitative concomitants of subjectivity
+within experience. But this is a widely different thing from saying that
+the only kind of such circumscription and complexity--or the only
+disposition of these relations--which can present a subjective side is
+that which is found in the structures and functions of a nervous system.
+
+Now, if we fix our attention merely on this matter of complexity, and
+refuse to be led astray by obviously false analogies of a more special
+kind, I think there can be no question that the macrocosm does furnish
+amply sufficient opportunity, as it were, for the presence of
+subjectivity, even if it be assumed that subjectivity can only be
+yielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous system.
+For, considering the material and dynamical system of the universe as a
+whole, it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater than that
+of any of its parts. Not only is it true that all these parts are
+included in the whole, and that even the visible sidereal system alone
+presents movements of enormous intricacy[9], but we find, for instance,
+that even within the limits of this small planet there is presented to
+actual observation a peculiar form of circumscribed complex, fully
+comparable with that of the individual brain, and yet external to each
+individual brain. For the so-called 'social organism,' although composed
+of innumerable individual personalities, is, with regard to each of its
+constituent units, a part of the objective world--just as the human
+brain would be, were each of its constituent cells of a construction
+sufficiently complex to yield a separate personality.
+
+If to this it be objected that, as a matter of fact, the social organism
+does not possess a self-conscious personality, I will give a twofold
+answer. In the first place, Who told the objector that it has not? For
+aught that any one of its constituent personalities can prove to the
+contrary, this social organism may possess self-conscious personality of
+the most vivid character: its constituent human minds may be born into
+it and die out of it as do the constituent cells of the human body: it
+may feel the throes of war and famine, rejoice in the comforts of peace
+and plenty: it may appreciate the growth of civilization as its passage
+from childhood to maturity. If this at first sight appears a grotesque
+supposition, we must remember that it would appear equally so to ascribe
+such possibilities to the individual brain, were it not for the
+irrelevant accident of this particular form of complex standing in such
+relation to our own subjectivity that we are able to verify the fact of
+its ejectivity. Thus, for aught that we can tell to the contrary, Comte
+may have been even more justified than his followers suppose, in
+teaching the personification of Humanity.
+
+But, in the next place, if the social organism is not endowed with
+personality, this may be for either one of two reasons. All the
+conditions required for attaining so high a level of psychical
+perfection may not be here present; or else the level of psychical
+perfection may be higher than that which we know as personality. This
+latter alternative will be considered in another relation by-and-by, so
+I will not dwell upon it now. But with reference to all these possible
+contingencies, I may observe that we are not without clear indications
+of the great fact that the high order of complexity which has been
+reached by the social organism _is_ accompanied by evidence of something
+which we may least dimly define as resembling subjectivity. In
+numberless ways, which I need not wait to enumerate, we perceive that
+society exhibits the phenomena both of thought and conduct. And these
+phenomena cannot always be explained by regarding them as the sum of the
+thoughts and actions of its constituent individuals--or, at least, they
+can only be so regarded by conceding that the thoughts and actions of
+the constituent individuals, when thus _summated_, yield a different
+product from that which would be obtained by a merely arithmetical
+computation of the constituent parts: the composite product differs from
+its component elements, as H_2O differs from 2H + O. The general truth
+of this remark will, I believe, be appreciated by all historians.
+Seeing that ideas are often, as it is said, 'in the air' before they are
+condensed in the mind of individual genius, we habitually speak of the
+'Zeit-geist' as the product of a kind of collective psychology, which is
+something other than the mere sum of all the individual minds of a
+generation. That is to say, we regard society as an eject, and the more
+that a man studies the thought and conduct of society, the more does he
+become convinced that we are right in so regarding it. Of course this
+eject is manifestly unlike that which we form of another individual
+mind: it is much more general, vague, and so far unlike the pattern of
+our own subjectivity that even to ascribe to it the important attribute
+of personality is felt, as we have just seen, to approach the grotesque.
+Still, in this vague and general way we do ascribe to society ejective
+existence: we habitually think of the whole world of human thought and
+feeling as a psychological complex, which is other than, and more than,
+a mere shorthand enumeration of all the thoughts and feelings of all
+individual human beings.
+
+The ejective existence thus ascribed to society serves as a
+stepping-stone to the yet more vague and general ascription of such
+existence to the Cosmos. At first, indeed, or during the earliest stages
+of culture, the ascription of ejective existence to the external world
+is neither vague nor general: on the contrary, it is most distinct and
+specific. Beginning in the rudest forms of animism, where every natural
+process admits of being immediately attributed to the volitional agency
+of an unseen spirit, anthropomorphism sets out upon its long course of
+development, which proceeds _pari passu_ with the development of
+abstract thought. Man, as it has been truly said, universally makes God
+in his own image; and it is difficult to see how the case could be
+otherwise. Universally the eject must assume the pattern of the subject,
+and it is only in the proportion that this pattern presents the features
+of abstract thinking that the image which it throws becomes less and
+less man-like. Hence, as Mr. Fiske has shown in detail, so soon as
+anthropomorphism has assumed its highest state of development, it begins
+to be replaced by a continuous growth of 'deanthropomorphism,' which,
+passing through polytheism into monotheism, eventually ends in a
+progressive 'purification' of theism--by which is meant a progressive
+metamorphosis of the theistic conception, tending to remove from Deity
+the attributes of Humanity. The last of these attributes to disappear is
+that of personality, and when this final ecdysis has been performed, the
+eject which remains is so unlike its original subject, that, as we shall
+immediately find, it is extremely difficult to trace any points of
+resemblance between them.
+
+Now it is with this perfect, or imago condition of the world-eject, that
+we have to do. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in what I consider the profoundest
+reaches of his philosophic thought, has well shown, on the one hand,
+how impossible it is to attribute to Deity any of the specific
+attributes of mind as known to ourselves subjectively; and, on the other
+hand, how it is possible to conceive 'symbolically' that the universe
+may be instinct with a 'quasi-psychical' principle, as greatly
+transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
+motion[10]. Accepting, then, the world-eject in this its highest
+conceivable stage of evolution, I desire to contemplate it under the
+light of the monistic theory.
+
+We have seen that, whether we look upon the subjective or objective face
+of personality, we find that personality arises from limitation--or, as
+I have previously termed it, circumscription. Now, we have no evidence,
+nor are we able to conceive, of the external world as limited;
+consequently we are not able to conceive, of the world-eject as
+personal. But, inasmuch as personality arises only from limitation, the
+conclusion that the world-eject is impersonal does not tend to show that
+it is of lower psychical value than conscious personality: on the
+contrary, it tends to show that it is probably of higher psychical
+value. True, we are not able to conceive actually of mind as impersonal;
+but we can see that this merely arises from our only experience of mind
+being given under conditions of personality; and, as just observed, it
+is possible to conceive symbolically that there may be a form of mind as
+greatly transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
+motion.
+
+Now, although we cannot conceive of such a mind actually, we may most
+probably make the nearest approach to conceiving of it truly, by
+_provisionally_ ascribing to it the highest attributes of mind as known
+to ourselves, or the attributes which belong to human personality. Just
+as a thinking insect would derive a better, or more true, conception of
+human personality by considering it ejectively than by considering it
+objectively (or by considering the mind-processes as distinguished from
+the brain-processes), so, if there is a form of mind immeasurably
+superior to our own, we may probably gain a more faithful--howsoever
+still inadequate--conception of it by contemplating its operations
+ejectively than by doing so objectively. I will, therefore, speak of the
+world-eject as presenting conscious volition, on the understanding that
+if _x_ does not present either consciousness or volition, this must
+be--according to the fundamental assumption of psychism on which we are
+now proceeding--because _x_ presents attributes at least as much higher
+than consciousness or volition as these are higher than mechanical
+motion. For when we consider the utmost that our conscious volition is
+able to accomplish in the way of contrivance--how limited its knowledge,
+how short its duration, how restricted its range, and how imperfect its
+adaptations--we can only conclude that _if_ the ultimate constitution of
+all things is pyschical, the philosophy of the Cosmos becomes a
+'philosophy of the Unconscious' only because it is a philosophy of the
+Superconscious.
+
+Now, if once we feel ourselves able to transcend the preliminary--and
+doubtless very considerable--difficulty of symbolically conceiving the
+world-eject as super-conscious, and (because not limited) also
+super-personal, I think there can be no question that the world-object
+furnishes overwhelming proof of psychism. I candidly confess that I am
+not myself able to overcome the preliminary difficulty in question. By
+discharging the elements of personality and conscious volition from the
+world-eject, I appear to be discharging from my conception of mind all
+that most distinctively belongs to that conception; and thus I seem to
+be brought back again to the point from which we started: the
+world-eject appears to have again resolved itself into the unknown
+quantity _x_. But here we must distinguish between actual conception and
+symbolical conception. Although it is unquestionably true that I can
+form no actual conception of Mind save as an eject of personality and
+conscious volition, it is a question whether I am not able to form a
+symbolical conception of Mind as thus extended. For I know that
+consciousness, implying as it does continual change in serial order of
+circumscribed mental processes, is not (symbolically considered) the
+highest conceivable exhibition of Mind; and just as a mathematician is
+able to deal symbolically with space of _n_ dimensions, while only able
+really to conceive of space as limited to three dimensions, so I feel
+that I ought not to limit the abstract possibilities of mental being by
+what I may term the accidental conditions of my own being.
+
+I need scarcely wait to show why it appears to me that if this position
+is granted, the world-object furnishes, as I have said, overwhelming
+proof of psychism; for this proof has been ably presented by many other
+writers. There is first the antecedent improbability that the human mind
+should be the highest manifestation of subjectivity in this universe of
+infinite objectivity. There is next the fact that throughout this
+universe of infinite objectivity--so far, at least, as human observation
+can extend--there is unquestionable evidence of some one integrating
+principle, whereby all its many and complex parts are correlated with
+one another in such wise that the result is universal order. And if we
+take any part of the whole system--such as that of organic nature on
+this planet--to examine in more detail, we find that it appears to be
+instinct with contrivance. So to speak, wherever we tap organic nature,
+it seems to flow with purpose; and, as we shall presently see, upon the
+monistic theory the evidence of purpose is here in no way attenuated by
+a full acceptance of any of the 'mechanical' explanations furnished by
+science. Now, these large and important facts of observation
+unquestionably point, as just observed, to some one integrating
+principle as pervading the Cosmos; and, if so, we can scarcely be wrong
+in supposing that among all our conceptions it must hold nearest kinship
+to that which is our highest conception of an integrating cause--viz.,
+the conception of psychism. Assuredly no human mind could either have
+devised or maintained the working of even a fragment of Nature; and,
+therefore, it seems but reasonable to conclude that the integrating
+principle of the whole--the Spirit, as it were, of the Universe--must be
+something which, while as I have said holding nearest kinship with our
+highest conception of disposing power, must yet be immeasurably superior
+to the psychism of man. The world-eject thus becomes invested with a
+psychical value as greatly transcending in magnitude that of the human
+mind, as the material frame of the universe transcends in its magnitude
+the material frame of the human body. Therefore, without in any way
+straining the theory of Monism, we may provisionally shade _x_ more
+deeply than _z_, and this in some immeasurable degree.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+One other matter remains to be considered with reference to this
+world-eject as sanctioned by Monism. It leaves us free to regard all
+natural causation as a direct exhibition of psychism. The prejudice
+against anything approaching a theistic interpretation of the Universe
+nowadays arises chiefly from the advance of physical science having
+practically revealed the ubiquity of natural causes. It is felt that
+when a complete explanation of any given phenomenon has been furnished
+in terms of these causes, there is no need to go further; the phenomenon
+has been rendered intelligible on its mechanical side, and therefore it
+is felt that we have no reason to suppose that it presents a mental
+side--any supplementary causation of a mental kind being regarded as
+superfluous. Even writers who expressly repudiate this reasoning prove
+themselves to be habitually under its influence; for we constantly find
+that such writers, after conceding the mechanical explanations as far as
+these have been _proved_, take their stand upon the more intricate
+phenomena of Nature where, as yet, the mechanical explanations are not
+forthcoming. Whether it be at the origin of life, the origin of
+sentiency, of instinct, of rationality, of morality, or of religion,
+these writers habitually argue that here, at least, the purely
+mechanical interpretations fail; and that here, consequently, there is
+still room left for a psychical interpretation. Of course the pleading
+for theism thus supplied is seen by others to be of an extremely feeble
+quality; for while, on the one hand, it rests only upon ignorance of
+natural causation (as distinguished from any knowledge of super-natural
+causation), on the other hand, abundant historical analogies are
+available to show that it is only a question of time when pleading of
+this kind will become more and more restricted in its subject-matter,
+till eventually it be altogether silenced. But the pleading which Monism
+is here able to supply can never be silenced.
+
+For, according to Monism, all matter in motion is mind; and, therefore,
+matter in motion is merely the objective revelation, _to_ us and _for_
+us, of that which in its subjective aspect--or in its ultimate
+reality--is mind. Just as the operations of my friend's mind can only be
+revealed to me through the mechanical operations of his body, so it may
+very well be that the operations of the Supreme Mind (supposing such to
+exist) can only be revealed to me through the mechanical operations of
+Nature. The only difference between the two cases is that while I am
+able, in the case of my friend's mind, to elicit responses of mechanical
+movement having a definite and intended relation to the operations of my
+own mind, similarly expressed to him; such is not the case with Nature.
+With the friend-eject I am able to _converse_; but not so with the
+world-eject[11]. This great difference, however, although obviously
+depriving me of any such direct corroboration of psychism in the
+world-eject as that which I thus derive of psychism in the friend-eject,
+ought not to be regarded by me as amounting, in the smallest degree, to
+_disproof_ of psychism in the world-eject. The fact that I am not able
+to converse with the world-eject is merely a negative fact, and should
+not be allowed to tell against any probability (otherwise derived) in
+favour of psychism as belonging to that eject. There may be a thousand
+very good reasons why I should be precluded from such converse--some of
+which, indeed, I can myself very clearly perceive.
+
+The importance of Monism in thus enabling us rationally to contemplate
+all processes of physical causation as possibly immediate exhibitions
+of psychism, is difficult to overrate. For it entirely discharges all
+distinction between the mechanical and the mental; so that if physical
+science were sufficiently advanced to yield a full natural explanation
+of all the phenomena within human experience, mankind would be in a
+position to gain as complete a knowledge as is theoretically possible of
+the psychological character of the world-eject. Already we are able to
+perceive the immense significance of being able to regard any sequence
+of natural causation as the merely phenomenal aspect of the ontological
+reality--the merely outward manifestation of an inward meaning. Thus,
+for example, I am listening to a sonata of Beethoven's played by Madame
+Schumann. Helmholtz tells me all that he knows about the physics and
+physiology of the process, both beyond and within my brain. But I feel
+that, even if Helmholtz were able to tell me very much more than he can,
+so long as he is dealing with these objective explanations, he is at
+work only upon the outer skin of the whole matter. The great reality is
+the mind of Beethoven communicating to my mind through the complex
+intervention of three different brains with their neuro-muscular
+systems, and an endless variety of a�rial vibrations proceeding from a
+pianoforte. The method of communication has nothing more to do with the
+reality communicated than have the paper and ink of this essay to do
+with the ideas which they serve to convey. In each case a vehicle of
+symbols is necessary in order that one mind should communicate with
+another; but in both cases this is a vehicle of _symbols_, and nothing
+more. Everywhere, therefore, the reality may be psychical, and the
+physical symbolic; everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and
+visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.
+
+Take again the case of morality and religion. Because science, by its
+theory of evolution, appears to be in a fair way of explaining the
+genesis of these things by natural causes, theists are taking alarm; it
+is felt by them that if morality can be fully explained by utility, and
+religion by superstition, the reality of both is destroyed. But Monism
+teaches that such a view is entirely erroneous. For, according to
+Monism, the natural causation of morality and religion has nothing
+whatever to do with the ultimate truth of either. The natural causation
+is merely a record of physical processes, serving to manifest the
+psychical processes. Nor can it make any difference, as regards the
+ultimate veracity of the moral and religious feelings, that they have
+been developed slowly by natural causes; that they were at first grossly
+selfish on the one hand, and hideously superstitious on the other; that
+they afterwards went through a long series of changes, none of which
+therefore can have fully corresponded with external truth; or that even
+now they may be both extremely far from any such correspondence. All
+that such considerations go to prove is, that it belongs to the natural
+method of mental evolution in man that with advancing culture his
+ejective interpretations of Nature should more and more nearly
+_approximate_ the truth. The world-eject must necessarily vary with the
+character of the human subject; but this does not prove that the
+ejective interpretation has throughout been wrong in _method_: it only
+proves that such interpretation has been imperfect--and necessarily
+imperfect--in _application_.
+
+Such, then, I conceive to be one of the most important consequences of
+the monistic theory. Namely, that by regarding physical causation as
+everywhere but the objective or phenomenal aspect of an ejective or
+ontological reality, it furnishes a logical basis for a theory of things
+which is at the same time natural and spiritual. On the objective
+aspect, the explanations furnished by reason are of necessity physical,
+while, on the ejective aspect, such explanations are of necessity
+metaphysical--or rather, let us say, hyper-physical. But these two
+orders of explanation are different only because their modes of
+interpreting the same events are different. The objective explanation
+which was given (as we supposed) by Helmholtz of the effects produced on
+the human brain by hearing a sonata, was no doubt perfectly sound within
+its own category; but the ejective explanation of these same effects
+which is given by a musician is equally sound within _its_ category. And
+similarly, if instead of the man-object we contemplate the world-object
+physical causation becomes but the phenomenal aspect of psychical
+causation; the invariability of its sequence becomes but the expression
+of intentional order; the iron rigidity of natural law becomes the
+sensuous manifestation of an unalterable consistency as belonging to the
+Supreme Volition.
+
+My object in this paper has been to show that the views of the late
+Professor Clifford concerning the influence of Monism on Theism are
+unsound. I am in full agreement with him in believing that Monism is
+destined to become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that
+it is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction of
+science on the one hand and of feeling on the other. But I disagree with
+him in holding that this theory is fraught with implications of an
+anti-theistic kind. In my opinion this theory leaves the question of
+Theism very much where it was before. That is to say, while not
+furnishing any independent proof of Theism, it likewise fails to furnish
+any independent disproof. The reason why in Clifford's hands this theory
+appeared to furnish independent disproof, was because he persisted in
+regarding the world only as an object: he did not entertain the
+possibility that the world might also be regarded as an eject. Yet, that
+the world, under the theory of Monism, is at least as susceptible of an
+ejective as it is of an objective interpretation, I trust that I have
+now been able to show. And this is all that I have endeavoured to show.
+As a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that Monism alone
+can only lead to Agnosticism. That is to say, it leaves a clear field of
+choice as between Theism and Atheism; and, therefore, to a carefully
+reasoning Monist, there are three alternatives open. He may remain a
+Monist, and nothing more; in which case he is an agnostic. He may
+entertain what appears to him independent evidence in favour of Theism,
+and thus he may become a theist. Or he may entertain what appears to him
+independent evidence in favour of Atheism, and thus he may become an
+atheist. But, in any case, so far as his Monism can carry him, he is
+left perfectly free either to regard the world as an object alone, or to
+regard the world as also an eject[12].
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 9: If we imagine the visible sidereal system compressed within
+the limits of a human skull, so that all its movements which we now
+recognize as molar should become molecular, the complexity of such
+movement would probably be as great as that which takes place in a human
+brain. Yet to this must be added all the molecular movements which are
+now going on in the sidereal system, visible and invisible.]
+
+[Footnote 10: _Principles of Psychology_, vol. i. pp. 159-61; _Essays_,
+vol. iii. pp. 246-9; and _First Principles_, p. 26.]
+
+[Footnote 11: It is, however, the belief of all religious persons that
+even this distinction does not hold. If they are right in their belief,
+the distinction would then become one as to the mode of converse. In
+this case what is called communion with the Supreme Mind must be
+supposed to be a communion _sui generis_: the converse of mind with mind
+is here _direct_, or does not require to be translated into the language
+of mechanical signs: it is subjective, not ejective. Still, even here we
+must believe that the physical aspect accompanies the psychical,
+although not necessarily observed. An act of prayer, for example, is, on
+its physical aspect, an act of cerebration: so is the answer (supposing
+it genuine), in as far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus prayer and
+its answer (according to Monism) resemble all the other processes of
+Nature in presenting an objective side of strictly physical causation.
+Nor is it possible that the case could be otherwise, if _all_ mental
+processes consist in physical process, and vice versa. It is obvious
+that this consideration has important bearings on the question as to the
+physical efficacy of prayer. From a monistic point of view both those
+who affirm and those who deny such efficacy are equally in the right,
+and equally in the wrong; they are merely quarrelling upon different
+sides of the same shield. For, according to Monism, if the theologians
+are right in supposing that the Supreme Mind is the hearer of prayer in
+any case, they are also right in supposing that the Mind must
+necessarily be able to grant what is called physical answers, seeing
+that in order to grant _any_ answer (even of the most apparently
+spiritual kind) some physical change must be produced, if it be only in
+the brain of the petitioner. On the other hand, the scientists are
+equally right in maintaining that no physical answer to prayer can be of
+the nature of a miracle, or produced independently of strictly physical
+causation; for, if so, the physical and the psychical would no longer be
+coincident. But, until the scientists are able to perform the hopeless
+task of proving where the possibilities of physical causation end, as a
+mere matter of abstract speculation and going upon the theory of Monism,
+it is evident that the theologians may have any latitude they choose to
+claim, both as regards this matter and that of so-called miracles.]
+
+[Footnote 12: It may be explained that by Agnosticism I understand a
+theory of things which abstains from either affirming or denying the
+existence of God. It thus represents, with regard to Theism, a state of
+suspended judgement; and all it undertakes to affirm is, that, upon
+existing evidence, the being of God is unknown. But the term Agnosticism
+is frequently used in a widely different sense, as implying belief that
+the being of God is not merely now unknown, but must always remain
+unknowable. It is therefore often represented that Mr. Herbert Spencer,
+in virtue of his doctrine of the Unknowable, is a kind of apostle of
+Agnosticism. This, however, I conceive to be a great mistake. The
+distinctive features of Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable are not
+merely non-agnostic, but anti-agnostic. For the doctrine affirms that we
+have this much knowledge of God--namely, that if He exists, He must for
+ever be unknown. Without question, this would be a most important piece
+of definite knowledge with regard to Deity, negative though it be; and,
+therefore, any man who holds it has no right to be called an agnostic.
+
+To me it has always seemed that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so
+far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is highly
+unphilosophical. By what right can it be affirmed that Deity, if He
+exists, may not reveal the fact of His existence to-morrow--and this to
+the whole human race without the possibility of doubt? Or, if there be a
+God, who is to say that there certainly cannot be a future life, in
+which each individual man may have unquestionable proof of Theism? It is
+a perfectly philosophical statement for any one to make that, as matters
+now stand, he can see no evidence of Theism; but to say that he knows
+the human race never can have such evidence, is a most unphilosophical
+statement, seeing that it could only be justified by absolute knowledge.
+And, on this account, I say that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so
+far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is the very reverse
+of agnostic.
+
+Now, the theory of Monism alone, as observed in the text, appears to be
+purely agnostic in the sense just explained. If in some parts of the
+foregoing essay I appear to have been arguing in favour of theistic
+implications, this has only been in order to show (as against Clifford)
+that the world does admit of being regarded as an eject. But inasmuch
+as--religious faith apart--we are not able to verify any such ejective
+interpretation, we are not able to estimate its value. Monism sanctions
+the shading of _x_ as deeply as we choose; but the shading which it
+sanctions is only provisional.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM.
+
+
+In the foregoing chapters I have considered the theory of Monism, first
+in contrast with the theories of Materialism and of Spiritualism, and
+next in relation to the theory of Theism. In this chapter and that which
+succeeds it I propose to consider Monism in relation to the Will. To do
+this it is needful to begin by considering the problems which are
+presented by the Will in relation to the older theories of Materialism
+on the one hand and of Spiritualism on the other.
+
+Although the phenomena of volition have occupied so large a province of
+philosophical literature, the fundamental problems which arise in
+connexion with them are only two in number, and both admit of being
+stated in extremely simple terms. The historical order in which these
+two problems have arisen is the inverse of their logical order. For
+while in logical order the two problems would stand thus--Is the Will an
+agent? If so, is it a free agent?--in actual discussion it was long
+taken for granted that the Will is an agent, and hence the only
+controversy gathered round the question whether the Will is a free
+agent. Descartes, indeed, seems to have entertained the prior question
+with regard to animals, and there are passages in the _Leviathan_ which
+may be taken to imply that Hobbes entertained this question with regard
+to man. But it was not until recent years that any such question could
+stand upon a basis of science as distinguished from speculation; the
+question did not admit of being so much as stated in terms of science
+until physiology was in a position openly to challenge our right to
+assume that the Will is an agent. Such a challenge physiology has now
+given, and even declared that any assumption of volitional agency is, in
+the presence of adequate physiological knowledge, impossible.
+
+The two problems which I thus state separately are often, and indeed
+generally, confused together; but for the purpose of clear analysis it
+is of the first importance that they should be kept apart. In order to
+show the wide distinction between them, we may best begin with a brief
+consideration of what it is that the two problems severally involve; and
+to do this we may best take the problems in what I have called their
+logical order.
+
+First, then, as regards the question whether the Will is an agent, the
+rival theories of Materialism and Spiritualism stand to one another in a
+relation of contradiction. For it is of the essence of Spiritualism to
+regard the Will as an agent, or as an original cause of bodily movement,
+and therefore as a true cause in Nature. On the other hand, it is of the
+essence of Materialism to deny that the Will is an agent. Hitherto,
+indeed, materialists as a body have not expressly recognized this
+implication as necessarily belonging to their theory; but that this
+implication does necessarily belong to their theory--or rather, I should
+say, really constitutes its most distinctive feature--admits of being
+easily shown. For the theory that material changes are the causes of
+mental changes necessarily terminates in the so-called theory of
+conscious automatism--or the theory that so far as the conditions to
+bodily action are concerned, consciousness is adventitious, bearing the
+same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as the striking
+of a clock bears to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. From
+this conclusion there is no possibility of escape, if once we accept the
+premises of Materialism; and therefore I say it belongs to the essence
+of Materialism to deny the agency of Will.
+
+Just as necessarily does it belong to the essence of Monism to affirm
+the agency of Will. For, according to this theory, while motion is
+producing nothing but motion, mind-change nothing but mind-change, both
+are producing both simultaneously; neither could be what it is without
+the other, for each is to the other a necessary counterpart or
+supplement, in the absence of which the whole causation (whether
+regarded from the physical or mental side) would not be complete.
+
+Now, in my opinion the importance of the view thus presented by the
+theory of Monism is, for all purposes of psychological analysis,
+inestimable. It is impossible nowadays that such analysis can proceed
+very far in any direction without confronting the facts presented by
+physiology: hence it is impossible for such analysis to confine itself
+exclusively to the spiritual or subjective side of psychology. On the
+other hand, in so far as such analysis has regard to the material or
+objective side, it has hitherto appeared to countenance--in however
+disguised a form--the dogmatic denial of the Will as an agent. Hence the
+supreme importance to psychology of reconciling the hitherto rival
+theories of Spiritualism and Materialism in the higher synthesis which
+is furnished by the theory of Monism. For, obviously, in the absence of
+any philosophical justification of the Will as an agent, we are without
+any guarantee that all psychological inquiry is not a vain beating of
+the air. If, as Materialism necessarily implies, the Will is not a cause
+in Nature, there would be no reason in Nature for the agency either of
+feeling or of intelligence. Feeling and intelligence would, therefore,
+stand as ciphers in the general constitution of things; and any inquiry
+touching their internal system of causation could have no reference to
+any scientific inquiry touching causation in general. I am aware that
+this truth is habitually overlooked by psychologists; but it is none
+the less a truth of fundamental importance to the whole superstructure
+of this science. Or, in other words, unless psychologists will expressly
+consent to rear their science on the basis provided by the philosophical
+theory of Monism, there is nothing to save it from logical
+disintegration; apart from this basis, the whole science is, so to
+speak, built in the air, like an unsubstantial structure of clouds.
+Psychologists, I repeat, habitually ignore this fact, and constantly
+speak of feeling and intelligence as true causes of adjustive action;
+but by so doing they merely beg from this contradictory theory of
+Spiritualism a flat denial of the fundamental postulate on which they
+elsewhere proceed--the postulate, namely, that mental changes are
+determined by cerebral changes. Consider, for example, the following
+passage from Mr. Spencer's _Principles of Psychology_ (� 125), which
+serves to show in brief compass the logical incoherency which in this
+matter runs through his whole work:--
+
+     'Those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the
+     average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities
+     conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and
+     habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or
+     indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been,
+     other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals
+     among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were
+     the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.'
+
+The argument here is that the 'adjustments of feelings to actions,' when
+once attained, leads in turn to an adjustment of actions to
+feelings--or, as I have myself stated the argument in my _Mental
+Evolution in Animals_, 'the _raison d'�tre_ of Pleasure and Pain has
+been that of furnishing organisms with guides to adjustive action:
+moreover, as in the case of direct sensation dictating any simple
+adjustment for the sake of securing an immediate good, so in the case of
+instinct dictating a more intricate action for the sake of eventually
+securing a more remote good (whether for self, progeny, or community);
+and so, likewise, in the case of reason dictating a still more intricate
+adjustment for the sake of securing a good still more remote--in all
+cases, that is, where volition is concerned, pleasures and pains are the
+guides of action.' But thus to affirm that pleasures and pains are the
+guides of action is merely another way of affirming that the Will is an
+agent--a cause of bodily movement, and, as such, a cause in Nature. Now,
+as we have seen, Mr. Spencer not only affirms this--or rather assumes
+it--but proceeds to render an _a priori_ explanation of the accuracy of
+the guidance. Yet he nowhere considers the fundamental question--Why
+should we suppose that the Will is an agent at all? Assuredly the answer
+given by physiology to this question is a simple denial that we have any
+justification so to regard the Will: in view of her demonstration of
+conscious automatism, she can see no reason why there should be any
+connexion at all between a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain
+and an objective fact of 'agreement or disagreement with the
+environment'--nay, one of the most eminent of her priesthood has
+declared that there _is_ no more connexion between the ambition of a
+Napoleon and a general commotion of Europe, than there is between the
+puff of a steam-whistle and the locomotion of a train. And, as I have
+now repeatedly insisted, on grounds of physiology alone this is the only
+logical conclusion at which it is possible to arrive. Yet Mr. Spencer,
+while elsewhere proceeding on the lines of physiology, whenever he
+encounters the question of the agency of Will, habitually jumps the
+whole gulf that separates Materialism from Spiritualism. And this
+wonderful feat of intellectual athletics is likewise performed, so far
+at least as I am aware, by every other psychologist who has proceeded on
+the lines of physiology. Indeed, the logical incoherency is not so
+serious in Mr. Spencer's case as it is in that of many other writers
+whom I need not wait to name. For Mr. Spencer does not seek to found his
+system on a basis of avowed Materialism, and, therefore, he may be said
+to have left this fundamental question of volitional agency in abeyance.
+But all those writers who have reared their systems of psychology on a
+basis of avowed Materialism--or, which is the same thing, on a basis of
+physiology alone--lay themselves open to the charge of grossest
+inconsistency when they thus assume that the Will is an agent. It is
+impossible that these writers can both have their cake and eat it.
+Either they must forego their Materialism, or else they must cease to
+speak of 'motives determining action,' 'conduct being governed by
+pleasures and pains,' 'voluntary movements in their last resort being
+all due to bodily feelings,' 'the highest morality and the lowest vice
+being alike the result of a pursuit of happiness,' &c. &c. And, so far
+as I can see, it is only in the way above indicated, or on the theory of
+Monism, that it is possible, without ignoring the facts of physiology on
+the one hand or those of psychology on the other, philosophically to
+save the agency of Will.
+
+From this brief exposition it may be gathered that on the materialistic
+theory it is impossible that the Will can be, in any sense of the term,
+an agent; that on the spiritualistic theory the Will is regarded as an
+agent, but only in the sense of a non-natural or miraculous cause; and,
+lastly, that on the monistic theory the Will is saved as an agent, or
+may be properly regarded and as properly denominated a true cause, in
+the ordinary sense of that term. For this, as well as for other reasons
+which need not here be specified, I accept in philosophy the theory of
+Monism; and am thus entitled in psychology to proceed upon the doctrine
+that the Will is an agent. We have next to consider the ulterior
+question whether upon this theory the Will may be properly regarded as a
+free agent.
+
+By a free agent is understood an agent that is able to act without
+restraint, or spontaneously. The word 'free,' therefore, bears a very
+different meaning when applied exclusively to the Will, and when
+applied more generally to the living organism. For we may properly say
+that a man, or an animal, is free when he, or it, is at liberty to act
+in accordance with desire. Touching the fact of freedom in this sense
+there is, of course, no question. We have not to consider the possible
+freedom of man, but the possible freedom of Will; we have not to
+contemplate whether a man may be free to do what he wills, but whether
+he can be free to will what he wills. Such being the question, we have
+to consider it in relation to the three philosophical theories already
+stated--Materialism, Spiritualism, and Monism.
+
+For the theory of Materialism the present question has no existence. If
+this announcement appears startling, it can only be because no
+materialist has ever taken the trouble to formulate his own theory with
+distinctness. For, as previously shown, Materialism necessarily involves
+the doctrine of conscious automatism; but, if so, the Will is concluded
+not to be an agent at all, and therefore it becomes idle to discuss
+whether, in any impossible exercise of its agency, it is free or subject
+to restraint. The most that in this connexion could logically stand to
+be considered by the advocates of Materialism would be whether or not
+the adventitious and inefficacious feelings of subjectivity which are
+associated with cerebral activity are determinate or free; but this
+would probably be regarded on all hands as a somewhat useless topic of
+discussion, and certainly in any case would have no reference to the
+question of free _agency_. The point to be clearly understood is that,
+according to the materialistic theory, a motor is distinct from a
+motive, although in some unaccountable manner the motor is able to cause
+the motive. But the motive, when thus caused, is not supposed to exert
+any causal influence on bodily action; it is supposed to begin and end
+as a motive, or never itself to become a motor. In other words, as
+before stated, the Will is not supposed to be an agent; and, therefore,
+to this theory the doctrine of free-will and of determinism are alike
+irrelevant. We need not wait to prove that this important fact is
+habitually overlooked by materialists themselves, or that whenever a
+materialist espouses the cause of determinism, he is thereby and for the
+time being vacating his position as a materialist; for if, according to
+his theory, the Will is not an agent, he is merely impugning his own
+doctrines by consenting to discuss the conditions of its agency.
+
+The theory of Spiritualism and the theory of Monism agree in holding
+that the Will is an agent; and, therefore, to both of these theories the
+question whether the Will is a free agent is a real question. Here,
+then, it devolves upon us to consider carefully the logical status of
+the rival doctrines of so-called Liberty and Necessity. For convenience
+of arrangement in what follows, we may best begin with the doctrine of
+Necessity, or Determinism.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM.
+
+
+We have now seen that, according to Materialism, the Will is not an
+agent, while according both to Spiritualism and to Monism the Will is an
+agent. Touching the further question, whether the Will is a free agent,
+we have seen that while the question does not exist for Materialism, it
+appears to require a negative answer both from Spiritualism and from
+Monism. For, as regards its relation to Spiritualism, when once the
+ground is cleared of certain errors of statement and fallacies of
+reasoning, we appear to find that unless the will is held to be
+motiveless--which would be to destroy not only the doctrine of moral
+responsibility, but likewise that of universal causation--it must be
+regarded as subject to law, or as determined in its action by the nature
+of its past history and present circumstances. Lastly, the theory of
+Monism appears likewise to deny the possibility of freedom as an
+attribute of Will; for, according to this theory, mental processes are
+one and the same with physical processes, and hence it does not appear
+that the doctrine of determinism could well be taught in a manner more
+emphatic.
+
+Thus far, then, the doctrine of determinism is seen to be victorious
+over the doctrine of freedom all along the line. By Materialism the
+question of freedom is excluded _ab initio_; by Spiritualism and by
+Monism, so far as yet seen, it can be logically answered only in the
+negative. From which it follows that the sense of moral responsibility
+is of the nature of a vast illusion, the historical genesis of which
+admits of being easily traced, and the authority of which is thus
+destroyed. Although it may still serve to supply motives to conduct, it
+seems that it can do so only in the way that belongs to
+superstition--that Conscience, as I have before said, is the bogey of
+mankind, and that belief in its authority is like belief in witchcraft,
+destined to dwindle and to fade before the advance of a better or more
+complete knowledge of natural causation.
+
+But the discussion must not end here. Hitherto I have presented the case
+Liberty _versus_ Necessity with all the impartiality of which I am
+capable; but I have done so without travelling an inch beyond those
+limits of discussion within which the question has been debated by
+previous writers. I believe, indeed, that I have pointed out several
+important oversights which have been made on both sides of the question;
+but in doing this I have not gone further than the philosophical basis
+upon which the question has been hitherto argued. My object, however,
+in publishing these papers is not that of destructive criticism; and
+what I have done in this direction has been done only in order to
+prepare the way for what is now to follow. Having shown, as it appears
+to me conclusively, that upon both the rival theories of Materialism and
+Spiritualism--the doctrine of Liberty, and therefore of Moral
+Responsibility--must logically fall, I now hope to show that this
+doctrine admits of being re-established on a basis furnished by the
+theory of Monism.
+
+It often happens that an elaborate structure of argument, which is
+perfectly sound and complete upon the basis furnished by a given
+hypothesis, admits of being wholly disintegrated when the fundamental
+hypothesis is shown to be either provisional or untrue. And such, I
+believe, is the case with the issue now before us. For the issue Liberty
+_versus_ Necessity has hitherto been argued on the common assumption
+that natural causation is not merely the most ultimate principle which
+the human mind can reach; but also a principle which is, in some way or
+another, external to that mind. It has been taken for granted by both
+sides in the controversy that if our volitions can be proved to depend
+upon natural causation, as rigid in its sequences within the sphere of a
+human mind as within that of a calculating machine, there must be an end
+of the controversy; seeing that our volitions would be thus proved to be
+rigidly determined by those same principles of fixed order, or 'natural
+law,' which are external to, or independent of, the human mind--quite as
+much as they are external to, or independent of, the calculating
+machine. Now, it is this assumption which I challenge. The theory of
+Monism entitles one to deny that when we have driven the question down
+to the granite bed of natural causation, nothing more remains to be
+done; according to this theory it still remains to be asked, What is the
+nature of this natural causation? Is it indeed the ultimate datum of
+experience, below which the human mind cannot go? And is it indeed so
+far external to, or independent of, the human mind, that the latter
+stands to it in the relation of a slave to a master--coerced as to
+action by the conditions which that master has laid down?
+
+Now these questions are all virtually answered in the affirmative by the
+dualistic theory of Spiritualism. For the Will is here regarded as an
+agent bound to act in accordance with those conditions of external
+necessity which dualism recognizes as natural causation. Its internal
+causation thus becomes but the reflex of external; and the reflection
+becomes known internally as the consciousness of motive. Hence, the Will
+cannot be philosophically liberated from the toils of this external
+necessity, so long as dualism recognizes that necessity as existing
+independently of the Will, and thus imposing its conditions on
+volitional activity. But the theory of Monism, by identifying external
+with internal causation--or physical processes with psychical
+processes--philosophically saves the doctrine of freedom, and with it
+the doctrine of moral responsibility. Moreover, it does so without
+relying upon any precarious appeal to the direct testimony of
+consciousness itself. As this view of the subject is one by no means
+easy of apprehension, I will endeavour to unfold it part by part.
+
+To begin with, Monism excludes the possibility of volition being
+determined by cerebration. Let us suppose, for example, that a sequence
+of ideas, _A, B, C, D_, occurs in the mind, which on its obverse or
+cerebral aspect may be represented by the sequence _a, b, c, d_. Here
+the parallelism is not due, as supposed by Materialism, to _a_
+determining _Ab_, _b_ determining _Bc_, &c.; it is due to _Aa_
+determining _Bb_, _Bb_ determining _Cc_, &c.--the two apparently diverse
+causal sequences being really but one causal sequence. If the
+determinist should rejoin that a causal sequence of some kind is all
+that he demands--that the Will is equally proved to be unfree, whether
+it be bound by the causal sequence _a, b, c, d_, or by the causal
+sequence _Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd_--I answer that this is a point which we have
+to consider by-and-by. Meanwhile I am only endeavouring to make clear
+the essential distinction between the philosophical theories of Monism
+and Materialism. And the effect of this distinction is to show that, for
+the purposes of clear analysis, we may wholly neglect either side of the
+double reality. If we happen to be engaged on any physiological
+inquiry, we may altogether neglect the processes of ideation with which
+any process of cerebration may be concerned; while, if we happen to be
+engaged upon any psychological inquiry, we may similarly neglect the
+processes of cerebration with which any process of ideation may be
+concerned. Seeing that each is equally an index of a common sequence, it
+can make no difference which of them we take as our guide, although for
+purposes of practical inquiry it is of course expedient to take the
+cerebral index when we are dealing with the objective side of the
+problem, and the mental index when dealing with the subjective. In the
+following pages, therefore, I shall altogether neglect the cerebral
+index. The inquiry on which we are engaged belongs to the region of
+mind, and, therefore, after what has just been said, it will be apparent
+that I am entitled to adopt the standpoint of a spiritualist, to the
+extent of fastening attention only upon the mental side of the problem.
+For although the theory of Monism teaches, as against Spiritualism, that
+no one of the mental sequences could take place without a corresponding
+physical sequence, the theory also teaches the converse proposition; and
+therefore it makes no difference which of the two phenomenal sequences
+is taken as our index of the ontological.
+
+Now, it clearly makes a great difference whether the mental changes
+concerned in volition are regarded as effects or as causes. According
+to Materialism, the mental changes are the effects of cerebral changes,
+which were themselves the effects of precedent cerebral changes.
+According to Spiritualism, these mental changes are the causes, not only
+of the cerebral changes, but also of one another. According to Monism,
+the mental changes may be regarded as the causes of the cerebral, or
+_vice versa_, seeing that in neither case are we stating a real
+truth--the real truth being that it is only a cerebro-mental change
+which can cause any change either of cerebration or of mentation. Now it
+is evident that if the mental processes were always the effects of
+cerebral processes (Materialism), there could be no further question
+with regard to Liberty and Necessity; while, if the mental processes are
+the causes both of the cerebral processes and of one another
+(Spiritualism), the question before us becomes raised to a higher level.
+The causality in question being now regarded as purely mental, the will
+is no longer regarded as a passive slave of the brain, and the only
+thing to be considered is whether freedom is compatible with causation
+of a purely mental kind. Now, at an earlier stage of our enquiry I have
+argued that it is not; but this argument was based entirely upon
+spiritualistic premises, or upon the assumption that the principle of
+causality is everywhere external to, or independent of, the human
+mind--under which assumption I cannot see that it makes much difference
+whether the coercion comes from the brain alone, or from the whole
+general system of things external to the human mind. And here it is that
+I think the theory of Monism comes to the rescue.
+
+For, if physical and mental processes are everywhere consubstantial, or
+identical in kind, it can make no difference whether we regard their
+sequences as objective or ejective, physical or spiritual. Hence, we are
+free to regard all causation as of a character essentially psychical.
+But, if so, it must be self-contained as psychical; it cannot be in any
+way determined by anything from without, seeing that outside itself
+there is nothing in the Universe. Now, if this is true of the
+World-eject, it must also be true of the Man-eject, as well as of the
+Man-subject, or Ego. If all causation is psychical, that portion of it
+which belongs to, or is manifested by, my own personality is not laid
+upon me by anything from without; it is merely the expression of my own
+psychical activity, as this is taking place within the circumscribed
+area of my own personality. And this activity is spontaneous, in the
+sense that it is not coerced from without. All the sequences which that
+activity displays within this region are self-determined, in the sense
+that they are determined by the self, and not by any agency external to
+it. The only influence which any external agency can here exert, is that
+of insisting that bodily action--the physical outcome of my psychical
+processes--shall be in accordance with the conditions imposed by the
+internal system of causation; but this does not influence in any degree
+those mental processes which do not express themselves in bodily action.
+Hence, it may be perfectly true that my bodily action in the past might
+have been different from what it actually was; for as this action was
+the outcome of my mentation at the time (according to the spiritual
+index, which is now our guide), and as this mentation was not coerced
+from without, it might very well have been different from what it was.
+Each of the mental sequences at that time was a result of those
+preceding and a cause of those succeeding; but behind all this play of
+mental causation there all the while stood that Self, which was at once
+the condition of its occurrence, and the _First Cause_ of its action. It
+is not true that that Self was nothing more than the result of all this
+play of mental causation; it can only have been the First Cause of it.
+For, otherwise, the mental causation must have been the cause of that
+causation, which is absurd. Who or What it was that originally caused
+this First Cause is, of course, another question, which I shall
+presently hope to show is not merely unanswerable, but unmeaning. As a
+matter of fact, however, we know that this Self is here, and that it can
+thus be proved to be a substance, _standing under_ the whole of that
+more superficial display of mental causation which it is able to look
+upon introspectively--and this almost as _impersonally_ as if it were
+regarding the display as narrated by another mind. I say, then, that
+the theory of Monism entitles us to regard this Self as the _fons et
+origo_ of our mental causation, and thus restores to us the doctrine of
+Liberty with its attendant consequence of Moral Responsibility.
+
+It may help to elucidate this matter if we regard it from another point
+of view. According to Hobbes, 'Liberty is the absence of all impediments
+to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical qualities
+of the agent.' Now, if we accept this definition, it is easy to show
+that the theory of Monism is really at one with the doctrine of Liberty.
+For, in the first place, according to the theory of Monism, the neurosis
+of the brain could not be what it is without the psychosis of the mind.
+Consequently, as above shown, it would be equally incorrect to say that
+the neurosis governs the psychosis, as it would be to say that the
+psychosis governs the neurosis. But, if so, the Will is free in
+accordance with Hobbes' definition of freedom. Suppose, for example,
+that on seeing a bone I think of Professor Flower, then remember that a
+long time ago I lent his book on Osteology to a friend, and forthwith
+resolve to ask my friend what has become of it; here my ultimate
+volition would be unfree if it were the effect of physical processes
+going on in my brain. But the volition might be free if each of these
+mental processes were the result of the preceding one, seeing that there
+may then have been 'an absence of all impediments' to the occurrence of
+these processes.
+
+Of course it will be objected--as I have myself urged in the preceding
+chapter--that causal action of any kind is incompatible with freedom of
+volition--that if there be any such causal action, even though it be
+wholly restricted within the sphere of mind, the Will is really
+compelled to will as it does will, is determined to determine as it does
+determine, and hence that its apparent freedom is illusory. Hobbes'
+definition, it may be urged, when applied to the case of the Will, is
+equivocal. No doubt a man is free as to his _action_, if there be an
+'absence of all impediments' to his action--or, in other words, if he is
+able to act as he wills to act. But it does not follow that he is free
+as to his _will_, even though there be an absence of all impediments to
+his willing as he wills to will. For here the very question is as to
+whether there are any impediments to his willing otherwise than he does
+will. The fact that he wills to will as he does will proves that there
+are no impediments to his willing in that direction; but is there a
+similar absence of impediments to his willing to will in any other
+direction? If so, we are still within the lines of determinism. Thus
+Hobbes' definition of freedom really applies only to freedom of bodily
+action; not to freedom of volition, seeing that if my will is caused I
+could not have willed to will otherwise than I did will. Now, the answer
+which Monism supplies to this objection is that the will itself is here
+the ultimate agent, and _therefore an agent which must be identified
+with the principle of causality_. In other words, the very reason why we
+feel that Hobbes' definition of liberty, while perfectly valid as
+regards bodily action, seems to lack something when applied to volition,
+is because volition belongs to the sphere of mind--belongs, therefore,
+to that sphere which the theory of Monism regards as identical with
+causality itself. Although it is true that volitions are caused by
+motives, yet it is the mind which conditions the motives, and therefore
+its own volitions. It is not true that the mind is always the passive
+slave of causes, known to it as motives. The human mind is itself a
+causal agent, having the same kind of priority within the microcosm as
+the World-eject has in the macrocosm. Therefore its motives are in large
+part matters of its own creation. In the intricate workings of its own
+internal machinery innumerable patterns of thought are turned out, some
+of which it selects as good, while others it rejects as bad; but no one
+of which could have come into being at all without this causal agency of
+the mind itself.
+
+It will probably be objected that even though all this were granted, we
+cannot thus save the doctrine of moral responsibility. For it may appear
+that the liberty which is thus accorded to the Will is nothing better
+than liberty to will at random, as argued in my previous essay. But here
+we must observe that although we are thus shown free to will at random,
+it does not follow that we are likewise free to act in accordance with
+our volitions. And this is a most important distinction, which
+libertarians have hitherto failed to notice. If we are free to will in
+any direction, it follows, indeed, that we are free to will at random;
+but it follows also, and for this very reason, that we are free to will
+the _impossible_. True, when we will what is known to be impossible of
+execution, we call the act an act of desire; but it is clearly the same
+in kind as an act of will, and differs only in not admitting of being
+translated into an act of body. Therefore I say that the restriction
+which is imposed upon us by the conditions of causality, whether
+external or internal, is not any restriction as to willing, but merely
+as to doing. It is not in the subjective, but in the objective world
+that we encounter the 'bondage of necessity.'
+
+Now, the knowledge that we are thus restricted as to bodily action
+imposes that kind of restraint upon volition which is termed rational.
+There is nothing in the nature of things to prevent our willing anything
+that we wish; but there is something in the nature of things to prevent
+our doing everything that we will; and as the practical object of our
+volition is that of determining bodily action, we find it expedient to
+will only such things as we believe that we can do. To this extent,
+therefore, the Will is bound--namely, by the executive capacity of the
+body. But, strictly speaking, this is not a binding of the Will _qua_
+Will. Even in such cases, as St. Paul says, to will may be present with
+us, but how to perform that which is good we find not. I say then that
+although the Will is free to will whatever it wills, nevertheless it
+would fail in its essential use or object did it refuse to will in
+accordance with the conditions which are imposed upon its executive
+capacity. Again, to quote St. Paul, the Will might say, All things for
+me are lawful; but all things are not expedient. Now, this consideration
+of expediency is one of constant and far-reaching importance. For not
+only, as already observed, does it lead to volition on the one hand as
+rational; but it also leads to volition on the other hand as moral. Let
+us take the two points separately.
+
+Do we say that a man is not free to conduct a scientific research,
+because in conducting it he must employ the needful apparatus? Or do we
+say that a man is not free to marry, because in order to do so he must
+go through a marriage ceremony? Obviously, to say such things would
+sound very like talking nonsense. It is true that in neither case is a
+man free to gain his object without adopting the means which are seen to
+be necessary under the system of external causation in which he finds
+himself; but this does not mean that he is not free to do as he wills,
+unless it so happens that he wills to do the impossible. Thus, within
+the limits that are set by the conditions of causation, a man is
+understood to be free to act as he wills so long as he is not 'impeded'
+by some of those conditions. To say that he is not free because he
+cannot get beyond those conditions would be absurd, since, apart from
+these conditions, action of any kind would be _a priori_ impossible,
+and the man would have, as his only alternative, no-action.
+
+Hence, in doing we must conform to the law of causation--which, indeed,
+is all that can be meant by doing--and if in willing what we do we must
+also conform to the law of causation, where is the difference with
+respect to freedom? Such restraint as there may be is here a restraint
+upon bodily action; not at all upon the mental action which we call
+volition. The Will may will in any way that it wills to will; but the
+body cannot act in every way that the Will may will it to act; therefore
+the Will finds it expedient to will only in such ways as the body can
+act--i. e. to conform in _its_ action to the external system of
+causation. If this condition of all action is held to be compatible with
+freedom in the one case, so in consistency must it be held in the other.
+Equally in either case the agent can only be properly said to be unfree,
+if he be subject to causal restraint from without. And in neither case
+does the universal condition of acting under the law of causation
+constitute bondage, in any other sense than that of furnishing the agent
+with his conditions to acting in any way at all. Therefore, unless it be
+said that a man is not free to do as he wills because he wills to do the
+impossible, it cannot be denied that he is free to will as he wills
+because he wills according to law. For no action of any kind is possible
+contrary to law--a general fact which goes to constitute an argument _a
+posteriori_ for the rationality of the World-eject--and if volition
+constituted an exception to this general statement, it could only do so
+by becoming no-action. Now, it is by thus willing according to law--or
+with due reference to those external conditions of causality with which
+the executive capacity has to do--that volition is rendered rational.
+The restraint laid upon volition is not laid upon it _as_ volition, but
+only in respect of execution. A man may will to marry as long and as
+hard as he chooses; but only if he further wills to take the necessary
+means can his volition become rational; it is irrational if he wills to
+marry, and at the same time wills not to go through the marriage
+ceremony. But although irrational, it is none the less free. Considered
+merely as an act of volition it is equally free, whether it be rational
+or irrational.
+
+And, similarly, it is equally free whether it be moral or immoral. The
+objection that an uncaused volition cannot be a responsible volition
+depends for its validity on the meaning which we attach to the term
+'uncaused.' If it be meant that the volition arises without any regard
+at all to the surrounding conditions of life, and is carried into effect
+without the agent being able to control it by means of any other
+voluntary act; then, indeed, whatever else such an agent may be, he
+certainly is not moral. But if it be meant that among a number of
+uncompleted volitions drawing in different directions--and all
+'uncaused' in the sense of belonging immediately to the Ego--one of
+them gains an advantage by a conscious reference of the mind to it as
+good or evil, then the agent who is capable of giving this advantage to
+that member of the system may properly be called moral. The man who
+willed to marry, and yet willed not to go through the marriage ceremony,
+was, as we have seen, irrational. Similarly, if any agent wills an
+action without being able to consider any of the consequences which it
+may involve as either moral or immoral, such an agent is what we must
+properly call unmoral. Even in such an agent, however, the Will may be
+free; only it would act without reference to any moral environment, just
+as the lunatic above supposed might endeavour to act without reference
+to any social environment.
+
+Let us look at the whole matter in yet another light. We have repeatedly
+seen that the question of free-will, and therefore of moral
+responsibility, depends upon the question as to whether a man's action
+in the past might have been other than it was, notwithstanding that all
+the conditions under which he was placed remained the same. Now, to this
+question only one answer can be given by a dualistic theory of things,
+whether materialistic or spiritualistic. For it belongs to the essence
+of a dualistic theory to regard the principle of causation as a
+principle external to, and independent of, the human mind; consequently,
+all the conditions of mental causation being given, a certain result in
+the way of volition is necessarily bound to ensue--or, in other words,
+at any given time in a man's mental history, his action cannot have
+been other than it was. But now, according to the monistic theory, all
+causation has a psychical basis--being but the objective expression to
+us of the psychical activity of the World-eject. Consequently, according
+to this theory, the course of even strictly physical causation is
+inevitable or necessary only in so far as the psychical activity of the
+World-eject is held to be uniform, or consistent within itself. And
+forasmuch as all our knowledge of physical causation is necessarily
+empirical, we have but very inadequate means of judging how far this
+empirical index is a true gauge of the reality. We can, indeed, predict
+an eclipse centuries in advance; but we can only do so on the
+supposition that such and such physical conditions remain constant, and
+we have no right to affirm that such must be the case. Our knowledge of
+physical causation, being but empirical, is probably but a very
+inadequate translation of the psychical activity of the World-eject; and
+hence, not only have we no right to predict a future eclipse with
+certainty, but we have not so much as the right to affirm that even a
+past eclipse must have taken place of necessity. For we have no right to
+affirm that at any one period of cosmic history the action of the
+World-eject must have been what it was, or could not have been other
+than it was. Our knowledge of the obverse aspect of this action (in the
+course of physical causation) is, as I have said, purely empirical; and
+this is merely another way of saying that although we do know what the
+action of the World-eject has been at such and such a period of cosmic
+history, we can have no means of knowing what else it might have been.
+For anything that we can tell to the contrary, the whole history of the
+solar system, for example, might have been quite different from what it
+has been; the course which it actually has run may have been but one out
+of an innumerable number of possible alternatives, any other of which
+might just as well have been adopted by the World-eject.
+
+Now, if this is true of natural causation in the case of the macrocosm,
+it would appear to be equally so of natural causation in the case of the
+microcosm. Indeed, prediction in the case of human activity is so much
+less certain than in the case of cosmic activity, that the attribute of
+free-will is generally ascribed to the former, while rarely suggested as
+possibly belonging to the latter. And similarly as regards past action.
+If we are unable to say that at any period in the past history of the
+solar system the World-eject might not have deflected the whole stream
+of events into some other channel, how can we be able to say that at any
+given period of his past history the Man-eject could not have performed
+an analogous act? Obviously, the only reason why we are not accustomed
+to entertain this supposition in either case, is because our judgements
+are beset with the assumption that the principle of causality is prior
+to that of mind--something of the nature of Fate superior even to the
+gods. And, no less obviously, if once we see any reason to regard the
+principle of causality as merely co-extensive with that of mind, the
+whole question as between Necessity and Free-will lapses; there is
+nothing to show that a man's action in the past might not have been
+other than it was. The only outward restraint placed upon the exercise
+of his Will is then seen to be imposed by the conditions of its
+executive capacity, and this restraint it is that constitutes man a
+rational agent. On the other hand, the structure of conscience--however
+we may suppose this to have been formed--imposes that further and inward
+restraint upon his Will, which constitutes man a moral agent. But
+neither of these restraints can properly be said to constitute bondage
+in the sense required by Necessitarianism, because neither of them
+requires that the man's Will must will as it does will; they require
+merely that his Will should act in certain ways if it is to accomplish
+certain results; and to this extent only is it subject to law, or to the
+incidence of those external influences which help to shape our motives.
+
+But if this is so, is it not obvious that the sense of moral
+responsibility is rationally justified? This sense goes upon the
+supposition that a man's conduct in the past might have been different
+from what it was. Clearly, therefore, no question of moral
+responsibility can ever obtain in cases where the general system of
+external causation, or natural law, rendered an alternative line of
+action physically impossible. _The question of moral responsibility can
+only obtain in cases where two or more lines of conduct were alike
+possible, so far as the external system of causation is concerned--or
+where the Will was equally free to choose between two or more courses of
+bodily action._ In other words, the question of moral responsibility has
+nothing to do with the only kind of bondage to which, according to our
+present point of view, the Will is subject--namely the bondage of being
+rationally obliged to will only what is capable of performance. The
+question of moral responsibility has only to do with the system of
+causation which is inherent in the mind itself; not with the system that
+is external to the mind. And as the theory of Monism identifies the mind
+with this its own inherent system of causation--or regards a man's Will
+as the originator of a particular portion of general causality--it
+follows from the theory that a man is justly liable to moral praise or
+blame as the case may be: the moral sense no longer appears as a
+gigantic illusion: conscience is justified at the bar of reason.
+
+It appears to me impossible that any valid exception can be taken to the
+above reasoning, if once the premiss is granted--namely, that the
+principle of Causality admits of being regarded as identical with that
+of Volition. For if Cause is but another name for Will--whether the Will
+be subjective or ejective--it follows that my will is a first cause,
+which is determined by other causes only in so far as the executive
+capacity of my body is so determined. As the whole stress of any
+objection to the present argument must thus be brought to bear upon the
+validity of this its fundamental premiss, a few words may now be said to
+show that the premiss is not wholly gratuitous. Of course the reason why
+at first sight it is apt to appear, not only gratuitous, but even
+grotesque, is because in these days of physical science the minds of
+most of us are dominated by the unthinking persuasion that the principle
+of causality is the most ultimate principle which our minds can reach.
+Most of us accept this persuasion as almost of the nature of an axiom,
+and hence the mere suggestion that our own volitions are really uncaused
+appears to us of the nature of a self-evident absurdity. A little
+thought, however, is enough to show that the only ground of reason which
+this strong prepossession can rest upon, is the assumption that the
+principle of causality is logically prior to that of mind. Therefore it
+is the validity of this assumption that we have here to investigate.
+
+In the first place, then, the assumption is _ipso facto_ irrational. For
+it is evident that in order to make the assumption there must already be
+a mind to make it. In other words, the very conception of the principle
+of causality implies a thinking substance wherein that conception
+arises, and therefore, as a mere matter of formal statement, it is
+impossible to assign logical priority to this conception over the thing
+whereby it is conceived.
+
+In the next place, when we carefully analyze the nature of this
+conception itself, we find that it arises immediately out of our
+conception of Being as Being. This is shown by the idea of _equivalency_
+between cause and effect, which is an essential feature of the
+conception of causality as such. In other words, the statement of any
+causal relation is merely a statement of the fact that both the matter
+and the energy concerned in the event were of a permanent nature and
+unalterable amount. Therefore, _if_ the ultimate Reality is mental,
+Causation _must_ be ontologically identical with Volition. And that the
+ultimate Reality is either mental, or something greater, seems to be
+proved by the consideration that if it be supposed anything _less_,
+there must be an end of the conception of equivalency as between cause
+and effect, and so of the conception of causality itself; for, clearly,
+if my mind has been caused by anything less than itself, there is an end
+of any possible equivalency between the activity of that thing as a
+cause, and the occurrence of my mind as an effect[13].
+
+Lastly, the conception of causality essentially involves the idea of
+finality as existing somewhere. Here I cannot do better than quote some
+extracts from Canon Mozley's essay on 'The Principle of Causation,' as
+he manages very tersely to convey the gist of previous philosophizing
+upon this subject.
+
+     'He (Clarke) brings out simply at bottom the meaning and
+     significance of an idea in the human mind, that there is implied in
+     the very idea itself of cause, firstly, that it causes something
+     else; and secondly, that it is uncaused itself.... An infinite
+     series of causes does not make a cause; ... an infinite succession
+     of causes rests, by the very hypothesis, upon no cause; each
+     particular one rests on the one which follows it, but the whole
+     rests upon nothing.... If from one cause we have to go back to
+     another, that which we go back from is not the cause, but that
+     which we go back to is. The very idea of cause, as I have said,
+     implies a stop; and wherever we stop is the cause.... A true cause
+     is a First Cause.... The atheistic idea thus does not correspond to
+     the idea of reason. The atheist appears to acknowledge the
+     necessity of a cause, and appears to provide for it; but when we
+     come to his scheme it fails exactly in that part of the idea which
+     clenches it, and which is essential to its integrity; it fails in
+     providing a stop; ... One might say to him, Why do you give
+     yourself the trouble to supply causation at all? You do so because
+     you consider yourself obliged in reason to do it, but if you supply
+     causation at all, why not furnish such a cause as reason has
+     impressed upon you, and which is inherent in your mind--a cause
+     which stands still, an original cause? If you never intended to
+     supply this, it must have been because you thought a real cause was
+     not wanted; but if you thought a cause not wanted, why not have
+     said from the first that causes were not wanted, and said from the
+     first that events could take place without causes?'
+
+Or, to quote a more recent authority, and one speaking from the side of
+physical science, Prof. Huxley writes:--
+
+     'The student of nature who starts from the axiom of the
+     universality of the law of causation, cannot refuse to admit an
+     eternal existence; if he admits the conservation of energy, he
+     cannot deny the possibility of an eternal energy; if he admits the
+     existence of immaterial phenomena in the form of consciousness, he
+     must admit the possibility, at any rate, of an eternal series of
+     such phenomena; and, if his studies have not been barren of the
+     best fruit of the investigation of nature, he will have enough
+     sense to see that, when Spinoza says, "Per Deum intelligo ens
+     absolute infinitum, hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis
+     attributis," the God so conceived is one that only a very great
+     fool would deny, even in his heart. Physical science is as little
+     Atheistic as it is Materialistic[14].'
+
+Now, if it thus belongs to the essence of our idea of causation that
+finality must be reached somewhere, I do not know where this is so
+likely to be reached as at that principle wherein the idea itself takes
+its rise--viz. Mind. But, if so, the statement that any particular acts
+of mind are uncaused ceases to present any character of self-evident
+absurdity.
+
+And the argument need not end here. For Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown
+that our idea of causation, not merely requires a mind for its
+occurrence, but that in every mind where it does occur it has been
+directly formed out of experiences of effort in acts of volition. So
+that whether we analyze the idea of cause as we actually discover it in
+our own minds, or investigate the history of its genesis, we alike find,
+as we might have antecedently expected, that it is dependent on our more
+ultimate idea of mind as mind; the conception of causality is not, as a
+matter of fact, original or primal, but derivative or secondary.
+Therefore, if this conception necessarily involves the postulation of a
+first cause, there can be no doubt that such a cause can only be
+conceived as of the nature of mind. From which it follows that each
+individual mind requires to be regarded--if it is regarded at all--as of
+the nature of a first cause.
+
+From this, however, it does not follow that each individual mind
+requires to be regarded as wholly independent of all other causes, or as
+never subject to any causal influence which may be exercised by other
+minds. Although each mind presents the feature of finality or
+spontaneity, this does not hinder that it also presents the feature of
+relation to other minds, which, therefore, are able to act upon it in
+numberless ways. Now, whether these minds are the minds of other men, of
+other intelligent beings, or of the whole World-eject, the causal
+activity which is exerted upon my mind expresses itself in that mind as
+a consciousness of motives. But although these motives may help to
+determine my volitions, there is no reason to suppose that they are
+themselves the volitions, or that without them my mind would cease to be
+itself a causal agent. On the contrary, if this were supposed, the
+supposition would amount to destroying the causal agency of my own mind,
+which, as we have just seen, must either be original or not at all.
+
+The way, therefore, that the matter stands is this. In so far as the
+microcosm is a circumscribed system of being--a thinking substance, a
+personality--it is of the nature of a first cause, free to act in any
+direction as to its thinking and willing, even though its thinking
+should be irrational as to truth, and its willing impossible as to
+execution. But in so far as the microcosm enters into relation with the
+macrocosm, the system of external causation which it encounters
+determines the character of its volitions. For although these volitions
+are themselves of the nature of first causes, it is no contradiction to
+say that they are--at all events in large measure--determined by other
+and external causes. This is no contradiction because, although they are
+thus determined, it does not follow that they are thus determined
+_necessarily_, and this makes all the difference between the theory of
+will as bond or free. In any stream of secondary causation each member
+of the series is understood to determine the next member of necessity;
+and it is because this notion is imported into psychology that the
+theory of determinism regards it as axiomatic that, if our volitions are
+in any way caused at all, they can only be caused by way of necessity;
+and hence that under the operation of any given set of motives the
+action of the will can only take place in the direction of the
+resultant. But any such axiom is valid only within the region of second
+causes. On the hypothesis that volitions are first causes, the axiom is
+irrelevant to them; for although it may be true that they are determined
+by causes from without, it may not be true that they are thus determined
+of necessity: their intrinsic character as themselves first causes,
+although not isolating them from any possible contact with other causes,
+nevertheless does protect them from being necessarily coerced by these
+causes, and therefore from becoming but the mere effects of them. Such
+influence, or determination, as is exerted upon the Will by these
+external causes is exerted only because any individual mind is not
+itself a macrocosm, but a microcosm in relation to a macrocosm. If it
+were itself a macrocosm, standing out of relation to all other being,
+its prime causation would, of course, be wholly uninfluenced by any
+other causation; its volitions would then be concerned only with the
+determination of its own thoughts in a constant stream of purely
+subjective contemplation, such as that which the Hindoo philosophy
+attributes to God. But as the human mind discovers itself as existing in
+close and complex relations with an external world of an orderly
+character, the human mind finds that it is, as before said, _expedient_
+to adapt the course of its own causal activity so as to bring it into
+harmony with the external order. For, although its own causal activity
+is primal, it by no means follows that on this account it is almighty;
+hence, even although it be primal, it is nevertheless under the
+necessity of adopting means in order to secure its ends--or, in other
+words, of adjusting its volitions (if they are to be practically
+efficient) to the conditions which are imposed upon its activity by the
+orderly system of the external world. Which is merely another way of
+stating the conclusion previously reached--viz. that the only necessity
+which can be proved to govern our volitions is the necessity which is
+imposed by our own considerations of reason and morality. Although we
+find that it is expedient to adapt our own causal activity to that
+larger system of causal activity by which we are surrounded--seeing that
+we must do so necessarily if we are to act at all--it by no means
+follows that we are bound to will what is expedient. In other words, the
+necessity laid upon us by the system of external causation is a
+necessity to adopt means for the attainment of ends; not a necessity to
+will the ends. And although in many cases this distinction may appear to
+be practically unmeaning--seeing that no man wills what he knows to be
+impossible of execution, and therefore that to say he is necessarily
+prevented from doing a certain thing seems practically equivalent to
+saying that he is necessarily prevented from willing that thing--in all
+cases where any question of moral responsibility can possibly obtain,
+the distinction is one of fundamental importance. For, as already shown,
+any question of moral responsibility can only obtain where two or more
+lines of action are alike possible, and therefore where no necessity is
+laid upon the man in respect of carrying out his volitions, in whichever
+direction they may eventually proceed. Although in any event he is
+necessarily bound to adopt means in order to secure his ends, the moral
+quality of his choice has reference only to the ends which he chooses;
+not at all to the fact that he has to employ means for the purpose of
+attaining them. And even though his choice be influenced by his physical
+and social environment--as it must be if it be either rational on the
+one hand or moral on the other--it does not follow that this influence
+is of a kind to neutralize or destroy the causal nature of his own
+volition. For the influence which is thus exerted cannot be exerted
+necessarily, unless we suppose that the Will is not a first cause, which
+is the possibility now under consideration. If the Will is a first
+cause, the influences brought to bear upon it by its relation to other
+causes--and in virtue of which it is constituted, not only a cause
+primal, but also a cause rational and moral--these influences differ
+_toto coelo_ from those which are exercised by any members in a series
+of secondary causes upon the next succeeding causes. And the difference
+consists in the absence of necessary or unconditional sequence in the
+one case, and its presence in the other. However strong the determining
+influence of a motive may be, if the Will is a first cause, the motive
+must belong to a different order of causal relation from a motor; for,
+no matter how strong the determining influence may be, _ex hypothesi_ it
+can never attain to the strength of necessity; the Will must ever remain
+free to overcome such influence by an adequate exercise of its own power
+of spontaneous action, or of supplying _de novo_ an additional access of
+strength to some other motive. Of course, as a general rule, the Will
+allows itself to be influenced by motives supplied immediately by its
+relations with the external world; but this is so only because the
+thinking substance well knows that it is expedient so to fall in with
+the general stream of external causation. Hence, as a general rule, it
+is only in cases where the stream of external causation is drawing the
+will in different directions that the causal activity of the Will itself
+is called into play. Or rather, I should say, it is only in such cases
+that we become conscious of the fact. In the case of every voluntary
+movement the primal activity of Will must be concerned (and this even in
+the case of the lower animals); but as the vast majority of such
+movements are performed by way of response to frequently recurring
+circumstances, the response which experience has shown to be most
+expedient is given, as it were, automatically, or without the occurrence
+of any adverse motive. But in cases where motives are drawing in
+different directions, we become conscious of an effort of Will in
+choosing one or other line of conduct, and, according to our present
+hypothesis, this consciousness of effort is an expression of the work
+which the Will is doing in the way of spontaneous causation.
+
+Thus, upon the whole, if we identify the principle of causation with the
+principle of mind--as we are bound to do by the theory of Monism--we
+thereby draw a great and fundamental distinction between causation as
+this occurs in the external world, and as it occurs within the limits of
+our own subjectivity. And the distinction consists in the unconditional
+nature of a causal sequence in the external world, as against the
+conditional nature of it in the other case; the condition to the
+effective operation of a motive--as distinguished from a motor--is the
+acquiescence of the first cause upon which that motive is operating.
+
+To the foregoing argument it may be objected that by expressly regarding
+the human mind as a first cause of its own volitions, I imply that that
+mind can itself have had no cause, which appears to be self-evidently
+absurd. But here again the absurdity only arises from our inveterate
+habit of regarding the principle of causation as logically prior to that
+of mind. If we expressly refuse to do this, there is nothing absurd in
+supposing the principle of mind wherever it occurs, as itself uncaused.
+For if, as we are now supposing, this principle is identical with that
+of causation, to say that any mind is caused would be to say that a
+cause is the cause of itself, which would be really absurd. Under the
+present point of view, therefore, it would be a meaningless question to
+ask for the cause of a human mind, since, _ex hypothesi_, a human mind
+is a part of the self-existing substance, although not on this account
+self-existing as to its individual personality. As argued in a previous
+chapter, the personality appears to arise on account of circumscription,
+or the isolation of a constituent part of the World-eject. Therefore,
+although it may be reasonable to ask for a cause of this
+circumscription--or of the personality--it is not reasonable to ask for
+a cause of the substance which is thus circumscribed, or of the quality
+of spontaneity which that substance exhibits.
+
+I will now state the whole case in another way. When we regard the facts
+of volition from the stand-point of psychology, the only theory of them
+which is open to us is, as we have before seen, that of determinism.
+Moreover, within these limits that theory is perfectly true. Psychology,
+as such, cannot recognize any principle more ultimate than natural
+causation, seeing that, like any other of her sisters in the family of
+sciences, her whole work and duty are confined to the investigation of
+this principle. But, just as in the case of all the other sciences, when
+her investigations have been pushed to the point where they encounter
+the problem of explaining this principle itself, her investigations
+must necessarily cease; this principle is for all the sciences the
+ultimate datum, behind which they cannot go without ceasing to be
+sciences. But it does not follow that because the area of science is
+limited by that of causation, therefore we are precluded from asking any
+questions as to the nature of this ultimate datum. Of course any
+questions which we may thus ask cannot possibly be answered by science;
+they are questions of philosophy, in the consideration of which science,
+from her very nature and essential limitation of her office, can have no
+voice. Now, if on taking up the principle of causation where this is
+left by science--viz. as the ultimate or unanalyzable _datum_ of
+experience, upon which all her investigations are founded, and by which
+they are all limited--philosophy finds any reason to surmise that it is
+resolvable into the principle of mind, philosophy is thus able to
+suggest that any distinction between mental processes as determinate or
+free, is really a meaningless distinction. For, according to this
+suggestion, the issue is no longer as to whether these processes are
+caused or uncaused; the very idea of cause has been abolished as one
+which belongs only to that lower level of inquiry with which science, or
+sensuous experience, is concerned. Here, no doubt, the question is a
+thoroughly real one, and, as shown in previous chapters, can only be
+answered in the way of determinism. But so soon as we ascend to the
+philosophical theory of Monism, and so transcend the conditions of
+sensuous experience, the question whether volitions are caused or
+uncaused becomes, as I have said, a meaningless question, or a question
+the terms of which are not correctly stated. If it be the case that all
+causality is of a nature psychical, volition and causation are one and
+the same thing, differing only in relation to our modes of apprehension.
+It would therefore be equally meaningless to say that either is the
+cause of the other--just as it would be equally meaningless to say that
+neurosis is the cause of psychosis, or that psychosis is the cause of
+neurosis. Or thus, if volition and causation are one and the same thing,
+the only reason why they ever appear diverse is because the one is known
+ontologically, while the other is known phenomenally. Were it possible
+that the orbit of my own personality could be widened so as to include
+within my own subjectivity the whole universe of causality, I should
+find--according to Monism--that all causation would become transformed
+into volition. Hence, the only reason why there now appears to be so
+great an antithesis between these two principles, is because the
+volition which is going on outside of my own consciousness can only be
+known to me objectively,--or at most ejectively,--on which account the
+principle of causality appears to me phenomenally as the most ultimate,
+or most unanalyzable, principle in the phenomenal universe.
+
+Upon the whole, then, I conclude that this is the teaching of Monism. If
+we view the facts of human volition relatively, or within the four
+corners of psychological science, there is no escape from the conclusion
+that they are determined with all the rigour which belongs to natural
+causation in general. For every sequence of mental changes and every
+sequence of cerebral changes, although phenomenally so diverse, are
+taken by this theory to be ontologically identical; and therefore the
+sequence of mental changes must be determined with the same degree of
+'necessity' as is that of the cerebral changes. In short, mental
+causation is taken to be but the obverse aspect of physical causation,
+and, as previously remarked, it is impossible that the doctrine of
+determinism could be taught in a manner more emphatic. But, on the other
+hand, the theory of Monism is bound to go further than this. From the
+very fact of its having gone so far as to identify all physical
+processes with psychical processes, it cannot refuse to take the further
+and final step of identifying the most ultimate known principle of the
+one with the most ultimate known principle of the other; it is bound to
+recognize in natural causation the phenomenal aspect of that which is
+known ontologically as volition. But if these two principles are thus
+regarded as identical, it clearly becomes as unmeaning to ask whether
+the one is the cause of the other, as it would be to ask whether the one
+wills the other. For, _ex hypothesi_, the two things being one thing,
+or but different modes of viewing the same thing, it becomes mere
+nonsense to speak of either determining the other; they are both but
+different expressions of the same ultimate fact, namely the fact of
+Being as Being.
+
+If this result should be deemed unsatisfactory on account of its
+vagueness, let it be remembered that nothing is gained on the side of
+clearness by the converse supposition--viz. that priority should be
+assigned to the principle of causality. For, if we say it is
+inconceivable that anything should come into existence without a
+cause--not even excepting the principle of mind itself--then the
+question immediately arises--If all volition is caused, what is the
+cause of volition? What caused this cause? And so on till we arrive at
+the question, What caused the principle of causality? which is absurd.
+So that whether we regard mind as prior to cause, or cause as prior to
+mind, or neither as prior to the other, we arrive at precisely the same
+difficulty. And the difficulty is a hopeless one, because it concerns
+the ultimate question of Being as Being, or the final mystery of things.
+
+Or, to state the matter in another way. An explanation means the
+reference of observed effects to known causes, or the inclusion of
+previously unknown causes among causes better known. Hence it is
+obvious, from the very meaning of what we call an explanation, that at
+the base of all possible explanations there must lie a great
+Inexplicable, which, just because more ultimate than any of our
+possible explanations, does not itself require to be explained. To
+suppose that it does require to be explained, would be to suppose, that
+there is something still more ultimate into which, if known, this
+Inexplicable could be merged. Hence, unless we postulate an infinite
+series of possible explanations, there must be a basal mystery
+somewhere, which, in virtue of its constituting the ground of all
+possible explanations, cannot be, and does not require to be, itself
+explained. What is this basal mystery? Materialism supposes it to be
+lodged in Matter to the exclusion of Mind, while Idealism in its extreme
+forms takes the converse view. Theism supposes that it is an intelligent
+Person, who is held--and logically enough--not to be able to give any
+explanation of his own existence; he is, as it is said, self-existent,
+and, if asked to give any account of his being, would only be able to
+restate the fact of his being in the words, 'I am that I am.' Lastly,
+Pantheism, or Monism, supposes the ultimate mystery to be lodged in the
+universe as a whole. Now, in the present connexion the question before
+us is simply this--Are we to regard the principle of causality or the
+principle of mind as the ultimate mystery? And to this question I answer
+that to me it appears most reasonable to assign priority to mind. For,
+on the one hand, our only knowledge of causation is empirical, while
+even as such it is only possible in the same way as our knowledge of
+objective existence in general is possible--namely, by way of inference
+from our own mental modifications, which therefore must necessarily have
+priority so far as we are ourselves concerned. Next, on the other hand,
+even if we were to grant that the principle of causality is the prius,
+or the ultimate and inexplicable mystery, I cannot see that it is really
+available to explain the fact of personality. To me it appears that,
+within the range of human observation, this is the fact that most wears
+the appearance of finality, or of that unanalyzable and inexplicable
+nature which we are bound to believe must belong to the ultimate mystery
+of Being. But, be this as it may, the speculative difficulty of
+assigning priority to mind is certainly no greater than that of
+assigning it to causality; and this, as above remarked, is a sufficient
+answer to the question before us. According to Monism, however, there is
+no need to assign priority to either principle, seeing that one is but a
+phenomenal expression of the other.
+
+Only one further question remains to be considered. From what I have
+just said on the subject of Personality, it will be apparent that the
+theory of Monism is in conflict with that of Theism only in so far as
+personality appears to imply limitation. This is a point which I have
+previously considered in these pages (Chapter iv, p. 109), with the
+result of appearing to show that the conflict is one which would
+probably vanish could we rise above the necessary limitations of human
+thought. Therefore, it here seems worth while to ask, What can be said
+by the philosophical theory of Monism to the old theological dilemma
+touching free-will and predestination? Or, even apart from any question
+of Theism, what position does Monism suppose the psychical activity of
+man to hold in relation to that of the universe? Of course the latter
+statement of the question is included in the former; and, therefore, we
+may present it thus;--If the human will is free, and the theory of
+Theism substantially true, how are we to reconcile the fact with the
+theory?
+
+According to the theory of Theism as sanctioned by Monism, what we
+apprehend as natural causation is the obverse of a part of a _summum
+genus_--i.e. the part falling within human observation whose whole is
+the Absolute Volition. This Volition, being absolute, can nowhere meet
+with restraint; it is therefore absolutely free, and can never
+contradict itself. Thus, those circumscribed portions of it which we
+know as human minds--and which, on account of being so circumscribed,
+are free within themselves--do not in their freedom conflict with the
+Absolute Volition. The Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition are
+always in unison. It is not that the Absolute Volition unconditionally
+determines the Relative Volition--else the Relative Volition would not
+be free; but it is that the Absolute Volition invariably assents to the
+Relative Volition as to the activity of an integral part of itself. This
+will be at once evident if we consider that our only idea of
+determination--i.e. causation--is, upon the theistic theory, derived
+from our observing the consistency of the Divine Will, whether as
+revealed subjectively in the causal operations of our own minds, or
+objectively in the causal operations of Nature. Therefore, the idea of
+causation as between the Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition is
+an idea destitute of meaning. One Relative Volition may act causally on
+another. Relative Volition, because each is wholly external to each. But
+all Relative Volitions are constituent parts of the Absolute Volition,
+which, therefore, cannot act causally _on_ them, though it always acts
+substantially _with_ them. Or, otherwise phrased, if the subject is a
+constituent part of its own World-eject--the volition of which is always
+self-consistent--it follows that the volition of the subject must always
+be coincident with that of its World-eject; and this without being
+determined in any other sense than the smaller size of a part can be
+said to be determined by the larger size of its whole: i.e. the
+determination--if we choose so to call it--is not a causal one, but
+arises immediately from the inherent nature of the case. The Absolute
+Volition within itself is free; the Relative Volition within itself is
+free; but there can be no conflict between these two freedoms. For, if
+there were a conflict, it must be caused; but where is the cause of this
+conflict to come from? Not from the Absolute Volition, which is
+everywhere self-consistent; not from the Relative Volition, which is
+wholly contained within the Absolute. Thus, regarded from within its own
+system, the Relative Volition is free; while, regarded from the system
+of its World-eject, the Relative Volition is predestined. But the
+freedom is not incompatible with the predestination, nor the
+predestination with the freedom. They stand to each other in the
+relation of complementary truths, the apparent contradiction of which
+arises only from the apparently fundamental antithesis between mind and
+cause which it is the privilege of Monism to abolish.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 13: 'Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily
+contain it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can
+ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it
+hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree' (Locke). To
+this argument Mill answers, 'How vastly nobler and more precious, for
+instance, are the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of
+which, and by the properties of which, they are raised up! But this
+stricture is not worthy of Mill. The soil and manure do not constitute
+the whole cause of the plants and animals. We must trace these and many
+other con-causes (conditions) back and back till we come to 'whatsoever
+is first of all things': it is merely childish to choose some few of the
+conditions, and arbitrarily to regard them as alone the efficient
+causes.]
+
+[Footnote 14: _Collected Essays_, vol. ix. 'Evolution and Ethics,' p.
+140.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
++-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+|Transcriber's note: In this text this H_2O represents a subscript 2|
++-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Oxford HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
+
+
+
+
+
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+Project Gutenberg's Mind and Motion and Monism, by George John Romanes
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
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+Title: Mind and Motion and Monism
+
+Author: George John Romanes
+
+Release Date: August 9, 2007 [EBook #22283]
+
+Language: English
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+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM ***
+
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+
+
+<h1>MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM<br /><br /></h1>
+
+<h4>BY THE LATE<br /></h4>
+
+<h2>GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.</h2>
+
+<h4>HONORARY FELLOW OF GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE<br /><br /></h4>
+
+<p class="center">LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. AND NEW YORK 1895<br />
+Oxford<br />
+HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY<br /><br /><br /><br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="centerbox bbox">
+<h3>WORKS BY</h3>
+
+<h2><i>GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.</i></h2>
+
+<hr style="width: 35%;" />
+
+<blockquote><p style="margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.5in"><b>DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN</b>: an Exposition of the Darwinian Theory, and a
+Discussion on Post-Darwinian Questions.</p>
+
+<p style="margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.5in"><span class="smcap">Part I. The Darwinian Theory.</span> With Portrait of Darwin and 125
+Illustrations. <i>Crown 8vo</i>, 10<i>s.</i> 6<i>d.</i></p>
+
+<p style="margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.5in"><span class="smcap">Part II. Post-Darwinian Questions: Heredity and Utility.</span> <i>Crown 8vo</i>.</p>
+
+<p><b>AN EXAMINATION OF WEISMANNISM.</b></p>
+<p class="author"><i>Crown 8vo</i>, 6<i>s.</i></p>
+
+<p><b>MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM.</b></p>
+
+<p class="author"><i>Crown 8vo</i>.</p>
+
+<p style="margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.5in"><b>THOUGHTS ON RELIGION</b>. Edited, with a Preface, by <span class="smcap">Charles Gore</span>, M.A.,
+Canon of Westminster. <i>Crown 8vo</i>, 4<i>s.</i> 6<i>d.</i></p></blockquote>
+
+<p class="center">
+London<br />
+LONGMANS, GREEN &amp; CO.
+</p></div>
+
+
+
+<h2><br /><br /><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE</h2>
+
+
+<p>Of the contents of this little volume the section on <i>Mind and Motion</i>
+which forms, in accordance with a suggestion of the author's, a general
+introduction, was delivered at Cambridge as the Rede Lecture in 1885,
+and was printed in the <i>Contemporary Review</i> for June in that year. The
+chapter on The <i>World as an Eject</i> was published, almost as it now
+stands, in the <i>Contemporary Review</i> for July, 1886. A paper on <i>The
+Fallacy of Materialism</i>, of which Mr. Romanes incorporated the more
+important parts in the Essay on Monism, was contributed to the
+<i>Nineteenth Century</i> for December, 1882. The rest was left in MS. and
+was probably written in 1889 or 1890.</p>
+
+<p>The subjects here discussed frequently occupied Mr. Romanes' keen and
+versatile mind. Had not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span> the hand of death fallen upon him while so much
+of the ripening grain of his thought still remained to be finally
+garnered, some modifications and extensions of the views set forth in
+the Essay on Monism would probably have been introduced. Attention may
+be drawn, for example, to the sentence on p. <a href='#Page_139'><b>139</b></a>,
+italicized by the author himself, in which it is contended that the will
+as agent <i>must be identified with the principle of Causality</i>. I have
+reason to believe that the chapter on <i>The World as an Eject</i> would, in
+a final revision of the Essay as a whole, have been modified so as to
+lay stress on this identification of the human will with the principle
+of Causality in the world at large&mdash;a doctrine the relation of which to
+the teachings of Schopenhauer will be evident to students of philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>But the hand of death closed on the thinker ere his thought had received
+its full and ultimate expression. When in July, 1893, I received from
+Mr. Romanes instructions with regard to the publication of that which
+now goes forth to the world in his name, his end seemed very near; and
+he said with faltering voice, in tones the pathos of which lingers with
+me still, that this and much besides must, he feared, be left
+unfinished. He suggested that perhaps I might revise the parts in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span> the
+light of the whole. But I have thought it best to leave what he had
+written as he wrote it, save for quite unimportant emendations, lest in
+revising I should cast over it the shadow of my own opinions.</p>
+
+<p>It only remains to add that the conclusions reached in this Essay should
+be studied in connection with the later <i>Thoughts on Religion</i> which
+Canon Gore has recently edited.</p>
+
+<p class="author">
+<span class="smcap">C. Ll. M.</span></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap"  style="margin-left: 2em;">Bristol</span>,<br />
+<br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>May, 1895.</i></span><br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span></p>
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2>CONTENTS</h2>
+
+
+<div class='centered'>
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" width="85%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS">
+<tr><td align='left' style="width: 15%;">&nbsp;</td><td style="width: 5%;">&nbsp;</td><td style="width: 70%;">&nbsp;</td><td align='right' style="width: 10%;">PAGE</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Mind and Motion</span></td><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_1'><b>1</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Monism</span></td><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_39'><b>39</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;"><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></span></td><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_41'><b>41</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">Chapter</span></span></td><td align='right'>I.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Spiritualism</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_47'><b>47</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">Chapter</span></span></td><td align='right'>II.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Materialism</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_55'><b>55</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">Chapter</span></span></td><td align='right'>III.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Monism</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_79'><b>79</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">Chapter</span></span></td><td align='right'>IV.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The World as an Eject</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_88'><b>88</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">Chapter</span></span></td><td align='right'>V.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Will in Relation To Materialism And Spiritualism</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_119'><b>119</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">Chapter</span></span></td><td align='right'>VI.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Will in Relation To Monism</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_129'><b>129</b></a></td></tr>
+</table></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="MIND_AND_MOTION" id="MIND_AND_MOTION"></a>MIND AND MOTION</h2>
+
+<h3>[REDE LECTURE, 1885.]</h3>
+
+
+<p>The earliest writer who deserves to be called a psychologist is Hobbes;
+and if we consider the time when he wrote, we cannot fail to be
+surprised at what I may term his prevision of the most important results
+which have now been established by science. He was the first clearly to
+sound the note which has ever since constituted the bass, or fundamental
+tone, of scientific thought. Let us listen to it through the clear
+instrumentality of his own language:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'All the qualities called sensible are, in the object which causeth
+them, but so many motions of the matter by which it presseth on our
+organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything
+else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but
+motion.... The cause of sense is the external body or object, which
+presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in
+taste and touch, or mediately, as in hearing, seeing, and smelling;
+which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings
+and membranes of the body, continued inwards to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> the brain and
+heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or
+endeavour.... And because <i>going</i>, <i>speaking</i>, and the like
+voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of
+<i>whither</i>, <i>which way</i>, and <i>what</i>; it is evident that the
+imagination [or idea] is the first internal beginning of all
+voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any
+motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or
+the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible;
+yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. These small
+beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in
+walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are
+commonly called ENDEAVOUR<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.'</p></div>
+
+<p>These quotations are sufficient to show that the system of Hobbes was
+prophetic of a revelation afterwards declared by two centuries of
+scientific research. For they show how plainly he taught that all our
+knowledge of the external world is a knowledge of motion; and, again,
+that all our acquisitions of knowledge and other acts of mind themselves
+imply, as he elsewhere says, some kind of 'motion, agitation, or
+alteration, which worketh in the brain.' That he conceived such motion,
+agitation, or alteration to be, from its extreme minuteness, 'invisible'
+and 'insensible,' or, as we should now say, molecular, is likewise
+evident. I can therefore imagine the delight with which he would hear me
+speak when I say, that it is no longer a matter of keen-sighted
+speculation, but a matter of carefully demonstrated fact, that all our
+knowledge of the external world is nothing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> more than a knowledge of
+motion. For all the forms of energy have now been proved to be but modes
+of motion; and even matter, if not in its ultimate constitution vortical
+motion, at all events is known to us only as changes of motion: all that
+we perceive in what we call matter is change in modes of motion. We do
+not even know what it is that moves; we only know that when some modes
+of motion pass into other modes, we perceive what we understand by
+matter. It would take me too long to justify this general statement so
+that it should be intelligible to every one; but I am confident that all
+persons who understand such subjects will, when they think about it,
+accept this general statement as one which is universally true. And, if
+so, they will agree with Hobbes that all our knowledge of the external
+world is a knowledge of motion.</p>
+
+<p>Now, if it would have been thus a joy to Hobbes to have heard to-day how
+thoroughly he has been justified in his views touching the external
+world, with no less joy would he have heard that he has been equally
+justified in his views touching the internal world. For it has now been
+proved, beyond the possibility of dispute, that it is only in virtue of
+those invisible movements which he inferred that the nervous system is
+enabled to perform its varied functions.</p>
+
+<p>To many among the different kinds of movement going on in the external
+world, the animal body is adapted to respond by its own movements as
+best<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> suits its own welfare; and the mechanism whereby this is effected
+is the neuro-muscular system. Those kinds of movement going on in the
+external world which are competent to evoke responsive movements in the
+animal body are called by physiologists stimuli. When a stimulus falls
+upon the appropriate sensory surface, a wave of molecular movement is
+sent up the attached sensory nerve to a nerve-centre, which thereupon
+issues another wave of molecular movement down a motor nerve to the
+group of muscles over whose action it presides; and when the muscles
+receive this wave of nervous influence they contract. This kind of
+response to stimuli is purely mechanical, or non-mental, and is
+ordinarily termed reflex action. The whole of the spinal cord and lower
+part of the brain are made up of nerve-centres of reflex action; and, in
+the result, we have a wonderfully perfect machine in the animal body
+considered as a whole. For while the various sensory surfaces are
+severally adapted to respond to different kinds of external
+movement&mdash;the eye to light, the ear to sound, and so on&mdash;any of these
+surfaces may be brought into suitable relation with any of the muscles
+of the body by means of the cerebro-spinal nerve-centres and their
+intercommunications.</p>
+
+<p>So much, then, for the machinery of the body. We must now turn to
+consider the corporeal seat of the mind, or the only part of the nervous
+system wherein the agitation of nervous matter is accompanied with
+consciousness. This is composed of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> a double nerve-centre, which occurs
+in all vertebrated animals, and the two parts of which are called the
+cerebral hemispheres. In man this double nerve-centre is so large that
+it completely fills the arch of the skull, as far down as the level of
+the eyebrows. The two hemispheres of which it consists meet face to face
+in the middle line of the skull, from the top of the nose backwards.
+Each hemisphere is composed of two conspicuously distinct parts, called
+respectively the grey matter and the white matter. The grey matter is
+external, enveloping the white matter like a skull-cap, and is composed
+of an inconceivable number of nerve-cells connected together by
+nerve-fibres. It is computed that in a human brain there cannot be less
+than a thousand millions of cells, and five thousand millions of fibres.
+The white matter is composed only of nerve-fibres, which pass downwards
+in great strands of conducting tissue to the lower centres of the brain
+and spinal cord. So that the whole constitutes one system, with the grey
+matter of the cerebral hemispheres at the apex or crown.</p>
+
+<p>That the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres is the exclusive seat
+of mind is proved in two ways. In the first place, if we look to the
+animal kingdom as a whole, we find that, speaking generally, the
+intelligence of species varies with the mass of this grey matter. Or, in
+other words, we find that the process of mental evolution, on its
+physical side, has consisted in the progressive development of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> this
+grey matter superimposed upon the pre-existing nervous machinery, until
+it has attained its latest and maximum growth in man.</p>
+
+<p>In the second place, we find that when the grey matter is experimentally
+removed from the brain of animals, the animals continue to live; but are
+completely deprived of intelligence. All the lower nerve-centres
+continue to perform their mechanical adjustments in response to suitable
+stimulation; but they are no longer under the government of the mind.
+Thus, for instance, when a bird is mutilated in this way, it will
+continue to perform all its reflex adjustments&mdash;such as sitting on a
+perch, using its wings when thrown into the air, and so forth; but it no
+longer remembers its nest or its young, and will starve to death in the
+midst of its food, unless it be fed artificially.</p>
+
+<p>Again, if the grey matter of only one hemisphere be removed, the mind is
+taken away from the corresponding (i. e. the opposite) side of the body,
+while it remains intact on the other side. For example, if a dog be
+deprived of one hemisphere, the eye which was supplied from it with
+nerve-fibres continues able to see, or to transmit impressions to the
+lower nerve-centre called the optic ganglion; for this eye will then
+mechanically follow the hand waved in front of it. But if the hand
+should hold a piece of meat, the dog will show no mental recognition of
+the meat, which of course it will immediately seize if exposed to the
+view of its other eye. The same thing is found to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> happen in the case of
+birds: on the injured side <i>sensation</i>, or the power of responding to a
+stimulus, remains intact; while <i>perception</i>, or the power of mental
+recognition, is destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>This description applies to the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres
+as a whole. But of course the question next arises whether it only acts
+as a whole, or whether there is any localization of different
+intellectual faculties in different parts of it. Now, in answer to this
+question, it has long been known that the faculty of speech is
+definitely localized in a part of the grey matter lying just behind the
+forehead; for, when this part is injured, a man loses all power of
+expressing even the most simple ideas in words, while the ideas
+themselves remain as clear as ever. It is remarkable that in each
+individual only this part of one hemisphere appears to be used; and
+there is some evidence to show that left-handed persons use the opposite
+side from right-handed. Moreover, when the side which is habitually in
+use is destroyed, the corresponding part of the other hemisphere begins
+to learn its work, so that the patient may in time recover his use of
+language.</p>
+
+<p>Within the last few years the important discovery has been made, that by
+stimulating with electricity the surface of the grey matter of the
+hemispheres, muscular movements are evoked; and that certain patches of
+the grey matter, when thus stimulated, always throw into action the same
+groups of muscles. In other words, there are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> definite local areas of
+grey matter, which, when stimulated, throw into action definite groups
+of muscles. The surface of the cerebral hemispheres has now been in
+large measure explored and mapped out with reference to these so-called
+motor-centres; and thus our knowledge of the neuro-muscular machinery of
+the higher animals (including man) has been very greatly furthered. Here
+I may observe parenthetically that, as the brain is insentient to
+injuries inflicted upon its own substance, none of the experiments to
+which I have alluded entail any suffering to the animals experimented
+upon; and it is evident that the important information which has thus
+been gained could not have been gained by any other method. I may also
+observe that as these motor-centres occur in the grey matter of the
+hemispheres, a strong probability arises that they are not only the
+motor-centres, but also the volitional centres which originate the
+intellectual commands for the contraction of this and that group of
+muscles. Unfortunately we cannot interrogate an animal whether, when we
+stimulate a motor-centre, we arouse in the animal's mind an act of will
+to throw the corresponding group of muscles into action; but that these
+motor-centres are really centres of volition is pointed to by the fact,
+that electrical stimuli have no longer any effect upon them when the
+mental faculties of the animal are suspended by an&aelig;sthetics, nor in the
+case of young animals where the mental faculties have not yet been
+sufficiently developed to admit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> of voluntary co-ordination among the
+muscles which are concerned. On the whole, then, it is not improbable
+that on stimulating artificially these motor-centres of the brain, a
+physiologist is actually playing from without, and at his own pleasure,
+upon the volitions of the animal.</p>
+
+<p>Turning, now, from this brief description of the structure and leading
+functions of the principal parts of the nervous system, I propose to
+consider what we know about the molecular movements which go on in
+different parts of this system, and which are concerned in all the
+processes of reflex adjustment, sensation, perception, emotion,
+instinct, thought, and volition.</p>
+
+<p>First of all, the rate at which these molecular movements travel through
+a nerve has been measured, and found to be about 100 feet per second, or
+somewhat more than a mile a minute, in the nerves of a frog. In the
+nerves of a mammal it is just about twice as fast; so that if London
+were connected with New York by means of a mammalian nerve instead of an
+electric cable, it would require nearly a whole day for a message to
+pass.</p>
+
+<p>Next, the time has also been measured which is required by a
+nerve-centre to perform its part in a reflex action, where no thought or
+consciousness is involved. This time, in the case of the winking reflex,
+and apart from the time required for the passage of the molecular waves
+up and down the sensory and motor nerves, is about 1/20 of a second.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span>
+Such is the rate at which a nerve-centre conducts its operations when no
+consciousness or volition is involved. But when consciousness and
+volition are involved, or when the cerebral hemispheres are called into
+play, the time required is considerably greater. For the operations on
+the part of the hemispheres which are comprised in perceiving a simple
+sensation (such as an electrical shock) and the volitional act of
+signalling the perception, cannot be performed in less than 1/12 of a
+second, which is nearly twice as long as the time required by the lower
+nerve-centres for the performance of a reflex action. Other experiments
+prove that the more complex an act of perception, the more time is
+required for its performance. Thus, when the experiment is made to
+consist, not merely in signalling a perception, but in signalling one of
+two or more perceptions (such as an electrical shock on one or other of
+the two hands, which of five letters is suddenly exposed to view, &amp;c.),
+a longer time is required for the more complex process of distinguishing
+which of the two or more expected stimuli is perceived, and in
+determining which of the appropriate signals to make in response. The
+time consumed by the cerebral hemispheres in meeting a 'dilemma' of this
+kind is from 1/5 to 1/20 of a second longer than that which they consume
+in the case of a simpler perception. Therefore, whenever mental
+operations are concerned, a relatively much greater time is required for
+a nerve-centre to perform its adjustments than when a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> merely mechanical
+or non-mental response is needed; and the more complex the mental
+operation the more time is necessary. Such may be termed the physiology
+of deliberation.</p>
+
+<p>So much, then, for the rate at which molecular movements travel through
+nerves, and the times which nerve-centres consume in performing their
+molecular adjustments. We may next consider the researches which have
+been made within the last few months upon the rates of these movements
+themselves, or the number of vibrations per second with which the
+particles of nervous matter oscillate.</p>
+
+<p>If, by means of a suitable apparatus, a muscle is made to record its own
+contraction, we find that during all the time it is in contraction, it
+is under-going a vibratory movement at the rate of about nine pulsations
+per second. What is the meaning of this movement? The meaning is that
+the act of will in the brain, which serves as a stimulus to the
+contraction of the muscle, is accompanied by a vibratory movement in the
+grey matter of the brain; that this movement is going on at the rate of
+nine pulsations per second; and that the muscle is giving a separate or
+distinct contraction in response to every one of these nervous
+pulsations. That such is the true explanation of the rhythm in the
+muscle is proved by the fact that if, instead of contracting a muscle by
+an act of the will, it be contracted by means of a rapid series of
+electrical shocks playing upon its attached nerve, the record then
+furnished shows a similar trembling going on in the muscle<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> as in the
+previous case; but the tremors of contraction are now no longer at the
+rate of nine per second: they correspond beat for beat with the
+interruptions of the electrical current. That is to say, the muscle is
+responding separately to every separate stimulus which it receives
+through the nerve; and further experiment shows that it is able thus to
+keep time with the separate shocks, even though these be made to follow
+one another so rapidly as 1,000 per second. Therefore we can have no
+doubt that the slow rhythm of nine per second under the influence of
+volitional stimulation, represents the rate at which the muscle is
+receiving so many separate impulses from the brain: the muscle is
+keeping time with the molecular vibrations going on in the cerebral
+hemispheres at the rate of nine beats per second. Careful tracings show
+that this rate cannot be increased by increasing the strength of the
+volitional stimulus; but some individuals&mdash;and those usually who are of
+quickest intelligence&mdash;display a somewhat quicker rate of rhythm, which
+may be as high as eleven per second. Moreover, it is found that by
+stimulating with strychnine any of the centres of reflex action, pretty
+nearly the same rate of rhythm is exhibited by the muscles thus thrown
+into contraction; so that all the nerve-cells in the body are thus shown
+to have in their vibrations pretty nearly the same period, and not to be
+able to vibrate with any other. For no matter how rapidly the electrical
+shocks are allowed to play upon the grey matter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> of the cerebral
+hemispheres, as distinguished from the nerve-trunks proceeding from them
+to the muscles, the muscles always show the same rhythm of about nine
+beats per second: the nerve-cells, unlike the nerve-fibres, refuse to
+keep time with the electric shocks, and will only respond to them by
+vibrating at their own intrinsic rate of nine beats per second.</p>
+
+<p>Thus much, then, for the rate of molecular vibration which goes on in
+nerve-centres. But the rate of such vibration which goes on in sensory
+and motor nerves may be very much more rapid. For while a nerve-centre
+is only able to <i>originate</i> a vibration at the rate of about nine beats
+per second, a motor-nerve, as we have already seen, is able to
+<i>transmit</i> a vibration of at least 1,000 beats per second; and a sensory
+nerve which at the surface of its expansion is able to respond
+differently to differences of musical pitch, of temperature, and even of
+colour, is probably able to vibrate very much more rapidly even than
+this. We are not, indeed, entitled to conclude that the nerves of
+special sense vibrate in actual unison, or synchronize, with these
+external sources of stimulation; but we are, I think, bound to conclude
+that they must vibrate in some numerical proportion to them (else we
+should not perceive objective differences in sound, temperature, or
+colour); and even this implies that they are probably able to vibrate at
+some enormous rate.</p>
+
+<p>With further reference to these molecular move<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>ments in sensory nerves,
+the following important observation has been made&mdash;viz. that there is a
+constant ratio between the amount of agitation produced in a sensory
+nerve, and the intensity of the corresponding sensation. This ratio is
+not a direct one. As Fechner states it, 'Sensation varies, not as the
+stimulus, but as the logarithm of the stimulus.' Thus, for instance, if
+1,000 candles are all throwing their light upon the same screen, we
+should require ten more candles to be added before our eyes could
+perceive any difference in the amount of illumination. But if we begin
+with only 100 candles shining upon the screen, we should perceive an
+increase in the illumination by adding a single candle. And what is true
+of sight is equally true of all the other senses: if any stimulus is
+increased, the smallest increase of sensation first occurs when the
+stimulus rises one per cent, above its original intensity. Such being
+the law on the side of sensation, suppose that we place upon the optic
+nerve of an animal the wires proceeding from a delicate galvanometer, we
+find that every time we stimulate the eye with light, the needle of the
+galvanometer moves, showing electrical changes going on in the nerve,
+caused by the molecular agitations. Now these electrical changes are
+found to vary in intensity with the intensity of the light used as a
+stimulus, and they do so very nearly in accordance with the law of
+sensation just mentioned. So we say that in sensation the cerebral
+hemispheres are, as it were, acting the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> part of galvanometers in
+appreciating the amount of molecular change which is going on in sensory
+nerves; and that they record their readings in the mind as faithfully as
+a galvanometer records its readings on the dial.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>Hitherto we have been considering certain features in the physiology of
+nervous action, so far as this can be appreciated by means of
+physiological instruments. But we have just seen that the cerebral
+hemispheres may themselves be regarded as such instruments, which record
+in our minds their readings of changes going on in our nerves. Hence,
+when other physiological instruments fail us, we may gain much
+additional insight touching the movements of nervous matter by attending
+to the thoughts and feelings of our own minds; for these are so many
+indices of what is going on in the cerebral hemispheres. I therefore
+propose next to contemplate the mind, considered thus as a physiological
+instrument.</p>
+
+<p>The same scientific instinct which led Hobbes so truly to anticipate the
+progress of physiology, led him not less truly to anticipate the
+progress of psychology. For just as he was the first to enunciate the
+fundamental principle of nerve-action in the vibration of molecules, so
+was he likewise the first to enunciate the fundamental principle of
+psychology in the association of ideas. And the great advance of
+knowledge which has been made since his day with respect to both these
+principles, entitles us to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> be much more confident than even he was that
+they are in some way intimately united. Moreover, the manner in which
+they are so united we have begun clearly to understand. For we know from
+our study of nerve-action in general, that when once a wave of invisible
+or molecular movement passes through any line of nerve-structure, it
+leaves behind it a change in the structure such that it is afterwards
+more easy for a similar wave, when started from the same point, to
+pursue the same course. Or, to adopt a simile from Hobbes, just as water
+upon a table flows most readily in the lines which have been wetted by a
+previous flow, so the invisible waves of nerve-action pass most readily
+in the lines of a previous passage. This is the reason why in any
+exercise requiring muscular co-ordination, or dexterity, 'practice makes
+perfect:' the nerve-centres concerned learn to perform their work by
+frequently repeating it, because in this way the needful lines of
+wave-movement in the structure of the nerve-centre are rendered more and
+more permeable by use. Now we have seen that in the nerve-centres called
+the cerebral hemispheres, wave-movement of this kind is accompanied with
+feeling. Changes of consciousness follow step by step these waves of
+movement in the brain, and therefore when on two successive occasions
+the waves of movement pursue the same pathway in the brain, they are
+attended with a succession of the same ideas in the mind. Thus we see
+that the tendency of ideas to <i>re</i>cur in the same order as that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> in
+which they have previously <i>oc</i>curred, is merely an obverse expression
+of the fact that lines of wave-movement in the brain become more and
+more permeable by use. So it comes that a child can learn its lessons by
+frequently repeating them; so it is that all our knowledge is
+accumulated; and so it is that all our thinking is conducted.</p>
+
+<p>A wholly new field of inquiry is thus opened up. By using our own
+consciousness as a physiological instrument of the greatest delicacy, we
+are able to learn a great deal about the dynamics of brain-action
+concerning which we should otherwise remain in total ignorance. But the
+field of inquiry thus opened up is too large for me to enter upon
+to-day. I will therefore merely observe, in general terms, that although
+we are still very far from understanding the operations of the brain in
+thought, there can be no longer any question that in these operations of
+the brain we have what I may term the objective machinery of thought.
+'Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,' said
+Hobbes. Starting from this fact, modern physiology has clearly shown why
+it is a fact; and looking to the astonishing rate at which the science
+of physiology is now advancing, I think we may fairly expect that within
+a time less remote than the two centuries which now separate us from
+Hobbes, the course of ideas in a given train of thought will admit of
+having its footsteps tracked in the corresponding pathways of the brain.
+Be this, however, as it may, even now we know enough<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> to say that,
+whether or not these footsteps will ever admit of being thus tracked in
+detail, they are all certainly present in the cerebral structures of
+each one of us. What we know on the side of mind as logical sequence, is
+on the side of the nervous system nothing more than a passage of nervous
+energy through one series of cells and fibres rather than through
+another: what we recognize as truth is merely the fact of the brain
+vibrating in tune with Nature.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>Such being the intimate relation between nerve-action and mind-action,
+it has become the scientifically orthodox teaching that the two stand to
+one another in the relation of cause to effect. One of the most
+distinguished of my predecessors in this place, the President of the
+Royal Society, has said in one of the most celebrated of his
+lectures:&mdash;'We have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of
+the nervous system as the cause of the state of consciousness, as we
+have for regarding any event as the cause of another.' And, by way of
+perfectly logical deduction from this statement, Professor Huxley argues
+that thought and feeling have nothing whatever to do with determining
+action: they are merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he
+expresses it, the indices of changes which are going on in the brain.
+Under this view we are all what he terms conscious automata, or machines
+which happen, as it were by chance, to be conscious of some of their own
+movements. But<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> the consciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears
+the same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as a
+steam-whistle bears to the activity of a locomotive, or the striking of
+a clock to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. Here, again,
+we meet with an echo of Hobbes, who opens his work on the Commonwealth
+with these words:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by
+the <i>art</i> of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated,
+that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a
+motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in the principal part
+within; why may we not say, that all <i>automata</i> (engines that move
+themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch), have an
+artificial life? For what is the <i>heart</i>, but a <i>spring</i>; and the
+<i>nerves</i>, but so many <i>strings</i>; and the <i>joints</i>, but so many
+<i>wheels</i>, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by
+the artificer<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>?'</p></div>
+
+<p>Now, this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a legitimate
+outcome of the theory that nervous changes are the causes of mental
+changes, but it is logically the only possible outcome. Nor do I see any
+way in which this theory can be fought on grounds of physiology. If we
+persist in regarding the association between brain and thought
+exclusively from a physiological point of view, we must of necessity be
+materialists. Further, so far as we are physiologists our materialism
+can do us no harm. On the contrary, it is to us of the utmost service,
+as at once the simplest physiological<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> explanation of facts already
+known, and the best working hypothesis to guide us in our further
+researches. But it does not follow from this that the theory of
+materialism is true. The bells of St. Mary's over the way always ring
+for a quarter of an hour before the University sermon; yet the ringing
+of the bells is not the cause of the sermon, although, as long as the
+association remains constant, there would be no harm in assuming, for
+any practical purposes, that it is so. But just as we should be wrong in
+concluding, if we did not happen to know so much about the matter as we
+do, that the University sermon is produced by the vibration of bells in
+the tower of St. Mary's Church, so we may be similarly wrong if we were
+definitely to conclude that the sermon is produced by the vibration of a
+number of little nerve-cells in the brain of the preacher.</p>
+
+<p>Now, if time permitted, and if I supposed that you would all care to go
+with me into matters of some abstruseness, I could certainly prove that
+whatever the connexion between body and mind may be, we have the best
+possible reasons for concluding that it is not a causal connexion. These
+reasons are, of course, extra-physiological; but they are not on this
+account less conclusive. Within the limits of a lecture, however, I can
+only undertake to give an outline sketch of what I take to be the
+overwhelming argument against materialism.</p>
+
+<p>We have first the general fact that all our know<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>ledge of motion, and so
+of matter, is merely a knowledge of the modifications of mind. That is
+to say, all our knowledge of the external world&mdash;including the knowledge
+of our own brains&mdash;is merely a knowledge of our own mental states. Let
+it be observed that we do not even require to go so far as the
+irrefutable position of Berkeley, that the existence of an external
+world without the medium of mind, or of being without knowing, is
+inconceivable. It is enough to take our stand on a lower level of
+abstraction, and to say that whether or not an external world can exist
+apart from mind in any absolute or inconceivable sense, at any rate it
+cannot do so <i>for us</i>. We cannot think any of the facts of external
+nature without presupposing the existence of a mind which thinks them;
+and therefore, so far at least as we are concerned, mind is necessarily
+prior to everything else. It is for us the only mode of existence which
+is real in its own right; and to it, as to a standard, all other modes
+of existence which may be <i>in</i>ferred must be <i>re</i>ferred. Therefore, if
+we say that mind is a function of motion, we are only saying, in
+somewhat confused terminology, that mind is a function of itself.</p>
+
+<p>Such, then, I take to be a general refutation of materialism. To use but
+a mild epithet, we must conclude that the theory is unphilosophical,
+seeing that it assumes one thing to be produced by another thing, in
+spite of an obvious demonstration that the alleged effect is necessarily
+prior to its cause. Such, I say, is a general refutation of
+materialism.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> But this is far from being all. 'Motion,' says Hobbes,
+'produceth nothing but motion;' and yet he immediately proceeds to
+assume that in the case of the brain it produces, not only motion, but
+mind. He was perfectly right in saying that with respect to its
+movements the animal body resembles an engine or a watch; and if he had
+been acquainted with the products of higher evolution in watch-making,
+he might with full propriety have argued, for instance, that in the
+compensating balance, whereby a watch adjusts its own movements in
+adaptation to external changes of temperature, a watch is exhibiting the
+mechanical aspect of volition. And, similarly, it is perhaps possible to
+conceive that the principles of mechanism might be more and more
+extended in their effects, until, in so marvellously perfected a
+structure as the human brain, all the voluntary movements of the body
+might be originated in the same mechanical manner as are the
+compensating movements of a watch; for this, indeed, as we have seen, is
+no more than happens in the case of all the nerve-centres other than the
+cerebral hemispheres. If this were so, motion would be producing nothing
+but motion, and upon the subject of brain-action there would be nothing
+further to say. Without consciousness I should be delivering this
+lecture; without consciousness you would be hearing it; and all the busy
+brains in this University would be conducting their researches, or
+preparing for their examinations,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> mindlessly. Strange as such a state
+of things might be, still motion would be producing nothing but motion;
+and, therefore, if there were any mind to contemplate the facts, it
+would encounter no philosophical paradox: it would merely have to
+conclude that such were the astonishing possibilities of mechanism. But,
+as the facts actually stand, we find that this is not the case. We find,
+indeed, that up to a certain level of complexity mechanism alone is able
+to perform all the compensations or adjustments which are performed by
+the animal body; but we also find that beyond this level such
+compensations or adjustments are never performed without the
+intervention of consciousness. Therefore, the theory of automatism has
+to meet the unanswerable question&mdash;How is it that in the machinery of
+the brain motion produces this something which is not motion? Science
+has now definitely proved the correlation of all the forces; and this
+means that if any kind of motion could produce anything else that is not
+motion, it would be producing that which science would be bound to
+regard as in the strictest sense of the word a miracle. Therefore, if we
+are to take our stand upon science&mdash;and this is what materialism
+professes to do&mdash;we are logically bound to conclude, not merely that the
+evidence of causation from body to mind is not so cogent as that of
+causation in any other case, but that in this particular case causation
+may be proved, again in the strictest sense of the term, a physical
+impossibility.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>To adduce only one other consideration. Apart from all that I have said,
+is it not in itself a strikingly suggestive fact that consciousness
+only, yet always, appears upon the scene when the adjustive actions of
+any animal body rise above the certain level of intricacy to which I
+have alluded? Surely this large and general fact points with
+irresistible force to the conclusion, that in the performance of these
+more complex adjustments, consciousness&mdash;or the power of feeling and the
+power of willing&mdash;is of some <i>use</i>. Assuredly on the principles of
+evolution, which materialists at all events cannot afford to disregard,
+it would be a wholly anomalous fact that so wide and important a class
+of faculties as those of mind should have become developed in constantly
+ascending degrees throughout the animal kingdom, if they were entirely
+without use to animals. And, be it observed, this consideration holds
+good whatever views we may happen to entertain upon the special theory
+of natural selection. For the consideration stands upon the general fact
+that all the organs and functions of animals are of use to animals: we
+never meet, on any large or general scale, with organs and functions
+which are wholly adventitious. Is it to be supposed that this general
+principle fails just where its presence is most required, and that the
+highest functions of the highest organs of the highest animals stand out
+of analogy with all other functions in being themselves functionless? To
+this question I, for one, can only answer, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> answer unequivocally,
+No. As a rational being who waits to take a wider view of the facts than
+that which is open to the one line of research pursued by the
+physiologist, I am forced to conclude that not without a reason does
+mind exist in the frame of things; and that apart from the activity of
+mind, whereby motion is related to that which is not motion, this planet
+could never have held the wonderful being, who in multiplying has
+replenished the earth and subdued it&mdash;holding dominion over the fish of
+the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
+moveth.</p>
+
+<p>What, then, shall we say touching this mysterious union of mind and
+motion? Having found it physically impossible that there should be a
+causal connexion proceeding from motion to mind, shall we try to reverse
+the terms, and suppose a causal connexion proceeding from mind to
+motion? This is the oldest and still the most popular theory&mdash;the theory
+of spiritualism. And, no doubt, in one important respect it is less
+unphilosophical than the opposite theory of materialism. For
+spiritualism supposes the causation to proceed from that which is the
+source of our idea of causality&mdash;the mind: not from that into which this
+idea has been read&mdash;the brain. Therefore, if causation were to be
+accepted as a possibility either way, it would be less unreasonable to
+suppose mental changes the causes of material changes than <i>vice vers&acirc;</i>;
+for we should then at least be starting from the basis of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> immediate
+knowledge, instead of from the reflection of that knowledge in what we
+call the external world. Seeing that the external world is known to us
+only as motion, it is logically impossible for the mind to infer its own
+causation from the external world; for this would be to infer that it is
+an effect of motion, which would be the same as saying that it is an
+effect of its own knowledge; and this would be absurd. But, on the other
+hand, it is not thus logically impossible for the mind to infer that it
+may be the cause of some of its own knowledge, or, in other words, that
+it may have in some measure the power of producing what it knows as
+motion. And when the mind does infer this, no logic on earth is able to
+touch the inference; the position of pure idealism is beyond the reach
+of argument. Nevertheless, it is opposed to the whole momentum of
+science. For if mind is supposed, on no matter how small a scale, to be
+a cause of motion, the fundamental axiom of science is impugned. This
+fundamental axiom is that energy can neither be created nor
+destroyed&mdash;that just as motion can produce nothing but motion, so,
+conversely, motion can be produced by nothing but motion. Regarded,
+therefore, from the stand-point of physical science, the theory of
+spiritualism is in precisely the same case as the theory of materialism:
+that is to say, if the supposed causation takes place, it can only be
+supposed to do so by way of miracle.</p>
+
+<p>And this is a conclusion which the more clear-<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>sighted of the idealists
+have expressly recognized. That subtle and most entertaining thinker,
+for example, the late Professor Green of Oxford, has said that the
+self-conscious volition of man 'does not consist in a series of natural
+events, ... is not natural in the ordinary sense of that term; not
+natural at any rate in any sense in which naturalness would imply its
+determination by antecedent events, or by conditions of which it is not
+itself the source.'</p>
+
+<p>Thus the theory of spiritualism, although not directly refutable by any
+process of logic, is certainly enfeebled by its collision with the
+instincts of physical science. In necessarily holding the facts of
+consciousness and volition super-natural, extra-natural, or non-natural,
+the theory is opposed to the principle of continuity.</p>
+
+<p>Spiritualism being thus unsatisfactory, and materialism impossible, is
+there yet any third hypothesis in which we may hope to find intellectual
+rest? In my opinion there is. If we unite in a higher synthesis the
+elements both of spiritualism and of materialism, we obtain a product
+which satisfies every fact of feeling on the one hand, and of
+observation on the other. The manner in which this synthesis may be
+effected is perfectly simple. We have only to suppose that the
+antithesis between mind and motion&mdash;subject and object&mdash;is itself
+phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have only to suppose
+that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of apprehension; and,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>
+therefore, that any change taking place in the mind, and any
+corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not two
+changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a musical
+sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.
+Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of
+changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in
+an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity
+in consciousness is created only by the difference in our modes of
+perceiving the same event&mdash;whether we see or whether we hear the
+vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of
+nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same
+event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of
+perceiving it.</p>
+
+<p>The great advantage of this theory is that it supposes only one stream
+of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously
+concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and
+contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.
+Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;
+mind-changes nothing but mind-changes: both producing both
+simultaneously, neither could be what it is without the other, because
+without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.
+Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that
+consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> of mind changes
+of brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very causation of
+these changes that they should have a mental side. The use of mind to
+animals is thus rendered apparent; for intelligent volition is thus
+shown to be a true cause of adjustive movement, in that the cerebration
+which it involves could not otherwise be possible: the causation would
+not otherwise be complete.</p>
+
+<p>A simple illustration may serve at once to render this doctrine more
+easily intelligible, and to show that, if accepted, the doctrine, as it
+appears to me, terminates the otherwise interminable controversy on the
+freedom of the will.</p>
+
+<p>In an Edison lamp the light which is emitted from the burner may be said
+indifferently to be caused by the number of vibrations per second going
+on in the carbon, or by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of
+vibration could not take place in the carbon without constituting that
+degree of temperature which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a
+train of thought may be said indifferently to be caused by brain-action
+or by mind-action; for, <i>ex hypothesi</i>, the one could not take place
+without the other. Now, when we contemplate the phenomena of volition by
+themselves, it is as though we were contemplating the phenomena of light
+by themselves: volition is produced by mind in brain, just as light is
+produced by temperature in carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of
+light as the cause, say, of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of
+volition<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> as the cause of bodily movement. That particular kind of
+physical activity which takes place in the carbon could not take place
+without the light which causes a photograph; and, similarly, that
+particular kind of physical activity which takes place in the brain
+could not take place without the volition which causes a bodily
+movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of bodily movement as is
+the physical activity of the brain; seeing that, in an absolute sense,
+the cause is one and the same. But if we once clearly perceive that what
+in a relative sense we know as volition is, in a similar sense, the
+cause of bodily movement, we terminate the question touching the freedom
+of the will. For this question in its last resort&mdash;and apart from the
+ambiguity which has been thrown around it by some of our
+metaphysicians&mdash;is merely the question whether the will is to be
+regarded as a cause of Nature. And the theory which we have now before
+us sanctions the doctrine that it may be so regarded, if only we
+remember that its causal activity depends upon its identity with the
+obverse aspect known as cerebration, without which identity in apparent
+duality neither volition nor cerebration could be the cause which in
+fact they are. It thus becomes a mere matter of phraseology whether we
+speak of the will determining, or being determined by, changes going on
+in the external world; just as it is but a matter of phraseology whether
+we speak of temperature determining, or being determined by, molecular
+vibration. All the requirements alike of the free-<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>will and of the
+bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a synthesis which comprises
+them both. On the one hand, it would be as impossible for an
+<i>un</i>conscious automaton to do the work or to perform the adjustments of
+a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp to give out light
+and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric current. On the
+other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to originate bodily
+movement without the occurrence of a strictly physical process of
+cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison lamp which
+had been deprived of its carbon-burner.</p>
+
+<p>It may be said of this theory that it is highly speculative, not
+verifiable by any possible experiment, and therefore at best is but a
+mere guess. All which is, no doubt, perfectly true; but, on the other
+hand, we must remember that this theory comes to us as the only one
+which is logically possible, and at the same time competent to satisfy
+the facts alike of the outer and of the inner world. It is a speculation
+in the sense of not being verifiable by experiment; but it has much more
+value than ordinarily attaches to an unverifiable speculation, in that
+there is really no alternative hypothesis to be considered: if we choose
+to call it a guess, we must at the same time remember it is a guess
+where it does not appear that any other is open. Once more to quote
+Hobbes, who, as we have seen, was himself a remarkable instance of what
+he here says: 'The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the
+best guesser, he that is most<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> versed and studied in the matters he
+guesses at.' In this case, therefore, the best prophet is not the
+physiologist, whose guess ends in materialism; nor the purely mental
+philosopher, whose guess ends in spiritualism; but rather the man who,
+being 'versed and studied' in all the facts appertaining to both sides
+of the matter, ends in the only alternative guess which remains open.
+And if that most troublesome individual, the 'plain man' of Locke,
+should say it seems at least opposed to common sense to suppose that
+there is anything in a burning candle or a rolling billiard-ball
+substantially the same as mind, the answer is that if he could look into
+my brain at this moment he would see nothing there but motion of
+molecules, or motion of masses; and apart from the accident of my being
+able to tell him so, his 'common sense' could never have divined that
+these motions in my brain are concerned in the genesis of my spoken
+thoughts.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>It is obvious that from this hypothesis as to the substantial identity
+of mind and motion, two important questions arise; and I feel that some
+reference to these questions is in present circumstances forced upon me,
+because they have both been considered in precisely the same connexion
+by one of the most powerful intellects that was ever sent out into the
+world by this University. I mean the late Professor Clifford. As my
+intimate and valued friend, I desire to mention his name in this place
+with all the affec<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>tion, as well as with all the admiration, to which I
+well know it is so fully entitled; and if I appear to mention him only
+in order to disagree with him, this is only because I know equally well
+that in his large and magnanimous thought differences of philosophical
+opinion were never felt to weaken the bonds of friendship.</p>
+
+<p>In his well-known lecture on Body and Mind, Professor Clifford adopted
+the hypothesis of identity which we are now considering, and from it was
+led to the conclusion that if in the case of cerebral processes motion
+is one with mind, the same must be true of motion wherever it occurs;
+or, as he expressed it subsequently, the whole universe must be made of
+mind-stuff. But in his view, although matter in motion presents what may
+be termed the raw material of mind, it is only in the highly elaborated
+constitution of the human brain that this raw material is sufficiently
+wrought up to yield a self-conscious personality. Hence the dissolution
+of a human brain implies the dissolution of a human mind; and hence also
+the universe, although entirely composed of mind-stuff, is itself
+mindless. Now, all I have to say about these two deductions is
+this&mdash;they do not necessarily follow from the theory which is before us.
+In holding that the mind of man perishes with his body, and that above
+the mind of man there is no other, Clifford may have been right, or may
+have been wrong. I am not here to discuss at length any questions of
+such supreme importance. But I feel that I am here to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> insist upon the
+one point which is immediately connected with my subject; and this is,
+that whether or not Clifford was right in his conclusions, these
+conclusions certainly did not follow by way of any logical sequence from
+his premises. Because within the limits of human experience mind is only
+known as associated with brain, it clearly does not follow that mind
+cannot exist in any other mode. It does not even follow that any
+probability upon this matter can be thus established. The basis of
+analogy on which Clifford sought to rear an inference of cosmical
+extent, was restricted to the one instance of mind as known upon one
+planet; and, therefore, it is hard to imagine a more precarious use of
+that precarious method which is called by logicians simple enumeration.
+Indeed, even for what it is worth, the inference may be pointed with
+quite as much effect in precisely the opposite direction. For we have
+seen how little it is that we understand of the one mode in which we
+certainly know that mind does exist; and if from this little we feel
+impelled to conclude that there is a mode of mind which is not
+restricted to brain, but co-extensive with motion, is consubstantial and
+co-eternal with all that was, and is, and is to come; have we not at
+least a suggestion, that high as the heavens are above the earth, so
+high above our thoughts may be the thoughts of such a mind as this? I
+offer no opinion upon the question whether the general order of Nature
+does not require some one explanatory cause; nor upon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> the question
+whether the mind of man itself does not point to something kindred in
+the self-existing origin of things. I am not concerned to argue any
+point upon which I feel that opinions may legitimately differ. I am only
+concerned to show that, in so far as any deductions can be drawn from
+the theory which is before us, they make at least as much against as in
+favour of the cosmical conclusions arrived at by Clifford.</p>
+
+<p>On February 17, in the year 1600, when the streets of Rome were thronged
+with pilgrims from all the quarters of Christendom, while no less than
+fifty cardinals were congregated for the Jubilee; into the densely
+crowded Campo di Fiori a man was led to the stake, where, 'silent and
+self-sustained,' before the eyes of all nations, he perished in the
+flames. That death was the death of a martyr: it was met voluntarily in
+attestation of truth. But most noble of all the noble army to which he
+belonged, the name of that man is written large in history, as the name
+of one who had fortitude to die, not in the cause of religious belief,
+but in that of scientific conviction. For why did Bruno suffer? He
+suffered, as we all know, because he refused to recant his persuasion of
+the truth of the Copernican theory. Why, then, do I adduce the name of
+Bruno at the close of this lecture? I do so because, as far as I have
+been able to ascertain, he was the first clearly to enunciate the
+monistic theory of things to which the consideration of my subject has
+conducted us.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> This theory&mdash;or that as to the substantial identity of
+mind and motion&mdash;was afterwards espoused, in different guises, by sundry
+other writers; but to Bruno belongs the merit of its original
+publication, and it was partly for his adherence to this publication
+that he died. To this day Bruno is ordinarily termed a pantheist, and
+his theory, which in the light of much fuller knowledge I am advocating,
+Pantheism. I do not care to consider a difference of terms, where the
+only distinction resides in so unintelligible an idea as that of the
+creation of substance. It is more to the purpose to observe that in the
+mind of its first originator&mdash;and this a mind which was sufficiently
+clear in its thought to die for its perception of astronomical
+truth&mdash;the theory of Pantheism was but a sublime extension of the then
+contracted views of Theism. And I think that we of to-day, when we look
+to the teaching of this martyr of science, will find that in his theory
+alone do we meet with what I may term a philosophically adequate
+conception of Deity. If the advance of natural science is now steadily
+leading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must
+we not see how the independent conclusion of mental science is thus
+independently confirmed&mdash;the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being
+without knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come
+when we may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study
+of Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of
+possible truths. And if this is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> case&mdash;if there is no motion without
+mind, no being without knowing&mdash;shall we infer, with Clifford, that
+universal being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that
+most stupendous of questions&mdash;Is there knowledge with the Most High? If
+there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not
+rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the
+medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?</p>
+
+<p>This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we are
+careful to set the logical conditions with complete impartiality. But
+the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as science is concerned,
+it is here possible to point any inference at all: the whole orbit of
+human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a parallax for measurements
+so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the voice of science must
+thus of necessity speak the language of agnosticism, at least let us see
+to it that the language is pure; let us not tolerate any barbarisms
+introduced from the side of aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this
+new grammar of thought does not admit of any constructions radically
+opposed to more venerable ways of thinking; even if we do not find that
+the often-quoted words of its earliest formulator apply with special
+force to its latest dialects&mdash;that if a little knowledge of physiology
+and a little knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper
+knowledge of both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their
+relations to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> one another, will lead men back to some form of religion,
+which, if it be more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier
+days.</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">'It is a beauteous evening, calm and free;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">The holy time is quiet as a nun,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Breathless with adoration; the broad sun<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Is sinking down in its tranquillity;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">The gentleness of heaven is on the sea:<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Listen! the mighty being is awake,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And doth with his eternal motion make<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">A sound like thunder, everlastingly.'<br /></span>
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></div></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="MONISM" id="MONISM"></a>MONISM</h2>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'Das Ich ist nicht aus Leib und Seele zusammengesetzt, sondern es
+ist eine bestimmte Entwicklungsstufe des Wesens, das von
+verschiedenem Standpunkt betrachtet in k&ouml;rperliches und geistiges
+Dasein auseinanderf&auml;llt.'&mdash;Wundt, <i>Vorlesungen &uuml;ber die
+Menschen-und Thierseele</i>, i. 293.</p></div>
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="INTRODUCTION" id="INTRODUCTION"></a>INTRODUCTION.</h2>
+
+
+<p>In no respect has the progress of physical science exercised a more
+profound influence upon philosophical thought than it has by proving an
+apparently quantitative relation between material changes and mental
+changes. It has always been known that there is qualitative relation.
+Even long before mankind suspected that the brain was in any way
+connected with thought, it was well understood that alcohol and other
+poisons exercised their sundry influences on the mind in virtue of
+influences which they exercised upon the body; and even the lowest
+savages must always have been aware that a blow on the head is followed
+by insensibility. But it was not until the rise of Physiology that this
+qualitative relation between corporeal changes and mental changes was
+gradually found to be a quantitative one&mdash;or that every particular
+change of mind had an exact and invariable counterpart in some
+particular change of body. It is needless for me to detail the
+successive steps in the long course of physiological discovery whereby
+this great fact has been established;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> it is enough to say that the fact
+<i>is</i> established to the satisfaction of every physiologist.</p>
+
+<p>Now, when once the relation between material changes and mental changes
+has been thus recognized as quantitative&mdash;or, which is the same thing,
+when once the association has been recognized as both invariable and
+exact&mdash;there arises the question as to how this relation is to be
+explained. Formally considered&mdash;or considered as a matter of logical
+statement irrespective of the relative probabilities which they may
+present, either to the minds of different individuals or to the general
+intelligence of the race&mdash;it appears to me that the possible hypotheses
+are here seven in number.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>I. The mental changes may cause the material changes.</p>
+
+<p>II. The material changes may cause the mental changes.</p>
+
+<p>III. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+may be only a phenomenal association&mdash;the two apparently diverse
+classes of phenomena being really one and the same.</p>
+
+<p>IV. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+may be due to a harmony pre-established by a superior mind.</p>
+
+<p>V. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+may always be due to chance.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>VI. There may be no causation either way, because the material
+order may not have any real existence at all, being merely an ideal
+creation of the mental order.</p>
+
+<p>VII. Whether or not there be any causation either way, the
+association may be one which it is necessarily beyond the power of
+the human mind to explain.</p></div>
+
+<p>So far as I can see, this list of possible answers to the question
+before us is exhaustive. I will next show why, in my opinion, the last
+four of them may be excluded <i>in limine</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The suggestion of pre-established harmony (IV) merely postpones the
+question: it <i>assumes</i> a higher <i>mind</i> as adjusting correspondencies
+between known minds and animal bodies with respect to the activities of
+each; and, therefore, it either leaves untouched the ultimate question
+concerning the relation of mind (as such) to matter, or else it answers
+this question in terms of spiritualism (I).</p>
+
+<p>The suggestion of chance (V) is effectually excluded by the doctrine of
+chances: even in any one individual mind, the association between mental
+changes and material changes is much too intimate, constant, and
+detailed to admit of any one reasonably supposing that it can be due
+only to chance.</p>
+
+<p>The suggestion of pure idealism (VI) ultimately implies that the
+thinking Ego is itself the sole existence&mdash;a position which cannot,
+indeed, be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> turned by any assault of logic; but one which is
+nevertheless too obviously opposed to common sense to admit of any
+serious defence; its immunity from direct attack arises only from the
+gratuitous nature of its challenge to prove a negative (namely, that the
+thinking Ego is <i>not</i> the sole existence), and this a negative which is
+necessarily beyond the region of proof.</p>
+
+<p>Lastly, the suggestion that the problem is necessarily insoluble (VII)
+does not deserve to be regarded as an hypothesis at all; for to suppose
+that the problem is necessarily insoluble is merely to exclude the
+supposition of there being any hypothesis available.</p>
+
+<p>In view of these several considerations, it appears to me that, although
+in a formal sense we may say there are altogether seven possible answers
+to the question before us, in reality, or for the purposes of practical
+discussion, there are nowadays but three&mdash;namely those which head the
+above list, and which I will now proceed to consider.</p>
+
+<p>I have named these three hypotheses in the order of their appearance
+during the history of philosophical thought. The earliest is the
+spiritualistic. As far back as we can trace the conceptions of primitive
+man, we meet with an unquestioning belief that it is his spirit which
+<i>animates</i> his body; and, starting from this belief as explanatory of
+the movements of his own body, he readily attributes movements elsewhere
+to analogous agencies&mdash;the theory of <i>animism</i> in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> Nature thus becoming
+the universal theory in all early stages of culture. It also appears to
+be the theory most natural to our own children during the early years of
+their dawning intelligence, and would doubtless continue through life in
+the case of every individual human being, were he not subsequently
+instructed in the reasons which have led to its rejection by many other
+members of his race. These reasons, as already observed, have been
+furnished in their entirety only within comparatively recent times; not
+until Physiology was able to prove how intimate is the association
+between cerebral processes and mental processes did it become possible
+for materialism to turn the tables upon spiritualism, by simply
+inverting the hypothesis. Lastly, although the theory of Monism (III)
+may be traced back at least as far as the pantheistic thought of
+Buddhism, it there had reference to theology as distinguished from
+psychology. And even as presented in the writings of Bruno, Spinoza, and
+other so-called monists prior to the present century, the hypothesis
+necessarily lacked completeness on account of the absence of knowledge
+afterwards supplied by physiology. For Monism, in the sense of this term
+as I shall use it, may be metaphorically regarded as the child of the
+two pre-existing theories, Spiritualism and Materialism. The birth of
+this child was necessarily impossible before both its parents had
+reached mature age. On the one hand it was necessary that the theory of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>
+Spiritualism should have outgrown its infancy as Animism, its childhood
+as Polytheism, before it entered upon its youth as Monotheism&mdash;or before
+it was able to supply material for the conception of Monism as a theory
+of cosmical extent. On the other hand, Materialism required to grow into
+the fullness of manhood, under the nursing influence of Science, before
+it was possible to engender this new-born offspring; for this offspring
+is new-born. The theory of Monism, as we are about to consider it, is a
+creature of our own generation; and it is only as such that I desire to
+call attention to the child. In order, however, to do this, I must
+follow the example of biographers in general, and begin by giving a
+brief sketch of both the parents.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I.</h2>
+
+<h3>SPIRITUALISM.</h3>
+
+
+<p>In proceeding to consider the opposite theories of Spiritualism and
+Materialism, it is before all else desirable to be perfectly clear upon
+the point of theory whereby they are essentially distinguished. This
+point is that which is raised by the question whether mind is the cause
+or the effect of motion. Both theories are dualistic, and therefore
+agree in holding that there is causation as between mind and motion:
+they differ only in their teaching as to the direction in which the
+causation proceeds. Of course, out of this fundamental difference there
+arise many secondary differences. The most important of these secondary
+differences has reference to the nature of the eternal or self-existing
+substance. Both theories agree that there is such a substance; but on
+the question whether this substance be mental or material, the two
+theories give contradictory answers, and logically so. For, if mind as
+we directly know it (namely, in ourselves) is taken to be a cause of
+motion, within our experience mind is accredited with priority; and
+hence the inference that else<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>where, or universally, mind is prior to
+motion. Furthermore, as motion cannot take place without something which
+moves, this something is likewise supposed to have been the result of
+mind: hence the doctrine of the creation by mind both of matter and of
+energy. On the other hand, the theory of materialism, by refusing to
+assign priority to mind as known directly in ourselves, naturally
+concludes that mind is elsewhere, or universally, the result of matter
+in motion&mdash;in other words, that matter in motion is the eternal or
+self-existing substance, and, as such, the cause of mind wherever mind
+occurs.</p>
+
+<p>I may observe, in passing, that although this cosmical deduction from
+the theory of materialism is, as I have said, natural, it is not (as is
+the case with the corresponding deduction from the theory of
+spiritualism) inevitable. For it is logically possible that even though
+all known minds be the results of matter in motion, matter in motion may
+nevertheless itself be the result of an unknown mind. This, indeed, is
+the position virtually adopted by Locke in his celebrated controversy
+with the Bishop of Worcester. Having been taken to task by this divine
+for the materialistic tendency of his writings, Locke defends himself by
+denying the necessary character of the deduction which we are now
+considering. For example, he insists, 'I see no contradiction in it that
+the first eternal thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain
+systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some
+degrees of sense, perception, and thought:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> though, as I think, I have
+proved (lib. IV, ch. 10 and 14 &amp;c.), it is no less than a contradiction
+to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense
+and thought) should be that eternal first thinking being.' Under this
+view, it will be observed, mind is supposed to have the ultimate
+priority, and thus to have been the original or creating cause of matter
+in motion, which, in turn, becomes the cause (or, at least, the
+conditional condition) of mind of a lower order. This view, however,
+need not detain us, inasmuch as it can only be held by those who, on
+grounds independent of philosophical thinking, already believe in mind
+as the First Cause or Eternal Being: this belief granted, there is, of
+course, an end of any question as between Spiritualism and Materialism.
+I have, therefore, only mentioned this possible phase of spiritualistic
+theory, in order to show that the theory of Materialism as applied to a
+human being does not <i>necessarily</i> involve an extension of that theory
+to the cosmos. But I hold this distinction as of no practical value: it
+merely indicates a logical possibility which no one would be likely to
+entertain except on grounds independent of those upon which the
+philosophical dispute between Spiritualism and Materialism must be
+confined.</p>
+
+<p>Of more practical importance is the remark already made, namely, that
+the fundamental or diagnostic distinction between these two species of
+theory consists <i>only</i> in the views which they severally take on the
+question of causality. This remark is of practical importance, because
+in the debate between<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> spiritualists and materialists it is often lost
+sight of: nay, in some cases, it is even expressly ignored. Obviously,
+when it is either intentionally or unintentionally disregarded, the
+debate ceases to be directed to the question under discussion, and may
+then wander aimlessly over the whole field of collateral speculation.
+Throughout the present essay, therefore, the discussion will be
+restricted to the only topic which we have to discuss&mdash;namely, whether
+mind is the cause of motion, motion the cause of mind, or neither the
+cause of the other.</p>
+
+<p>The view to be first considered&mdash;namely, that mind is the cause of
+motion&mdash;obviously has one great advantage over the opposite view: it
+supposes the causality to proceed from that which is the source of our
+idea of causality (the mind); not from that into which this idea has
+been read by the mind. Hence, it is so far less difficult to imagine
+that mental changes are the cause of bodily changes than <i>vice versa</i>;
+for upon this hypothesis we are starting at least from the substance of
+immediate knowledge, and not from the reflection of that knowledge in
+what we call the external world.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, the theory of Spiritualism labours under certain
+speculative difficulties which appear to me overwhelming. The most
+formidable of these difficulties arises from the inevitable collision of
+the theory with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy.
+Whether or not we adopt the view that all causation of a physical kind
+is ultimately an expression of the fact that matter and energy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> are
+indestructible<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>, it is equally certain that this indestructibility is
+a necessary condition to the occurrence of causation as natural.
+Therefore, if the mind of man is capable of breaking in as an
+independent cause upon the otherwise uniform system of natural
+causation, the only way in which it could do so would be by either
+destroying or creating certain <i>quanta</i> of either matter or energy or
+both. But to suppose the mind capable of doing any of these things would
+be to suppose that the mind is a cause in some other sense than a
+physical or a natural cause; it would be to suppose that the mind is a
+super-natural cause, or, more plainly, that all mental activity, so far
+as it is an efficient cause of bodily movement, is of the nature of a
+miracle.</p>
+
+<p>This conclusion, which appears to me unavoidably implicated in the
+spiritualistic hypothesis, is not merely improbable <i>per se</i>, but admits
+of being shown virtually impossible if we proceed to consider the
+consequences to which it necessarily leads. A sportsman, for example,
+pulls the trigger<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> of a gun, thereby initiating a long train of physical
+causes, which we may take up at the point where the powder is
+discharged, the shot propelled, and the bird dropped. Here the man's
+volition is supposed to have broken in upon the otherwise continuous
+stream of physical causes&mdash;first by modifying the molecular movements of
+his brain, so as to produce the particular co-ordination of
+neuro-muscular movement required to take accurate aim and to fire at the
+right moment; next by converting a quantity of gunpowder into gas,
+propelling a quantity of lead through the air; and finally, by killing a
+bird. Now, without tracing the matter further than this, let us consider
+how enormous a change the will of the man has introduced, even by so
+trivial an exercise of its activity. No doubt the first change in the
+material world was exceedingly slight: the molecular movement in the
+cortex of his brain was probably not more than might be dynamically
+represented by some small fraction of a foot-pound. But so intricate is
+the <i>nexus</i> of physical causality throughout the whole domain of Nature,
+that the intervention of even so minute a disturbance <i>ab extra</i> is
+obviously bound to continue to assert an influence of ever-widening
+extent as well as of everlasting duration. The heat generated by the
+explosion of the powder, the changed disposition of the shot, the death
+of the bird&mdash;leading to innumerable physical changes as to stoppage of
+many mechanical processes previously going on in the bird's body, loss
+of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> animal heat, &amp;c., and also to innumerable vital changes, leading to
+a stoppage of all the mechanical changes which the bird would have
+helped to condition had it lived to die some other death, to propagate
+its kind, and thus indirectly condition an incalculable number of future
+changes that would have been brought about by the ever increasing number
+of its descendants&mdash;these and an indefinite number of other physical
+changes must all be held to have followed as a direct consequence of the
+man's volition thus suddenly breaking in as an independent cause upon
+the otherwise uniform course of Nature. Now, I say that, apart from some
+system of pre-established harmony, it appears simply inconceivable that
+the order of Nature could be maintained at all, if it were thus liable
+to be interfered with at any moment in any number of points. And if the
+spiritualist takes refuge in the further hypothesis of a pre-established
+harmony between acts of human (not to add brute) volition and causes of
+a natural kind, we have only to observe that he thus lands himself in a
+speculative position which is practically identical with that occupied
+by the materialist. For the only difference between the two positions
+then is that the necessity which the materialist takes to be imposed on
+human volition by the system of natural causation, is now taken by the
+spiritualist to be equally imposed by a super-natural volition. The
+necessity which binds the human volition must be equally rigid in
+either<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> case; and therefore it can make no practical difference whether
+the source of it be regarded as natural or super-natural, material or
+mental: so that a man be fated to will only in certain ways&mdash;and this
+with all the rigour which belongs to causation as physical&mdash;it is
+scarcely worth while to dispute whether the predestination is of God or
+of Nature. There can be no question, however, that in this matter the
+possibility which I have supposed to be suggested by the spiritualist is
+more far-fetched than that which obviously lies to the hand of the
+materialist; and, moreover, that it too plainly wears the appearance of
+a desperate device to save a hollow theory.</p>
+
+<p>It remains to add that this great difficulty against the spiritualistic
+theory has been revealed in all its force only during the present
+generation. Since the days of fetishism, indeed, the difficulty has
+always been an increasing one&mdash;growing with the growth of the perception
+of uniformity on the one hand, and of mechanical as distinguished from
+volitional agency on the other. But it was not until the correlation of
+all the physical forces had been proved by actual experiment, and the
+scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy became as a
+consequence firmly established, that the difficulty in question assumed
+the importance of a logical barrier to the theory of mental changes
+acting as efficient causes of material changes.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II.</h2>
+
+<h3>MATERIALISM.</h3>
+
+
+<p>This is the theory which presents great fascination to the student of
+physical science. By laborious investigation physiology has established
+the fact beyond the reach of rational dispute, that there is a constant
+relation of concomitancy between cerebral action and thought. Within
+experience mind is found in constant and definite association with that
+highly complex and peculiar disposition of matter called a living brain.
+The size and elaboration of this peculiar structure throughout the
+animal kingdom stand in conspicuous proportion to the degree of
+intelligence displayed; while the impairment of this structure, whether
+by congenital defect, mutilation, anaemia, decay, or appropriate poison,
+entails corresponding impairment of mental processes. Thus much being
+established, no reasonable man can hesitate in believing the relation
+between neurosis and psychosis to be a constant and concomitant
+relation, so that the step between this, and regarding it as a causal
+relation, seems indeed a small one. For, in all matters of physical
+inquiry, whenever we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> have proved a constant relation of concomitancy in
+a sequence <i>A B</i>, we call <i>A</i> the cause of <i>B</i>; and, therefore, it has
+been frequently said that the evidence of causation between neurosis and
+psychosis is recognized causation. Lastly, to fortify this hypothesis,
+materialists point to the doctrine of the conservation of energy, which
+is supplied by the science of physics as a sort of buttress in this
+matter to the teachings of physiology. For, as this doctrine compels us
+to believe that the chain of physical causation involved in cerebral
+processes can nowhere be broken or deflected <i>ab extra</i>, we are
+compelled to believe that the mental processes, which are correlatively
+associated with these cerebral processes, can nowhere escape from 'the
+charmed circle of the forces,' so that whether we look to the detailed
+teachings of physiology, or to the more general teachings of physics, we
+alike perceive that natural science appears to leave no locus for mind
+other than as a something which is in some way a result of motion.</p>
+
+<p>The position of Materialism being thus at first sight so naturally
+strong, and having been in recent years so fortified by the labours of
+physiology, it is not surprising that in the present generation
+Materialism should be in the ascendant. It is the simple truth, as a
+learned and temperate author, speaking from the side of theology, has
+recently said, that</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'Materialism is a danger to which individuals and societies will
+always be more or less exposed. The present generation,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> however,
+and especially the generation which is growing up, will obviously
+be very especially exposed to it; as much so, perhaps, as any
+generation in the history of the world. Within the last thirty
+years the great wave of spiritualistic or idealistic thought ...
+has been receding and decreasing; and another, which is in the main
+driven by materialistic forces, has been gradually rising behind,
+vast and threatening. It is but its crest that we at present see;
+it is but a certain vague shaking produced by it that we at present
+feel; but we shall probably soon enough fail not both to see and
+feel it fully and distinctly<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>.'</p></div>
+
+<p>Such being the present importance of Materialism, I shall devote the
+present chapter to a consideration of this theory. Each of the points in
+the argument for Materialism which I have mentioned above admits, of
+course, of elaboration; but I think that their enumeration contains all
+that is essential to the theory in question. It now devolves upon us to
+inquire whether this theory is adequate to meet the facts.</p>
+
+<p>And here I may as well at once give it as my own opinion that, of
+however much service the theory of Materialism may be, up to a certain
+point, it can never be accepted by any competent mind as a final
+explanation of the facts with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as
+its use may be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine,
+it is wholly inadequate as a hypothesis in philosophy. That is to say,
+so long as there is a constant relation of concomitancy found by
+experience to obtain between neural processes and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> mental processes, so
+long no harm can accrue to physical science by assuming, for its own
+purposes, that this relation is a causal one. But as soon as the
+question concerning the validity of this assumption is raised into the
+region of philosophy, it receives the answer that the assumption cannot
+be allowed to pass. For where the question becomes one not as to the
+<i>fact</i> of the association but as to its <i>nature</i>, philosophy, which must
+have regard to the facts of mind no less than to those of matter, must
+pronounce that the hypothesis is untenable; for the hypothesis of this
+association being one of causality acting from neurosis to psychosis,
+cannot be accepted without doing violence, not merely to our faculty of
+reason, but to our very idea of causation itself.</p>
+
+<p>A very small amount of thinking is enough to show that what I call my
+knowledge of the external world, is merely a knowledge of my own mental
+modifications. A step further and I find that my idea of causation as a
+principle in the external world is derived from my knowledge of this
+principle in the internal world. For I find that my idea of force and
+energy in the external world is a mere projection of the idea which I
+have of effort within the region of my own consciousness; and therefore
+my only idea of causation is that which is originally derived from the
+experience which I have of this principle as obtaining among my own
+mental modifications.</p>
+
+<p>If once we see plainly that the idea of causation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> is derived from
+within, and that what we call the evidence of physical causation is
+really the evidence of mental modifications following one another in a
+definite sequence, we shall then clearly see, not merely that we have no
+evidence, but that we <i>can have</i> no evidence of causation as proceeding
+from object to subject. However cogent the evidence may appear at first
+sight to be, it is found to vanish like a cloud as soon as it is exposed
+to the light of adequate contemplation. In the very act of thinking the
+evidence, we are virtually denying its possibility as evidence; for as
+evidence it appeals only to the mind, and since the mind can only know
+its own sequences, the evidence must be presenting to the mind an
+account of its own modifications; from the mere fact, therefore, of its
+being accepted as thinkable, the evidence is proved to be illusory.</p>
+
+<p>To uneducated men it appears an indisputable fact of 'common sense' that
+the colour of a flower exists as perceived in the flower, apart from any
+relation to the percipient mind. A physiologist has gone further into
+the thicket of things, and finds that the way is not so simple as this.
+He regards the quality of colour as necessarily related to the faculty
+of visual perception; does not suppose that the colour exists <i>as such</i>
+in the flower, but thinks of the something there as a certain order of
+vibrations which, when brought into relation with consciousness through
+the medium of certain nerves, gives rise to the perception experienced;
+and in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> order to account for the translation into visual feeling of an
+event so unlike that feeling as is the process taking place in the
+flower, physiologists have recourse to an elaborate theory, such as that
+of Helmholtz or Hering. In other words, physiologists here fully
+recognize that colour, or any other thing perceived, only exists <i>as
+perceived</i> in virtue of a subjective element blending with an objective;
+the thing <i>as perceived</i> is recognized as having no existence apart from
+its relation to a percipient mind. Now, although physiologists are at
+one with the philosophers thus far, it is to be feared that very
+frequently they are in the same position as the above-mentioned
+'uneducated men,' when it becomes needful to press still further into
+the thicket. For after having distinguished the necessity of recognizing
+a mind-element in any possible theory of perception, they forthwith
+proceed to disregard this element when passing from the ground of
+perception to that of thought. Although the ideas of matter, motion,
+causation, and so on, are themselves as much the offspring of a thinking
+mind, with its environment, as the perception of colour is a conceiving
+of the percipient mind, with <i>its</i> environment, these ideas are
+inconsistently supposed to stand for equivalent realities of the
+external world&mdash;to truly represent things that are virtually independent
+of any necessary relation to mind. Or, as the case has recently been
+well put by Principal Caird:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'You cannot get mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the
+very attempt to do so you have already begun with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> mind. The
+easiest step of any such inquiry involves categories of thought,
+and it is in terms of thought that the very problem you are
+investigating can be so much as stated. You cannot start in your
+investigations with a bare, self-identical, objective fact,
+stripped of every ideal element or contribution from thought. The
+least and lowest part of outward observation is not an independent
+entity&mdash;fact <i>minus</i> mind, and out of which mind may, somewhere or
+other, be seen to emerge; but it is fact or object as it appears to
+an observing mind, in the medium of thought, having mind or thought
+as an inseparable factor of it. Whether there be such a thing as an
+absolute world outside of thought, whether there be such things as
+matter and material atoms existing in themselves before any mind
+begins to perceive or think about them, is not the question before
+us. If it were possible to conceive of such atoms, at any rate you,
+before you begin to make anything of them, must think them; and you
+can never, by thinking about atoms, prove that there is no such
+thing as thought other than as an ultimate product of atoms. Before
+you could reach thought or mind as a last result you must needs
+eliminate from it the data of the problem with which you start, and
+that you can never do, any more than you can stand on your own
+shoulders or outstrip your own shadow.... In one word, to
+constitute the reality of the outward world&mdash;to make possible the
+minimum of knowledge, nay, the very existence for us of molecules
+and atoms&mdash;you must needs presuppose that thought or thinking self,
+which some would persuade us is to be educed or evolved from
+them.... To make thought a function of matter is thus, simply, to
+make thought a function of itself<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>.'</p></div>
+
+<p>From this reasoning there can be no escape; and it is more rational for
+a man to believe that colour exists as such in a flower than, after
+having plainly seen that such cannot be the case, forthwith<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> to
+disregard the teaching of this analogy, and to imagine that any apparent
+evidence of mind as a result of matter or motion can possibly be
+entertained as real evidence.</p>
+
+<p>Remembering, then, that from the nature of this particular case it is as
+impossible for mind to prove its own causation as it is for water to
+rise above its source, it may still be well, for the sake of further
+argument, to sink this general consideration, and to regard such
+spurious evidence of causation as is presented by Materialism, without
+prejudice arising from its being <i>prim&acirc; facie</i> inadmissible.</p>
+
+<p>Materialists, as already observed, are fond of saying that the evidence
+of causation from neurosis to psychosis is as good as such evidence can
+be proved to be in any other case. Now, quite apart from the general
+considerations just adduced to show that from the peculiar nature of
+this case there can here be no such evidence at all&mdash;quite apart from
+this, and treating the problem on the lower ground of the supposed
+analogy, it may be clearly shown that the statement is untrue. For a
+little thought will show that in point of fact the only resemblance
+between this supposed case of causation and all other cases of
+recognized causation, consists in the invariability of the correlation
+between cerebral processes and mental processes; in all other points the
+analogy fails. For in all cases of recognized causation there is a
+perceived <i>connexion</i> between the cause and the effect; the antecedents
+are physical, and the consequents are physical. But in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> the case before
+us there is no perceived, or even conceivable, connexion between the
+cause and the effect; for the causes are supposed to be physical and the
+effects mental. And the antithesis thus posited is alone sufficient to
+separate <i>toto coelo</i> the case of causation supposed from that of all
+cases of causation recognized. From the singularly clear and
+well-balanced statement of this subject given by Professor Allman in his
+Presidential Address before the British Association, I may here fitly
+quote the following:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'If we could see any analogy between thought and any one of the
+admitted phenomena of matter, we should be justified in the first
+of these conclusions (i. e. that of Materialism) as the simplest,
+and as affording a hypothesis most in accordance with the
+comprehensiveness of natural laws; but between thought and the
+physical phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but no
+conceivable analogy; and the obvious and continuous path which we
+have hitherto followed up in our reasonings from the phenomena of
+lifeless matter through those of living matter here comes suddenly
+to an end. The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep
+and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by
+which, as by a bridge, we may span it over<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>.'</p></div>
+
+<p>And, not unduly to multiply quotations, I shall only adduce one more
+from another of the few eminent men of science who have seen their way
+clearly in this matter, and have expressed what they have seen in
+language as clear as their vision. Professor Tyndall writes:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding
+facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite
+thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur
+simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor
+apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to
+pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one phenomenon to the
+other. They appear together but we do not know why. Were our minds
+and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable
+us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable
+of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their
+electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately
+acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we
+should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem. How are
+these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness?
+The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain
+intellectually impassable<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>.'</p></div>
+
+<p>Next, in all cases of recognized causation there is a perceived
+<i>equivalency</i> between cause and effect, such equivalency belonging to
+the very essence of that in which we conceive causation to consist. But
+as between matter and motion on the one side, and feeling and thought on
+the other, there can be no such equivalency conceivable. That no such
+equivalency is conceivable may be rendered apparent on grounds of
+Materialism itself. For Materialism is bound to accept the fundamental
+doctrine of modern physics&mdash;that, viz. as to the conservation of
+energy&mdash;and therefore it becomes evident that unless we assimilate
+thought with energy, there is no possibility of a causal relation, or a
+relation of equivalency, as obtaining between the one and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> other.
+For however little we may know about brain-dynamics, materialists, at
+least, must take it for granted that in every process of cerebration the
+matter and force concerned are indestructible quantities, and therefore
+that all their possible equations are fully satisfied, could we but
+follow them out. Howsoever complex we may suppose the flux and reflux of
+forces to be within the structure of a living brain, it is no more
+possible for any one of the forces concerned to escape from brain to
+mind, than it would be for such an escape to occur in a steam-engine or
+a watch; the doctrine of the conservation of energy forms an insuperable
+bar to the supposition that any equation in the region of physics can be
+left unsatisfied, in order to pass over and satisfy some other equation
+in the region of psychics.</p>
+
+<p>Of course in saying this I am aware that some of the more clear-sighted
+of the materialists have plainly perceived this difficulty in all its
+magnitude, and so have felt that unless it can be met, any theory of
+Materialism must necessarily contain a radical contradiction of
+principles. Some few materialists have therefore sought to meet the
+difficulty in the only way it can be met, viz. by boldly asserting the
+possibility of thought and energy being transmutable. On this view
+thought becomes a mode of motion, and takes its rank among the forces as
+identical in nature with heat, light, electricity, and the rest. But
+this view is also inherently impossible. For suppose, as a matter of
+argument,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> that physiologists should discover a mechanical equivalent of
+thought, so that we might estimate the value of a calculation in thermal
+units, or the 'labour of love' in foot-pounds: still we should not be
+out of our difficulties; we should only have to cut a twist of flax to
+find a lock of iron. For by thus assimilating thought with energy, we
+should in no wise have explained the fundamental antithesis between
+subject and object. The fact would remain, if possible, more
+unaccountable than ever, that mind should present absolutely no point of
+real analogy with motion. Involved with the essential idea of motion is
+the idea of extension; suppress the latter and the former must
+necessarily vanish, for motion only means transition in space of
+something itself extended. But thought, as far as we can possibly know
+it, is known and distinguished by the very peculiarity of not having
+extension. Therefore, even if we were to find a mechanical equivalent of
+thought, thought would still not be proved a mode of motion. On the
+contrary, what would be proved would be that, in becoming transformed
+into thought, energy had ceased to be energy; in passing out of its
+relation to space it would cease to exist as energy, and if it again
+passed into that relation it would only be by starting <i>de novo</i> on a
+new course of history. Therefore the proof that thought has a mechanical
+equivalent would simply amount to the proof, not that thought <i>is</i>
+energy, but that thought <i>destroys</i> energy. And if Materialism were to
+prove this,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> Materialism would commit suicide. For if once it were
+proved that the relation of energy to thought is such that thought is
+able to absorb or temporarily to annihilate energy, the whole argument
+of Materialism would be inverted, and whatever evidence there is of
+causation as between mind and matter would become available in all its
+force on the side of Spiritualism. This seems plain, for if it even were
+conceivable&mdash;which most distinctly it is not&mdash;that a motor could ever
+become a motive, and so pass from the sphere of dynamics into the sphere
+of consciousness, the fact would go to prove, not that the motor was the
+cause of the motive, but rather that the motive was the cause of
+destroying the motor; so that at that point the otherwise unbroken chain
+of physical sequences was interrupted by the motive striking in upon it,
+and in virtue of the mysterious power supposed to have been proved by
+physiology, cancelling the motor, so allowing the nerve-centre to act as
+determined by the motive.</p>
+
+<p>Of course I wish it to be understood that I believe we are here dealing
+with what I may call, in perhaps suitably contradictory terms,
+inconceivable conceptions. But let it be remembered that I am not
+responsible for this ambiguity; I am only showing what must be the
+necessary outcome of analysis if we begin by endeavouring phenomenally
+to unite the most antithetical of elements&mdash;mind and motion.
+Materialism, at least, will not be the gainer should it ever be proved
+that in the complex operations<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> of the brain a unique exception occurs
+to the otherwise universal law of the conservation of energy in space.</p>
+
+<p>We may, therefore, quit the suggestion that the difficulty experienced
+by Materialism of showing an equivalency between neurosis and psychosis
+can ever be met by assuming that some day mental processes may admit of
+being expressed in terms of physical. But before leaving this difficulty
+with regard to equivalency, I may mention one other point that seems to
+me of importance in connexion with it. I have already said that if we
+suppose causation to proceed from brain to mind, we must suppose this
+essential requirement of equivalency between the cerebral causes and the
+mental effects to be satisfied somewhere.</p>
+
+<p>But where are we to say that it is satisfied? Even if we suppose that
+thought has a mechanical equivalent, and that causation proceeds in the
+direction from energy to thought, still, when we have regard to the
+supposed effects, we find that even yet they bear no kind of equivalency
+to their supposed causes. The brain of a Shakespeare probably did not,
+as a system, exhibit so much energy as does the brain of an elephant;
+and the cerebral operations of a Darwin may not have had a very
+perceptibly larger mechanical equivalent than those of a banker's clerk.
+Yet in the world of thought the difference between our estimate of the
+results, or 'work done,' in these cases is such as to drive all ideas of
+equivalency to the winds.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> Doubtless, a materialist will answer that it
+is not fair to take our estimate of 'work done' in the world of mind as
+the real equivalent of the energy supposed to have passed over from the
+world of motion, seeing that our estimate is based, not on the
+quantitative amount of thought produced, but rather on its qualitative
+character with reference to the social requirements of the race. But to
+this it is enough to answer that we have no means of gauging the
+quantity of thought produced other than by having regard to <i>its</i>
+effects in the world of mind, and this we cannot do except by having
+regard to its qualitative character. Many a man, for instance, must have
+consumed more than a thousand times the brain-substance and brain-energy
+that Shelley expended over his 'Ode to a Skylark,' and yet as a result
+have produced an utterly worthless poem. Now, in what way are we to
+estimate the 'work done' in two such cases, except by looking to the
+relative effects produced in the only region where they are produced,
+viz. in the region of mind? Yet, when we do so estimate them, what
+becomes of the evidence of equivalency between the physical causes and
+the psychical effects?</p>
+
+<p>Now if thus, whether or not we try to form an estimate, it is impossible
+to show any semblance of equivalency between the supposed causes and the
+alleged effects, how can any one be found to say that the evidence of
+causation is here as valid as it is in any other case? The truth rather
+is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> that the alleged effects stand out of every relation to the supposed
+causes, with the exception only of being associated in time.</p>
+
+<p>There still remains one other enormous difficulty in the way of the
+theory of Materialism; it necessarily embodies the theory of <i>conscious
+automatism</i>, and is therefore called upon to explain why consciousness
+and thought have ever appeared upon the scene of things at all. That
+this is the necessary position of Materialism is easily proved as
+follows. We have already seen that Materialism would commit suicide by
+supposing that energy could be transmuted into thought, for this would
+amount to nothing short of supposing the destruction of energy as such;
+and to suppose energy thus destructible would be to open wide the door
+of spiritualism. Materialism, therefore, is logically bound to argue in
+this way: We cannot conceive of a conscious idea, or mental change, as
+in any way affecting the course of a cerebral reflex, or material
+change; while, on the other hand, our knowledge of the conservation of
+energy teaches us as an axiom that the cerebral changes must determine
+each other in their sequence as in a continuous series. Nowhere can we
+suppose the physical process to be interrupted or diverted by the
+psychical process; and therefore we must conclude that thought and
+volition really play no part whatever in determining action. Thoughts
+and feelings are but indices which show in the mirror of the mind
+certain changes that are proceeding<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> in the matter of the brain, and are
+as inefficient in influencing those changes as the shadow of a cloud is
+powerless to direct the movements of that of which it is the shadow.</p>
+
+<p>But when Materialism reaches, in a clear and articulate manner, this
+inference as a conclusion necessary from its premises, it becomes
+opposed at once to common sense and to the requirements of methodical
+reason. It becomes opposed to common sense because we all feel it is
+practically impossible to believe that the world would now have been
+exactly what it is even if consciousness, thought, and volition had
+never appeared upon the scene&mdash;that railway trains would have been
+running filled with mindless passengers, or that telephones would have
+been invented by brains that could not think to speak to ears that could
+not hear. And the conclusion is opposed to the requirements of
+methodical reason, because reason to be methodical is bound to have an
+answer to the question that immediately arises from the conclusion. This
+question simply is, Why have consciousness, thought, and volition ever
+been called into existence; and why are they related, as they are
+related, to cerebral action? Materialism, by here undertaking to prove
+that these things stand uselessly isolated from all other things, is
+bound to show some reason why they ever came to be, and to be what they
+are. For observe, it is not merely that these things exist in a supposed
+unnecessary relation to all other things;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> the fact to be explained is
+that they exist in a most intimately woven and invariable connexion with
+certain highly complex forms of organic structure and certain highly
+peculiar distributions of physical force. Yet these unique and
+extraordinary things are supposed by automatism to be always results and
+never causes; in the theatre of things they are supposed to be always
+spectators and never actors; in the laboratory of life they are supposed
+to be always by-products; and therefore in the order of nature they are
+supposed to have no <i>raison d'&ecirc;tre</i>. Such a state of matters would be
+accountable enough if the stream of mental changes were but partly,
+occasionally, and imperfectly associated with the stream of material
+changes; but as the association is so minute, invariable, and precise,
+the hypothesis of the association being merely accidental, or <i>not
+requiring explanation</i>, becomes, at the bar of methodical reasoning,
+self-convicted of absurdity.</p>
+
+<p>The state of the case, then, simply is that two distinct facts stand to
+be explained by the theory of conscious automatism&mdash;first, why psychosis
+should ever have been developed as a mysterious appendage to neurosis;
+and, secondly, why the association between these things should be so
+intimate and precise. Assuredly, on the principles of evolution, which
+materialists at least cannot afford to disregard, it would be a wholly
+anomalous fact that so wide and general a class of phenomena as those of
+mind should have become developed in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> constantly ascending degrees
+throughout the animal kingdom, if they are entirely without use to
+animals. If psychosis is, as supposed, a function of neurosis, the
+doctrine of natural selection alone would forbid us to imagine that this
+function differs from all other functions in being itself functionless.
+If it would be detrimental to the theory of natural selection that any
+one isolated structure&mdash;such as the tail of a rattlesnake&mdash;should be
+adapted to perform a function useless to the animal possessing it, how
+utterly destructive of that theory would be the fact that all the
+phenomena of mind have been elaborated as functions of nerve-tissue
+without any one of them ever having been of any use either to the
+individual or to the species. And the difficulty that thus arises is
+magnified without limit when we remember that the phenomena of mind are
+invariable in their association with cerebral structure, grade for
+grade, and process for process.</p>
+
+<p>It is of no argumentative use to point to the fact that many adaptive
+movements in animals are performed by nerve-centres apart from any
+association with consciousness or volition, because all the facts on
+this head go to prove that consciousness and volition come in most
+suggestively just where adaptive movements begin to grow varied and
+complex, and then continue to develop with a proportional reference to
+the growing variety and complexity of these movements. The facts,
+therefore, irresistibly lead to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> conclusion (if we argue here as we
+should in the case of any other function) that consciousness and
+volition are functions of nerve-tissue super-added to its previous
+functions, in order to meet new and more complex demands on its powers
+of adaptation.</p>
+
+<p>Neither is it of any argumentative use to point to the fact that
+adaptive actions which originally are performed with conscious volition
+may by practice come to be performed without conscious volition. For it
+is certain that no adaptive action of quite a novel kind is ever
+performed from the first without consciousness of its performance, and
+therefore, although it is true that by repetition its performance may
+become mechanical or unconscious, this does not prove that consciousness
+was without use in producing the adaptive action. It only proves that
+after a nervous mechanism has been elaborated by the help of
+consciousness, consciousness may be withdrawn and leave the finished
+mechanism to work alone; the structure having been completed, the
+scaffolding necessary to its completion may be removed.</p>
+
+<p>But passing over this difficulty which the theory of conscious
+automatism seems bound to encounter in its collision with the theory of
+natural selection, the most insuperable of all its difficulties arises
+from the bare fact, which it cannot explain, that conscious intelligence
+exists, and exists in the most intimate relation with one peculiar kind
+of material structure. For automatists must concede<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> that the evidence
+of causation in the region of mind is at least as cogent as it is in the
+region of matter, seeing that the whole science of psychology is only
+rendered possible as a science by the fundamental fact of observation
+that mental antecedents determine mental consequents. Therefore, if we
+call a physical sequence <i>A, B, C</i>, and a mental sequence <i>a, b, c</i>
+automatists have to explain, not merely why there should be such a thing
+as a mental sequence at all, but also why the sequence <i>a, b, c</i> should
+always proceed, link for link, with the sequence <i>A, B, C</i>. It clearly
+is no answer to say that the sequence <i>A, B, C</i> implies the successive
+activity of certain definite nerve-centres <i>A', B', C'</i> which have for
+their subjective effects the sequence <i>a, b, c</i> so that whenever the
+sequence <i>A, B, C</i> occurs the sequence <i>a, b, c</i> must likewise occur.
+This is no answer, because it merely restates the hypothesis of
+automatism, and begs the whole question to be discussed. What methodical
+reason demands as an answer is simply why the sequence <i>A, B, C</i> even
+though we freely grant it due to the successive activity of certain
+definite nerve-centres, should be attended by the sequence <i>a, b, c</i>.
+Reason perceives clearly enough that the sequence <i>a, b, c</i> belongs to a
+wholly different category from the sequence <i>A, B, C</i> the one being
+immediately known as a process taking place in a something which is
+without extension or physical properties of any kind, and the other
+taking place in a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> something which when, translated by the previous
+something, we recognize as having extension and the other antithetical
+properties which we class together as physical. There would of course be
+no difficulty if the sequence <i>A, B, C</i> continued through any amount of
+complexity in the same conceivable category of being; so that there
+would be nothing actually inconceivable in cerebral sequence&mdash;changes
+running through <i>D, E, F</i>, &amp;c., to an extent sufficient to cause
+unconscious automatism of any degree of complexity. But that which does
+require explanation from automatists is why automatism should have
+become associated with consciousness, and this so intimately that every
+change in the sequence <i>A, B, C</i>, &amp;c., is accompanied by a particular
+and corresponding change in the sequence <i>a, b, c</i>, &amp;c. Thus, to take a
+definite illustration, if on seeing the sun I think of a paper on solar
+physics, and from this pass to thinking of Mr. Norman Lockyer, and from
+this to speculating on the probability of certain supposed elements
+being really compounds, there is here a definite causal connexion in the
+sequence of my <i>thoughts</i>. But it is the last extravagance of absurdity
+to tell me that the accompanying causal sequences going on in my brain
+happen to have exactly corresponded to the sequences which were taking
+place in the mind, the two trains of sequences being each definite and
+coherent in themselves, and yet each proceeding link for link in lines
+parallel with the other. Without some theory<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> of pre-established
+harmony&mdash;which, of course, it is no part of automatism to entertain&mdash;it
+would, on the doctrine of chances alone, be impossible to suppose that
+the causal sequences in the brain always happen to be just those which,
+by running link for link with another set of causal sequences taking
+place in the mind, enable both the series to be definite and coherent in
+themselves. Therefore, before reason can allow the theory of automatism
+to pass, it must be told how this wonderful fact of parallelism is to be
+explained. There must be <i>some</i> connexion between the intrinsically
+coherent series <i>A, B, C</i> and the no less intrinsically coherent
+sequence <i>a, b, c</i>, which may be taken as an explanation why they
+coincide each to each. What is this connexion? We do not know; but we
+have now seen that, whatever it is, it cannot be an ordinary causal
+connexion&mdash;first, because the doctrine of the conservation of energy
+makes it incumbent on us to believe that the procession of physical
+cause and effect is complete within the region of brain&mdash;a closed
+circle, as it were, from which no energy can, without argumentative
+suicide, be supposed to escape into the region of mind; and next,
+because, even were this difficulty disregarded, it is unaccountable that
+the causative influence (whatever it is supposed to be), which passes
+over from the region of physics into that of psychics, should be such as
+to render the psychical series coherent in itself, when on the physical
+side the series must be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> determined by purely physical conditions,
+having no reference whatsoever to psychical requirements.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it is argumentatively impossible for Materialism to elude the
+necessity of explaining the kind of connexion which it supposes to
+subsist between neurosis and psychosis; and forasmuch as the above
+considerations clearly show this connexion cannot be accepted as one of
+ordinary causality without some answer being given to the questions
+which reason has to ask, Materialism must be ruled out of court if she
+fails to respond to the demand. But it is no less clearly impossible
+that she can respond to the demand, and therefore at the bar of
+Philosophy Materialism must be pronounced, for this as well as for the
+reasons previously cited, conspicuously inadequate to account for the
+facts.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III.</h2>
+
+<h3>MONISM.</h3>
+
+
+<p>We have seen, then, that both the alternative theories of Spiritualism
+and Materialism are found, when carefully examined, to be so beset with
+difficulties of a necessary and fundamental kind, that it is impossible
+to entertain either without closing our eyes to certain contradictions
+which they severally and inherently present. We may, indeed, go even
+further than this, and affirm that to suppose mind the cause of motion
+or motion the cause of mind is equally to suppose that which in its very
+nature as a supposition is neither true nor untrue, but nonsensical.
+For, as Prof. Clifford has said in his essay on <i>Body and Mind</i>,&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'It may be conceived that, at the same time with every exercise of
+volition, there is a disturbance of the physical laws; but this
+disturbance, being perceptible to me, would be a physical fact
+accompanying the volition, and could not be volition itself, which
+is not perceptible to me. Whether there is such a disturbance of
+the physical laws or no is a question of fact to which we have the
+best of reasons for giving a negative answer; but the assertion
+that another man's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> volition, a feeling in his consciousness which
+I cannot perceive, is part of the train of physical facts which I
+may perceive,&mdash;this is neither true nor untrue, but nonsense; it is
+a combination of words whose corresponding ideas will not go
+together<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>.'</p></div>
+
+<p>And seeing that the correlatives are in each case the same, it is
+similarly 'nonsense' to assert the converse proposition: or, in other
+words, it is equally nonsense to speak of mental action causing cerebral
+action, or of cerebral action causing mental action&mdash;nonsense of the
+same kind as it would be to speak of the <i>Pickwick Papers</i> causing a
+storm at sea, or the eruption of a volcano causing the forty-seventh
+proposition in the first book of Euclid.</p>
+
+<p>We see, then, that two of the three possible theories of things contain
+the elements of their own destruction: when carefully analyzed, both
+these theories are found to present inherent contradictions. On this
+account the third, or only alternative theory, comes to us with a large
+antecedent presumption in its favour. For it comes to us, as it were, on
+a clear field, or with the negative advantage of having no logical
+rivals to contend with. The other two suggestions having been weighed in
+the balance and found wanting, we are free to look to the new-comer as
+quite unopposed. This new-comer must, indeed, be interrogated as
+carefully as his predecessors, and, like them, must be judged upon his
+own merits. But as he constitutes our last possible hope of solving the
+question which he professes himself able<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> to solve, the absolute failure
+of his predecessors entitles him to a patient hearing. By the method of
+exclusion his voice is now the only voice that remains to be heard, and
+unless it can speak to better purpose than the others, we shall have no
+alternative but to abandon the facts as inexplicable, or to confess that
+it is necessarily impossible for the human mind ever to arrive at any
+theory of things.</p>
+
+<p>Before proceeding to state or to examine this third and last of the
+suggested theories, it is desirable&mdash;in order still further to define
+its <i>status a priori</i>&mdash;that I should exhibit the reason why the two
+other suggestions have necessarily failed. For to my mind it is
+perfectly obvious that this reason is to be found, and found only, in
+the fact that they are both dualistic. The inherent, the fatal, and the
+closely similar difficulties which attach to both the dualistic
+theories, attach to them merely because they <i>are</i> dualistic. The
+'nonsense' of each of them is really identical, and arises only because
+they both make the same irrational attempt to find more in the effect
+than they have put into the cause. In other words, both the dualistic
+theories suppose that the physical chains of causation is complete
+within itself, and that the mental chain is also complete within itself:
+yet they both proceed to the contradiction that one of these chains is
+able to allow some of its causal influence to escape, as it were, in
+order to constitute the other chain. It makes no difference, in point
+of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> logic, whether such an escape is supposed to take place from the
+physical chain (materialism) or from the mental chain (spiritualism): in
+either case the fundamental principle of causality is alike
+impugned&mdash;the principle, that is, of there being an equivalency between
+cause and effect, such that you cannot get more out of your effect than
+you have put into your cause. Both these dualistic theories, although
+they take opposite views as to which of the two chains of causation is
+the cause of the other, nevertheless agree in supposing that there <i>are</i>
+two chains of causation, and that one of them <i>does</i> act causally upon
+the other: and it is in this matter of their common consent that they
+both commit suicide. Every process in the physical sphere must be
+supposed to have its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the
+doctrine of the conservation of energy would be contravened, and thus
+the causation contemplated could no longer be contemplated as physical.
+Similarly, every process in the mental sphere must be supposed to have
+its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the causation
+contemplated could no longer be contemplated as mental: some of the
+equations must be supposed not to have been satisfied within the mental
+sphere, but to have been carried over into the physical sphere&mdash;thus to
+have either created or destroyed certain quantities of energy within
+that sphere, and thus, also, to have introduced elements of endless
+confusion into the otherwise orderly system of Nature.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>From this vice of radical contradiction, to which both the dualistic
+theories are committed, the monistic theory is free. Moreover, as we
+shall immediately find, it is free to combine the elements of truth
+which severally belong to both the other theories. These other theories
+are each concerned with what they see upon different sides of the same
+shield. The facts which they severally receive they severally report,
+and their reports appear to contradict each other. But truth can never
+be really in contradiction with other truth; and it is reserved for
+Monism, by taking a simultaneous view of both sides, to reconcile the
+previously apparent contradictions. For these and other reasons, which
+will unfold themselves as we proceed, I fully agree with the late
+Professor Clifford where he says of this theory&mdash;'It is not merely a
+speculation, but is a result to which all the greatest minds that have
+studied this question (the relation between body and mind) in the right
+way have gradually been approximating for a long time.' This theory is,
+as we have already seen, that mental phenomena and physical phenomena,
+although apparently diverse, are really identical.</p>
+
+<p>If we thus unite in a higher synthesis the elements both of spiritualism
+and of materialism, we obtain a product which satisfies every fact of
+feeling on the one hand, and of observation on the other. We have only
+to suppose that the antithesis between mind and motion&mdash;subject and
+object&mdash;is itself phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> have
+only to suppose that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of
+apprehension: and, therefore, that any change taking place in the mind,
+and any corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not
+two changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a
+musical sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.
+Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of
+changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in
+an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity
+in consciousness is created only by the difference in our mode of
+perceiving the same events&mdash;whether we see or whether we hear the
+vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of
+nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same
+event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of
+perceiving it.</p>
+
+<p>Or, to take another and a better illustration, in an Edison lamp the
+light which is emitted from the burner may be said indifferently to be
+caused by the number of vibrations per second going on in the carbon, or
+by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of vibration could not
+take place in the carbon without constituting that degree of temperature
+which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a train of thought may be
+said indifferently to be caused by brain-action or by mind-action; for,
+<i>ex hypothesi</i>, the one could not take place without the other. Now when
+we contemplate the phenomena<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> of volition by themselves, it is as though
+we were contemplating the phenomena of light by themselves: volition is
+produced by mind in brain, just as light is produced by temperature in
+carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of light as the cause, say,
+of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of volition as the cause of
+bodily movement. That particular kind of physical activity which takes
+place in the carbon could not take place without the light which causes
+a photograph; and, similarly, that particular kind of physical activity
+which takes place in the brain could not take place without the volition
+which causes a bodily movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of
+bodily movement as is the physical activity of the brain; seeing that,
+in an absolute sense, the cause is one and the same. But if we once
+clearly perceive that what in a relative sense we know as volition is,
+in a similar sense, the cause of bodily movement, we terminate the
+question touching the freedom of the will. It thus becomes a mere matter
+of phraseology whether we speak of the will determining, or being
+determined by, changes going on in the external world; just as it is but
+a matter of phraseology whether we speak of temperature determining, or
+being determined by, molecular vibration. All the requirements alike of
+the free-will and of the bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a
+synthesis which comprises them both. On the one hand, it would be as
+impossible for an <i>un</i>conscious automaton to do the work or to perform
+the adjustments of a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp
+to give out light and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric
+current. On the other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to
+originate bodily motion without the occurrence of a strictly physical
+process of cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison
+lamp which had been deprived of its carbon-burner.</p>
+
+<p>The great advantage of this theory is, that it supposes only one stream
+of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously
+concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and
+contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.
+Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;
+mind-changes nothing but mind-changes&mdash;both producing both
+simultaneously: neither could be what it is without the other, because
+without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.
+Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that
+consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind the
+changes of the brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
+causation of these movements that they should have a mental side. And
+equally impossible is the supposition of the spiritualist that the
+cerebral processes are adventitious, or that in the absence of brain the
+changes of the mind could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
+causation of these changes that they should have a material side.
+Furthermore, the use of mind to animals and to men is thus rendered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>
+apparent; for intelligent volition is thus shown to be a true cause of
+adjustive movement, in that the cerebration which it involves could not
+otherwise be possible: the causation would not otherwise be complete.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV.</h2>
+
+<h3>THE WORLD AS AN EJECT.</h3>
+
+
+<p>In the Introduction to this essay I have sought to show that there are,
+for the purposes of practical discussion, but three theories of the
+World of Being. There is, first, the theory of Materialism, which
+supposes matter in motion to be the ultimate or self-existing Reality,
+and, therefore, the cause of mind. Next, there is the theory of
+Spiritualism, which supposes mind to be the ultimate Reality, and,
+therefore, the cause of matter in motion. Lastly, there is the theory of
+Monism which supposes matter in motion to be substantially identical
+with mind, and, therefore, that as between mind and matter in motion
+there is no causal relation either way. In the foregoing chapters I have
+considered these three theories, and argued that of them the
+last-mentioned is the only one which satisfies all the facts of feeling
+on the one hand, and of observation on the other. The theory of Monism
+alone is able to explain, without inherent contradiction, the phenomena
+both of the subjective and objective spheres.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It is my present purpose to extend the considerations already presented.
+Assuming the theory of Monism, I desire to ascertain the result to which
+it will lead when applied to the question whether we ought to regard the
+external world as of a character mental or non-mental. As observed in my
+Rede Lecture (<i>supra</i>, p. <a href='#Page_33'><b>33</b></a>), this question has
+already been considered by the late Professor Clifford, who decided that
+on the monistic theory the probability pointed towards the external
+world being of a character non-mental; that, although the whole universe
+is composed of 'mind-stuff,' the universe as a whole is mindless. This
+decision I then briefly criticized; it is now my object to contemplate
+the matter somewhat more in detail.</p>
+
+<p>I will assume, on account of reasons previously given, that when we
+speak of matter in motion we do not at all know what it is that moves,
+nor do we know at all what it is that we mean by motion. Therefore if,
+as unknown quantities, we call matter <i>a</i> and motion <i>b</i>, all we are
+entitled to affirm is that <i>a + b = z</i>, where <i>z</i> is a known quantity,
+or mind. Obversely stated, we may say that the known quantity <i>z</i> is
+capable of being resolved into the unknown <i>a + b</i>. But, inasmuch as
+both <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> are unknown, we may simplify matters by regarding their
+sum as a single unknown quantity <i>x</i>, which we take to be substantially
+identical with its obverse aspect known as <i>z</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Here, then, are our data. The theory of Monism<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> teaches that what we
+perceive as matter in motion, <i>x</i>, is the obverse of what we know as
+mind, <i>z</i>. What, then, do we know of <i>z</i>? In the first place, we well
+know that this is the only entity with which we are acquainted, so to
+speak, at first hand; all our knowledge of <i>x</i> (which is the only other
+knowledge we possess) is possible only in so far as we are able to
+translate it into terms of <i>z</i>. In the next place, we know that <i>z</i> is
+itself an entity of the most enormous complexity. Standing as a symbol
+of the whole range of individual subjectivity, it may be said to
+constitute for each individual the symbol of his own personality&mdash;or the
+sum total of his conscious life. Now each individual knows by direct
+knowledge that his conscious life is, as I have said, of enormous
+complexity, and that numberless ingredients of feeling, thought, and
+volition are therein combined in numberless ways. Therefore the symbol
+<i>z</i> may be considered as the sum of innumerable constituent parts,
+grouped <i>inter se</i> in numberless systems of more or less complexity.</p>
+
+
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 523px;">
+<img src="images/p098.jpg" width="523" height="342" alt="Figs 1,  2, 3, 4" title="Figs 1,  2, 3, 4" />
+
+</div>
+
+
+<p>From these considerations we arrive at the following conclusions. The
+theory of Monism teaches that all <i>z</i> is <i>x</i>; but it does not,
+therefore, necessarily teach that all <i>x</i> is <i>z</i>. Nevertheless, it does
+teach that if all <i>x</i> is not <i>z</i>, this must be because <i>x</i> is <i>z</i>,
+<i>plus</i> something more than <i>z</i>, as a little thought will be sufficient
+to show. Thus, the four annexed diagrams exhaust the logical
+possibilities of any case, where the question is as to the inclusion or
+exclusion of one quantity by another. In Fig. 1<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> the two quantities are
+coincident; in Fig 2 the one is wholly included by the other; in Fig. 3
+it is partially included; and in Fig. 4 wholly excluded. Now in the
+present case, and upon the data supplied, the logical possibilities are
+exhausted by Figs. 1 and 2. For, upon these data, Figs. 3 and 4
+obviously represent logical impossibilities; no part of Mind can,
+according to these data, stand outside the limits of Matter and Motion.
+Therefore, if the Ego is not coincident with the Non-ego (or if all <i>x</i>
+is not <i>z</i>, as in Fig. 1), this can only be because the Ego is less
+extensive than the Non-ego (or because <i>x</i> is <i>z plus</i> something more
+than <i>z</i>, as in Fig. 2).</p>
+
+
+
+<p>Of these two logical possibilities Idealism, in its most extreme form,
+may adopt the first. For Idealism in this form may hold that apart from
+the Ego there is no external world; that outside of <i>z</i> there is no <i>x</i>;
+that the only <i>esse</i> is the <i>percipi</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> But, as very few persons
+nowadays are prepared to go the length of seriously maintaining that in
+actual fact there is no external world save in so far as this is
+perceived by the individual mind, I need not wait to consider this
+possibility. We are thus practically shut up to a consideration of the
+possibility marked 2.</p>
+
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 482px;">
+<img src="images/p099.jpg" width="482" height="433" alt="Figs 5, 6, 7" title="Figs 5, 6, 7" />
+
+</div>
+
+
+
+<p>The theory of Monism, then, teaches that <i>x</i> is <i>z</i> <i>plus</i> something
+more than <i>z</i>; and therefore it becomes a matter of great moment to
+consider the probable nature of the overplus. For it obviously does not
+follow that because <i>x</i> is greater than <i>z</i> in a logical sense,
+therefore <i>x</i> must be greater than <i>z</i> in a psychological sense. Save
+upon the theory of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> Idealism (with which Monism is not specially
+concerned) the amount (whatever it may be) wherein <i>x</i> is greater than
+<i>z</i>, may not present any psychological signification at all. We may find
+that the surface of our globe is considerably larger than that of the
+dry land, and yet it may not follow that the mental-life to be met with
+in the sea is psychologically superior to that which occurs on dry land.
+If, therefore, we represent by comparative shading degrees of
+psychological excellence, it is evident that the theory of Monism must
+entertain the three possibilities indicated diagrammatically in Figs. 5,
+6, and 7. It makes no difference what the comparative areas of <i>x</i> and
+<i>z</i> may be, or whether <i>x</i> be uniformly shaded throughout its extent.
+All we have so far to notice is that the fact of logical inclusion does
+not necessarily carry with it the implication of psychological
+superiority.</p>
+
+<p>Next we must notice that besides our own subjectivities, we have
+cognizance of being surrounded by many other inferred subjectivities
+more or less like in kind (i. e. other human minds); and also yet many
+other inferred subjectivities more or less unlike, but all inferior (i.
+e. the minds of lower animals, young children, and idiots). Following
+Clifford, I will call these inferred subjectivities by the name of
+ejects, and assign to them the symbol <i>y</i>. Thus, in the following
+discussion, <i>x</i> = the objective world, <i>y</i> = the ejective world, and <i>z</i>
+= subjective world. Now, the theory of Monism supposes that <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>,
+and <i>z</i> are all alike in kind, but present no definite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> teaching as to
+how far they may differ in degree. We may, however, at once allow that
+between the psychological value of <i>z</i> and that of <i>y</i> there is a wide
+difference of degree; and also that, while the value of <i>z</i> is a fixed
+quantity, that of <i>y</i> varies greatly in the different parts of the area
+<i>y</i>. Our scheme, therefore, will now adopt this form&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 450px;">
+<img src="images/p101.jpg" width="450" height="440" alt="" title="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>But the important question remains how we ought to shade <i>x</i>. According
+to Clifford, this ought scarcely to be shaded at all, while according to
+theologians (and theists generally) it ought to be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> shaded so much more
+deeply than either <i>y</i> or <i>z</i>, that the joint representation in one
+diagram would only be possible by choosing for the shading of <i>x</i> a
+colour different from that employed for <i>y</i> and <i>z</i>, and assigning to
+that colour a representative value higher than that assigned to the
+other in the ratio of one to infinity. It will be my object to estimate
+the relative probability of these rival estimates of the psychological
+value of <i>x</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Starting from <i>z</i> as our centre, we know that this is an isolated system
+of subjectivity, and hence we infer that all <i>y</i> is composed of
+analogous systems, resembling one another as to their isolation, and
+differing only in their degrees of psychological value. Now this,
+translated into terms of <i>x</i> (or into terms of objectivity) means that
+<i>z</i> is an isolated system of matter in motion, and that the same has to
+be said of all the constituent parts of <i>y</i>. In other words, both
+subjectivity and ejectivity are only known under the condition of being
+isolated from objectivity; which, obversely considered, means that the
+matter in motion here concerned is temporarily separated off from the
+rest of the objective world, in such wise that it forms a distinct
+system of its own. If any part of the objective world rudely forces its
+way within the machinery of that system, it is at the risk of
+disarranging the machinery and stopping its work&mdash;as is the case when a
+bullet enters the brain. Such converse as the brain normally holds with
+the external world, is held through the appointed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> channels of the
+senses, whereby appropriate causation is supplied to keep the otherwise
+isolated system at work. We know, from physiological evidence, that when
+such external causation is withheld, the isolated system ceases to work;
+therefore, the isolation, although complete under one point of view,
+under another point of view is incomplete. It is complete only in the
+sense in which the isolation of a machine is complete&mdash;i. e. it is in
+itself a working system, yet its working is ultimately dependent upon
+causation supplied from without in certain appropriate ways. This truth
+is likewise testified to on the obverse aspect of psychology. For
+analysis shows that all our mental processes (however complex they may
+be internally) are ultimately dependent on impressions of the external
+world gained through the senses. Whether regarded objectively or
+subjectively, therefore, we find that it is the business of the isolated
+system to elaborate, by its internal processes, the raw materials which
+are supplied to it from without. Seeing, then, that the isolation of the
+system is thus only partial, we may best apply to it the term
+circumscribed. Such partial isolation or circumscription of matter in
+motion&mdash;so that it shall in itself constitute a little working
+microcosm&mdash;appears to be the first condition to the being of a
+subjective personality. Why, then, does not the working of a machine
+present a subjective side?</p>
+
+<p>Our answer to this question is to be found in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> following
+considerations. We are going upon the hypothesis that all mind is matter
+in motion, and that all matter in motion is mind&mdash;or, as Clifford
+phrased it, that all the external world is composed of mind-stuff. No
+matter how lightly we may shade <i>x</i>, we are assuming that it must be
+shaded, and not left perfectly white. Now, both mind and matter in
+motion admit of degrees: first as to quantity, next as to velocity, and
+lastly as to complexity. But the degrees of matter in motion are found,
+in point of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind, save
+in the last particular of complexity, where there is unquestionably an
+evident correspondence. Therefore it is that a machine, although
+conforming to the prime condition of subjectivity in being a
+circumscribed system of matter in motion, nevertheless does not attain
+to subjectivity: the <i>x</i> does not rise to <i>z</i> because the internal
+processes of <i>x</i> are not sufficiently intricate, or their intricacy is
+not of the appropriate kind. From which it follows that although, as I
+have said, all matter in motion is mind, merely as matter in motion (or
+irrespective of the kinds and degrees of both) it may not necessarily be
+mind in the elaborated form of consciousness: it may only be the raw
+material of mind&mdash;or, as Clifford called it, mind-stuff. Thus, although
+all conscious volition is matter in motion, it does not follow that all
+matter in motion is conscious volition. Which serves to restate the
+question as to how far it is probable, or improbable, that all matter in
+motion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> is conscious volition&mdash;i.e. how deeply we ought to shade <i>x</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Well, the first thing to be considered in answering this question is
+that, according to the theory of Monism, we <i>know</i> that it is within the
+range of possibility for matter in motion to reach a level of intricacy
+which shall yield conscious volition, and even self-conscious thought of
+an extremely high order of development. Therefore, the only question is
+as to whether it is possible, or in any way probable, that matter in
+motion as occurring in <i>x</i> resembles, in point of intricacy, matter in
+motion as occurring in <i>z</i>. Professor Clifford perceived that this is
+the core of the question, and staked the whole answer to it on an
+extremely simple issue. He said that unless we can show in the
+disposition of heavenly bodies some morphological resemblance to the
+structure of a human brain, we are precluded from rationally
+entertaining any probability that self-conscious volition belongs to the
+universe. Obviously, this way of presenting the case is so grossly
+illogical that even the exigencies of popular exposition cannot be held
+to justify the presentation. For aught that we can know to the contrary,
+not merely the highly specialized structure of the human brain, but even
+that of nervous matter in general, may only be one of a thousand
+possible ways in which the material and dynamical conditions required
+for the apparition of self-consciousness can be secured. To imagine that
+the human brain of necessity exhausts these possibilities is in the last
+degree absurd.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> Therefore, we may suggest the following presentation of
+Clifford's case as one that is less obviously inadequate:&mdash;if any
+resemblance to the material and dynamical conditions of the microcosm
+can be detected in the macrocosm, we should have good reason to ascribe
+to the latter those attributes of subjectivity which we know as
+belonging to the former; but if no such resemblance can be traced, we
+shall have some reason to suppose that these attributes do not belong to
+the universe. Even this, however, I should regard as much too wide a
+statement of the case. To take the particular conditions under which
+alone subjectivity is known to occur upon a single planet as exhausting
+the possibilities of its occurrence elsewhere, is too flagrant a use of
+the method of simple enumeration to admit of a moment's countenance.
+Even the knowledge that we have of the two great conditions under which
+terrestrial subjectivities occur&mdash;circumscription and complexity&mdash;is
+only empirical. It may well be that elsewhere (or apart from the
+conditions imposed by nervous tissue) subjectivity is possible
+irrespective both of circumscription and of complexity. Therefore,
+properly or logically regarded, the great use of the one exhibition of
+subjectivity furnished to human experience, is the proof thus furnished
+that subjectivity is possible under <i>some</i> conditions; and the utmost
+which on the grounds of such proof human experience is entitled to argue
+is, that <i>probably</i>, if subjectivity is possible elsewhere, its
+possibility is given by those conditions of circum<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span>scription and
+complexity in the material and dynamical relations concerned, which we
+find to be the invariable and quantitative concomitants of subjectivity
+within experience. But this is a widely different thing from saying that
+the only kind of such circumscription and complexity&mdash;or the only
+disposition of these relations&mdash;which can present a subjective side is
+that which is found in the structures and functions of a nervous system.</p>
+
+<p>Now, if we fix our attention merely on this matter of complexity, and
+refuse to be led astray by obviously false analogies of a more special
+kind, I think there can be no question that the macrocosm does furnish
+amply sufficient opportunity, as it were, for the presence of
+subjectivity, even if it be assumed that subjectivity can only be
+yielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous system.
+For, considering the material and dynamical system of the universe as a
+whole, it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater than that
+of any of its parts. Not only is it true that all these parts are
+included in the whole, and that even the visible sidereal system alone
+presents movements of enormous intricacy<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>, but we find, for instance,
+that even within the limits of this small planet there is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> presented to
+actual observation a peculiar form of circumscribed complex, fully
+comparable with that of the individual brain, and yet external to each
+individual brain. For the so-called 'social organism,' although composed
+of innumerable individual personalities, is, with regard to each of its
+constituent units, a part of the objective world&mdash;just as the human
+brain would be, were each of its constituent cells of a construction
+sufficiently complex to yield a separate personality.</p>
+
+<p>If to this it be objected that, as a matter of fact, the social organism
+does not possess a self-conscious personality, I will give a twofold
+answer. In the first place, Who told the objector that it has not? For
+aught that any one of its constituent personalities can prove to the
+contrary, this social organism may possess self-conscious personality of
+the most vivid character: its constituent human minds may be born into
+it and die out of it as do the constituent cells of the human body: it
+may feel the throes of war and famine, rejoice in the comforts of peace
+and plenty: it may appreciate the growth of civilization as its passage
+from childhood to maturity. If this at first sight appears a grotesque
+supposition, we must remember that it would appear equally so to ascribe
+such possibilities to the individual brain, were it not for the
+irrelevant accident of this particular form of complex standing in such
+relation to our own subjectivity that we are able to verify the fact of
+its ejectivity. Thus, for aught that we can tell to the contrary,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> Comte
+may have been even more justified than his followers suppose, in
+teaching the personification of Humanity.</p>
+
+<p>But, in the next place, if the social organism is not endowed with
+personality, this may be for either one of two reasons. All the
+conditions required for attaining so high a level of psychical
+perfection may not be here present; or else the level of psychical
+perfection may be higher than that which we know as personality. This
+latter alternative will be considered in another relation by-and-by, so
+I will not dwell upon it now. But with reference to all these possible
+contingencies, I may observe that we are not without clear indications
+of the great fact that the high order of complexity which has been
+reached by the social organism <i>is</i> accompanied by evidence of something
+which we may least dimly define as resembling subjectivity. In
+numberless ways, which I need not wait to enumerate, we perceive that
+society exhibits the phenomena both of thought and conduct. And these
+phenomena cannot always be explained by regarding them as the sum of the
+thoughts and actions of its constituent individuals&mdash;or, at least, they
+can only be so regarded by conceding that the thoughts and actions of
+the constituent individuals, when thus <i>summated</i>, yield a different
+product from that which would be obtained by a merely arithmetical
+computation of the constituent parts: the composite product differs from
+its component elements, as H<sub>2</sub>O differs from 2H + O. The general truth
+of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> this remark will, I believe, be appreciated by all historians.
+Seeing that ideas are often, as it is said, 'in the air' before they are
+condensed in the mind of individual genius, we habitually speak of the
+'Zeit-geist' as the product of a kind of collective psychology, which is
+something other than the mere sum of all the individual minds of a
+generation. That is to say, we regard society as an eject, and the more
+that a man studies the thought and conduct of society, the more does he
+become convinced that we are right in so regarding it. Of course this
+eject is manifestly unlike that which we form of another individual
+mind: it is much more general, vague, and so far unlike the pattern of
+our own subjectivity that even to ascribe to it the important attribute
+of personality is felt, as we have just seen, to approach the grotesque.
+Still, in this vague and general way we do ascribe to society ejective
+existence: we habitually think of the whole world of human thought and
+feeling as a psychological complex, which is other than, and more than,
+a mere shorthand enumeration of all the thoughts and feelings of all
+individual human beings.</p>
+
+<p>The ejective existence thus ascribed to society serves as a
+stepping-stone to the yet more vague and general ascription of such
+existence to the Cosmos. At first, indeed, or during the earliest stages
+of culture, the ascription of ejective existence to the external world
+is neither vague nor general: on the contrary, it is most distinct and
+specific. Beginning in the rudest forms of animism, where<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> every natural
+process admits of being immediately attributed to the volitional agency
+of an unseen spirit, anthropomorphism sets out upon its long course of
+development, which proceeds <i>pari passu</i> with the development of
+abstract thought. Man, as it has been truly said, universally makes God
+in his own image; and it is difficult to see how the case could be
+otherwise. Universally the eject must assume the pattern of the subject,
+and it is only in the proportion that this pattern presents the features
+of abstract thinking that the image which it throws becomes less and
+less man-like. Hence, as Mr. Fiske has shown in detail, so soon as
+anthropomorphism has assumed its highest state of development, it begins
+to be replaced by a continuous growth of 'deanthropomorphism,' which,
+passing through polytheism into monotheism, eventually ends in a
+progressive 'purification' of theism&mdash;by which is meant a progressive
+metamorphosis of the theistic conception, tending to remove from Deity
+the attributes of Humanity. The last of these attributes to disappear is
+that of personality, and when this final ecdysis has been performed, the
+eject which remains is so unlike its original subject, that, as we shall
+immediately find, it is extremely difficult to trace any points of
+resemblance between them.</p>
+
+<p>Now it is with this perfect, or imago condition of the world-eject, that
+we have to do. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in what I consider the profoundest
+reaches of his philosophic thought, has well shown, on the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> one hand,
+how impossible it is to attribute to Deity any of the specific
+attributes of mind as known to ourselves subjectively; and, on the other
+hand, how it is possible to conceive 'symbolically' that the universe
+may be instinct with a 'quasi-psychical' principle, as greatly
+transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
+motion<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>. Accepting, then, the world-eject in this its highest
+conceivable stage of evolution, I desire to contemplate it under the
+light of the monistic theory.</p>
+
+<p>We have seen that, whether we look upon the subjective or objective face
+of personality, we find that personality arises from limitation&mdash;or, as
+I have previously termed it, circumscription. Now, we have no evidence,
+nor are we able to conceive, of the external world as limited;
+consequently we are not able to conceive, of the world-eject as
+personal. But, inasmuch as personality arises only from limitation, the
+conclusion that the world-eject is impersonal does not tend to show that
+it is of lower psychical value than conscious personality: on the
+contrary, it tends to show that it is probably of higher psychical
+value. True, we are not able to conceive actually of mind as impersonal;
+but we can see that this merely arises from our only experience of mind
+being given under conditions of personality; and, as just observed, it
+is possible to conceive symbolically that there may be a form of mind as
+greatly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
+motion.</p>
+
+<p>Now, although we cannot conceive of such a mind actually, we may most
+probably make the nearest approach to conceiving of it truly, by
+<i>provisionally</i> ascribing to it the highest attributes of mind as known
+to ourselves, or the attributes which belong to human personality. Just
+as a thinking insect would derive a better, or more true, conception of
+human personality by considering it ejectively than by considering it
+objectively (or by considering the mind-processes as distinguished from
+the brain-processes), so, if there is a form of mind immeasurably
+superior to our own, we may probably gain a more faithful&mdash;howsoever
+still inadequate&mdash;conception of it by contemplating its operations
+ejectively than by doing so objectively. I will, therefore, speak of the
+world-eject as presenting conscious volition, on the understanding that
+if <i>x</i> does not present either consciousness or volition, this must
+be&mdash;according to the fundamental assumption of psychism on which we are
+now proceeding&mdash;because <i>x</i> presents attributes at least as much higher
+than consciousness or volition as these are higher than mechanical
+motion. For when we consider the utmost that our conscious volition is
+able to accomplish in the way of contrivance&mdash;how limited its knowledge,
+how short its duration, how restricted its range, and how imperfect its
+adaptations&mdash;we can only conclude that <i>if</i> the ultimate constitution of
+all things is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> pyschical, the philosophy of the Cosmos becomes a
+'philosophy of the Unconscious' only because it is a philosophy of the
+Superconscious.</p>
+
+<p>Now, if once we feel ourselves able to transcend the preliminary&mdash;and
+doubtless very considerable&mdash;difficulty of symbolically conceiving the
+world-eject as super-conscious, and (because not limited) also
+super-personal, I think there can be no question that the world-object
+furnishes overwhelming proof of psychism. I candidly confess that I am
+not myself able to overcome the preliminary difficulty in question. By
+discharging the elements of personality and conscious volition from the
+world-eject, I appear to be discharging from my conception of mind all
+that most distinctively belongs to that conception; and thus I seem to
+be brought back again to the point from which we started: the
+world-eject appears to have again resolved itself into the unknown
+quantity <i>x</i>. But here we must distinguish between actual conception and
+symbolical conception. Although it is unquestionably true that I can
+form no actual conception of Mind save as an eject of personality and
+conscious volition, it is a question whether I am not able to form a
+symbolical conception of Mind as thus extended. For I know that
+consciousness, implying as it does continual change in serial order of
+circumscribed mental processes, is not (symbolically considered) the
+highest conceivable exhibition of Mind; and just as a mathematician is
+able to deal symbolically with space of <i>n</i> dimensions, while only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> able
+really to conceive of space as limited to three dimensions, so I feel
+that I ought not to limit the abstract possibilities of mental being by
+what I may term the accidental conditions of my own being.</p>
+
+<p>I need scarcely wait to show why it appears to me that if this position
+is granted, the world-object furnishes, as I have said, overwhelming
+proof of psychism; for this proof has been ably presented by many other
+writers. There is first the antecedent improbability that the human mind
+should be the highest manifestation of subjectivity in this universe of
+infinite objectivity. There is next the fact that throughout this
+universe of infinite objectivity&mdash;so far, at least, as human observation
+can extend&mdash;there is unquestionable evidence of some one integrating
+principle, whereby all its many and complex parts are correlated with
+one another in such wise that the result is universal order. And if we
+take any part of the whole system&mdash;such as that of organic nature on
+this planet&mdash;to examine in more detail, we find that it appears to be
+instinct with contrivance. So to speak, wherever we tap organic nature,
+it seems to flow with purpose; and, as we shall presently see, upon the
+monistic theory the evidence of purpose is here in no way attenuated by
+a full acceptance of any of the 'mechanical' explanations furnished by
+science. Now, these large and important facts of observation
+unquestionably point, as just observed, to some one integrating
+principle as pervading the Cosmos; and, if so, we can scarcely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> be wrong
+in supposing that among all our conceptions it must hold nearest kinship
+to that which is our highest conception of an integrating cause&mdash;viz.,
+the conception of psychism. Assuredly no human mind could either have
+devised or maintained the working of even a fragment of Nature; and,
+therefore, it seems but reasonable to conclude that the integrating
+principle of the whole&mdash;the Spirit, as it were, of the Universe&mdash;must be
+something which, while as I have said holding nearest kinship with our
+highest conception of disposing power, must yet be immeasurably superior
+to the psychism of man. The world-eject thus becomes invested with a
+psychical value as greatly transcending in magnitude that of the human
+mind, as the material frame of the universe transcends in its magnitude
+the material frame of the human body. Therefore, without in any way
+straining the theory of Monism, we may provisionally shade <i>x</i> more
+deeply than <i>z</i>, and this in some immeasurable degree.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>One other matter remains to be considered with reference to this
+world-eject as sanctioned by Monism. It leaves us free to regard all
+natural causation as a direct exhibition of psychism. The prejudice
+against anything approaching a theistic interpretation of the Universe
+nowadays arises chiefly from the advance of physical science having
+practically revealed the ubiquity of natural causes. It is felt that
+when a complete explanation of any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> given phenomenon has been furnished
+in terms of these causes, there is no need to go further; the phenomenon
+has been rendered intelligible on its mechanical side, and therefore it
+is felt that we have no reason to suppose that it presents a mental
+side&mdash;any supplementary causation of a mental kind being regarded as
+superfluous. Even writers who expressly repudiate this reasoning prove
+themselves to be habitually under its influence; for we constantly find
+that such writers, after conceding the mechanical explanations as far as
+these have been <i>proved</i>, take their stand upon the more intricate
+phenomena of Nature where, as yet, the mechanical explanations are not
+forthcoming. Whether it be at the origin of life, the origin of
+sentiency, of instinct, of rationality, of morality, or of religion,
+these writers habitually argue that here, at least, the purely
+mechanical interpretations fail; and that here, consequently, there is
+still room left for a psychical interpretation. Of course the pleading
+for theism thus supplied is seen by others to be of an extremely feeble
+quality; for while, on the one hand, it rests only upon ignorance of
+natural causation (as distinguished from any knowledge of super-natural
+causation), on the other hand, abundant historical analogies are
+available to show that it is only a question of time when pleading of
+this kind will become more and more restricted in its subject-matter,
+till eventually it be altogether silenced. But the pleading which Monism
+is here able to supply can never be silenced.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>For, according to Monism, all matter in motion is mind; and, therefore,
+matter in motion is merely the objective revelation, <i>to</i> us and <i>for</i>
+us, of that which in its subjective aspect&mdash;or in its ultimate
+reality&mdash;is mind. Just as the operations of my friend's mind can only be
+revealed to me through the mechanical operations of his body, so it may
+very well be that the operations of the Supreme Mind (supposing such to
+exist) can only be revealed to me through the mechanical operations of
+Nature. The only difference between the two cases is that while I am
+able, in the case of my friend's mind, to elicit responses of mechanical
+movement having a definite and intended relation to the operations of my
+own mind, similarly expressed to him; such is not the case with Nature.
+With the friend-eject I am able to <i>converse</i>; but not so with the
+world-eject<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>. This great difference, however,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> although obviously
+depriving me of any such direct corroboration of psychism in the
+world-eject as that which I thus derive of psychism in the friend-eject,
+ought not to be regarded by me as amounting, in the smallest degree, to
+<i>disproof</i> of psychism in the world-eject. The fact that I am not able
+to converse with the world-eject is merely a negative fact, and should
+not be allowed to tell against any probability (otherwise derived) in
+favour of psychism as belonging to that eject. There may be a thousand
+very good reasons why I should be precluded from such converse&mdash;some of
+which, indeed, I can myself very clearly perceive.</p>
+
+<p>The importance of Monism in thus enabling us rationally to contemplate
+all processes of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> physical causation as possibly immediate exhibitions
+of psychism, is difficult to overrate. For it entirely discharges all
+distinction between the mechanical and the mental; so that if physical
+science were sufficiently advanced to yield a full natural explanation
+of all the phenomena within human experience, mankind would be in a
+position to gain as complete a knowledge as is theoretically possible of
+the psychological character of the world-eject. Already we are able to
+perceive the immense significance of being able to regard any sequence
+of natural causation as the merely phenomenal aspect of the ontological
+reality&mdash;the merely outward manifestation of an inward meaning. Thus,
+for example, I am listening to a sonata of Beethoven's played by Madame
+Schumann. Helmholtz tells me all that he knows about the physics and
+physiology of the process, both beyond and within my brain. But I feel
+that, even if Helmholtz were able to tell me very much more than he can,
+so long as he is dealing with these objective explanations, he is at
+work only upon the outer skin of the whole matter. The great reality is
+the mind of Beethoven communicating to my mind through the complex
+intervention of three different brains with their neuro-muscular
+systems, and an endless variety of a&euml;rial vibrations proceeding from a
+pianoforte. The method of communication has nothing more to do with the
+reality communicated than have the paper and ink of this essay to do
+with the ideas<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> which they serve to convey. In each case a vehicle of
+symbols is necessary in order that one mind should communicate with
+another; but in both cases this is a vehicle of <i>symbols</i>, and nothing
+more. Everywhere, therefore, the reality may be psychical, and the
+physical symbolic; everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and
+visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.</p>
+
+<p>Take again the case of morality and religion. Because science, by its
+theory of evolution, appears to be in a fair way of explaining the
+genesis of these things by natural causes, theists are taking alarm; it
+is felt by them that if morality can be fully explained by utility, and
+religion by superstition, the reality of both is destroyed. But Monism
+teaches that such a view is entirely erroneous. For, according to
+Monism, the natural causation of morality and religion has nothing
+whatever to do with the ultimate truth of either. The natural causation
+is merely a record of physical processes, serving to manifest the
+psychical processes. Nor can it make any difference, as regards the
+ultimate veracity of the moral and religious feelings, that they have
+been developed slowly by natural causes; that they were at first grossly
+selfish on the one hand, and hideously superstitious on the other; that
+they afterwards went through a long series of changes, none of which
+therefore can have fully corresponded with external truth; or that even
+now they may be both extremely far from any such correspondence. All
+that such considerations<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> go to prove is, that it belongs to the natural
+method of mental evolution in man that with advancing culture his
+ejective interpretations of Nature should more and more nearly
+<i>approximate</i> the truth. The world-eject must necessarily vary with the
+character of the human subject; but this does not prove that the
+ejective interpretation has throughout been wrong in <i>method</i>: it only
+proves that such interpretation has been imperfect&mdash;and necessarily
+imperfect&mdash;in <i>application</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Such, then, I conceive to be one of the most important consequences of
+the monistic theory. Namely, that by regarding physical causation as
+everywhere but the objective or phenomenal aspect of an ejective or
+ontological reality, it furnishes a logical basis for a theory of things
+which is at the same time natural and spiritual. On the objective
+aspect, the explanations furnished by reason are of necessity physical,
+while, on the ejective aspect, such explanations are of necessity
+metaphysical&mdash;or rather, let us say, hyper-physical. But these two
+orders of explanation are different only because their modes of
+interpreting the same events are different. The objective explanation
+which was given (as we supposed) by Helmholtz of the effects produced on
+the human brain by hearing a sonata, was no doubt perfectly sound within
+its own category; but the ejective explanation of these same effects
+which is given by a musician is equally sound within <i>its</i> category. And
+similarly, if instead of the man-object we contemplate the world-object<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>
+physical causation becomes but the phenomenal aspect of psychical
+causation; the invariability of its sequence becomes but the expression
+of intentional order; the iron rigidity of natural law becomes the
+sensuous manifestation of an unalterable consistency as belonging to the
+Supreme Volition.</p>
+
+<p>My object in this paper has been to show that the views of the late
+Professor Clifford concerning the influence of Monism on Theism are
+unsound. I am in full agreement with him in believing that Monism is
+destined to become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that
+it is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction of
+science on the one hand and of feeling on the other. But I disagree with
+him in holding that this theory is fraught with implications of an
+anti-theistic kind. In my opinion this theory leaves the question of
+Theism very much where it was before. That is to say, while not
+furnishing any independent proof of Theism, it likewise fails to furnish
+any independent disproof. The reason why in Clifford's hands this theory
+appeared to furnish independent disproof, was because he persisted in
+regarding the world only as an object: he did not entertain the
+possibility that the world might also be regarded as an eject. Yet, that
+the world, under the theory of Monism, is at least as susceptible of an
+ejective as it is of an objective interpretation, I trust that I have
+now been able to show. And this is all that I have endeavoured to show.
+As a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> Monism alone
+can only lead to Agnosticism. That is to say, it leaves a clear field of
+choice as between Theism and Atheism; and, therefore, to a carefully
+reasoning Monist, there are three alternatives open. He may remain a
+Monist, and nothing more; in which case he is an agnostic. He may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>
+entertain what appears to him independent evidence in favour of Theism,
+and thus he may become a theist. Or he may entertain what appears to him
+independent evidence in favour of Atheism, and thus he may become an
+atheist. But, in any case, so far as his Monism can carry him, he is
+left perfectly free either to regard the world as an object alone, or to
+regard the world as also an eject<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V.</h2>
+
+<h3>THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM.</h3>
+
+
+<p>In the foregoing chapters I have considered the theory of Monism, first
+in contrast with the theories of Materialism and of Spiritualism, and
+next in relation to the theory of Theism. In this chapter and that which
+succeeds it I propose to consider Monism in relation to the Will. To do
+this it is needful to begin by considering the problems which are
+presented by the Will in relation to the older theories of Materialism
+on the one hand and of Spiritualism on the other.</p>
+
+<p>Although the phenomena of volition have occupied so large a province of
+philosophical literature, the fundamental problems which arise in
+connexion with them are only two in number, and both admit of being
+stated in extremely simple terms. The historical order in which these
+two problems have arisen is the inverse of their logical order. For
+while in logical order the two problems would stand thus&mdash;Is the Will an
+agent? If so, is it a free agent?&mdash;in actual discussion it was long
+taken for granted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> that the Will is an agent, and hence the only
+controversy gathered round the question whether the Will is a free
+agent. Descartes, indeed, seems to have entertained the prior question
+with regard to animals, and there are passages in the <i>Leviathan</i> which
+may be taken to imply that Hobbes entertained this question with regard
+to man. But it was not until recent years that any such question could
+stand upon a basis of science as distinguished from speculation; the
+question did not admit of being so much as stated in terms of science
+until physiology was in a position openly to challenge our right to
+assume that the Will is an agent. Such a challenge physiology has now
+given, and even declared that any assumption of volitional agency is, in
+the presence of adequate physiological knowledge, impossible.</p>
+
+<p>The two problems which I thus state separately are often, and indeed
+generally, confused together; but for the purpose of clear analysis it
+is of the first importance that they should be kept apart. In order to
+show the wide distinction between them, we may best begin with a brief
+consideration of what it is that the two problems severally involve; and
+to do this we may best take the problems in what I have called their
+logical order.</p>
+
+<p>First, then, as regards the question whether the Will is an agent, the
+rival theories of Materialism and Spiritualism stand to one another in a
+relation of contradiction. For it is of the essence of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> Spiritualism to
+regard the Will as an agent, or as an original cause of bodily movement,
+and therefore as a true cause in Nature. On the other hand, it is of the
+essence of Materialism to deny that the Will is an agent. Hitherto,
+indeed, materialists as a body have not expressly recognized this
+implication as necessarily belonging to their theory; but that this
+implication does necessarily belong to their theory&mdash;or rather, I should
+say, really constitutes its most distinctive feature&mdash;admits of being
+easily shown. For the theory that material changes are the causes of
+mental changes necessarily terminates in the so-called theory of
+conscious automatism&mdash;or the theory that so far as the conditions to
+bodily action are concerned, consciousness is adventitious, bearing the
+same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as the striking
+of a clock bears to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. From
+this conclusion there is no possibility of escape, if once we accept the
+premises of Materialism; and therefore I say it belongs to the essence
+of Materialism to deny the agency of Will.</p>
+
+<p>Just as necessarily does it belong to the essence of Monism to affirm
+the agency of Will. For, according to this theory, while motion is
+producing nothing but motion, mind-change nothing but mind-change, both
+are producing both simultaneously; neither could be what it is without
+the other, for each is to the other a necessary counterpart or
+supplement, in the absence of which the whole<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> causation (whether
+regarded from the physical or mental side) would not be complete.</p>
+
+<p>Now, in my opinion the importance of the view thus presented by the
+theory of Monism is, for all purposes of psychological analysis,
+inestimable. It is impossible nowadays that such analysis can proceed
+very far in any direction without confronting the facts presented by
+physiology: hence it is impossible for such analysis to confine itself
+exclusively to the spiritual or subjective side of psychology. On the
+other hand, in so far as such analysis has regard to the material or
+objective side, it has hitherto appeared to countenance&mdash;in however
+disguised a form&mdash;the dogmatic denial of the Will as an agent. Hence the
+supreme importance to psychology of reconciling the hitherto rival
+theories of Spiritualism and Materialism in the higher synthesis which
+is furnished by the theory of Monism. For, obviously, in the absence of
+any philosophical justification of the Will as an agent, we are without
+any guarantee that all psychological inquiry is not a vain beating of
+the air. If, as Materialism necessarily implies, the Will is not a cause
+in Nature, there would be no reason in Nature for the agency either of
+feeling or of intelligence. Feeling and intelligence would, therefore,
+stand as ciphers in the general constitution of things; and any inquiry
+touching their internal system of causation could have no reference to
+any scientific inquiry touching causation in general. I am aware that
+this truth is habitually overlooked<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> by psychologists; but it is none
+the less a truth of fundamental importance to the whole superstructure
+of this science. Or, in other words, unless psychologists will expressly
+consent to rear their science on the basis provided by the philosophical
+theory of Monism, there is nothing to save it from logical
+disintegration; apart from this basis, the whole science is, so to
+speak, built in the air, like an unsubstantial structure of clouds.
+Psychologists, I repeat, habitually ignore this fact, and constantly
+speak of feeling and intelligence as true causes of adjustive action;
+but by so doing they merely beg from this contradictory theory of
+Spiritualism a flat denial of the fundamental postulate on which they
+elsewhere proceed&mdash;the postulate, namely, that mental changes are
+determined by cerebral changes. Consider, for example, the following
+passage from Mr. Spencer's <i>Principles of Psychology</i> (&sect; 125), which
+serves to show in brief compass the logical incoherency which in this
+matter runs through his whole work:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'Those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the
+average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities
+conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and
+habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or
+indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been,
+other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals
+among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were
+the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.'</p></div>
+
+<p>The argument here is that the 'adjustments of feelings to actions,' when
+once attained, leads in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> turn to an adjustment of actions to
+feelings&mdash;or, as I have myself stated the argument in my <i>Mental
+Evolution in Animals</i>, 'the <i>raison d'&eacute;tre</i> of Pleasure and Pain has
+been that of furnishing organisms with guides to adjustive action:
+moreover, as in the case of direct sensation dictating any simple
+adjustment for the sake of securing an immediate good, so in the case of
+instinct dictating a more intricate action for the sake of eventually
+securing a more remote good (whether for self, progeny, or community);
+and so, likewise, in the case of reason dictating a still more intricate
+adjustment for the sake of securing a good still more remote&mdash;in all
+cases, that is, where volition is concerned, pleasures and pains are the
+guides of action.' But thus to affirm that pleasures and pains are the
+guides of action is merely another way of affirming that the Will is an
+agent&mdash;a cause of bodily movement, and, as such, a cause in Nature. Now,
+as we have seen, Mr. Spencer not only affirms this&mdash;or rather assumes
+it&mdash;but proceeds to render an <i>a priori</i> explanation of the accuracy of
+the guidance. Yet he nowhere considers the fundamental question&mdash;Why
+should we suppose that the Will is an agent at all? Assuredly the answer
+given by physiology to this question is a simple denial that we have any
+justification so to regard the Will: in view of her demonstration of
+conscious automatism, she can see no reason why there should be any
+connexion at all between a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain and an
+objective fact of 'agreement or disagreement with the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>
+environment'&mdash;nay, one of the most eminent of her priesthood has
+declared that there <i>is</i> no more connexion between the ambition of a
+Napoleon and a general commotion of Europe, than there is between the
+puff of a steam-whistle and the locomotion of a train. And, as I have
+now repeatedly insisted, on grounds of physiology alone this is the only
+logical conclusion at which it is possible to arrive. Yet Mr. Spencer,
+while elsewhere proceeding on the lines of physiology, whenever he
+encounters the question of the agency of Will, habitually jumps the
+whole gulf that separates Materialism from Spiritualism. And this
+wonderful feat of intellectual athletics is likewise performed, so far
+at least as I am aware, by every other psychologist who has proceeded on
+the lines of physiology. Indeed, the logical incoherency is not so
+serious in Mr. Spencer's case as it is in that of many other writers
+whom I need not wait to name. For Mr. Spencer does not seek to found his
+system on a basis of avowed Materialism, and, therefore, he may be said
+to have left this fundamental question of volitional agency in abeyance.
+But all those writers who have reared their systems of psychology on a
+basis of avowed Materialism&mdash;or, which is the same thing, on a basis of
+physiology alone&mdash;lay themselves open to the charge of grossest
+inconsistency when they thus assume that the Will is an agent. It is
+impossible that these writers can both have their cake and eat it.
+Either they must forego their Materialism, or else they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> must cease to
+speak of 'motives determining action,' 'conduct being governed by
+pleasures and pains,' 'voluntary movements in their last resort being
+all due to bodily feelings,' 'the highest morality and the lowest vice
+being alike the result of a pursuit of happiness,' &amp;c. &amp;c. And, so far
+as I can see, it is only in the way above indicated, or on the theory of
+Monism, that it is possible, without ignoring the facts of physiology on
+the one hand or those of psychology on the other, philosophically to
+save the agency of Will.</p>
+
+<p>From this brief exposition it may be gathered that on the materialistic
+theory it is impossible that the Will can be, in any sense of the term,
+an agent; that on the spiritualistic theory the Will is regarded as an
+agent, but only in the sense of a non-natural or miraculous cause; and,
+lastly, that on the monistic theory the Will is saved as an agent, or
+may be properly regarded and as properly denominated a true cause, in
+the ordinary sense of that term. For this, as well as for other reasons
+which need not here be specified, I accept in philosophy the theory of
+Monism; and am thus entitled in psychology to proceed upon the doctrine
+that the Will is an agent. We have next to consider the ulterior
+question whether upon this theory the Will may be properly regarded as a
+free agent.</p>
+
+<p>By a free agent is understood an agent that is able to act without
+restraint, or spontaneously. The word 'free,' therefore, bears a very
+different<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> meaning when applied exclusively to the Will, and when
+applied more generally to the living organism. For we may properly say
+that a man, or an animal, is free when he, or it, is at liberty to act
+in accordance with desire. Touching the fact of freedom in this sense
+there is, of course, no question. We have not to consider the possible
+freedom of man, but the possible freedom of Will; we have not to
+contemplate whether a man may be free to do what he wills, but whether
+he can be free to will what he wills. Such being the question, we have
+to consider it in relation to the three philosophical theories already
+stated&mdash;Materialism, Spiritualism, and Monism.</p>
+
+<p>For the theory of Materialism the present question has no existence. If
+this announcement appears startling, it can only be because no
+materialist has ever taken the trouble to formulate his own theory with
+distinctness. For, as previously shown, Materialism necessarily involves
+the doctrine of conscious automatism; but, if so, the Will is concluded
+not to be an agent at all, and therefore it becomes idle to discuss
+whether, in any impossible exercise of its agency, it is free or subject
+to restraint. The most that in this connexion could logically stand to
+be considered by the advocates of Materialism would be whether or not
+the adventitious and inefficacious feelings of subjectivity which are
+associated with cerebral activity are determinate or free; but this
+would probably be regarded on all hands as a somewhat<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> useless topic of
+discussion, and certainly in any case would have no reference to the
+question of free <i>agency</i>. The point to be clearly understood is that,
+according to the materialistic theory, a motor is distinct from a
+motive, although in some unaccountable manner the motor is able to cause
+the motive. But the motive, when thus caused, is not supposed to exert
+any causal influence on bodily action; it is supposed to begin and end
+as a motive, or never itself to become a motor. In other words, as
+before stated, the Will is not supposed to be an agent; and, therefore,
+to this theory the doctrine of free-will and of determinism are alike
+irrelevant. We need not wait to prove that this important fact is
+habitually overlooked by materialists themselves, or that whenever a
+materialist espouses the cause of determinism, he is thereby and for the
+time being vacating his position as a materialist; for if, according to
+his theory, the Will is not an agent, he is merely impugning his own
+doctrines by consenting to discuss the conditions of its agency.</p>
+
+<p>The theory of Spiritualism and the theory of Monism agree in holding
+that the Will is an agent; and, therefore, to both of these theories the
+question whether the Will is a free agent is a real question. Here,
+then, it devolves upon us to consider carefully the logical status of
+the rival doctrines of so-called Liberty and Necessity. For convenience
+of arrangement in what follows, we may best begin with the doctrine of
+Necessity, or Determinism.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI.</h2>
+
+<h3>THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM.</h3>
+
+
+<p>We have now seen that, according to Materialism, the Will is not an
+agent, while according both to Spiritualism and to Monism the Will is an
+agent. Touching the further question, whether the Will is a free agent,
+we have seen that while the question does not exist for Materialism, it
+appears to require a negative answer both from Spiritualism and from
+Monism. For, as regards its relation to Spiritualism, when once the
+ground is cleared of certain errors of statement and fallacies of
+reasoning, we appear to find that unless the will is held to be
+motiveless&mdash;which would be to destroy not only the doctrine of moral
+responsibility, but likewise that of universal causation&mdash;it must be
+regarded as subject to law, or as determined in its action by the nature
+of its past history and present circumstances. Lastly, the theory of
+Monism appears likewise to deny the possibility of freedom as an
+attribute of Will; for, according to this theory, mental processes are
+one and the same with physical processes, and hence it does not appear<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span>
+that the doctrine of determinism could well be taught in a manner more
+emphatic.</p>
+
+<p>Thus far, then, the doctrine of determinism is seen to be victorious
+over the doctrine of freedom all along the line. By Materialism the
+question of freedom is excluded <i>ab initio</i>; by Spiritualism and by
+Monism, so far as yet seen, it can be logically answered only in the
+negative. From which it follows that the sense of moral responsibility
+is of the nature of a vast illusion, the historical genesis of which
+admits of being easily traced, and the authority of which is thus
+destroyed. Although it may still serve to supply motives to conduct, it
+seems that it can do so only in the way that belongs to
+superstition&mdash;that Conscience, as I have before said, is the bogey of
+mankind, and that belief in its authority is like belief in witchcraft,
+destined to dwindle and to fade before the advance of a better or more
+complete knowledge of natural causation.</p>
+
+<p>But the discussion must not end here. Hitherto I have presented the case
+Liberty <i>versus</i> Necessity with all the impartiality of which I am
+capable; but I have done so without travelling an inch beyond those
+limits of discussion within which the question has been debated by
+previous writers. I believe, indeed, that I have pointed out several
+important oversights which have been made on both sides of the question;
+but in doing this I have not gone further than the philosophical basis
+upon which the question has been hitherto<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> argued. My object, however,
+in publishing these papers is not that of destructive criticism; and
+what I have done in this direction has been done only in order to
+prepare the way for what is now to follow. Having shown, as it appears
+to me conclusively, that upon both the rival theories of Materialism and
+Spiritualism&mdash;the doctrine of Liberty, and therefore of Moral
+Responsibility&mdash;must logically fall, I now hope to show that this
+doctrine admits of being re-established on a basis furnished by the
+theory of Monism.</p>
+
+<p>It often happens that an elaborate structure of argument, which is
+perfectly sound and complete upon the basis furnished by a given
+hypothesis, admits of being wholly disintegrated when the fundamental
+hypothesis is shown to be either provisional or untrue. And such, I
+believe, is the case with the issue now before us. For the issue Liberty
+<i>versus</i> Necessity has hitherto been argued on the common assumption
+that natural causation is not merely the most ultimate principle which
+the human mind can reach; but also a principle which is, in some way or
+another, external to that mind. It has been taken for granted by both
+sides in the controversy that if our volitions can be proved to depend
+upon natural causation, as rigid in its sequences within the sphere of a
+human mind as within that of a calculating machine, there must be an end
+of the controversy; seeing that our volitions would be thus proved to be
+rigidly determined by those same principles of fixed order, or 'natural<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span>
+law,' which are external to, or independent of, the human mind&mdash;quite as
+much as they are external to, or independent of, the calculating
+machine. Now, it is this assumption which I challenge. The theory of
+Monism entitles one to deny that when we have driven the question down
+to the granite bed of natural causation, nothing more remains to be
+done; according to this theory it still remains to be asked, What is the
+nature of this natural causation? Is it indeed the ultimate datum of
+experience, below which the human mind cannot go? And is it indeed so
+far external to, or independent of, the human mind, that the latter
+stands to it in the relation of a slave to a master&mdash;coerced as to
+action by the conditions which that master has laid down?</p>
+
+<p>Now these questions are all virtually answered in the affirmative by the
+dualistic theory of Spiritualism. For the Will is here regarded as an
+agent bound to act in accordance with those conditions of external
+necessity which dualism recognizes as natural causation. Its internal
+causation thus becomes but the reflex of external; and the reflection
+becomes known internally as the consciousness of motive. Hence, the Will
+cannot be philosophically liberated from the toils of this external
+necessity, so long as dualism recognizes that necessity as existing
+independently of the Will, and thus imposing its conditions on
+volitional activity. But the theory of Monism, by identifying external
+with internal causation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>&mdash;or physical processes with psychical
+processes&mdash;philosophically saves the doctrine of freedom, and with it
+the doctrine of moral responsibility. Moreover, it does so without
+relying upon any precarious appeal to the direct testimony of
+consciousness itself. As this view of the subject is one by no means
+easy of apprehension, I will endeavour to unfold it part by part.</p>
+
+<p>To begin with, Monism excludes the possibility of volition being
+determined by cerebration. Let us suppose, for example, that a sequence
+of ideas, <i>A, B, C, D</i>, occurs in the mind, which on its obverse or
+cerebral aspect may be represented by the sequence <i>a, b, c, d</i>. Here
+the parallelism is not due, as supposed by Materialism, to <i>a</i>
+determining <i>Ab</i>, <i>b</i> determining <i>Bc</i>, &amp;c.; it is due to <i>Aa</i>
+determining <i>Bb</i>, <i>Bb</i> determining <i>Cc</i>, &amp;c.&mdash;the two apparently diverse
+causal sequences being really but one causal sequence. If the
+determinist should rejoin that a causal sequence of some kind is all
+that he demands&mdash;that the Will is equally proved to be unfree, whether
+it be bound by the causal sequence <i>a, b, c, d</i>, or by the causal
+sequence <i>Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd</i>&mdash;I answer that this is a point which we have
+to consider by-and-by. Meanwhile I am only endeavouring to make clear
+the essential distinction between the philosophical theories of Monism
+and Materialism. And the effect of this distinction is to show that, for
+the purposes of clear analysis, we may wholly neglect either side of the
+double reality. If we happen to be engaged<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> on any physiological
+inquiry, we may altogether neglect the processes of ideation with which
+any process of cerebration may be concerned; while, if we happen to be
+engaged upon any psychological inquiry, we may similarly neglect the
+processes of cerebration with which any process of ideation may be
+concerned. Seeing that each is equally an index of a common sequence, it
+can make no difference which of them we take as our guide, although for
+purposes of practical inquiry it is of course expedient to take the
+cerebral index when we are dealing with the objective side of the
+problem, and the mental index when dealing with the subjective. In the
+following pages, therefore, I shall altogether neglect the cerebral
+index. The inquiry on which we are engaged belongs to the region of
+mind, and, therefore, after what has just been said, it will be apparent
+that I am entitled to adopt the standpoint of a spiritualist, to the
+extent of fastening attention only upon the mental side of the problem.
+For although the theory of Monism teaches, as against Spiritualism, that
+no one of the mental sequences could take place without a corresponding
+physical sequence, the theory also teaches the converse proposition; and
+therefore it makes no difference which of the two phenomenal sequences
+is taken as our index of the ontological.</p>
+
+<p>Now, it clearly makes a great difference whether the mental changes
+concerned in volition are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> regarded as effects or as causes. According
+to Materialism, the mental changes are the effects of cerebral changes,
+which were themselves the effects of precedent cerebral changes.
+According to Spiritualism, these mental changes are the causes, not only
+of the cerebral changes, but also of one another. According to Monism,
+the mental changes may be regarded as the causes of the cerebral, or
+<i>vice versa</i>, seeing that in neither case are we stating a real
+truth&mdash;the real truth being that it is only a cerebro-mental change
+which can cause any change either of cerebration or of mentation. Now it
+is evident that if the mental processes were always the effects of
+cerebral processes (Materialism), there could be no further question
+with regard to Liberty and Necessity; while, if the mental processes are
+the causes both of the cerebral processes and of one another
+(Spiritualism), the question before us becomes raised to a higher level.
+The causality in question being now regarded as purely mental, the will
+is no longer regarded as a passive slave of the brain, and the only
+thing to be considered is whether freedom is compatible with causation
+of a purely mental kind. Now, at an earlier stage of our enquiry I have
+argued that it is not; but this argument was based entirely upon
+spiritualistic premises, or upon the assumption that the principle of
+causality is everywhere external to, or independent of, the human
+mind&mdash;under which assumption I cannot see that it makes much difference
+whether the coercion comes from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> brain alone, or from the whole
+general system of things external to the human mind. And here it is that
+I think the theory of Monism comes to the rescue.</p>
+
+<p>For, if physical and mental processes are everywhere consubstantial, or
+identical in kind, it can make no difference whether we regard their
+sequences as objective or ejective, physical or spiritual. Hence, we are
+free to regard all causation as of a character essentially psychical.
+But, if so, it must be self-contained as psychical; it cannot be in any
+way determined by anything from without, seeing that outside itself
+there is nothing in the Universe. Now, if this is true of the
+World-eject, it must also be true of the Man-eject, as well as of the
+Man-subject, or Ego. If all causation is psychical, that portion of it
+which belongs to, or is manifested by, my own personality is not laid
+upon me by anything from without; it is merely the expression of my own
+psychical activity, as this is taking place within the circumscribed
+area of my own personality. And this activity is spontaneous, in the
+sense that it is not coerced from without. All the sequences which that
+activity displays within this region are self-determined, in the sense
+that they are determined by the self, and not by any agency external to
+it. The only influence which any external agency can here exert, is that
+of insisting that bodily action&mdash;the physical outcome of my psychical
+processes&mdash;shall be in accordance with the conditions imposed by the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>
+internal system of causation; but this does not influence in any degree
+those mental processes which do not express themselves in bodily action.
+Hence, it may be perfectly true that my bodily action in the past might
+have been different from what it actually was; for as this action was
+the outcome of my mentation at the time (according to the spiritual
+index, which is now our guide), and as this mentation was not coerced
+from without, it might very well have been different from what it was.
+Each of the mental sequences at that time was a result of those
+preceding and a cause of those succeeding; but behind all this play of
+mental causation there all the while stood that Self, which was at once
+the condition of its occurrence, and the <i>First Cause</i> of its action. It
+is not true that that Self was nothing more than the result of all this
+play of mental causation; it can only have been the First Cause of it.
+For, otherwise, the mental causation must have been the cause of that
+causation, which is absurd. Who or What it was that originally caused
+this First Cause is, of course, another question, which I shall
+presently hope to show is not merely unanswerable, but unmeaning. As a
+matter of fact, however, we know that this Self is here, and that it can
+thus be proved to be a substance, <i>standing under</i> the whole of that
+more superficial display of mental causation which it is able to look
+upon introspectively&mdash;and this almost as <i>impersonally</i> as if it were
+regarding the display as narrated by another mind. I say, then, that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span>
+the theory of Monism entitles us to regard this Self as the <i>fons et
+origo</i> of our mental causation, and thus restores to us the doctrine of
+Liberty with its attendant consequence of Moral Responsibility.</p>
+
+<p>It may help to elucidate this matter if we regard it from another point
+of view. According to Hobbes, 'Liberty is the absence of all impediments
+to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical qualities
+of the agent.' Now, if we accept this definition, it is easy to show
+that the theory of Monism is really at one with the doctrine of Liberty.
+For, in the first place, according to the theory of Monism, the neurosis
+of the brain could not be what it is without the psychosis of the mind.
+Consequently, as above shown, it would be equally incorrect to say that
+the neurosis governs the psychosis, as it would be to say that the
+psychosis governs the neurosis. But, if so, the Will is free in
+accordance with Hobbes' definition of freedom. Suppose, for example,
+that on seeing a bone I think of Professor Flower, then remember that a
+long time ago I lent his book on Osteology to a friend, and forthwith
+resolve to ask my friend what has become of it; here my ultimate
+volition would be unfree if it were the effect of physical processes
+going on in my brain. But the volition might be free if each of these
+mental processes were the result of the preceding one, seeing that there
+may then have been 'an absence of all impediments' to the occurrence of
+these processes.</p>
+
+<p>Of course it will be objected&mdash;as I have myself<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> urged in the preceding
+chapter&mdash;that causal action of any kind is incompatible with freedom of
+volition&mdash;that if there be any such causal action, even though it be
+wholly restricted within the sphere of mind, the Will is really
+compelled to will as it does will, is determined to determine as it does
+determine, and hence that its apparent freedom is illusory. Hobbes'
+definition, it may be urged, when applied to the case of the Will, is
+equivocal. No doubt a man is free as to his <i>action</i>, if there be an
+'absence of all impediments' to his action&mdash;or, in other words, if he is
+able to act as he wills to act. But it does not follow that he is free
+as to his <i>will</i>, even though there be an absence of all impediments to
+his willing as he wills to will. For here the very question is as to
+whether there are any impediments to his willing otherwise than he does
+will. The fact that he wills to will as he does will proves that there
+are no impediments to his willing in that direction; but is there a
+similar absence of impediments to his willing to will in any other
+direction? If so, we are still within the lines of determinism. Thus
+Hobbes' definition of freedom really applies only to freedom of bodily
+action; not to freedom of volition, seeing that if my will is caused I
+could not have willed to will otherwise than I did will. Now, the answer
+which Monism supplies to this objection is that the will itself is here
+the ultimate agent, and <i>therefore an agent which must be identified
+with the principle of causality</i>. In other words, the very reason why we
+feel that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> Hobbes' definition of liberty, while perfectly valid as
+regards bodily action, seems to lack something when applied to volition,
+is because volition belongs to the sphere of mind&mdash;belongs, therefore,
+to that sphere which the theory of Monism regards as identical with
+causality itself. Although it is true that volitions are caused by
+motives, yet it is the mind which conditions the motives, and therefore
+its own volitions. It is not true that the mind is always the passive
+slave of causes, known to it as motives. The human mind is itself a
+causal agent, having the same kind of priority within the microcosm as
+the World-eject has in the macrocosm. Therefore its motives are in large
+part matters of its own creation. In the intricate workings of its own
+internal machinery innumerable patterns of thought are turned out, some
+of which it selects as good, while others it rejects as bad; but no one
+of which could have come into being at all without this causal agency of
+the mind itself.</p>
+
+<p>It will probably be objected that even though all this were granted, we
+cannot thus save the doctrine of moral responsibility. For it may appear
+that the liberty which is thus accorded to the Will is nothing better
+than liberty to will at random, as argued in my previous essay. But here
+we must observe that although we are thus shown free to will at random,
+it does not follow that we are likewise free to act in accordance with
+our volitions. And this is a most important distinction, which
+libertarians have hitherto failed to notice. If we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> are free to will in
+any direction, it follows, indeed, that we are free to will at random;
+but it follows also, and for this very reason, that we are free to will
+the <i>impossible</i>. True, when we will what is known to be impossible of
+execution, we call the act an act of desire; but it is clearly the same
+in kind as an act of will, and differs only in not admitting of being
+translated into an act of body. Therefore I say that the restriction
+which is imposed upon us by the conditions of causality, whether
+external or internal, is not any restriction as to willing, but merely
+as to doing. It is not in the subjective, but in the objective world
+that we encounter the 'bondage of necessity.'</p>
+
+<p>Now, the knowledge that we are thus restricted as to bodily action
+imposes that kind of restraint upon volition which is termed rational.
+There is nothing in the nature of things to prevent our willing anything
+that we wish; but there is something in the nature of things to prevent
+our doing everything that we will; and as the practical object of our
+volition is that of determining bodily action, we find it expedient to
+will only such things as we believe that we can do. To this extent,
+therefore, the Will is bound&mdash;namely, by the executive capacity of the
+body. But, strictly speaking, this is not a binding of the Will <i>qua</i>
+Will. Even in such cases, as St. Paul says, to will may be present with
+us, but how to perform that which is good we find not. I say then that
+although the Will is free to will whatever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> it wills, nevertheless it
+would fail in its essential use or object did it refuse to will in
+accordance with the conditions which are imposed upon its executive
+capacity. Again, to quote St. Paul, the Will might say, All things for
+me are lawful; but all things are not expedient. Now, this consideration
+of expediency is one of constant and far-reaching importance. For not
+only, as already observed, does it lead to volition on the one hand as
+rational; but it also leads to volition on the other hand as moral. Let
+us take the two points separately.</p>
+
+<p>Do we say that a man is not free to conduct a scientific research,
+because in conducting it he must employ the needful apparatus? Or do we
+say that a man is not free to marry, because in order to do so he must
+go through a marriage ceremony? Obviously, to say such things would
+sound very like talking nonsense. It is true that in neither case is a
+man free to gain his object without adopting the means which are seen to
+be necessary under the system of external causation in which he finds
+himself; but this does not mean that he is not free to do as he wills,
+unless it so happens that he wills to do the impossible. Thus, within
+the limits that are set by the conditions of causation, a man is
+understood to be free to act as he wills so long as he is not 'impeded'
+by some of those conditions. To say that he is not free because he
+cannot get beyond those conditions would be absurd, since, apart from
+these conditions, action of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> any kind would be <i>a priori</i> impossible,
+and the man would have, as his only alternative, no-action.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, in doing we must conform to the law of causation&mdash;which, indeed,
+is all that can be meant by doing&mdash;and if in willing what we do we must
+also conform to the law of causation, where is the difference with
+respect to freedom? Such restraint as there may be is here a restraint
+upon bodily action; not at all upon the mental action which we call
+volition. The Will may will in any way that it wills to will; but the
+body cannot act in every way that the Will may will it to act; therefore
+the Will finds it expedient to will only in such ways as the body can
+act&mdash;i. e. to conform in <i>its</i> action to the external system of
+causation. If this condition of all action is held to be compatible with
+freedom in the one case, so in consistency must it be held in the other.
+Equally in either case the agent can only be properly said to be unfree,
+if he be subject to causal restraint from without. And in neither case
+does the universal condition of acting under the law of causation
+constitute bondage, in any other sense than that of furnishing the agent
+with his conditions to acting in any way at all. Therefore, unless it be
+said that a man is not free to do as he wills because he wills to do the
+impossible, it cannot be denied that he is free to will as he wills
+because he wills according to law. For no action of any kind is possible
+contrary to law&mdash;a general fact which goes to constitute an argument <i>a
+posteriori</i> for the rationality of the World-eject&mdash;and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> if volition
+constituted an exception to this general statement, it could only do so
+by becoming no-action. Now, it is by thus willing according to law&mdash;or
+with due reference to those external conditions of causality with which
+the executive capacity has to do&mdash;that volition is rendered rational.
+The restraint laid upon volition is not laid upon it <i>as</i> volition, but
+only in respect of execution. A man may will to marry as long and as
+hard as he chooses; but only if he further wills to take the necessary
+means can his volition become rational; it is irrational if he wills to
+marry, and at the same time wills not to go through the marriage
+ceremony. But although irrational, it is none the less free. Considered
+merely as an act of volition it is equally free, whether it be rational
+or irrational.</p>
+
+<p>And, similarly, it is equally free whether it be moral or immoral. The
+objection that an uncaused volition cannot be a responsible volition
+depends for its validity on the meaning which we attach to the term
+'uncaused.' If it be meant that the volition arises without any regard
+at all to the surrounding conditions of life, and is carried into effect
+without the agent being able to control it by means of any other
+voluntary act; then, indeed, whatever else such an agent may be, he
+certainly is not moral. But if it be meant that among a number of
+uncompleted volitions drawing in different directions&mdash;and all
+'uncaused' in the sense of belonging immediately to the Ego&mdash;one of
+them<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> gains an advantage by a conscious reference of the mind to it as
+good or evil, then the agent who is capable of giving this advantage to
+that member of the system may properly be called moral. The man who
+willed to marry, and yet willed not to go through the marriage ceremony,
+was, as we have seen, irrational. Similarly, if any agent wills an
+action without being able to consider any of the consequences which it
+may involve as either moral or immoral, such an agent is what we must
+properly call unmoral. Even in such an agent, however, the Will may be
+free; only it would act without reference to any moral environment, just
+as the lunatic above supposed might endeavour to act without reference
+to any social environment.</p>
+
+<p>Let us look at the whole matter in yet another light. We have repeatedly
+seen that the question of free-will, and therefore of moral
+responsibility, depends upon the question as to whether a man's action
+in the past might have been other than it was, notwithstanding that all
+the conditions under which he was placed remained the same. Now, to this
+question only one answer can be given by a dualistic theory of things,
+whether materialistic or spiritualistic. For it belongs to the essence
+of a dualistic theory to regard the principle of causation as a
+principle external to, and independent of, the human mind; consequently,
+all the conditions of mental causation being given, a certain result in
+the way of volition is necessarily bound to ensue&mdash;or, in other words,
+at any given time in a man's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> mental history, his action cannot have
+been other than it was. But now, according to the monistic theory, all
+causation has a psychical basis&mdash;being but the objective expression to
+us of the psychical activity of the World-eject. Consequently, according
+to this theory, the course of even strictly physical causation is
+inevitable or necessary only in so far as the psychical activity of the
+World-eject is held to be uniform, or consistent within itself. And
+forasmuch as all our knowledge of physical causation is necessarily
+empirical, we have but very inadequate means of judging how far this
+empirical index is a true gauge of the reality. We can, indeed, predict
+an eclipse centuries in advance; but we can only do so on the
+supposition that such and such physical conditions remain constant, and
+we have no right to affirm that such must be the case. Our knowledge of
+physical causation, being but empirical, is probably but a very
+inadequate translation of the psychical activity of the World-eject; and
+hence, not only have we no right to predict a future eclipse with
+certainty, but we have not so much as the right to affirm that even a
+past eclipse must have taken place of necessity. For we have no right to
+affirm that at any one period of cosmic history the action of the
+World-eject must have been what it was, or could not have been other
+than it was. Our knowledge of the obverse aspect of this action (in the
+course of physical causation) is, as I have said, purely empirical; and
+this is merely another way<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> of saying that although we do know what the
+action of the World-eject has been at such and such a period of cosmic
+history, we can have no means of knowing what else it might have been.
+For anything that we can tell to the contrary, the whole history of the
+solar system, for example, might have been quite different from what it
+has been; the course which it actually has run may have been but one out
+of an innumerable number of possible alternatives, any other of which
+might just as well have been adopted by the World-eject.</p>
+
+<p>Now, if this is true of natural causation in the case of the macrocosm,
+it would appear to be equally so of natural causation in the case of the
+microcosm. Indeed, prediction in the case of human activity is so much
+less certain than in the case of cosmic activity, that the attribute of
+free-will is generally ascribed to the former, while rarely suggested as
+possibly belonging to the latter. And similarly as regards past action.
+If we are unable to say that at any period in the past history of the
+solar system the World-eject might not have deflected the whole stream
+of events into some other channel, how can we be able to say that at any
+given period of his past history the Man-eject could not have performed
+an analogous act? Obviously, the only reason why we are not accustomed
+to entertain this supposition in either case, is because our judgements
+are beset with the assumption that the principle of causality is prior
+to that of mind&mdash;something of the nature of Fate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> superior even to the
+gods. And, no less obviously, if once we see any reason to regard the
+principle of causality as merely co-extensive with that of mind, the
+whole question as between Necessity and Free-will lapses; there is
+nothing to show that a man's action in the past might not have been
+other than it was. The only outward restraint placed upon the exercise
+of his Will is then seen to be imposed by the conditions of its
+executive capacity, and this restraint it is that constitutes man a
+rational agent. On the other hand, the structure of conscience&mdash;however
+we may suppose this to have been formed&mdash;imposes that further and inward
+restraint upon his Will, which constitutes man a moral agent. But
+neither of these restraints can properly be said to constitute bondage
+in the sense required by Necessitarianism, because neither of them
+requires that the man's Will must will as it does will; they require
+merely that his Will should act in certain ways if it is to accomplish
+certain results; and to this extent only is it subject to law, or to the
+incidence of those external influences which help to shape our motives.</p>
+
+<p>But if this is so, is it not obvious that the sense of moral
+responsibility is rationally justified? This sense goes upon the
+supposition that a man's conduct in the past might have been different
+from what it was. Clearly, therefore, no question of moral
+responsibility can ever obtain in cases where the general system of
+external causation, or natural law, rendered an alternative line of
+action physically<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> impossible. <i>The question of moral responsibility can
+only obtain in cases where two or more lines of conduct were alike
+possible, so far as the external system of causation is concerned&mdash;or
+where the Will was equally free to choose between two or more courses of
+bodily action.</i> In other words, the question of moral responsibility has
+nothing to do with the only kind of bondage to which, according to our
+present point of view, the Will is subject&mdash;namely the bondage of being
+rationally obliged to will only what is capable of performance. The
+question of moral responsibility has only to do with the system of
+causation which is inherent in the mind itself; not with the system that
+is external to the mind. And as the theory of Monism identifies the mind
+with this its own inherent system of causation&mdash;or regards a man's Will
+as the originator of a particular portion of general causality&mdash;it
+follows from the theory that a man is justly liable to moral praise or
+blame as the case may be: the moral sense no longer appears as a
+gigantic illusion: conscience is justified at the bar of reason.</p>
+
+<p>It appears to me impossible that any valid exception can be taken to the
+above reasoning, if once the premiss is granted&mdash;namely, that the
+principle of Causality admits of being regarded as identical with that
+of Volition. For if Cause is but another name for Will&mdash;whether the Will
+be subjective or ejective&mdash;it follows that my will is a first cause,
+which is determined by other causes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> only in so far as the executive
+capacity of my body is so determined. As the whole stress of any
+objection to the present argument must thus be brought to bear upon the
+validity of this its fundamental premiss, a few words may now be said to
+show that the premiss is not wholly gratuitous. Of course the reason why
+at first sight it is apt to appear, not only gratuitous, but even
+grotesque, is because in these days of physical science the minds of
+most of us are dominated by the unthinking persuasion that the principle
+of causality is the most ultimate principle which our minds can reach.
+Most of us accept this persuasion as almost of the nature of an axiom,
+and hence the mere suggestion that our own volitions are really uncaused
+appears to us of the nature of a self-evident absurdity. A little
+thought, however, is enough to show that the only ground of reason which
+this strong prepossession can rest upon, is the assumption that the
+principle of causality is logically prior to that of mind. Therefore it
+is the validity of this assumption that we have here to investigate.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, then, the assumption is <i>ipso facto</i> irrational. For
+it is evident that in order to make the assumption there must already be
+a mind to make it. In other words, the very conception of the principle
+of causality implies a thinking substance wherein that conception
+arises, and therefore, as a mere matter of formal statement, it is
+impossible to assign logical priority to this conception over the thing
+whereby it is conceived.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>In the next place, when we carefully analyze the nature of this
+conception itself, we find that it arises immediately out of our
+conception of Being as Being. This is shown by the idea of <i>equivalency</i>
+between cause and effect, which is an essential feature of the
+conception of causality as such. In other words, the statement of any
+causal relation is merely a statement of the fact that both the matter
+and the energy concerned in the event were of a permanent nature and
+unalterable amount. Therefore, <i>if</i> the ultimate Reality is mental,
+Causation <i>must</i> be ontologically identical with Volition. And that the
+ultimate Reality is either mental, or something greater, seems to be
+proved by the consideration that if it be supposed anything <i>less</i>,
+there must be an end of the conception of equivalency as between cause
+and effect, and so of the conception of causality itself; for, clearly,
+if my mind has been caused by anything less than itself, there is an end
+of any possible equivalency between the activity of that thing as a
+cause, and the occurrence of my mind as an effect<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Lastly, the conception of causality essentially involves the idea of
+finality as existing somewhere. Here I cannot do better than quote some
+extracts from Canon Mozley's essay on 'The Principle of Causation,' as
+he manages very tersely to convey the gist of previous philosophizing
+upon this subject.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'He (Clarke) brings out simply at bottom the meaning and
+significance of an idea in the human mind, that there is implied in
+the very idea itself of cause, firstly, that it causes something
+else; and secondly, that it is uncaused itself.... An infinite
+series of causes does not make a cause; ... an infinite succession
+of causes rests, by the very hypothesis, upon no cause; each
+particular one rests on the one which follows it, but the whole
+rests upon nothing.... If from one cause we have to go back to
+another, that which we go back from is not the cause, but that
+which we go back to is. The very idea of cause, as I have said,
+implies a stop; and wherever we stop is the cause.... A true cause
+is a First Cause.... The atheistic idea thus does not correspond to
+the idea of reason. The atheist appears to acknowledge the
+necessity of a cause, and appears to provide for it; but when we
+come to his scheme it fails exactly in that part of the idea which
+clenches it, and which is essential to its integrity; it fails in
+providing a stop; ... One might say to him, Why do you give
+yourself the trouble to supply causation at all? You do so because
+you consider yourself obliged in reason to do it, but if you supply
+causation at all, why not furnish such a cause as reason has
+impressed upon you, and which is inherent in your mind&mdash;a cause
+which stands still, an original cause? If you never intended to
+supply this, it must have been because you thought a real cause was
+not wanted; but if you thought a cause not wanted, why not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> have
+said from the first that causes were not wanted, and said from the
+first that events could take place without causes?'</p></div>
+
+<p>Or, to quote a more recent authority, and one speaking from the side of
+physical science, Prof. Huxley writes:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'The student of nature who starts from the axiom of the
+universality of the law of causation, cannot refuse to admit an
+eternal existence; if he admits the conservation of energy, he
+cannot deny the possibility of an eternal energy; if he admits the
+existence of immaterial phenomena in the form of consciousness, he
+must admit the possibility, at any rate, of an eternal series of
+such phenomena; and, if his studies have not been barren of the
+best fruit of the investigation of nature, he will have enough
+sense to see that, when Spinoza says, "Per Deum intelligo ens
+absolute infinitum, hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis
+attributis," the God so conceived is one that only a very great
+fool would deny, even in his heart. Physical science is as little
+Atheistic as it is Materialistic<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>.'</p></div>
+
+<p>Now, if it thus belongs to the essence of our idea of causation that
+finality must be reached somewhere, I do not know where this is so
+likely to be reached as at that principle wherein the idea itself takes
+its rise&mdash;viz. Mind. But, if so, the statement that any particular acts
+of mind are uncaused ceases to present any character of self-evident
+absurdity.</p>
+
+<p>And the argument need not end here. For Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown
+that our idea of causation, not merely requires a mind for its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span>
+occurrence, but that in every mind where it does occur it has been
+directly formed out of experiences of effort in acts of volition. So
+that whether we analyze the idea of cause as we actually discover it in
+our own minds, or investigate the history of its genesis, we alike find,
+as we might have antecedently expected, that it is dependent on our more
+ultimate idea of mind as mind; the conception of causality is not, as a
+matter of fact, original or primal, but derivative or secondary.
+Therefore, if this conception necessarily involves the postulation of a
+first cause, there can be no doubt that such a cause can only be
+conceived as of the nature of mind. From which it follows that each
+individual mind requires to be regarded&mdash;if it is regarded at all&mdash;as of
+the nature of a first cause.</p>
+
+<p>From this, however, it does not follow that each individual mind
+requires to be regarded as wholly independent of all other causes, or as
+never subject to any causal influence which may be exercised by other
+minds. Although each mind presents the feature of finality or
+spontaneity, this does not hinder that it also presents the feature of
+relation to other minds, which, therefore, are able to act upon it in
+numberless ways. Now, whether these minds are the minds of other men, of
+other intelligent beings, or of the whole World-eject, the causal
+activity which is exerted upon my mind expresses itself in that mind as
+a consciousness of motives. But although these motives may help to
+determine my volitions, there is no reason to suppose that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> they are
+themselves the volitions, or that without them my mind would cease to be
+itself a causal agent. On the contrary, if this were supposed, the
+supposition would amount to destroying the causal agency of my own mind,
+which, as we have just seen, must either be original or not at all.</p>
+
+<p>The way, therefore, that the matter stands is this. In so far as the
+microcosm is a circumscribed system of being&mdash;a thinking substance, a
+personality&mdash;it is of the nature of a first cause, free to act in any
+direction as to its thinking and willing, even though its thinking
+should be irrational as to truth, and its willing impossible as to
+execution. But in so far as the microcosm enters into relation with the
+macrocosm, the system of external causation which it encounters
+determines the character of its volitions. For although these volitions
+are themselves of the nature of first causes, it is no contradiction to
+say that they are&mdash;at all events in large measure&mdash;determined by other
+and external causes. This is no contradiction because, although they are
+thus determined, it does not follow that they are thus determined
+<i>necessarily</i>, and this makes all the difference between the theory of
+will as bond or free. In any stream of secondary causation each member
+of the series is understood to determine the next member of necessity;
+and it is because this notion is imported into psychology that the
+theory of determinism regards it as axiomatic that, if our volitions are
+in any way caused at all, they can only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> be caused by way of necessity;
+and hence that under the operation of any given set of motives the
+action of the will can only take place in the direction of the
+resultant. But any such axiom is valid only within the region of second
+causes. On the hypothesis that volitions are first causes, the axiom is
+irrelevant to them; for although it may be true that they are determined
+by causes from without, it may not be true that they are thus determined
+of necessity: their intrinsic character as themselves first causes,
+although not isolating them from any possible contact with other causes,
+nevertheless does protect them from being necessarily coerced by these
+causes, and therefore from becoming but the mere effects of them. Such
+influence, or determination, as is exerted upon the Will by these
+external causes is exerted only because any individual mind is not
+itself a macrocosm, but a microcosm in relation to a macrocosm. If it
+were itself a macrocosm, standing out of relation to all other being,
+its prime causation would, of course, be wholly uninfluenced by any
+other causation; its volitions would then be concerned only with the
+determination of its own thoughts in a constant stream of purely
+subjective contemplation, such as that which the Hindoo philosophy
+attributes to God. But as the human mind discovers itself as existing in
+close and complex relations with an external world of an orderly
+character, the human mind finds that it is, as before said, <i>expedient</i>
+to adapt the course of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> its own causal activity so as to bring it into
+harmony with the external order. For, although its own causal activity
+is primal, it by no means follows that on this account it is almighty;
+hence, even although it be primal, it is nevertheless under the
+necessity of adopting means in order to secure its ends&mdash;or, in other
+words, of adjusting its volitions (if they are to be practically
+efficient) to the conditions which are imposed upon its activity by the
+orderly system of the external world. Which is merely another way of
+stating the conclusion previously reached&mdash;viz. that the only necessity
+which can be proved to govern our volitions is the necessity which is
+imposed by our own considerations of reason and morality. Although we
+find that it is expedient to adapt our own causal activity to that
+larger system of causal activity by which we are surrounded&mdash;seeing that
+we must do so necessarily if we are to act at all&mdash;it by no means
+follows that we are bound to will what is expedient. In other words, the
+necessity laid upon us by the system of external causation is a
+necessity to adopt means for the attainment of ends; not a necessity to
+will the ends. And although in many cases this distinction may appear to
+be practically unmeaning&mdash;seeing that no man wills what he knows to be
+impossible of execution, and therefore that to say he is necessarily
+prevented from doing a certain thing seems practically equivalent to
+saying that he is necessarily prevented from willing that thing&mdash;in all
+cases where any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> question of moral responsibility can possibly obtain,
+the distinction is one of fundamental importance. For, as already shown,
+any question of moral responsibility can only obtain where two or more
+lines of action are alike possible, and therefore where no necessity is
+laid upon the man in respect of carrying out his volitions, in whichever
+direction they may eventually proceed. Although in any event he is
+necessarily bound to adopt means in order to secure his ends, the moral
+quality of his choice has reference only to the ends which he chooses;
+not at all to the fact that he has to employ means for the purpose of
+attaining them. And even though his choice be influenced by his physical
+and social environment&mdash;as it must be if it be either rational on the
+one hand or moral on the other&mdash;it does not follow that this influence
+is of a kind to neutralize or destroy the causal nature of his own
+volition. For the influence which is thus exerted cannot be exerted
+necessarily, unless we suppose that the Will is not a first cause, which
+is the possibility now under consideration. If the Will is a first
+cause, the influences brought to bear upon it by its relation to other
+causes&mdash;and in virtue of which it is constituted, not only a cause
+primal, but also a cause rational and moral&mdash;these influences differ
+<i>toto coelo</i> from those which are exercised by any members in a series
+of secondary causes upon the next succeeding causes. And the difference
+consists in the absence of necessary or unconditional sequence in the
+one case, and its presence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> in the other. However strong the determining
+influence of a motive may be, if the Will is a first cause, the motive
+must belong to a different order of causal relation from a motor; for,
+no matter how strong the determining influence may be, <i>ex hypothesi</i> it
+can never attain to the strength of necessity; the Will must ever remain
+free to overcome such influence by an adequate exercise of its own power
+of spontaneous action, or of supplying <i>de novo</i> an additional access of
+strength to some other motive. Of course, as a general rule, the Will
+allows itself to be influenced by motives supplied immediately by its
+relations with the external world; but this is so only because the
+thinking substance well knows that it is expedient so to fall in with
+the general stream of external causation. Hence, as a general rule, it
+is only in cases where the stream of external causation is drawing the
+will in different directions that the causal activity of the Will itself
+is called into play. Or rather, I should say, it is only in such cases
+that we become conscious of the fact. In the case of every voluntary
+movement the primal activity of Will must be concerned (and this even in
+the case of the lower animals); but as the vast majority of such
+movements are performed by way of response to frequently recurring
+circumstances, the response which experience has shown to be most
+expedient is given, as it were, automatically, or without the occurrence
+of any adverse motive. But in cases<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> where motives are drawing in
+different directions, we become conscious of an effort of Will in
+choosing one or other line of conduct, and, according to our present
+hypothesis, this consciousness of effort is an expression of the work
+which the Will is doing in the way of spontaneous causation.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, upon the whole, if we identify the principle of causation with the
+principle of mind&mdash;as we are bound to do by the theory of Monism&mdash;we
+thereby draw a great and fundamental distinction between causation as
+this occurs in the external world, and as it occurs within the limits of
+our own subjectivity. And the distinction consists in the unconditional
+nature of a causal sequence in the external world, as against the
+conditional nature of it in the other case; the condition to the
+effective operation of a motive&mdash;as distinguished from a motor&mdash;is the
+acquiescence of the first cause upon which that motive is operating.</p>
+
+<p>To the foregoing argument it may be objected that by expressly regarding
+the human mind as a first cause of its own volitions, I imply that that
+mind can itself have had no cause, which appears to be self-evidently
+absurd. But here again the absurdity only arises from our inveterate
+habit of regarding the principle of causation as logically prior to that
+of mind. If we expressly refuse to do this, there is nothing absurd in
+supposing the principle of mind wherever it occurs, as itself uncaused.
+For if, as we are now supposing, this principle is identical with that
+of causation, to say<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> that any mind is caused would be to say that a
+cause is the cause of itself, which would be really absurd. Under the
+present point of view, therefore, it would be a meaningless question to
+ask for the cause of a human mind, since, <i>ex hypothesi</i>, a human mind
+is a part of the self-existing substance, although not on this account
+self-existing as to its individual personality. As argued in a previous
+chapter, the personality appears to arise on account of circumscription,
+or the isolation of a constituent part of the World-eject. Therefore,
+although it may be reasonable to ask for a cause of this
+circumscription&mdash;or of the personality&mdash;it is not reasonable to ask for
+a cause of the substance which is thus circumscribed, or of the quality
+of spontaneity which that substance exhibits.</p>
+
+<p>I will now state the whole case in another way. When we regard the facts
+of volition from the stand-point of psychology, the only theory of them
+which is open to us is, as we have before seen, that of determinism.
+Moreover, within these limits that theory is perfectly true. Psychology,
+as such, cannot recognize any principle more ultimate than natural
+causation, seeing that, like any other of her sisters in the family of
+sciences, her whole work and duty are confined to the investigation of
+this principle. But, just as in the case of all the other sciences, when
+her investigations have been pushed to the point where they encounter
+the problem of explaining this principle<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> itself, her investigations
+must necessarily cease; this principle is for all the sciences the
+ultimate datum, behind which they cannot go without ceasing to be
+sciences. But it does not follow that because the area of science is
+limited by that of causation, therefore we are precluded from asking any
+questions as to the nature of this ultimate datum. Of course any
+questions which we may thus ask cannot possibly be answered by science;
+they are questions of philosophy, in the consideration of which science,
+from her very nature and essential limitation of her office, can have no
+voice. Now, if on taking up the principle of causation where this is
+left by science&mdash;viz. as the ultimate or unanalyzable <i>datum</i> of
+experience, upon which all her investigations are founded, and by which
+they are all limited&mdash;philosophy finds any reason to surmise that it is
+resolvable into the principle of mind, philosophy is thus able to
+suggest that any distinction between mental processes as determinate or
+free, is really a meaningless distinction. For, according to this
+suggestion, the issue is no longer as to whether these processes are
+caused or uncaused; the very idea of cause has been abolished as one
+which belongs only to that lower level of inquiry with which science, or
+sensuous experience, is concerned. Here, no doubt, the question is a
+thoroughly real one, and, as shown in previous chapters, can only be
+answered in the way of determinism. But so soon as we ascend to the
+philosophical theory of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> Monism, and so transcend the conditions of
+sensuous experience, the question whether volitions are caused or
+uncaused becomes, as I have said, a meaningless question, or a question
+the terms of which are not correctly stated. If it be the case that all
+causality is of a nature psychical, volition and causation are one and
+the same thing, differing only in relation to our modes of apprehension.
+It would therefore be equally meaningless to say that either is the
+cause of the other&mdash;just as it would be equally meaningless to say that
+neurosis is the cause of psychosis, or that psychosis is the cause of
+neurosis. Or thus, if volition and causation are one and the same thing,
+the only reason why they ever appear diverse is because the one is known
+ontologically, while the other is known phenomenally. Were it possible
+that the orbit of my own personality could be widened so as to include
+within my own subjectivity the whole universe of causality, I should
+find&mdash;according to Monism&mdash;that all causation would become transformed
+into volition. Hence, the only reason why there now appears to be so
+great an antithesis between these two principles, is because the
+volition which is going on outside of my own consciousness can only be
+known to me objectively,&mdash;or at most ejectively,&mdash;on which account the
+principle of causality appears to me phenomenally as the most ultimate,
+or most unanalyzable, principle in the phenomenal universe.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Upon the whole, then, I conclude that this is the teaching of Monism. If
+we view the facts of human volition relatively, or within the four
+corners of psychological science, there is no escape from the conclusion
+that they are determined with all the rigour which belongs to natural
+causation in general. For every sequence of mental changes and every
+sequence of cerebral changes, although phenomenally so diverse, are
+taken by this theory to be ontologically identical; and therefore the
+sequence of mental changes must be determined with the same degree of
+'necessity' as is that of the cerebral changes. In short, mental
+causation is taken to be but the obverse aspect of physical causation,
+and, as previously remarked, it is impossible that the doctrine of
+determinism could be taught in a manner more emphatic. But, on the other
+hand, the theory of Monism is bound to go further than this. From the
+very fact of its having gone so far as to identify all physical
+processes with psychical processes, it cannot refuse to take the further
+and final step of identifying the most ultimate known principle of the
+one with the most ultimate known principle of the other; it is bound to
+recognize in natural causation the phenomenal aspect of that which is
+known ontologically as volition. But if these two principles are thus
+regarded as identical, it clearly becomes as unmeaning to ask whether
+the one is the cause of the other, as it would be to ask whether the one
+wills the other. For, <i>ex hypothesi</i>, the two things being one thing,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span>
+or but different modes of viewing the same thing, it becomes mere
+nonsense to speak of either determining the other; they are both but
+different expressions of the same ultimate fact, namely the fact of
+Being as Being.</p>
+
+<p>If this result should be deemed unsatisfactory on account of its
+vagueness, let it be remembered that nothing is gained on the side of
+clearness by the converse supposition&mdash;viz. that priority should be
+assigned to the principle of causality. For, if we say it is
+inconceivable that anything should come into existence without a
+cause&mdash;not even excepting the principle of mind itself&mdash;then the
+question immediately arises&mdash;If all volition is caused, what is the
+cause of volition? What caused this cause? And so on till we arrive at
+the question, What caused the principle of causality? which is absurd.
+So that whether we regard mind as prior to cause, or cause as prior to
+mind, or neither as prior to the other, we arrive at precisely the same
+difficulty. And the difficulty is a hopeless one, because it concerns
+the ultimate question of Being as Being, or the final mystery of things.</p>
+
+<p>Or, to state the matter in another way. An explanation means the
+reference of observed effects to known causes, or the inclusion of
+previously unknown causes among causes better known. Hence it is
+obvious, from the very meaning of what we call an explanation, that at
+the base of all possible explanations there must lie a great
+Inexplicable, which, just because more ultimate than any of our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span>
+possible explanations, does not itself require to be explained. To
+suppose that it does require to be explained, would be to suppose, that
+there is something still more ultimate into which, if known, this
+Inexplicable could be merged. Hence, unless we postulate an infinite
+series of possible explanations, there must be a basal mystery
+somewhere, which, in virtue of its constituting the ground of all
+possible explanations, cannot be, and does not require to be, itself
+explained. What is this basal mystery? Materialism supposes it to be
+lodged in Matter to the exclusion of Mind, while Idealism in its extreme
+forms takes the converse view. Theism supposes that it is an intelligent
+Person, who is held&mdash;and logically enough&mdash;not to be able to give any
+explanation of his own existence; he is, as it is said, self-existent,
+and, if asked to give any account of his being, would only be able to
+restate the fact of his being in the words, 'I am that I am.' Lastly,
+Pantheism, or Monism, supposes the ultimate mystery to be lodged in the
+universe as a whole. Now, in the present connexion the question before
+us is simply this&mdash;Are we to regard the principle of causality or the
+principle of mind as the ultimate mystery? And to this question I answer
+that to me it appears most reasonable to assign priority to mind. For,
+on the one hand, our only knowledge of causation is empirical, while
+even as such it is only possible in the same way as our knowledge of
+objective existence in general is possible&mdash;namely, by way of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> inference
+from our own mental modifications, which therefore must necessarily have
+priority so far as we are ourselves concerned. Next, on the other hand,
+even if we were to grant that the principle of causality is the prius,
+or the ultimate and inexplicable mystery, I cannot see that it is really
+available to explain the fact of personality. To me it appears that,
+within the range of human observation, this is the fact that most wears
+the appearance of finality, or of that unanalyzable and inexplicable
+nature which we are bound to believe must belong to the ultimate mystery
+of Being. But, be this as it may, the speculative difficulty of
+assigning priority to mind is certainly no greater than that of
+assigning it to causality; and this, as above remarked, is a sufficient
+answer to the question before us. According to Monism, however, there is
+no need to assign priority to either principle, seeing that one is but a
+phenomenal expression of the other.</p>
+
+<p>Only one further question remains to be considered. From what I have
+just said on the subject of Personality, it will be apparent that the
+theory of Monism is in conflict with that of Theism only in so far as
+personality appears to imply limitation. This is a point which I have
+previously considered in these pages (Chapter iv, p. 109), with the
+result of appearing to show that the conflict is one which would
+probably vanish could we rise above the necessary limitations of human
+thought. Therefore, it here seems worth while to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> ask, What can be said
+by the philosophical theory of Monism to the old theological dilemma
+touching free-will and predestination? Or, even apart from any question
+of Theism, what position does Monism suppose the psychical activity of
+man to hold in relation to that of the universe? Of course the latter
+statement of the question is included in the former; and, therefore, we
+may present it thus;&mdash;If the human will is free, and the theory of
+Theism substantially true, how are we to reconcile the fact with the
+theory?</p>
+
+<p>According to the theory of Theism as sanctioned by Monism, what we
+apprehend as natural causation is the obverse of a part of a <i>summum
+genus</i>&mdash;i.e. the part falling within human observation whose whole is
+the Absolute Volition. This Volition, being absolute, can nowhere meet
+with restraint; it is therefore absolutely free, and can never
+contradict itself. Thus, those circumscribed portions of it which we
+know as human minds&mdash;and which, on account of being so circumscribed,
+are free within themselves&mdash;do not in their freedom conflict with the
+Absolute Volition. The Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition are
+always in unison. It is not that the Absolute Volition unconditionally
+determines the Relative Volition&mdash;else the Relative Volition would not
+be free; but it is that the Absolute Volition invariably assents to the
+Relative Volition as to the activity of an integral part of itself. This
+will be at once evident if we consider that our only idea of
+determination&mdash;i.e.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> causation&mdash;is, upon the theistic theory, derived
+from our observing the consistency of the Divine Will, whether as
+revealed subjectively in the causal operations of our own minds, or
+objectively in the causal operations of Nature. Therefore, the idea of
+causation as between the Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition is
+an idea destitute of meaning. One Relative Volition may act causally on
+another. Relative Volition, because each is wholly external to each. But
+all Relative Volitions are constituent parts of the Absolute Volition,
+which, therefore, cannot act causally <i>on</i> them, though it always acts
+substantially <i>with</i> them. Or, otherwise phrased, if the subject is a
+constituent part of its own World-eject&mdash;the volition of which is always
+self-consistent&mdash;it follows that the volition of the subject must always
+be coincident with that of its World-eject; and this without being
+determined in any other sense than the smaller size of a part can be
+said to be determined by the larger size of its whole: i.e. the
+determination&mdash;if we choose so to call it&mdash;is not a causal one, but
+arises immediately from the inherent nature of the case. The Absolute
+Volition within itself is free; the Relative Volition within itself is
+free; but there can be no conflict between these two freedoms. For, if
+there were a conflict, it must be caused; but where is the cause of this
+conflict to come from? Not from the Absolute Volition, which is
+everywhere self-consistent; not from the Relative Volition, which is
+wholly contained within the Absolute. Thus, regarded from within its own
+system,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> the Relative Volition is free; while, regarded from the system
+of its World-eject, the Relative Volition is predestined. But the
+freedom is not incompatible with the predestination, nor the
+predestination with the freedom. They stand to each other in the
+relation of complementary truths, the apparent contradiction of which
+arises only from the apparently fundamental antithesis between mind and
+cause which it is the privilege of Monism to abolish.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p>
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Leviathan</i>, pt. i. chaps, i. and vi.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Leviathan</i>, Introduction.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In the opinion of some modern writers the indestructibility
+of matter and the conservation of energy are alone sufficient to explain
+all the facts of natural causation. 'For,' it is urged, 'if in any case
+similar antecedents did not determine similar consequents, on one or
+other of these occasions some <i>quantum</i> of force, or of matter, or of
+both, must have disappeared&mdash;or, which is the same thing, the law of
+causation cannot have been constant.' In a future chapter I shall have
+to recur to this view. Meanwhile I have only to observe that whether or
+not the law of causation is nothing more than a re-statement of the fact
+that matter and energy are indestructible, it is equally true that this
+fact is at least a necessary <i>condition</i> to the operation of that law.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Professor Flint, <i>Antitheistic Theories</i>, p. 99.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Philosophy of Religion</i>, pp. 95, 99, and 101.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> British Association Report, 1879, p. 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> British Association Report, 1868. Trans. of Sections, p.
+5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Lectures and Essays</i>, vol. ii. pp. 56-7.</p></div>
+
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> If we imagine the visible sidereal system compressed within
+the limits of a human skull, so that all its movements which we now
+recognize as molar should become molecular, the complexity of such
+movement would probably be as great as that which takes place in a human
+brain. Yet to this must be added all the molecular movements which are
+now going on in the sidereal system, visible and invisible.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, vol. i. pp. 159-61; <i>Essays</i>,
+vol. iii. pp. 246-9; and <i>First Principles</i>, p. 26.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> It is, however, the belief of all religious persons that
+even this distinction does not hold. If they are right in their belief,
+the distinction would then become one as to the mode of converse. In
+this case what is called communion with the Supreme Mind must be
+supposed to be a communion <i>sui generis</i>: the converse of mind with mind
+is here <i>direct</i>, or does not require to be translated into the language
+of mechanical signs: it is subjective, not ejective. Still, even here we
+must believe that the physical aspect accompanies the psychical,
+although not necessarily observed. An act of prayer, for example, is, on
+its physical aspect, an act of cerebration: so is the answer (supposing
+it genuine), in as far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus prayer and
+its answer (according to Monism) resemble all the other processes of
+Nature in presenting an objective side of strictly physical causation.
+Nor is it possible that the case could be otherwise, if <i>all</i> mental
+processes consist in physical process, and vice versa. It is obvious
+that this consideration has important bearings on the question as to the
+physical efficacy of prayer. From a monistic point of view both those
+who affirm and those who deny such efficacy are equally in the right,
+and equally in the wrong; they are merely quarrelling upon different
+sides of the same shield. For, according to Monism, if the theologians
+are right in supposing that the Supreme Mind is the hearer of prayer in
+any case, they are also right in supposing that the Mind must
+necessarily be able to grant what is called physical answers, seeing
+that in order to grant <i>any</i> answer (even of the most apparently
+spiritual kind) some physical change must be produced, if it be only in
+the brain of the petitioner. On the other hand, the scientists are
+equally right in maintaining that no physical answer to prayer can be of
+the nature of a miracle, or produced independently of strictly physical
+causation; for, if so, the physical and the psychical would no longer be
+coincident. But, until the scientists are able to perform the hopeless
+task of proving where the possibilities of physical causation end, as a
+mere matter of abstract speculation and going upon the theory of Monism,
+it is evident that the theologians may have any latitude they choose to
+claim, both as regards this matter and that of so-called miracles.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> It may be explained that by Agnosticism I understand a
+theory of things which abstains from either affirming or denying the
+existence of God. It thus represents, with regard to Theism, a state of
+suspended judgement; and all it undertakes to affirm is, that, upon
+existing evidence, the being of God is unknown. But the term Agnosticism
+is frequently used in a widely different sense, as implying belief that
+the being of God is not merely now unknown, but must always remain
+unknowable. It is therefore often represented that Mr. Herbert Spencer,
+in virtue of his doctrine of the Unknowable, is a kind of apostle of
+Agnosticism. This, however, I conceive to be a great mistake. The
+distinctive features of Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable are not
+merely non-agnostic, but anti-agnostic. For the doctrine affirms that we
+have this much knowledge of God&mdash;namely, that if He exists, He must for
+ever be unknown. Without question, this would be a most important piece
+of definite knowledge with regard to Deity, negative though it be; and,
+therefore, any man who holds it has no right to be called an agnostic.
+</p><p>
+To me it has always seemed that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so
+far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is highly
+unphilosophical. By what right can it be affirmed that Deity, if He
+exists, may not reveal the fact of His existence to-morrow&mdash;and this to
+the whole human race without the possibility of doubt? Or, if there be a
+God, who is to say that there certainly cannot be a future life, in
+which each individual man may have unquestionable proof of Theism? It is
+a perfectly philosophical statement for any one to make that, as matters
+now stand, he can see no evidence of Theism; but to say that he knows
+the human race never can have such evidence, is a most unphilosophical
+statement, seeing that it could only be justified by absolute knowledge.
+And, on this account, I say that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so
+far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is the very reverse
+of agnostic.
+</p><p>
+Now, the theory of Monism alone, as observed in the text, appears to be
+purely agnostic in the sense just explained. If in some parts of the
+foregoing essay I appear to have been arguing in favour of theistic
+implications, this has only been in order to show (as against Clifford)
+that the world does admit of being regarded as an eject. But inasmuch
+as&mdash;religious faith apart&mdash;we are not able to verify any such ejective
+interpretation, we are not able to estimate its value. Monism sanctions
+the shading of <i>x</i> as deeply as we choose; but the shading which it
+sanctions is only provisional.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> 'Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily
+contain it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can
+ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it
+hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree' (Locke). To
+this argument Mill answers, 'How vastly nobler and more precious, for
+instance, are the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of
+which, and by the properties of which, they are raised up! But this
+stricture is not worthy of Mill. The soil and manure do not constitute
+the whole cause of the plants and animals. We must trace these and many
+other con-causes (conditions) back and back till we come to 'whatsoever
+is first of all things': it is merely childish to choose some few of the
+conditions, and arbitrarily to regard them as alone the efficient
+causes.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Collected Essays</i>, vol. ix. 'Evolution and Ethics,' p.
+140.</p></div></div>
+
+<p class="center">Oxford HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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+Project Gutenberg's Mind and Motion and Monism, by George John Romanes
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Mind and Motion and Monism
+
+Author: George John Romanes
+
+Release Date: August 9, 2007 [EBook #22283]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Janet Blenkinship
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+http://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM
+
+  BY THE LATE
+
+  GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.
+
+  HONORARY FELLOW OF GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
+
+
+  LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. AND NEW YORK 1895
+  Oxford
+  HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
+
+
+
+    WORKS BY _GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S._
+
+    =DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN=: an Exposition of the Darwinian Theory,
+    and a Discussion on Post-Darwinian Questions.
+
+    PART I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. With Portrait of Darwin and 125
+    Illustrations. _Crown 8vo_, 10s. 6d.
+
+    PART II. POST-DARWINIAN QUESTIONS: HEREDITY AND UTILITY. _Crown
+    8vo_.
+
+    =AN EXAMINATION OF WEISMANNISM.= _Crown 8vo_, 6s.
+
+    =MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM.= _Crown 8vo_.
+
+    =THOUGHTS ON RELIGION=. Edited, with a Preface, by CHARLES GORE,
+    M.A., Canon of Westminster. _Crown 8vo_, 4s. 6d.
+
+    London
+    LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+Of the contents of this little volume the section on _Mind and Motion_
+which forms, in accordance with a suggestion of the author's, a general
+introduction, was delivered at Cambridge as the Rede Lecture in 1885,
+and was printed in the _Contemporary Review_ for June in that year. The
+chapter on The _World as an Eject_ was published, almost as it now
+stands, in the _Contemporary Review_ for July, 1886. A paper on _The
+Fallacy of Materialism_, of which Mr. Romanes incorporated the more
+important parts in the Essay on Monism, was contributed to the
+_Nineteenth Century_ for December, 1882. The rest was left in MS. and
+was probably written in 1889 or 1890.
+
+The subjects here discussed frequently occupied Mr. Romanes' keen and
+versatile mind. Had not the hand of death fallen upon him while so much
+of the ripening grain of his thought still remained to be finally
+garnered, some modifications and extensions of the views set forth in
+the Essay on Monism would probably have been introduced. Attention may
+be drawn, for example, to the sentence on p. 139, italicized by the
+author himself, in which it is contended that the will as agent _must be
+identified with the principle of Causality_. I have reason to believe
+that the chapter on _The World as an Eject_ would, in a final revision
+of the Essay as a whole, have been modified so as to lay stress on this
+identification of the human will with the principle of Causality in the
+world at large--a doctrine the relation of which to the teachings of
+Schopenhauer will be evident to students of philosophy.
+
+But the hand of death closed on the thinker ere his thought had received
+its full and ultimate expression. When in July, 1893, I received from
+Mr. Romanes instructions with regard to the publication of that which
+now goes forth to the world in his name, his end seemed very near; and
+he said with faltering voice, in tones the pathos of which lingers with
+me still, that this and much besides must, he feared, be left
+unfinished. He suggested that perhaps I might revise the parts in the
+light of the whole. But I have thought it best to leave what he had
+written as he wrote it, save for quite unimportant emendations, lest in
+revising I should cast over it the shadow of my own opinions.
+
+It only remains to add that the conclusions reached in this Essay should
+be studied in connection with the later _Thoughts on Religion_ which
+Canon Gore has recently edited.
+                                                C. LL. M.
+  BRISTOL,
+  _May, 1895._
+
+
+
+
+  CONTENTS
+                                                                      PAGE
+
+  MIND AND MOTION                                                        1
+
+  MONISM                                                                39
+
+  INTRODUCTION                                                          41
+
+  CHAPTER     I. SPIRITUALISM                                           47
+
+     "       II. MATERIALISM                                            55
+
+     "      III. MONISM                                                 79
+
+     "       IV. THE WORLD AS AN EJECT                                  88
+
+     "        V. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM  119
+
+     "       VI. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM                        129
+
+
+
+
+MIND AND MOTION
+
+[REDE LECTURE, 1885.]
+
+
+The earliest writer who deserves to be called a psychologist is Hobbes;
+and if we consider the time when he wrote, we cannot fail to be
+surprised at what I may term his prevision of the most important results
+which have now been established by science. He was the first clearly to
+sound the note which has ever since constituted the bass, or fundamental
+tone, of scientific thought. Let us listen to it through the clear
+instrumentality of his own language:--
+
+     'All the qualities called sensible are, in the object which causeth
+     them, but so many motions of the matter by which it presseth on our
+     organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything
+     else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but
+     motion.... The cause of sense is the external body or object, which
+     presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in
+     taste and touch, or mediately, as in hearing, seeing, and smelling;
+     which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings
+     and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and
+     heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or
+     endeavour.... And because _going_, _speaking_, and the like
+     voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of
+     _whither_, _which way_, and _what_; it is evident that the
+     imagination [or idea] is the first internal beginning of all
+     voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any
+     motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or
+     the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible;
+     yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. These small
+     beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in
+     walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are
+     commonly called ENDEAVOUR[1].'
+
+These quotations are sufficient to show that the system of Hobbes was
+prophetic of a revelation afterwards declared by two centuries of
+scientific research. For they show how plainly he taught that all our
+knowledge of the external world is a knowledge of motion; and, again,
+that all our acquisitions of knowledge and other acts of mind themselves
+imply, as he elsewhere says, some kind of 'motion, agitation, or
+alteration, which worketh in the brain.' That he conceived such motion,
+agitation, or alteration to be, from its extreme minuteness, 'invisible'
+and 'insensible,' or, as we should now say, molecular, is likewise
+evident. I can therefore imagine the delight with which he would hear me
+speak when I say, that it is no longer a matter of keen-sighted
+speculation, but a matter of carefully demonstrated fact, that all our
+knowledge of the external world is nothing more than a knowledge of
+motion. For all the forms of energy have now been proved to be but modes
+of motion; and even matter, if not in its ultimate constitution vortical
+motion, at all events is known to us only as changes of motion: all that
+we perceive in what we call matter is change in modes of motion. We do
+not even know what it is that moves; we only know that when some modes
+of motion pass into other modes, we perceive what we understand by
+matter. It would take me too long to justify this general statement so
+that it should be intelligible to every one; but I am confident that all
+persons who understand such subjects will, when they think about it,
+accept this general statement as one which is universally true. And, if
+so, they will agree with Hobbes that all our knowledge of the external
+world is a knowledge of motion.
+
+Now, if it would have been thus a joy to Hobbes to have heard to-day how
+thoroughly he has been justified in his views touching the external
+world, with no less joy would he have heard that he has been equally
+justified in his views touching the internal world. For it has now been
+proved, beyond the possibility of dispute, that it is only in virtue of
+those invisible movements which he inferred that the nervous system is
+enabled to perform its varied functions.
+
+To many among the different kinds of movement going on in the external
+world, the animal body is adapted to respond by its own movements as
+best suits its own welfare; and the mechanism whereby this is effected
+is the neuro-muscular system. Those kinds of movement going on in the
+external world which are competent to evoke responsive movements in the
+animal body are called by physiologists stimuli. When a stimulus falls
+upon the appropriate sensory surface, a wave of molecular movement is
+sent up the attached sensory nerve to a nerve-centre, which thereupon
+issues another wave of molecular movement down a motor nerve to the
+group of muscles over whose action it presides; and when the muscles
+receive this wave of nervous influence they contract. This kind of
+response to stimuli is purely mechanical, or non-mental, and is
+ordinarily termed reflex action. The whole of the spinal cord and lower
+part of the brain are made up of nerve-centres of reflex action; and, in
+the result, we have a wonderfully perfect machine in the animal body
+considered as a whole. For while the various sensory surfaces are
+severally adapted to respond to different kinds of external
+movement--the eye to light, the ear to sound, and so on--any of these
+surfaces may be brought into suitable relation with any of the muscles
+of the body by means of the cerebro-spinal nerve-centres and their
+intercommunications.
+
+So much, then, for the machinery of the body. We must now turn to
+consider the corporeal seat of the mind, or the only part of the nervous
+system wherein the agitation of nervous matter is accompanied with
+consciousness. This is composed of a double nerve-centre, which occurs
+in all vertebrated animals, and the two parts of which are called the
+cerebral hemispheres. In man this double nerve-centre is so large that
+it completely fills the arch of the skull, as far down as the level of
+the eyebrows. The two hemispheres of which it consists meet face to face
+in the middle line of the skull, from the top of the nose backwards.
+Each hemisphere is composed of two conspicuously distinct parts, called
+respectively the grey matter and the white matter. The grey matter is
+external, enveloping the white matter like a skull-cap, and is composed
+of an inconceivable number of nerve-cells connected together by
+nerve-fibres. It is computed that in a human brain there cannot be less
+than a thousand millions of cells, and five thousand millions of fibres.
+The white matter is composed only of nerve-fibres, which pass downwards
+in great strands of conducting tissue to the lower centres of the brain
+and spinal cord. So that the whole constitutes one system, with the grey
+matter of the cerebral hemispheres at the apex or crown.
+
+That the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres is the exclusive seat
+of mind is proved in two ways. In the first place, if we look to the
+animal kingdom as a whole, we find that, speaking generally, the
+intelligence of species varies with the mass of this grey matter. Or, in
+other words, we find that the process of mental evolution, on its
+physical side, has consisted in the progressive development of this
+grey matter superimposed upon the pre-existing nervous machinery, until
+it has attained its latest and maximum growth in man.
+
+In the second place, we find that when the grey matter is experimentally
+removed from the brain of animals, the animals continue to live; but are
+completely deprived of intelligence. All the lower nerve-centres
+continue to perform their mechanical adjustments in response to suitable
+stimulation; but they are no longer under the government of the mind.
+Thus, for instance, when a bird is mutilated in this way, it will
+continue to perform all its reflex adjustments--such as sitting on a
+perch, using its wings when thrown into the air, and so forth; but it no
+longer remembers its nest or its young, and will starve to death in the
+midst of its food, unless it be fed artificially.
+
+Again, if the grey matter of only one hemisphere be removed, the mind is
+taken away from the corresponding (i. e. the opposite) side of the body,
+while it remains intact on the other side. For example, if a dog be
+deprived of one hemisphere, the eye which was supplied from it with
+nerve-fibres continues able to see, or to transmit impressions to the
+lower nerve-centre called the optic ganglion; for this eye will then
+mechanically follow the hand waved in front of it. But if the hand
+should hold a piece of meat, the dog will show no mental recognition of
+the meat, which of course it will immediately seize if exposed to the
+view of its other eye. The same thing is found to happen in the case of
+birds: on the injured side _sensation_, or the power of responding to a
+stimulus, remains intact; while _perception_, or the power of mental
+recognition, is destroyed.
+
+This description applies to the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres
+as a whole. But of course the question next arises whether it only acts
+as a whole, or whether there is any localization of different
+intellectual faculties in different parts of it. Now, in answer to this
+question, it has long been known that the faculty of speech is
+definitely localized in a part of the grey matter lying just behind the
+forehead; for, when this part is injured, a man loses all power of
+expressing even the most simple ideas in words, while the ideas
+themselves remain as clear as ever. It is remarkable that in each
+individual only this part of one hemisphere appears to be used; and
+there is some evidence to show that left-handed persons use the opposite
+side from right-handed. Moreover, when the side which is habitually in
+use is destroyed, the corresponding part of the other hemisphere begins
+to learn its work, so that the patient may in time recover his use of
+language.
+
+Within the last few years the important discovery has been made, that by
+stimulating with electricity the surface of the grey matter of the
+hemispheres, muscular movements are evoked; and that certain patches of
+the grey matter, when thus stimulated, always throw into action the same
+groups of muscles. In other words, there are definite local areas of
+grey matter, which, when stimulated, throw into action definite groups
+of muscles. The surface of the cerebral hemispheres has now been in
+large measure explored and mapped out with reference to these so-called
+motor-centres; and thus our knowledge of the neuro-muscular machinery of
+the higher animals (including man) has been very greatly furthered. Here
+I may observe parenthetically that, as the brain is insentient to
+injuries inflicted upon its own substance, none of the experiments to
+which I have alluded entail any suffering to the animals experimented
+upon; and it is evident that the important information which has thus
+been gained could not have been gained by any other method. I may also
+observe that as these motor-centres occur in the grey matter of the
+hemispheres, a strong probability arises that they are not only the
+motor-centres, but also the volitional centres which originate the
+intellectual commands for the contraction of this and that group of
+muscles. Unfortunately we cannot interrogate an animal whether, when we
+stimulate a motor-centre, we arouse in the animal's mind an act of will
+to throw the corresponding group of muscles into action; but that these
+motor-centres are really centres of volition is pointed to by the fact,
+that electrical stimuli have no longer any effect upon them when the
+mental faculties of the animal are suspended by anaesthetics, nor in the
+case of young animals where the mental faculties have not yet been
+sufficiently developed to admit of voluntary co-ordination among the
+muscles which are concerned. On the whole, then, it is not improbable
+that on stimulating artificially these motor-centres of the brain, a
+physiologist is actually playing from without, and at his own pleasure,
+upon the volitions of the animal.
+
+Turning, now, from this brief description of the structure and leading
+functions of the principal parts of the nervous system, I propose to
+consider what we know about the molecular movements which go on in
+different parts of this system, and which are concerned in all the
+processes of reflex adjustment, sensation, perception, emotion,
+instinct, thought, and volition.
+
+First of all, the rate at which these molecular movements travel through
+a nerve has been measured, and found to be about 100 feet per second, or
+somewhat more than a mile a minute, in the nerves of a frog. In the
+nerves of a mammal it is just about twice as fast; so that if London
+were connected with New York by means of a mammalian nerve instead of an
+electric cable, it would require nearly a whole day for a message to
+pass.
+
+Next, the time has also been measured which is required by a
+nerve-centre to perform its part in a reflex action, where no thought or
+consciousness is involved. This time, in the case of the winking reflex,
+and apart from the time required for the passage of the molecular waves
+up and down the sensory and motor nerves, is about 1/20 of a second.
+Such is the rate at which a nerve-centre conducts its operations when no
+consciousness or volition is involved. But when consciousness and
+volition are involved, or when the cerebral hemispheres are called into
+play, the time required is considerably greater. For the operations on
+the part of the hemispheres which are comprised in perceiving a simple
+sensation (such as an electrical shock) and the volitional act of
+signalling the perception, cannot be performed in less than 1/12 of a
+second, which is nearly twice as long as the time required by the lower
+nerve-centres for the performance of a reflex action. Other experiments
+prove that the more complex an act of perception, the more time is
+required for its performance. Thus, when the experiment is made to
+consist, not merely in signalling a perception, but in signalling one of
+two or more perceptions (such as an electrical shock on one or other of
+the two hands, which of five letters is suddenly exposed to view, &c.),
+a longer time is required for the more complex process of distinguishing
+which of the two or more expected stimuli is perceived, and in
+determining which of the appropriate signals to make in response. The
+time consumed by the cerebral hemispheres in meeting a 'dilemma' of this
+kind is from 1/5 to 1/20 of a second longer than that which they consume
+in the case of a simpler perception. Therefore, whenever mental
+operations are concerned, a relatively much greater time is required for
+a nerve-centre to perform its adjustments than when a merely mechanical
+or non-mental response is needed; and the more complex the mental
+operation the more time is necessary. Such may be termed the physiology
+of deliberation.
+
+So much, then, for the rate at which molecular movements travel through
+nerves, and the times which nerve-centres consume in performing their
+molecular adjustments. We may next consider the researches which have
+been made within the last few months upon the rates of these movements
+themselves, or the number of vibrations per second with which the
+particles of nervous matter oscillate.
+
+If, by means of a suitable apparatus, a muscle is made to record its own
+contraction, we find that during all the time it is in contraction, it
+is under-going a vibratory movement at the rate of about nine pulsations
+per second. What is the meaning of this movement? The meaning is that
+the act of will in the brain, which serves as a stimulus to the
+contraction of the muscle, is accompanied by a vibratory movement in the
+grey matter of the brain; that this movement is going on at the rate of
+nine pulsations per second; and that the muscle is giving a separate or
+distinct contraction in response to every one of these nervous
+pulsations. That such is the true explanation of the rhythm in the
+muscle is proved by the fact that if, instead of contracting a muscle by
+an act of the will, it be contracted by means of a rapid series of
+electrical shocks playing upon its attached nerve, the record then
+furnished shows a similar trembling going on in the muscle as in the
+previous case; but the tremors of contraction are now no longer at the
+rate of nine per second: they correspond beat for beat with the
+interruptions of the electrical current. That is to say, the muscle is
+responding separately to every separate stimulus which it receives
+through the nerve; and further experiment shows that it is able thus to
+keep time with the separate shocks, even though these be made to follow
+one another so rapidly as 1,000 per second. Therefore we can have no
+doubt that the slow rhythm of nine per second under the influence of
+volitional stimulation, represents the rate at which the muscle is
+receiving so many separate impulses from the brain: the muscle is
+keeping time with the molecular vibrations going on in the cerebral
+hemispheres at the rate of nine beats per second. Careful tracings show
+that this rate cannot be increased by increasing the strength of the
+volitional stimulus; but some individuals--and those usually who are of
+quickest intelligence--display a somewhat quicker rate of rhythm, which
+may be as high as eleven per second. Moreover, it is found that by
+stimulating with strychnine any of the centres of reflex action, pretty
+nearly the same rate of rhythm is exhibited by the muscles thus thrown
+into contraction; so that all the nerve-cells in the body are thus shown
+to have in their vibrations pretty nearly the same period, and not to be
+able to vibrate with any other. For no matter how rapidly the electrical
+shocks are allowed to play upon the grey matter of the cerebral
+hemispheres, as distinguished from the nerve-trunks proceeding from them
+to the muscles, the muscles always show the same rhythm of about nine
+beats per second: the nerve-cells, unlike the nerve-fibres, refuse to
+keep time with the electric shocks, and will only respond to them by
+vibrating at their own intrinsic rate of nine beats per second.
+
+Thus much, then, for the rate of molecular vibration which goes on in
+nerve-centres. But the rate of such vibration which goes on in sensory
+and motor nerves may be very much more rapid. For while a nerve-centre
+is only able to _originate_ a vibration at the rate of about nine beats
+per second, a motor-nerve, as we have already seen, is able to
+_transmit_ a vibration of at least 1,000 beats per second; and a sensory
+nerve which at the surface of its expansion is able to respond
+differently to differences of musical pitch, of temperature, and even of
+colour, is probably able to vibrate very much more rapidly even than
+this. We are not, indeed, entitled to conclude that the nerves of
+special sense vibrate in actual unison, or synchronize, with these
+external sources of stimulation; but we are, I think, bound to conclude
+that they must vibrate in some numerical proportion to them (else we
+should not perceive objective differences in sound, temperature, or
+colour); and even this implies that they are probably able to vibrate at
+some enormous rate.
+
+With further reference to these molecular movements in sensory nerves,
+the following important observation has been made--viz. that there is a
+constant ratio between the amount of agitation produced in a sensory
+nerve, and the intensity of the corresponding sensation. This ratio is
+not a direct one. As Fechner states it, 'Sensation varies, not as the
+stimulus, but as the logarithm of the stimulus.' Thus, for instance, if
+1,000 candles are all throwing their light upon the same screen, we
+should require ten more candles to be added before our eyes could
+perceive any difference in the amount of illumination. But if we begin
+with only 100 candles shining upon the screen, we should perceive an
+increase in the illumination by adding a single candle. And what is true
+of sight is equally true of all the other senses: if any stimulus is
+increased, the smallest increase of sensation first occurs when the
+stimulus rises one per cent, above its original intensity. Such being
+the law on the side of sensation, suppose that we place upon the optic
+nerve of an animal the wires proceeding from a delicate galvanometer, we
+find that every time we stimulate the eye with light, the needle of the
+galvanometer moves, showing electrical changes going on in the nerve,
+caused by the molecular agitations. Now these electrical changes are
+found to vary in intensity with the intensity of the light used as a
+stimulus, and they do so very nearly in accordance with the law of
+sensation just mentioned. So we say that in sensation the cerebral
+hemispheres are, as it were, acting the part of galvanometers in
+appreciating the amount of molecular change which is going on in sensory
+nerves; and that they record their readings in the mind as faithfully as
+a galvanometer records its readings on the dial.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Hitherto we have been considering certain features in the physiology of
+nervous action, so far as this can be appreciated by means of
+physiological instruments. But we have just seen that the cerebral
+hemispheres may themselves be regarded as such instruments, which record
+in our minds their readings of changes going on in our nerves. Hence,
+when other physiological instruments fail us, we may gain much
+additional insight touching the movements of nervous matter by attending
+to the thoughts and feelings of our own minds; for these are so many
+indices of what is going on in the cerebral hemispheres. I therefore
+propose next to contemplate the mind, considered thus as a physiological
+instrument.
+
+The same scientific instinct which led Hobbes so truly to anticipate the
+progress of physiology, led him not less truly to anticipate the
+progress of psychology. For just as he was the first to enunciate the
+fundamental principle of nerve-action in the vibration of molecules, so
+was he likewise the first to enunciate the fundamental principle of
+psychology in the association of ideas. And the great advance of
+knowledge which has been made since his day with respect to both these
+principles, entitles us to be much more confident than even he was that
+they are in some way intimately united. Moreover, the manner in which
+they are so united we have begun clearly to understand. For we know from
+our study of nerve-action in general, that when once a wave of invisible
+or molecular movement passes through any line of nerve-structure, it
+leaves behind it a change in the structure such that it is afterwards
+more easy for a similar wave, when started from the same point, to
+pursue the same course. Or, to adopt a simile from Hobbes, just as water
+upon a table flows most readily in the lines which have been wetted by a
+previous flow, so the invisible waves of nerve-action pass most readily
+in the lines of a previous passage. This is the reason why in any
+exercise requiring muscular co-ordination, or dexterity, 'practice makes
+perfect:' the nerve-centres concerned learn to perform their work by
+frequently repeating it, because in this way the needful lines of
+wave-movement in the structure of the nerve-centre are rendered more and
+more permeable by use. Now we have seen that in the nerve-centres called
+the cerebral hemispheres, wave-movement of this kind is accompanied with
+feeling. Changes of consciousness follow step by step these waves of
+movement in the brain, and therefore when on two successive occasions
+the waves of movement pursue the same pathway in the brain, they are
+attended with a succession of the same ideas in the mind. Thus we see
+that the tendency of ideas to _re_cur in the same order as that in
+which they have previously _oc_curred, is merely an obverse expression
+of the fact that lines of wave-movement in the brain become more and
+more permeable by use. So it comes that a child can learn its lessons by
+frequently repeating them; so it is that all our knowledge is
+accumulated; and so it is that all our thinking is conducted.
+
+A wholly new field of inquiry is thus opened up. By using our own
+consciousness as a physiological instrument of the greatest delicacy, we
+are able to learn a great deal about the dynamics of brain-action
+concerning which we should otherwise remain in total ignorance. But the
+field of inquiry thus opened up is too large for me to enter upon
+to-day. I will therefore merely observe, in general terms, that although
+we are still very far from understanding the operations of the brain in
+thought, there can be no longer any question that in these operations of
+the brain we have what I may term the objective machinery of thought.
+'Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,' said
+Hobbes. Starting from this fact, modern physiology has clearly shown why
+it is a fact; and looking to the astonishing rate at which the science
+of physiology is now advancing, I think we may fairly expect that within
+a time less remote than the two centuries which now separate us from
+Hobbes, the course of ideas in a given train of thought will admit of
+having its footsteps tracked in the corresponding pathways of the brain.
+Be this, however, as it may, even now we know enough to say that,
+whether or not these footsteps will ever admit of being thus tracked in
+detail, they are all certainly present in the cerebral structures of
+each one of us. What we know on the side of mind as logical sequence, is
+on the side of the nervous system nothing more than a passage of nervous
+energy through one series of cells and fibres rather than through
+another: what we recognize as truth is merely the fact of the brain
+vibrating in tune with Nature.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Such being the intimate relation between nerve-action and mind-action,
+it has become the scientifically orthodox teaching that the two stand to
+one another in the relation of cause to effect. One of the most
+distinguished of my predecessors in this place, the President of the
+Royal Society, has said in one of the most celebrated of his
+lectures:--'We have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of
+the nervous system as the cause of the state of consciousness, as we
+have for regarding any event as the cause of another.' And, by way of
+perfectly logical deduction from this statement, Professor Huxley argues
+that thought and feeling have nothing whatever to do with determining
+action: they are merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he
+expresses it, the indices of changes which are going on in the brain.
+Under this view we are all what he terms conscious automata, or machines
+which happen, as it were by chance, to be conscious of some of their own
+movements. But the consciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears
+the same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as a
+steam-whistle bears to the activity of a locomotive, or the striking of
+a clock to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. Here, again,
+we meet with an echo of Hobbes, who opens his work on the Commonwealth
+with these words:--
+
+     'Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by
+     the _art_ of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated,
+     that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a
+     motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in the principal part
+     within; why may we not say, that all _automata_ (engines that move
+     themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch), have an
+     artificial life? For what is the _heart_, but a _spring_; and the
+     _nerves_, but so many _strings_; and the _joints_, but so many
+     _wheels_, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by
+     the artificer[2]?'
+
+Now, this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a legitimate
+outcome of the theory that nervous changes are the causes of mental
+changes, but it is logically the only possible outcome. Nor do I see any
+way in which this theory can be fought on grounds of physiology. If we
+persist in regarding the association between brain and thought
+exclusively from a physiological point of view, we must of necessity be
+materialists. Further, so far as we are physiologists our materialism
+can do us no harm. On the contrary, it is to us of the utmost service,
+as at once the simplest physiological explanation of facts already
+known, and the best working hypothesis to guide us in our further
+researches. But it does not follow from this that the theory of
+materialism is true. The bells of St. Mary's over the way always ring
+for a quarter of an hour before the University sermon; yet the ringing
+of the bells is not the cause of the sermon, although, as long as the
+association remains constant, there would be no harm in assuming, for
+any practical purposes, that it is so. But just as we should be wrong in
+concluding, if we did not happen to know so much about the matter as we
+do, that the University sermon is produced by the vibration of bells in
+the tower of St. Mary's Church, so we may be similarly wrong if we were
+definitely to conclude that the sermon is produced by the vibration of a
+number of little nerve-cells in the brain of the preacher.
+
+Now, if time permitted, and if I supposed that you would all care to go
+with me into matters of some abstruseness, I could certainly prove that
+whatever the connexion between body and mind may be, we have the best
+possible reasons for concluding that it is not a causal connexion. These
+reasons are, of course, extra-physiological; but they are not on this
+account less conclusive. Within the limits of a lecture, however, I can
+only undertake to give an outline sketch of what I take to be the
+overwhelming argument against materialism.
+
+We have first the general fact that all our knowledge of motion, and so
+of matter, is merely a knowledge of the modifications of mind. That is
+to say, all our knowledge of the external world--including the knowledge
+of our own brains--is merely a knowledge of our own mental states. Let
+it be observed that we do not even require to go so far as the
+irrefutable position of Berkeley, that the existence of an external
+world without the medium of mind, or of being without knowing, is
+inconceivable. It is enough to take our stand on a lower level of
+abstraction, and to say that whether or not an external world can exist
+apart from mind in any absolute or inconceivable sense, at any rate it
+cannot do so _for us_. We cannot think any of the facts of external
+nature without presupposing the existence of a mind which thinks them;
+and therefore, so far at least as we are concerned, mind is necessarily
+prior to everything else. It is for us the only mode of existence which
+is real in its own right; and to it, as to a standard, all other modes
+of existence which may be _in_ferred must be _re_ferred. Therefore, if
+we say that mind is a function of motion, we are only saying, in
+somewhat confused terminology, that mind is a function of itself.
+
+Such, then, I take to be a general refutation of materialism. To use but
+a mild epithet, we must conclude that the theory is unphilosophical,
+seeing that it assumes one thing to be produced by another thing, in
+spite of an obvious demonstration that the alleged effect is necessarily
+prior to its cause. Such, I say, is a general refutation of
+materialism. But this is far from being all. 'Motion,' says Hobbes,
+'produceth nothing but motion;' and yet he immediately proceeds to
+assume that in the case of the brain it produces, not only motion, but
+mind. He was perfectly right in saying that with respect to its
+movements the animal body resembles an engine or a watch; and if he had
+been acquainted with the products of higher evolution in watch-making,
+he might with full propriety have argued, for instance, that in the
+compensating balance, whereby a watch adjusts its own movements in
+adaptation to external changes of temperature, a watch is exhibiting the
+mechanical aspect of volition. And, similarly, it is perhaps possible to
+conceive that the principles of mechanism might be more and more
+extended in their effects, until, in so marvellously perfected a
+structure as the human brain, all the voluntary movements of the body
+might be originated in the same mechanical manner as are the
+compensating movements of a watch; for this, indeed, as we have seen, is
+no more than happens in the case of all the nerve-centres other than the
+cerebral hemispheres. If this were so, motion would be producing nothing
+but motion, and upon the subject of brain-action there would be nothing
+further to say. Without consciousness I should be delivering this
+lecture; without consciousness you would be hearing it; and all the busy
+brains in this University would be conducting their researches, or
+preparing for their examinations, mindlessly. Strange as such a state
+of things might be, still motion would be producing nothing but motion;
+and, therefore, if there were any mind to contemplate the facts, it
+would encounter no philosophical paradox: it would merely have to
+conclude that such were the astonishing possibilities of mechanism. But,
+as the facts actually stand, we find that this is not the case. We find,
+indeed, that up to a certain level of complexity mechanism alone is able
+to perform all the compensations or adjustments which are performed by
+the animal body; but we also find that beyond this level such
+compensations or adjustments are never performed without the
+intervention of consciousness. Therefore, the theory of automatism has
+to meet the unanswerable question--How is it that in the machinery of
+the brain motion produces this something which is not motion? Science
+has now definitely proved the correlation of all the forces; and this
+means that if any kind of motion could produce anything else that is not
+motion, it would be producing that which science would be bound to
+regard as in the strictest sense of the word a miracle. Therefore, if we
+are to take our stand upon science--and this is what materialism
+professes to do--we are logically bound to conclude, not merely that the
+evidence of causation from body to mind is not so cogent as that of
+causation in any other case, but that in this particular case causation
+may be proved, again in the strictest sense of the term, a physical
+impossibility.
+
+To adduce only one other consideration. Apart from all that I have said,
+is it not in itself a strikingly suggestive fact that consciousness
+only, yet always, appears upon the scene when the adjustive actions of
+any animal body rise above the certain level of intricacy to which I
+have alluded? Surely this large and general fact points with
+irresistible force to the conclusion, that in the performance of these
+more complex adjustments, consciousness--or the power of feeling and the
+power of willing--is of some _use_. Assuredly on the principles of
+evolution, which materialists at all events cannot afford to disregard,
+it would be a wholly anomalous fact that so wide and important a class
+of faculties as those of mind should have become developed in constantly
+ascending degrees throughout the animal kingdom, if they were entirely
+without use to animals. And, be it observed, this consideration holds
+good whatever views we may happen to entertain upon the special theory
+of natural selection. For the consideration stands upon the general fact
+that all the organs and functions of animals are of use to animals: we
+never meet, on any large or general scale, with organs and functions
+which are wholly adventitious. Is it to be supposed that this general
+principle fails just where its presence is most required, and that the
+highest functions of the highest organs of the highest animals stand out
+of analogy with all other functions in being themselves functionless? To
+this question I, for one, can only answer, and answer unequivocally,
+No. As a rational being who waits to take a wider view of the facts than
+that which is open to the one line of research pursued by the
+physiologist, I am forced to conclude that not without a reason does
+mind exist in the frame of things; and that apart from the activity of
+mind, whereby motion is related to that which is not motion, this planet
+could never have held the wonderful being, who in multiplying has
+replenished the earth and subdued it--holding dominion over the fish of
+the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
+moveth.
+
+What, then, shall we say touching this mysterious union of mind and
+motion? Having found it physically impossible that there should be a
+causal connexion proceeding from motion to mind, shall we try to reverse
+the terms, and suppose a causal connexion proceeding from mind to
+motion? This is the oldest and still the most popular theory--the theory
+of spiritualism. And, no doubt, in one important respect it is less
+unphilosophical than the opposite theory of materialism. For
+spiritualism supposes the causation to proceed from that which is the
+source of our idea of causality--the mind: not from that into which this
+idea has been read--the brain. Therefore, if causation were to be
+accepted as a possibility either way, it would be less unreasonable to
+suppose mental changes the causes of material changes than _vice versa_;
+for we should then at least be starting from the basis of immediate
+knowledge, instead of from the reflection of that knowledge in what we
+call the external world. Seeing that the external world is known to us
+only as motion, it is logically impossible for the mind to infer its own
+causation from the external world; for this would be to infer that it is
+an effect of motion, which would be the same as saying that it is an
+effect of its own knowledge; and this would be absurd. But, on the other
+hand, it is not thus logically impossible for the mind to infer that it
+may be the cause of some of its own knowledge, or, in other words, that
+it may have in some measure the power of producing what it knows as
+motion. And when the mind does infer this, no logic on earth is able to
+touch the inference; the position of pure idealism is beyond the reach
+of argument. Nevertheless, it is opposed to the whole momentum of
+science. For if mind is supposed, on no matter how small a scale, to be
+a cause of motion, the fundamental axiom of science is impugned. This
+fundamental axiom is that energy can neither be created nor
+destroyed--that just as motion can produce nothing but motion, so,
+conversely, motion can be produced by nothing but motion. Regarded,
+therefore, from the stand-point of physical science, the theory of
+spiritualism is in precisely the same case as the theory of materialism:
+that is to say, if the supposed causation takes place, it can only be
+supposed to do so by way of miracle.
+
+And this is a conclusion which the more clear-sighted of the idealists
+have expressly recognized. That subtle and most entertaining thinker,
+for example, the late Professor Green of Oxford, has said that the
+self-conscious volition of man 'does not consist in a series of natural
+events, ... is not natural in the ordinary sense of that term; not
+natural at any rate in any sense in which naturalness would imply its
+determination by antecedent events, or by conditions of which it is not
+itself the source.'
+
+Thus the theory of spiritualism, although not directly refutable by any
+process of logic, is certainly enfeebled by its collision with the
+instincts of physical science. In necessarily holding the facts of
+consciousness and volition super-natural, extra-natural, or non-natural,
+the theory is opposed to the principle of continuity.
+
+Spiritualism being thus unsatisfactory, and materialism impossible, is
+there yet any third hypothesis in which we may hope to find intellectual
+rest? In my opinion there is. If we unite in a higher synthesis the
+elements both of spiritualism and of materialism, we obtain a product
+which satisfies every fact of feeling on the one hand, and of
+observation on the other. The manner in which this synthesis may be
+effected is perfectly simple. We have only to suppose that the
+antithesis between mind and motion--subject and object--is itself
+phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have only to suppose
+that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of apprehension; and,
+therefore, that any change taking place in the mind, and any
+corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not two
+changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a musical
+sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.
+Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of
+changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in
+an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity
+in consciousness is created only by the difference in our modes of
+perceiving the same event--whether we see or whether we hear the
+vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of
+nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same
+event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of
+perceiving it.
+
+The great advantage of this theory is that it supposes only one stream
+of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously
+concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and
+contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.
+Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;
+mind-changes nothing but mind-changes: both producing both
+simultaneously, neither could be what it is without the other, because
+without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.
+Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that
+consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind changes
+of brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very causation of
+these changes that they should have a mental side. The use of mind to
+animals is thus rendered apparent; for intelligent volition is thus
+shown to be a true cause of adjustive movement, in that the cerebration
+which it involves could not otherwise be possible: the causation would
+not otherwise be complete.
+
+A simple illustration may serve at once to render this doctrine more
+easily intelligible, and to show that, if accepted, the doctrine, as it
+appears to me, terminates the otherwise interminable controversy on the
+freedom of the will.
+
+In an Edison lamp the light which is emitted from the burner may be said
+indifferently to be caused by the number of vibrations per second going
+on in the carbon, or by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of
+vibration could not take place in the carbon without constituting that
+degree of temperature which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a
+train of thought may be said indifferently to be caused by brain-action
+or by mind-action; for, _ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place
+without the other. Now, when we contemplate the phenomena of volition by
+themselves, it is as though we were contemplating the phenomena of light
+by themselves: volition is produced by mind in brain, just as light is
+produced by temperature in carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of
+light as the cause, say, of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of
+volition as the cause of bodily movement. That particular kind of
+physical activity which takes place in the carbon could not take place
+without the light which causes a photograph; and, similarly, that
+particular kind of physical activity which takes place in the brain
+could not take place without the volition which causes a bodily
+movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of bodily movement as is
+the physical activity of the brain; seeing that, in an absolute sense,
+the cause is one and the same. But if we once clearly perceive that what
+in a relative sense we know as volition is, in a similar sense, the
+cause of bodily movement, we terminate the question touching the freedom
+of the will. For this question in its last resort--and apart from the
+ambiguity which has been thrown around it by some of our
+metaphysicians--is merely the question whether the will is to be
+regarded as a cause of Nature. And the theory which we have now before
+us sanctions the doctrine that it may be so regarded, if only we
+remember that its causal activity depends upon its identity with the
+obverse aspect known as cerebration, without which identity in apparent
+duality neither volition nor cerebration could be the cause which in
+fact they are. It thus becomes a mere matter of phraseology whether we
+speak of the will determining, or being determined by, changes going on
+in the external world; just as it is but a matter of phraseology whether
+we speak of temperature determining, or being determined by, molecular
+vibration. All the requirements alike of the free-will and of the
+bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a synthesis which comprises
+them both. On the one hand, it would be as impossible for an
+_un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform the adjustments of
+a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp to give out light
+and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric current. On the
+other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to originate bodily
+movement without the occurrence of a strictly physical process of
+cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison lamp which
+had been deprived of its carbon-burner.
+
+It may be said of this theory that it is highly speculative, not
+verifiable by any possible experiment, and therefore at best is but a
+mere guess. All which is, no doubt, perfectly true; but, on the other
+hand, we must remember that this theory comes to us as the only one
+which is logically possible, and at the same time competent to satisfy
+the facts alike of the outer and of the inner world. It is a speculation
+in the sense of not being verifiable by experiment; but it has much more
+value than ordinarily attaches to an unverifiable speculation, in that
+there is really no alternative hypothesis to be considered: if we choose
+to call it a guess, we must at the same time remember it is a guess
+where it does not appear that any other is open. Once more to quote
+Hobbes, who, as we have seen, was himself a remarkable instance of what
+he here says: 'The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the
+best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he
+guesses at.' In this case, therefore, the best prophet is not the
+physiologist, whose guess ends in materialism; nor the purely mental
+philosopher, whose guess ends in spiritualism; but rather the man who,
+being 'versed and studied' in all the facts appertaining to both sides
+of the matter, ends in the only alternative guess which remains open.
+And if that most troublesome individual, the 'plain man' of Locke,
+should say it seems at least opposed to common sense to suppose that
+there is anything in a burning candle or a rolling billiard-ball
+substantially the same as mind, the answer is that if he could look into
+my brain at this moment he would see nothing there but motion of
+molecules, or motion of masses; and apart from the accident of my being
+able to tell him so, his 'common sense' could never have divined that
+these motions in my brain are concerned in the genesis of my spoken
+thoughts.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+It is obvious that from this hypothesis as to the substantial identity
+of mind and motion, two important questions arise; and I feel that some
+reference to these questions is in present circumstances forced upon me,
+because they have both been considered in precisely the same connexion
+by one of the most powerful intellects that was ever sent out into the
+world by this University. I mean the late Professor Clifford. As my
+intimate and valued friend, I desire to mention his name in this place
+with all the affection, as well as with all the admiration, to which I
+well know it is so fully entitled; and if I appear to mention him only
+in order to disagree with him, this is only because I know equally well
+that in his large and magnanimous thought differences of philosophical
+opinion were never felt to weaken the bonds of friendship.
+
+In his well-known lecture on Body and Mind, Professor Clifford adopted
+the hypothesis of identity which we are now considering, and from it was
+led to the conclusion that if in the case of cerebral processes motion
+is one with mind, the same must be true of motion wherever it occurs;
+or, as he expressed it subsequently, the whole universe must be made of
+mind-stuff. But in his view, although matter in motion presents what may
+be termed the raw material of mind, it is only in the highly elaborated
+constitution of the human brain that this raw material is sufficiently
+wrought up to yield a self-conscious personality. Hence the dissolution
+of a human brain implies the dissolution of a human mind; and hence also
+the universe, although entirely composed of mind-stuff, is itself
+mindless. Now, all I have to say about these two deductions is
+this--they do not necessarily follow from the theory which is before us.
+In holding that the mind of man perishes with his body, and that above
+the mind of man there is no other, Clifford may have been right, or may
+have been wrong. I am not here to discuss at length any questions of
+such supreme importance. But I feel that I am here to insist upon the
+one point which is immediately connected with my subject; and this is,
+that whether or not Clifford was right in his conclusions, these
+conclusions certainly did not follow by way of any logical sequence from
+his premises. Because within the limits of human experience mind is only
+known as associated with brain, it clearly does not follow that mind
+cannot exist in any other mode. It does not even follow that any
+probability upon this matter can be thus established. The basis of
+analogy on which Clifford sought to rear an inference of cosmical
+extent, was restricted to the one instance of mind as known upon one
+planet; and, therefore, it is hard to imagine a more precarious use of
+that precarious method which is called by logicians simple enumeration.
+Indeed, even for what it is worth, the inference may be pointed with
+quite as much effect in precisely the opposite direction. For we have
+seen how little it is that we understand of the one mode in which we
+certainly know that mind does exist; and if from this little we feel
+impelled to conclude that there is a mode of mind which is not
+restricted to brain, but co-extensive with motion, is consubstantial and
+co-eternal with all that was, and is, and is to come; have we not at
+least a suggestion, that high as the heavens are above the earth, so
+high above our thoughts may be the thoughts of such a mind as this? I
+offer no opinion upon the question whether the general order of Nature
+does not require some one explanatory cause; nor upon the question
+whether the mind of man itself does not point to something kindred in
+the self-existing origin of things. I am not concerned to argue any
+point upon which I feel that opinions may legitimately differ. I am only
+concerned to show that, in so far as any deductions can be drawn from
+the theory which is before us, they make at least as much against as in
+favour of the cosmical conclusions arrived at by Clifford.
+
+On February 17, in the year 1600, when the streets of Rome were thronged
+with pilgrims from all the quarters of Christendom, while no less than
+fifty cardinals were congregated for the Jubilee; into the densely
+crowded Campo di Fiori a man was led to the stake, where, 'silent and
+self-sustained,' before the eyes of all nations, he perished in the
+flames. That death was the death of a martyr: it was met voluntarily in
+attestation of truth. But most noble of all the noble army to which he
+belonged, the name of that man is written large in history, as the name
+of one who had fortitude to die, not in the cause of religious belief,
+but in that of scientific conviction. For why did Bruno suffer? He
+suffered, as we all know, because he refused to recant his persuasion of
+the truth of the Copernican theory. Why, then, do I adduce the name of
+Bruno at the close of this lecture? I do so because, as far as I have
+been able to ascertain, he was the first clearly to enunciate the
+monistic theory of things to which the consideration of my subject has
+conducted us. This theory--or that as to the substantial identity of
+mind and motion--was afterwards espoused, in different guises, by sundry
+other writers; but to Bruno belongs the merit of its original
+publication, and it was partly for his adherence to this publication
+that he died. To this day Bruno is ordinarily termed a pantheist, and
+his theory, which in the light of much fuller knowledge I am advocating,
+Pantheism. I do not care to consider a difference of terms, where the
+only distinction resides in so unintelligible an idea as that of the
+creation of substance. It is more to the purpose to observe that in the
+mind of its first originator--and this a mind which was sufficiently
+clear in its thought to die for its perception of astronomical
+truth--the theory of Pantheism was but a sublime extension of the then
+contracted views of Theism. And I think that we of to-day, when we look
+to the teaching of this martyr of science, will find that in his theory
+alone do we meet with what I may term a philosophically adequate
+conception of Deity. If the advance of natural science is now steadily
+leading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must
+we not see how the independent conclusion of mental science is thus
+independently confirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being
+without knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come
+when we may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study
+of Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of
+possible truths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without
+mind, no being without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that
+universal being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that
+most stupendous of questions--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If
+there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not
+rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the
+medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?
+
+This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we are
+careful to set the logical conditions with complete impartiality. But
+the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as science is concerned,
+it is here possible to point any inference at all: the whole orbit of
+human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a parallax for measurements
+so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the voice of science must
+thus of necessity speak the language of agnosticism, at least let us see
+to it that the language is pure; let us not tolerate any barbarisms
+introduced from the side of aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this
+new grammar of thought does not admit of any constructions radically
+opposed to more venerable ways of thinking; even if we do not find that
+the often-quoted words of its earliest formulator apply with special
+force to its latest dialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology
+and a little knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper
+knowledge of both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their
+relations to one another, will lead men back to some form of religion,
+which, if it be more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier
+days.
+
+    'It is a beauteous evening, calm and free;
+    The holy time is quiet as a nun,
+    Breathless with adoration; the broad sun
+    Is sinking down in its tranquillity;
+    The gentleness of heaven is on the sea:
+    Listen! the mighty being is awake,
+    And doth with his eternal motion make
+    A sound like thunder, everlastingly.'
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: _Leviathan_, pt. i. chaps, i. and vi.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Leviathan_, Introduction.]
+
+
+
+
+MONISM
+
+
+     'Das Ich ist nicht aus Leib und Seele zusammengesetzt, sondern es
+     ist eine bestimmte Entwicklungsstufe des Wesens, das von
+     verschiedenem Standpunkt betrachtet in koerperliches und geistiges
+     Dasein auseinanderfaellt.'--Wundt, _Vorlesungen ueber die
+     Menschen-und Thierseele_, i. 293.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+In no respect has the progress of physical science exercised a more
+profound influence upon philosophical thought than it has by proving an
+apparently quantitative relation between material changes and mental
+changes. It has always been known that there is qualitative relation.
+Even long before mankind suspected that the brain was in any way
+connected with thought, it was well understood that alcohol and other
+poisons exercised their sundry influences on the mind in virtue of
+influences which they exercised upon the body; and even the lowest
+savages must always have been aware that a blow on the head is followed
+by insensibility. But it was not until the rise of Physiology that this
+qualitative relation between corporeal changes and mental changes was
+gradually found to be a quantitative one--or that every particular
+change of mind had an exact and invariable counterpart in some
+particular change of body. It is needless for me to detail the
+successive steps in the long course of physiological discovery whereby
+this great fact has been established; it is enough to say that the fact
+_is_ established to the satisfaction of every physiologist.
+
+Now, when once the relation between material changes and mental changes
+has been thus recognized as quantitative--or, which is the same thing,
+when once the association has been recognized as both invariable and
+exact--there arises the question as to how this relation is to be
+explained. Formally considered--or considered as a matter of logical
+statement irrespective of the relative probabilities which they may
+present, either to the minds of different individuals or to the general
+intelligence of the race--it appears to me that the possible hypotheses
+are here seven in number.
+
+     I. The mental changes may cause the material changes.
+
+     II. The material changes may cause the mental changes.
+
+     III. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+     may be only a phenomenal association--the two apparently diverse
+     classes of phenomena being really one and the same.
+
+     IV. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+     may be due to a harmony pre-established by a superior mind.
+
+     V. There may be no causation either way, because the association
+     may always be due to chance.
+
+     VI. There may be no causation either way, because the material
+     order may not have any real existence at all, being merely an ideal
+     creation of the mental order.
+
+     VII. Whether or not there be any causation either way, the
+     association may be one which it is necessarily beyond the power of
+     the human mind to explain.
+
+So far as I can see, this list of possible answers to the question
+before us is exhaustive. I will next show why, in my opinion, the last
+four of them may be excluded _in limine_.
+
+The suggestion of pre-established harmony (IV) merely postpones the
+question: it _assumes_ a higher _mind_ as adjusting correspondencies
+between known minds and animal bodies with respect to the activities of
+each; and, therefore, it either leaves untouched the ultimate question
+concerning the relation of mind (as such) to matter, or else it answers
+this question in terms of spiritualism (I).
+
+The suggestion of chance (V) is effectually excluded by the doctrine of
+chances: even in any one individual mind, the association between mental
+changes and material changes is much too intimate, constant, and
+detailed to admit of any one reasonably supposing that it can be due
+only to chance.
+
+The suggestion of pure idealism (VI) ultimately implies that the
+thinking Ego is itself the sole existence--a position which cannot,
+indeed, be turned by any assault of logic; but one which is
+nevertheless too obviously opposed to common sense to admit of any
+serious defence; its immunity from direct attack arises only from the
+gratuitous nature of its challenge to prove a negative (namely, that the
+thinking Ego is _not_ the sole existence), and this a negative which is
+necessarily beyond the region of proof.
+
+Lastly, the suggestion that the problem is necessarily insoluble (VII)
+does not deserve to be regarded as an hypothesis at all; for to suppose
+that the problem is necessarily insoluble is merely to exclude the
+supposition of there being any hypothesis available.
+
+In view of these several considerations, it appears to me that, although
+in a formal sense we may say there are altogether seven possible answers
+to the question before us, in reality, or for the purposes of practical
+discussion, there are nowadays but three--namely those which head the
+above list, and which I will now proceed to consider.
+
+I have named these three hypotheses in the order of their appearance
+during the history of philosophical thought. The earliest is the
+spiritualistic. As far back as we can trace the conceptions of primitive
+man, we meet with an unquestioning belief that it is his spirit which
+_animates_ his body; and, starting from this belief as explanatory of
+the movements of his own body, he readily attributes movements elsewhere
+to analogous agencies--the theory of _animism_ in Nature thus becoming
+the universal theory in all early stages of culture. It also appears to
+be the theory most natural to our own children during the early years of
+their dawning intelligence, and would doubtless continue through life in
+the case of every individual human being, were he not subsequently
+instructed in the reasons which have led to its rejection by many other
+members of his race. These reasons, as already observed, have been
+furnished in their entirety only within comparatively recent times; not
+until Physiology was able to prove how intimate is the association
+between cerebral processes and mental processes did it become possible
+for materialism to turn the tables upon spiritualism, by simply
+inverting the hypothesis. Lastly, although the theory of Monism (III)
+may be traced back at least as far as the pantheistic thought of
+Buddhism, it there had reference to theology as distinguished from
+psychology. And even as presented in the writings of Bruno, Spinoza, and
+other so-called monists prior to the present century, the hypothesis
+necessarily lacked completeness on account of the absence of knowledge
+afterwards supplied by physiology. For Monism, in the sense of this term
+as I shall use it, may be metaphorically regarded as the child of the
+two pre-existing theories, Spiritualism and Materialism. The birth of
+this child was necessarily impossible before both its parents had
+reached mature age. On the one hand it was necessary that the theory of
+Spiritualism should have outgrown its infancy as Animism, its childhood
+as Polytheism, before it entered upon its youth as Monotheism--or before
+it was able to supply material for the conception of Monism as a theory
+of cosmical extent. On the other hand, Materialism required to grow into
+the fullness of manhood, under the nursing influence of Science, before
+it was possible to engender this new-born offspring; for this offspring
+is new-born. The theory of Monism, as we are about to consider it, is a
+creature of our own generation; and it is only as such that I desire to
+call attention to the child. In order, however, to do this, I must
+follow the example of biographers in general, and begin by giving a
+brief sketch of both the parents.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+SPIRITUALISM.
+
+
+In proceeding to consider the opposite theories of Spiritualism and
+Materialism, it is before all else desirable to be perfectly clear upon
+the point of theory whereby they are essentially distinguished. This
+point is that which is raised by the question whether mind is the cause
+or the effect of motion. Both theories are dualistic, and therefore
+agree in holding that there is causation as between mind and motion:
+they differ only in their teaching as to the direction in which the
+causation proceeds. Of course, out of this fundamental difference there
+arise many secondary differences. The most important of these secondary
+differences has reference to the nature of the eternal or self-existing
+substance. Both theories agree that there is such a substance; but on
+the question whether this substance be mental or material, the two
+theories give contradictory answers, and logically so. For, if mind as
+we directly know it (namely, in ourselves) is taken to be a cause of
+motion, within our experience mind is accredited with priority; and
+hence the inference that elsewhere, or universally, mind is prior to
+motion. Furthermore, as motion cannot take place without something which
+moves, this something is likewise supposed to have been the result of
+mind: hence the doctrine of the creation by mind both of matter and of
+energy. On the other hand, the theory of materialism, by refusing to
+assign priority to mind as known directly in ourselves, naturally
+concludes that mind is elsewhere, or universally, the result of matter
+in motion--in other words, that matter in motion is the eternal or
+self-existing substance, and, as such, the cause of mind wherever mind
+occurs.
+
+I may observe, in passing, that although this cosmical deduction from
+the theory of materialism is, as I have said, natural, it is not (as is
+the case with the corresponding deduction from the theory of
+spiritualism) inevitable. For it is logically possible that even though
+all known minds be the results of matter in motion, matter in motion may
+nevertheless itself be the result of an unknown mind. This, indeed, is
+the position virtually adopted by Locke in his celebrated controversy
+with the Bishop of Worcester. Having been taken to task by this divine
+for the materialistic tendency of his writings, Locke defends himself by
+denying the necessary character of the deduction which we are now
+considering. For example, he insists, 'I see no contradiction in it that
+the first eternal thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain
+systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some
+degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have
+proved (lib. IV, ch. 10 and 14 &c.), it is no less than a contradiction
+to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense
+and thought) should be that eternal first thinking being.' Under this
+view, it will be observed, mind is supposed to have the ultimate
+priority, and thus to have been the original or creating cause of matter
+in motion, which, in turn, becomes the cause (or, at least, the
+conditional condition) of mind of a lower order. This view, however,
+need not detain us, inasmuch as it can only be held by those who, on
+grounds independent of philosophical thinking, already believe in mind
+as the First Cause or Eternal Being: this belief granted, there is, of
+course, an end of any question as between Spiritualism and Materialism.
+I have, therefore, only mentioned this possible phase of spiritualistic
+theory, in order to show that the theory of Materialism as applied to a
+human being does not _necessarily_ involve an extension of that theory
+to the cosmos. But I hold this distinction as of no practical value: it
+merely indicates a logical possibility which no one would be likely to
+entertain except on grounds independent of those upon which the
+philosophical dispute between Spiritualism and Materialism must be
+confined.
+
+Of more practical importance is the remark already made, namely, that
+the fundamental or diagnostic distinction between these two species of
+theory consists _only_ in the views which they severally take on the
+question of causality. This remark is of practical importance, because
+in the debate between spiritualists and materialists it is often lost
+sight of: nay, in some cases, it is even expressly ignored. Obviously,
+when it is either intentionally or unintentionally disregarded, the
+debate ceases to be directed to the question under discussion, and may
+then wander aimlessly over the whole field of collateral speculation.
+Throughout the present essay, therefore, the discussion will be
+restricted to the only topic which we have to discuss--namely, whether
+mind is the cause of motion, motion the cause of mind, or neither the
+cause of the other.
+
+The view to be first considered--namely, that mind is the cause of
+motion--obviously has one great advantage over the opposite view: it
+supposes the causality to proceed from that which is the source of our
+idea of causality (the mind); not from that into which this idea has
+been read by the mind. Hence, it is so far less difficult to imagine
+that mental changes are the cause of bodily changes than _vice versa_;
+for upon this hypothesis we are starting at least from the substance of
+immediate knowledge, and not from the reflection of that knowledge in
+what we call the external world.
+
+On the other hand, the theory of Spiritualism labours under certain
+speculative difficulties which appear to me overwhelming. The most
+formidable of these difficulties arises from the inevitable collision of
+the theory with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy.
+Whether or not we adopt the view that all causation of a physical kind
+is ultimately an expression of the fact that matter and energy are
+indestructible[3], it is equally certain that this indestructibility is
+a necessary condition to the occurrence of causation as natural.
+Therefore, if the mind of man is capable of breaking in as an
+independent cause upon the otherwise uniform system of natural
+causation, the only way in which it could do so would be by either
+destroying or creating certain _quanta_ of either matter or energy or
+both. But to suppose the mind capable of doing any of these things would
+be to suppose that the mind is a cause in some other sense than a
+physical or a natural cause; it would be to suppose that the mind is a
+super-natural cause, or, more plainly, that all mental activity, so far
+as it is an efficient cause of bodily movement, is of the nature of a
+miracle.
+
+This conclusion, which appears to me unavoidably implicated in the
+spiritualistic hypothesis, is not merely improbable _per se_, but admits
+of being shown virtually impossible if we proceed to consider the
+consequences to which it necessarily leads. A sportsman, for example,
+pulls the trigger of a gun, thereby initiating a long train of physical
+causes, which we may take up at the point where the powder is
+discharged, the shot propelled, and the bird dropped. Here the man's
+volition is supposed to have broken in upon the otherwise continuous
+stream of physical causes--first by modifying the molecular movements of
+his brain, so as to produce the particular co-ordination of
+neuro-muscular movement required to take accurate aim and to fire at the
+right moment; next by converting a quantity of gunpowder into gas,
+propelling a quantity of lead through the air; and finally, by killing a
+bird. Now, without tracing the matter further than this, let us consider
+how enormous a change the will of the man has introduced, even by so
+trivial an exercise of its activity. No doubt the first change in the
+material world was exceedingly slight: the molecular movement in the
+cortex of his brain was probably not more than might be dynamically
+represented by some small fraction of a foot-pound. But so intricate is
+the _nexus_ of physical causality throughout the whole domain of Nature,
+that the intervention of even so minute a disturbance _ab extra_ is
+obviously bound to continue to assert an influence of ever-widening
+extent as well as of everlasting duration. The heat generated by the
+explosion of the powder, the changed disposition of the shot, the death
+of the bird--leading to innumerable physical changes as to stoppage of
+many mechanical processes previously going on in the bird's body, loss
+of animal heat, &c., and also to innumerable vital changes, leading to
+a stoppage of all the mechanical changes which the bird would have
+helped to condition had it lived to die some other death, to propagate
+its kind, and thus indirectly condition an incalculable number of future
+changes that would have been brought about by the ever increasing number
+of its descendants--these and an indefinite number of other physical
+changes must all be held to have followed as a direct consequence of the
+man's volition thus suddenly breaking in as an independent cause upon
+the otherwise uniform course of Nature. Now, I say that, apart from some
+system of pre-established harmony, it appears simply inconceivable that
+the order of Nature could be maintained at all, if it were thus liable
+to be interfered with at any moment in any number of points. And if the
+spiritualist takes refuge in the further hypothesis of a pre-established
+harmony between acts of human (not to add brute) volition and causes of
+a natural kind, we have only to observe that he thus lands himself in a
+speculative position which is practically identical with that occupied
+by the materialist. For the only difference between the two positions
+then is that the necessity which the materialist takes to be imposed on
+human volition by the system of natural causation, is now taken by the
+spiritualist to be equally imposed by a super-natural volition. The
+necessity which binds the human volition must be equally rigid in
+either case; and therefore it can make no practical difference whether
+the source of it be regarded as natural or super-natural, material or
+mental: so that a man be fated to will only in certain ways--and this
+with all the rigour which belongs to causation as physical--it is
+scarcely worth while to dispute whether the predestination is of God or
+of Nature. There can be no question, however, that in this matter the
+possibility which I have supposed to be suggested by the spiritualist is
+more far-fetched than that which obviously lies to the hand of the
+materialist; and, moreover, that it too plainly wears the appearance of
+a desperate device to save a hollow theory.
+
+It remains to add that this great difficulty against the spiritualistic
+theory has been revealed in all its force only during the present
+generation. Since the days of fetishism, indeed, the difficulty has
+always been an increasing one--growing with the growth of the perception
+of uniformity on the one hand, and of mechanical as distinguished from
+volitional agency on the other. But it was not until the correlation of
+all the physical forces had been proved by actual experiment, and the
+scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy became as a
+consequence firmly established, that the difficulty in question assumed
+the importance of a logical barrier to the theory of mental changes
+acting as efficient causes of material changes.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 3: In the opinion of some modern writers the indestructibility
+of matter and the conservation of energy are alone sufficient to explain
+all the facts of natural causation. 'For,' it is urged, 'if in any case
+similar antecedents did not determine similar consequents, on one or
+other of these occasions some _quantum_ of force, or of matter, or of
+both, must have disappeared--or, which is the same thing, the law of
+causation cannot have been constant.' In a future chapter I shall have
+to recur to this view. Meanwhile I have only to observe that whether or
+not the law of causation is nothing more than a re-statement of the fact
+that matter and energy are indestructible, it is equally true that this
+fact is at least a necessary _condition_ to the operation of that law.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+MATERIALISM.
+
+
+This is the theory which presents great fascination to the student of
+physical science. By laborious investigation physiology has established
+the fact beyond the reach of rational dispute, that there is a constant
+relation of concomitancy between cerebral action and thought. Within
+experience mind is found in constant and definite association with that
+highly complex and peculiar disposition of matter called a living brain.
+The size and elaboration of this peculiar structure throughout the
+animal kingdom stand in conspicuous proportion to the degree of
+intelligence displayed; while the impairment of this structure, whether
+by congenital defect, mutilation, anaemia, decay, or appropriate poison,
+entails corresponding impairment of mental processes. Thus much being
+established, no reasonable man can hesitate in believing the relation
+between neurosis and psychosis to be a constant and concomitant
+relation, so that the step between this, and regarding it as a causal
+relation, seems indeed a small one. For, in all matters of physical
+inquiry, whenever we have proved a constant relation of concomitancy in
+a sequence _A B_, we call _A_ the cause of _B_; and, therefore, it has
+been frequently said that the evidence of causation between neurosis and
+psychosis is recognized causation. Lastly, to fortify this hypothesis,
+materialists point to the doctrine of the conservation of energy, which
+is supplied by the science of physics as a sort of buttress in this
+matter to the teachings of physiology. For, as this doctrine compels us
+to believe that the chain of physical causation involved in cerebral
+processes can nowhere be broken or deflected _ab extra_, we are
+compelled to believe that the mental processes, which are correlatively
+associated with these cerebral processes, can nowhere escape from 'the
+charmed circle of the forces,' so that whether we look to the detailed
+teachings of physiology, or to the more general teachings of physics, we
+alike perceive that natural science appears to leave no locus for mind
+other than as a something which is in some way a result of motion.
+
+The position of Materialism being thus at first sight so naturally
+strong, and having been in recent years so fortified by the labours of
+physiology, it is not surprising that in the present generation
+Materialism should be in the ascendant. It is the simple truth, as a
+learned and temperate author, speaking from the side of theology, has
+recently said, that
+
+     'Materialism is a danger to which individuals and societies will
+     always be more or less exposed. The present generation, however,
+     and especially the generation which is growing up, will obviously
+     be very especially exposed to it; as much so, perhaps, as any
+     generation in the history of the world. Within the last thirty
+     years the great wave of spiritualistic or idealistic thought ...
+     has been receding and decreasing; and another, which is in the main
+     driven by materialistic forces, has been gradually rising behind,
+     vast and threatening. It is but its crest that we at present see;
+     it is but a certain vague shaking produced by it that we at present
+     feel; but we shall probably soon enough fail not both to see and
+     feel it fully and distinctly[4].'
+
+Such being the present importance of Materialism, I shall devote the
+present chapter to a consideration of this theory. Each of the points in
+the argument for Materialism which I have mentioned above admits, of
+course, of elaboration; but I think that their enumeration contains all
+that is essential to the theory in question. It now devolves upon us to
+inquire whether this theory is adequate to meet the facts.
+
+And here I may as well at once give it as my own opinion that, of
+however much service the theory of Materialism may be, up to a certain
+point, it can never be accepted by any competent mind as a final
+explanation of the facts with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as
+its use may be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine,
+it is wholly inadequate as a hypothesis in philosophy. That is to say,
+so long as there is a constant relation of concomitancy found by
+experience to obtain between neural processes and mental processes, so
+long no harm can accrue to physical science by assuming, for its own
+purposes, that this relation is a causal one. But as soon as the
+question concerning the validity of this assumption is raised into the
+region of philosophy, it receives the answer that the assumption cannot
+be allowed to pass. For where the question becomes one not as to the
+_fact_ of the association but as to its _nature_, philosophy, which must
+have regard to the facts of mind no less than to those of matter, must
+pronounce that the hypothesis is untenable; for the hypothesis of this
+association being one of causality acting from neurosis to psychosis,
+cannot be accepted without doing violence, not merely to our faculty of
+reason, but to our very idea of causation itself.
+
+A very small amount of thinking is enough to show that what I call my
+knowledge of the external world, is merely a knowledge of my own mental
+modifications. A step further and I find that my idea of causation as a
+principle in the external world is derived from my knowledge of this
+principle in the internal world. For I find that my idea of force and
+energy in the external world is a mere projection of the idea which I
+have of effort within the region of my own consciousness; and therefore
+my only idea of causation is that which is originally derived from the
+experience which I have of this principle as obtaining among my own
+mental modifications.
+
+If once we see plainly that the idea of causation is derived from
+within, and that what we call the evidence of physical causation is
+really the evidence of mental modifications following one another in a
+definite sequence, we shall then clearly see, not merely that we have no
+evidence, but that we _can have_ no evidence of causation as proceeding
+from object to subject. However cogent the evidence may appear at first
+sight to be, it is found to vanish like a cloud as soon as it is exposed
+to the light of adequate contemplation. In the very act of thinking the
+evidence, we are virtually denying its possibility as evidence; for as
+evidence it appeals only to the mind, and since the mind can only know
+its own sequences, the evidence must be presenting to the mind an
+account of its own modifications; from the mere fact, therefore, of its
+being accepted as thinkable, the evidence is proved to be illusory.
+
+To uneducated men it appears an indisputable fact of 'common sense' that
+the colour of a flower exists as perceived in the flower, apart from any
+relation to the percipient mind. A physiologist has gone further into
+the thicket of things, and finds that the way is not so simple as this.
+He regards the quality of colour as necessarily related to the faculty
+of visual perception; does not suppose that the colour exists _as such_
+in the flower, but thinks of the something there as a certain order of
+vibrations which, when brought into relation with consciousness through
+the medium of certain nerves, gives rise to the perception experienced;
+and in order to account for the translation into visual feeling of an
+event so unlike that feeling as is the process taking place in the
+flower, physiologists have recourse to an elaborate theory, such as that
+of Helmholtz or Hering. In other words, physiologists here fully
+recognize that colour, or any other thing perceived, only exists _as
+perceived_ in virtue of a subjective element blending with an objective;
+the thing _as perceived_ is recognized as having no existence apart from
+its relation to a percipient mind. Now, although physiologists are at
+one with the philosophers thus far, it is to be feared that very
+frequently they are in the same position as the above-mentioned
+'uneducated men,' when it becomes needful to press still further into
+the thicket. For after having distinguished the necessity of recognizing
+a mind-element in any possible theory of perception, they forthwith
+proceed to disregard this element when passing from the ground of
+perception to that of thought. Although the ideas of matter, motion,
+causation, and so on, are themselves as much the offspring of a thinking
+mind, with its environment, as the perception of colour is a conceiving
+of the percipient mind, with _its_ environment, these ideas are
+inconsistently supposed to stand for equivalent realities of the
+external world--to truly represent things that are virtually independent
+of any necessary relation to mind. Or, as the case has recently been
+well put by Principal Caird:
+
+     'You cannot get mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the
+     very attempt to do so you have already begun with mind. The
+     easiest step of any such inquiry involves categories of thought,
+     and it is in terms of thought that the very problem you are
+     investigating can be so much as stated. You cannot start in your
+     investigations with a bare, self-identical, objective fact,
+     stripped of every ideal element or contribution from thought. The
+     least and lowest part of outward observation is not an independent
+     entity--fact _minus_ mind, and out of which mind may, somewhere or
+     other, be seen to emerge; but it is fact or object as it appears to
+     an observing mind, in the medium of thought, having mind or thought
+     as an inseparable factor of it. Whether there be such a thing as an
+     absolute world outside of thought, whether there be such things as
+     matter and material atoms existing in themselves before any mind
+     begins to perceive or think about them, is not the question before
+     us. If it were possible to conceive of such atoms, at any rate you,
+     before you begin to make anything of them, must think them; and you
+     can never, by thinking about atoms, prove that there is no such
+     thing as thought other than as an ultimate product of atoms. Before
+     you could reach thought or mind as a last result you must needs
+     eliminate from it the data of the problem with which you start, and
+     that you can never do, any more than you can stand on your own
+     shoulders or outstrip your own shadow.... In one word, to
+     constitute the reality of the outward world--to make possible the
+     minimum of knowledge, nay, the very existence for us of molecules
+     and atoms--you must needs presuppose that thought or thinking self,
+     which some would persuade us is to be educed or evolved from
+     them.... To make thought a function of matter is thus, simply, to
+     make thought a function of itself[5].'
+
+From this reasoning there can be no escape; and it is more rational for
+a man to believe that colour exists as such in a flower than, after
+having plainly seen that such cannot be the case, forthwith to
+disregard the teaching of this analogy, and to imagine that any apparent
+evidence of mind as a result of matter or motion can possibly be
+entertained as real evidence.
+
+Remembering, then, that from the nature of this particular case it is as
+impossible for mind to prove its own causation as it is for water to
+rise above its source, it may still be well, for the sake of further
+argument, to sink this general consideration, and to regard such
+spurious evidence of causation as is presented by Materialism, without
+prejudice arising from its being _prima facie_ inadmissible.
+
+Materialists, as already observed, are fond of saying that the evidence
+of causation from neurosis to psychosis is as good as such evidence can
+be proved to be in any other case. Now, quite apart from the general
+considerations just adduced to show that from the peculiar nature of
+this case there can here be no such evidence at all--quite apart from
+this, and treating the problem on the lower ground of the supposed
+analogy, it may be clearly shown that the statement is untrue. For a
+little thought will show that in point of fact the only resemblance
+between this supposed case of causation and all other cases of
+recognized causation, consists in the invariability of the correlation
+between cerebral processes and mental processes; in all other points the
+analogy fails. For in all cases of recognized causation there is a
+perceived _connexion_ between the cause and the effect; the antecedents
+are physical, and the consequents are physical. But in the case before
+us there is no perceived, or even conceivable, connexion between the
+cause and the effect; for the causes are supposed to be physical and the
+effects mental. And the antithesis thus posited is alone sufficient to
+separate _toto coelo_ the case of causation supposed from that of all
+cases of causation recognized. From the singularly clear and
+well-balanced statement of this subject given by Professor Allman in his
+Presidential Address before the British Association, I may here fitly
+quote the following:--
+
+     'If we could see any analogy between thought and any one of the
+     admitted phenomena of matter, we should be justified in the first
+     of these conclusions (i. e. that of Materialism) as the simplest,
+     and as affording a hypothesis most in accordance with the
+     comprehensiveness of natural laws; but between thought and the
+     physical phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but no
+     conceivable analogy; and the obvious and continuous path which we
+     have hitherto followed up in our reasonings from the phenomena of
+     lifeless matter through those of living matter here comes suddenly
+     to an end. The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep
+     and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by
+     which, as by a bridge, we may span it over[6].'
+
+And, not unduly to multiply quotations, I shall only adduce one more
+from another of the few eminent men of science who have seen their way
+clearly in this matter, and have expressed what they have seen in
+language as clear as their vision. Professor Tyndall writes:--
+
+     'The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding
+     facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite
+     thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur
+     simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor
+     apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to
+     pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one phenomenon to the
+     other. They appear together but we do not know why. Were our minds
+     and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable
+     us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable
+     of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their
+     electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately
+     acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we
+     should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem. How are
+     these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness?
+     The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain
+     intellectually impassable[7].'
+
+Next, in all cases of recognized causation there is a perceived
+_equivalency_ between cause and effect, such equivalency belonging to
+the very essence of that in which we conceive causation to consist. But
+as between matter and motion on the one side, and feeling and thought on
+the other, there can be no such equivalency conceivable. That no such
+equivalency is conceivable may be rendered apparent on grounds of
+Materialism itself. For Materialism is bound to accept the fundamental
+doctrine of modern physics--that, viz. as to the conservation of
+energy--and therefore it becomes evident that unless we assimilate
+thought with energy, there is no possibility of a causal relation, or a
+relation of equivalency, as obtaining between the one and the other.
+For however little we may know about brain-dynamics, materialists, at
+least, must take it for granted that in every process of cerebration the
+matter and force concerned are indestructible quantities, and therefore
+that all their possible equations are fully satisfied, could we but
+follow them out. Howsoever complex we may suppose the flux and reflux of
+forces to be within the structure of a living brain, it is no more
+possible for any one of the forces concerned to escape from brain to
+mind, than it would be for such an escape to occur in a steam-engine or
+a watch; the doctrine of the conservation of energy forms an insuperable
+bar to the supposition that any equation in the region of physics can be
+left unsatisfied, in order to pass over and satisfy some other equation
+in the region of psychics.
+
+Of course in saying this I am aware that some of the more clear-sighted
+of the materialists have plainly perceived this difficulty in all its
+magnitude, and so have felt that unless it can be met, any theory of
+Materialism must necessarily contain a radical contradiction of
+principles. Some few materialists have therefore sought to meet the
+difficulty in the only way it can be met, viz. by boldly asserting the
+possibility of thought and energy being transmutable. On this view
+thought becomes a mode of motion, and takes its rank among the forces as
+identical in nature with heat, light, electricity, and the rest. But
+this view is also inherently impossible. For suppose, as a matter of
+argument, that physiologists should discover a mechanical equivalent of
+thought, so that we might estimate the value of a calculation in thermal
+units, or the 'labour of love' in foot-pounds: still we should not be
+out of our difficulties; we should only have to cut a twist of flax to
+find a lock of iron. For by thus assimilating thought with energy, we
+should in no wise have explained the fundamental antithesis between
+subject and object. The fact would remain, if possible, more
+unaccountable than ever, that mind should present absolutely no point of
+real analogy with motion. Involved with the essential idea of motion is
+the idea of extension; suppress the latter and the former must
+necessarily vanish, for motion only means transition in space of
+something itself extended. But thought, as far as we can possibly know
+it, is known and distinguished by the very peculiarity of not having
+extension. Therefore, even if we were to find a mechanical equivalent of
+thought, thought would still not be proved a mode of motion. On the
+contrary, what would be proved would be that, in becoming transformed
+into thought, energy had ceased to be energy; in passing out of its
+relation to space it would cease to exist as energy, and if it again
+passed into that relation it would only be by starting _de novo_ on a
+new course of history. Therefore the proof that thought has a mechanical
+equivalent would simply amount to the proof, not that thought _is_
+energy, but that thought _destroys_ energy. And if Materialism were to
+prove this, Materialism would commit suicide. For if once it were
+proved that the relation of energy to thought is such that thought is
+able to absorb or temporarily to annihilate energy, the whole argument
+of Materialism would be inverted, and whatever evidence there is of
+causation as between mind and matter would become available in all its
+force on the side of Spiritualism. This seems plain, for if it even were
+conceivable--which most distinctly it is not--that a motor could ever
+become a motive, and so pass from the sphere of dynamics into the sphere
+of consciousness, the fact would go to prove, not that the motor was the
+cause of the motive, but rather that the motive was the cause of
+destroying the motor; so that at that point the otherwise unbroken chain
+of physical sequences was interrupted by the motive striking in upon it,
+and in virtue of the mysterious power supposed to have been proved by
+physiology, cancelling the motor, so allowing the nerve-centre to act as
+determined by the motive.
+
+Of course I wish it to be understood that I believe we are here dealing
+with what I may call, in perhaps suitably contradictory terms,
+inconceivable conceptions. But let it be remembered that I am not
+responsible for this ambiguity; I am only showing what must be the
+necessary outcome of analysis if we begin by endeavouring phenomenally
+to unite the most antithetical of elements--mind and motion.
+Materialism, at least, will not be the gainer should it ever be proved
+that in the complex operations of the brain a unique exception occurs
+to the otherwise universal law of the conservation of energy in space.
+
+We may, therefore, quit the suggestion that the difficulty experienced
+by Materialism of showing an equivalency between neurosis and psychosis
+can ever be met by assuming that some day mental processes may admit of
+being expressed in terms of physical. But before leaving this difficulty
+with regard to equivalency, I may mention one other point that seems to
+me of importance in connexion with it. I have already said that if we
+suppose causation to proceed from brain to mind, we must suppose this
+essential requirement of equivalency between the cerebral causes and the
+mental effects to be satisfied somewhere.
+
+But where are we to say that it is satisfied? Even if we suppose that
+thought has a mechanical equivalent, and that causation proceeds in the
+direction from energy to thought, still, when we have regard to the
+supposed effects, we find that even yet they bear no kind of equivalency
+to their supposed causes. The brain of a Shakespeare probably did not,
+as a system, exhibit so much energy as does the brain of an elephant;
+and the cerebral operations of a Darwin may not have had a very
+perceptibly larger mechanical equivalent than those of a banker's clerk.
+Yet in the world of thought the difference between our estimate of the
+results, or 'work done,' in these cases is such as to drive all ideas of
+equivalency to the winds. Doubtless, a materialist will answer that it
+is not fair to take our estimate of 'work done' in the world of mind as
+the real equivalent of the energy supposed to have passed over from the
+world of motion, seeing that our estimate is based, not on the
+quantitative amount of thought produced, but rather on its qualitative
+character with reference to the social requirements of the race. But to
+this it is enough to answer that we have no means of gauging the
+quantity of thought produced other than by having regard to _its_
+effects in the world of mind, and this we cannot do except by having
+regard to its qualitative character. Many a man, for instance, must have
+consumed more than a thousand times the brain-substance and brain-energy
+that Shelley expended over his 'Ode to a Skylark,' and yet as a result
+have produced an utterly worthless poem. Now, in what way are we to
+estimate the 'work done' in two such cases, except by looking to the
+relative effects produced in the only region where they are produced,
+viz. in the region of mind? Yet, when we do so estimate them, what
+becomes of the evidence of equivalency between the physical causes and
+the psychical effects?
+
+Now if thus, whether or not we try to form an estimate, it is impossible
+to show any semblance of equivalency between the supposed causes and the
+alleged effects, how can any one be found to say that the evidence of
+causation is here as valid as it is in any other case? The truth rather
+is that the alleged effects stand out of every relation to the supposed
+causes, with the exception only of being associated in time.
+
+There still remains one other enormous difficulty in the way of the
+theory of Materialism; it necessarily embodies the theory of _conscious
+automatism_, and is therefore called upon to explain why consciousness
+and thought have ever appeared upon the scene of things at all. That
+this is the necessary position of Materialism is easily proved as
+follows. We have already seen that Materialism would commit suicide by
+supposing that energy could be transmuted into thought, for this would
+amount to nothing short of supposing the destruction of energy as such;
+and to suppose energy thus destructible would be to open wide the door
+of spiritualism. Materialism, therefore, is logically bound to argue in
+this way: We cannot conceive of a conscious idea, or mental change, as
+in any way affecting the course of a cerebral reflex, or material
+change; while, on the other hand, our knowledge of the conservation of
+energy teaches us as an axiom that the cerebral changes must determine
+each other in their sequence as in a continuous series. Nowhere can we
+suppose the physical process to be interrupted or diverted by the
+psychical process; and therefore we must conclude that thought and
+volition really play no part whatever in determining action. Thoughts
+and feelings are but indices which show in the mirror of the mind
+certain changes that are proceeding in the matter of the brain, and are
+as inefficient in influencing those changes as the shadow of a cloud is
+powerless to direct the movements of that of which it is the shadow.
+
+But when Materialism reaches, in a clear and articulate manner, this
+inference as a conclusion necessary from its premises, it becomes
+opposed at once to common sense and to the requirements of methodical
+reason. It becomes opposed to common sense because we all feel it is
+practically impossible to believe that the world would now have been
+exactly what it is even if consciousness, thought, and volition had
+never appeared upon the scene--that railway trains would have been
+running filled with mindless passengers, or that telephones would have
+been invented by brains that could not think to speak to ears that could
+not hear. And the conclusion is opposed to the requirements of
+methodical reason, because reason to be methodical is bound to have an
+answer to the question that immediately arises from the conclusion. This
+question simply is, Why have consciousness, thought, and volition ever
+been called into existence; and why are they related, as they are
+related, to cerebral action? Materialism, by here undertaking to prove
+that these things stand uselessly isolated from all other things, is
+bound to show some reason why they ever came to be, and to be what they
+are. For observe, it is not merely that these things exist in a supposed
+unnecessary relation to all other things; the fact to be explained is
+that they exist in a most intimately woven and invariable connexion with
+certain highly complex forms of organic structure and certain highly
+peculiar distributions of physical force. Yet these unique and
+extraordinary things are supposed by automatism to be always results and
+never causes; in the theatre of things they are supposed to be always
+spectators and never actors; in the laboratory of life they are supposed
+to be always by-products; and therefore in the order of nature they are
+supposed to have no _raison d'etre_. Such a state of matters would be
+accountable enough if the stream of mental changes were but partly,
+occasionally, and imperfectly associated with the stream of material
+changes; but as the association is so minute, invariable, and precise,
+the hypothesis of the association being merely accidental, or _not
+requiring explanation_, becomes, at the bar of methodical reasoning,
+self-convicted of absurdity.
+
+The state of the case, then, simply is that two distinct facts stand to
+be explained by the theory of conscious automatism--first, why psychosis
+should ever have been developed as a mysterious appendage to neurosis;
+and, secondly, why the association between these things should be so
+intimate and precise. Assuredly, on the principles of evolution, which
+materialists at least cannot afford to disregard, it would be a wholly
+anomalous fact that so wide and general a class of phenomena as those of
+mind should have become developed in constantly ascending degrees
+throughout the animal kingdom, if they are entirely without use to
+animals. If psychosis is, as supposed, a function of neurosis, the
+doctrine of natural selection alone would forbid us to imagine that this
+function differs from all other functions in being itself functionless.
+If it would be detrimental to the theory of natural selection that any
+one isolated structure--such as the tail of a rattlesnake--should be
+adapted to perform a function useless to the animal possessing it, how
+utterly destructive of that theory would be the fact that all the
+phenomena of mind have been elaborated as functions of nerve-tissue
+without any one of them ever having been of any use either to the
+individual or to the species. And the difficulty that thus arises is
+magnified without limit when we remember that the phenomena of mind are
+invariable in their association with cerebral structure, grade for
+grade, and process for process.
+
+It is of no argumentative use to point to the fact that many adaptive
+movements in animals are performed by nerve-centres apart from any
+association with consciousness or volition, because all the facts on
+this head go to prove that consciousness and volition come in most
+suggestively just where adaptive movements begin to grow varied and
+complex, and then continue to develop with a proportional reference to
+the growing variety and complexity of these movements. The facts,
+therefore, irresistibly lead to the conclusion (if we argue here as we
+should in the case of any other function) that consciousness and
+volition are functions of nerve-tissue super-added to its previous
+functions, in order to meet new and more complex demands on its powers
+of adaptation.
+
+Neither is it of any argumentative use to point to the fact that
+adaptive actions which originally are performed with conscious volition
+may by practice come to be performed without conscious volition. For it
+is certain that no adaptive action of quite a novel kind is ever
+performed from the first without consciousness of its performance, and
+therefore, although it is true that by repetition its performance may
+become mechanical or unconscious, this does not prove that consciousness
+was without use in producing the adaptive action. It only proves that
+after a nervous mechanism has been elaborated by the help of
+consciousness, consciousness may be withdrawn and leave the finished
+mechanism to work alone; the structure having been completed, the
+scaffolding necessary to its completion may be removed.
+
+But passing over this difficulty which the theory of conscious
+automatism seems bound to encounter in its collision with the theory of
+natural selection, the most insuperable of all its difficulties arises
+from the bare fact, which it cannot explain, that conscious intelligence
+exists, and exists in the most intimate relation with one peculiar kind
+of material structure. For automatists must concede that the evidence
+of causation in the region of mind is at least as cogent as it is in the
+region of matter, seeing that the whole science of psychology is only
+rendered possible as a science by the fundamental fact of observation
+that mental antecedents determine mental consequents. Therefore, if we
+call a physical sequence _A, B, C_, and a mental sequence _a, b, c_
+automatists have to explain, not merely why there should be such a thing
+as a mental sequence at all, but also why the sequence _a, b, c_ should
+always proceed, link for link, with the sequence _A, B, C_. It clearly
+is no answer to say that the sequence _A, B, C_ implies the successive
+activity of certain definite nerve-centres _A', B', C'_ which have for
+their subjective effects the sequence _a, b, c_ so that whenever the
+sequence _A, B, C_ occurs the sequence _a, b, c_ must likewise occur.
+This is no answer, because it merely restates the hypothesis of
+automatism, and begs the whole question to be discussed. What methodical
+reason demands as an answer is simply why the sequence _A, B, C_ even
+though we freely grant it due to the successive activity of certain
+definite nerve-centres, should be attended by the sequence _a, b, c_.
+Reason perceives clearly enough that the sequence _a, b, c_ belongs to a
+wholly different category from the sequence _A, B, C_ the one being
+immediately known as a process taking place in a something which is
+without extension or physical properties of any kind, and the other
+taking place in a something which when, translated by the previous
+something, we recognize as having extension and the other antithetical
+properties which we class together as physical. There would of course be
+no difficulty if the sequence _A, B, C_ continued through any amount of
+complexity in the same conceivable category of being; so that there
+would be nothing actually inconceivable in cerebral sequence--changes
+running through _D, E, F_, &c., to an extent sufficient to cause
+unconscious automatism of any degree of complexity. But that which does
+require explanation from automatists is why automatism should have
+become associated with consciousness, and this so intimately that every
+change in the sequence _A, B, C_, &c., is accompanied by a particular
+and corresponding change in the sequence _a, b, c_, &c. Thus, to take a
+definite illustration, if on seeing the sun I think of a paper on solar
+physics, and from this pass to thinking of Mr. Norman Lockyer, and from
+this to speculating on the probability of certain supposed elements
+being really compounds, there is here a definite causal connexion in the
+sequence of my _thoughts_. But it is the last extravagance of absurdity
+to tell me that the accompanying causal sequences going on in my brain
+happen to have exactly corresponded to the sequences which were taking
+place in the mind, the two trains of sequences being each definite and
+coherent in themselves, and yet each proceeding link for link in lines
+parallel with the other. Without some theory of pre-established
+harmony--which, of course, it is no part of automatism to entertain--it
+would, on the doctrine of chances alone, be impossible to suppose that
+the causal sequences in the brain always happen to be just those which,
+by running link for link with another set of causal sequences taking
+place in the mind, enable both the series to be definite and coherent in
+themselves. Therefore, before reason can allow the theory of automatism
+to pass, it must be told how this wonderful fact of parallelism is to be
+explained. There must be _some_ connexion between the intrinsically
+coherent series _A, B, C_ and the no less intrinsically coherent
+sequence _a, b, c_, which may be taken as an explanation why they
+coincide each to each. What is this connexion? We do not know; but we
+have now seen that, whatever it is, it cannot be an ordinary causal
+connexion--first, because the doctrine of the conservation of energy
+makes it incumbent on us to believe that the procession of physical
+cause and effect is complete within the region of brain--a closed
+circle, as it were, from which no energy can, without argumentative
+suicide, be supposed to escape into the region of mind; and next,
+because, even were this difficulty disregarded, it is unaccountable that
+the causative influence (whatever it is supposed to be), which passes
+over from the region of physics into that of psychics, should be such as
+to render the psychical series coherent in itself, when on the physical
+side the series must be determined by purely physical conditions,
+having no reference whatsoever to psychical requirements.
+
+Thus it is argumentatively impossible for Materialism to elude the
+necessity of explaining the kind of connexion which it supposes to
+subsist between neurosis and psychosis; and forasmuch as the above
+considerations clearly show this connexion cannot be accepted as one of
+ordinary causality without some answer being given to the questions
+which reason has to ask, Materialism must be ruled out of court if she
+fails to respond to the demand. But it is no less clearly impossible
+that she can respond to the demand, and therefore at the bar of
+Philosophy Materialism must be pronounced, for this as well as for the
+reasons previously cited, conspicuously inadequate to account for the
+facts.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 4: Professor Flint, _Antitheistic Theories_, p. 99.]
+
+[Footnote 5: _Philosophy of Religion_, pp. 95, 99, and 101.]
+
+[Footnote 6: British Association Report, 1879, p. 28.]
+
+[Footnote 7: British Association Report, 1868. Trans. of Sections, p.
+5.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+MONISM.
+
+
+We have seen, then, that both the alternative theories of Spiritualism
+and Materialism are found, when carefully examined, to be so beset with
+difficulties of a necessary and fundamental kind, that it is impossible
+to entertain either without closing our eyes to certain contradictions
+which they severally and inherently present. We may, indeed, go even
+further than this, and affirm that to suppose mind the cause of motion
+or motion the cause of mind is equally to suppose that which in its very
+nature as a supposition is neither true nor untrue, but nonsensical.
+For, as Prof. Clifford has said in his essay on _Body and Mind_,--
+
+     'It may be conceived that, at the same time with every exercise of
+     volition, there is a disturbance of the physical laws; but this
+     disturbance, being perceptible to me, would be a physical fact
+     accompanying the volition, and could not be volition itself, which
+     is not perceptible to me. Whether there is such a disturbance of
+     the physical laws or no is a question of fact to which we have the
+     best of reasons for giving a negative answer; but the assertion
+     that another man's volition, a feeling in his consciousness which
+     I cannot perceive, is part of the train of physical facts which I
+     may perceive,--this is neither true nor untrue, but nonsense; it is
+     a combination of words whose corresponding ideas will not go
+     together[8].'
+
+And seeing that the correlatives are in each case the same, it is
+similarly 'nonsense' to assert the converse proposition: or, in other
+words, it is equally nonsense to speak of mental action causing cerebral
+action, or of cerebral action causing mental action--nonsense of the
+same kind as it would be to speak of the _Pickwick Papers_ causing a
+storm at sea, or the eruption of a volcano causing the forty-seventh
+proposition in the first book of Euclid.
+
+We see, then, that two of the three possible theories of things contain
+the elements of their own destruction: when carefully analyzed, both
+these theories are found to present inherent contradictions. On this
+account the third, or only alternative theory, comes to us with a large
+antecedent presumption in its favour. For it comes to us, as it were, on
+a clear field, or with the negative advantage of having no logical
+rivals to contend with. The other two suggestions having been weighed in
+the balance and found wanting, we are free to look to the new-comer as
+quite unopposed. This new-comer must, indeed, be interrogated as
+carefully as his predecessors, and, like them, must be judged upon his
+own merits. But as he constitutes our last possible hope of solving the
+question which he professes himself able to solve, the absolute failure
+of his predecessors entitles him to a patient hearing. By the method of
+exclusion his voice is now the only voice that remains to be heard, and
+unless it can speak to better purpose than the others, we shall have no
+alternative but to abandon the facts as inexplicable, or to confess that
+it is necessarily impossible for the human mind ever to arrive at any
+theory of things.
+
+Before proceeding to state or to examine this third and last of the
+suggested theories, it is desirable--in order still further to define
+its _status a priori_--that I should exhibit the reason why the two
+other suggestions have necessarily failed. For to my mind it is
+perfectly obvious that this reason is to be found, and found only, in
+the fact that they are both dualistic. The inherent, the fatal, and the
+closely similar difficulties which attach to both the dualistic
+theories, attach to them merely because they _are_ dualistic. The
+'nonsense' of each of them is really identical, and arises only because
+they both make the same irrational attempt to find more in the effect
+than they have put into the cause. In other words, both the dualistic
+theories suppose that the physical chains of causation is complete
+within itself, and that the mental chain is also complete within itself:
+yet they both proceed to the contradiction that one of these chains is
+able to allow some of its causal influence to escape, as it were, in
+order to constitute the other chain. It makes no difference, in point
+of logic, whether such an escape is supposed to take place from the
+physical chain (materialism) or from the mental chain (spiritualism): in
+either case the fundamental principle of causality is alike
+impugned--the principle, that is, of there being an equivalency between
+cause and effect, such that you cannot get more out of your effect than
+you have put into your cause. Both these dualistic theories, although
+they take opposite views as to which of the two chains of causation is
+the cause of the other, nevertheless agree in supposing that there _are_
+two chains of causation, and that one of them _does_ act causally upon
+the other: and it is in this matter of their common consent that they
+both commit suicide. Every process in the physical sphere must be
+supposed to have its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the
+doctrine of the conservation of energy would be contravened, and thus
+the causation contemplated could no longer be contemplated as physical.
+Similarly, every process in the mental sphere must be supposed to have
+its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the causation
+contemplated could no longer be contemplated as mental: some of the
+equations must be supposed not to have been satisfied within the mental
+sphere, but to have been carried over into the physical sphere--thus to
+have either created or destroyed certain quantities of energy within
+that sphere, and thus, also, to have introduced elements of endless
+confusion into the otherwise orderly system of Nature.
+
+From this vice of radical contradiction, to which both the dualistic
+theories are committed, the monistic theory is free. Moreover, as we
+shall immediately find, it is free to combine the elements of truth
+which severally belong to both the other theories. These other theories
+are each concerned with what they see upon different sides of the same
+shield. The facts which they severally receive they severally report,
+and their reports appear to contradict each other. But truth can never
+be really in contradiction with other truth; and it is reserved for
+Monism, by taking a simultaneous view of both sides, to reconcile the
+previously apparent contradictions. For these and other reasons, which
+will unfold themselves as we proceed, I fully agree with the late
+Professor Clifford where he says of this theory--'It is not merely a
+speculation, but is a result to which all the greatest minds that have
+studied this question (the relation between body and mind) in the right
+way have gradually been approximating for a long time.' This theory is,
+as we have already seen, that mental phenomena and physical phenomena,
+although apparently diverse, are really identical.
+
+If we thus unite in a higher synthesis the elements both of spiritualism
+and of materialism, we obtain a product which satisfies every fact of
+feeling on the one hand, and of observation on the other. We have only
+to suppose that the antithesis between mind and motion--subject and
+object--is itself phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have
+only to suppose that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of
+apprehension: and, therefore, that any change taking place in the mind,
+and any corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not
+two changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a
+musical sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.
+Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of
+changes, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in
+an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity
+in consciousness is created only by the difference in our mode of
+perceiving the same events--whether we see or whether we hear the
+vibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of
+nerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same
+event, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of
+perceiving it.
+
+Or, to take another and a better illustration, in an Edison lamp the
+light which is emitted from the burner may be said indifferently to be
+caused by the number of vibrations per second going on in the carbon, or
+by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of vibration could not
+take place in the carbon without constituting that degree of temperature
+which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a train of thought may be
+said indifferently to be caused by brain-action or by mind-action; for,
+_ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place without the other. Now when
+we contemplate the phenomena of volition by themselves, it is as though
+we were contemplating the phenomena of light by themselves: volition is
+produced by mind in brain, just as light is produced by temperature in
+carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of light as the cause, say,
+of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of volition as the cause of
+bodily movement. That particular kind of physical activity which takes
+place in the carbon could not take place without the light which causes
+a photograph; and, similarly, that particular kind of physical activity
+which takes place in the brain could not take place without the volition
+which causes a bodily movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of
+bodily movement as is the physical activity of the brain; seeing that,
+in an absolute sense, the cause is one and the same. But if we once
+clearly perceive that what in a relative sense we know as volition is,
+in a similar sense, the cause of bodily movement, we terminate the
+question touching the freedom of the will. It thus becomes a mere matter
+of phraseology whether we speak of the will determining, or being
+determined by, changes going on in the external world; just as it is but
+a matter of phraseology whether we speak of temperature determining, or
+being determined by, molecular vibration. All the requirements alike of
+the free-will and of the bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a
+synthesis which comprises them both. On the one hand, it would be as
+impossible for an _un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform
+the adjustments of a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp
+to give out light and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric
+current. On the other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to
+originate bodily motion without the occurrence of a strictly physical
+process of cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison
+lamp which had been deprived of its carbon-burner.
+
+The great advantage of this theory is, that it supposes only one stream
+of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously
+concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and
+contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.
+Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;
+mind-changes nothing but mind-changes--both producing both
+simultaneously: neither could be what it is without the other, because
+without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.
+Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that
+consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind the
+changes of the brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
+causation of these movements that they should have a mental side. And
+equally impossible is the supposition of the spiritualist that the
+cerebral processes are adventitious, or that in the absence of brain the
+changes of the mind could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
+causation of these changes that they should have a material side.
+Furthermore, the use of mind to animals and to men is thus rendered
+apparent; for intelligent volition is thus shown to be a true cause of
+adjustive movement, in that the cerebration which it involves could not
+otherwise be possible: the causation would not otherwise be complete.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 8: _Lectures and Essays_, vol. ii. pp. 56-7.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE WORLD AS AN EJECT.
+
+
+In the Introduction to this essay I have sought to show that there are,
+for the purposes of practical discussion, but three theories of the
+World of Being. There is, first, the theory of Materialism, which
+supposes matter in motion to be the ultimate or self-existing Reality,
+and, therefore, the cause of mind. Next, there is the theory of
+Spiritualism, which supposes mind to be the ultimate Reality, and,
+therefore, the cause of matter in motion. Lastly, there is the theory of
+Monism which supposes matter in motion to be substantially identical
+with mind, and, therefore, that as between mind and matter in motion
+there is no causal relation either way. In the foregoing chapters I have
+considered these three theories, and argued that of them the
+last-mentioned is the only one which satisfies all the facts of feeling
+on the one hand, and of observation on the other. The theory of Monism
+alone is able to explain, without inherent contradiction, the phenomena
+both of the subjective and objective spheres.
+
+It is my present purpose to extend the considerations already presented.
+Assuming the theory of Monism, I desire to ascertain the result to which
+it will lead when applied to the question whether we ought to regard the
+external world as of a character mental or non-mental. As observed in my
+Rede Lecture (_supra_, p. 33), this question has already been considered
+by the late Professor Clifford, who decided that on the monistic theory
+the probability pointed towards the external world being of a character
+non-mental; that, although the whole universe is composed of
+'mind-stuff,' the universe as a whole is mindless. This decision I then
+briefly criticized; it is now my object to contemplate the matter
+somewhat more in detail.
+
+I will assume, on account of reasons previously given, that when we
+speak of matter in motion we do not at all know what it is that moves,
+nor do we know at all what it is that we mean by motion. Therefore if,
+as unknown quantities, we call matter _a_ and motion _b_, all we are
+entitled to affirm is that _a + b = z_, where _z_ is a known quantity,
+or mind. Obversely stated, we may say that the known quantity _z_ is
+capable of being resolved into the unknown _a + b_. But, inasmuch as
+both _a_ and _b_ are unknown, we may simplify matters by regarding their
+sum as a single unknown quantity _x_, which we take to be substantially
+identical with its obverse aspect known as _z_.
+
+Here, then, are our data. The theory of Monism teaches that what we
+perceive as matter in motion, _x_, is the obverse of what we know as
+mind, _z_. What, then, do we know of _z_? In the first place, we well
+know that this is the only entity with which we are acquainted, so to
+speak, at first hand; all our knowledge of _x_ (which is the only other
+knowledge we possess) is possible only in so far as we are able to
+translate it into terms of _z_. In the next place, we know that _z_ is
+itself an entity of the most enormous complexity. Standing as a symbol
+of the whole range of individual subjectivity, it may be said to
+constitute for each individual the symbol of his own personality--or the
+sum total of his conscious life. Now each individual knows by direct
+knowledge that his conscious life is, as I have said, of enormous
+complexity, and that numberless ingredients of feeling, thought, and
+volition are therein combined in numberless ways. Therefore the symbol
+_z_ may be considered as the sum of innumerable constituent parts,
+grouped _inter se_ in numberless systems of more or less complexity.
+
+From these considerations we arrive at the following conclusions. The
+theory of Monism teaches that all _z_ is _x_; but it does not,
+therefore, necessarily teach that all _x_ is _z_. Nevertheless, it does
+teach that if all _x_ is not _z_, this must be because _x_ is _z_,
+_plus_ something more than _z_, as a little thought will be sufficient
+to show. Thus, the four annexed diagrams exhaust the logical
+possibilities of any case, where the question is as to the inclusion or
+exclusion of one quantity by another. In Fig. 1 the two quantities are
+coincident; in Fig 2 the one is wholly included by the other; in Fig. 3
+it is partially included; and in Fig. 4 wholly excluded. Now in the
+present case, and upon the data supplied, the logical possibilities are
+exhausted by Figs. 1 and 2. For, upon these data, Figs. 3 and 4
+obviously represent logical impossibilities; no part of Mind can,
+according to these data, stand outside the limits of Matter and Motion.
+Therefore, if the Ego is not coincident with the Non-ego (or if all _x_
+is not _z_, as in Fig. 1), this can only be because the Ego is less
+extensive than the Non-ego (or because _x_ is _z plus_ something more
+than _z_, as in Fig. 2).
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 1]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 2]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 3]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 4]
+
+Of these two logical possibilities Idealism, in its most extreme form,
+may adopt the first. For Idealism in this form may hold that apart from
+the Ego there is no external world; that outside of _z_ there is no _x_;
+that the only _esse_ is the _percipi_. But, as very few persons
+nowadays are prepared to go the length of seriously maintaining that in
+actual fact there is no external world save in so far as this is
+perceived by the individual mind, I need not wait to consider this
+possibility. We are thus practically shut up to a consideration of the
+possibility marked 2.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 5]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 6]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 7]
+
+The theory of Monism, then, teaches that _x_ is _z_ _plus_ something
+more than _z_; and therefore it becomes a matter of great moment to
+consider the probable nature of the overplus. For it obviously does not
+follow that because _x_ is greater than _z_ in a logical sense,
+therefore _x_ must be greater than _z_ in a psychological sense. Save
+upon the theory of Idealism (with which Monism is not specially
+concerned) the amount (whatever it may be) wherein _x_ is greater than
+_z_, may not present any psychological signification at all. We may find
+that the surface of our globe is considerably larger than that of the
+dry land, and yet it may not follow that the mental-life to be met with
+in the sea is psychologically superior to that which occurs on dry land.
+If, therefore, we represent by comparative shading degrees of
+psychological excellence, it is evident that the theory of Monism must
+entertain the three possibilities indicated diagrammatically in Figs. 5,
+6, and 7. It makes no difference what the comparative areas of _x_ and
+_z_ may be, or whether _x_ be uniformly shaded throughout its extent.
+All we have so far to notice is that the fact of logical inclusion does
+not necessarily carry with it the implication of psychological
+superiority.
+
+Next we must notice that besides our own subjectivities, we have
+cognizance of being surrounded by many other inferred subjectivities
+more or less like in kind (i. e. other human minds); and also yet many
+other inferred subjectivities more or less unlike, but all inferior (i.
+e. the minds of lower animals, young children, and idiots). Following
+Clifford, I will call these inferred subjectivities by the name of
+ejects, and assign to them the symbol _y_. Thus, in the following
+discussion, _x_ = the objective world, _y_ = the ejective world, and _z_
+= subjective world. Now, the theory of Monism supposes that _x_, _y_,
+and _z_ are all alike in kind, but present no definite teaching as to
+how far they may differ in degree. We may, however, at once allow that
+between the psychological value of _z_ and that of _y_ there is a wide
+difference of degree; and also that, while the value of _z_ is a fixed
+quantity, that of _y_ varies greatly in the different parts of the area
+_y_. Our scheme, therefore, will now adopt this form--
+
+[Illustration]
+
+But the important question remains how we ought to shade _x_. According
+to Clifford, this ought scarcely to be shaded at all, while according to
+theologians (and theists generally) it ought to be shaded so much more
+deeply than either _y_ or _z_, that the joint representation in one
+diagram would only be possible by choosing for the shading of _x_ a
+colour different from that employed for _y_ and _z_, and assigning to
+that colour a representative value higher than that assigned to the
+other in the ratio of one to infinity. It will be my object to estimate
+the relative probability of these rival estimates of the psychological
+value of _x_.
+
+Starting from _z_ as our centre, we know that this is an isolated system
+of subjectivity, and hence we infer that all _y_ is composed of
+analogous systems, resembling one another as to their isolation, and
+differing only in their degrees of psychological value. Now this,
+translated into terms of _x_ (or into terms of objectivity) means that
+_z_ is an isolated system of matter in motion, and that the same has to
+be said of all the constituent parts of _y_. In other words, both
+subjectivity and ejectivity are only known under the condition of being
+isolated from objectivity; which, obversely considered, means that the
+matter in motion here concerned is temporarily separated off from the
+rest of the objective world, in such wise that it forms a distinct
+system of its own. If any part of the objective world rudely forces its
+way within the machinery of that system, it is at the risk of
+disarranging the machinery and stopping its work--as is the case when a
+bullet enters the brain. Such converse as the brain normally holds with
+the external world, is held through the appointed channels of the
+senses, whereby appropriate causation is supplied to keep the otherwise
+isolated system at work. We know, from physiological evidence, that when
+such external causation is withheld, the isolated system ceases to work;
+therefore, the isolation, although complete under one point of view,
+under another point of view is incomplete. It is complete only in the
+sense in which the isolation of a machine is complete--i. e. it is in
+itself a working system, yet its working is ultimately dependent upon
+causation supplied from without in certain appropriate ways. This truth
+is likewise testified to on the obverse aspect of psychology. For
+analysis shows that all our mental processes (however complex they may
+be internally) are ultimately dependent on impressions of the external
+world gained through the senses. Whether regarded objectively or
+subjectively, therefore, we find that it is the business of the isolated
+system to elaborate, by its internal processes, the raw materials which
+are supplied to it from without. Seeing, then, that the isolation of the
+system is thus only partial, we may best apply to it the term
+circumscribed. Such partial isolation or circumscription of matter in
+motion--so that it shall in itself constitute a little working
+microcosm--appears to be the first condition to the being of a
+subjective personality. Why, then, does not the working of a machine
+present a subjective side?
+
+Our answer to this question is to be found in the following
+considerations. We are going upon the hypothesis that all mind is matter
+in motion, and that all matter in motion is mind--or, as Clifford
+phrased it, that all the external world is composed of mind-stuff. No
+matter how lightly we may shade _x_, we are assuming that it must be
+shaded, and not left perfectly white. Now, both mind and matter in
+motion admit of degrees: first as to quantity, next as to velocity, and
+lastly as to complexity. But the degrees of matter in motion are found,
+in point of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind, save
+in the last particular of complexity, where there is unquestionably an
+evident correspondence. Therefore it is that a machine, although
+conforming to the prime condition of subjectivity in being a
+circumscribed system of matter in motion, nevertheless does not attain
+to subjectivity: the _x_ does not rise to _z_ because the internal
+processes of _x_ are not sufficiently intricate, or their intricacy is
+not of the appropriate kind. From which it follows that although, as I
+have said, all matter in motion is mind, merely as matter in motion (or
+irrespective of the kinds and degrees of both) it may not necessarily be
+mind in the elaborated form of consciousness: it may only be the raw
+material of mind--or, as Clifford called it, mind-stuff. Thus, although
+all conscious volition is matter in motion, it does not follow that all
+matter in motion is conscious volition. Which serves to restate the
+question as to how far it is probable, or improbable, that all matter in
+motion is conscious volition--i.e. how deeply we ought to shade _x_.
+
+Well, the first thing to be considered in answering this question is
+that, according to the theory of Monism, we _know_ that it is within the
+range of possibility for matter in motion to reach a level of intricacy
+which shall yield conscious volition, and even self-conscious thought of
+an extremely high order of development. Therefore, the only question is
+as to whether it is possible, or in any way probable, that matter in
+motion as occurring in _x_ resembles, in point of intricacy, matter in
+motion as occurring in _z_. Professor Clifford perceived that this is
+the core of the question, and staked the whole answer to it on an
+extremely simple issue. He said that unless we can show in the
+disposition of heavenly bodies some morphological resemblance to the
+structure of a human brain, we are precluded from rationally
+entertaining any probability that self-conscious volition belongs to the
+universe. Obviously, this way of presenting the case is so grossly
+illogical that even the exigencies of popular exposition cannot be held
+to justify the presentation. For aught that we can know to the contrary,
+not merely the highly specialized structure of the human brain, but even
+that of nervous matter in general, may only be one of a thousand
+possible ways in which the material and dynamical conditions required
+for the apparition of self-consciousness can be secured. To imagine that
+the human brain of necessity exhausts these possibilities is in the last
+degree absurd. Therefore, we may suggest the following presentation of
+Clifford's case as one that is less obviously inadequate:--if any
+resemblance to the material and dynamical conditions of the microcosm
+can be detected in the macrocosm, we should have good reason to ascribe
+to the latter those attributes of subjectivity which we know as
+belonging to the former; but if no such resemblance can be traced, we
+shall have some reason to suppose that these attributes do not belong to
+the universe. Even this, however, I should regard as much too wide a
+statement of the case. To take the particular conditions under which
+alone subjectivity is known to occur upon a single planet as exhausting
+the possibilities of its occurrence elsewhere, is too flagrant a use of
+the method of simple enumeration to admit of a moment's countenance.
+Even the knowledge that we have of the two great conditions under which
+terrestrial subjectivities occur--circumscription and complexity--is
+only empirical. It may well be that elsewhere (or apart from the
+conditions imposed by nervous tissue) subjectivity is possible
+irrespective both of circumscription and of complexity. Therefore,
+properly or logically regarded, the great use of the one exhibition of
+subjectivity furnished to human experience, is the proof thus furnished
+that subjectivity is possible under _some_ conditions; and the utmost
+which on the grounds of such proof human experience is entitled to argue
+is, that _probably_, if subjectivity is possible elsewhere, its
+possibility is given by those conditions of circumscription and
+complexity in the material and dynamical relations concerned, which we
+find to be the invariable and quantitative concomitants of subjectivity
+within experience. But this is a widely different thing from saying that
+the only kind of such circumscription and complexity--or the only
+disposition of these relations--which can present a subjective side is
+that which is found in the structures and functions of a nervous system.
+
+Now, if we fix our attention merely on this matter of complexity, and
+refuse to be led astray by obviously false analogies of a more special
+kind, I think there can be no question that the macrocosm does furnish
+amply sufficient opportunity, as it were, for the presence of
+subjectivity, even if it be assumed that subjectivity can only be
+yielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous system.
+For, considering the material and dynamical system of the universe as a
+whole, it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater than that
+of any of its parts. Not only is it true that all these parts are
+included in the whole, and that even the visible sidereal system alone
+presents movements of enormous intricacy[9], but we find, for instance,
+that even within the limits of this small planet there is presented to
+actual observation a peculiar form of circumscribed complex, fully
+comparable with that of the individual brain, and yet external to each
+individual brain. For the so-called 'social organism,' although composed
+of innumerable individual personalities, is, with regard to each of its
+constituent units, a part of the objective world--just as the human
+brain would be, were each of its constituent cells of a construction
+sufficiently complex to yield a separate personality.
+
+If to this it be objected that, as a matter of fact, the social organism
+does not possess a self-conscious personality, I will give a twofold
+answer. In the first place, Who told the objector that it has not? For
+aught that any one of its constituent personalities can prove to the
+contrary, this social organism may possess self-conscious personality of
+the most vivid character: its constituent human minds may be born into
+it and die out of it as do the constituent cells of the human body: it
+may feel the throes of war and famine, rejoice in the comforts of peace
+and plenty: it may appreciate the growth of civilization as its passage
+from childhood to maturity. If this at first sight appears a grotesque
+supposition, we must remember that it would appear equally so to ascribe
+such possibilities to the individual brain, were it not for the
+irrelevant accident of this particular form of complex standing in such
+relation to our own subjectivity that we are able to verify the fact of
+its ejectivity. Thus, for aught that we can tell to the contrary, Comte
+may have been even more justified than his followers suppose, in
+teaching the personification of Humanity.
+
+But, in the next place, if the social organism is not endowed with
+personality, this may be for either one of two reasons. All the
+conditions required for attaining so high a level of psychical
+perfection may not be here present; or else the level of psychical
+perfection may be higher than that which we know as personality. This
+latter alternative will be considered in another relation by-and-by, so
+I will not dwell upon it now. But with reference to all these possible
+contingencies, I may observe that we are not without clear indications
+of the great fact that the high order of complexity which has been
+reached by the social organism _is_ accompanied by evidence of something
+which we may least dimly define as resembling subjectivity. In
+numberless ways, which I need not wait to enumerate, we perceive that
+society exhibits the phenomena both of thought and conduct. And these
+phenomena cannot always be explained by regarding them as the sum of the
+thoughts and actions of its constituent individuals--or, at least, they
+can only be so regarded by conceding that the thoughts and actions of
+the constituent individuals, when thus _summated_, yield a different
+product from that which would be obtained by a merely arithmetical
+computation of the constituent parts: the composite product differs from
+its component elements, as H_2O differs from 2H + O. The general truth
+of this remark will, I believe, be appreciated by all historians.
+Seeing that ideas are often, as it is said, 'in the air' before they are
+condensed in the mind of individual genius, we habitually speak of the
+'Zeit-geist' as the product of a kind of collective psychology, which is
+something other than the mere sum of all the individual minds of a
+generation. That is to say, we regard society as an eject, and the more
+that a man studies the thought and conduct of society, the more does he
+become convinced that we are right in so regarding it. Of course this
+eject is manifestly unlike that which we form of another individual
+mind: it is much more general, vague, and so far unlike the pattern of
+our own subjectivity that even to ascribe to it the important attribute
+of personality is felt, as we have just seen, to approach the grotesque.
+Still, in this vague and general way we do ascribe to society ejective
+existence: we habitually think of the whole world of human thought and
+feeling as a psychological complex, which is other than, and more than,
+a mere shorthand enumeration of all the thoughts and feelings of all
+individual human beings.
+
+The ejective existence thus ascribed to society serves as a
+stepping-stone to the yet more vague and general ascription of such
+existence to the Cosmos. At first, indeed, or during the earliest stages
+of culture, the ascription of ejective existence to the external world
+is neither vague nor general: on the contrary, it is most distinct and
+specific. Beginning in the rudest forms of animism, where every natural
+process admits of being immediately attributed to the volitional agency
+of an unseen spirit, anthropomorphism sets out upon its long course of
+development, which proceeds _pari passu_ with the development of
+abstract thought. Man, as it has been truly said, universally makes God
+in his own image; and it is difficult to see how the case could be
+otherwise. Universally the eject must assume the pattern of the subject,
+and it is only in the proportion that this pattern presents the features
+of abstract thinking that the image which it throws becomes less and
+less man-like. Hence, as Mr. Fiske has shown in detail, so soon as
+anthropomorphism has assumed its highest state of development, it begins
+to be replaced by a continuous growth of 'deanthropomorphism,' which,
+passing through polytheism into monotheism, eventually ends in a
+progressive 'purification' of theism--by which is meant a progressive
+metamorphosis of the theistic conception, tending to remove from Deity
+the attributes of Humanity. The last of these attributes to disappear is
+that of personality, and when this final ecdysis has been performed, the
+eject which remains is so unlike its original subject, that, as we shall
+immediately find, it is extremely difficult to trace any points of
+resemblance between them.
+
+Now it is with this perfect, or imago condition of the world-eject, that
+we have to do. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in what I consider the profoundest
+reaches of his philosophic thought, has well shown, on the one hand,
+how impossible it is to attribute to Deity any of the specific
+attributes of mind as known to ourselves subjectively; and, on the other
+hand, how it is possible to conceive 'symbolically' that the universe
+may be instinct with a 'quasi-psychical' principle, as greatly
+transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
+motion[10]. Accepting, then, the world-eject in this its highest
+conceivable stage of evolution, I desire to contemplate it under the
+light of the monistic theory.
+
+We have seen that, whether we look upon the subjective or objective face
+of personality, we find that personality arises from limitation--or, as
+I have previously termed it, circumscription. Now, we have no evidence,
+nor are we able to conceive, of the external world as limited;
+consequently we are not able to conceive, of the world-eject as
+personal. But, inasmuch as personality arises only from limitation, the
+conclusion that the world-eject is impersonal does not tend to show that
+it is of lower psychical value than conscious personality: on the
+contrary, it tends to show that it is probably of higher psychical
+value. True, we are not able to conceive actually of mind as impersonal;
+but we can see that this merely arises from our only experience of mind
+being given under conditions of personality; and, as just observed, it
+is possible to conceive symbolically that there may be a form of mind as
+greatly transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
+motion.
+
+Now, although we cannot conceive of such a mind actually, we may most
+probably make the nearest approach to conceiving of it truly, by
+_provisionally_ ascribing to it the highest attributes of mind as known
+to ourselves, or the attributes which belong to human personality. Just
+as a thinking insect would derive a better, or more true, conception of
+human personality by considering it ejectively than by considering it
+objectively (or by considering the mind-processes as distinguished from
+the brain-processes), so, if there is a form of mind immeasurably
+superior to our own, we may probably gain a more faithful--howsoever
+still inadequate--conception of it by contemplating its operations
+ejectively than by doing so objectively. I will, therefore, speak of the
+world-eject as presenting conscious volition, on the understanding that
+if _x_ does not present either consciousness or volition, this must
+be--according to the fundamental assumption of psychism on which we are
+now proceeding--because _x_ presents attributes at least as much higher
+than consciousness or volition as these are higher than mechanical
+motion. For when we consider the utmost that our conscious volition is
+able to accomplish in the way of contrivance--how limited its knowledge,
+how short its duration, how restricted its range, and how imperfect its
+adaptations--we can only conclude that _if_ the ultimate constitution of
+all things is pyschical, the philosophy of the Cosmos becomes a
+'philosophy of the Unconscious' only because it is a philosophy of the
+Superconscious.
+
+Now, if once we feel ourselves able to transcend the preliminary--and
+doubtless very considerable--difficulty of symbolically conceiving the
+world-eject as super-conscious, and (because not limited) also
+super-personal, I think there can be no question that the world-object
+furnishes overwhelming proof of psychism. I candidly confess that I am
+not myself able to overcome the preliminary difficulty in question. By
+discharging the elements of personality and conscious volition from the
+world-eject, I appear to be discharging from my conception of mind all
+that most distinctively belongs to that conception; and thus I seem to
+be brought back again to the point from which we started: the
+world-eject appears to have again resolved itself into the unknown
+quantity _x_. But here we must distinguish between actual conception and
+symbolical conception. Although it is unquestionably true that I can
+form no actual conception of Mind save as an eject of personality and
+conscious volition, it is a question whether I am not able to form a
+symbolical conception of Mind as thus extended. For I know that
+consciousness, implying as it does continual change in serial order of
+circumscribed mental processes, is not (symbolically considered) the
+highest conceivable exhibition of Mind; and just as a mathematician is
+able to deal symbolically with space of _n_ dimensions, while only able
+really to conceive of space as limited to three dimensions, so I feel
+that I ought not to limit the abstract possibilities of mental being by
+what I may term the accidental conditions of my own being.
+
+I need scarcely wait to show why it appears to me that if this position
+is granted, the world-object furnishes, as I have said, overwhelming
+proof of psychism; for this proof has been ably presented by many other
+writers. There is first the antecedent improbability that the human mind
+should be the highest manifestation of subjectivity in this universe of
+infinite objectivity. There is next the fact that throughout this
+universe of infinite objectivity--so far, at least, as human observation
+can extend--there is unquestionable evidence of some one integrating
+principle, whereby all its many and complex parts are correlated with
+one another in such wise that the result is universal order. And if we
+take any part of the whole system--such as that of organic nature on
+this planet--to examine in more detail, we find that it appears to be
+instinct with contrivance. So to speak, wherever we tap organic nature,
+it seems to flow with purpose; and, as we shall presently see, upon the
+monistic theory the evidence of purpose is here in no way attenuated by
+a full acceptance of any of the 'mechanical' explanations furnished by
+science. Now, these large and important facts of observation
+unquestionably point, as just observed, to some one integrating
+principle as pervading the Cosmos; and, if so, we can scarcely be wrong
+in supposing that among all our conceptions it must hold nearest kinship
+to that which is our highest conception of an integrating cause--viz.,
+the conception of psychism. Assuredly no human mind could either have
+devised or maintained the working of even a fragment of Nature; and,
+therefore, it seems but reasonable to conclude that the integrating
+principle of the whole--the Spirit, as it were, of the Universe--must be
+something which, while as I have said holding nearest kinship with our
+highest conception of disposing power, must yet be immeasurably superior
+to the psychism of man. The world-eject thus becomes invested with a
+psychical value as greatly transcending in magnitude that of the human
+mind, as the material frame of the universe transcends in its magnitude
+the material frame of the human body. Therefore, without in any way
+straining the theory of Monism, we may provisionally shade _x_ more
+deeply than _z_, and this in some immeasurable degree.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+One other matter remains to be considered with reference to this
+world-eject as sanctioned by Monism. It leaves us free to regard all
+natural causation as a direct exhibition of psychism. The prejudice
+against anything approaching a theistic interpretation of the Universe
+nowadays arises chiefly from the advance of physical science having
+practically revealed the ubiquity of natural causes. It is felt that
+when a complete explanation of any given phenomenon has been furnished
+in terms of these causes, there is no need to go further; the phenomenon
+has been rendered intelligible on its mechanical side, and therefore it
+is felt that we have no reason to suppose that it presents a mental
+side--any supplementary causation of a mental kind being regarded as
+superfluous. Even writers who expressly repudiate this reasoning prove
+themselves to be habitually under its influence; for we constantly find
+that such writers, after conceding the mechanical explanations as far as
+these have been _proved_, take their stand upon the more intricate
+phenomena of Nature where, as yet, the mechanical explanations are not
+forthcoming. Whether it be at the origin of life, the origin of
+sentiency, of instinct, of rationality, of morality, or of religion,
+these writers habitually argue that here, at least, the purely
+mechanical interpretations fail; and that here, consequently, there is
+still room left for a psychical interpretation. Of course the pleading
+for theism thus supplied is seen by others to be of an extremely feeble
+quality; for while, on the one hand, it rests only upon ignorance of
+natural causation (as distinguished from any knowledge of super-natural
+causation), on the other hand, abundant historical analogies are
+available to show that it is only a question of time when pleading of
+this kind will become more and more restricted in its subject-matter,
+till eventually it be altogether silenced. But the pleading which Monism
+is here able to supply can never be silenced.
+
+For, according to Monism, all matter in motion is mind; and, therefore,
+matter in motion is merely the objective revelation, _to_ us and _for_
+us, of that which in its subjective aspect--or in its ultimate
+reality--is mind. Just as the operations of my friend's mind can only be
+revealed to me through the mechanical operations of his body, so it may
+very well be that the operations of the Supreme Mind (supposing such to
+exist) can only be revealed to me through the mechanical operations of
+Nature. The only difference between the two cases is that while I am
+able, in the case of my friend's mind, to elicit responses of mechanical
+movement having a definite and intended relation to the operations of my
+own mind, similarly expressed to him; such is not the case with Nature.
+With the friend-eject I am able to _converse_; but not so with the
+world-eject[11]. This great difference, however, although obviously
+depriving me of any such direct corroboration of psychism in the
+world-eject as that which I thus derive of psychism in the friend-eject,
+ought not to be regarded by me as amounting, in the smallest degree, to
+_disproof_ of psychism in the world-eject. The fact that I am not able
+to converse with the world-eject is merely a negative fact, and should
+not be allowed to tell against any probability (otherwise derived) in
+favour of psychism as belonging to that eject. There may be a thousand
+very good reasons why I should be precluded from such converse--some of
+which, indeed, I can myself very clearly perceive.
+
+The importance of Monism in thus enabling us rationally to contemplate
+all processes of physical causation as possibly immediate exhibitions
+of psychism, is difficult to overrate. For it entirely discharges all
+distinction between the mechanical and the mental; so that if physical
+science were sufficiently advanced to yield a full natural explanation
+of all the phenomena within human experience, mankind would be in a
+position to gain as complete a knowledge as is theoretically possible of
+the psychological character of the world-eject. Already we are able to
+perceive the immense significance of being able to regard any sequence
+of natural causation as the merely phenomenal aspect of the ontological
+reality--the merely outward manifestation of an inward meaning. Thus,
+for example, I am listening to a sonata of Beethoven's played by Madame
+Schumann. Helmholtz tells me all that he knows about the physics and
+physiology of the process, both beyond and within my brain. But I feel
+that, even if Helmholtz were able to tell me very much more than he can,
+so long as he is dealing with these objective explanations, he is at
+work only upon the outer skin of the whole matter. The great reality is
+the mind of Beethoven communicating to my mind through the complex
+intervention of three different brains with their neuro-muscular
+systems, and an endless variety of aerial vibrations proceeding from a
+pianoforte. The method of communication has nothing more to do with the
+reality communicated than have the paper and ink of this essay to do
+with the ideas which they serve to convey. In each case a vehicle of
+symbols is necessary in order that one mind should communicate with
+another; but in both cases this is a vehicle of _symbols_, and nothing
+more. Everywhere, therefore, the reality may be psychical, and the
+physical symbolic; everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and
+visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.
+
+Take again the case of morality and religion. Because science, by its
+theory of evolution, appears to be in a fair way of explaining the
+genesis of these things by natural causes, theists are taking alarm; it
+is felt by them that if morality can be fully explained by utility, and
+religion by superstition, the reality of both is destroyed. But Monism
+teaches that such a view is entirely erroneous. For, according to
+Monism, the natural causation of morality and religion has nothing
+whatever to do with the ultimate truth of either. The natural causation
+is merely a record of physical processes, serving to manifest the
+psychical processes. Nor can it make any difference, as regards the
+ultimate veracity of the moral and religious feelings, that they have
+been developed slowly by natural causes; that they were at first grossly
+selfish on the one hand, and hideously superstitious on the other; that
+they afterwards went through a long series of changes, none of which
+therefore can have fully corresponded with external truth; or that even
+now they may be both extremely far from any such correspondence. All
+that such considerations go to prove is, that it belongs to the natural
+method of mental evolution in man that with advancing culture his
+ejective interpretations of Nature should more and more nearly
+_approximate_ the truth. The world-eject must necessarily vary with the
+character of the human subject; but this does not prove that the
+ejective interpretation has throughout been wrong in _method_: it only
+proves that such interpretation has been imperfect--and necessarily
+imperfect--in _application_.
+
+Such, then, I conceive to be one of the most important consequences of
+the monistic theory. Namely, that by regarding physical causation as
+everywhere but the objective or phenomenal aspect of an ejective or
+ontological reality, it furnishes a logical basis for a theory of things
+which is at the same time natural and spiritual. On the objective
+aspect, the explanations furnished by reason are of necessity physical,
+while, on the ejective aspect, such explanations are of necessity
+metaphysical--or rather, let us say, hyper-physical. But these two
+orders of explanation are different only because their modes of
+interpreting the same events are different. The objective explanation
+which was given (as we supposed) by Helmholtz of the effects produced on
+the human brain by hearing a sonata, was no doubt perfectly sound within
+its own category; but the ejective explanation of these same effects
+which is given by a musician is equally sound within _its_ category. And
+similarly, if instead of the man-object we contemplate the world-object
+physical causation becomes but the phenomenal aspect of psychical
+causation; the invariability of its sequence becomes but the expression
+of intentional order; the iron rigidity of natural law becomes the
+sensuous manifestation of an unalterable consistency as belonging to the
+Supreme Volition.
+
+My object in this paper has been to show that the views of the late
+Professor Clifford concerning the influence of Monism on Theism are
+unsound. I am in full agreement with him in believing that Monism is
+destined to become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that
+it is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction of
+science on the one hand and of feeling on the other. But I disagree with
+him in holding that this theory is fraught with implications of an
+anti-theistic kind. In my opinion this theory leaves the question of
+Theism very much where it was before. That is to say, while not
+furnishing any independent proof of Theism, it likewise fails to furnish
+any independent disproof. The reason why in Clifford's hands this theory
+appeared to furnish independent disproof, was because he persisted in
+regarding the world only as an object: he did not entertain the
+possibility that the world might also be regarded as an eject. Yet, that
+the world, under the theory of Monism, is at least as susceptible of an
+ejective as it is of an objective interpretation, I trust that I have
+now been able to show. And this is all that I have endeavoured to show.
+As a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that Monism alone
+can only lead to Agnosticism. That is to say, it leaves a clear field of
+choice as between Theism and Atheism; and, therefore, to a carefully
+reasoning Monist, there are three alternatives open. He may remain a
+Monist, and nothing more; in which case he is an agnostic. He may
+entertain what appears to him independent evidence in favour of Theism,
+and thus he may become a theist. Or he may entertain what appears to him
+independent evidence in favour of Atheism, and thus he may become an
+atheist. But, in any case, so far as his Monism can carry him, he is
+left perfectly free either to regard the world as an object alone, or to
+regard the world as also an eject[12].
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 9: If we imagine the visible sidereal system compressed within
+the limits of a human skull, so that all its movements which we now
+recognize as molar should become molecular, the complexity of such
+movement would probably be as great as that which takes place in a human
+brain. Yet to this must be added all the molecular movements which are
+now going on in the sidereal system, visible and invisible.]
+
+[Footnote 10: _Principles of Psychology_, vol. i. pp. 159-61; _Essays_,
+vol. iii. pp. 246-9; and _First Principles_, p. 26.]
+
+[Footnote 11: It is, however, the belief of all religious persons that
+even this distinction does not hold. If they are right in their belief,
+the distinction would then become one as to the mode of converse. In
+this case what is called communion with the Supreme Mind must be
+supposed to be a communion _sui generis_: the converse of mind with mind
+is here _direct_, or does not require to be translated into the language
+of mechanical signs: it is subjective, not ejective. Still, even here we
+must believe that the physical aspect accompanies the psychical,
+although not necessarily observed. An act of prayer, for example, is, on
+its physical aspect, an act of cerebration: so is the answer (supposing
+it genuine), in as far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus prayer and
+its answer (according to Monism) resemble all the other processes of
+Nature in presenting an objective side of strictly physical causation.
+Nor is it possible that the case could be otherwise, if _all_ mental
+processes consist in physical process, and vice versa. It is obvious
+that this consideration has important bearings on the question as to the
+physical efficacy of prayer. From a monistic point of view both those
+who affirm and those who deny such efficacy are equally in the right,
+and equally in the wrong; they are merely quarrelling upon different
+sides of the same shield. For, according to Monism, if the theologians
+are right in supposing that the Supreme Mind is the hearer of prayer in
+any case, they are also right in supposing that the Mind must
+necessarily be able to grant what is called physical answers, seeing
+that in order to grant _any_ answer (even of the most apparently
+spiritual kind) some physical change must be produced, if it be only in
+the brain of the petitioner. On the other hand, the scientists are
+equally right in maintaining that no physical answer to prayer can be of
+the nature of a miracle, or produced independently of strictly physical
+causation; for, if so, the physical and the psychical would no longer be
+coincident. But, until the scientists are able to perform the hopeless
+task of proving where the possibilities of physical causation end, as a
+mere matter of abstract speculation and going upon the theory of Monism,
+it is evident that the theologians may have any latitude they choose to
+claim, both as regards this matter and that of so-called miracles.]
+
+[Footnote 12: It may be explained that by Agnosticism I understand a
+theory of things which abstains from either affirming or denying the
+existence of God. It thus represents, with regard to Theism, a state of
+suspended judgement; and all it undertakes to affirm is, that, upon
+existing evidence, the being of God is unknown. But the term Agnosticism
+is frequently used in a widely different sense, as implying belief that
+the being of God is not merely now unknown, but must always remain
+unknowable. It is therefore often represented that Mr. Herbert Spencer,
+in virtue of his doctrine of the Unknowable, is a kind of apostle of
+Agnosticism. This, however, I conceive to be a great mistake. The
+distinctive features of Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable are not
+merely non-agnostic, but anti-agnostic. For the doctrine affirms that we
+have this much knowledge of God--namely, that if He exists, He must for
+ever be unknown. Without question, this would be a most important piece
+of definite knowledge with regard to Deity, negative though it be; and,
+therefore, any man who holds it has no right to be called an agnostic.
+
+To me it has always seemed that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so
+far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is highly
+unphilosophical. By what right can it be affirmed that Deity, if He
+exists, may not reveal the fact of His existence to-morrow--and this to
+the whole human race without the possibility of doubt? Or, if there be a
+God, who is to say that there certainly cannot be a future life, in
+which each individual man may have unquestionable proof of Theism? It is
+a perfectly philosophical statement for any one to make that, as matters
+now stand, he can see no evidence of Theism; but to say that he knows
+the human race never can have such evidence, is a most unphilosophical
+statement, seeing that it could only be justified by absolute knowledge.
+And, on this account, I say that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so
+far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is the very reverse
+of agnostic.
+
+Now, the theory of Monism alone, as observed in the text, appears to be
+purely agnostic in the sense just explained. If in some parts of the
+foregoing essay I appear to have been arguing in favour of theistic
+implications, this has only been in order to show (as against Clifford)
+that the world does admit of being regarded as an eject. But inasmuch
+as--religious faith apart--we are not able to verify any such ejective
+interpretation, we are not able to estimate its value. Monism sanctions
+the shading of _x_ as deeply as we choose; but the shading which it
+sanctions is only provisional.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM.
+
+
+In the foregoing chapters I have considered the theory of Monism, first
+in contrast with the theories of Materialism and of Spiritualism, and
+next in relation to the theory of Theism. In this chapter and that which
+succeeds it I propose to consider Monism in relation to the Will. To do
+this it is needful to begin by considering the problems which are
+presented by the Will in relation to the older theories of Materialism
+on the one hand and of Spiritualism on the other.
+
+Although the phenomena of volition have occupied so large a province of
+philosophical literature, the fundamental problems which arise in
+connexion with them are only two in number, and both admit of being
+stated in extremely simple terms. The historical order in which these
+two problems have arisen is the inverse of their logical order. For
+while in logical order the two problems would stand thus--Is the Will an
+agent? If so, is it a free agent?--in actual discussion it was long
+taken for granted that the Will is an agent, and hence the only
+controversy gathered round the question whether the Will is a free
+agent. Descartes, indeed, seems to have entertained the prior question
+with regard to animals, and there are passages in the _Leviathan_ which
+may be taken to imply that Hobbes entertained this question with regard
+to man. But it was not until recent years that any such question could
+stand upon a basis of science as distinguished from speculation; the
+question did not admit of being so much as stated in terms of science
+until physiology was in a position openly to challenge our right to
+assume that the Will is an agent. Such a challenge physiology has now
+given, and even declared that any assumption of volitional agency is, in
+the presence of adequate physiological knowledge, impossible.
+
+The two problems which I thus state separately are often, and indeed
+generally, confused together; but for the purpose of clear analysis it
+is of the first importance that they should be kept apart. In order to
+show the wide distinction between them, we may best begin with a brief
+consideration of what it is that the two problems severally involve; and
+to do this we may best take the problems in what I have called their
+logical order.
+
+First, then, as regards the question whether the Will is an agent, the
+rival theories of Materialism and Spiritualism stand to one another in a
+relation of contradiction. For it is of the essence of Spiritualism to
+regard the Will as an agent, or as an original cause of bodily movement,
+and therefore as a true cause in Nature. On the other hand, it is of the
+essence of Materialism to deny that the Will is an agent. Hitherto,
+indeed, materialists as a body have not expressly recognized this
+implication as necessarily belonging to their theory; but that this
+implication does necessarily belong to their theory--or rather, I should
+say, really constitutes its most distinctive feature--admits of being
+easily shown. For the theory that material changes are the causes of
+mental changes necessarily terminates in the so-called theory of
+conscious automatism--or the theory that so far as the conditions to
+bodily action are concerned, consciousness is adventitious, bearing the
+same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as the striking
+of a clock bears to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. From
+this conclusion there is no possibility of escape, if once we accept the
+premises of Materialism; and therefore I say it belongs to the essence
+of Materialism to deny the agency of Will.
+
+Just as necessarily does it belong to the essence of Monism to affirm
+the agency of Will. For, according to this theory, while motion is
+producing nothing but motion, mind-change nothing but mind-change, both
+are producing both simultaneously; neither could be what it is without
+the other, for each is to the other a necessary counterpart or
+supplement, in the absence of which the whole causation (whether
+regarded from the physical or mental side) would not be complete.
+
+Now, in my opinion the importance of the view thus presented by the
+theory of Monism is, for all purposes of psychological analysis,
+inestimable. It is impossible nowadays that such analysis can proceed
+very far in any direction without confronting the facts presented by
+physiology: hence it is impossible for such analysis to confine itself
+exclusively to the spiritual or subjective side of psychology. On the
+other hand, in so far as such analysis has regard to the material or
+objective side, it has hitherto appeared to countenance--in however
+disguised a form--the dogmatic denial of the Will as an agent. Hence the
+supreme importance to psychology of reconciling the hitherto rival
+theories of Spiritualism and Materialism in the higher synthesis which
+is furnished by the theory of Monism. For, obviously, in the absence of
+any philosophical justification of the Will as an agent, we are without
+any guarantee that all psychological inquiry is not a vain beating of
+the air. If, as Materialism necessarily implies, the Will is not a cause
+in Nature, there would be no reason in Nature for the agency either of
+feeling or of intelligence. Feeling and intelligence would, therefore,
+stand as ciphers in the general constitution of things; and any inquiry
+touching their internal system of causation could have no reference to
+any scientific inquiry touching causation in general. I am aware that
+this truth is habitually overlooked by psychologists; but it is none
+the less a truth of fundamental importance to the whole superstructure
+of this science. Or, in other words, unless psychologists will expressly
+consent to rear their science on the basis provided by the philosophical
+theory of Monism, there is nothing to save it from logical
+disintegration; apart from this basis, the whole science is, so to
+speak, built in the air, like an unsubstantial structure of clouds.
+Psychologists, I repeat, habitually ignore this fact, and constantly
+speak of feeling and intelligence as true causes of adjustive action;
+but by so doing they merely beg from this contradictory theory of
+Spiritualism a flat denial of the fundamental postulate on which they
+elsewhere proceed--the postulate, namely, that mental changes are
+determined by cerebral changes. Consider, for example, the following
+passage from Mr. Spencer's _Principles of Psychology_ (Sec. 125), which
+serves to show in brief compass the logical incoherency which in this
+matter runs through his whole work:--
+
+     'Those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the
+     average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities
+     conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and
+     habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or
+     indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been,
+     other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals
+     among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were
+     the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.'
+
+The argument here is that the 'adjustments of feelings to actions,' when
+once attained, leads in turn to an adjustment of actions to
+feelings--or, as I have myself stated the argument in my _Mental
+Evolution in Animals_, 'the _raison d'etre_ of Pleasure and Pain has
+been that of furnishing organisms with guides to adjustive action:
+moreover, as in the case of direct sensation dictating any simple
+adjustment for the sake of securing an immediate good, so in the case of
+instinct dictating a more intricate action for the sake of eventually
+securing a more remote good (whether for self, progeny, or community);
+and so, likewise, in the case of reason dictating a still more intricate
+adjustment for the sake of securing a good still more remote--in all
+cases, that is, where volition is concerned, pleasures and pains are the
+guides of action.' But thus to affirm that pleasures and pains are the
+guides of action is merely another way of affirming that the Will is an
+agent--a cause of bodily movement, and, as such, a cause in Nature. Now,
+as we have seen, Mr. Spencer not only affirms this--or rather assumes
+it--but proceeds to render an _a priori_ explanation of the accuracy of
+the guidance. Yet he nowhere considers the fundamental question--Why
+should we suppose that the Will is an agent at all? Assuredly the answer
+given by physiology to this question is a simple denial that we have any
+justification so to regard the Will: in view of her demonstration of
+conscious automatism, she can see no reason why there should be any
+connexion at all between a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain
+and an objective fact of 'agreement or disagreement with the
+environment'--nay, one of the most eminent of her priesthood has
+declared that there _is_ no more connexion between the ambition of a
+Napoleon and a general commotion of Europe, than there is between the
+puff of a steam-whistle and the locomotion of a train. And, as I have
+now repeatedly insisted, on grounds of physiology alone this is the only
+logical conclusion at which it is possible to arrive. Yet Mr. Spencer,
+while elsewhere proceeding on the lines of physiology, whenever he
+encounters the question of the agency of Will, habitually jumps the
+whole gulf that separates Materialism from Spiritualism. And this
+wonderful feat of intellectual athletics is likewise performed, so far
+at least as I am aware, by every other psychologist who has proceeded on
+the lines of physiology. Indeed, the logical incoherency is not so
+serious in Mr. Spencer's case as it is in that of many other writers
+whom I need not wait to name. For Mr. Spencer does not seek to found his
+system on a basis of avowed Materialism, and, therefore, he may be said
+to have left this fundamental question of volitional agency in abeyance.
+But all those writers who have reared their systems of psychology on a
+basis of avowed Materialism--or, which is the same thing, on a basis of
+physiology alone--lay themselves open to the charge of grossest
+inconsistency when they thus assume that the Will is an agent. It is
+impossible that these writers can both have their cake and eat it.
+Either they must forego their Materialism, or else they must cease to
+speak of 'motives determining action,' 'conduct being governed by
+pleasures and pains,' 'voluntary movements in their last resort being
+all due to bodily feelings,' 'the highest morality and the lowest vice
+being alike the result of a pursuit of happiness,' &c. &c. And, so far
+as I can see, it is only in the way above indicated, or on the theory of
+Monism, that it is possible, without ignoring the facts of physiology on
+the one hand or those of psychology on the other, philosophically to
+save the agency of Will.
+
+From this brief exposition it may be gathered that on the materialistic
+theory it is impossible that the Will can be, in any sense of the term,
+an agent; that on the spiritualistic theory the Will is regarded as an
+agent, but only in the sense of a non-natural or miraculous cause; and,
+lastly, that on the monistic theory the Will is saved as an agent, or
+may be properly regarded and as properly denominated a true cause, in
+the ordinary sense of that term. For this, as well as for other reasons
+which need not here be specified, I accept in philosophy the theory of
+Monism; and am thus entitled in psychology to proceed upon the doctrine
+that the Will is an agent. We have next to consider the ulterior
+question whether upon this theory the Will may be properly regarded as a
+free agent.
+
+By a free agent is understood an agent that is able to act without
+restraint, or spontaneously. The word 'free,' therefore, bears a very
+different meaning when applied exclusively to the Will, and when
+applied more generally to the living organism. For we may properly say
+that a man, or an animal, is free when he, or it, is at liberty to act
+in accordance with desire. Touching the fact of freedom in this sense
+there is, of course, no question. We have not to consider the possible
+freedom of man, but the possible freedom of Will; we have not to
+contemplate whether a man may be free to do what he wills, but whether
+he can be free to will what he wills. Such being the question, we have
+to consider it in relation to the three philosophical theories already
+stated--Materialism, Spiritualism, and Monism.
+
+For the theory of Materialism the present question has no existence. If
+this announcement appears startling, it can only be because no
+materialist has ever taken the trouble to formulate his own theory with
+distinctness. For, as previously shown, Materialism necessarily involves
+the doctrine of conscious automatism; but, if so, the Will is concluded
+not to be an agent at all, and therefore it becomes idle to discuss
+whether, in any impossible exercise of its agency, it is free or subject
+to restraint. The most that in this connexion could logically stand to
+be considered by the advocates of Materialism would be whether or not
+the adventitious and inefficacious feelings of subjectivity which are
+associated with cerebral activity are determinate or free; but this
+would probably be regarded on all hands as a somewhat useless topic of
+discussion, and certainly in any case would have no reference to the
+question of free _agency_. The point to be clearly understood is that,
+according to the materialistic theory, a motor is distinct from a
+motive, although in some unaccountable manner the motor is able to cause
+the motive. But the motive, when thus caused, is not supposed to exert
+any causal influence on bodily action; it is supposed to begin and end
+as a motive, or never itself to become a motor. In other words, as
+before stated, the Will is not supposed to be an agent; and, therefore,
+to this theory the doctrine of free-will and of determinism are alike
+irrelevant. We need not wait to prove that this important fact is
+habitually overlooked by materialists themselves, or that whenever a
+materialist espouses the cause of determinism, he is thereby and for the
+time being vacating his position as a materialist; for if, according to
+his theory, the Will is not an agent, he is merely impugning his own
+doctrines by consenting to discuss the conditions of its agency.
+
+The theory of Spiritualism and the theory of Monism agree in holding
+that the Will is an agent; and, therefore, to both of these theories the
+question whether the Will is a free agent is a real question. Here,
+then, it devolves upon us to consider carefully the logical status of
+the rival doctrines of so-called Liberty and Necessity. For convenience
+of arrangement in what follows, we may best begin with the doctrine of
+Necessity, or Determinism.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM.
+
+
+We have now seen that, according to Materialism, the Will is not an
+agent, while according both to Spiritualism and to Monism the Will is an
+agent. Touching the further question, whether the Will is a free agent,
+we have seen that while the question does not exist for Materialism, it
+appears to require a negative answer both from Spiritualism and from
+Monism. For, as regards its relation to Spiritualism, when once the
+ground is cleared of certain errors of statement and fallacies of
+reasoning, we appear to find that unless the will is held to be
+motiveless--which would be to destroy not only the doctrine of moral
+responsibility, but likewise that of universal causation--it must be
+regarded as subject to law, or as determined in its action by the nature
+of its past history and present circumstances. Lastly, the theory of
+Monism appears likewise to deny the possibility of freedom as an
+attribute of Will; for, according to this theory, mental processes are
+one and the same with physical processes, and hence it does not appear
+that the doctrine of determinism could well be taught in a manner more
+emphatic.
+
+Thus far, then, the doctrine of determinism is seen to be victorious
+over the doctrine of freedom all along the line. By Materialism the
+question of freedom is excluded _ab initio_; by Spiritualism and by
+Monism, so far as yet seen, it can be logically answered only in the
+negative. From which it follows that the sense of moral responsibility
+is of the nature of a vast illusion, the historical genesis of which
+admits of being easily traced, and the authority of which is thus
+destroyed. Although it may still serve to supply motives to conduct, it
+seems that it can do so only in the way that belongs to
+superstition--that Conscience, as I have before said, is the bogey of
+mankind, and that belief in its authority is like belief in witchcraft,
+destined to dwindle and to fade before the advance of a better or more
+complete knowledge of natural causation.
+
+But the discussion must not end here. Hitherto I have presented the case
+Liberty _versus_ Necessity with all the impartiality of which I am
+capable; but I have done so without travelling an inch beyond those
+limits of discussion within which the question has been debated by
+previous writers. I believe, indeed, that I have pointed out several
+important oversights which have been made on both sides of the question;
+but in doing this I have not gone further than the philosophical basis
+upon which the question has been hitherto argued. My object, however,
+in publishing these papers is not that of destructive criticism; and
+what I have done in this direction has been done only in order to
+prepare the way for what is now to follow. Having shown, as it appears
+to me conclusively, that upon both the rival theories of Materialism and
+Spiritualism--the doctrine of Liberty, and therefore of Moral
+Responsibility--must logically fall, I now hope to show that this
+doctrine admits of being re-established on a basis furnished by the
+theory of Monism.
+
+It often happens that an elaborate structure of argument, which is
+perfectly sound and complete upon the basis furnished by a given
+hypothesis, admits of being wholly disintegrated when the fundamental
+hypothesis is shown to be either provisional or untrue. And such, I
+believe, is the case with the issue now before us. For the issue Liberty
+_versus_ Necessity has hitherto been argued on the common assumption
+that natural causation is not merely the most ultimate principle which
+the human mind can reach; but also a principle which is, in some way or
+another, external to that mind. It has been taken for granted by both
+sides in the controversy that if our volitions can be proved to depend
+upon natural causation, as rigid in its sequences within the sphere of a
+human mind as within that of a calculating machine, there must be an end
+of the controversy; seeing that our volitions would be thus proved to be
+rigidly determined by those same principles of fixed order, or 'natural
+law,' which are external to, or independent of, the human mind--quite as
+much as they are external to, or independent of, the calculating
+machine. Now, it is this assumption which I challenge. The theory of
+Monism entitles one to deny that when we have driven the question down
+to the granite bed of natural causation, nothing more remains to be
+done; according to this theory it still remains to be asked, What is the
+nature of this natural causation? Is it indeed the ultimate datum of
+experience, below which the human mind cannot go? And is it indeed so
+far external to, or independent of, the human mind, that the latter
+stands to it in the relation of a slave to a master--coerced as to
+action by the conditions which that master has laid down?
+
+Now these questions are all virtually answered in the affirmative by the
+dualistic theory of Spiritualism. For the Will is here regarded as an
+agent bound to act in accordance with those conditions of external
+necessity which dualism recognizes as natural causation. Its internal
+causation thus becomes but the reflex of external; and the reflection
+becomes known internally as the consciousness of motive. Hence, the Will
+cannot be philosophically liberated from the toils of this external
+necessity, so long as dualism recognizes that necessity as existing
+independently of the Will, and thus imposing its conditions on
+volitional activity. But the theory of Monism, by identifying external
+with internal causation--or physical processes with psychical
+processes--philosophically saves the doctrine of freedom, and with it
+the doctrine of moral responsibility. Moreover, it does so without
+relying upon any precarious appeal to the direct testimony of
+consciousness itself. As this view of the subject is one by no means
+easy of apprehension, I will endeavour to unfold it part by part.
+
+To begin with, Monism excludes the possibility of volition being
+determined by cerebration. Let us suppose, for example, that a sequence
+of ideas, _A, B, C, D_, occurs in the mind, which on its obverse or
+cerebral aspect may be represented by the sequence _a, b, c, d_. Here
+the parallelism is not due, as supposed by Materialism, to _a_
+determining _Ab_, _b_ determining _Bc_, &c.; it is due to _Aa_
+determining _Bb_, _Bb_ determining _Cc_, &c.--the two apparently diverse
+causal sequences being really but one causal sequence. If the
+determinist should rejoin that a causal sequence of some kind is all
+that he demands--that the Will is equally proved to be unfree, whether
+it be bound by the causal sequence _a, b, c, d_, or by the causal
+sequence _Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd_--I answer that this is a point which we have
+to consider by-and-by. Meanwhile I am only endeavouring to make clear
+the essential distinction between the philosophical theories of Monism
+and Materialism. And the effect of this distinction is to show that, for
+the purposes of clear analysis, we may wholly neglect either side of the
+double reality. If we happen to be engaged on any physiological
+inquiry, we may altogether neglect the processes of ideation with which
+any process of cerebration may be concerned; while, if we happen to be
+engaged upon any psychological inquiry, we may similarly neglect the
+processes of cerebration with which any process of ideation may be
+concerned. Seeing that each is equally an index of a common sequence, it
+can make no difference which of them we take as our guide, although for
+purposes of practical inquiry it is of course expedient to take the
+cerebral index when we are dealing with the objective side of the
+problem, and the mental index when dealing with the subjective. In the
+following pages, therefore, I shall altogether neglect the cerebral
+index. The inquiry on which we are engaged belongs to the region of
+mind, and, therefore, after what has just been said, it will be apparent
+that I am entitled to adopt the standpoint of a spiritualist, to the
+extent of fastening attention only upon the mental side of the problem.
+For although the theory of Monism teaches, as against Spiritualism, that
+no one of the mental sequences could take place without a corresponding
+physical sequence, the theory also teaches the converse proposition; and
+therefore it makes no difference which of the two phenomenal sequences
+is taken as our index of the ontological.
+
+Now, it clearly makes a great difference whether the mental changes
+concerned in volition are regarded as effects or as causes. According
+to Materialism, the mental changes are the effects of cerebral changes,
+which were themselves the effects of precedent cerebral changes.
+According to Spiritualism, these mental changes are the causes, not only
+of the cerebral changes, but also of one another. According to Monism,
+the mental changes may be regarded as the causes of the cerebral, or
+_vice versa_, seeing that in neither case are we stating a real
+truth--the real truth being that it is only a cerebro-mental change
+which can cause any change either of cerebration or of mentation. Now it
+is evident that if the mental processes were always the effects of
+cerebral processes (Materialism), there could be no further question
+with regard to Liberty and Necessity; while, if the mental processes are
+the causes both of the cerebral processes and of one another
+(Spiritualism), the question before us becomes raised to a higher level.
+The causality in question being now regarded as purely mental, the will
+is no longer regarded as a passive slave of the brain, and the only
+thing to be considered is whether freedom is compatible with causation
+of a purely mental kind. Now, at an earlier stage of our enquiry I have
+argued that it is not; but this argument was based entirely upon
+spiritualistic premises, or upon the assumption that the principle of
+causality is everywhere external to, or independent of, the human
+mind--under which assumption I cannot see that it makes much difference
+whether the coercion comes from the brain alone, or from the whole
+general system of things external to the human mind. And here it is that
+I think the theory of Monism comes to the rescue.
+
+For, if physical and mental processes are everywhere consubstantial, or
+identical in kind, it can make no difference whether we regard their
+sequences as objective or ejective, physical or spiritual. Hence, we are
+free to regard all causation as of a character essentially psychical.
+But, if so, it must be self-contained as psychical; it cannot be in any
+way determined by anything from without, seeing that outside itself
+there is nothing in the Universe. Now, if this is true of the
+World-eject, it must also be true of the Man-eject, as well as of the
+Man-subject, or Ego. If all causation is psychical, that portion of it
+which belongs to, or is manifested by, my own personality is not laid
+upon me by anything from without; it is merely the expression of my own
+psychical activity, as this is taking place within the circumscribed
+area of my own personality. And this activity is spontaneous, in the
+sense that it is not coerced from without. All the sequences which that
+activity displays within this region are self-determined, in the sense
+that they are determined by the self, and not by any agency external to
+it. The only influence which any external agency can here exert, is that
+of insisting that bodily action--the physical outcome of my psychical
+processes--shall be in accordance with the conditions imposed by the
+internal system of causation; but this does not influence in any degree
+those mental processes which do not express themselves in bodily action.
+Hence, it may be perfectly true that my bodily action in the past might
+have been different from what it actually was; for as this action was
+the outcome of my mentation at the time (according to the spiritual
+index, which is now our guide), and as this mentation was not coerced
+from without, it might very well have been different from what it was.
+Each of the mental sequences at that time was a result of those
+preceding and a cause of those succeeding; but behind all this play of
+mental causation there all the while stood that Self, which was at once
+the condition of its occurrence, and the _First Cause_ of its action. It
+is not true that that Self was nothing more than the result of all this
+play of mental causation; it can only have been the First Cause of it.
+For, otherwise, the mental causation must have been the cause of that
+causation, which is absurd. Who or What it was that originally caused
+this First Cause is, of course, another question, which I shall
+presently hope to show is not merely unanswerable, but unmeaning. As a
+matter of fact, however, we know that this Self is here, and that it can
+thus be proved to be a substance, _standing under_ the whole of that
+more superficial display of mental causation which it is able to look
+upon introspectively--and this almost as _impersonally_ as if it were
+regarding the display as narrated by another mind. I say, then, that
+the theory of Monism entitles us to regard this Self as the _fons et
+origo_ of our mental causation, and thus restores to us the doctrine of
+Liberty with its attendant consequence of Moral Responsibility.
+
+It may help to elucidate this matter if we regard it from another point
+of view. According to Hobbes, 'Liberty is the absence of all impediments
+to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical qualities
+of the agent.' Now, if we accept this definition, it is easy to show
+that the theory of Monism is really at one with the doctrine of Liberty.
+For, in the first place, according to the theory of Monism, the neurosis
+of the brain could not be what it is without the psychosis of the mind.
+Consequently, as above shown, it would be equally incorrect to say that
+the neurosis governs the psychosis, as it would be to say that the
+psychosis governs the neurosis. But, if so, the Will is free in
+accordance with Hobbes' definition of freedom. Suppose, for example,
+that on seeing a bone I think of Professor Flower, then remember that a
+long time ago I lent his book on Osteology to a friend, and forthwith
+resolve to ask my friend what has become of it; here my ultimate
+volition would be unfree if it were the effect of physical processes
+going on in my brain. But the volition might be free if each of these
+mental processes were the result of the preceding one, seeing that there
+may then have been 'an absence of all impediments' to the occurrence of
+these processes.
+
+Of course it will be objected--as I have myself urged in the preceding
+chapter--that causal action of any kind is incompatible with freedom of
+volition--that if there be any such causal action, even though it be
+wholly restricted within the sphere of mind, the Will is really
+compelled to will as it does will, is determined to determine as it does
+determine, and hence that its apparent freedom is illusory. Hobbes'
+definition, it may be urged, when applied to the case of the Will, is
+equivocal. No doubt a man is free as to his _action_, if there be an
+'absence of all impediments' to his action--or, in other words, if he is
+able to act as he wills to act. But it does not follow that he is free
+as to his _will_, even though there be an absence of all impediments to
+his willing as he wills to will. For here the very question is as to
+whether there are any impediments to his willing otherwise than he does
+will. The fact that he wills to will as he does will proves that there
+are no impediments to his willing in that direction; but is there a
+similar absence of impediments to his willing to will in any other
+direction? If so, we are still within the lines of determinism. Thus
+Hobbes' definition of freedom really applies only to freedom of bodily
+action; not to freedom of volition, seeing that if my will is caused I
+could not have willed to will otherwise than I did will. Now, the answer
+which Monism supplies to this objection is that the will itself is here
+the ultimate agent, and _therefore an agent which must be identified
+with the principle of causality_. In other words, the very reason why we
+feel that Hobbes' definition of liberty, while perfectly valid as
+regards bodily action, seems to lack something when applied to volition,
+is because volition belongs to the sphere of mind--belongs, therefore,
+to that sphere which the theory of Monism regards as identical with
+causality itself. Although it is true that volitions are caused by
+motives, yet it is the mind which conditions the motives, and therefore
+its own volitions. It is not true that the mind is always the passive
+slave of causes, known to it as motives. The human mind is itself a
+causal agent, having the same kind of priority within the microcosm as
+the World-eject has in the macrocosm. Therefore its motives are in large
+part matters of its own creation. In the intricate workings of its own
+internal machinery innumerable patterns of thought are turned out, some
+of which it selects as good, while others it rejects as bad; but no one
+of which could have come into being at all without this causal agency of
+the mind itself.
+
+It will probably be objected that even though all this were granted, we
+cannot thus save the doctrine of moral responsibility. For it may appear
+that the liberty which is thus accorded to the Will is nothing better
+than liberty to will at random, as argued in my previous essay. But here
+we must observe that although we are thus shown free to will at random,
+it does not follow that we are likewise free to act in accordance with
+our volitions. And this is a most important distinction, which
+libertarians have hitherto failed to notice. If we are free to will in
+any direction, it follows, indeed, that we are free to will at random;
+but it follows also, and for this very reason, that we are free to will
+the _impossible_. True, when we will what is known to be impossible of
+execution, we call the act an act of desire; but it is clearly the same
+in kind as an act of will, and differs only in not admitting of being
+translated into an act of body. Therefore I say that the restriction
+which is imposed upon us by the conditions of causality, whether
+external or internal, is not any restriction as to willing, but merely
+as to doing. It is not in the subjective, but in the objective world
+that we encounter the 'bondage of necessity.'
+
+Now, the knowledge that we are thus restricted as to bodily action
+imposes that kind of restraint upon volition which is termed rational.
+There is nothing in the nature of things to prevent our willing anything
+that we wish; but there is something in the nature of things to prevent
+our doing everything that we will; and as the practical object of our
+volition is that of determining bodily action, we find it expedient to
+will only such things as we believe that we can do. To this extent,
+therefore, the Will is bound--namely, by the executive capacity of the
+body. But, strictly speaking, this is not a binding of the Will _qua_
+Will. Even in such cases, as St. Paul says, to will may be present with
+us, but how to perform that which is good we find not. I say then that
+although the Will is free to will whatever it wills, nevertheless it
+would fail in its essential use or object did it refuse to will in
+accordance with the conditions which are imposed upon its executive
+capacity. Again, to quote St. Paul, the Will might say, All things for
+me are lawful; but all things are not expedient. Now, this consideration
+of expediency is one of constant and far-reaching importance. For not
+only, as already observed, does it lead to volition on the one hand as
+rational; but it also leads to volition on the other hand as moral. Let
+us take the two points separately.
+
+Do we say that a man is not free to conduct a scientific research,
+because in conducting it he must employ the needful apparatus? Or do we
+say that a man is not free to marry, because in order to do so he must
+go through a marriage ceremony? Obviously, to say such things would
+sound very like talking nonsense. It is true that in neither case is a
+man free to gain his object without adopting the means which are seen to
+be necessary under the system of external causation in which he finds
+himself; but this does not mean that he is not free to do as he wills,
+unless it so happens that he wills to do the impossible. Thus, within
+the limits that are set by the conditions of causation, a man is
+understood to be free to act as he wills so long as he is not 'impeded'
+by some of those conditions. To say that he is not free because he
+cannot get beyond those conditions would be absurd, since, apart from
+these conditions, action of any kind would be _a priori_ impossible,
+and the man would have, as his only alternative, no-action.
+
+Hence, in doing we must conform to the law of causation--which, indeed,
+is all that can be meant by doing--and if in willing what we do we must
+also conform to the law of causation, where is the difference with
+respect to freedom? Such restraint as there may be is here a restraint
+upon bodily action; not at all upon the mental action which we call
+volition. The Will may will in any way that it wills to will; but the
+body cannot act in every way that the Will may will it to act; therefore
+the Will finds it expedient to will only in such ways as the body can
+act--i. e. to conform in _its_ action to the external system of
+causation. If this condition of all action is held to be compatible with
+freedom in the one case, so in consistency must it be held in the other.
+Equally in either case the agent can only be properly said to be unfree,
+if he be subject to causal restraint from without. And in neither case
+does the universal condition of acting under the law of causation
+constitute bondage, in any other sense than that of furnishing the agent
+with his conditions to acting in any way at all. Therefore, unless it be
+said that a man is not free to do as he wills because he wills to do the
+impossible, it cannot be denied that he is free to will as he wills
+because he wills according to law. For no action of any kind is possible
+contrary to law--a general fact which goes to constitute an argument _a
+posteriori_ for the rationality of the World-eject--and if volition
+constituted an exception to this general statement, it could only do so
+by becoming no-action. Now, it is by thus willing according to law--or
+with due reference to those external conditions of causality with which
+the executive capacity has to do--that volition is rendered rational.
+The restraint laid upon volition is not laid upon it _as_ volition, but
+only in respect of execution. A man may will to marry as long and as
+hard as he chooses; but only if he further wills to take the necessary
+means can his volition become rational; it is irrational if he wills to
+marry, and at the same time wills not to go through the marriage
+ceremony. But although irrational, it is none the less free. Considered
+merely as an act of volition it is equally free, whether it be rational
+or irrational.
+
+And, similarly, it is equally free whether it be moral or immoral. The
+objection that an uncaused volition cannot be a responsible volition
+depends for its validity on the meaning which we attach to the term
+'uncaused.' If it be meant that the volition arises without any regard
+at all to the surrounding conditions of life, and is carried into effect
+without the agent being able to control it by means of any other
+voluntary act; then, indeed, whatever else such an agent may be, he
+certainly is not moral. But if it be meant that among a number of
+uncompleted volitions drawing in different directions--and all
+'uncaused' in the sense of belonging immediately to the Ego--one of
+them gains an advantage by a conscious reference of the mind to it as
+good or evil, then the agent who is capable of giving this advantage to
+that member of the system may properly be called moral. The man who
+willed to marry, and yet willed not to go through the marriage ceremony,
+was, as we have seen, irrational. Similarly, if any agent wills an
+action without being able to consider any of the consequences which it
+may involve as either moral or immoral, such an agent is what we must
+properly call unmoral. Even in such an agent, however, the Will may be
+free; only it would act without reference to any moral environment, just
+as the lunatic above supposed might endeavour to act without reference
+to any social environment.
+
+Let us look at the whole matter in yet another light. We have repeatedly
+seen that the question of free-will, and therefore of moral
+responsibility, depends upon the question as to whether a man's action
+in the past might have been other than it was, notwithstanding that all
+the conditions under which he was placed remained the same. Now, to this
+question only one answer can be given by a dualistic theory of things,
+whether materialistic or spiritualistic. For it belongs to the essence
+of a dualistic theory to regard the principle of causation as a
+principle external to, and independent of, the human mind; consequently,
+all the conditions of mental causation being given, a certain result in
+the way of volition is necessarily bound to ensue--or, in other words,
+at any given time in a man's mental history, his action cannot have
+been other than it was. But now, according to the monistic theory, all
+causation has a psychical basis--being but the objective expression to
+us of the psychical activity of the World-eject. Consequently, according
+to this theory, the course of even strictly physical causation is
+inevitable or necessary only in so far as the psychical activity of the
+World-eject is held to be uniform, or consistent within itself. And
+forasmuch as all our knowledge of physical causation is necessarily
+empirical, we have but very inadequate means of judging how far this
+empirical index is a true gauge of the reality. We can, indeed, predict
+an eclipse centuries in advance; but we can only do so on the
+supposition that such and such physical conditions remain constant, and
+we have no right to affirm that such must be the case. Our knowledge of
+physical causation, being but empirical, is probably but a very
+inadequate translation of the psychical activity of the World-eject; and
+hence, not only have we no right to predict a future eclipse with
+certainty, but we have not so much as the right to affirm that even a
+past eclipse must have taken place of necessity. For we have no right to
+affirm that at any one period of cosmic history the action of the
+World-eject must have been what it was, or could not have been other
+than it was. Our knowledge of the obverse aspect of this action (in the
+course of physical causation) is, as I have said, purely empirical; and
+this is merely another way of saying that although we do know what the
+action of the World-eject has been at such and such a period of cosmic
+history, we can have no means of knowing what else it might have been.
+For anything that we can tell to the contrary, the whole history of the
+solar system, for example, might have been quite different from what it
+has been; the course which it actually has run may have been but one out
+of an innumerable number of possible alternatives, any other of which
+might just as well have been adopted by the World-eject.
+
+Now, if this is true of natural causation in the case of the macrocosm,
+it would appear to be equally so of natural causation in the case of the
+microcosm. Indeed, prediction in the case of human activity is so much
+less certain than in the case of cosmic activity, that the attribute of
+free-will is generally ascribed to the former, while rarely suggested as
+possibly belonging to the latter. And similarly as regards past action.
+If we are unable to say that at any period in the past history of the
+solar system the World-eject might not have deflected the whole stream
+of events into some other channel, how can we be able to say that at any
+given period of his past history the Man-eject could not have performed
+an analogous act? Obviously, the only reason why we are not accustomed
+to entertain this supposition in either case, is because our judgements
+are beset with the assumption that the principle of causality is prior
+to that of mind--something of the nature of Fate superior even to the
+gods. And, no less obviously, if once we see any reason to regard the
+principle of causality as merely co-extensive with that of mind, the
+whole question as between Necessity and Free-will lapses; there is
+nothing to show that a man's action in the past might not have been
+other than it was. The only outward restraint placed upon the exercise
+of his Will is then seen to be imposed by the conditions of its
+executive capacity, and this restraint it is that constitutes man a
+rational agent. On the other hand, the structure of conscience--however
+we may suppose this to have been formed--imposes that further and inward
+restraint upon his Will, which constitutes man a moral agent. But
+neither of these restraints can properly be said to constitute bondage
+in the sense required by Necessitarianism, because neither of them
+requires that the man's Will must will as it does will; they require
+merely that his Will should act in certain ways if it is to accomplish
+certain results; and to this extent only is it subject to law, or to the
+incidence of those external influences which help to shape our motives.
+
+But if this is so, is it not obvious that the sense of moral
+responsibility is rationally justified? This sense goes upon the
+supposition that a man's conduct in the past might have been different
+from what it was. Clearly, therefore, no question of moral
+responsibility can ever obtain in cases where the general system of
+external causation, or natural law, rendered an alternative line of
+action physically impossible. _The question of moral responsibility can
+only obtain in cases where two or more lines of conduct were alike
+possible, so far as the external system of causation is concerned--or
+where the Will was equally free to choose between two or more courses of
+bodily action._ In other words, the question of moral responsibility has
+nothing to do with the only kind of bondage to which, according to our
+present point of view, the Will is subject--namely the bondage of being
+rationally obliged to will only what is capable of performance. The
+question of moral responsibility has only to do with the system of
+causation which is inherent in the mind itself; not with the system that
+is external to the mind. And as the theory of Monism identifies the mind
+with this its own inherent system of causation--or regards a man's Will
+as the originator of a particular portion of general causality--it
+follows from the theory that a man is justly liable to moral praise or
+blame as the case may be: the moral sense no longer appears as a
+gigantic illusion: conscience is justified at the bar of reason.
+
+It appears to me impossible that any valid exception can be taken to the
+above reasoning, if once the premiss is granted--namely, that the
+principle of Causality admits of being regarded as identical with that
+of Volition. For if Cause is but another name for Will--whether the Will
+be subjective or ejective--it follows that my will is a first cause,
+which is determined by other causes only in so far as the executive
+capacity of my body is so determined. As the whole stress of any
+objection to the present argument must thus be brought to bear upon the
+validity of this its fundamental premiss, a few words may now be said to
+show that the premiss is not wholly gratuitous. Of course the reason why
+at first sight it is apt to appear, not only gratuitous, but even
+grotesque, is because in these days of physical science the minds of
+most of us are dominated by the unthinking persuasion that the principle
+of causality is the most ultimate principle which our minds can reach.
+Most of us accept this persuasion as almost of the nature of an axiom,
+and hence the mere suggestion that our own volitions are really uncaused
+appears to us of the nature of a self-evident absurdity. A little
+thought, however, is enough to show that the only ground of reason which
+this strong prepossession can rest upon, is the assumption that the
+principle of causality is logically prior to that of mind. Therefore it
+is the validity of this assumption that we have here to investigate.
+
+In the first place, then, the assumption is _ipso facto_ irrational. For
+it is evident that in order to make the assumption there must already be
+a mind to make it. In other words, the very conception of the principle
+of causality implies a thinking substance wherein that conception
+arises, and therefore, as a mere matter of formal statement, it is
+impossible to assign logical priority to this conception over the thing
+whereby it is conceived.
+
+In the next place, when we carefully analyze the nature of this
+conception itself, we find that it arises immediately out of our
+conception of Being as Being. This is shown by the idea of _equivalency_
+between cause and effect, which is an essential feature of the
+conception of causality as such. In other words, the statement of any
+causal relation is merely a statement of the fact that both the matter
+and the energy concerned in the event were of a permanent nature and
+unalterable amount. Therefore, _if_ the ultimate Reality is mental,
+Causation _must_ be ontologically identical with Volition. And that the
+ultimate Reality is either mental, or something greater, seems to be
+proved by the consideration that if it be supposed anything _less_,
+there must be an end of the conception of equivalency as between cause
+and effect, and so of the conception of causality itself; for, clearly,
+if my mind has been caused by anything less than itself, there is an end
+of any possible equivalency between the activity of that thing as a
+cause, and the occurrence of my mind as an effect[13].
+
+Lastly, the conception of causality essentially involves the idea of
+finality as existing somewhere. Here I cannot do better than quote some
+extracts from Canon Mozley's essay on 'The Principle of Causation,' as
+he manages very tersely to convey the gist of previous philosophizing
+upon this subject.
+
+     'He (Clarke) brings out simply at bottom the meaning and
+     significance of an idea in the human mind, that there is implied in
+     the very idea itself of cause, firstly, that it causes something
+     else; and secondly, that it is uncaused itself.... An infinite
+     series of causes does not make a cause; ... an infinite succession
+     of causes rests, by the very hypothesis, upon no cause; each
+     particular one rests on the one which follows it, but the whole
+     rests upon nothing.... If from one cause we have to go back to
+     another, that which we go back from is not the cause, but that
+     which we go back to is. The very idea of cause, as I have said,
+     implies a stop; and wherever we stop is the cause.... A true cause
+     is a First Cause.... The atheistic idea thus does not correspond to
+     the idea of reason. The atheist appears to acknowledge the
+     necessity of a cause, and appears to provide for it; but when we
+     come to his scheme it fails exactly in that part of the idea which
+     clenches it, and which is essential to its integrity; it fails in
+     providing a stop; ... One might say to him, Why do you give
+     yourself the trouble to supply causation at all? You do so because
+     you consider yourself obliged in reason to do it, but if you supply
+     causation at all, why not furnish such a cause as reason has
+     impressed upon you, and which is inherent in your mind--a cause
+     which stands still, an original cause? If you never intended to
+     supply this, it must have been because you thought a real cause was
+     not wanted; but if you thought a cause not wanted, why not have
+     said from the first that causes were not wanted, and said from the
+     first that events could take place without causes?'
+
+Or, to quote a more recent authority, and one speaking from the side of
+physical science, Prof. Huxley writes:--
+
+     'The student of nature who starts from the axiom of the
+     universality of the law of causation, cannot refuse to admit an
+     eternal existence; if he admits the conservation of energy, he
+     cannot deny the possibility of an eternal energy; if he admits the
+     existence of immaterial phenomena in the form of consciousness, he
+     must admit the possibility, at any rate, of an eternal series of
+     such phenomena; and, if his studies have not been barren of the
+     best fruit of the investigation of nature, he will have enough
+     sense to see that, when Spinoza says, "Per Deum intelligo ens
+     absolute infinitum, hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis
+     attributis," the God so conceived is one that only a very great
+     fool would deny, even in his heart. Physical science is as little
+     Atheistic as it is Materialistic[14].'
+
+Now, if it thus belongs to the essence of our idea of causation that
+finality must be reached somewhere, I do not know where this is so
+likely to be reached as at that principle wherein the idea itself takes
+its rise--viz. Mind. But, if so, the statement that any particular acts
+of mind are uncaused ceases to present any character of self-evident
+absurdity.
+
+And the argument need not end here. For Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown
+that our idea of causation, not merely requires a mind for its
+occurrence, but that in every mind where it does occur it has been
+directly formed out of experiences of effort in acts of volition. So
+that whether we analyze the idea of cause as we actually discover it in
+our own minds, or investigate the history of its genesis, we alike find,
+as we might have antecedently expected, that it is dependent on our more
+ultimate idea of mind as mind; the conception of causality is not, as a
+matter of fact, original or primal, but derivative or secondary.
+Therefore, if this conception necessarily involves the postulation of a
+first cause, there can be no doubt that such a cause can only be
+conceived as of the nature of mind. From which it follows that each
+individual mind requires to be regarded--if it is regarded at all--as of
+the nature of a first cause.
+
+From this, however, it does not follow that each individual mind
+requires to be regarded as wholly independent of all other causes, or as
+never subject to any causal influence which may be exercised by other
+minds. Although each mind presents the feature of finality or
+spontaneity, this does not hinder that it also presents the feature of
+relation to other minds, which, therefore, are able to act upon it in
+numberless ways. Now, whether these minds are the minds of other men, of
+other intelligent beings, or of the whole World-eject, the causal
+activity which is exerted upon my mind expresses itself in that mind as
+a consciousness of motives. But although these motives may help to
+determine my volitions, there is no reason to suppose that they are
+themselves the volitions, or that without them my mind would cease to be
+itself a causal agent. On the contrary, if this were supposed, the
+supposition would amount to destroying the causal agency of my own mind,
+which, as we have just seen, must either be original or not at all.
+
+The way, therefore, that the matter stands is this. In so far as the
+microcosm is a circumscribed system of being--a thinking substance, a
+personality--it is of the nature of a first cause, free to act in any
+direction as to its thinking and willing, even though its thinking
+should be irrational as to truth, and its willing impossible as to
+execution. But in so far as the microcosm enters into relation with the
+macrocosm, the system of external causation which it encounters
+determines the character of its volitions. For although these volitions
+are themselves of the nature of first causes, it is no contradiction to
+say that they are--at all events in large measure--determined by other
+and external causes. This is no contradiction because, although they are
+thus determined, it does not follow that they are thus determined
+_necessarily_, and this makes all the difference between the theory of
+will as bond or free. In any stream of secondary causation each member
+of the series is understood to determine the next member of necessity;
+and it is because this notion is imported into psychology that the
+theory of determinism regards it as axiomatic that, if our volitions are
+in any way caused at all, they can only be caused by way of necessity;
+and hence that under the operation of any given set of motives the
+action of the will can only take place in the direction of the
+resultant. But any such axiom is valid only within the region of second
+causes. On the hypothesis that volitions are first causes, the axiom is
+irrelevant to them; for although it may be true that they are determined
+by causes from without, it may not be true that they are thus determined
+of necessity: their intrinsic character as themselves first causes,
+although not isolating them from any possible contact with other causes,
+nevertheless does protect them from being necessarily coerced by these
+causes, and therefore from becoming but the mere effects of them. Such
+influence, or determination, as is exerted upon the Will by these
+external causes is exerted only because any individual mind is not
+itself a macrocosm, but a microcosm in relation to a macrocosm. If it
+were itself a macrocosm, standing out of relation to all other being,
+its prime causation would, of course, be wholly uninfluenced by any
+other causation; its volitions would then be concerned only with the
+determination of its own thoughts in a constant stream of purely
+subjective contemplation, such as that which the Hindoo philosophy
+attributes to God. But as the human mind discovers itself as existing in
+close and complex relations with an external world of an orderly
+character, the human mind finds that it is, as before said, _expedient_
+to adapt the course of its own causal activity so as to bring it into
+harmony with the external order. For, although its own causal activity
+is primal, it by no means follows that on this account it is almighty;
+hence, even although it be primal, it is nevertheless under the
+necessity of adopting means in order to secure its ends--or, in other
+words, of adjusting its volitions (if they are to be practically
+efficient) to the conditions which are imposed upon its activity by the
+orderly system of the external world. Which is merely another way of
+stating the conclusion previously reached--viz. that the only necessity
+which can be proved to govern our volitions is the necessity which is
+imposed by our own considerations of reason and morality. Although we
+find that it is expedient to adapt our own causal activity to that
+larger system of causal activity by which we are surrounded--seeing that
+we must do so necessarily if we are to act at all--it by no means
+follows that we are bound to will what is expedient. In other words, the
+necessity laid upon us by the system of external causation is a
+necessity to adopt means for the attainment of ends; not a necessity to
+will the ends. And although in many cases this distinction may appear to
+be practically unmeaning--seeing that no man wills what he knows to be
+impossible of execution, and therefore that to say he is necessarily
+prevented from doing a certain thing seems practically equivalent to
+saying that he is necessarily prevented from willing that thing--in all
+cases where any question of moral responsibility can possibly obtain,
+the distinction is one of fundamental importance. For, as already shown,
+any question of moral responsibility can only obtain where two or more
+lines of action are alike possible, and therefore where no necessity is
+laid upon the man in respect of carrying out his volitions, in whichever
+direction they may eventually proceed. Although in any event he is
+necessarily bound to adopt means in order to secure his ends, the moral
+quality of his choice has reference only to the ends which he chooses;
+not at all to the fact that he has to employ means for the purpose of
+attaining them. And even though his choice be influenced by his physical
+and social environment--as it must be if it be either rational on the
+one hand or moral on the other--it does not follow that this influence
+is of a kind to neutralize or destroy the causal nature of his own
+volition. For the influence which is thus exerted cannot be exerted
+necessarily, unless we suppose that the Will is not a first cause, which
+is the possibility now under consideration. If the Will is a first
+cause, the influences brought to bear upon it by its relation to other
+causes--and in virtue of which it is constituted, not only a cause
+primal, but also a cause rational and moral--these influences differ
+_toto coelo_ from those which are exercised by any members in a series
+of secondary causes upon the next succeeding causes. And the difference
+consists in the absence of necessary or unconditional sequence in the
+one case, and its presence in the other. However strong the determining
+influence of a motive may be, if the Will is a first cause, the motive
+must belong to a different order of causal relation from a motor; for,
+no matter how strong the determining influence may be, _ex hypothesi_ it
+can never attain to the strength of necessity; the Will must ever remain
+free to overcome such influence by an adequate exercise of its own power
+of spontaneous action, or of supplying _de novo_ an additional access of
+strength to some other motive. Of course, as a general rule, the Will
+allows itself to be influenced by motives supplied immediately by its
+relations with the external world; but this is so only because the
+thinking substance well knows that it is expedient so to fall in with
+the general stream of external causation. Hence, as a general rule, it
+is only in cases where the stream of external causation is drawing the
+will in different directions that the causal activity of the Will itself
+is called into play. Or rather, I should say, it is only in such cases
+that we become conscious of the fact. In the case of every voluntary
+movement the primal activity of Will must be concerned (and this even in
+the case of the lower animals); but as the vast majority of such
+movements are performed by way of response to frequently recurring
+circumstances, the response which experience has shown to be most
+expedient is given, as it were, automatically, or without the occurrence
+of any adverse motive. But in cases where motives are drawing in
+different directions, we become conscious of an effort of Will in
+choosing one or other line of conduct, and, according to our present
+hypothesis, this consciousness of effort is an expression of the work
+which the Will is doing in the way of spontaneous causation.
+
+Thus, upon the whole, if we identify the principle of causation with the
+principle of mind--as we are bound to do by the theory of Monism--we
+thereby draw a great and fundamental distinction between causation as
+this occurs in the external world, and as it occurs within the limits of
+our own subjectivity. And the distinction consists in the unconditional
+nature of a causal sequence in the external world, as against the
+conditional nature of it in the other case; the condition to the
+effective operation of a motive--as distinguished from a motor--is the
+acquiescence of the first cause upon which that motive is operating.
+
+To the foregoing argument it may be objected that by expressly regarding
+the human mind as a first cause of its own volitions, I imply that that
+mind can itself have had no cause, which appears to be self-evidently
+absurd. But here again the absurdity only arises from our inveterate
+habit of regarding the principle of causation as logically prior to that
+of mind. If we expressly refuse to do this, there is nothing absurd in
+supposing the principle of mind wherever it occurs, as itself uncaused.
+For if, as we are now supposing, this principle is identical with that
+of causation, to say that any mind is caused would be to say that a
+cause is the cause of itself, which would be really absurd. Under the
+present point of view, therefore, it would be a meaningless question to
+ask for the cause of a human mind, since, _ex hypothesi_, a human mind
+is a part of the self-existing substance, although not on this account
+self-existing as to its individual personality. As argued in a previous
+chapter, the personality appears to arise on account of circumscription,
+or the isolation of a constituent part of the World-eject. Therefore,
+although it may be reasonable to ask for a cause of this
+circumscription--or of the personality--it is not reasonable to ask for
+a cause of the substance which is thus circumscribed, or of the quality
+of spontaneity which that substance exhibits.
+
+I will now state the whole case in another way. When we regard the facts
+of volition from the stand-point of psychology, the only theory of them
+which is open to us is, as we have before seen, that of determinism.
+Moreover, within these limits that theory is perfectly true. Psychology,
+as such, cannot recognize any principle more ultimate than natural
+causation, seeing that, like any other of her sisters in the family of
+sciences, her whole work and duty are confined to the investigation of
+this principle. But, just as in the case of all the other sciences, when
+her investigations have been pushed to the point where they encounter
+the problem of explaining this principle itself, her investigations
+must necessarily cease; this principle is for all the sciences the
+ultimate datum, behind which they cannot go without ceasing to be
+sciences. But it does not follow that because the area of science is
+limited by that of causation, therefore we are precluded from asking any
+questions as to the nature of this ultimate datum. Of course any
+questions which we may thus ask cannot possibly be answered by science;
+they are questions of philosophy, in the consideration of which science,
+from her very nature and essential limitation of her office, can have no
+voice. Now, if on taking up the principle of causation where this is
+left by science--viz. as the ultimate or unanalyzable _datum_ of
+experience, upon which all her investigations are founded, and by which
+they are all limited--philosophy finds any reason to surmise that it is
+resolvable into the principle of mind, philosophy is thus able to
+suggest that any distinction between mental processes as determinate or
+free, is really a meaningless distinction. For, according to this
+suggestion, the issue is no longer as to whether these processes are
+caused or uncaused; the very idea of cause has been abolished as one
+which belongs only to that lower level of inquiry with which science, or
+sensuous experience, is concerned. Here, no doubt, the question is a
+thoroughly real one, and, as shown in previous chapters, can only be
+answered in the way of determinism. But so soon as we ascend to the
+philosophical theory of Monism, and so transcend the conditions of
+sensuous experience, the question whether volitions are caused or
+uncaused becomes, as I have said, a meaningless question, or a question
+the terms of which are not correctly stated. If it be the case that all
+causality is of a nature psychical, volition and causation are one and
+the same thing, differing only in relation to our modes of apprehension.
+It would therefore be equally meaningless to say that either is the
+cause of the other--just as it would be equally meaningless to say that
+neurosis is the cause of psychosis, or that psychosis is the cause of
+neurosis. Or thus, if volition and causation are one and the same thing,
+the only reason why they ever appear diverse is because the one is known
+ontologically, while the other is known phenomenally. Were it possible
+that the orbit of my own personality could be widened so as to include
+within my own subjectivity the whole universe of causality, I should
+find--according to Monism--that all causation would become transformed
+into volition. Hence, the only reason why there now appears to be so
+great an antithesis between these two principles, is because the
+volition which is going on outside of my own consciousness can only be
+known to me objectively,--or at most ejectively,--on which account the
+principle of causality appears to me phenomenally as the most ultimate,
+or most unanalyzable, principle in the phenomenal universe.
+
+Upon the whole, then, I conclude that this is the teaching of Monism. If
+we view the facts of human volition relatively, or within the four
+corners of psychological science, there is no escape from the conclusion
+that they are determined with all the rigour which belongs to natural
+causation in general. For every sequence of mental changes and every
+sequence of cerebral changes, although phenomenally so diverse, are
+taken by this theory to be ontologically identical; and therefore the
+sequence of mental changes must be determined with the same degree of
+'necessity' as is that of the cerebral changes. In short, mental
+causation is taken to be but the obverse aspect of physical causation,
+and, as previously remarked, it is impossible that the doctrine of
+determinism could be taught in a manner more emphatic. But, on the other
+hand, the theory of Monism is bound to go further than this. From the
+very fact of its having gone so far as to identify all physical
+processes with psychical processes, it cannot refuse to take the further
+and final step of identifying the most ultimate known principle of the
+one with the most ultimate known principle of the other; it is bound to
+recognize in natural causation the phenomenal aspect of that which is
+known ontologically as volition. But if these two principles are thus
+regarded as identical, it clearly becomes as unmeaning to ask whether
+the one is the cause of the other, as it would be to ask whether the one
+wills the other. For, _ex hypothesi_, the two things being one thing,
+or but different modes of viewing the same thing, it becomes mere
+nonsense to speak of either determining the other; they are both but
+different expressions of the same ultimate fact, namely the fact of
+Being as Being.
+
+If this result should be deemed unsatisfactory on account of its
+vagueness, let it be remembered that nothing is gained on the side of
+clearness by the converse supposition--viz. that priority should be
+assigned to the principle of causality. For, if we say it is
+inconceivable that anything should come into existence without a
+cause--not even excepting the principle of mind itself--then the
+question immediately arises--If all volition is caused, what is the
+cause of volition? What caused this cause? And so on till we arrive at
+the question, What caused the principle of causality? which is absurd.
+So that whether we regard mind as prior to cause, or cause as prior to
+mind, or neither as prior to the other, we arrive at precisely the same
+difficulty. And the difficulty is a hopeless one, because it concerns
+the ultimate question of Being as Being, or the final mystery of things.
+
+Or, to state the matter in another way. An explanation means the
+reference of observed effects to known causes, or the inclusion of
+previously unknown causes among causes better known. Hence it is
+obvious, from the very meaning of what we call an explanation, that at
+the base of all possible explanations there must lie a great
+Inexplicable, which, just because more ultimate than any of our
+possible explanations, does not itself require to be explained. To
+suppose that it does require to be explained, would be to suppose, that
+there is something still more ultimate into which, if known, this
+Inexplicable could be merged. Hence, unless we postulate an infinite
+series of possible explanations, there must be a basal mystery
+somewhere, which, in virtue of its constituting the ground of all
+possible explanations, cannot be, and does not require to be, itself
+explained. What is this basal mystery? Materialism supposes it to be
+lodged in Matter to the exclusion of Mind, while Idealism in its extreme
+forms takes the converse view. Theism supposes that it is an intelligent
+Person, who is held--and logically enough--not to be able to give any
+explanation of his own existence; he is, as it is said, self-existent,
+and, if asked to give any account of his being, would only be able to
+restate the fact of his being in the words, 'I am that I am.' Lastly,
+Pantheism, or Monism, supposes the ultimate mystery to be lodged in the
+universe as a whole. Now, in the present connexion the question before
+us is simply this--Are we to regard the principle of causality or the
+principle of mind as the ultimate mystery? And to this question I answer
+that to me it appears most reasonable to assign priority to mind. For,
+on the one hand, our only knowledge of causation is empirical, while
+even as such it is only possible in the same way as our knowledge of
+objective existence in general is possible--namely, by way of inference
+from our own mental modifications, which therefore must necessarily have
+priority so far as we are ourselves concerned. Next, on the other hand,
+even if we were to grant that the principle of causality is the prius,
+or the ultimate and inexplicable mystery, I cannot see that it is really
+available to explain the fact of personality. To me it appears that,
+within the range of human observation, this is the fact that most wears
+the appearance of finality, or of that unanalyzable and inexplicable
+nature which we are bound to believe must belong to the ultimate mystery
+of Being. But, be this as it may, the speculative difficulty of
+assigning priority to mind is certainly no greater than that of
+assigning it to causality; and this, as above remarked, is a sufficient
+answer to the question before us. According to Monism, however, there is
+no need to assign priority to either principle, seeing that one is but a
+phenomenal expression of the other.
+
+Only one further question remains to be considered. From what I have
+just said on the subject of Personality, it will be apparent that the
+theory of Monism is in conflict with that of Theism only in so far as
+personality appears to imply limitation. This is a point which I have
+previously considered in these pages (Chapter iv, p. 109), with the
+result of appearing to show that the conflict is one which would
+probably vanish could we rise above the necessary limitations of human
+thought. Therefore, it here seems worth while to ask, What can be said
+by the philosophical theory of Monism to the old theological dilemma
+touching free-will and predestination? Or, even apart from any question
+of Theism, what position does Monism suppose the psychical activity of
+man to hold in relation to that of the universe? Of course the latter
+statement of the question is included in the former; and, therefore, we
+may present it thus;--If the human will is free, and the theory of
+Theism substantially true, how are we to reconcile the fact with the
+theory?
+
+According to the theory of Theism as sanctioned by Monism, what we
+apprehend as natural causation is the obverse of a part of a _summum
+genus_--i.e. the part falling within human observation whose whole is
+the Absolute Volition. This Volition, being absolute, can nowhere meet
+with restraint; it is therefore absolutely free, and can never
+contradict itself. Thus, those circumscribed portions of it which we
+know as human minds--and which, on account of being so circumscribed,
+are free within themselves--do not in their freedom conflict with the
+Absolute Volition. The Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition are
+always in unison. It is not that the Absolute Volition unconditionally
+determines the Relative Volition--else the Relative Volition would not
+be free; but it is that the Absolute Volition invariably assents to the
+Relative Volition as to the activity of an integral part of itself. This
+will be at once evident if we consider that our only idea of
+determination--i.e. causation--is, upon the theistic theory, derived
+from our observing the consistency of the Divine Will, whether as
+revealed subjectively in the causal operations of our own minds, or
+objectively in the causal operations of Nature. Therefore, the idea of
+causation as between the Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition is
+an idea destitute of meaning. One Relative Volition may act causally on
+another. Relative Volition, because each is wholly external to each. But
+all Relative Volitions are constituent parts of the Absolute Volition,
+which, therefore, cannot act causally _on_ them, though it always acts
+substantially _with_ them. Or, otherwise phrased, if the subject is a
+constituent part of its own World-eject--the volition of which is always
+self-consistent--it follows that the volition of the subject must always
+be coincident with that of its World-eject; and this without being
+determined in any other sense than the smaller size of a part can be
+said to be determined by the larger size of its whole: i.e. the
+determination--if we choose so to call it--is not a causal one, but
+arises immediately from the inherent nature of the case. The Absolute
+Volition within itself is free; the Relative Volition within itself is
+free; but there can be no conflict between these two freedoms. For, if
+there were a conflict, it must be caused; but where is the cause of this
+conflict to come from? Not from the Absolute Volition, which is
+everywhere self-consistent; not from the Relative Volition, which is
+wholly contained within the Absolute. Thus, regarded from within its own
+system, the Relative Volition is free; while, regarded from the system
+of its World-eject, the Relative Volition is predestined. But the
+freedom is not incompatible with the predestination, nor the
+predestination with the freedom. They stand to each other in the
+relation of complementary truths, the apparent contradiction of which
+arises only from the apparently fundamental antithesis between mind and
+cause which it is the privilege of Monism to abolish.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 13: 'Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily
+contain it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can
+ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it
+hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree' (Locke). To
+this argument Mill answers, 'How vastly nobler and more precious, for
+instance, are the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of
+which, and by the properties of which, they are raised up! But this
+stricture is not worthy of Mill. The soil and manure do not constitute
+the whole cause of the plants and animals. We must trace these and many
+other con-causes (conditions) back and back till we come to 'whatsoever
+is first of all things': it is merely childish to choose some few of the
+conditions, and arbitrarily to regard them as alone the efficient
+causes.]
+
+[Footnote 14: _Collected Essays_, vol. ix. 'Evolution and Ethics,' p.
+140.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
++-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+|Transcriber's note: In this text this H_2O represents a subscript 2|
++-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Oxford HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
+
+
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