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+Project Gutenberg's A Candid Examination of Theism, by George John Romanes
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: A Candid Examination of Theism
+
+Author: George John Romanes
+
+Release Date: August 7, 2006 [EBook #19003]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and
+the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of
+public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital
+Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+A
+
+CANDID EXAMINATION
+
+OF
+
+THEISM.
+
+BY
+
+PHYSICUS.
+
+BOSTON:
+HOUGHTON, OSGOOD, & COMPANY.
+1878.
+[_All rights reserved_]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+_CANST THOU BY SEARCHING FIND OUT GOD?_
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The following essay was written several years ago; but I have hitherto
+refrained from publishing it, lest, after having done so, I should find
+that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the essay sets
+forth. Judging, however, that it is now more than ever improbable that I
+shall myself be able to detect any errors in my reasoning, I feel that it
+is time to present the latter to the contemplation of other minds; and in
+doing so, I make this explanation only because I feel it desirable to state
+at the outset that the present treatise was written before the publication
+of Mr. Mill's treatise on the same subject. It is desirable to make this
+statement, first, because in several instances the trains of reasoning in
+the two essays are parallel, and next, because in other instances I have
+quoted passages from Mr. Mill's essay in connections which would be
+scarcely intelligible were it not understood that these passages are
+insertions made after the present essay had been completed. I have also
+added several supplementary essays which have been written since the main
+essay was finished.
+
+It is desirable further to observe, that the only reason why I publish this
+edition anonymously is because I feel very strongly that, in matters of the
+kind with which the present essay deals, opinions and arguments should be
+allowed to produce the exact degree of influence to which as opinions and
+arguments they are entitled: they should be permitted to stand upon their
+own intrinsic merits alone, and quite beyond the shadow of that unfair
+prejudication which cannot but arise so soon as their author's authority,
+or absence of authority, becomes known. Notwithstanding this avowal,
+however, I fear that many who glance over the following pages will read in
+the "Physicus" of the first one a very different motive. There is at the
+present time a wonderfully wide-spread sentiment pervading all classes of
+society--a sentiment which it would not be easy to define, but the
+practical outcome of which is, that to discuss the question of which this
+essay treats is, in some way or other, morally wrong. Many, therefore, who
+share this sentiment will doubtless attribute my reticence to a puerile
+fear on my part to meet it. I can only say that such is not the case.
+Although I allude to this sentiment with all respect--believing as I do
+that it is an offshoot from the stock which contains all that is best and
+greatest in human nature--nevertheless it seems to me impossible to deny
+that the sentiment in question is as unreasonable as the frame of mind
+which harbours it must be unreasoning. If there is no God, where can be the
+harm in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence? If there is a
+God, surely our first duty towards him must be to exert to our utmost, in
+our attempts to find him, the most noble faculty with which he has endowed
+us--as carefully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to
+furnish of his own existence as we investigate the evidence of inferior
+things in his dependent creation. To say that there is one rule or method
+for ascertaining truth in the latter case, which it is not legitimate to
+apply in the former case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity,
+if he exists, has not supplied us with rational evidence of his existence.
+For my own part, I feel that such an assertion cannot but embody far more
+unworthy conceptions of a Personal God than are represented by any amount
+of earnest inquiry into whatever evidence of his existence there may be
+present; but, neglecting this reflection, if there is a God, it is certain
+that reason is the faculty by which he has enabled man to discover truth,
+and it is no less certain that the scientific methods have proved
+themselves by far the most trustworthy for reason to adopt. To my mind,
+therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, looking to this
+undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific methods as ways to truth, whether
+or not there is a God, the question as to his existence is both more
+morally and more reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a
+problem for methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other
+light. Or, stating the case in other words, I believe that in whatever
+degree we intentionally abstain from using in this case what we _know_ to
+be the most trustworthy methods of inquiry in other cases, in that degree
+are we either unworthily closing our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we are
+guilty of the worst among human sins--"Depart from us, for we desire not
+the knowledge of thy ways." If it is said that, supposing man to be in a
+state of probation, faith, and not reason, must be the instrument of his
+trial, I am ready to admit the validity of the remark; but I must also ask
+it to be remembered, that unless faith has _some_ basis of reason whereon
+to rest, it differs in nothing from superstition; and hence that it is
+still our duty to investigate the _rational_ standing of the question
+before us by the _scientific_ methods alone. And I may here observe
+parenthetically, that the same reasoning applies to all investigations
+concerning the reality of a supposed revelation. With such investigations,
+however, the present essay has nothing to do, although, I may remark that
+if there is any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible in the structure of a
+professing revelation, such evidence, in whatever degree present, would be
+of the best possible kind for substantiating the hypothesis of Theism.
+
+Such being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the most
+truly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the following
+pages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion were more
+negative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice in me _for this
+reason_ to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of the present kind
+could ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism, there might be much
+for its author to regret, but nothing for him to be ashamed of; and, by
+parity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result of such an inquiry is
+seen to have a tendency to negative the theistic theory, the author should
+not be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his conviction as to the degree of
+such tendency, provided only that his conviction is an _honest_ one, and
+that he is conscious of its having been reached by using his faculties with
+the utmost care of which he is capable.
+
+If it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate a
+character that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I reply
+that they are nevertheless the _best_ methods available, and hence that the
+retort is without pertinence: the question is still to be regarded as a
+scientific one, although we may perceive that neither an affirmative nor a
+negative answer can be given to it with any approach to a full
+demonstration. But if the question is thus conceded to be one falling
+within the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that the mere
+fact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently impossible should
+not deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a well-recognised
+principle of scientific research, that however difficult or impossible it
+may be to _prove_ a given theory true or false, the theory should
+nevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being tested, by the full
+rigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration cannot be hoped for,
+it still remains desirable to reduce the question at issue to the last
+analysis of which it is capable.
+
+Adopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the following
+analysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour of the
+theory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of light which
+the progress of modern science--physical and speculative--has shed upon it.
+And forasmuch as it is impossible that demonstrated truth can ever be shown
+untrue, and forasmuch as the demonstrated truths on which the present
+examination rests are the most fundamental which it is possible for the
+human mind to reach, I do not think it presumptuous to assert what appears
+to me a necessary deduction from these facts--namely, that, possible errors
+in reasoning apart, the rational position of Theism as here defined must
+remain without material modification as long as our intelligence remains
+human.
+
+LONDON, 1878.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+ANALYSIS.
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM.
+
+SECT.
+
+1. Introductory.
+
+2. Object of the chapter.
+
+3. The Argument from the Inconceivability of Self-existence.
+
+4. The Argument from the Desirability of there being a God.
+
+5. The Argument from the Presence of Human Aspirations.
+
+6. The Argument from Consciousness.
+
+7. The Argument for a First Cause.
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND.
+
+8. Introductory.
+
+9. Examination of the Argument, and the independent coincidence of my views
+regarding it with those of Mr. Mill.
+
+10. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a re-enunciation of it in the
+form of a Syllogism.
+
+11. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot explain Mind in the abstract.
+Mill quoted and answered. This defect in the Syllogism clearly defined.
+
+12. The Syllogism further defective, in that it assumes Intelligence to be
+the only possible cause of Intelligence. This assumption amounts to begging
+the whole question as to the being of a God. Inconceivability of Matter
+thinking no proof that it may not think. Locke himself strangely concedes
+this. His fallacies and self-contradictions pointed out in an Appendix.
+
+13. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a Materialist, but assuming that
+he is one, he is as much entitled to the hypothesis that Matter thinks as a
+Theist is to his hypothesis that it does not.
+
+14. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly equivalent value, save that
+while Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a certain basis of fact to rest
+upon. This basis defined in a footnote, where also Professor Clifford's
+essay on "Body and Mind" is briefly examined. Difficulty of estimating the
+worth of the Argument as to the _most_ conceivable being _most_ likely
+true.
+
+15. Locke's comparison between certainty of the Inconceivability Argument
+as applied to Theism and to mathematics shown to contain a _virtual_ though
+not a _formal_ fallacy.
+
+16. Summary of considerations as to the value of this Argument from
+Inconceivability.
+
+17. Introductory to the other Arguments in favour of the conclusion that
+only Intelligence can have caused Intelligence.
+
+18. Locke's presentation of the view that the cause must contain all that
+is contained in the effects. His statements contradicted. Mill quoted to
+show that the analogy of Nature is against the doctrine of higher
+perfections never growing out of lower ones.
+
+19. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in favour of the proposition
+that only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. Hamilton quoted to show that
+in his philosophy the entire question as to the being of a God hinges upon
+that as to whether or not human volitions are caused.
+
+20. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. Hamilton erroneously
+identified this theory with the fact that we possess a moral sense. His
+resulting dilemma.
+
+21. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus identifying genuine fact with
+spurious theory, yet his Argument from the fact of our having a moral sense
+remains to be considered.
+
+22. The question here is merely as to whether or not the presence of the
+moral sense can be explained by natural causes. _A priori_ probability of
+the moral sense having been evolved. _A posteriori_ confirmation supplied
+by Utilitarianism, &c.
+
+23. Mill's presentation of the Argument a resuscitation of Paley's. His
+criticism on Paley shown to be unfair.
+
+24. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation pointed out.
+
+25. The same fallacy pointed out in another way.
+
+26. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in order to illustrate the
+root fallacy of his Argument from Design. Mill's observations upon this
+Argument criticised.
+
+27. Result yielded by the present analysis of the Argument from Design. The
+Argument shown to be a _petitio principii_.
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS.
+
+28. My belief that no competent writer in favour of the Argument from
+Design could have written upon it at all, had it not been for his
+instinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument from General
+Laws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency insisted upon.
+
+29. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws prior to the
+enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The Rev. Baden
+Powell quoted.
+
+30. The nature of General Laws when these are interpreted in terms of the
+doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The word "Law" defined in terms of
+this doctrine.
+
+31. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws subsequent to
+the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy.
+
+32. The self-evolution of General Laws, or the objective aspect of the
+question as to whether we may infer the presence of Mind in Nature because
+Nature admits of being intelligently interrogated.
+
+33. The subjective aspect of this question, according to the data afforded
+by evolutionary psychology.
+
+34. Correspondence between products due to human intelligence and products
+supposed due to Divine Intelligence, a correspondence which is only
+generic. Illustrations drawn from prodigality in Nature. Further
+illustrations. Illogical manner in which natural theologians deal with such
+difficulties. The generic resemblance contemplated is just what we should
+expect to find, if the doctrine of evolutionary psychology be true.
+
+35. The last three sections parenthetical. Necessary nature of the
+conclusion which follows from the last five sections.
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD.
+
+36. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion reached in the previous
+chapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely scientific, and not of
+logical conclusiveness. Preparation for considering the question in its
+purely logical form.
+
+37. The logic of probability in general explained, and canon of
+interpretation enunciated.
+
+38. Application of this canon to the particular case of Theism.
+
+39. Exposition of the logical state of the question.
+
+40. Exposition continued.
+
+41. Result of the exposition; "Suspended Judgment" the only logical
+attitude of mind with regard to the question of Theism.
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.
+
+42. Statement of the position to which the question of Theism has been
+reduced by the foregoing analysis.
+
+43. Distinction between a scientific and a metaphysical teleology.
+Statement of the latter in legitimate terms. Criticism of this statement
+legitimately made on the side of Atheism as being gratuitous. Impartial
+judgment on this criticism.
+
+44. Examination of the question as to whether the metaphysical system of
+teleology is really destitute of all rational support. Pleading of a
+supposed Theist in support of the system. The principle of correlation of
+general laws. The complexity of Nature.
+
+45. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and judgment that it fairly removes
+from the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology the charge of the latter
+being gratuitous.
+
+46. Examination of the degree of probability that is presented by the
+hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising an examination of the
+Theistic objection to the scientific train of reasoning on account of its
+symbolism, and showing that a no less cogent objection lies against the
+metaphysical train of reasoning on account of its embodying the supposition
+of unknowable causes. Distinction between "inconceivability" in a formal or
+symbolical, and in a material or realisable sense. Reply of a supposed
+Atheist to the previous pleading of the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencer
+quoted on inconceivability of cosmic evolution as due to Mind.
+
+47. Final judgment on the rational value of a metaphysical system of
+teleology. Distinction between "inconceivability" in an absolute and in a
+relative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of mind which it is rational
+to adopt towards the question of Theism. The desirability and the
+rationality of tolerance in this particular case.
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
+
+48. General summary of the whole essay.
+
+49. Concluding remarks.
+
+APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+A Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument against
+the possibility of Matter thinking on grounds of its being inconceivable
+that it should.
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY I.
+
+Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and criticism to
+show that it is inadequate to sustain the doctrine of "Cosmic Theism" which
+Mr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it.
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY II.
+
+A Critical Examination of the Rev. Professor Flint's work on "Theism".
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY III.
+
+On the Speculative Standing of Materialism.
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IV.
+
+On the Final Mystery of Things.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+THEISM.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM.
+
+Sec. 1. Few subjects have occupied so much attention among speculative
+thinkers as that which relates to the being of God. Notwithstanding,
+however, the great amount that has been written on this subject, I am not
+aware that any one has successfully endeavoured to approach it, on all its
+various sides, from the ground of pure reason alone, and thus to fix, as
+nearly as possible, the exact position which, in pure reason, this subject
+ought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought that an exception to this
+statement ought to be made in favour of John Stuart Mill's posthumous essay
+on Theism; but from my great respect for this author, I should rather be
+inclined to regard that essay as a criticism on illogical arguments, than
+as a _careful_ or _matured_ attempt to formulate the strictly rational
+_status_ of the question in all its bearings. Nevertheless, as this essay
+is in some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yet
+appeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came from
+the pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most serious
+attention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the course of
+the following pages.
+
+Seeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer has
+hitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question as
+to the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any attempt,
+however imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of every
+school--the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious rapidity which
+of late years has marked the advance both of physical and of speculative
+science, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting us towards a
+reasonable and, I think, a final decision as to the strictly logical
+standing of this important matter. However, be my attempt welcome or no, I
+feel that it is my obvious duty to publish the results which have been
+yielded by an honest and careful analysis.
+
+Sec. 2. I may most fitly begin this analysis by briefly disposing of such
+arguments in favour of Theism as are manifestly erroneous. And I do this
+the more willingly because, as these arguments are at the present time most
+in vogue, an exposure of their fallacies may perhaps deter our popular
+apologists of the future from drawing upon themselves the silent contempt
+of every reader whose intellect is not either prejudiced or imbecile.
+
+Sec. 3. A favourite piece of apologetic juggling is that of first demolishing
+Atheism, Pantheism, Materialism, &c., by successively calling upon them to
+explain the mystery of self-existence, and then tacitly assuming that the
+need of such an explanation is absent in the case of Theism--as though the
+attribute in question were more conceivable when posited in a Deity than
+when posited elsewhere.
+
+It is, I hope, unnecessary to observe that, so far as the ultimate mystery
+of existence is concerned, any and every theory of things is equally
+entitled to the inexplicable fact that something is; and that any endeavour
+on the part of the votaries of one theory to shift from themselves to the
+votaries of another theory the _onus_ of explaining the necessarily
+inexplicable, is an instance of irrationality which borders on the
+ludicrous.
+
+Sec. 4. Another argument, or semblance of an argument, is the very prevalent
+one, "Our heart requires a God; therefore it is probable that there is a
+God:" as though such a subjective necessity, even if made out, could ever
+prove an objective existence.[1]
+
+Sec. 5. If it is said that the theistic aspirations of the human heart, by the
+mere fact of their presence, point to the existence of a God as to their
+explanatory cause, I answer that the argument would only be valid after the
+possibility of any more proximate causes having been in action has been
+excluded--else the theistic explanation violates the fundamental rule of
+science, the Law of Parcimony, or the law which forbids us to assume the
+action of more remote causes where more proximate ones are found sufficient
+to explain the effects. Consequently, the validity of the argument now
+under consideration is inversely proportional to the number of
+possibilities there are of the aspirations in question being due to the
+agency of physical causes; and forasmuch as our ignorance of psychological
+causation is well-nigh total, the Law of Parcimony forbids us to allow any
+determinate degree of logical value to the present argument. In other
+words, we must not use the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its
+presence--must not argue from our ignorance of psychological possibilities,
+as though this ignorance were knowledge of corresponding impossibilities.
+The burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and from the nature of
+the case this burden cannot be discharged until the science of psychology
+shall have been fully perfected. I may add that, for my own part, I cannot
+help feeling that, even in the present embryonic condition of this science,
+we are not without some indications of the manner in which the aspirations
+in question arose; but even were this not so, the above considerations
+prove that the argument before us is invalid. If it is retorted that the
+fact of these aspirations having had _proximate_ causes to account for
+their origin, even if made out, would not negative the inference of these
+being due to a Deity as to their _ultimate_ cause; I answer that this is
+not to use the argument from the presence of these aspirations; it is
+merely to beg the question as to the being of a God.
+
+Sec. 6. Next, we may consider the argument from consciousness. Many persons
+ground their belief in the existence of a Deity upon a real or supposed
+necessity of their own subjective thought. I say "real or supposed,"
+because, in its bearing upon rational argument, it is of no consequence of
+which character the alleged necessity actually is. Even if the necessity of
+thought be real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to affirm is, that
+it is impossible for _him_, by any effort of thinking, to rid himself of
+the persuasion that God exists; he is not entitled to affirm that this
+persuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the human mind.
+Or, as Mill puts it, "One man cannot by proclaiming with ever so much
+confidence that _he_ perceives an object, convince other people that they
+see it too.... When no claim is set up to any peculiar gift, but we are
+told that all of us are as capable of seeing what he sees, feeling what he
+feels, nay, that we actually do so, and when the utmost effort of which we
+are capable fails to make us aware of what we are told, we perceive this
+supposed universal faculty of intuition is but
+
+  'The Dark Lantern of the Spirit
+  Which none see by but those who bear it.'"
+
+It is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument must,
+from its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save its
+assertor; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is not
+universal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument.
+
+And now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether the
+alleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a
+_real_ necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are the
+victims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable that
+their minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute from the
+minds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the above
+quotation, "They may fairly be asked to consider, whether it is not more
+likely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in their
+minds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an impression
+in theirs." No doubt it is true that education and habits of thought may so
+stereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what is conceivable to
+one man or generation may not be so to another;[2] but to adduce this
+consideration in this place would clearly be but to destroy the argument
+from the _intuitive_ necessity of believing in a God.
+
+Lastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if the
+impossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law of
+human mind--which it certainly is not--the fact of his existence could not
+be thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much more probable than it
+now is--as probable, for instance, if not more probable, than is the
+existence of an external world;--but still it would not be necessarily
+true.
+
+Sec. 7. The argument from the general consent of mankind is so clearly
+fallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I shall pass it over and
+proceed at once to the last of the untenable arguments--that, namely, from
+the existence of a First Cause. And here I should like to express myself
+indebted to Mr. Mill for the following ideas:--"The cause of every change
+is a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there were no new
+antecedent, there would be no new consequent. If the state of facts which
+brings the phenomenon into existence, had existed always or for an
+indefinite duration, the effect also would have existed always or been
+produced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of
+causation, within the sphere of experience, that the causes as well as the
+effects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem,
+therefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for a
+first cause, is repugnant to it; and that the very essence of causation, as
+it exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First
+Cause."
+
+The rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are tolerably
+obvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his essay. I
+shall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them.
+
+"But it is necessary to look more particularly into this matter, and
+analyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have
+experience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have a
+beginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had no
+beginning, this permanent element may with some justice be termed a first
+or universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself to cause
+anything, it enters as a con-cause into all causation."
+
+He then shows that the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy supplies us
+with such a datum, and thus the conclusion easily follows--"It would seem,
+then, that the only sense in which experience supports, in any shape, the
+doctrine of a First Cause, viz., as the primaeval and universal element of
+all causes, the First Cause can be no other than Force."
+
+Still, however, it may be maintained that "all force is will-force." But
+"if there be any truth in the doctrine of Conservation of Force, ... this
+doctrine does not change from true to false when it reaches the field of
+voluntary agency. The will does not, any more than other agencies, create
+Force: granting that it originates motion, it has no means of doing so but
+by converting into that particular manifestation, a portion of Force which
+already existed in other forms. It is known that the source from which this
+portion of Force is derived, is chiefly, or entirely, the force evolved in
+the processes of chemical composition and decomposition which constitute
+the body of nutrition: the force so liberated becomes a fund upon which
+every muscular and every nervous action, as of a train of thought, is a
+draft. It is in this sense only that, according to the best lights of
+science, volition is an originating cause. Volition, therefore, does not
+answer to the idea of a First Cause; since Force must, in every instance,
+be assumed as prior to it; and there is not the slightest colour, derived
+from experience, for supposing Force itself to have been created by a
+volition. As far as anything can be concluded from human experience, Force
+has all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated....
+
+"All that can be affirmed (even) by the strongest assertion of the Freedom
+of the Will, is that volitions are themselves uncaused and are, therefore,
+alone fit to be the first or universal cause. But, even assuming volitions
+to be uncaused, the properties of matter, so far as experience discloses,
+are uncaused also, and have the advantage over any particular volition, in
+being, so far as experience can show, eternal. Theism, therefore, in so far
+as it rests on the necessity of a First Cause, has no support from
+experience."
+
+Such may be taken as a sufficient refutation of the argument that, as human
+volition is apparently a cause in nature, and moreover constitutes the
+basis of our conception of all causation, therefore all causation is
+probably volitional in character. But as this is a favourite argument with
+some theists, I shall introduce another quotation from Mr. Mill, which is
+taken from a different work.
+
+"Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervous
+action, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves.
+Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient and
+not merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the
+particular phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that cause;
+are we therefore to say with these writers that since we know of no other
+efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there _is_
+no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A more
+outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among the
+infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a
+particular mode of action of certain nerves which has for its cause and, as
+we are now supposing, for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and
+because this is the only efficient cause of "which we are conscious, being
+the only one of which, in the nature of the case, we _can_ be conscious,
+since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify
+us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of
+efficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly
+human or animal phenomenon?" It is then shown that a logical parallel to
+this mode of inference is that of generalising from the one known instance
+of the earth being inhabited, to the conclusion that "every heavenly body
+without exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star, or nebula, is
+inhabited, and must be so from the inherent constitution of things." After
+which the passage continues, "It is true there are cases in which, with
+acknowledged propriety, we generalise from a single instance to a multitude
+of instances. But they must be instances which resemble the one known
+instance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with it except
+that of being instances.... But the supporters of the volition theory ask
+us to infer that volition causes everything, for no other reason except
+that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from
+being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws
+bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether
+of inorganic or of organic nature."[3]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND.
+
+Sec. 8. Leaving now the obviously untenable arguments, we next come to those
+which, in my opinion, may properly be termed scientific.
+
+It will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under one
+or other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of Theism
+will be found to range themselves.
+
+Sec. 9. We have first the argument drawn from the existence of the human mind.
+This is an argument which, for at least the last three centuries, and
+especially during the present one, has been more relied upon than any other
+by philosophical thinkers. It consists in the reflection that the being of
+our own subjective intelligence is the most certain fact which our
+experience supplies, that this fact demands an adequate cause for its
+explanation, and that the only adequate cause of our intelligence must be
+some other intelligence. Granting the existence of a conditioned
+intelligence (and no one could reasonably suppose his own intelligence to
+be otherwise), and the existence of an unconditioned intelligence becomes a
+logical necessity, unless we deny either the validity of the principle that
+every effect must have an adequate cause, or else that the only adequate
+cause of Mind is Mind.
+
+It has been a great satisfaction to me to find that my examination of this
+argument--an examination which was undertaken and completed several months
+before Mr. Mill's essay appeared--has been minutely corroborated by that of
+our great logician. I mention this circumstance here, as on previous
+occasions, not for the petty motive of vindicating my own originality, but
+because in matters of this kind the accuracy of the reasoning employed, and
+therefore the logical validity of the conclusions attained, are guaranteed
+in the best possible manner, if the trains of thought have been
+independently pursued by different minds.
+
+Sec. 10. Seeing that, among the advocates of this argument, Locke went so far
+as to maintain that by it alone he could render the existence of a Deity as
+certain as any mathematical demonstration, it is only fair, preparatory to
+our examining this argument, to present it in the words of this great
+thinker.
+
+He says:--"There was a time when there was no knowing (_i.e._, conscious)
+being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a
+knowing being from all eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no
+being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all
+understanding, I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have
+been any knowledge: it being as impossible that things wholly void of
+knowledge, and operating blindly, and without perception, should produce a
+knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three
+angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of
+senseless matter, that it should put into itself, sense, perception, and
+knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put
+into itself greater angles than two right ones."[4]
+
+Now, although this argument has been more fully elaborated by other
+writers, the above presentation contains its whole essence. It will be seen
+that it has the great advantage of resting _immediately_ upon the
+foundation from which all argument concerning this or any other matter,
+must necessarily arise, viz.,--upon the very existence of our argumentative
+faculty itself. For the sake of a critical examination, it is desirable to
+throw the argument before us into the syllogistic form. It will then stand
+thus:--
+
+All known minds are caused by an unknown mind. Our mind is a known mind;
+therefore, our mind is caused by an unknown mind.
+
+Sec. 11. Now the major premiss of this syllogism is inadmissible for two
+reasons: in the first place, it is assumed that known mind can only be
+caused by unknown mind; and, in the second place, even if this assumption
+were granted, it would not explain the existence of Mind as Mind. To take
+the last of these objections first, in the words of Mr. Mill, "If the mere
+existence of Mind is supposed to require, as a necessary antecedent,
+another Mind greater and more powerful, the difficulty is not removed by
+going one step back: the creating mind stands as much in need of another
+mind to be the source of its existence as the created mind. Be it
+remembered that we have no direct knowledge (at least apart from
+Revelation) of a mind which is even apparently eternal, as Force and Matter
+are: an eternal mind is, as far as the present argument is concerned, a
+simple hypothesis to account for the minds which we know to exist. Now it
+is essential to an hypothesis that, if admitted, it should at least remove
+the difficulty and account for the facts. But it does not account for mind
+to refer our mind to a prior mind for its origin. The problem remains
+unsolved, nay, rather increased."
+
+Nevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, "My object is
+not to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more than it is
+my object to explain Existence itself in the abstract--to either of which
+absurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally applicable;--but I
+seek for an explanation of _my own individual finite mind_, which I know to
+have had a beginning in time, and which, therefore, in accordance with the
+widest and most complete analogy that experience supplies, I believe to
+have been _caused_. And if there is no other objection to my believing in
+Intelligence as the cause of my intelligence, than that I cannot prove my
+own intelligence caused, then I am satisfied to let the matter rest here;
+for as every argument must have _some_ basis of assumption to stand upon, I
+am well pleased to find that the basis in this case is the most solid which
+experience can supply, viz.,--the law of causation. Fully admitting that it
+does not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior
+mind for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, _does_ account for the
+fact that _my mind_ exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intended
+to cover. For to endeavour to _explain_ the existence of an _eternal_ mind,
+could only be done by those who do not understand the meaning of these
+words."
+
+Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would so
+far be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis _does_ supply a provisional
+explanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, an
+explanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain.
+But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation of
+his own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in the
+abstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypothetically
+explaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing a
+probability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind. Only if
+he has some independent reason to infer that such an Unknown Mind exists,
+could such a probability be made out, and his hypothetical explanation of
+known mind become of more value than a guess. In other words, although the
+theistic hypothesis supplies _a possible_ explanation of known mind, we
+have no reason to conclude that it is _the true_ explanation, unless other
+reasons can be shown to justify, on independent grounds, the validity of
+the theistic hypothesis. Hence it is manifestly absurd to adduce this
+explanation as evidence of the hypothesis on which it rests--to argue that
+Theism must therefore be true; because we assume it to be so, in order to
+explain _known_ mind, as distinguished from _Mind_. If it be answered, We
+are justified in assuming Theism true, because we are justified in assuming
+that known mind can _only_ have been caused by an unknown mind, and hence
+that Mind must somewhere be self-existing, then this is to lead us to the
+second objection to the above syllogism.
+
+Sec. 12. And this second objection is of a most serious nature. "Mind can only
+be caused by Mind," and, therefore, Mind must either be uncaused, or caused
+by a Mind. What is our warrant for ranking this assertion? Where is the
+proof that nothing can have caused a mind except another mind? Answer to
+this question there is none. For aught that we can ever know to the
+contrary, anything within the whole range of the Possible may be competent
+to produce a self-conscious intelligence--and to assume that Mind is so far
+an entity _sui generis_, that it must either be self-existing, or derived
+from another mind which is self-existing, is merely to beg the whole
+question as to the being of a God. In other words, if we can prove that the
+order of existence to which Mind belongs, is so essentially different from
+that order, or those orders, to which all else belongs, as to render it
+_abstractedly impossible_ that the latter can produce the former--if we can
+prove this, we have likewise proved the existence of a Deity. But this is
+just the point in dispute, and to set out with a bare affirmation of it is
+merely to beg the question and to abandon the discussion. Doubtless, by the
+mere act of consulting their own consciousness, the fact now in dispute
+appears to some persons self-evident. But in matters of such high
+abstraction as this, even the evidence of self-evidence must not be relied
+upon too implicitly. To the country boor it appears self-evident that wood
+is annihilated by combustion; and even to the mind of the greatest
+philosophers of antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt that the sun moved
+over a stationary earth. Much more, therefore, may our broad distinction
+between "cogitative and incogitative being"[5] not be a distinction which
+is "legitimated by the conditions of external reality."
+
+Doubtless many will fall back upon the position already indicated, "It is
+as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into
+itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of
+a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right
+ones." But, granting this, and also that conscious matter is the sole
+alternative, and what follows? Not surely that matter cannot perceive, and
+feel, and know, merely because it is repugnant to our idea of it that it
+should. Granting that there is no other alternative in the whole
+possibility of things, than that matter must be conscious, or that
+self-conscious Mind must somewhere be self-existing; and granting that it
+is quite "impossible for us to conceive" of consciousness as an attribute
+of matter; still surely it would be a prodigious leap to conclude that for
+this reason matter cannot possess this attribute. Indeed, Locke himself
+elsewhere strangely enough insists that thought may be a property of
+matter, if only the Deity chose to unite that attribute with that
+substance. Why it should be deemed abstractedly impossible for matter to
+think if there is no God, and yet abstractedly possible that it should
+think if there is a God, I confess myself quite unable to determine; but I
+conceive that it is very important clearly to point out this peculiarity in
+Locke's views, for he is a favourite authority with theists, and this
+peculiarity amounts to nothing less than a suicide of his entire argument.
+The mere circumstance that he assumed the Deity capable of endowing matter
+with the faculty of thinking, could not have enabled him to _conceive_ of
+matter as thinking, any more than he could _conceive_ of this in the
+absence of his assumption. Yet in the one case he recognises the
+possibility of matter thinking, and in the other case denies such
+possibility, _and this on the sole ground of its being inconceivable_!
+However, I am not here concerned with Locke's eccentricities:[6] I am
+merely engaged with the general principle, that a subjective inability to
+establish certain relations in thought is no sufficient warrant for
+concluding that corresponding objective relations may not obtain.
+
+Sec. 13. Hence, an objector to the above syllogism need not be a materialist;
+it is not even necessary that he should hold any theory of things at all.
+Nevertheless, for the sake of definition, I shall assume that he is a
+materialist. As a materialist, then, he would appear to be as much entitled
+to his hypothesis as a theist is to his--in respect, I mean, of this
+particular argument. For although I think, as before shown, that in strict
+reasoning a theist might have taken exception to the last-quoted passage
+from Mill in its connection with the law of causation, that passage, if
+considered in the present connection, is certainly unanswerable. What is
+the state of the present argument as between a materialist and a theist?
+The mystery of existence and the inconceivability of matter thinking are
+their common data. Upon these data the materialist, justly arguing that he
+has no right to make his own conceptive faculty the unconditional test of
+objective possibility, is content to merge the mystery of his own mind's
+existence into that of Existence in general; while the theist, compelled to
+accept without explanation the mystery of Existence in general,
+nevertheless has recourse to inventing a wholly gratuitous hypothesis to
+explain one mode of existence in particular. If it is said that the latter
+hypothesis has the merit of causing the mystery of material existence and
+the mystery of mental existence to be united in a thinkable manner--viz.,
+in a self-existing Mind,--I reply, It is not so; for in whatever degree it
+is unthinkable that Matter should be the cause of Mind, in that precise
+degree must it be unthinkable that Mind was ever the cause of Matter, the
+correlatives being in each case the same, and experience affording no
+evidence of causality in either.
+
+Sec. 14. The two hypotheses, therefore, are of exactly equivalent value, save
+that while the one has a certain basis of fact to rest upon,[7] the other
+is wholly arbitrary. But it may still be retorted, 'Is not that which is
+_most_ conceivable _most likely_ to be true? and if it is more conceivable
+that my intelligence is caused by another Intelligence than that it is
+caused by Non-intelligence, may I not regard the more conceivable
+hypothesis as also the more probable one? It is somewhat difficult to say
+how far this argument is, in this case, valid; only I think it is quite
+evident that its validity is open to grave dispute. For nothing can be more
+evident to a philosophical thinker than that the substance of Mind must--so
+far at least as we can at present see--_necessarily_ be unknowable; so that
+if Matter (and Force) be this substance, we should antecedently expect to
+find that the actual causal connection should, in this particular case, be
+more inconceivable than some imaginary one: it would be more natural for
+the mind to infer that something conceivably more akin to itself should be
+its cause, than that this cause should be the entity which really gives
+rise to the unthinkable connection. But even waiving this reflection, and
+granting that the above argument is _valid_, it is still to an indefinite
+degree _valueless_, seeing that we are unable to tell _how much it is more
+likely_ that the more conceivable should here be true than that the less
+conceivable should be so.
+
+Sec. 15. Returning then to Locke's comparison between the certainty of this
+argument and that which proves the sum of the angles of a triangle to be
+equal to two right-angles, I should say that there is a _virtual_, though
+not a _formal_, fallacy in his presentation. For mathematical science being
+confessedly but of relative significance, any comparison between the degree
+of certainty attained by reasoning upon so transcendental a subject as the
+present, and that of mathematical demonstrations regarding relative truth,
+must be misleading. In the present instance, the whole strain of the
+argument comes upon the adequacy of the proposed test of truth, viz., our
+being able to conceive it if true. Now, will any one undertake to say that
+this test of truth is of equivalent value when it is applied to a triangle
+and when it is applied to the Deity. In the one case we are dealing with a
+geometrical figure of an exceedingly simple type, with which our experience
+is well acquainted, and presenting a very limited number of relations for
+us to contemplate. In the other case we are endeavouring to deal with the
+_summum genus_ of all mystery, with reference to which experience is quite
+impossible, and which in its mention contains all the relations that are to
+us unknown and unknowable. Here, then, is the oversight. Because men find
+conceivability a valid test of truth in the affairs of everyday life--as it
+is easy to show _a priori_ that it must be, if our experience has been
+formed under a given code of constant and general laws--therefore they
+conclude that it must be equally valid _wherever_ it is applied; forgetting
+that its validity must perforce decrease in proportion to the distance at
+which the test is applied from the sphere of experience.[8]
+
+Sec. 16. Upon the whole, then, I think it is transparently obvious that the
+mere fact of our being unable to conceive, say, how any disposition of
+matter and motion could possibly give rise to a self-conscious
+intelligence, in no wise warrants us in concluding that for this reason no
+such disposition is possible. The only question would appear to be, whether
+the test which is here proposed as an unconditional criterion of truth
+should be allowed any the smallest degree of credit. Seeing, on the one
+hand, how very fallible the test in question is known to have proved itself
+in many cases of much less speculative difficulty--seeing, too, that even
+now "the philosophy of the condition proves that things there are which
+may, nay must, be true, of which nevertheless the mind is unable to
+construe to itself the possibility;"[9] and seeing, on the other hand, that
+the substance of Mind, whatever it is, must necessarily be
+unknowable;--seeing these things, if any question remains as to whether the
+test of inconceivability should in this case be regarded as having any
+degree of validity at all, there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt that
+such degree should be regarded as of the smallest.
+
+Sec. 17. Let us then turn to the other considerations which have been supposed
+to justify the assertion that nothing can have caused our mind save another
+Mind. Neglecting the crushing fact that "it does not account for Mind to
+refer it to another Mind for its origin," let as see what positive reasons
+there are for concluding that no other influence than Intelligence can
+possibly have produced our intelligence.
+
+Sec. 18. First we may notice the argument which is well and tersely presented
+by Locke, thus:--"Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily
+contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can
+ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it
+hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily
+follows that the first eternal being cannot be Matter." Now, as this
+presentation is strictly formal, I shall first meet it with a formal reply,
+and this reply consists in a direct contradiction. It is simply untrue that
+"whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and
+actually have, at least, all the perfections that can after exist;" or that
+it can never "give to another any perfection that it hath not actually in
+itself." In a sense, no doubt, a cause contains all that is contained in
+its effects; the latter content being _potentially_ present in the former.
+But to say that a cause already contains _actually_ all that its effects
+may afterwards so contain, is a statement which logic and common sense
+alike condemn as absurd.
+
+Nevertheless, although the argument now before us thus admits of a
+childishly easy refutation on strictly formal grounds, I suspect that in
+substance the argument in a general way is often relied upon as one of very
+considerable weight. Even though it is clearly illogical to say that causes
+cannot give to their effects any perfection which they themselves do not
+actually present, yet it seems in a general way incredible that gross
+matter could contain, even potentially, the faculty of thinking.
+Nevertheless, this is but to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability;
+to do which, even were it here legitimate, would, as we have seen, be
+unavailing. But to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability in this
+case would _not_ be legitimate; for we are in possession of an abundant
+analogy to render the supposition in question, not only conceivable, but
+credible. In the words of Mr. Mill, "Apart from experience, and arguing on
+what is called reason, that is, on supposed self-evidence, the notion seems
+to be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious or
+elevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the known
+analogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are
+the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which, and by
+the properties of which, they are raised up! The tendency of all recent
+speculation is towards the opinion that the development of inferior orders
+of existence into superior, the substitution of greater elaboration, and
+higher organisation for lower, is the general rule of nature. Whether this
+is so or not, there are at least in nature a multitude of facts bearing
+that character, and this is sufficient for the argument."
+
+Sec. 19. We now come to the last of the arguments which, so far as I know,
+have ever been adduced in support of the assertion that there can be no
+other cause of our intelligence than another and superior Intelligence. The
+argument is chiefly remarkable for the very great prominence which was
+given to it by Sir W. Hamilton.
+
+This learned and able author says:--"The Deity is not an object of
+immediate contemplation; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our
+reach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only
+warranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary to
+account for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties are
+supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressive
+inference from the existence of a special class of effects to the existence
+of a special character of cause, it is evident that the whole argument
+hinges on the fact,--Does a state of things really exist such as is only
+possible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For if it can be shown that
+such a state of things does not really exist, then our inference to the
+kind of cause requisite to account for it is necessarily null.
+
+"This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class of
+phaenomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity is
+exclusively given in the phaenomena of mind,--that the phaenomena of matter
+taken by themselves, (you will observe the qualification taken by
+themselves) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God,
+would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation.
+
+"If, in man, intelligence be a free power,--in so far as its liberty
+extends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter; and a
+power independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an
+immaterial subject,--that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence
+of intelligence on matter in the human constitution, in other words, if the
+spirituality of mind in man be supposed a datum of observation, in this
+datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we have
+only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the
+same relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the first
+positive condition of a Deity is established in the establishment of the
+absolute priority of a free creative intelligence."[10]
+
+Sec. 20. Thus, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the whole question as to the
+being of a God depends upon that as to whether our "intelligence be a free
+power,"--or, as he elsewhere states it himself, "Theology is wholly
+dependent upon Psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature of man
+stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity." It will be observed
+that I am not at present engaged with the legitimacy of this author's
+decision upon the comparative merits of the different arguments in favour
+of Theism: I am merely showing the high opinion he entertained of the
+particular argument before us. He positively affirms that, unless the
+freedom of the human will be a matter of experience, Atheism is the sole
+alternative. Doubtless most well-informed readers will feel that the
+solitary basis thus provided for Theism is a very insecure one, while many
+such readers will at once conclude that if this is the only basis which
+reason can provide for Theism to stand upon, Theism is without any rational
+basis to stand upon at all. I have no hesitation in saying that the
+last-mentioned opinion is the one to which I myself subscribe, for I am
+quite unable to understand how any one at the present day, and with the
+most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself to
+embrace the theory of Free-will. I may add that I cannot but believe that
+those who do embrace this theory with an honest conviction, must have
+failed to understand the issue to which modern thought has reduced the
+question. Here, however, is not the place to discuss this question. It will
+be sufficient for my purpose to show that even Sir W. Hamilton himself
+considered it a very difficult one; and although he thought upon the whole
+that the will must be free, he nevertheless allowed--nay, insisted--that he
+was unable to conceive how it could be so. Such inability in itself does
+not of course show the Free-will theory to be untrue; and I merely point
+out the circumstance that Hamilton allowed the supposed fact unthinkable,
+in order to show how very precarious, even in his eyes, the argument which
+we are considering must have appeared. Let us then, for this purpose,
+contemplate his attitude with regard to it a little more closely. He says,
+"It would have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity
+are both incomprehensible, as beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but
+that though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so
+neither can it be speculatively disproved; while we may claim for it as a
+fact of real actuality, though of inconceivable possibility, the testimony
+of consciousness, that we are morally free, as we are morally accountable
+for our actions. In this manner the whole question of free- and bond-will
+is in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all
+the moral instincts of Man entire."[11]
+
+From this passage it is clear that Sir W. Hamilton regarded these two
+counter-theories as of precisely equivalent value in everything save "the
+testimony of consciousness;" or, as he elsewhere states it, "as equally
+unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus
+theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral
+law ... gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the
+doctrine of fate."
+
+But the whole question concerning the freedom of the will has now come to
+be as to whether or not consciousness _does_ give its verdict on the side
+of freedom. Supposing we grant that "we are warranted to rely on a
+deliverance of consciousness, when that deliverance is _that_ a thing is,
+although we may be unable to think _how_ it can be,"[12] in this case the
+question still remains, whether our opponents have rightly interpreted the
+deliverance of their consciousness. I, for one, am quite persuaded that I
+never perform any action without some appropriate motive, or set of
+motives, having induced me to perform it. However, I am not discussing this
+question, and I have merely made the above quotations for the purpose of
+showing that Sir W. Hamilton appears to identify the _theory_ of Free-will
+with the _fact_ that we possess a moral sense. He argues throughout as
+though the theory he advocates were the only one that can explain a given
+"fact of real actuality." But no one with whom we have to deal questions
+the fact of our having a moral sense; and to identify this "deliverance of
+consciousness" with belief in the theory that volitions are uncaused, is,
+or would now be, merely to abandon the only questions in dispute.
+
+It is very instructive, from this point of view, to observe the dilemma
+into which Hamilton found himself driven by this identification of genuine
+fact with spurious theory. He believed that the fact of man possessing an
+ethical faculty could only be explained by the theory that man's will was
+not determined by motives; for otherwise man could not be the author of his
+own actions. But when he considered the matter in its other aspect, he
+found that his theory of Free-will was as little compatible with moral
+responsibility as was the opposing theory of "Bond-will;" for not only did
+he candidly confess that he could not conceive of will as acting without
+motives, but he further allowed the unquestionable truth "that, though
+inconceivable, a motiveless volition would, if conceived, be conceived as
+morally worthless."[13] I say this is very instructive, because it shows
+that in Hamilton's view each theory was alike irreconcilable with "the
+deliverance of consciousness," and that he only chose the one in preference
+to the other, because, although not any more conceivable a solution, it
+seemed to him a more possible one.[14]
+
+Sec. 21. Such, then, is the speculative basis on which, according to Sir W.
+Hamilton, our belief in a Deity can alone be grounded.
+
+Those who at the present day are still confused enough in their notions
+regarding the Free-will question to suppose that any further rational
+question remains, may here be left to ruminate over this _bolus_, and to
+draw from it such nourishment as they can in support of their belief in a
+God; but to those who can see as plainly as daylight that the doctrine of
+Determinism not only harmonises with all the facts of observation, but
+alone affords a possible condition for, and a satisfactory explanation of,
+the existence of our ethical faculty,--to such persons the question will
+naturally arise:--"Although Hamilton was wrong in identifying a known fact
+with a false theory, yet may he not have been right in the deductions which
+he drew from the fact?" In other words, granting that his theory of
+Free-will was wrong, does not his argument from the existence of a moral
+sense in man to the existence of a moral Governor of the Universe remain as
+intact as ever? Now, it is quite true that whatever degree of cogency the
+argument from the presence of the moral sense may at any time have had,
+this degree remains unaffected by the explosion of erroneous theories to
+account for such presence. We have, therefore, still to face the fact that
+the moral sense of man undoubtedly exists.
+
+Sec. 22. The question we have to determine is, What evidence have we to show
+that the moral part of man was created in the image of God; and if there is
+any such evidence, what counter-existence is there to show that the moral
+existence of man may be due to natural causes? In deciding this question,
+just as in deciding any other question of a purely scientific character, we
+must be guided in our examination by the Law of Parcimony; we must not
+assume the agency of supernatural causes if we can discover the agency of
+natural causes; neither must we merge the supposed mystery directly into
+the highest mystery, until we are quite sure that it does not admit of
+being proximately explained by the action of proximate influences.
+
+Now, whether or not Mr. Darwin's theory as to the origin and development of
+the moral sense be considered satisfactory, there can, I think, be very
+little doubt in any impartial mind which duly considers the subject, that
+in _some way or other_ the moral sense has been evolved. The body of
+scientific evidence which has now been collected in favour of the general
+theory of evolution is simply overwhelming; and in the presence of so large
+an analogy, it would require a vast amount of contradictory evidence to
+remove the presumption that human conscience, like everything else, has
+been evolved. Now, for my own part, I am quite unable to distinguish any
+such evidence, while, on the other hand, in support of the _a priori_
+presumption that conscience has been evolved, I cannot conceal from myself
+that there is a large amount of _a posteriori_ confirmation. I am quite
+unable to distinguish anything in my sense of right and wrong which I
+cannot easily conceive to have been brought about during the evolution of
+my intelligence from lower forms of psychical life. On the contrary,
+everything that I can find in my sense of right and wrong is precisely what
+I should expect to find on the supposition of this sense having been
+moulded by the progressive requirements of social development. Read in the
+light of evolution, Conscience, in its every detail, is deductively
+explained.
+
+And, as though there were not sufficient evidence of this kind to justify
+the conclusion drawn from the theory of evolution, the doctrine of
+utilitarianism--separately conceived and separately worked out on
+altogether independent grounds--the doctrine of utilitarianism comes in
+with irresistible force to confirm that _a priori_ conclusion by the widest
+and most unexceptionable of inductions.[15]
+
+In the supernatural interpretation of the facts, the whole stress of the
+argument comes upon the character of conscience as a _spontaneously
+admonishing influence which acts independently of our own volition_. For it
+is from this character alone that the inference can arise that conscience
+is the delegate of the will of another. Thus, to render the whole argument
+in the singularly beautiful words of Dr. Newman:--"If, as is the case, we
+feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voice
+of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible,
+before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing
+wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us
+on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming serenity
+of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight, which follows on one
+receiving praise from a father,--we certainly have within us the image of
+some person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find
+our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in
+whose anger we waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for
+their exciting cause an intelligent being; we are not affectionate towards
+a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse
+or compunction in breaking mere human law. Yet so it is; conscience emits
+all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and,
+on the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a
+resignation, and a hope which there is no sensible, no earthly object to
+elicit. 'The wicked flees when no one pursueth;' then why does he flee?
+whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the
+hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not
+belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is
+directed must be supernatural and divine; and thus the phenomena of
+conscience as a dictate avail to impress the imagination with the picture
+of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing,
+retributive."[16]
+
+Now I have quoted this passage because it seems to me to convey in a
+concise form the whole of the argument from Conscience. But how tremendous
+are the inferences which are drawn from the facts! As the first step in our
+criticism, it is necessary to point out that two very different orders of
+feelings are here treated by Dr. Newman. There is first the pure or
+uncompounded ethical feelings, which spring directly from the moral sense
+alone, and which all men experience in varying degrees. And next there are
+what we may term the _ethico-theological_ feelings, which can only spring
+from a blending of the moral sense with a belief in a personal God, or
+other supernatural agents. The former class of feelings, or the
+uncompounded ethical class, have exclusive reference to the moral
+obligations that subsist between ourselves and other human beings, or
+sentient organisms. The latter class of feelings, or the ethico-theological
+class, have reference to the moral obligations that are believed to subsist
+between ourselves and the Deity, or other supernatural beings. Now, in
+order not to lose sight of this all-important distinction, I shall
+criticise Dr. Newman's rendering of the ordinary argument from Conscience
+in each of these two points of views separately. To begin, then, with the
+uncompounded ethical feelings.
+
+Such emotions as attend the operation of conscience in those who follow its
+light alone without any theories as to its supernatural origin, are all of
+the character of _reasonable_ or _explicable_ emotions. Granting that
+fellow-feeling has been for the benefit of the race, and therefore that it
+has been developed by natural causes, certainly there is nothing
+_mysterious_ in the emotions that attend the violating or the following of
+the dictates of conscience. For conscience is, by this naturalistic
+supposition, nothing more than an organised body of certain psychological
+elements, which, by long inheritance, have come to inform us, by way of
+intuitive feeling, how we should act for the interests of society; so that,
+if this hypothesis is correct, there cannot be anything more mysterious or
+supernatural in the working of conscience than there is in the working of
+any of our other faculties. That the disagreeable feeling of
+_self-reproach_, as distinguished from _religious_ feeling, should follow
+upon a violation of such an organized body of psychological elements,
+cannot be thought surprising, if it is remembered that one of these
+elements is natural fellow-feeling, and the others the elements which lead
+us to know directly that we have violated the interests of other persons.
+And as regards the mere fact that the working of conscience is independent
+of the will, surely this is not more than we find, in varying degrees, to
+be true of all our emotions; and conscience, according to the evolution
+theory, has its root in the emotions. Hence, it is no more an argument to
+say that the irrepressible character of conscience refers us to a God of
+morality, than it would be to say that the sometimes resistless force of
+the ludicrous refers us to a god of laughter. Love, again, is an emotion
+which cannot be subdued by volition, and in its tendency to persist bears
+just such a striking resemblance to the feelings of morality as we should
+expect to find on the supposition of the former having played an important
+part in the genesis of the latter. The _dictating_ character of conscience,
+therefore, is clearly in itself of no avail as pointing to a superhuman
+Dictator. Thus, for example, to take Dr. Newman's own illustration, why
+should we feel such tearful, broken-hearted sorrow on intentionally or
+carelessly hurting a mother? We see no shadow of a reason for resorting to
+any supernatural hypothesis to explain the fact--love between mother and
+offspring being an essential condition to the existence of higher animals.
+Yet this is a simple case of truly conscientious feeling, where the thought
+of any _personal_ cause of conscience _need_ not be entertained, and is
+certainly not necessary to explain the effects. And similarly with _all_
+cases of conscientious feeling, _except in cases where it refers directly
+to its supposed author_. But these latter cases, or the ethico-theological
+class of feelings, are in no way surprising. If the moral sense has had a
+natural genesis in the actual relations between man and man, as soon as an
+ideal "image" of "a holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive" God is
+firmly believed to have an objective existence, as a matter of course moral
+feelings must become transferred to the relations which are believed to
+obtain between ourselves and this most holy God. Indeed, it is these very
+feelings which, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, must be
+concluded, in accordance with the law of parcimony, to have _generated_
+this idea of God as "holy, just," and good. And the mere fact that, when
+the complex system of religious belief has once been built up, conscience
+is strongly wrought upon by that belief and its accompanying emotions, is
+surely a fact the very reverse of mysterious. Suppose, for the sake of
+argument, that the moral sense has been evolved from the social feelings,
+and should we not certainly expect that, when the belief in a moral and
+all-seeing God is superadded, conscience should be distracted at the
+thought of offending him, and experience a "soothing, satisfactory delight"
+in the belief that we are pleasing him? And as to the argument, "Why does
+the wicked flee when none pursueth? whence his terror?" the question admits
+of only too easy an answer. Indeed, the form into which the question is
+thrown would almost seem--were it not written by Dr. Newman--to imply a
+sarcastic reference to the power of superstition. "Who is it that," not
+only Dr. Newman, but the haunted savage, the mediaeval sorcerer, or the
+frightened child, "sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of
+his heart?" Who but the "image" of his own thought? "If the cause of these
+emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his
+perception is directed must be supernatural and divine." Assuredly; but
+what an inference from what an assumption! Whether or not the moral sense
+has been developed by natural causes, "these emotions" of terror at the
+thought of offending beings "supernatural and divine" are not of such
+unique occurrence "in the visible world" as to give Dr. Newman the monopoly
+of his particular "Object." With a deeper meaning, therefore, than he
+intends may we repeat, "The phenomena of conscience as a dictate _avail_ to
+impress the _imagination_ with the _picture_ of a Supreme Governor." But
+criticism here is positively painful. Let it be enough to say that those of
+us who do not already believe in any such particular "Object"--be it ghost,
+shape, demon, or deity--are strangers, utter and complete, to any such
+supernatural pursuers. The fact, therefore, of these various religious
+emotions being associated with conscience in the minds of theists, can in
+itself be no proof of Theism, seeing that it is the theory of Theism which
+itself _engenders_ these emotions; those who do not believe in this theory
+experiencing none of these feelings of personal dread, responsibility to an
+unknown God, and the feelings of doing injury to, or of receiving praise
+from, a parent. To such of us the violation of conscience is its own
+punishment, as the pursuit of virtue is its own reward. For we know that
+not more certainly than fire will burn, any violation of the deeply-rooted
+feelings of our humanity will leave a gaping wound which even time may not
+always heal. And when it is shown us that our natural dread of fire is due
+to a supernatural cause, we may be prepared to entertain the argument that
+our natural dread of sin, as distinguished from our dread of God, is
+likewise due to such a cause. But until this can be done we must, as
+reasonable men, _whose minds have been trained in the school of nature_,
+forbear to allow that the one fact is of any greater cogency than the
+other, so far as the question of a supernatural cause of either is
+concerned. For, as we have already seen, the law of parcimony forbids us to
+ascribe "the phenomena of conscience as a dictate" to a supernatural cause,
+until the science of psychology shall have proved that they cannot have
+been due to natural causes. But, as we have also seen, the science of
+psychology is now beginning, as quick and thoroughly as can be expected, to
+prove the very converse; so that the probability is now overwhelming that
+our moral sense, like all our other faculties, has been evolved. Therefore,
+while the burden of proof really lies on the side of Theism--or with those
+who account for the natural phenomena of conscience by the hypothesis of a
+supernatural origin--this burden is now being rapidly discharged by the
+opposite side. That is to say, while the proofs which are now beginning to
+substantiate the naturalistic hypothesis are all in full accord with the
+ordinary lines of scientific explanations, the vague and feeble reflections
+of those who still maintain that Conscience is evidence of Deity, are all
+such as run counter to the very truisms of scientific method.
+
+In the face of all the facts, therefore, I find it impossible to recognise
+as valid any inference which is drawn from the existence of our moral sense
+to the existence of a God; although, of course, all inferences drawn from
+the existence of our moral sense to the _character_ of a God already
+believed to exist remain unaffected by the foregoing considerations.[17]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN.
+
+Sec. 23. The argument from Design, as presented by Mill, is merely a
+resuscitation of it as presented by Paley. True it is that the logical
+penetration of the former enabled him to perceive that the latter had "put
+the case much too strongly;" although, even here, he has failed to see
+wherein Paley's error consisted. He says:--"If I found a watch on an
+apparently desolate island, I should indeed infer that it had been left
+there by a human being; but the inference would not be from the marks of
+design, but because I already know by direct experience that watches are
+made by men." Now I submit that this misses the whole point of Paley's
+meaning; for it is evident that there would be no argument at all unless
+this author be understood to say what he clearly enough expresses, viz.,
+that the evidence of design supposed to be afforded by the watch is
+supposed to be afforded by examination of its mechanism only, and not by
+any previous knowledge as to how that particular mechanism called a watch
+is made. Paley, I take it, only chose a watch for his example because he
+knew that no reader would dispute the fact that watches are constructed by
+design: except for the purpose of pointing out that mechanism is in some
+cases admitted to be due to intelligence, for all the other purposes of his
+argument he might as well have chosen for his illustration any case of
+mechanism occurring in nature. What the real fallacy in Paley's argument
+is, is another question, and this I shall now endeavour to answer; for, as
+Mill's argument is clearly the same in kind as that of Paley and his
+numberless followers, in examining the one I am also examining the other.
+
+Sec. 24. In nature, then, we see innumerable examples of apparent design: are
+these of equal value in testifying to the presence of a designing
+intelligence as are similar examples of human contrivance, and if not, why
+not? The answer to the first of these questions is patent. If such examples
+were of the same value in the one case as they are in the other, the
+existence of a Deity would be, as Paley appears to have thought it was,
+demonstrated by the fact. A brief and yet satisfactory answer to the second
+question is not so easy, and we may best approach it by assuming the
+existence of a Deity. If, then, there is a God, it by no means follows that
+every apparent contrivance in nature is an actual contrivance, in the same
+sense as is any human contrivance. The eye of a vertebrated animal, for
+instance, exhibits as much apparent design as does a watch; but no one--at
+the present day, at least--will undertake to affirm that the evidence of
+divine thought furnished by one example is as conclusive as is the evidence
+of human thought furnished by the other--and this even assuming a Deity to
+exist. Why is this? The reason, I think, is, that we know by our personal
+experience what are our own relations to the material world, and to the
+laws which preside over the action of physical forces; while we can have no
+corresponding knowledge of the relations subsisting between the Deity and
+these same objects of our own experience. Hence, to suppose that the Deity
+constructed the eye by any such process of thought as we know that men
+construct watches, is to make an assumption not only incapable of proof,
+but destitute of any assignable degree of likelihood. Take an example. The
+relation in which a bee stands to the external world is to a large extent a
+matter of observation, and, therefore, no one imagines that the formation
+of its scientifically-constructed cells is due to any profound study on the
+bee's part. Whatever the origin of the cell-making instinct may have been,
+its nature is certainly not the same as it would have been in man,
+supposing him to have had occasion to construct honeycombs. It may be said
+that the requisite calculations have been made for the bees by the Deity;
+but, even if this assumption were true, it would be nothing to the point,
+which is merely that even within the limits of the animal kingdom the
+relations of intelligence to the external world are so diverse, that the
+same results may be accomplished by totally different intellectual
+processes. And as this example is parallel to the case on which we are
+engaged in everything save the _observability_ of the relations involved,
+it supplies us with the exact measure of the probability we are trying to
+estimate. Hence it is evident that so long as we remain ignorant of the
+element essential to the argument from design in its Paleyerian form--viz.,
+knowledge or presumption of the relations subsisting between an
+hypothetical Deity and his creation--so long must that argument remain, not
+only unassignably weak, but incapable of being strengthened by any number
+of examples similar in kind.
+
+Sec. 25. To put the case in another way. The root fallacy in Paley's argument
+consisted in reasoning from a particular to an universal. Because he knew
+that design was the cause of adaptation in some cases, and because the
+phenomena of life exhibited more instances of adaptation than any other
+class of phenomena in nature, he pointed to these phenomena as affording an
+exceptional kind of proof of the presence in nature of intelligent agency.
+Yet, if it is admitted--and of this, even in Paley's days, there was a
+strong analogical presumption--that the phenomena of life are throughout
+their history as much subject to law as are any other phenomena
+whatsoever,--that the method of the divine government, supposing such to
+exist, is the same here as elsewhere; then nothing can be clearer than that
+any amount of observable adaptation of means to ends within this class of
+phenomena cannot afford any different kind of evidence of _design_ than is
+afforded by any other class of phenomena whatsoever. Either we know the
+relations of the Deity to his creation, or we do not. If we do, then we
+must know whether or not _every_ physical change which occurs in accordance
+with law--_i.e._, every change occurring within experience, and so, until
+contrary evidence is produced, presumably every change occurring beyond
+experience--was separately planned by the Deity. If we do not, then we have
+no more reason to suppose that any one set of physical changes rather than
+another has been separately planned by him, unless we could point (as Paley
+virtually pointed) to one particular set of changes and assert, These are
+not subject to the same method of divine government which we observe
+elsewhere, or, in other words, to law. If it is retorted that _in some way
+or other_ all these wonderful adaptations must ultimately have been due to
+intelligence, this is merely to shift the argument to a ground which we
+shall presently have to consider: all we are now engaged upon is to show
+that we have no right to found arguments on the assumed _mode_, _manner_,
+or _process_ by which the supposed intelligence is thought to have
+operated. We can here see, then, more clearly where Paley stumbled. He
+virtually assumed that the relations subsisting between the Deity and the
+universe were such, that the exceptional adaptations met with in the
+organised part of the latter cannot have been due to the same intellectual
+_processes_ as was the rest of the universe--or that, if they were, still
+they yielded better evidence of having been due to these processes than
+does the rest of the universe. And it is easy to perceive that his error
+arose from his pre-formed belief in special creation. So long as a man
+regards every living organism which he sees as the lineal descendant of a
+precisely similar organism originally struck out by the immediate fiat of
+Deity, so long is he justified in holding his axiom, "Contrivance must have
+had a contriver." For "adaptation" then becomes to our minds the synonym of
+"contrivance"--it being utterly inconceivable that the numberless
+adaptations found in any living organism could have resulted in any other
+way than by intelligent contrivance, at the time when this organism was in
+the first instance _suddenly_ introduced into its complex conditions of
+life. Still, as an argument, this is of course merely reasoning in a
+circle: we adopt a hypothesis which presupposes the existence of a Deity as
+the first step in the proof of his existence. I do not say that Paley
+committed this error expressly, but merely that if it had not been for his
+pre-formed conviction as to the truth of the special-creation theory, he
+would probably not have written his "Natural Theology."
+
+Sec. 26. Thus let us take a case of his own choosing, and the one which is
+adduced by him as typical of "the application of the argument." "I know of
+no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of comparing a
+single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As
+far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same
+proof that the eye was made for vision as there is that the telescope was
+made for assisting it. They are both made upon the same principles, both
+being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays
+of light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves;
+but these laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted to
+them. For instance: these laws require, in order to produce the same
+effect, that the rays of light, in passing through water into the eye,
+should be refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of air
+into the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of
+it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial
+animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this
+difference?" But what, let us ask, is the proximate cause of this
+difference? 'The immediate volition of the Deity, manifested in special
+creation,' virtually answers Paley; while we of to-day are able to reply,
+'The agency of natural laws, to wit, inheritance, variation, survival of
+the fittest, and probably of other laws as yet not discovered.' Now, of
+course, according to the former of these two premises, there can be no more
+legitimate conclusion than that the difference in question is due to
+intelligent and special design; but, according to the other premise, it is
+equally clear that no conclusion can be more unwarranted; for, under the
+latter view, the greater rotundity of the crystalline lens in a fish's eye
+no more exhibits the presence of any special design than does the
+adaptation of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means of
+excavating. When, therefore, Paley goes on to ask:--"How is it possible,
+under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of
+equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the case of the eye, yet to
+acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest
+and clearest of all propositions, in the case of the telescope?" the answer
+is sufficiently obvious, namely, that the "evidence" in the two cases is
+_not_ "equal;"--any more than is the existence, say, of the Nile of equal
+value in point of evidence that it was designed for traffic, as is the
+existence of the Suez Canal that it was so designed. And the mere fact that
+the problem of achromatism was solved by "the mind of a sagacious optician
+inquiring how this matter was managed in the eye," no more proves that
+"this could not be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the
+optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose," than would
+the fact, say, of the winnowing of corn having suggested the
+fanning-machine prove that air currents were designed for the purpose of
+eliminating chaff from grain. In short, the real substance of the argument
+from Design must eventually merge into that which Paley, in the
+above-quoted passage, expressly passes over--viz., "the origin of the laws
+themselves;" for so long as there is any reason to suppose that any
+apparent "adaptation" to a certain set of "fixed laws" is itself due to the
+influence of other "fixed laws," so long have we as little right to say
+that the latter set of fixed laws exhibit any better indications of
+intelligent adaptation to the former set, than the former do to that of the
+latter--the eye to light, than light to the eye. Hence I conceive that Mill
+is entirely wrong when he says of Paley's argument, "It surpasses analogy
+exactly as induction surpasses it," because "the instances chosen are
+particular instances of a circumstance which experience shows to have a
+real connection with an intelligent origin--the fact of conspiring to an
+end." Experience shows as this, but it shows us more besides; it shows us
+that there is no _necessary_ or _uniform_ connection between an
+"intelligent origin" and the fact of apparent "means conspiring to an
+[apparent] end." If the reader will take the trouble to compare this
+quotation just made from Mill, and the long train of reasoning that
+follows, with an admirable illustration in Mr. Wallace's "Natural
+Selection," he will be well rewarded by finding all the steps in Mr. Mill's
+reasoning so closely paralleled by the caricature, that but for the
+respective dates of publication, one might have thought the latter had an
+express reference to the former.[18] True, Mr. Mill closes his argument
+with a brief allusion to the "principle of the survival of the fittest,"
+observing that "creative forethought is not absolutely the only link by
+which the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connected
+with the fact of sight." I am surprised, however, that a man of Mr. Mill's
+penetration did not see that whatever view we may take as to "the adequacy
+of this principle (_i.e._, Natural Selection) to account for such truly
+admirable combinations as some of those in nature," the argument from
+_Design_ is not materially affected. So far as this argument is concerned,
+the issue is not Design _versus_ Natural Selection, but it is Design
+_versus_ Natural Law. By all means, "leaving this remarkable speculation
+(_i.e._, Mr. Darwin's) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have
+in store for it," and it by no means follows that "in the present state of
+knowledge the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability
+in favour of creation by intelligence." For whatever we may think of this
+special theory as to the _mode_, there can be no longer any reasonable
+doubt, "in the present state of our knowledge," as to the truth of the
+general theory of _Evolution_; and the latter, if accepted, is as
+destructive to the argument from _Design_ as would the former be if proved.
+In a word, it is the _fact_ and not the _method_ of Evolution which is
+subversive of Teleology in its Paleyerian form.
+
+Sec. 27. We have come then to this:--Apparent intellectual adaptations are
+perfectly valid indications of design, so long as their authorship is known
+to be confined to human intelligence; for then we know from experience what
+are our relations to these laws, and so in any given case can argue _a
+posteriori_ that such an adaptation to such a set of laws by such an
+intelligence can only have been due to such a process. But when we overstep
+the limits of experience, we are not entitled to argue anything _a priori_
+of any other intelligence in this respect, even supposing any such
+intelligence to exist. The analogy by which the unknown relations are
+inferred from the known is "infinitely precarious;" seeing that two of the
+analogous terms--to wit, the divine intelligence and the human--may differ
+to an immeasurable extent in their properties--nay, are supposed thus to
+differ, the one being supposed omniscient, omnipotent, &c., and the other
+not. And, as a final step, we may now see that the argument from Design, in
+its last resort, resolves itself into a _petitio principii_. For,
+ultimately, the only point which the analogical argument in question is
+adduced to prove is, that the relations subsisting between an Unknown Cause
+and certain physical forces are so far identical with the relations known
+to subsist between human intelligence and these same forces, that similar
+intellectual processes are required in the two cases to account for the
+production of similar effects--and hence that the Unknown Cause is
+intelligent. But it is evident that the analogy itself can have no
+existence, except upon the presupposition that these two sets of relations
+_are_ thus identical. The point which the analogy is adduced to prove is
+therefore postulated by the fact of its being adduced at all, and the whole
+argument resolves itself into a case of _petitio principii_.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS.
+
+Sec. 28. Turning now to an important error of Mr. Mill's in respect of
+omission, I firmly believe that all competent writers who have ever
+undertaken to support the argument from Design, have been moved to do so by
+their instinctive appreciation of the much more important argument, which
+Mill does not mention at all and which we now proceed to consider--the
+argument from General Laws. That is to say, I cannot think that any one
+competent writer ever seriously believed, had he taken time to analyse his
+beliefs, that the cogency of his argument lay in assuming any knowledge
+concerning the _process_ of divine thought; he must have really believed
+that it lay entirely in his observation of the _product_ of divine
+thought--or rather, let us say, of divine intelligence. Now this is the
+whole difference between the argument from Design and the argument from
+General Laws. The argument from Design says, There must be a God, because
+such and such an organic structure must have been due to such and such an
+intellectual _process_. The argument from General Laws says, There must be
+a God, because such and such an organic structure must _in some way or
+other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence. Nor does this argument end
+here. Not only must such and such an organic structure have been ultimately
+due to intelligence, but every such structure--nay, every phenomenon in the
+universe--must have been the same; for all phenomena are alike subject to
+the same method of sequence. The argument is thus a cumulative one; for as
+there is no single known exception to this universal mode of existence, the
+united effect of so vast a body of evidence is all but irresistible, and
+its tendency is clearly to point us to some _one_ explanatory cause. The
+scope of this argument is therefore co-extensive with the universe; it
+draws alike upon all phenomena with which experience is acquainted. For
+instance, it contains all the phenomena covered by the Design argument,
+just as a genus contains any one of its species; it being manifest, from
+what was said in the last section, that if the general doctrine of
+Evolution is accepted, the argument from Design must of necessity merge
+into that from General Laws. And this wide basis, we may be sure, must be
+the most legitimate one whereon to rest an argument in favour of Theism. If
+there is any such thing as such an argument at all, the most unassailable
+field for its display must be the universe as a whole, seeing that if we
+separate any one section of the universe from the rest, and suppose that we
+here discover a different kind of testimony to intelligence from that which
+we can discover elsewhere, we may from analogy be abundantly sure that on
+the confines of our division there must be second causes and general laws
+at work (whether discoverable or not), which are the immediate agents in
+the production of the observed results. Of course I do not deny that some
+classes of phenomena afford us more and better proofs of intellectual
+agency than do others, in the sense of the laws in operation being more
+numerous, subtle, and complex; but it will be seen that this is a different
+interpretation of the evidence from that against which I am contending.
+Thus, if there are tokens of divine intention (as distinguished from
+design) to be met with in the eye,--if it is inconceivable that so "nice
+and intricate a structure" should exist without intelligence as its
+_ultimate_ cause; then the discovery of natural selection, or of any other
+law, as the _manner_ in which this intelligence wrought in no wise
+attenuates the proof as to the fact of an intelligent cause. On the
+contrary, it tends rather to confirm it; for, besides the evidence before
+existing, there is added that which arises from the conformity of the
+method to that which is observable in the rest of the universe.
+
+Thus, notwithstanding what Hamilton, Chalmers, and others have said, I
+cannot but feel that the ubiquitous action of general laws is, of all facts
+supplied by experience, the most cogent in its bearing upon teleology. If
+perpetual and uninterrupted uniformity of method does not indicate the
+existence of a presiding intelligence, it becomes a question whether any
+other kind of method--short of the intelligently miraculous--could possibly
+do so; seeing that the further the divine _modus operandi_ (supposing such
+to exist) were removed from absolute uniformity, the greater would be the
+room for our interpreting it as mere fortuity. But forasmuch as the
+progress of science has shown that within experience the method of the
+Supreme Causality is absolutely uniform, the hypothesis of fortuity is
+rendered irrational; and let us think of this Supreme Causality as we may,
+the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive influence of
+uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous magnitude and exact
+precision, worthy of our highest possible conceptions of Deity.
+
+Sec. 29. Had it been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I doubt not
+that I should have regarded the foregoing considerations as final: I should
+have concluded that there was an overwhelming balance of rational
+probability in favour of Theism; and I think I should also have insisted
+that this balance of rational probability would require to continue as it
+was till the end of time. I should have maintained, in some such words as
+the following, in which the Rev. Baden Powell conveys this argument:--"The
+very essence of the whole argument is the invariable preservation of the
+principle of _order_: not necessarily such as we can directly recognise,
+but the universal conviction of the unfailing subordination of everything
+to _some_ grand principles of _law_, however imperfectly apprehended in our
+partial conceptions, and the successive subordination of such laws to
+others of still higher generality, to an extent transcending our
+conceptions, and constituting the true chain of universal causation which
+culminates in the sublime conception of the COSMOS.
+
+"It is in immediate connection with this enlarged view of universal
+immutable natural order that I have regarded the narrow notions of those
+who obscure the sublime prospect by imagining so unworthy an idea as that
+of occasional interruptions in the physical economy of the world.
+
+"The only instance considered was that of the alleged sudden supernatural
+origination of new species of organised beings in remote geological epochs.
+It is in relation to the broad principle of law, if once rightly
+apprehended, that such inferences are seen to be wholly unwarranted by
+science, and such fancies utterly derogatory and inadmissible in
+philosophy; while, even in those instances properly understood, the real
+scientific conclusions of the invariable and indissoluble chain of
+causation stand vindicated in the sublime contemplations with which they
+are thus associated.
+
+"To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, the one essential
+requisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this
+_one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather constituting the
+very idea of nature_;--which forms the vital essence of the whole of
+inductive science, and the sole assurance of those higher inferences from
+the inductive study of natural causes which are the vindications of a
+supreme intelligence and a moral cause.
+
+"_The whole of the ensuing discussion must stand or fall with the admission
+of this grand principle_. Those who are not prepared to embrace it in its
+full extent may probably not accept the conclusions; but they must be sent
+back to the school of inductive science, where alone it must be
+independently imbibed and thoroughly assimilated with the mind of the
+student in the first instance.
+
+"On the slightest consideration of the nature, the foundations, and general
+results of inductive science,... we recognise the powers of intellect fitly
+employed in the study of nature,... pre-eminently leading us to perceive
+_in nature_, and in the invariable and universal constancy of its laws, the
+indications of universal, unchangeable, and recondite arrangement,
+dependence, and connection in reason....
+
+"We thus see the importance of taking a more enlarged view of the great
+argument of natural theology; and the necessity for so doing becomes the
+more apparent when we reflect on the injury to which these sublime
+inferences are exposed from the narrow and unworthy form in which the
+reasoning has been too often conducted....
+
+"The satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those more
+enlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation of
+cosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences from the
+_past_, but to proofs of the _ever-present_ mind and reason in nature.
+
+"If we read a book which it requires much thought and exercise of reason to
+understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as
+we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present
+comprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason _exist
+in that book_ irrespectively of our minds, and equally so of any question
+as to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly exists, and is ever
+open to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case under a slightly
+different form:--When the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or the
+naturalist notes down a series of observed facts or measured dates, he is
+not an _author_ expressing his own ideas,--he is a mere _amanuensis_ taking
+down the dictations of nature: his observation book is the record of the
+thoughts of _another mind_: he has but set down literally what he himself
+does not understand, or only very imperfectly. On further examination, and
+after deep and anxious study, he perhaps begins to decipher the meaning, by
+perceiving some law which gives a signification to the facts; and the
+further he pursues the investigation up to any more comprehensive theory,
+the more fully he perceives that there is a higher reason, of which his own
+is but the humbler interpreter, and into whose depths he may penetrate
+continually further, to discover yet more profound and invariable order and
+system, always indicating still deeper and more hidden abysses yet
+unfathomed, but throughout which he is assured the same recondite and
+immutable arrangement ever prevails.
+
+"That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself
+thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must
+be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is but partial, then
+the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the
+student. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the
+necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast
+extent and compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and its
+reality, as _existing in the immutably connected order of objects
+examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator.
+
+"But considerations of this kind, just and transcendently important as they
+are in themselves, give us no aid in any inquiry into the _origin_ of the
+order of things thus investigated, or the _nature_ or other attributes of
+the mind evinced in them.
+
+"The real argument for universal _intelligence_, manifested in the
+universality of order and law in the material world, is very different from
+any attempt to give a form to our conceptions, even by the language of
+analogy, as to the _nature_ or _mode of existence_ or operation of that
+intelligence [_i.e._, as I have stated the case, the argument can only rest
+on a study of the _products_, as distinguished from the _processes_ of such
+intelligence]: and still more different from any extension of our inference
+from what _is_ to what _may have been_, from _present_ order to a supposed
+_origination_, first adjustment, or planning of that order.
+
+"By keeping these distinctions steadily in view, we appreciate properly
+both the limits and the extent and compass of what we may appropriately
+call COSMOTHEOLOGY."[19]
+
+I have quoted these passages at length, because they convey in a more
+forcible, guarded, and accurate manner than any others with which I am
+acquainted, the strictly rational standing of this great subject prior to
+the date at which the above-quoted passage was written. Therefore, as I
+have said, if it had been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I
+should certainly have rested in these "sublime conceptions" as in an
+argument supreme and irrefutable. I should have felt that the progress of
+physical knowledge could never exert any other influence on Theism than
+that of ever tending more and more to confirm that magnificent belief, by
+continuously expanding our human thoughts into progressively advancing
+conceptions, ever grander and yet more grand, of that tremendous Origin of
+Things--the Mind of God. Such would have been my hope--such would have been
+my prayer. But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has so
+terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now
+behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might,
+uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed, and
+burying our highest life in mindless desolation. Science, whom erstwhile we
+thought a very Angel of God, pointing to that great barrier of Law, and
+proclaiming to the restless sea of changing doubt, "Hitherto shalt thou
+come, but no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed,"--even
+Science has now herself thrown down this trusted barrier; the flood-gates
+of infidelity are open, and Atheism overwhelming is upon us.
+
+Sec. 30. All and every law follows as a necessary consequence from the
+persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter.[20] That this
+must be so is evident if we consider that, were it not so, force could not
+be permanent nor matter constant. For instance, if action and reaction were
+not invariably equal and opposite, force would not be invariably
+persistent, seeing that in no case can the formula fail, unless some one or
+other of the forces concerned, or parts of them, disappear. And as with a
+simple law of this kind, so with every other natural law and
+inter-operation of laws, howsoever complex such inter-operation may be; for
+it is manifest that if in any case similar antecedents did not determine
+similar consequents, on one or other of these occasions some quantum of
+force, or of matter, or of both, must have disappeared--or, which is the
+same thing, the law of causation cannot have been constant. Every natural
+law, therefore, may be defined as the formula of a sequence, which must
+either ensue upon certain forces of a given intensity impinging upon
+certain given quantities, kinds, and forms of matter, or else, by not
+ensuing, prove that the force or the matter concerned were not of a
+permanent nature.
+
+Sec. 31. The argument, then, which was elaborated in Sec. 29, and which has so
+long and so generally received the popular sanction in the common-sense
+epitome, that in the last record there must be mind in external nature,
+since "that which it requires thought and reason to understand must itself
+be thought and reason,"--this argument, I say, must now for ever be
+abandoned by reasonable men. No doubt it would be easy to point to several
+speculative thinkers who have previously combated this argument,[21] and
+from this fact some readers will perhaps be inclined to judge, from a false
+analogy, that as the argument in question has withstood previous assaults,
+it need not necessarily succumb to the present one. Be it observed,
+however, that the present assault differs from all previous assaults, just
+as demonstration differs from speculation. What has hitherto been but mere
+guess and unwarrantable assertion has now become a matter of the greatest
+certainty. That the argument from General Laws is a futile argument, is no
+longer a matter of unverifiable opinion: it is as sure as is the most
+fundamental axiom of science. That the argument will long remain in
+illogical minds, I doubt not; but that it is from henceforth quite
+inadmissible in accurate thinking, there can be no question. For the sake,
+however, of impressing this fact still more strongly upon such readers as
+have been accustomed to rely upon this argument, and so find it difficult
+thus abruptly to reverse the whole current of their thoughts,--for the sake
+of such, I shall here add a few remarks with the view of facilitating the
+conception of an universal Order existing independently of Mind.
+
+Sec. 32. Interpreting the mazy nexus of phenomena only by the facts which
+science has revealed, and what conclusion are we driven to accept? Clearly,
+looking to what has been said in the last two sections, that from the time
+when the process of evolution first began,--from the time before the
+condensation of the nebula had showed any signs of commencing,--every
+subsequent change or event of evolution was _necessarily bound_ to ensue;
+else force and matter have not been persistent. How then, it will be asked,
+did the vast nexus of natural laws which is now observable ever begin or
+continue to be? In this way. When the first womb of things was pregnant
+with all the future, there would probably have been existent at any rate
+not more than one of the formulae which we now call natural laws. This one
+law, of course, would have been the law of gravitation. Here we may take
+our stand. It does not signify whether there ever was a time when
+gravitation was not,--_i.e._, if ever there was a time when matter, _as we
+now know it_, was not in existence;--for if there ever was such a time,
+there is no reason to doubt, but every reason to conclude, that the
+evolution of matter, as we now know it, was accomplished in accordance with
+law. Similarly, we are not concerned with the question as to how the law of
+gravitation came to be associated with matter; for it is overwhelmingly
+probable, from the extent of the analogy, that if our knowledge concerning
+molecular physics were sufficiently great, the existence of the law in
+question would be found to follow as a necessary deduction from the primary
+qualities of matter and force, just as we can now see that, when present,
+its peculiar quantitative action necessarily follows from the primary
+qualities of space.
+
+Starting, then, with these data,--matter, force, and the law of
+gravitation,--what must happen? We have the strongest scientific reason to
+believe that the matter of the solar system primordially existed in a
+highly diffused or nebulous form. By mutual gravitation, therefore, all the
+substance of the nebula must have begun to concentrate upon itself, or to
+condense. Now, from this point onwards, I wish it to be clearly understood
+that the mere consideration of the supposed facts not admitting of
+scientific proof, or of scientific explanation if true, in no wise affects
+the certainty of the doctrine which these facts are here adduced to
+establish. Fully granting that the alleged facts are not beyond dispute,
+and that, even if true, innumerable other unknown and unknowable facts must
+have been associated with them--fully admitting, in short, that our ideas
+concerning the genesis of the solar system are of the crudest and least
+trustworthy character; still, if it be admitted, what at the present day
+only ignorance or prejudice can deny, viz., that, as a whole, evolution has
+been the method of the universe; then it follows that the doctrine here
+contended for is as certainly true as it would be were we fully acquainted
+with every cause and every change which has acted and ensued throughout the
+whole process of the genesis of things.
+
+Now, bearing this caveat in mind, we have next to observe that when once
+the nebula began to condense, new relations among its constituent parts
+would, _for this reason_, begin to be established. "Given a rare and widely
+diffused mass of nebulous matter,... what are the successive changes that
+will take place? Mutual gravitation will approximate its atoms, but their
+approximation will be opposed by atomic repulsion, the overcoming of which
+implies the evolution of heat." That is to say, the condensation of the
+nebula as a whole of necessity implies at least the origination of these
+new material and dynamical relations among its constituent parts. "As fast
+as this heat partially escapes by radiation, further approximation will
+take place, attended by further evolution of heat, and so on continuously:
+the processes not occurring separately, as here described, but
+simultaneously, uninterruptedly, and with increasing activity." Hence the
+newly established relations continuously acquire new increments of
+intensity. But now observe a more important point. The previous essential
+conditions remaining unaltered--viz., the persistence of matter and force,
+as well as, or rather let us say and consequently, the law of
+gravitation--these conditions, I say, remaining constant, and the newly
+established relations would necessarily _of themselves_ give origin to
+_new_ laws. For whenever two given quantities of force and matter met in
+one of the novel relations, they would of necessity give rise to novel
+effects; and whenever, on any future occasion, similar quantities of force
+and matter again so met, precisely similar effects would of necessity
+require to occur: but the occurrence of similar effects under similar
+conditions is all that we mean by a natural law.
+
+Continuing, then, our quotation from Mr. Herbert Spencer's terse and lucid
+exposition of the nebular theory, we find this doctrine virtually embodied
+in the next sentences:--"Eventually this slow movement of the atoms towards
+their common centre of gravity will bring about phenomena of another order.
+
+"Arguing from the known laws of atomic combination, it will happen that,
+when the nebulous mass has reached a particular stage of condensation--when
+its internally situated atoms have approached to within certain distances,
+have generated a certain amount of heat, and are subject to a certain
+mutual pressure (the heat and pressure increasing as the aggregation
+progresses), some of them will suddenly enter into chemical union. Whether
+the binary atoms so produced be of kinds such as we know, which is
+possible, or whether they be of kinds simpler than any we know, which is
+more probable, matters not to the argument. It suffices that molecular
+combinations of some species will finally take place." We have, then, here
+a new and important change of relations. Matter, primordially uniform, has
+itself become heterogeneous; and in as many places as it has thus changed
+its state, it must, in virtue of the fact, give rise to other hitherto
+novel relations, and so, in many cases, to new laws.[22]
+
+It would be tedious and unnecessary to trace this genesis of natural law
+any further: indeed, it would be quite impossible so to trace it for any
+considerable distance without feeling that the ever-multiplying mazes of
+relations renders all speculation as to the actual processes quite useless.
+This fact, however, as before insisted, in no wise affects the only
+doctrine which I here enunciate--viz., that the self-generation of natural
+law is a necessary corollary from the persistence of matter and force. And
+that this must be so is now, I hope, sufficiently evident. Just as in the
+first dawn of things, when the proto-binary compounds of matter gave rise
+to new relations together with their appropriate laws, so throughout the
+whole process of evolution, as often as matter acquired a hitherto novel
+state, or in one of its old states entered into hitherto novel relations,
+so often would non-existent or even impossible laws become at once possible
+and necessary. And in this way I cannot see that there is any reason to
+stop until we arrive at all the marvellous complexity of things as they
+are. For aught that speculative reason can ever from henceforth show to the
+contrary, the evolution of all the diverse phenomena of inorganic nature,
+of life, and of mind, appears to be as necessary and as self-determined as
+is the being of that mysterious Something which is Everything,--the Entity
+we must all believe in, which without condition and beyond relation holds
+its existence in itself.
+
+Sec. 33. Does it still seem incredible that, notwithstanding it requires
+mental processes to interpret external nature, external nature may
+nevertheless be destitute of mind? Then let us look at the subject on its
+obverse aspect.
+
+According to the theory of evolution--which, be it always remembered, is no
+mere gratuitous supposition, but a genuine scientific theory--human
+intelligence, like everything else, has been evolved. Now in what does the
+evolution of intelligence consist? Any one acquainted with the writings of
+our great philosopher can have no hesitation in answering: Clearly and only
+in the establishment of more and more numerous and complex internal or
+psychological relations. In other words, the law of intelligence being
+"that the strengths of the inner cohesions between psychical states must be
+proportionate to the persistences of the outer relations symbolised," it
+follows that the development of intelligence is "secured by the one simple
+principle that experience of the outer relations _produces_ inner
+cohesions, and makes the inner cohesions strong in proportion as the outer
+relations are persistent." Now the question before us at present is merely
+this:--Must we not infer that these outer relations are regulated by mind,
+seeing that order is undoubtedly apparent among them, and that it requires
+mental processes on our part to interpret this order? The only legitimate
+answer to this question is, that these outer relations _may_ be regulated
+by mind, but that, in view of the evolution theory, we are certainly not
+entitled to infer that they _are_ so regulated, _merely_ because it
+requires mental processes on our part to interpret their orderly character.
+For if it is true that the human mind was itself evolved by these outer
+relations--ever continuously moulded into conformity with them as the prime
+condition of its existence--then its process of interpreting them is but
+reflecting (as it were) in consciousness these outer relations by which the
+inner ones were originally produced. Granting that, as a matter of fact, an
+objective macrocosm exists, and if we can prove or render probable that
+this objective macrocosm is _of itself_ sufficient to evolve a subjective
+microcosm, I do not see any the faintest reason for the latter to conclude
+that a self-conscious intelligence is inherent in the former, merely
+because it is able to trace in the macrocosm some of those orderly
+objective relations by which its own corresponding subjective relations
+were originally produced. If it is said that it is impossible to conceive
+how, apart from mind, the orderly objective relations themselves can ever
+have originated, I reply that this is merely to shift the ground of
+discussion to that which occupied us in the last section: all we are now
+engaged upon is,--Granting that the existence of such orderly relations is
+actual, whether with or without mind to account for them; and granting also
+that these relations are _of themselves_ sufficient to produce
+corresponding subjective relations; then the mere fact of our conscious
+intelligence being able to discover numerous and complex outer relations
+answering to those which they themselves have caused in our intelligence,
+does not warrant the latter in concluding that the causal connection
+between intelligence and non-intelligence has ever been reversed--that
+these outer relations in turn are caused by a similar conscious
+intelligence. How such a thing as a conscious intelligence is possible is
+another and wholly unanswerable question (though not more so than that as
+to the existence of force and matter, and would not be rendered less so by
+merging the fact in a hypothetical Deity); but granting, as we must, that
+such an entity does exist, and supposing it to have been evolved by natural
+causes, then it would appear incontestably to follow, that whether or not
+objective existence is presided over by objective mind, our subjective mind
+would _alike_ and _equally_ require to read in the facts of the external
+world an indication, whether true or false, of some such presiding agency.
+The subjective mind being, by the supposition, but the obverse aspect of
+the sum total of such among objective relations as have had a share in its
+production, when, as in observation and reflection, this obverse aspect is
+again inverted upon its die, it naturally fits more or less exactly into
+all the prints.
+
+Sec. 34. This last illustration, however, serves to introduce us to another
+point. The supposed evidence from which the existence of mind in nature is
+inferred does not always depend upon such minute correspondences between
+subjective method and objective method as the illustration suggests. Every
+natural theologian has experienced more or less difficulty in explaining
+the fact, that while there is a tolerably general similarity between the
+contrivances due to human thought and the apparent contrivances in nature
+which he regards as due to divine thought, the similarity is nevertheless
+_only_ general. For instance, if a man has occasion to devise any
+artificial appliance, he does so with the least possible cost of labour to
+himself, and with the least possible expenditure of material. Yet it is
+obvious that in nature as a whole no such economic considerations obtain.
+Doubtless by superficial minds this assertion will be met at first with an
+indignant denial: they have been accustomed to accumulate instances of this
+very principle of economy in nature; perhaps written about it in books, and
+illustrated it in lectures,--totally ignoring the fact that the instances
+of economy in nature bear no proportion at all to the instances of
+prodigality. Conceive of the force which is being quite uselessly expended
+by all the wind-currents which are at this moment blowing over the face of
+Europe. Imagine the energy that must have been dissipated during the
+secular cooling of this single planet. Feebly try to think of what the sun
+is radiating into space. If it is retorted that we are incompetent to judge
+of the purposes of the Almighty, I reply that this is but to abandon the
+argument from economy whenever it is found untenable: we presume to be
+competent judges of almighty purposes so long as they appear to imitate our
+own; but so soon as there is any divergence observable, we change front. By
+thus selecting all the instances of economy in nature, and disregarding all
+the vastly greater instances of reckless waste, we are merely laying
+ourselves open to the charge of an unfair eclecticism. And this formal
+refutation of the argument from economy admits of being further justified
+in a strikingly substantial manner; for if all the examples of economy in
+nature that were ever observed, or admit being observed, were collected
+into one view, I undertake to affirm that, without exception, they would be
+found to marshal themselves in one great company--the subjects whose law is
+_survival of the fittest_. One question only will I here ask. Is it
+possible at the present day for any degree of prejudice, after due
+consideration, to withstand the fact that the solitary exceptions to the
+universal prodigality so painfully conspicuous in nature are to be found
+where there is also to be found a full and adequate physical explanation of
+their occurrence?
+
+But, again, prodigality is only one of several particulars wherein the
+modes and the means of the supposed divine intelligence differ from those
+of its human counterpart. Comparative anatomists can point to organic
+structures which are far from being theoretically perfect: even the mind of
+man in these cases, notwithstanding its confessed deficiencies in respect
+both of cognitive and cogitative powers, is competent to suggest
+improvements to an intelligence supposed to be omniscient and all-wise! And
+what shall we say of the numerous cases in which the supposed purposes of
+this intelligence could have been attained by other and less roundabout
+means? In short, not needlessly to prolong discussion, it is admitted, even
+by natural theologians themselves, that the difficulties of reconciling,
+even approximately, the supposed processes of divine thought with the known
+processes of human thought are quite insuperable. The fact is expressed by
+such writers in various ways,--_e.g._, that it would be presumptuous in man
+to expect complete conformity in all cases; that the counsels of God are
+past finding out; that his ways are not as our ways, and so on. Observing
+only, as before, that in thus ignoring adverse cases natural theologians
+are guilty of an unfair eclecticism, it is evident that all such
+expressions concede the fact, that even in those provinces of nature where
+the evidence of superhuman intelligence appears most plain, the resemblance
+of its apparent products to those of human intelligence consists in a
+general approximation of method rather than in any precise similarity of
+particulars: the likeness is generic rather than specific.
+
+Now this is exactly what we should expect to be the case, if the similarity
+in question be due to the cause which the present section endeavours to set
+forth. If all natural laws are self-evolved, and if human intelligence is
+but a subjective photograph of certain among their interrelations, it seems
+but natural that when this photograph compares itself with the whole
+external world from parts of which it was taken, its subjective lights and
+shadows should be found to correspond with some of the objective lights and
+shadows much more perfectly than with others. Still there would doubtless
+be sufficient general conformity to lead the thinking photograph to
+conclude that the great world of objective reality, instead of being the
+_cause_ of such conformity as exists, was itself the _effect_ of some
+common cause,--that it too was of the nature of a picture. Dropping the
+figure, if it is true that human intelligence has been evolved by natural
+law, then in view of all that has been said it must now, I think, be
+tolerably apparent, _that as by the hypothesis human intelligence has
+always been required to think and to act in conformity with law, human
+intelligence must at last be in danger of confusing or identifying the fact
+of action in conformity with law with the existence and the action of a
+self-conscious intelligence. Reading then in external nature innumerable
+examples of action in conformity with law, human intelligence falls back
+upon the unwarrantable identification, and out of the bare fact that law
+exists in nature concludes that beyond nature there is an Intelligent
+Lawgiver._
+
+Sec. 35. From what has been said in the last five sections, it manifestly
+follows that all the varied phenomena of the universe not only may, but
+must, depend upon the persistence of force and the primary qualities of
+matter.[23] Be it remembered that the object of the last three sections was
+merely to "_facilitate conception_" of the fact that it does not at all
+follow, because the phenomena of external nature admit of being
+intelligently inquired into, therefore they are due to an intelligent
+cause. The last three sections are hence in a manner parenthetical, and it
+is of comparatively little importance whether or not they have been
+successful in their object; for, from what went before, it is abundantly
+manifest that, whether or not the subjective side of the question admits of
+satisfactory elucidation, there can be no doubt that the objective side of
+it is as certain as are the fundamental axioms of science. It does not
+admit of one moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the
+exquisite beauty and melodious harmony of nature follow as necessarily and
+as inevitably from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of
+matter, as it is certainly true that force is persistent, or that matter is
+extended and impenetrable. No doubt this generalisation is too vast to be
+adequately conceived, but there can be equally little doubt that it is
+necessarily true. If matter and force have been eternal, so far as human
+mind can soar it can discover no need of a superior mind to explain the
+varied phenomena of existence. Man has truly become in a new sense the
+measure of the universe, and in this the latest and most appalling of his
+soundings, indications are returned from the infinite voids of space and
+time by which he is surrounded, that his intelligence, with all its noble
+capacities for love and adoration, is yet alone--destitute of kith or kin
+in all this universe of being.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD.
+
+Sec. 36. But the discussion must not end here. Inexorable logic has forced us
+to conclude that, viewing the question as to the existence of a God only by
+the light which modern science has shed upon it, there no longer appears to
+be any semblance of an argument in its favour. Let us then turn upon
+science herself, and question her right to be our sole guide in this
+matter. Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the
+hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as certainly
+superfluous is the very basis of all science is certainly true. There can
+no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a God is wholly
+unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the universe, than there is
+doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall upon the table. Nay, the
+doubt is even less than this, because while the knowledge that my pen will
+fall if I allow it to do so is founded chiefly upon empirical knowledge (I
+could not predict with _a priori_ certainty that it would so fall, for the
+pen might be in an electrical state, or subject to some set of unknown
+natural laws antagonistic to gravity), the knowledge that a Deity is
+superfluous as an explanation of anything, being grounded on the doctrine
+of the persistence of force, is grounded on an _a priori_ necessity of
+reason--_i.e._, if this fact were not so, our science, our thought, our
+very existence itself, would be scientifically impossible.
+
+But now, having thus stated the case as strongly as I am able, it remains
+to question how far the authority of science extends. Even our knowledge of
+the persistence of force and of the primary qualities of matter is but of
+relative significance. Deeper than the foundations of our experience,
+"deeper than demonstration--deeper even than definite cognition,--deep as
+the very nature of mind,"[24] are these the most ultimate of known truths;
+but where from this is our warrant for concluding with certainty that these
+known truths are everywhere and eternally true? It will be said that there
+is a strong analogical probability. Perhaps so, but of this next: I am not
+now speaking of probability; I am speaking of certainty; and unless we deny
+the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, we cannot but conclude that
+there is no absolute certainty in this case. As I deem this consideration
+one of great importance, I shall proceed to develop it at some length. It
+will be observed, then, that the consideration really amounts to
+this:--Although it must on all hands be admitted that the fact of the
+theistic hypothesis not being required to explain any of the phenomena of
+nature is a fact which has been demonstrated _scientifically_, nevertheless
+it must likewise on all hands be admitted that this fact has not, and
+cannot be, demonstrated _logically_. Or thus, although it is unquestionably
+true that so far as science can penetrate she cannot discern any
+speculative necessity for a God, it may nevertheless be true that if
+science could penetrate further she might discern some such necessity. Now
+the present discussion would clearly be incomplete if it neglected to
+define as carefully this the logical standing of our subject, as it has
+hitherto endeavoured to define its scientific standing. As a final step in
+our analysis, therefore, we must altogether quit the region of experience,
+and, ignoring even the very foundations of science and so all the most
+certain of relative truths, pass into the transcendental region of purely
+formal considerations. In this region theist and atheist must alike consent
+to forego all their individual predilections, and, after regarding the
+subject as it were in the abstract and by the light of pure logic alone,
+finally come to an agreement as to the transcendental probability of the
+question before them. Disregarding the actual probability which they
+severally feel to exist in relation to their own individual intelligences,
+they must apply themselves to ascertain the probability which exists in
+relation to those fundamental laws of thought which preside over the
+intelligence of our race. In fine, it will now, I hope, be understood that,
+as we have hitherto been endeavouring to determine, by deductions drawn
+from the very foundations of all possible science, the _relative_
+probability as to the existence of a God, so we shall next apply ourselves
+to the task of ascertaining the _absolute_ probability of such
+existence--or, more correctly, what is the strictly _formal_ probability of
+such existence when its possibility is contemplated in an absolute sense.
+
+Sec. 37. To begin then. In the last resort, the value of every probability is
+fixed by "ratiocination." In endeavouring, therefore, to fix the degree of
+strictly formal probability that is present in any given case, our method
+of procedure should be, first to ascertain the ultimate ratios on which the
+probability depends, and then to estimate the comparative value of these
+ratios. Now I think there can be no doubt that the value of any probability
+in this its last analysis is determined by the number, the importance, and
+the definiteness of the relations known, as compared with those of the
+relations unknown; and, consequently, that in all cases where the sum of
+the unknown relations is larger, or more important, or more indefinite than
+is the sum of the known relations, it is an essential principle that the
+value of the probability decreases in exact proportion to the decrease in
+the similarity between the two sets of relations, whether this decrease
+consists in the number, in the importance, or in the definiteness of the
+relations involved. This rule or canon is self-evident as soon as pointed
+out, and has been formulated by Professor Bain in his "Logic" when treating
+of Analogy, but not with sufficient precision; for, while recognising the
+elements of number and importance, he has overlooked that of definiteness.
+This element, however, is a very essential one--indeed the most essential
+of the three; for there are many analogical inferences in which either the
+character or the extent of the unknown relations is quite indefinite; and
+it is obvious that, whenever this is the case, the value of the analogy is
+proportionably diminished, and diminished in a much more material
+particular than it is when the diminution of value arises from a mere
+excess of the unknown relations over the known ones in respect of their
+number or of their importance. For it is evident that, in the latter case,
+however little value the analogy may possess, the exact degree of such
+value admits of being _determined_; while it is no less evident that, in
+the former case, we are precluded from estimating the value of the analogy
+at all, and this just in proportion to the indefiniteness of the unknown
+relations.
+
+Sec. 38. Now the particular instance with which we are concerned is somewhat
+peculiar. Notwithstanding we have the entire sphere of human experience
+from which to argue, we are still unable to gauge the strictly logical
+probability of any argument whatsoever; for the unknown relations in this
+case are so wholly indefinite, both as to their character and extent, that
+any attempt to institute a definite comparison between them and the known
+relations is felt at once to be absurd. The question discussed, being the
+most ultimate of all possible questions, must eventually contain in itself
+all that is to man unknown and unknowable; the whole orbit of human
+knowledge is here insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to institute
+the required measurements.
+
+Sec. 39. I think it is desirable to insist upon this truth at somewhat greater
+length, and, for the sake of impressing it still more deeply, I shall
+present it in another form. No one can for a single moment deny that,
+beyond and around the sphere of the Knowable, there exists the unfathomable
+abyss of the Unknowable. I do not here use this latter word as embodying
+any theory: I merely wish it to state the undoubted fact, which all must
+admit, viz., that beneath all our possible explanations there lies a great
+Inexplicable. Now let us see what is the effect of making this necessary
+admission. In the first place, it clearly follows that, while our
+conceptions as to what the Unknowable contains may or may not represent the
+truth, it is certain that we can never discover whether or not they do.
+Further, it is impossible for us to determine even a definite _probability_
+as to the existence (much less the nature) of anything which we may suppose
+the Unknowable to contain. We may, of course, perceive that such and such a
+supposition is more _conceivable_ than such and such; but, as already
+indicated, the fact does not show that the one is in itself more definitely
+_probable_ than the other, unless it has been previously shown, either that
+the capacity of our conceptions is a _fully adequate measure_ of the
+Possible, or that the proportion between such capacity and the extent of
+the Possible is a proportion that can be _determined_. In either of these
+cases, the Conceivable would be a fair measure of the Possible: in the
+former case, an exact equivalent (_e.g._, in any instance of contradictory
+propositions, the most conceivable would _certainly_ be true); in the
+latter case, a measure any degree less than an exact equivalent--the degree
+depending upon the _then_ ascertainable disparity between the extent of the
+Possible and the extent of the Conceivable. Now the Unknowable (including
+of course the Inconceivable Existent) is a species of the Possible, and in
+its name carries the declaration that the disparity between its extent and
+the extent of the Conceivable (_i.e._, the other species of the Possible)
+is a disparity that cannot be determined. We are hence driven to the
+conclusion that the most apparently probable of all propositions, if
+predicated of anything within the Unknowable, may not in reality be a whit
+more so than is the most apparently improbable proposition which it is
+possible to make; for if it is admitted (as of course it must be) that we
+are necessarily precluded from comparing the extent of the Conceivable with
+that of the Unknowable, then it necessarily follows that in no case
+whatever are we competent to judge how far an _apparent_ probability
+relating to the latter province is an _actual_ probability. In other words,
+did we know the proportion subsisting between the Conceivable and the
+Unknowable in respect of relative extent and character, and so of inherent
+probabilities, we should then be able to estimate the actual value of any
+apparent probability relating to the latter province; but, as it is, our
+ability to make this estimate varies inversely as our inability to estimate
+our ignorance in this particular. And as our ignorance in this particular
+is total--_i.e._, since we cannot even approximately determine the
+proportion that subsists between the Conceivable and the Unknowable,--the
+result is that our ability to make the required estimate in any given case
+is absolutely _nil_.
+
+Sec. 40. I have purposely rendered this presentation in terms of the highest
+abstraction, partly to avoid the possibility of any one, whatever his
+theory of things may be, finding anything at which to object, and partly in
+order that my meaning may be understood to include all things which are
+beyond the range of possible knowledge. Most of all, therefore, must this
+presentation (if it contains anything of truth) apply to the question
+regarding the existence of Deity; for the _Ens Realissimum_ must of all
+things be furthest removed from the range of possible knowledge. Hence, if
+this presentation contains anything of truth--and of its rigidly accurate
+truth I think there can be no question--the assertion that the
+Self-existing Substance is a Personal and Intelligent Being, and the
+assertion that this Substance is an Impersonal and Non-Intelligent Being,
+are alike assertions wholly destitute of any assignable degree of logical
+probability, I say _assignable_ degree of logical probability, because that
+_some_ degree of such probability may exist I do not undertake to deny. All
+I assert is, that if we are here able to institute any such probability at
+all, we are unable logically to assign to it any determinate degree of
+value. Or, in other words, although we may establish some probability in a
+sense relative to ourselves, we are unable to know how far this probability
+is a probability in an absolute sense. Or again, the case is not as though
+we were altogether unacquainted with the Possible. Experience undoubtedly
+affords us some information regarding this, although, comparatively
+speaking, we are unable to know how much. Consequently, we must suppose
+that, in any given case, it is more likely that the Conceivable should be
+Possible than that the Inconceivable should be so, and that the Conceivably
+Probable should exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: in
+neither case, however, can we know _what degree_ of such likelihood is
+present.
+
+Sec. 41. From the foregoing considerations, then, it would appear that the
+only attitude which in strict logic it is admissible to adopt towards the
+question concerning the being of a God is that of "suspended judgment."
+Formally speaking, it is alike illegitimate to affirm or to deny
+Intelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And here I would desire it to
+be observed, that this is the attitude which the majority of
+scientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted with regard to
+this matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet endeavoured to
+formulate the justification of this attitude; and as I think there can be
+no doubt that the above presentation contains in a logical shape the whole
+of such justification, I cannot but think that some important ends will
+have been secured by it. For we are here in possession, not merely of a
+vague and general impression that the Ultimate is super-scientific, and so
+beyond the range of legitimate prediction; but we are also in possession of
+a logical formula whereby at once to vindicate the rationality of our
+opinion, and to measure the precise degree of its technical value.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.
+
+Sec. 42. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of the formal considerations
+which have been adduced in the last chapter on the scientific
+considerations which were dealt with in the previous chapters. In these
+previous chapters the proposition was clearly established that, just as
+certainly as the fundamental data of science are true, so certainly is it
+true that the theory of Theism in any shape is, scientifically considered,
+superfluous; for these chapters have clearly shown that, if there is a God,
+his existence, considered as a cause of things, is as certainly unnecessary
+as it is certainly true that force is persistent and that matter is
+indestructible. But after this proposition had been carefully justified, it
+remained to show that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelled
+us to carry our discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. For
+although we observed that the essential qualities of matter and of force
+are the most ultimate data of human knowledge, and although, by showing how
+far the question of Theism depended on these data, we carried the
+discussion of that question to the utmost possible limits of scientific
+thought, it still devolved on us to contemplate the fact that even these
+the most ultimate data of science are only known to be of relative
+significance. And the bearing of this fact to the question of Theism was
+seen to be most important. For, without waiting to recapitulate the
+substance of a chapter so recently concluded, it will be remembered that
+its effect was to establish this position beyond all controversy--viz.,
+that when ideas which have been formed by our experience within the region
+of phenomenal actuality are projected into the region of ontological
+possibility, they become utterly worthless; seeing that we can never have
+any means whereby to test the actual value of whatever transcendental
+probabilities they may appear to establish. Therefore it is that even the
+most ultimate of relative truths with which, as we have seen, the question
+of Theism is so vitally associated, is almost without meaning when
+contemplated in an absolute sense. What, then, is the effect of these
+metaphysical considerations on the position of Theism as we have seen it to
+be left by the highest generalisations of physical science? Let us
+contemplate this question with the care which it deserves.
+
+In the first place, it is evident that the effect of these purely formal
+considerations is to render all reasonings on the subject of Theism equally
+illegitimate, unless it is constantly borne in mind that such reasonings
+can only be of relative signification. Thus, as a matter of pure logic,
+these considerations are destructive of all assignable validity of any such
+reasoning whatsoever. Still, even a strictly relative probability is, in
+some undefinable degree, of more value than no probability at all, as we
+have seen these same formal considerations to show (see Sec. 40); and,
+moreover, even were this not so, the human mind will never rest until it
+attains to the furthest probability which to its powers is accessible.
+Therefore, if we do not forget the merely relative nature of the
+considerations which are about to be adduced, by adducing them we may at
+the same time satisfy our own minds and abstain from violating the
+conditions of sound logic.
+
+The shape, then, to which the subject has now been reduced is simply
+this:--Seeing that the theory of Evolution in its largest sense has shown
+the theory of Theism to be superfluous in a scientific sense, does it not
+follow that the theory of Theism is thus shown to be superfluous in any
+sense? For it would seem from the discussion, so far as it has hitherto
+gone, that the only rational basis on which the theory of Theism can rest
+is a basis of teleology; and if, as has been clearly shown, the theory of
+evolution, by deducing the genesis of natural law from the primary data of
+science, irrevocably destroys this basis, does it not follow that the
+theory of evolution has likewise destroyed the theory which rested on that
+basis? Now I conclude, as stated at the close of Chapter IV., that the
+question here put must certainly be answered in the affirmative, so far as
+its scientific aspect is concerned. But when we consider the question in
+its purely logical aspect, as we have done in Chapter V., the case is
+otherwise. For although, so far as the utmost reach of scientific vision
+enables us to see, we can discern no evidence of Deity, it does not
+therefore follow that beyond the range of such vision Deity does not exist.
+Science indeed has proved that if there is a Divine Mind in nature, and if
+by the hypothesis such a Mind exerts any causative influence on the
+phenomena of nature, such influence is exerted beyond the sphere of
+experience. And this achievement of science, be it never forgotten, is an
+achievement of prodigious importance, effectually destroying, as it does,
+all vestiges of a scientific teleology. But be it now carefully observed,
+although all vestiges of a _scientific_ teleology are thus completely and
+permanently ruined, the formal considerations adduced in the last chapter
+supply the conditions for constructing what may be termed a _metaphysical_
+teleology. I use these terms advisedly, because I think they will serve to
+bring out with great clearness the condition to which our analysis of the
+teleological argument has now been reduced.
+
+Sec. 43. In the first place, let it be understood that I employ the terms
+"scientific" and "metaphysical" in the convenient sense in which they are
+employed by Mr. Lewes, viz., as respectively designating a theory that is
+verifiable and a theory that is not. Consequently, by the term "scientific
+teleology" I mean to denote a form of teleology which admits either of
+being proved or disproved, while by the term "metaphysical teleology" I
+mean to denote a form of teleology which does not admit either of being
+proved or of being disproved. Now, with these significations clearly
+understood, it will be seen that the forms of teleology which we have
+hitherto considered belong entirely to the scientific class. That the
+Paleyerian form of the argument did so is manifest, first because this
+argument itself treats the problem of Theism as a problem that is
+susceptible of scientific demonstration, and next because we have seen that
+the advance of science has proved this argument susceptible of scientific
+refutation. In other words, from the supposed axiom, "There cannot be
+apparent design without a designer," adaptations in nature become logically
+available as purely scientific evidence of an intelligent cause; and that
+Paley himself regarded them exclusively in this light is manifest, both
+from his own "statement of the argument," and from the character of the
+evidence by which he seeks to establish the argument when stated--witness
+the typical passage before quoted (Sec. 26). On the other hand, we have
+clearly seen that this Paleyerian system of natural theology has been
+effectually demolished by the scientific theory of natural selection--the
+fundamental axiom of the former having been shown by the latter to be
+scientifically untrue. Hence the term "scientific teleology" is without
+question applicable to the Paleyerian system.
+
+Nor is the case essentially different with the more refined form of the
+teleological argument which we have had to consider--the argument, namely,
+from General Laws. For here, likewise, we have clearly seen that the
+inference from the ubiquitous operation of General Laws to the existence of
+an omniscient Law-maker is quite as illegitimate as is the inference from
+apparent Design to the existence of a Supreme Designer. In other words,
+science, by establishing the doctrine of the persistence of force and the
+indestructibility of matter, has effectually disproved the hypothesis that
+the presence of Law in nature is of itself sufficient to prove the
+existence of an intelligent Law-giver.
+
+Thus it is that scientific teleology in any form is now and for ever
+obsolete. But not so with what I have termed metaphysical teleology. For as
+we have seen that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge precludes us
+from asserting, or even from inferring, that beyond the region of the
+Knowable Mind does not exist, it remains logically possible to institute a
+metaphysical hypothesis that beyond this region of the Knowable Mind does
+exist. There being a necessary absence of any positive information whereby
+to refute this metaphysical hypothesis, any one who chooses to adopt it is
+fully justified in doing so, provided only he remembers that the purely
+metaphysical quality whereby the hypothesis is ensured against disproof,
+likewise, and in the same degree, precludes it from the possibility of
+proof. He must remember that it is no longer open to him to point to any
+particular set of general laws and to assert, these proclaim Intelligence
+as their cause; for we have repeatedly seen that the known states of matter
+and force themselves afford sufficient explanation of the facts to which he
+points. And he must remember that the only reason why his hypothesis does
+not conflict with any of the truths known to science, is because he has
+been careful to rest that hypothesis upon a basis of purely formal
+considerations, which lie beyond even the most fundamental truths of which
+science is cognisant.
+
+Thus, for example, he may present his metaphysical theory of Theism in some
+such terms as these:--'Fully conceding what reason shows must be conceded,
+and there still remains this possible supposition--viz., that there is a
+presiding Mind in nature, which exerts its causative influence beyond the
+sphere of experience, thus rendering it impossible for us to obtain
+scientific evidence of its action. For such a Mind, exerting such an
+influence beyond experience, may direct affairs within experience by
+methods conceivable or inconceivable to us--producing, possibly,
+innumerable and highly varied results, which in turn may produce their
+effects within experience, their introduction being then, of course, in the
+ordinary way of natural law. For instance, there can be no question that by
+the intelligent creation or dissipation of energy, all the phenomena of
+cosmic evolution might have been directed, and, for aught that science can
+show to the contrary, thus only rendered possible. Hence there is at least
+one nameable way in which, even in accordance with observed facts, a
+Supreme Mind could be competent to direct the phenomena of observable
+nature. But we are not necessarily restricted to the limits of the nameable
+in this matter, so that it is of no argumentative importance whether or not
+this suggested method is the method which the supposed Mind actually
+adopts, seeing that there may still be other possible methods, which,
+nevertheless, we are unable to suggest.'
+
+Doubtless the hypothesis of Theism, as thus presented, will be deemed by
+many persons but of very slender probability. I am not, however, concerned
+with whatever character of probability it may be supposed to exhibit. I am
+merely engaged in carefully presenting the only hypothesis which can be
+presented, if the theory as to an Intelligent Author of nature is any
+longer to be maintained on grounds of a rational teleology. No doubt,
+scientifically considered, the hypothesis in question is purely gratuitous;
+for, so far as the light of science can penetrate, there is no need of any
+such hypothesis at all. Thus it may well seem, at first sight, that no
+hypothesis could well have less to recommend it; and, so far as the
+presentation has yet gone, it is therefore fully legitimate for an atheist
+to reply:--'All that this so-called metaphysical theory amounts to is a
+wholly gratuitous assumption. No doubt it is always difficult, and usually
+impossible, logically or unequivocally to prove a negative. If my adversary
+chose to imagine that nature is presided over by a demon with horns and
+hoofs, or by a dragon with claws and tail, I should be as unable to
+disprove this his supposed theory as I am now unable to disprove his actual
+theory. But in all cases reasonable men ought to be guided in their beliefs
+by such positive evidence as is available; and if, as in the present case,
+the alternative belief is wholly gratuitous--adopted not only without any
+evidence, but against all that great body of evidence which the sum-total
+of science supplies--surely we ought not to hesitate for one moment in the
+choice of our creed?'
+
+Now all this is quite sound in principle, provided only that the
+metaphysical theory of Theism _is_ wholly gratuitous, in the sense of being
+utterly destitute of evidential support. That it is destitute of all
+_scientific_ support, we have already and repeatedly seen; but the question
+remains as to whether it is similarly destitute of _metaphysical_ support.
+
+Sec. 44. To this question, then, let us next address ourselves. From the
+theistic pleading which we have just heard, it is abundantly manifest that
+the formal conditions of a metaphysical teleology are present: the question
+now before us is as to whether or not any actual evidence exists in favour
+of such a theory. In order to discuss this question, let us begin by
+allowing the theist to continue his pleading. 'You have shown me,' he may
+say, 'that a scientific or demonstrable system of teleology is no longer
+possible, and, therefore, as I have already conceded, I must take my stand
+on a metaphysical or non-demonstrable system. But I reflect that the latter
+term is a loose one, seeing that it embraces all possible degrees of
+evidence short of actual proof. The question, therefore, I conceive to be,
+What amount of evidence is there in favour of this metaphysical system of
+teleology? And this question I answer by the following considerations:--As
+general laws separately have all been shown to be the necessary outcome of
+the primary data of science, it certainly follows that general laws
+collectively must be the same--_i.e._, that the whole system of general
+laws must be, so far as the lights of our science can penetrate, the
+necessary outcome of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of
+matter. But you have also dearly shown me that these lights are of the
+feeblest conceivable character when they are brought to illuminate the
+final mystery of things. I therefore feel at liberty to assert, that if
+there is any one principle to be observed in the collective operation of
+general laws which cannot conceivably be explained by any cause other than
+that of intelligent guidance, I am still free to fall back on such a
+principle and to maintain--Although the collective operation of general
+laws follows as a necessary consequence from the primary data of science,
+this one principle which pervades their united action, and which cannot be
+conceivably explained by any hypothesis other than that of intelligent
+guidance, is a principle which still remains to be accounted for; and as it
+cannot conceivably be accounted for on grounds of physical science, I may
+legitimately account for it on grounds of metaphysical teleology. Now I
+cannot open my eyes without perceiving such a principle everywhere
+characterising the collective operation of general laws. Universally I
+behold in nature, order, beauty, harmony,--that is, a perfect _correlation_
+among general laws. But this ubiquitous correlation among general laws,
+considered as the cause of cosmic harmony, itself requires some explanatory
+cause such as the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter
+cannot conceivably be made to supply. For unless we postulate some one
+integrating cause, the greater the number of general laws in nature, the
+less likelihood is there of such laws being so correlated as to produce
+harmony by their combined action. And forasmuch as the only cause that I am
+able to imagine as competent to produce such effects is that of intelligent
+guidance, I accept the metaphysical hypothesis that beyond the sphere of
+the Knowable there exists an Unknown God.[25]
+
+'If it is retorted that the above argument involves an absurd
+contradiction, in that while it sets out with an explicit avowal of the
+fact that the collective operation of general laws follows as a necessary
+consequence from the primary data of physical science, it nevertheless
+afterwards proceeds to explain an effect of such collective operation by a
+metaphysical hypothesis; I answer that it was expressly for the purpose of
+eliciting this retort that I threw my argument into the above form. For the
+position which I wish to establish is this, that fully accepting the
+logical cogency of the reasoning whereby the action of every law is deduced
+from the primary data of science, I wish to show that when this train of
+reasoning is followed to its ultimate term, it leads us into the presence
+of a fact for which it is inadequate to account. If, then, my contention be
+granted--viz., that to human faculties it is not conceivable how, in the
+absence of a directing intelligence, general laws could be so correlated as
+to produce universal harmony--then I have brought the matter to this
+issue:--Notwithstanding the scientific train of argument being complete in
+itself, it still leaves us in the presence of a fact which it cannot
+conceivably explain; and it is this unexplained residuum--this total
+product of the operation of general laws--that I appeal to as the logical
+justification for a system of metaphysical teleology--a system which offers
+the only conceivable explanation of this stupendous fact.
+
+'And here I may further observe, that the scientific train of reasoning is
+of the kind which embodies what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls "symbolic
+conceptions of the illegitimate order."[26] That is to say, we can see how
+such simple laws as that action and reaction are equal and opposite may
+have been self-evolved, and from this fact we go on generalising and
+generalising, until we land ourselves in wholly symbolic and--a paradox is
+here legitimate--inconceivable conceptions. Now the farther we travel into
+this region of unrealisable ideas, the less trustworthy is the report that
+we are able to bring back. The method is in a sense scientific; but when
+even scientific method is projected into a region of really
+super-scientific possibility, it ceases to have that character of undoubted
+certainty which it enjoys when dealing with verifiable subjects of inquiry.
+The demonstrations are formal, but they are not real.
+
+'Therefore, looking to this necessarily suspicious character of the
+scientific train of reasoning, and then observing that, even if accepted,
+it leaves the fact of cosmic harmony unexplained, I maintain, that whatever
+probability the phenomena of nature may in former times have been thought
+to establish in favour of the theory as to an intelligent Author of nature,
+that probability has been in no wise annihilated--nor apparently can it
+ever be annihilated--by the advance of science. And not only so, but I
+question whether this probability has been even seriously impaired by such
+advance, seeing that although this advance has revealed a speculative
+_raison d'etre_ of the mechanical precision of nature, it has at the same
+time shown the baffling complexity of nature; and therefore, in view of
+what has just been said, leaves the balance of probability concerning the
+existence of a God very much where it always was. For stay awhile to
+contemplate this astounding complexity of harmonious nature! Think of how
+much we already know of its innumerable laws and processes, and then think
+that this knowledge only serves to reveal, in a glimmering way, the huge
+immensity of the unknown. Try to picture the meshwork of contending rhythms
+which must have been before organic nature was built up, and then let us
+ask, Is it conceivable, is it credible, that all this can have been the
+work of blind fate? Must we not feel that had there not been intelligent
+agency at work somewhere, other and less terrifically intricate results
+would have ensued? And if we further try to symbolise in thought the
+unimaginable complexity of the material and dynamical changes in virtue of
+which that thought itself exists,--if we then extend our symbols to
+represent all the history of all the orderly changes which must have taken
+place to evolve human intelligence into what it is,--and if we still
+further extend our symbols to try if it be possible, even in the language
+of symbols, to express the number and the subtlety of those natural laws
+which now preside over the human will;--in the face of so vast an
+assumption as that all this has been self-evolved, I am content still to
+rest in the faith of my forefathers.'
+
+Sec. 45. Now I think it must be admitted that we have here a valid argument.
+That is to say, the considerations which we have just adduced must, I
+think, in fairness be allowed to have established this position:--That the
+system of metaphysical teleology for which we have supposed a candid theist
+to plead, is something more than a purely gratuitous system--that it does
+not belong to the same category of baseless imaginings as that to which the
+atheist at first sight, and in view of the scientific deductions alone,
+might be inclined to assign it. For we have seen that our supposed theist,
+while fully admitting the formal cogency of the scientific train of
+reasoning, is nevertheless able to point to a fact which, in his opinion,
+lies without that train of reasoning. For he declares that it is beyond his
+powers of conception to regard the complex harmony of nature otherwise than
+as a product of some one integrating cause; and that the only cause of
+which he is able to conceive as adequate to produce such an effect is that
+of a conscious Intelligence. Pointing, therefore, to this complex harmony
+of nature as to a fact which cannot to his mind be conceivably explained by
+any deductions from physical science, he feels that he is justified in
+explaining this fact by the aid of a metaphysical hypothesis. And in so
+doing he is in my opinion perfectly justified, at any rate to this
+extent--that his antagonist cannot fairly dispose of this metaphysical
+hypothesis as a purely gratuitous hypothesis. How far it is a probable
+hypothesis is another question, and to this question we shall now address
+ourselves.
+
+Sec. 46. If it is true that the deductions from physical science cannot be
+conceived to explain some among the observed facts of nature, and if it is
+true that these particular facts admit of being conceivably explained by
+the metaphysical hypothesis in question, then, beyond all controversy, this
+metaphysical hypothesis must be provisionally accepted. Let us then
+carefully examine the premises which are thus adduced to justify acceptance
+of this hypothesis as their conclusion.
+
+In the first place, it is not--cannot--be denied, even by a theist, that
+the deductions from physical science _do_ embrace the fact of cosmic
+harmony in their explanation, seeing that, as they explain the operation of
+general laws collectively, they must be regarded as also explaining every
+effect of such operation. And this, as we have seen, is a consideration to
+which our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did he meet it? He met
+it by the considerations--1st. That the scientific train of reasoning
+evolved this conclusion only by employing, in a wholly unrestricted manner,
+"symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order;" and, 2d. That when the
+conclusion thus illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with the
+fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to be
+beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to
+such a cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on the
+scientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be no
+question that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which that
+train of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weakness
+to the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think,
+be equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who would
+venture honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of cosmic
+harmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific train of
+reasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an atheist may
+reply, that although the objections of his antagonist against this symbolic
+method of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the nature of the
+case, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which is available.
+If, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his antagonist for pointing
+out a source of weakness in this method of reasoning--a source of weakness,
+be it observed, which renders it impossible for him to estimate the actual,
+as distinguished from the apparent, probability of the conclusion
+attained--this is all that he can be expected to do: he cannot be expected
+to abandon the only scientific method of reasoning available, in favour of
+a metaphysical method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leaping
+with a single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to the
+inference of an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist may
+well point out that, however objectionable his scientific method of
+reasoning may be on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must at
+any rate be preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbols
+throughout refer to known causes.[27] With regard, then, to this stricture
+on the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although the caveat
+which it contains should never be lost sight of by atheists, it is not of
+sufficient cogency to justify theists in abandoning a scientific in favour
+of a metaphysical mode of reasoning.
+
+How then does it fare with the other stricture, or the consideration that,
+"when the conclusion thus illegitimately[28] evolved is confronted with the
+fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, we find it to be
+beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to
+such a cause"? The atheist may answer, in the first place, that a great
+deal here turns on the precise meaning which we assign to the word
+"conceive." For we have just seen that, by employing "symbolic
+conceptions," we _are_ able to frame what we may term a _formal_ conception
+of universal harmony as due to the persistence of force and the primary
+qualities of matter. That is to say, we have seen that such universal
+harmony as nature presents must be regarded as an effect of the collective
+operation of general laws; and we have previously arrived at a formal
+conception of general laws as singly and collectively the product of
+self-evolution. Consequently, the word "conceive," as used in the theistic
+argument, must be taken to mean our ability to frame what we may term a
+_material_ conception, or a representation in thought of the whole history
+of cosmic evolution, which representation shall be in some satisfactory
+degree intellectually realisable. Observing, then, this important
+difference between an inconceivability which arises from an impossibility
+of establishing relations in thought between certain _abstract_ or
+_symbolic_ conceptions, and an inconceivability which arises from a mere
+failure to realise in imagination the results which must follow among
+external relations if the symbolically conceivable combinations among them
+ever took place, an atheist may here argue as follows; and it does not
+appear that there is any legitimate escape from his reasonings.
+
+'I first consider the undoubted fact that the existence of a Supreme Mind
+in nature is, scientifically considered, unnecessary; and, therefore, that
+the only reason we require to entertain the supposition of any such
+existence at all is, that the complexity of nature being so great, we are
+unable adequately to conceive of its self-evolution--notwithstanding our
+reason tells us plainly that, given a self-existing universe of force and
+matter, and such self-evolution becomes abstractedly possible. I then
+reflect that this is a negative and not a positive ground of belief. If the
+hypothesis of self-evolution is true, we should _a priori_ expect that by
+the time evolution had advanced sufficiently far to admit of the production
+of a reasoning intelligence, the complexity of nature must be so great that
+the nascent reasoning powers would be completely baffled in their attempts
+to comprehend the various processes going on around them. This seems to be
+about the state of things which we now experience. Still, as reason
+advances more and more, we may expect, both from general _a priori_
+principles and from particular historical analogies, that more and more of
+the processes of nature will admit of being interpreted by reason, and that
+in proportion as our ability to _understand_ the frame and the constitution
+of things progresses, so our ability to _conceive_ of them as all naturally
+and necessarily evolved will likewise and concurrently progress. Thus, for
+example, how vast a number of the most intricate and delicate correlations
+in nature have been rendered at once intelligible and conceivably due to
+non-intelligent causes, by the discovery of a single principle in
+nature--the principle of natural selection.
+
+'In the adverse argument, conceivability is again made the unconditional
+test of truth, just as it was in the argument against the possibility of
+matter thinking. We reject the hypothesis of self-evolution, not because it
+is the more remote one, but simply because we experience a subjective
+incapacity adequately to frame the requisite generalisations in thought, or
+to frame them with as much clearness as we could wish. Yet our reason tells
+us as plainly as it tells us any general truth which is too large to be
+presented in detail, that there is nothing in the nature of things
+themselves, as far as we can see, antagonistic to the supposition of their
+having been self-evolved. Only on the ground, therefore, of our own
+intellectual deficiencies; only because as yet, by the self-evolutionary
+hypothesis, the inner order does not completely answer to the outer order;
+only because the number and complexity of subjective relations have not yet
+been able to rival those of the objective relations producing them; only on
+this ground do we refuse to assent to the obvious deductions of our
+reason.[29]
+
+'And here I may observe, further, that the presumption in favour of atheism
+which these deductions establish is considerably fortified by certain _a
+posteriori_ considerations which we cannot afford to overlook. In
+particular, I reflect that, as a matter of fact, the theistic theory is
+born of highly suspicious parentage,--that Fetichism, or the crudest form
+of the theory of personal agency in external nature, admits of being easily
+traced to the laws of a primitive psychology; that the step from this to
+Polytheism is easy; and that the step from this to Monotheism is necessary.
+If it is objected to this view that it does not follow that because some
+theories of personal agency have proved themselves false, therefore all
+such theories must be so--I answer, Unquestionably not; but the above
+considerations are not adduced in order to _negative_ the theistic theory:
+they are merely adduced to show that the human mind has hitherto
+undoubtedly exhibited an undue and a vicious tendency to interpret the
+objective processes of nature in terms of its own subjective processes; and
+as we can see quite well that the current theory of personal agency in
+nature, whether or not true, is a necessary outcome of intellectual
+evolution, I think that the fact of so abundant an historical analogy ought
+to be allowed to lend a certain degree of antecedent suspicion to this
+theory--although, of course, the suspicion is of a kind which would admit
+of immediate destruction before any satisfactory positive evidence in
+favour of the theory.[30]
+
+'But what is 'the satisfactory positive evidence' that is offered me?
+Nothing, save an alleged subjective incapacity on the part of my opponent
+adequately to conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony as due to physical
+causation alone. Now I have already commented on the weakness of his
+position; but as my opponent will doubtless resort to the consideration
+that inconceivability of an opposite is, after all, the best criterion of
+truth which at any given stage of intellectual evolution is available, I
+will now conclude my overthrow by pointing out that, even if we take the
+argument from teleology in its widest possible sense--the argument, I mean,
+from the general order and beauty of nature, as well as the gross
+constituent part of it from design--even taking this argument in its widest
+sense and upon its own ground (which ground, I presume, it is now
+sufficiently obvious _can_ only be that of the inconceivability of its
+negation), I will conclude my examination of this argument by showing that
+it is quite as inconceivable to predicate cosmic harmony an effect of
+Intelligence, as it is to predicate it an effect of Non-intelligence; and
+therefore that the argument from inconceivability admits of being turned
+with quite as terrible a force upon Theism as it can be made to exert upon
+Atheism.
+
+'"In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded and
+accepted as quite believable are absolutely inconceivable. There is a
+perpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but pseud-ideas.
+No distinction is made between propositions that contain real thoughts and
+propositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A thinkable proposition
+is one of which the _two terms can be brought together in consciousness
+under the relation said to exist between them_. But very often, when the
+subject of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and when
+the predicate of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and
+when the relation alleged between them has been thought of as a known
+relation, it is supposed that the proposition itself has been thought. The
+thinking separately of the elements of a proposition is mistaken for the
+thinking of them in the combination which the proposition affirms. And
+hence it continually happens that propositions which cannot be rendered
+into thought at all are supposed to be not only thought but believed. The
+proposition that Evolution is caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two
+terms are separately intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relation
+of effect and cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them together
+in this relation.
+
+'"The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his own
+states of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his own,
+he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to
+frame a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits under which
+alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know nothing of
+thought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to the effects
+wrought by objects on me. A mental act is an unintelligible phrase if I am
+not to regard it as an act in which states of consciousness are severally
+known as like other states in the series that has gone by, and in which the
+relations between them are severally known as like past relations in the
+series. If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an 'originating
+Mind,' I must conceive this Mind as having attributes akin to those of the
+only mind I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind at all.
+
+'"I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by asking how
+the 'originating Mind' is to be thought of as having states produced by
+things objective to it, as discriminating among these states, and classing
+them as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective result to another.
+I will simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the 'originating Mind' the
+character absolutely essential to the conception of mind, that it consists
+of a series of states of consciousness? Put a series of states of
+consciousness as cause and the evolving universe as effect, and then
+endeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I find it possible to
+imagine in some dim way a series of states of consciousness serving as
+antecedent to any one of the movements I see going on; for my own states of
+consciousness are often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But
+how if I attempt to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions
+throughout the universe--to the motions of the multitudinous stars
+throughout space, to the revolutions of all their planets round them, to
+the gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infinitely
+multiplied physical processes going on in each of these suns and planets? I
+cannot think of a single series of states of consciousness as causing even
+the relatively small groups of actions going on over the earth's surface. I
+cannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various winds and the
+dissolving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the rivers, and the
+grinding actions of all the glaciers; still less can I think of it as
+antecedent to the infinity of processes simultaneously going on in all the
+plants that cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowded
+tropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that roam among them,
+and the millions of millions of insects that buzz about them. Even a single
+small set of these multitudinous terrestrial changes I cannot conceive as
+antecedent a single series of states of consciousness--cannot, for
+instance, think of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that are at
+this instant curling over on the shores of England. How, then, is it
+possible for me to conceive an 'originating Mind,' which I must represent
+to myself as a _single_ series of states of consciousness, working the
+infinitely multiplied sets of changes _simultaneously_ going on in worlds
+too numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that baffles
+imagination?
+
+'"If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere going
+on, 'Mind must be conceived as there' 'under the guise of simple Dynamics,'
+then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind must be divested of all
+attributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when thus divested of
+its distinguishing attributes, the conception disappears--the word Mind
+stands for a blank....
+
+'"Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an 'originating Mind' is the
+cause of evolution is a proposition that can be entertained so long only as
+no attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the alleged
+relation. That it should be accepted as a matter of _faith_ may be a
+defensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should be so
+accepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of _understanding_--as
+a statement making the order of the universe comprehensible--is a quite
+indefensible position."'[31]
+
+Sec. 47. We have now heard the pleading on both sides of the ultimate issue to
+which it is possible that the argument from teleology can ever be reduced.
+It therefore devolves on us very briefly to adjudicate upon the contending
+opinions. And this it is not difficult to do; for throughout the pleading
+on both sides I have been careful to exclude all arguments and
+considerations which are not logically valid. It is therefore impossible
+for me now to pass any criticisms on the pleading of either side which have
+not already been passed by the pleading of the other. But nevertheless, in
+my capacity of an impartial judge, I feel it desirable to conclude this
+chapter with a few general considerations.
+
+In the first place, I think that the theist's antecedent objection to a
+scientific mode of reasoning on the score of its symbolism, may be regarded
+as fairly balanced by the atheist's antecedent objection to a metaphysical
+mode of reasoning on the score of its postulating an unknowable cause. And
+it must be allowed that the force of this antecedent objection is
+considerably increased by the reflection that the _kind_ of unknowable
+cause which is thus postulated is that which the human mind has always
+shown an overweening tendency to postulate as a cause of natural phenomena.
+
+I think, therefore, that neither disputant has the right to regard the _a
+priori_ standing of his opponent's theory as much more suspicious than that
+of his own; for it is obvious that neither disputant has the means whereby
+to estimate the actual value of these antecedent objections.
+
+With regard, then, to the _a posteriori_ evidence in favour of the rival
+theories, I think that the final test of their validity--_i.e._, the
+inconceivability of their respective negations--fails equally in the case
+of both theories; for in the case of each theory any proposition which
+embodies it must itself contain an infinite, _i.e._, an
+inconceivable--term. Thus, whether we speak of an Infinite Mind as the
+cause of evolution, or of evolution as due to an infinite duration of
+physical processes, we are alike open to the charge of employing
+unthinkable propositions.
+
+Hence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is an
+eternity of matter and of force,[32] and the other an Infinite Mind, so
+that in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; and
+therefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon the
+subject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the other
+from an appeal to the test of inconceivability.
+
+Yet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more ultimate.
+What then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion concerning
+the rational standing of the teleological argument? The answer, I think, to
+this question is, that in strict reasoning the teleological argument, in
+its every shape, is inadequate to form a basis of Theism; or, in other
+words, that the logical cogency of this argument is insufficient to justify
+a wholly impartial mind in accepting the theory of Theism on so insecure a
+foundation. Nevertheless, if the further question were directly put to me,
+'After having heard the pleading both for and against the most refined
+expression of the argument from teleology, with what degree of strictly
+rational probability do you accredit it?'--I should reply as follows:--'The
+question which you put I take to be a question which it is wholly
+impossible to answer, and this for the simple reason that the degree of
+even rational probability may here legitimately vary with the character of
+the mind which contemplates it.' This statement, no doubt, sounds
+paradoxical; but I think it is justified by the following considerations.
+When we say that one proposition is more conceivable than another, we may
+mean either of two very different things, and this quite apart from the
+distinction previously drawn between symbolic conceptions and realisable
+conceptions. For we may mean that one of the two propositions presents
+terms which cannot possibly be rendered into thought at all in the relation
+which the proposition alleges to subsist between them; or we may mean that
+one of the two propositions presents terms in a relation which is more
+congruous with the habitual tenor of our thoughts than does the other
+proposition. Thus, as an example of the former usage, we may say, It is
+more conceivable that two and two should make four than that two and two
+should make five; and, as an example of the latter usage, we may say, It is
+more conceivable that a man should be able to walk than that he should be
+able to fly. Now, for the sake of distinction, I shall call the first of
+these usages the test of _absolute_ inconceivability, and the second the
+test of _relative_ inconceivability. Doubtless, when the word
+"inconceivability" is used in the sense of relative inconceivability, it is
+incorrectly used, unless it is qualified in some way; because, if used
+without qualification, there is danger of its being confused with
+inconceivability in its absolute sense. Nevertheless, if used with some
+qualifying epithet, it becomes quite unexceptionable. For the process of
+conception being in all cases the process of establishing relations in
+thought, we may properly say, It is relatively more conceivable that a man
+should walk than that a man should fly, since it is _more easy_ to
+establish, the necessary relations in thought in the case of the former
+than in the case of the latter proposition. The only difference, then,
+between what I have called absolute inconceivability and what I have called
+relative inconceivability consists in this--that while the latter admits of
+_degrees_, the former does not.[33]
+
+With this distinction clearly understood, I may now proceed to observe that
+in everyday life we constantly apply the test of relative inconceivability
+as a test of truth. And in the vast majority of cases this test of relative
+inconceivability is, for all practical purposes, as valid a test of truth
+as is the test of absolute conceivability. For as every man is more or less
+in harmony with his environment, his habits of thought with regard to his
+environment are for the most part stereotyped correctly; so that the most
+ready and the most trustworthy gauge of probability that he has is an
+immediate appeal to consciousness as to whether he _feels_ the probability.
+Thus every man learns for himself to endow his own sense of probability
+with a certain undefined but massive weight of authority. Now it is this
+test of relative conceivability which all men apply in varying degrees to
+the question of Theism. For if, from education and organised habits of
+thought, the probability in this matter appears to a man to incline in a
+certain direction, when this probability is called in question, the whole
+body of this organised system of thought rises in opposition to the
+questioning, and being individually conscious of this strong feeling of
+subjective opposition, the man declares the sceptical propositions to be
+more inconceivable to him than are the counter-propositions. And in so
+saying he is, of course, perfectly right. Hence I conceive that the
+acceptance or the rejection of metaphysical teleology as probable will
+depend entirely upon individual habits of thought. The test of absolute
+inconceivability making equally for and against the doctrine of Theism,
+disputants are compelled to fall back on the test of relative
+inconceivability; and as the direction in which the more inconceivable
+proposition will here seem to lie will be determined by previous habits of
+thought, it follows that while to a theist metaphysical teleology will
+appear a probable argument, to an atheist it will appear an improbable one.
+Thus to a theist it will no doubt appear more conceivable that the Supreme
+Mind should be such that in some of its attributes it resembles the human
+mind, while in other of its attributes--among which he will place
+omnipresence, omnipotence, and directive agency--it transcends the human
+mind as greatly as the latter "transcends mechanical motion;" and therefore
+that although it is true, as a matter of logical terminology, that we ought
+to designate such an entity "Not mind" or "Blank," still, as a matter of
+psychology, we may come nearer to the truth by assimilating in thought this
+entity with the nearest analogies which experience supplies, than by
+assimilating it in thought with any other entity--such as force or
+matter--which are felt to be in all likelihood still more remote from it in
+nature. On the other hand, to an atheist it will no doubt appear more
+conceivable, because more simple, to accept the dogma of an eternal
+self-existence of something which we call force and matter, and with this
+dogma to accept the implication of a necessary self-evolution of cosmic
+harmony, than to resort to the additional and no less inconceivable
+supposition of a self-existing Agent which must be regarded both as Mind
+and as Not-mind at the same time. But in both cases, in whatever degree
+this test of relative inconceivability of a negative is held by the
+disputants to be valid in solving the problem of Theism, in that degree is
+each man entitled to his respective estimate of the probability in
+question. And thus we arrive at the judgment that the rational probability
+of Theism legitimately varies with the character of the mind which
+contemplates it. For, as the test of absolute inconceivability is equally
+annihilative in whichever direction it is applied, the test of relative
+inconceivability is the only one that remains; and as the formal conditions
+of a metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and
+the formal conditions of a physical explanation of cosmic harmony are no
+less undoubtedly present on the other hand, it follows that a theist and an
+atheist have an equal right to employ this test of relative
+inconceivability. And as there is no more ultimate court of appeal whereby
+to decide the question than the universe as a whole, each man has here an
+equal argumentative right to abide by the decision which that court awards
+_to him individually_--to accept whatever probability the sum-total of
+phenomena appears to present to his particular understanding. And it is
+needless to say that experience shows, even among well-informed and
+accurate reasoners, how large an allowance must thus be made for personal
+equations. To some men the facts of external nature seem to proclaim a God
+with clarion voice, while to other men the same facts bring no whisper of
+such a message. All, therefore, that a logician can here do is to remark,
+that the individuals in each class--provided they bear in mind the strictly
+_relative_ character of their belief--have a similar right to be regarded
+as holding a rational creed: the grounds of belief in this case logically
+vary with the natural disposition and the subsequent training of different
+minds.[34]
+
+It only remains to show that disputants on either side are apt to endow
+this test of relative inconceivability with far more than its real logical
+worth. Being accustomed to apply this test of truth in daily life, and
+there finding it a trustworthy test, most men are apt to forget that its
+value as a test must clearly diminish in proportion to the distance from
+experience at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to be the case even
+with the test of absolute inconceivability (see Chapter V.), but much more
+must it be the case with this test of relative inconceivability. For,
+without comment, it is manifest that our acquired sense of probability, as
+distinguished from our innate sense of possibility, with regard to any
+particular question of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparable
+with its value in the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which our
+sense of probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although,
+therefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain a
+belief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally entitled
+to be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in whatever
+degree either party considers their belief as of a higher validity than the
+grounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in that degree must the
+members of that party be deemed irrational. In other words, not only must a
+man be careful not to confuse the test of relative inconceivability with
+that of absolute conceivability--not to suppose that his sense of
+probability in this matter is determined by an innate psychological
+inability to conceive a proposition, when in reality it is only determined
+by the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have long been habitually
+associated;--but he must also be careful to remember that the test of
+relative inconceivability in this matter is only valid as justifying a
+belief of the most diffident possible kind.
+
+And from this the practical deduction is--tolerance. Let no man think that
+he has any argumentative right to expect that the mere subjective habit or
+tone of his own mind should exert any influence on that of his fellow; but
+rather let him always remember that the only legitimate weapons of his
+intellectual warfare are those the _material_ of which is derived from the
+external world, and only the _form_ of which is due to the forging process
+of his own mind. And if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted on
+the hardened armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardened
+armoury of confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must not
+too confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of his
+own weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need we
+all stand of this caution:--Knowing how greatly the value of arguments is
+affected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame of mind in
+which we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not to
+over-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is actually
+superior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is surely
+needless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us to bear
+in mind this further caution:--Knowing with what great subjective
+opposition arguments are met when they conflict with our established modes
+of thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard the sanctuary of our
+judgment from the polluting tyranny of habit.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
+
+Sec. 48. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here suffice
+to convey an epitomised recollection of the numerous facts and conclusions
+which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first disposed of the
+conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of things, or the mystery
+of existence, admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any
+further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the
+argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a
+subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to
+prove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with regard
+to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations point to
+God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to observe that the
+argument could only be admissible after the possibility of the operation of
+natural causes had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed
+intuitive necessity of individual thought was found to be untenable, first,
+because, even if the supposed necessity were a real one, it would only
+possess an individual applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact,
+it is extremely improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity
+even for the individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that
+it is not such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the
+general consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts
+and principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a
+first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument
+that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is
+probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of
+inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced worthless.
+
+Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in favour of
+Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds are caused
+by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our mind is caused
+by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible for two reasons.
+In the first place, "it does not account for mind (in the abstract) to
+refer it to a prior mind for its origin;" and therefore, although the
+hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of _known_ mind, it is
+useless as an argument for the existence of the unknown mind, the
+assumption of which forms the basis of that explanation. Again, in the next
+place, if it be said that mind is so far an entity _sui generis_ that it
+must be either self-existing or caused by another mind, there is no
+assignable warrant for the assertion. And this is the second objection to
+the above syllogism; for anything within the whole range of the possible
+may, for aught that we can tell, be competent to produce a self-conscious
+intelligence. Thus an objector to the above syllogism need not hold any
+theory of things at all; but even as opposed to the definite theory of
+materialism, the above syllogism has not so valid an argumentative basis to
+stand upon. We know that what we call matter and force are to all
+appearance eternal, while we have no corresponding evidence of a "mind that
+is even apparently eternal." Further, within experience mind is invariably
+associated with highly differentiated collocations of matter and
+distributions of force, and many facts go to prove, and none to negative,
+the conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or
+at least is associated with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development.
+There is thus both a qualitative and a quantitative relation between
+intelligence and cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and
+motion cannot produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they
+should, we have seen at some length that this is no conclusive
+consideration as applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental
+nature, and that in the present case it is particularly inconclusive,
+because, as it is speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be
+unknowable, it seems _a priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the
+unknowable reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into
+thought in that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which
+is imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_
+conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is in
+this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly, the
+statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects can
+contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by everyday
+experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the will and
+the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively by the
+theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of utilitarianism. On
+the whole, then, with regard to the argument from the existence of the
+human mind, we were compelled to decide that it is destitute of any
+assignable weight, there being nothing more to lead to the conclusion that
+our mind has been caused by another mind, than to the conclusion that it
+has been caused by anything else whatsoever.
+
+With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that Mill's
+presentation of it is merely a resuscitation of the argument as presented
+by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers. And indeed we saw that the first-named writer
+treated this whole subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising
+in him; for while he has failed to assign anything like due weight to the
+inductive evidence of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a
+supernatural explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed
+signally in his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common
+with all previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly
+impossible for us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer
+stands to the Designed,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme
+Mind, even supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any
+particular intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the
+Design argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be
+due to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that
+this Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and
+such cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise the
+supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of the
+existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after all, of
+very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the _methods_
+of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that, _in some way
+or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due to Intelligence
+of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the first to endorse this
+remark. It has always appeared to me one of the most unaccountable things
+in the history of speculation that so many competent writers can have
+insisted upon _Design_ as an argument for Theism, when they must all have
+known perfectly well that they have no means of ascertaining the subjective
+psychology of that Supreme Mind whose existence the argument is adduced to
+demonstrate. The truth is, that the argument from teleology must, and can
+only, rest upon the observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the
+intellectual _processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been
+accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this is
+merely to change the teleological argument from its gross Paleyerian form,
+into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws. And we saw
+that this transformation is now a rational necessity. How far the great
+principle of natural selection may have been instrumental in the evolution
+of organic forms, is not here, as Mill erroneously imagined, the question;
+the question is simply as to whether we are to accept the theory of special
+creation or the theory of organic evolution. And forasmuch as no competent
+judge at the present time can hesitate for one moment in answering this
+question, the argument from a proximate teleology must be regarded as no
+longer having any rational existence.
+
+How then does it fare with the last of the arguments--the argument from an
+ultimate teleology? Doubtless at first sight this argument seems a very
+powerful one, inasmuch as it is a generic argument, which embraces not only
+biological phenomena, but all the phenomena of the universe. But
+nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent power
+dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if force and
+matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have resulted by
+way of necessary consequence. It will be remembered that I dwelt at
+considerable length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only
+because of its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but
+also because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation.
+
+The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the conclusion that
+was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless collapse of all the
+possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully demonstrated that
+there is no shadow of a positive argument in support of the theistic
+theory, there arose the danger that some persons might erroneously conclude
+that for this reason the theistic theory must be untrue. It therefore
+became necessary to point out, that although, as far as we can see, nature
+does not require an Intelligent Cause to account for any of her phenomena,
+yet it is possible that, if we could see farther, we should see that nature
+could not be what she is unless she had owed her existence to an
+Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words, the probability there is that an
+Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of nature,
+is only equal to the probability there is that the doctrine of the
+persistence of force is everywhere and eternally true.
+
+As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the
+region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science,
+and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the discussion
+into the transcendental region of purely formal considerations. And here we
+laid down the canon, "that the value of any probability, in its last
+analysis, is determined by the number, the importance, and the definiteness
+of the relations known, as compared with those of the relations unknown;"
+and, consequently, that in cases where the unknown relations are more
+numerous, more important, or more indefinite than are the known relations,
+the value of our inference varies inversely as the difference in these
+respects between the relations compared. From which canon it followed, that
+as the problem of Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so
+contains in its unknown relations all that is to man unknown and
+unknowable, these relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all
+relations that it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently,
+that although we have here the entire range of experience from which to
+argue, we are unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever.
+The unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite,
+both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the known
+relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite probability
+either for or against the being of a God. Therefore, although it is true
+that, so far as human science can penetrate or human thought infer, we can
+perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right on this account to
+conclude that there is no God. The probability, therefore, that nature is
+devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest kind if regarded
+scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific demonstration,--is
+nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically. Notwithstanding it is
+as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of all experience
+that, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a cause of the
+universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that, if there had
+never been a God, the universe could never have existed.
+
+Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter how
+great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative sense, we
+have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute sense. From
+which position there emerged the possibility of another argument in favour
+of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of the teleological
+argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing that these formal
+considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for or against Deity in
+an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such reasoning in a relative
+sense, if there yet remain any theistic deductions which may properly be
+drawn from experience, these may now be adduced to balance the atheistic
+deductions from the persistence of force. For although the latter
+deductions have clearly shown the existence of Deity to be superfluous in a
+scientific sense, the formal considerations in question have no less
+clearly opened up beyond the sphere of science a possible _locus_ for the
+existence of Deity; so that if there are any facts supplied by experience
+for which the atheistic deductions appear insufficient to account, we are
+still free to account for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of
+Theism. And, it may be urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in
+the correlation of general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It
+signifies nothing, the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the
+methods whereby the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor
+does it signify that its operation must now be relegated to a
+super-scientific province. What does signify is that, taking a general view
+of nature, we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of
+her harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation.
+Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be
+remembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to
+distinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in
+contradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction, it
+will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms of
+teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible reach of
+science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific refutation,
+the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis which is
+clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be susceptible of
+scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system of teleology does
+rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it accepts the most
+ultimate truths of which science can ever be cognisant--viz., the
+persistence of force and the consequently necessary genesis of natural
+law,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of regarding Mind as the
+ultimate cause of things is not on this account removed; and, therefore,
+that if science now requires the operation of a Supreme Mind to be posited
+in a super-scientific sphere, then in a super-scientific sphere it ought to
+be posited. No doubt this hypothesis at first sight seems gratuitous,
+seeing that, so far as science can penetrate, there is no need of any such
+hypothesis at all--cosmic harmony resulting as a physically necessary
+consequence from the combined action of natural laws, which in turn result
+as a physically necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the
+primary qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that
+metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered scientifically,
+it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if considered
+psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable that Mind should
+be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the persistence of force
+should be so, then it is not irrational to accept the more conceivable
+hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable one, provided that the
+choice is made with the diffidence which is required by the considerations
+adduced in Chapter V.
+
+I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology,
+although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense
+legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this
+argument can rest--viz., the position that the fundamental postulate of
+Atheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of
+Theism--we have seen two important objections to lie.
+
+For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" is
+here used is that of the impossibility of framing _realisable_ relations in
+the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_ relations
+in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is true that
+the complexity of the human organisation and its functions is
+inconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much less
+weight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without waiting
+again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative standing of
+Materialism) how far even the genuine test of inconceivability ought to be
+allowed to make against an inference which there is a body of scientific
+evidence to substantiate, we went on to the second objection against this
+fundamental position of metaphysical teleology. This objection, it will be
+remembered, was, that it is as impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as
+an effect of Mind, as it is to conceive of it as an effect of mindless
+evolution. The argument from inconceivability, therefore, admits of being
+turned with quite as terrible an effect on Theism, as it can possibly be
+made to exert on Atheism.
+
+Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and
+which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of Theism,
+is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its metaphysical
+character it has escaped the opposition of physical science, only to
+encounter a new opposition in the region of pure psychology to which it
+fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry, therefore, it devolved on us to
+determine the relative magnitudes of these opposing forces. And in doing
+this we first observed that, if the supporters of metaphysical teleology
+objected _a priori_ to the method whereby the genesis of natural law was
+deduced from the datum of the persistence of force, in that this method
+involved an unrestricted use of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it
+is no less open to an atheist to object _a priori_ to the method whereby a
+directing Mind was inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this
+method involved the population of an unknowable cause,--and this of a
+character which the whole history of human thought has proved the human
+mind to exhibit an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of
+natural phenomena. On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as
+their respective standing _a priori_ is concerned, both theories may be
+regarded as about equally suspicious. And similar with regard to their
+standing _a posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least
+one infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely
+inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the
+two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a
+question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of
+absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a man
+wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by what I
+have designated relative inconceivability--_i.e._, in accordance with the
+verdict given by his individual sense of probability as determined by his
+previous habits of thought. And forasmuch as the test of relative
+inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to vary with the
+character of the mind which applies it, the strictly rational probability
+of the question to which it is applied varies in like manner. Or, otherwise
+presented, the only alternative for any man in this matter is either to
+discipline himself into an attitude of pure scepticism, and thus to refuse
+in thought to entertain either a probability or an improbability concerning
+the existence of a God; or else to incline in thought towards an
+affirmation or a negation of God, according as his previous habits of
+thought have rendered such an inclination more facile in the one direction
+than in the other. And although, under such circumstances, I should
+consider that man the more rational who carefully suspended his judgment, I
+conclude that if this course is departed from, neither the metaphysical
+teleologist nor the scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over
+the other in respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a
+metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the
+formal conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on
+the other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein
+the pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be
+made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.
+
+Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the abstract
+nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which at the
+present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the confusing
+amount of good, bad, and indifferent literature on both sides of the
+controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not think that
+the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the score of its
+lacking precision. At a time like the present, when traditional beliefs
+respecting Theism are so generally accepted and so commonly concluded, as a
+matter of course, to have a large and valid basis of induction whereon to
+rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this short essay, by showing how
+very concise the scientific _status_ of the subject really is, will do more
+to settle the minds of most readers as to the exact standing at the present
+time of all the probabilities of the question, than could a perusal of all
+the rest of the literature upon this subject. And, looking to the present
+condition of speculative philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost
+importance to have clearly shown that the advance of science has now
+entitled us to assert, without the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of
+Mind in nature is as certainly superfluous to account for any of the
+phenomena of nature, as the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force
+and the indestructibility of matter is certainly true.
+
+On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical
+aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite as
+has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter which
+does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of necessity be
+left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears this
+consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly complain of my
+not having done my utmost in this case to define as sharply as possible the
+character and the limits of this margin.
+
+Sec. 49. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any
+antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is
+unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with the
+utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here
+worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save the
+strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society to
+give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they may he worth.
+Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the most profitable
+for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual endeavour to attain
+it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed and sincere, ought
+without hesitation to be made the common property of all men, no matter in
+what direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend. And so
+far as the ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can have
+a more lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency of
+my work. So far as I am individually concerned, the result of this analysis
+has been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower
+plane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely
+formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all
+belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my
+intellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest
+scepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with those
+who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable
+substitute for the waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to
+confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost
+its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work
+while it is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the
+terribly intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no
+man can work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the
+appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was
+mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such times
+I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my
+nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being
+sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be
+due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were
+the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for
+others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of
+Hamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but
+of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has become transformed into the
+terrific oracle to Oedipus--
+
+  "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+APPENDIX
+
+AND
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF A FALLACY IN LOCKE'S USE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST
+THE POSSIBILITY OF MATTER THINKING ON GROUNDS OF ITS BEING INCONCEIVABLE
+THAT IT SHOULD.
+
+Lest it should be thought that I am doing injustice to the views of this
+illustrious theist, I here quote his own words:--"We have the ideas of
+matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any
+mere material being thinks or no, it being impossible for us, by the
+contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether
+omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a power
+to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a
+thinking immaterial substance; it being, in respect of our notions, not
+much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if He
+pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that He should
+superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know
+not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substance the Almighty
+has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being,
+but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I see no
+contradiction in it that the first eternal thinking being should, if he
+pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together
+as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though,
+as I think, I have proved, lib. iv., ch. 10 and 14, &c., it is no less than
+a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature
+void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-thinking being.
+What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such
+as, _e.g._, pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves,
+after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be
+in an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as
+far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body; and
+motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce
+nothing but motion: so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain,
+or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond
+our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For
+since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way
+conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He
+could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive
+capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of
+matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way
+lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality, &c.... It is a point which
+seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge; and he who will
+give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate
+part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him
+fixedly for or against the soul's materiality. Since on which side soever
+he views it, either as an unextended substance or as a thinking extended
+matter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in
+his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which
+some men take with themselves, who, because of the inconceivableness of
+something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary
+hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed
+understanding."
+
+This passage, I do not hesitate to say, is one of the most remarkable in
+the whole range of philosophical literature, in respect of showing how even
+the strongest and most candid intellect may have its reasoning faculty
+impaired by the force of a preformed conviction. Here we have a mind of
+unsurpassed penetration and candour, which has left us side by side two
+parallel trains of reasoning. In the one, the object is to show that the
+author's preformed conviction as to the being of a God is justifiable on
+grounds of reason; in the other, the object is to show that, granting the
+existence of a God, and it is not impossible that he may have endowed
+matter with the faculty of thinking. Now, in the former train of reasoning,
+the whole proof rests entirely upon the fact that "it is impossible to
+conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking
+intelligent being." Clearly, if this proposition is true, it must destroy
+one or other of the trains of reasoning; for it is common to them both, and
+in one of them it is made the sole ground for concluding that matter cannot
+think, while in the other it is made compatible with the supposition that
+matter may think. This extraordinary inconsistency no doubt arose from the
+fact that the author was antecedently persuaded of the existence of an
+_Omnipotent_ Mind, and having been long accustomed in his intellectual
+symbols to regard it presumptuous in him to impose any limitations on this
+almighty power, when he asked himself whether it would be possible for this
+almighty power, if it so willed, to endow matter with the faculty of
+thinking, he argued that it might be possible, notwithstanding his being
+unable to conceive the possibility. But when he banished from his mind the
+idea of this personal and almighty power, and with that idea banished all
+its associations, he then felt that he had a right to argue more freely,
+and forthwith made his conceptive faculty a test of abstract possibility.
+Yet _the sum total of abstract possibility, in relation to him, must have
+been the same in the two cases_; so that in whichever of the two trains of
+reasoning his argument was sound, in the other it must certainly have been
+null.
+
+We may well feel amazed that so able a thinker can have fallen into so
+obvious an error, and afterwards have persisted in it through pages and
+pages of his work. It will be instructive, however, to those who rely upon
+Locke's exposition of the argument from Inconceivability to see how
+effectually he has himself destroyed it. For this purpose, therefore, I
+shall make some further quotations from the same train of reasoning. The
+statement of Locke's opinion that the Almighty could endow matter with the
+faculty of thinking if He so willed, called down some remonstrances and
+rebukes from the then Bishop of Worcester. Locke's reply was a very lengthy
+one, and from it the following extracts are taken. I merely request the
+reader throughout to substitute for the words God, Creator, Almighty,
+Omipotency, &c., the words _Summum genus_ of Possibility.
+
+"But it is further urged that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I
+grant it, but to argue from thence that God therefore cannot give to matter
+a faculty of thinking is to say God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow
+compass because man's understanding is so, and brings down God's infinite
+power to the size of our capacities....
+
+"If God can give no power to any parts of matter but what men can account
+for from the essence of matter in general; if all such qualities and
+properties must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties of
+matter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be
+the natural consequence of that essence; it is plain that the essence of
+matter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of the
+sensible parts of this our system. For it is visible that all the planets
+have revolutions about certain remote centres, which I would have any one
+explain or make conceivable by the bare essence, or natural powers
+depending on the essence of matter in general, without something added to
+that essence which we cannot conceive; for the moving of matter in a
+crooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can be
+said in the case; either of which it is above our reach to derive from the
+essence of matter or body in general, though one of these two must
+unavoidably be allowed to be superadded, in this instance, to the essence
+of matter in general. The omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the
+making of the world, and His ways are not the less excellent because they
+are past finding out....
+
+"In all such cases, the superinducement of greater perfections and nobler
+qualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that were there
+before, unless there can be showed a manifest repugnancy between them; but
+all the proof offered for that is only that we cannot conceive how matter,
+without such superadded perfections, can produce such effects; which is, in
+truth, no more than to say matter in general, or every part of matter, as
+matter, has them not, but is no reason to prove that God, if He pleases,
+cannot superadd them to some parts of matter, unless it can be proved to be
+a contradiction that God should give to some parts of matter qualities and
+perfections which matter in general has not, though we cannot conceive how
+matter is invested with them, or how it operates by virtue of those new
+endowments; nor is it to be wondered that we cannot, whilst we limit all
+its operations to those qualities it had before, and would explain them by
+the known properties of matter in general, without any such induced
+perfections. For if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing to
+be because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be, I shall desire
+them who use it to stick to this rule, and see what work it will make both
+in divinity as well as philosophy, and whether they can advance anything
+more in favour of scepticism.
+
+"For to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking and
+self-motion bestowed by omnipotent power in some parts of matter: the
+objection to this is, I cannot conceive how matter should think. What is
+the consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this stand
+for a good reason, and then proceed in other cases by the same.
+
+"You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance, much
+less at the distance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it such a
+power: you cannot conceive how matter should feel or move itself, or affect
+any material being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it such
+powers: which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution of the
+planets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, without sense or
+spontaneous motion; and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary motion.
+
+"Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an
+extended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think:
+can you conceive how your own soul or any substance thinks? You find,
+indeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how the
+action of thinking is performed: this, I confess, is beyond my conception;
+and I would be glad any one who conceives it would explain it to me.
+
+"God, I find, has given me this faculty; and since I cannot but be
+convinced of His power in this instance, which, though I every moment
+experience in myself, yet I cannot conceive the manner of, what would it be
+less than an insolent absurdity to deny His power in other like cases, only
+for this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?...
+
+"That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at the
+same time, I think with due reverence [diffidence?[35]] we may say; but
+that a solid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers,
+which have no natural or visibly necessary connection with solidity and
+extension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing)
+to be positive in.
+
+"If God cannot join things together by connections inconceivable to us, we
+must deny even the consistency and being of matter itself; since every
+particle of it having some bulk, has its parts connected by ways
+inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raised against
+the thinking of matter, from our ignorance or narrow conceptions, stand not
+at all in the way of the power of God, if He pleases to ordain it so; nor
+prove anything against His having actually endowed some parcels of matter,
+so disposed as He thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can he
+shown that it contains a contradiction to suppose it.
+
+"Though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general, in the
+foregoing discourse I have spoke of sense in brutes as distinct from
+thinking; because your lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in brutes.
+But here I take liberty to observe, that if your lordship allows brutes to
+have sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to some
+parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking, or that all animals
+have immaterial, and consequently, according to your lordship, immortal
+souls, as well as men; and to say that fleas and mites, &c., have immortal
+souls as well as men, will possibly be looked on as going a great way to
+serve an hypothesis....
+
+"It is true, I say, 'That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else,' and
+so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their
+operation. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's
+incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power
+in this point by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards
+matter, by way unconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God
+can, if He pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation above what
+can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know
+of matter, but also an unquestionable and everywhere visible instance that
+He has done so. And therefore, in the next edition of my book, I will take
+care to have that passage rectified....
+
+"As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks, 'What is there like
+self-consciousness in matter?' Nothing at all in matter as matter. But that
+God cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and with
+it self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking how is it possible to
+apprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive? The
+weakness of our apprehension I grant in the case: I confess as much as you
+please, that we cannot conceive how an unsolid created substance thinks;
+but this weakness of our apprehension reaches not the power of God, whose
+weakness is stronger than anything in man."
+
+Lastly, Locke turns upon his opponent the power of the _odium theologicum_.
+
+"Let it be as hard a matter as it will to give an account what it is that
+should keep the parts of a material soul together after it is separated
+from the body, yet it will be always as easy to give an account of it as to
+give an account what it is that shall keep together a material and
+immaterial substance. And yet the difficulty that there is to give an
+account of that, I hope, does not, with your lordship, weaken the
+credibility of the inseparable union of soul and body to eternity; and I
+persuade myself that the men of sense, to whom your lordship appeals in
+this case, do not find their belief of this fundamental point much weakened
+by that difficulty.... But you will say, you speak only of the soul; and
+your words are, that it is no easy matter to give an account how the soul
+should be capable of immortality unless it be a material substance. I grant
+it, but crave leave to say, that there is not any one of these difficulties
+that are or can be raised about the manner how a material soul can be
+immortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body....
+
+"But your lordship, as I guess from your following words, would argue that
+a material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby I suppose you only
+mean that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance should begin,
+stop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, that when
+you can make it conceivable how any created, finite, dependent substance
+can move itself, I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow
+this power on a solid than an unsolid created substance.... But though you
+cannot see how any created substance, solid or not solid, can be a free
+agent (pardon me, my lord, if I put in both, till your lordship please to
+explain it of either, and show the manner how either of them can of itself
+move itself or anything else), yet I do not think you will so far deny men
+to be free agents, from the difficulty there is to see how they are free
+agents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough for the day of
+judgment."
+
+Let us now, for the sake of contrast, turn to some passages which occur in
+the other train of reasoning.
+
+"If we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can never
+begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or
+without motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, perception,
+and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and
+knowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every
+particle of it." There is a double fallacy here. In the first place,
+conceivability is made the unconditional test of possibility; and, in the
+next place, it is asserted that unless every particle of matter can think,
+no collocation of such particles can possibly do so. This latter fallacy is
+further insisted upon thus:--"If they will not allow matter as matter, that
+is, every particle of matter, to be as well cogitative as extended, they
+will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative
+being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended
+parts, if I may so speak.... Every particle of matter, as matter, is
+capable of all the same figures and motions of any other, and I challenge
+any one in his thoughts to add anything else to one above another." Now, as
+we have seen, Locke himself has shown in his other trains of argument that
+this challenge is thoroughly futile as a refutation of possibilities; but
+the point to which I now wish to draw attention is this--It does not follow
+because certain and highly complex collocations of material particles may
+be supposed capable of thinking, that therefore every particle of matter
+must be regarded as having this attribute. We have innumerable analogies in
+nature of a certain collocation of matter and force producing certain
+results which another somewhat similar collocation could not produce: in
+such cases we do not assume that all the resulting attributes of the one
+collocation must be presented also by the other--still less that these
+resulting attributes must belong to the primary qualities of matter and
+force. Hence, it is not fair to assume that thought must either be inherent
+in every particle of matter, or else not producible by any possible
+collocation of such particles, unless it has previously been shown that so
+to produce it by any possible collocation is in the nature of things
+impossible. But no one could refute this fallacy better than Locke himself
+has done in some of the passages already quoted from his other train of
+reasoning.
+
+But to continue the quotation:--"If, therefore, it be evident that
+something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident that
+that something must necessarily be a cogitative being; for it is as
+impossible [_inconceivable_] that incogitative matter should produce a
+cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should
+produce a positive being or matter." Again,--"For unthinking particles of
+matter, however put together, can have [_can be taught to have_] nothing
+thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is
+impossible [_inconceivable_] should give thought and knowledge to them."
+
+It is unnecessary to multiply these quotations, for, in effect, they would
+all be merely repetitions of one another. It is enough to have seen that
+this able author undertakes to demonstrate the existence of a God, and that
+his whole demonstration resolves itself into the unwarrantable inference,
+that as we are unable to conceive how thought can be a property of matter,
+therefore a property of matter thought cannot be. That such an erroneous
+inference should occur in any writings of so old a date as those of Locke
+is not in itself surprising. What is surprising is the fact, that in the
+same writings, and in the course of the same discussion, the fallacy of
+this very inference is repeatedly pointed out and insisted upon in a great
+variety of ways; and it has been chiefly for the sake of showing the
+pernicious influence which preformed opinion may exert--viz., even to
+blinding the eyes of one of the most clear-sighted and thoughtful men that
+ever lived to a glaring contradiction repeated over and over again in the
+course of a few pages,--it has been chiefly for this reason that I have
+extended this Appendix to so great a length. I shall now conclude it by
+quoting some sentences which occur on the very next page after that from
+which the last quoted sentences were taken. Our author here again returns
+to his defence of the omnipotency of God; and as he now again thus
+personifies the sum total of possibility, his mind abruptly reverts to all
+its other class of associations. In this case the transition is
+particularly interesting, not only on account of its suddenness, but also
+because the correlations contemplated happen to be exactly the same in the
+two cases--viz., matter as the cause of mind, and mind as the cause of
+matter. Remember that on the last page this great philosopher supposed he
+had demonstrated the abstract impossibility of matter being the cause of
+mind on the ground of a causal connection being inconceivable, let us now
+observe what he says upon this page regarding the abstract possibility of
+mind being the cause of matter. "Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate
+ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would
+reach to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some
+dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to
+exist by the power of that eternal first being.... But you will say, Is it
+not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, since we
+cannot possibly conceive it? I answer--No; because it is not reasonable to
+deny the power of an infinite being [this phrase, in the absence of
+hypothesis, _i.e._, in Locke's other train of reasoning, is of course
+equivalent to the sum-total of possibility] because we cannot comprehend
+its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we
+cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive
+how anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is not a
+reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant
+experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which
+are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our minds, and are
+not, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of the blind
+matter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or
+choice to alter it. For example, my right hand writes, whilst my left hand
+is still: what causes rest in one and motion in the other? Nothing but my
+will, a thought in my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests,
+and the left hands moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied:
+explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to
+understand creation."[36]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I.
+
+COSMIC THEISM.[37]
+
+Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable is a doctrine of so much
+speculative importance, that it behoves all students of philosophy to have
+clear views respecting its character and implications. Mr. Spencer has
+himself so fully explained the character of this doctrine, that no
+attentive reader can fail to understand it; but concerning those of its
+implications which may be termed theological--as distinguished from
+religious--Mr. Spencer is silent. Within the last two or three years,
+however, there has appeared a valuable work by an able exponent of the new
+philosophy; and in this work the writer, adopting his master's teaching of
+the Unknowable, proceeds to develop it into a definite system of what may
+be termed scientific theology. And not only so, but he assures the world
+that this system of scientific theology is the highest, the purest, and the
+most ennobling form of religion that mankind has ever been privileged to
+know in the past, or, from the nature of the case, can ever be destined to
+know in the future. It is a system, we are told, wherein the most
+fundamental truths of Theism are taught as necessary deductions from the
+highest truths of Science; it is a system wherein no single doctrine
+appeals for its acceptance to any principle of blind or credulous faith,
+but wherein every doctrine can be fully justified by the searching light of
+reason; it is a system wherein the noblest of our aspirations and the most
+sublime of our emotions are able to find an object far more worthy and much
+more glorious than has ever been supplied to them by any of the older forms
+of Theism; and it is a system, therefore, in which, with a greatly enlarged
+and intensified meaning, we may worship God, and all that is within us
+bless His holy name. Assuredly a proclamation such as this, emanating from
+the most authoritative expounders of modern thought, as the highest and the
+greatest result to which a rigorous philosophic synthesis has led, is a
+proclamation which cannot fail to arrest our most serious attention. Nay,
+may it not do more than this? May it not appeal to hearts which long have
+ceased to worship? May it not once more revive a hope--long banished,
+perhaps, but still the dearest which our poor natures have
+experienced--that somewhere, sometime, or in some way, it may yet be
+possible to feel that God is not far from any one of us? For to those who
+have known the anguish of a shattered faith, it will not seem so childish
+that our hearts should beat the quicker when we once more hear a voice
+announcing to a world of superstitious idolaters--"Whom ye ignorantly
+worship, Him declare I unto you." But if, when we have listened to the glad
+tidings of the new gospel, we find that the preacher, though apparently in
+earnest, is not worthy to be heard again on this matter; and if, as we turn
+away, our eyes grow dim with the memory of a vanished dream, surely we may
+feel that the preacher is deserving of our blame for obtruding thus upon
+the most sacred of our sorrows.
+
+Mr. John Fiske is, as is well known, an author who unites in himself the
+qualities of a well-read student of philosophy, a clear and accurate
+thinker, a thorough master of the principles which in his recent work he
+undertakes to explain and to extend, and a writer gifted in a remarkable
+degree with the power of lucid exposition. Such being the intellectual
+calibre of the man who elaborates this new system of scientific theology, I
+confess that, on first seeing his work, I experienced a faint hope that, in
+the higher departments of the Philosophy of Evolution as conceived by Mr.
+Spencer and elaborated by his disciple, there might be found some rational
+justification for an attenuated form of Theism. But on examination I find
+that the bread which these fathers have offered us turns out to be a stone;
+and thinking that it is desirable to warn other of the children--whether of
+the family Philosophical or Theological--against swallowing on trust a
+morsel so injurious, I shall endeavour to point out what I conceive to be
+the true nature of "Cosmic Theism."
+
+Starting from the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, Mr. Fiske,
+following Mr. Spencer, proceeds to show how the doctrine implies that there
+must be a mode of Being to which human knowledge is non-relative. Or, in
+other words, he shows that the postulation of phenomena necessitates the
+further postulation of noumena of which phenomena are the manifestations.
+Now what may we affirm of noumena without departing from a scientific or
+objective mode of philosophising? We may affirm at least this much of
+noumena, that they constitute a mode of existence which need not
+necessarily vanish were our consciousness to perish; and, therefore, that
+they now stand out of necessary relation to our consciousness. Or, in other
+words, so far as human consciousness is concerned, noumena must be regarded
+as absolute. "But now, what do we mean by this affirmation of absolute
+reality independent of the conditions of the process of knowing? Do we mean
+to ... affirm, in language savouring strongly of scholasticism, that
+beneath the phenomena which we call subjective there is an occult
+substratum Mind, and beneath the phenomena which we call objective there is
+an occult substratum Matter? Our conclusion cannot be stated in any such
+form.... Our conclusion is simply this, that no theory of phenomena,
+external or internal, can be framed without postulating an Absolute
+Existence of which phenomena are the manifestations. And now let us
+carefully note what follows. We cannot identify this Absolute Existence
+with Mind, since what we know as Mind is a series of phenomenal
+manifestations.... Nor can we identify this Absolute Existence with Matter,
+since what we know as Matter is a series of phenomenal manifestations....
+Absolute Existence, therefore,--the Reality which persists independently of
+us, and of which Mind and Matter are the phenomenal manifestations,--cannot
+be identified either with Mind or with Matter. Thus is Materialism included
+in the same condemnation with Idealism.... See then how far we have
+travelled from the scholastic theory of occult substrata underlying each
+group of phenomena. These substrata were but the ghosts of the phenomena
+themselves; behind the tree or the mountain a sort of phantom tree or
+mountain, which persists after the body of perception has gone away with
+the departure of the percipient mind. Clearly this is no scientific
+interpretation of the facts, but is rather a specimen of naive barbaric
+thought surviving in metaphysics. The tree or mountain being groups of
+phenomena, what we assert as persisting independently of the percipient
+mind is a something which we are unable to condition either as tree or as
+mountain.
+
+"And now we come down to the very bottom of the problem. Since we do
+postulate Absolute Existence, and do not postulate a particular occult
+substance underlying each group of phenomena, are we to be understood as
+implying that there is a single Being of which all phenomena, internal and
+external to consciousness, are manifestations? Such must seem to be the
+inevitable conclusion, since we are able to carry on thinking at all only
+under the relations of Difference and No-difference.... It may seem that,
+since we cannot attribute to the Absolute Reality any relations of
+Difference, we must positively ascribe to it No-difference. Or, what is the
+same thing, in refusing to predicate multiplicity of it, do we not
+virtually predicate of it unity? We do, simply because we cannot think
+without so doing."[38]
+
+A single Absolute Reality being thus posited, our author proceeds, towards
+the close of his work, to argue that as this Reality cannot be conceived as
+limited either in space or time, it constitutes a Being which corresponds
+with our essential conception of Deity. True it is devoid of certain
+accessory attributes, such as personality, intelligence, and volition; but
+for this very reason, it is insisted, the theistic ideal as thus presented
+is a purer, and therefore a better, ideal than has ever been presented
+before. Nay, it is the highest possible form of this ideal, as the
+following considerations will show. In what has consisted that continuous
+purification of Theism which the history of thought shows to have been
+effected, from the grossest form of belief in supernatural agency as
+exhibited in Fetichism, through its more refined form as exhibited in
+Polytheism, to its still more refined form as exhibited in Monotheism? In
+nothing but in a continuous process of what Mr. Fiske calls
+"deanthropomorphisation." Consequently, must we not conclude that when we
+carry this process yet one step further, and divest our conception of Deity
+of all the yet lingering remnants of anthropomorphism which occur in the
+current conceptions of Deity, we are but still further purifying that
+conception? Assuredly, the attributes of personality, intelligence, and so
+forth, are only known as attributes of Humanity, and therefore to ascribe
+them to Deity is but to foster, in a more refined form, the anthropomorphic
+teachings of previous religions. But if we carefully refuse to limit Deity
+by the ascription of any human attributes whatever, and if the only
+attributes which we do ascribe are such as on grounds of pure reason alone
+we are compelled to ascribe, must we not conclude that the form of Theism
+which results is the purest and the most refined form in which it is
+possible for Theism to exist? "From the anthropomorphic point of view it
+will quite naturally be urged in objection, that this apparently desirable
+result is reached through the degradation of Deity from an 'intelligent
+personality' to a 'blind force,' and is therefore in reality an undesirable
+and perhaps quasi-atheistic result."[39] But the question which really
+presents itself is, "theologically phrased, whether the creature is to be
+taken as a measure of the Creator. Scientifically phrased, the question is
+whether the highest form of Being as yet suggested to one petty race of
+creatures by its ephemeral experience of what is going on in one tiny
+corner of the universe, is necessarily to be taken as the equivalent of
+that absolutely highest form of Being in which all the possibilities of
+existence are alike comprehended."[40] Therefore, in conclusion, "whether
+or not it is true that, within the bounds of the phenomenal universe the
+highest type of existence is that which we know as humanity, the conclusion
+is in every way forced upon us that, quite independently of limiting
+conditions in space or time, there is a form of Being which can neither be
+assimilated to humanity nor to any lower type of existence. We have no
+alternative, therefore, but to regard it as higher than humanity, even 'as
+the heavens are higher than the earth,' and except for the intellectual
+arrogance which the arguments of theologians show lurking beneath their
+expressions of humility, there is no reason why this admission should not
+be made unreservedly, without the anthropomorphic qualifications by which
+its effect is commonly nullified. The time is surely coming when the
+slowness of men in accepting such a conclusion will be marvelled at, and
+when the very inadequacy of human language to express Divinity will be
+regarded as a reason for a deeper faith and more solemn adoration."[41]
+
+I have now sufficiently detailed the leading principles of Cosmic Theism to
+render a clear and just conception of those fundamental parts of the system
+which I am about to criticise; but it is needless to say that, for all
+minor details of this system, I must refer those who may not already have
+perused them to Mr. Fiske's somewhat elaborate essays. In now beginning my
+criticisms, it may be well to state at the outset, that they are to be
+restricted to the philosophical aspect of the subject. With matters of
+sentiment I do not intend to deal,--partly because to do so would be unduly
+to extend this essay, and partly also because I believe that, so far as the
+acceptance or the rejection of Cosmic Theism is to be determined by
+sentiment, much, if not all, will depend on individual habits of thought.
+For whether or not Cosmic Theism is to be regarded as a religion adapted to
+the needs of any individual man, will depend on what these needs are felt
+to be by that man himself: we cannot assert magisterially that this
+religion must be adapted to his needs because we have found it to be
+adapted to our own. And if it is retorted that, human nature being
+everywhere the same, a form of religion that is adapted to one man must on
+this account be adapted to another, I reply that it is not so. For if a man
+who is what Mr. Fiske calls an "Anthropomorphic Theist" finds from
+experience that his system of religion--say Christianity--creates and
+sustains a class of emotions and general habits of thought which he feels
+to be the highest and the best of which he is capable, it is useless for a
+"Cosmic Theist" to offer such a man another system of religion, in which
+the conditions essential to the existence of these particular emotions and
+habits of thought are manifestly absent. For such a man cannot but feel
+that the proffered substitution would be tantamount, if accepted, to an
+utter destruction of all that he regards as essentially religious. He will
+tell us that he finds it perfectly easy to understand and to appreciate
+those feelings of vague awe and "worship of the silent kind" which the
+Cosmic Theist declares to be fostered by Cosmic Theism; but he will also
+tell us that those feelings, which he has experienced with equal vividness
+under his own system of Anthropomorphic Theism, are to him but as
+non-religious dross compared with the unspeakable felicity of holding
+definite commune with the Almighty and Most Merciful, or of rendering
+worship that is a glad hosanna--a fearless shout of joy. On the other hand,
+I believe that it is possible for philosophic habits of thought so to
+discipline the mind that the feelings of vague awe and silent worship in
+the presence of an appalling Mystery become more deep and steady than a
+theist proper can well believe. It is therefore impossible that either
+party can fully appreciate those sentiments of the other which they have
+never fully experienced themselves; for even in those cases where an
+anthropomorphic theist has been compelled to abandon his creed, as the
+change must take place in mature life, his tone of mind has been determined
+before it does take place; and therefore in sentiment, though not in faith,
+he is more or less of a theist for the rest of his life: the only effect of
+the change is to create a troubled interference between his desires and his
+beliefs.
+
+However, I do not intend to develop this branch of the subject further than
+thus to point out, in a general way, that religion-mongers as a class are
+apt to show too little regard for the sentiments, as distinguished from the
+beliefs, of those to whom they offer their wares. But although I do not
+intend to constitute myself a champion of theology by pointing out the
+defects of Cosmic Theism in the aspect which it presents to current modes
+of thought, there is one such defect which I must here dwell upon, because
+we shall afterwards have occasion to refer to it. A theologian may very
+naturally make this objection to Cosmic Theism as presented by Mr.
+Fiske--viz., that the argument on which this philosopher throughout relies
+as a self-evident demonstration that the new system of Theism is a further
+and a final improvement on all the previous systems of Theism, is a
+fallacious argument. As we have already seen, this argument is, that as the
+progress in the purification of Theism has throughout consisted in a
+process of "deanthropomorphisation," therefore the terminal phase in this
+process, which Cosmic Theism introduces, must be still in the direction of
+that progress. But to this argument a theologian may not unreasonably
+object, that this terminal phase differs from all the previous phases in
+one all-important feature--viz., in effecting a _total abolition_ of the
+anthropomorphic element. Before, therefore, it can be shown that this
+terminal phase is a further development of _Theism_, it must he shown that
+Theism still remains Theism after this hitherto characteristic element has
+been removed. If it is true, as Mr. Fiske very properly insists, that all
+the various forms of belief in God have thus far had this as a common
+factor, that they ascribed to God the attributes of Man; it becomes a
+question whether we may properly abstract this hitherto invariable factor
+of a belief, and still call that belief by the same name. Or, to put the
+matter in another light, as cosmists maintain that Theism, in all the
+phases of its development, has been the product of a probably erroneous
+theory of personal agency in nature, when this theory is expressly
+discarded--as it is by the doctrine of the Unknowable--is it
+philosophically legitimate for cosmists to render their theory of things in
+terms which belong to the totally different theory which they discard? No
+doubt it is true that the progressive refinement of Theism has throughout
+consisted in a progressive discarding of anthropomorphic qualities; but
+this fact does not touch the consideration that, when we proceed to strip
+off the last remnants of these qualities, we are committing an act which
+differs _toto coelo_ from all the previous acts which are cited as
+precedents; for by this terminal act we are not, as heretofore, _refining_
+the theory of Theism--we are completely _transforming_ it by removing an
+element which, both genetically and historically, would seem to constitute
+the very essence of Theism.
+
+Or the case may be presented in yet another light. The only use of terms,
+whether in daily talk or in philosophical disquisition, is that of
+designating certain things or attributes to which by general custom we
+agree to affix them; so that if anyone applies a term to some thing or
+attribute which general custom does not warrant him in so applying, he is
+merely laying himself open to the charge of abusing that term. Now apply
+these elementary principles to the case before us. We have but to think of
+the disgust with which the vast majority of living persons would regard the
+sense in which Mr. Fiske uses the term "Theism," to perceive how intimate
+is the association of that term with the idea of a Personal God. Such
+persons will feel strongly that, by this final act of purification, Mr.
+Fiske has simply purified the Deity altogether out of existence. And I
+scarcely think it is here competent to reply that all previous acts of
+purification were at first similarly regarded as destructive, because it is
+evident that none of these previous acts affected, as this one does, the
+central core of Theism. And, lastly, if it should be still further
+objected, that by declaring the theory of Personal Agency the central core
+of Theism, I am begging the question as to the appropriateness of Mr.
+Fiske's use of the word "Theism,"--seeing he appears to regard the
+essential meaning of this word to be that of a postulation of merely Causal
+Agency,--I answer, More of this anon; but meanwhile let it be observed that
+any charge of question-begging lies rather at the door of Mr. Fiske, in
+that he assumes, without any expressed justification, that the essence of
+Theism _does_ consist in such a postulation and in nothing more. And as he
+unquestionably has against him the present world of theists no less than
+the history of Theism in the past, I do not see how he is to meet this
+charge except by confessing to an abuse of the term in question.
+
+I will now proceed to examine the structure of Cosmic Theism. We are all, I
+suppose, at one in allowing that there are only three "verbally
+intelligible" theories of the universe,--viz., that it is self-existent, or
+that it is self-created, or that it has been created by some other and
+external Being. It is usual to call the first of these theories Atheism,
+the second Pantheism, and the third Theism. Now as there are here three
+distinct nameable theories, it is necessary, if the term "Cosmic Theism" is
+to be justified as an appropriate term, that the particular theory which it
+designates should be shown to be in its essence theistic--_i.e._, that the
+theory should present those distinguishing features in virtue of which
+Theism differs from Atheism on the one hand, and from Pantheism on the
+other. Now what are these features? The postulate of an Eternal
+Self-existing Something is common to Theism and to Atheism. Here Atheism
+ends. Theism, however, is generally said to assume Personality,
+Intelligence, and Creative Power as attributes of the single self-existing
+substance. Lastly, Pantheism assumes the Something now existing to have
+been self-created. To which, then, of these distinct theories is Cosmic
+Theism most nearly allied? For the purpose of answering this question, I
+shall render that theory in terms of a formula which Mr. Fiske presents as
+a full and complete statement of the theory:--"_There exists a_ POWER, _to
+which no limit in space or time is conceivable, of which all phenomena, as
+presented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can only know
+through these manifestations._" But although the word "Power" is here so
+strongly emphasised, we are elsewhere told that it is not to be regarded as
+having more than a strictly relative or symbolic meaning; so that, in point
+of fact, some more neutral word, such as "Something," "Being," or
+"Substance," ought in strictness to be here substituted for the word
+"Power." Well, if this is done, we have the postulation of a Being which is
+self-existing, infinite, and eternal--relatively, at all events, to our
+powers of conception. Thus far, therefore, it would seem that we are still
+on the common standing-ground of Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism; for as it
+is not, so far as I can see, incumbent on Pantheism to affirm that "thought
+is a measure of things," the _apparent_ or _relative_ eternity which the
+Primal Something must be supposed to present may not be _actual_ or
+_absolute_ eternity. Nevertheless, as Mr. Fiske, by predicating Divinity of
+the Primal Something, implicitly attributes to it the quality of an
+_eternal_ self-existence, I infer that Cosmic Theism may be concluded at
+this point to part company with Pantheism. There remain, then, Theism and
+Atheism.
+
+Now undoubtedly, at first sight, Cosmic Theism appears to differ from
+Atheism in one all-important particular. For we have seen that, by means of
+a subtle though perfectly logical argument, Cosmic Philosophy has evolved
+this conclusion--that all phenomena as presented in consciousness are
+manifestations of a not improbable Single Self-existing Power, of whose
+existence these manifestations alone can make us cognisant. From which it
+apparently follows, that this hypothetical Power must be regarded as
+existing out of necessary relation to the phenomenal universe; that it is,
+therefore, beyond question "Absolute Being;" and that, as such, we are
+entitled to call it Deity. But in the train of reasoning of which this is a
+very condensed epitome, it is evident that the legitimacy of denominating
+this Absolute Being Deity, must depend on the exact meaning which we attach
+to the word "Absolute"--and this, be it observed, quite apart from the
+question, before touched upon, as to whether Personality and Intelligence
+are not to be considered as attributes essential to Deity. In what sense,
+then, is the word "Absolute" used? It is used in this sense. As from the
+relativity of knowledge we cannot know things in themselves, but only
+symbolical representations of such things, therefore things in themselves
+are absolute to consciousness: but analysis shows that we cannot
+conceivably predicate Difference among things in themselves, so that we are
+at liberty, with due diffidence, to predicate of them No-difference: hence
+the noumena of the schoolmen admit of being collected into a _summum genus_
+of noumenal existence; and since, before their colligation noumena were
+severally absolute, after their colligation they become collectively
+absolute: therefore it is legitimate to designate this sum-total of
+noumenal existence, "Absolute Being." Now there is clearly no exception to
+be taken to the formal accuracy of this reasoning; the only question is as
+to whether the "Absolute Being" which it evolves is absolute in the sense
+required by Theism. I confess that to me this Being appears to be absolute
+in a widely different sense from that in which Deity must be regarded as
+absolute. For this Being is thus seen to be absolute in no other sense than
+as holding--to quote from Mr. Fiske--"existence independent of the
+conditions of the process of knowing." In other words, it is absolute only
+as standing out of necessary relation to _human consciousness_. But Theism
+requires, as an essential feature, that Deity should be absolute as
+standing out of necessary relation to _all else_. Before, therefore, the
+Absolute Being of Cosmism can be shown, by the reasoning adopted, to
+deserve, even in part, the appellation of Deity, it must be shown that
+there is no other mode of Being in existence save our own subjective
+consciousness and the Absolute Reality which becomes objective to it
+through the world of phenomena. But any attempt to establish this position
+would involve a disregard of the doctrine that knowledge is relative; and
+to do this, it is needless to say, would be to destroy the basis of the
+argument whereby the Absolute Being of Cosmism was posited.
+
+Or, to state this part of the criticism in other words, as the first step
+in justifying the predication of Deity, it must be shown that the Being of
+which the predication is made is absolute, and this not merely as
+independent of human consciousness, but as independent of the whole
+noumenal universe--Deity itself alone excepted. That is, the Being of which
+Deity is predicated must be Unconditioned. Hence it is incumbent on Cosmic
+Theism to prove, either that the Causal Agent which it denominates Deity is
+itself the whole noumenal universe, or that it created the rest of a
+noumenal universe; else there is nothing to show that this Causal Agent was
+not itself created--seeing that, even if we assume the existence of a God,
+there is nothing to indicate that the Causal Agent of Cosmism is that God.
+
+It would appear therefore from this, that whatever else the Cosmist's
+theory of things may be, it certainly is not Theism; and I think that
+closer inspection will tend to confirm this judgment. To this then let us
+proceed.
+
+Mr. Fiske is very hard on the atheists, and so will probably repudiate with
+scorn any insinuations to the effect that his theory of things is
+"quasi-atheistic." Nevertheless, it seems to me that he is very unjust to
+the atheists, in that while he spares no pains to "purify" and "refine" the
+theory of the theists, so as at last to leave nothing but what he regards
+as the distilled essence of Theism behind; he habitually leaves the theory
+of the atheists as he finds it, without making any attempt either to
+"purify" it by removing its weak and unnecessary ingredients, or to
+"refine" it by adding such sublimated ingredients as modern speculation has
+supplied. Thus, while he despises the atheists of the eighteenth century
+for their irrationality in believing in the self-existence of a
+_phenomenal_ universe, and reviles them for their irreligion in denying
+that "the religious sentiment needed satisfaction;" he does not wait to
+inquire whether, in its essential substance, the theory of these men is not
+the one that has proved itself best able to withstand the grinding action
+of more recent thought. But let us in fairness ask, What was the essential
+substance of that theory? Apparently it was the bare statement of the
+unthinkable fact that Something Is. It therefore seems to me useless in Mr.
+Fiske to lay so much stress on the fact that this Something was originally
+identified by atheists with the phenomenal universe. It seems useless to do
+this, because such identification is clearly no part of the _essence_ of
+Atheism, which, as just stated, I take to consist in the single dogma of
+self-existence as itself sufficient to constitute a theory of things. And,
+if so, it is a matter of scarcely any moment, as regards that theory,
+whether we are _immediately_ cognisant of that which is self-existent, or
+only become so through the world of phenomena--the vital point of the
+theory being, that Self-existence, _wherever posited_, is itself the only
+admissible explanation of phenomena. Or, in other words, it does not seem
+that there is anything in the atheistic theory, as such, which is
+incompatible with the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge; so that
+whatever cogency there may be in the train of reasoning whereby a single
+Causal Agent is deduced from that doctrine, it would seem that an atheist
+has as much right to the benefit of this reasoning as a theist; and there
+is thus no more apparent reason why this single Causal Agent should be
+appropriated as the God of Theism, than that it should be appropriated as
+the Self-existing X of Atheism. Indeed, there seems to be less reason. For
+an atheist of to-day may very properly argue:--'So far from beholding
+anything divine in this Single Being absolute to human consciousness, it is
+just precisely the form of Being which my theory postulates as the
+Self-existing All. In order to constitute such a Being God, it must be
+shown, as we have already seen, to be something more than a merely Causal
+Agent which is absolute in the grotesquely restricted sense of being
+independent of 'one petty race of creatures with an ephemeral experience of
+what is going on in one tiny corner of the universe;' it must be shown to
+be something more than absolute even in the wholly unrestricted sense of
+being Unconditioned; it must be shown to possess such other attributes as
+are distinctive of Deity. For I maintain that even Unconditioned Being,
+_merely as such_, would only then have a right to the name of God when it
+has been shown that the theory of Theism has a right to monopolise the
+doctrine of Relativity.'
+
+In thus endeavouring to "purify" the theory of Atheism, by divesting it of
+all superfluous accessories, and laying bare what I conceive to be its
+essential substance; it may be well to state that, even apart from their
+irreligious character, I have no sympathy with the atheists of the past
+century. I mean, that these men do not seem to me to deserve any credit for
+advanced powers of speculation merely because they adopted a theory of
+things which in its essential features now promises to be the most
+enduring. For it is evident that the strength of this theory now lies in
+its _simplicity_,--in its undertaking to explain, so far as explanation is
+possible, the sum-total of phenomena by the single postulate of
+self-existence. But it seems to me that in the last century there were no
+sufficient data for rendering such a theory of things a rational theory;
+for so long as the quality of self-existence was supposed to reside in
+phenomena themselves, the very simplicity of the theory, as expressed in
+words, must have seemed to render it inapplicable as a reasonable theory of
+things. The astounding variety, complexity, and harmony which are
+everywhere so conspicuous in the world of phenomena must have seemed to
+necessitate as an explanation some one integrating cause; and it is
+impossible that in the eighteenth century any such integrating cause can
+have been conceivable other than Intelligence. Therefore I think, with Mr.
+Fiske, that the atheists of the eighteenth century were irrational in
+applying their single postulate of self-existence as alone a sufficient
+explanation of things. But of course the aspect of the case is now
+completely changed, when we regard it in all the flood of light which has
+been shed on it by recent science, physical and speculative. For the
+demonstration of the fact that energy is indestructible, coupled with the
+corollary that every so-called natural law is a physically necessary
+consequence of that fact, clearly supply us with a completely novel datum
+as the ultimate source of experience--and a datum, moreover, which is as
+different as can well be imagined from the ever-changing, ever-fleeting,
+world of phenomena. We have, therefore, but to apply the postulate of
+self-existence to this single ultimate datum, and we have a theory of
+things as rational as the Atheism of the last century was irrational.
+Nevertheless, that this theory is more akin to the Atheism of the last
+century than to any other theory of that time, is, I think, unquestionable;
+for while we retain the central doctrine of self-existence as alone a
+scientifically admissible, or non-gratuitous, explanation of things, we
+only change the original theory by transferring the application of this
+doctrine from the world of manifestations to that which causes the
+manifestations: we do not resort to any of the _additional_ doctrines
+whereby the other theories of the universe were distinguished from the
+theory of Atheism in its original form. However, as by our recognition of
+the relativity of knowledge we are precluded from dogmatically denying any
+theory of the universe that may be proposed, it would clearly be erroneous
+to identify the doctrine of the Unknowable with the theory of Atheism: all
+we can say is, that, so far as speculative thought can soar, the permanent
+self-existence of an inconceivable Something, which manifests itself to
+consciousness as force and matter, constitutes the only datum that can be
+shown to be required for the purposes of a rational ontology.
+
+To sum up. In the theory which Mr. Fiske calls Cosmic Theism, while I am
+able to discern the elements which I think may properly be regarded as
+common to Theism and to Atheism, I am not able to discern any single
+element that is specifically distinctive of Theism. Still I am far from
+concluding that the theory in question is the theory of Atheism. All I wish
+to insist upon is this--that as the Absolute Being of Cosmism presents no
+other qualities than such as are required by the renovated theory of
+Atheism, its postulation supplies a basis, not for Theism, but for
+Non-theism: a man with such a postulate ought in strictness to abstain from
+either affirming or denying the existence of God. And this, I may observe,
+appears to be the position which Mr. Spencer himself has adopted as the
+only logical outcome of his doctrine of the Unknowable--a position which,
+in my opinion, it is most undesirable to obscure by endeavouring to give it
+a quasi-theistic interpretation. I may further observe, that we here seem
+to have a philosophical justification of the theological sentiment
+previously alluded to--the sentiment, namely, that by his attempt at a
+final purification of Theism, Mr. Fiske has destroyed those essential
+features of the theory in virtue of which alone it exists as Theism. For
+seeing it is impossible, from the relativity of knowledge, that the
+Absolute Being of Cosmism can ever be shown absolute in the sense required
+by Theism, and, even if it could, that it would still be but the
+Unconditioned Being of Atheism; it follows that if this Absolute Being is
+to be shown even in part to deserve the appellation of Deity, it must be
+shown to possess the only remaining attributes which are distinctive of
+Deity--to wit, personality and intelligence. But forasmuch as the final act
+of purifying the conception of Deity consists, according to Mr. Fiske, in
+expressly removing these particular attributes from the object of that
+conception, does it not follow that the conception which remains is, as I
+have said, not theistic, but non-theistic?
+
+Here my criticism might properly have ended, were it not that Mr. Fiske,
+after having divested the Deity of all his psychical attributes, forthwith
+proceeds to show how it may be dimly possible to reinvest him with
+attributes that are "quasi-psychical." Mr. Fiske is, of course, far too
+subtle a thinker not to see that his previous argument from relativity
+precludes him from assigning much weight to the ontological speculations in
+which he here indulges, seeing that in whatever degree the relativity of
+knowledge renders legitimate the non-ascription to Deity of known psychical
+attributes, in some such degree at least must it render illegitimate the
+ascription to Deity of unknown psychical attributes. But in the part of his
+work in which he treats of the quasi-psychical attributes, Mr. Fiske is
+merely engaged in showing that the speculative standing of the
+"materialists" is inferior to that of the "spiritualists;" so that, as this
+is a subject distinct from Theism, he is not open to the charge of
+inconsistency. Well, feeble as these speculations undoubtedly are in the
+support which they render to Theism, it nevertheless seems desirable to
+consider them before closing this review. The speculations in question are
+quoted from Mr. Spencer, and are as follows:--
+
+"Mind, as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of
+activities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another,
+throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of which
+they are the activities. But the same experiences which make him aware of
+this coherent aggregate of mental activities, simultaneously make him aware
+of activities that are not included in it--outlying activities which become
+known by their effects on this aggregate, but which are experimentally
+proved to be not coherent with it, and to be coherent with one another
+(_First Principles_, Sec.Sec. 43, 44). As, by the definition of them, these
+external activities cannot be brought within the aggregate of activities
+distinguished as those of Mind, they must for ever remain to him nothing
+more than the unknown correlatives of their effects on this aggregate; and
+can be thought of only in terms furnished by this aggregate. Hence, if he
+regards his conceptions of these activities lying beyond Mind as
+constituting knowledge of them, he is deluding himself: he is but
+representing these activities in terms of Mind, and can never do otherwise.
+Eventually he is obliged to admit that his ideas of Matter and Motion,
+merely symbolic of unknowable realities, are complex states of
+consciousness built out of units of feeling. But if, after admitting this,
+he persists in asking whether units of feeling are of the same nature as
+the units of force distinguished as external, or whether the units of force
+distinguished as external are of the same nature as units of feeling; then
+the reply, still substantially the same, is that we may go further towards
+conceiving units of external force to be identical with units of feeling,
+than we can towards conceiving units of feeling to be identical with units
+of external force. Clearly, if units of external force are regarded as
+absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into
+them is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And if
+they are what they are supposed to be by those who identify them with their
+symbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is
+insurmountable: if Force as it objectively exists is absolutely alien in
+nature from that which exists subjectively as Feeling, then the
+transformation of Force into Feeling is unthinkable. Either way, therefore,
+it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence.
+But if, on the other hand, units of Force as they exist objectively are
+essentially the same in nature with those manifested subjectively as units
+of Feeling, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of
+that aggregate of activities constituting a consciousness is known as
+belonging to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond the
+limits of this coherent aggregate of activities exist activities quite
+independent of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine,
+then, that by their exclusion from the circumscribed activities
+constituting consciousness, these outer activities, though of the same
+intrinsic nature, become antithetically opposed in aspect. Being
+disconnected from consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are thereby
+rendered foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, or
+linked with these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it
+were, run through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious--are
+symbolised as having the nature called material, as opposed to that called
+spiritual. While, however, it thus seems an imaginable possibility that
+units of external Force may be identical in nature with units of the force
+known as Feeling, yet we cannot by so representing them get any nearer to a
+comprehension of external Force. For, as already shown, supposing all forms
+of Mind to be composed of homogeneous units of feeling variously
+aggregated, the resolution of them into such units leaves us as unable as
+before to think of the substance of Mind as it exists in such units; and
+thus, even could we really figure to ourselves all units of external Force
+as being essentially like units of the force known as Feeling, and as so
+constituting a universal sentiency, we should be as far as ever from
+forming a conception of that which is universally sentient."[42]
+
+Now while I agree with Mr. Fiske that we have here "the most subtle
+conclusion now within the ken of the scientific speculator, reached without
+any disregard of the canons prescribed by the doctrine of relativity," I
+would like to point out to minds less clear-sighted than his, that this
+same "doctrine of relativity" effectually debars us from using this
+"conclusion" as an argument of any assignable value in favour of Theism.
+For the value of conceivability as a test of truth, on which this
+conclusion is founded, is here vitiated by the consideration that,
+_whatever_ the nature of Force-units may be, we can clearly perceive it to
+be a subjective necessity of the case that they should admit of being more
+easily conceived by us to be of the nature of Feeling-units than to be of
+any other nature. For as units of Feeling are the only entities of which we
+are, or can be, conscious, they are the entities into which units of Force
+must be, so to speak, subjectively translated before we can cognise their
+existence at all. Therefore, _whatever_ the real nature of Force-units may
+be, ultimate analysis must show that it is more conceivable to identify
+them in thought with the only units of which we are cognisant, than it is
+to think of them as units of which we are not cognisant, and concerning
+which, therefore, conception is necessarily impossible. Or thus, the only
+alternative with respect to the classifying of Force-units lies between
+refusing to classify them at all, or classifying them with the only
+ultimate units with which we are acquainted. But this restriction, for
+aught that can ever be shown to the contrary, arises only from the
+subjective conditions of our own consciousness; there is nothing to
+indicate that, in objective reality, units of Force are in any wise akin to
+units of Feeling. Conceivability, therefore, as a test of truth, is in this
+particular case of no assignable degree of value; for as the entities to
+which it is applied are respectively the highest known abstractions of
+subjective and objective existence, the test of conceivability is
+neutralised by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that
+subsists between subject and object. I think, therefore, it is evident that
+these ontological speculations present no sufficient warrant for an
+inference, even of the slenderest kind, that the Absolute Being of Cosmism
+possesses attributes of a nature quasi-psychical; and, if so, it follows
+that these speculations are incompetent to form the basis of a theory
+which, even by the greatest stretch of courtesy, can in any legitimate
+sense be termed quasi-theistic.[43]
+
+On the whole, then, I conclude that the term "Cosmic Theism" is not an
+appropriate term whereby to denote the theory of things set forth in
+"Cosmic Philosophy;" and that it would therefore be more judicious to leave
+the doctrine of the Unknowable as Mr. Spencer has left it--that is, without
+theological implications of any kind. But in now taking leave of this
+subject, I should like it to be understood that the only reason why I have
+ventured thus to take exception to a part of Mr. Fiske's work is because I
+regret that a treatise which displays so much of literary excellence and
+philosophic power should lend itself to promoting what I regard as mistaken
+views concerning the ontological tendencies of recent thought, and this
+with no other apparent motive than that of unworthily retaining in the new
+philosophy a religious term the distinctive connotations of which are
+considered by that philosophy to have become obsolete.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+II.
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IN REPLY TO A RECENT WORK ON THEISM.[44]
+
+On perusing my main essay several years after its completion, it occurred
+to me that another very effectual way of demonstrating the immense
+difference between the nature of all previous attacks upon the teleological
+argument and the nature of the present attack, would be briefly to review
+the reasonable objections to which all the previous attacks were open. Very
+opportunely a work on Theism has just been published which states these
+objections with great lucidity, and answers them with much ability. The
+work to which I allude is by the Rev. Professor Flint, and as it is
+characterised by temperate candour in tone and logical care in exposition,
+I felt on reading it that the work was particularly well suited for
+displaying the enormous change in the speculative standing of Theism which
+the foregoing considerations must be rationally deemed to have effected. I
+therefore determined on throwing my supplementary essay, which I had
+previously intended to write, into the form of a criticism on Professor
+Flint's treatise, and I adopted this course the more willingly because
+there are several other points dwelt upon in that treatise which it seems
+desirable for me to consider in the present one, although, for the sake of
+conciseness, I abstained from discussing them in my previous essay. With
+these two objects in view, therefore, I undertook the following
+criticism.[45]
+
+In the first place, it is needful to protest against an argument which our
+author adopts on the authority of Professor Clark Maxwell. The argument is
+now a well-known one, and is thus stated by Professor Maxwell in his
+presidential address before the British Association for the Advancement of
+Science, 1870:--"None of the processes of nature, since the time when
+nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of
+any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of
+the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any
+of the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact quality
+of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John
+Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article,
+and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. Thus we have
+been led along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which
+science must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the external
+mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from
+investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing
+back the history of matter, science is arrested when she assures herself,
+on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that
+it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural."
+
+Now it is obvious that we have here no real argument, since it is obvious
+that science can never be in a position to assert that atoms, the very
+existence of which is hypothetical, were never "made by any of the
+processes we call natural." The mere fact that in the universe, as we now
+know it, the evolution of material atoms is not observed to be taking place
+"by any of the processes we call natural," cannot possibly be taken as
+proof, or even as presumption, that there ever was a time when the material
+atoms now in existence were created by a supernatural cause. The fact
+cannot be taken to justify any such inference for the following reasons. In
+the first place, assuming the atomic theory to be true, and there is
+nothing in the argument to show that the now-existing atoms are not
+self-existing atoms, endowed with their peculiar and severally distinctive
+properties from all eternity. Doubtless the argument is, that as there
+appear to be some sixty or more elementary atoms constituting the raw
+material of the observable universe, it is incredible that they can all
+have owed their correlated properties to any cause other than that of a
+designing and manufacturing intelligence. But, in the next place--and here
+comes the demolishing force of the criticism--science is not in a position
+to assert that these sixty or more elementary atoms are in any real sense
+of the term elementary. The mere fact that chemistry is as yet in too
+undeveloped a condition to pronounce whether or not all the forms of matter
+known to her are modifications of some smaller number of elements, or even
+of a single element, cannot possibly be taken as a warrant for so huge an
+inference as that there are really more than sixty elements all endowed
+with absolutely distinctive properties by a supernatural cause. Now this
+consideration, which arises immediately from the doctrine of the relativity
+of knowledge, is alone amply sufficient to destroy the present argument.
+But we must not on this account lose sight of the fact that, even to our
+strictly relative science in its present embryonic condition, we are not
+without decided indications, not only that the so-called elements are
+probably for the most part compounds, but even that matter as a whole is
+one substance, which is itself probably but some modification of energy.
+Indeed, the whole tendency of recent scientific speculation is towards the
+view that the universe consists of some one substance, which, whether
+self-existing or created, is diverse only in its relation to ignorance. And
+if this view is correct, how obvious is the inference which I have
+elaborated in Sec. 32, that all the diverse forms of matter, as we know them,
+were probably evolved by natural causes. So obvious, indeed, is this
+inference, that to resort to any supernatural hypothesis to explain the
+diverse properties of the various chemical elements appears to me a most
+glaring violation of the law of parcimony--as much more glaring, for
+instance, than the violation of this law by Paley, as the number and
+variety of organic species are greater than the number and variety of
+chemical species. And if it was illegitimate in Paley to use a mere absence
+of knowledge as to how the transmutation of apparently fixed species of
+animals was effected as equivalent to the possession of knowledge that such
+transmutation had not been effected, how much more illegitimate must it be
+to commit a similar sin against logic in the case of the chemical elements,
+where our classification is confessedly beset with numberless difficulties,
+and when we begin to discern that in all probability it is a classification
+essentially artificial. Lastly, the mere fact that the transmutation of
+chemical species and the evolution of chemical "atoms" are processes which
+we do not now observe as occurring in nature, is surely a consideration of
+a far more feeble kind than it is even in the case of biological species
+and biological evolution; seeing that nature's laboratory must be now so
+inconceivably different from what it was during the condensation of the
+nebula. What an atrocious piece of arrogance, therefore, it is to assert
+that "none of the processes of nature, _since the time when nature began_,
+have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule!"
+No one can entertain a higher respect for Professor Clark Maxwell than I
+do; but a single sentence of such a kind as this cannot leave two opinions
+in any impartial mind concerning his competency to deal with such subjects.
+
+I am therefore sorry to see this absurd argument approvingly incorporated
+in Professor Flint's work. He says, "I believe that no reply to these words
+of Professor Clark Maxwell is possible from any one who holds the ordinary
+view of scientific men as to the ultimate constitution of matter. They must
+suppose every atom, every molecule, to be of such a nature, to be so
+related to others and to the universe generally, that things may be such as
+we see them to be; but this their fitness to be built up into the structure
+of the universe is a proof that they have been made fit, and since natural
+forces could not have acted on them while not yet existent, a supernatural
+power must have created them, and created them with a view to their
+manifold uses." Here the inference so confidently drawn would have been a
+weak one even were we not able to see that the doctrine of natural
+evolution probably applies to inorganic nature no less than to organic. For
+the inference is drawn from considerations of a character so transcendental
+and so remote from science, that unless we wish to be deceived by a merely
+verbal argument, we must feel that the possibilities of error in the
+inference are so numerous and indefinite, that the inference itself is
+well-nigh worthless as a basis of belief. But when we add that in Chapter
+IV. of the foregoing essay it has been shown to be within the legitimate
+scope of scientific reasoning to conclude that material atoms have been
+progressively evolved _pari passu_ with the natural laws of chemical
+combination, it is evident that any force which the present argument could
+ever have had must now be pronounced as neutralised. Natural causes have
+been shown, so far as scientific inference can extend, as not improbably
+sufficient to produce the observed effects; and therefore we are no longer
+free to invoke the hypothetical action of any supernatural cause.
+
+The same observations apply to Professor Flint's theistic argument drawn
+from recent scientific speculations as to the vortex-ring construction of
+matter. If these speculations are sound, their only influence on Theism
+would be that of supplying a scientific demonstration of the substantial
+identity of Force and Matter, and so of supplying a still more valid basis
+for the theory as to the natural genesis of matter from a single primordial
+substance, in the manner sketched out in Chapter IV. For the argument
+adduced by Professor Flint, that as the manner in which the vorticial
+motion of a ring is originated has not as yet been suggested, therefore its
+origination must have been due to a "Divine impulse," is an argument which
+again uses the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its possession. We are
+in the presence of a very novel and highly abstruse theory, or rather
+hypothesis, in physics, which was originally suggested by, and has hitherto
+been mainly indebted to, empirical experiments as distinguished from
+mathematical calculations; and from the mere fact that, in the case of such
+a hypothesis, mathematicians have not as yet been able to determine the
+physical conditions required to originate vorticial motion, we are expected
+to infer that no such conditions can ever have existed, and therefore that
+every such vortex system, if it exists, is a miracle!
+
+And substantially the same criticism applies to the argument which
+Professor Flint adduces--the argument also on which Professors Balfour and
+Tait lay so much stress in their work on the _Unseen Universe_--the
+argument, namely, as to the non-eternal character of heat. The calculations
+on which this argument depends would only be valid as sustaining this
+argument if they were based upon a knowledge of the universe _as a whole_;
+and therefore, as before, the absence of requisite knowledge must not be
+used as equivalent to its possession.
+
+These, however, are the weakest parts of Professor Flint's work. I
+therefore gladly turn to those parts which are exceedingly cogent as
+written from his standpoint, but which, in view of the strictures on the
+teleological argument that I have adduced in Chapters IV. and VI., I submit
+to be now wholly valueless.
+
+"How could matter of itself produce order, even if it were self-existent
+and eternal? It is far more unreasonable to believe that the atoms or
+constituents of matter produced of themselves, without the action of a
+Supreme Mind, this wonderful universe, than that the letters of the English
+alphabet produced the plays of Shakespeare, without the slightest
+assistance from the human mind known by that famous name. These atoms
+might, perhaps, now and then, here and there, at great distances and long
+intervals, produce by a chance contact some curious collocation or
+compound; but never could they produce order or organisation on an
+extensive scale, or of a durable character, unless ordered, arranged, and
+adjusted in ways of which intelligence alone can be the ultimate
+explanation. To believe that these fortuitous and indirected movements
+could originate the universe, and all the harmonies and utilities and
+beauties which abound in it, evinces a credulity far more extravagant than
+has ever been displayed by the most superstitious of religionists. Yet no
+consistent materialist can refuse to accept this colossal chance
+hypothesis. All the explanations of the order of the universe which
+materialists, from Democritus and Epicurus to Diderot and Lange, have
+devised, rest on the assumption that the elements of matter, being eternal,
+must pass through infinite combinations, and that one of these must be our
+present world--a special collocation among the countless millions of
+collocations, past and future. Throw the letters of the Greek alphabet, it
+has been said, an infinite number of times, and you must produce the
+'Iliad' and all the Greek books. The theory of probabilities, I need hardly
+say, requires us to believe nothing so absurd.... But what is the 'Iliad'
+to the hymn of creation and the drama of providence?" &c.
+
+Now this I conceive to have been a fully valid argument at the time it was
+published, and indeed the most convincing of all the arguments in favour of
+Theism. But, as already so frequently pointed out, the considerations
+adduced in Chapter IV. of the present work are utterly destructive of this
+argument. For this argument assumes, rightly enough, that the only
+alternative we have in choosing our hypothesis concerning the final
+explanation of things is either to regard that explanation as Intelligence
+or as Fortuity. This, I say, was a legitimate argument a few months ago,
+because up to that time no one had shown that strictly natural causes, as
+distinguished from chances, could conceivably be able to produce a cosmos;
+and although the several previous writers to whom Professor Flint
+alludes--and he might have alluded to others in this
+connection--entertained a dim anticipation of the fact that natural causes
+might alone be sufficient to produce the observed universe, still these dim
+anticipations were worthless as _arguments_ so long as it remained
+impossible to suggest any natural _principle_ whereby such a result could
+have been conceivably effected by such causes. But it is evident that
+Professor Flint's time-honoured argument is now completely overthrown,
+unless it can be proved that there is some radical error in the reasoning
+whereby I have endeavoured to show that natural causes not only _may_, but
+_must_, have produced existing order. The overthrow is complete, because
+the very groundwork of the argument in question is knocked away; a third
+possibility, of the nature of a necessity, is introduced, and therefore the
+alternative is no longer between Intelligence and Fortuity, but between
+Intelligence and Natural Causation. Whereas the overwhelming strength of
+the argument from Order has hitherto consisted in the supposition of
+Intelligence as the one and only conceivable cause of the integration of
+things, my exposition in Chapter IV. has shown that such integration must
+have been due, at all events in a relative or proximate sense, to a
+strictly physical cause--the persistence of force and the consequent
+self-evolution of natural law. And the question as to whether or not
+Intelligence may not have been the absolute or ultimate cause is manifestly
+a question altogether alien to the argument from Order; for if existing
+order admits of being accounted for, in a relative or proximate sense, by
+merely physical causes, the argument from a relative or proximate order is
+not at liberty to infer or to assume the existence of any higher or more
+ultimate cause. Although, therefore, in Chapter V., I have been careful to
+point out that the fact of existing order having been due to proximate or
+natural causes does not actually _disprove_ the possible existence of an
+ultimate and supernatural cause, still it must be carefully observed that
+this _negative_ fact cannot possibly justify any _positive_ inference to
+the existence of such a cause.
+
+Thus, upon the whole, it may be said, without danger of reasonable dispute,
+that as the argument from Order has hitherto derived its immense weight
+entirely from the fact that Intelligence appeared to be the one and only
+cause sufficient to produce the observed integration of the cosmos, this
+immense weight has now been completely counterpoised by the demonstration
+that other causes of a strictly physical kind must have been instrumental,
+if not themselves alone sufficient, to produce this integration, So that,
+just as in the case of Astronomy the demonstration of the one natural
+principle of gravity was sufficient to classify under one physical
+explanation several observed facts which many persons had previously
+attributed to supernatural causes; and just as in the more complex science
+of Geology the demonstration of the one principle of uniformitarianism was
+sufficient to explain, without the aid of supernaturalism, a still greater
+number of facts; and, lastly, just as in the case of the still more complex
+science of Biology the demonstration of the one principle of natural
+selection was sufficient to marshal under one scientific, or natural,
+hypothesis an almost incalculable number of facts which were previously
+explained by the metaphysical hypothesis of supernatural design; so in the
+science which includes all other sciences, and which we may term the
+science of Cosmology, I assert with confidence that in the one principle of
+the persistence of force we have a demonstrably harmonising principle,
+whereby all the facts within our experience admit of being collocated under
+one natural explanation, without there being the smallest reason to
+attribute these facts to any supernatural cause.
+
+But perhaps the immense change which these considerations must logically be
+regarded as having produced in the speculative standing of the argument
+from teleology will be better appreciated if I continue to quote from
+Professor Flint's very forcible and thoroughly logical exposition of the
+previous standing of this argument. He says:--
+
+"To ascribe the origination of order to _law_ is a manifest evasion of the
+real problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be explained. The
+question is--Has law a reason, or is it without a reason? The unperverted
+human mind cannot believe it to be without a reason."
+
+I do not know where a more terse and accurate statement of the case could
+be found; and to my mind the question so lucidly put admits of the direct
+answer--Law clearly has a reason of a purely physical kind. And therefore I
+submit that the following quotation which Professor Flint makes from
+Professor Jevons, logical as it was when written, must now be regarded as
+embodying an argument which is obsolete.
+
+"As an unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in an
+unlimited number of modes of distribution, there must, even granting matter
+to have had all its laws from eternity, have been at some moment in time,
+out of the unlimited choices and distributions possible, that one choice
+and distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe that now
+exists. Only out of rational choice can order have come."
+
+But clearly the alternative is now no longer one between chance and choice.
+If natural laws arise by way of necessary consequence from the persistence
+of a single self-existing substance, it becomes a matter of scientific
+(though not of logical) demonstration that "the fair and orderly universe
+that now exists" is the one and only universe that, in the nature of
+things, _can_ exist. But to continue this interesting passage from Dr.
+Flint's work--interesting not only because it sets forth the previous
+standing of this subject with so much clearness, but also because the work
+is of such very recent publication.
+
+"The most common mode, perhaps, of evading the problem which order presents
+to reason is the indication of the process by which the order has been
+realised. From Democritus to the latest Darwinian there have been men who
+supposed they had completely explained away the evidences of design in
+nature when they had described the physical antecedents of the arrangements
+appealed to as evidences. Aristotle showed the absurdity of this
+supposition more than 2200 years ago."
+
+Now this is a perfectly valid criticism on all such previous non-theistical
+arguments as were drawn from an "indication of the process by which the
+order has been realised;" for in all these previous arguments there was an
+absence of any physical explanation of the _ultimate_ cause of the process
+contemplated, and so long as this ultimate cause remained obscure, although
+the evidence of design might by these arguments have been excluded from
+particular processes, the evidence of design could not be similarly
+excluded from the ultimate cause of these processes. Thus, for instance, it
+is doubtless illogical, as Professor Flint points out, in any Darwinian to
+argue that because his theory of natural selection supplies him with a
+natural explanation of the process whereby organisms have been adapted to
+their surroundings, therefore this process need not itself have been
+designed. That is to say, in general terms, as insisted upon in the
+foregoing essay, the discovery of a natural law or orderly process cannot
+of itself justify the inference that this law or method of orderly
+procedure is not itself a product of supernatural Intelligence; but, on the
+contrary, the very existence of such orderly processes, considered only in
+relation to their products, must properly be regarded as evidence of the
+best possible kind in favour of supernatural Intelligence, _provided that
+no natural cause can be suggested as adequate to explain the origin of
+these processes_. But this is precisely what the persistence of force,
+considered as a natural cause, must be pronounced as necessarily competent
+to achieve; for we can clearly see that all these processes obviously must
+and actually do derive their origin from this one causative principle. And
+whether or not behind this one causative principle of natural law there
+exists a still more ultimate cause in the form of a supernatural
+Intelligence, this is a question altogether foreign to any argument from
+teleology, seeing that teleology, in so far as it is _teleology_, can only
+rest upon the observed facts of the cosmos; and if these facts admit of
+being explained by the action of a single causative principle inherent in
+the cosmos itself, teleology is not free to assume the action of any
+causative principle of a more ultimate character. Still, as I have
+repeatedly insisted, these considerations do not entitle us dogmatically to
+deny the existence of some such more ultimate principle; all that these
+considerations do is to remove any rational argument from teleological
+sources that any such more ultimate principle exists. Therefore I am, of
+course, quite at one with Professor Flint when he says Professor Huxley
+"admits that the most thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume 'a
+primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe
+are the consequences,' and 'is thereby at the mercy of the theologist, who
+can defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not
+intended to involve the phenomena of the universe.' Granting this much, he
+is logically bound to grant more. If the entire evolution of the universe
+may have been intended, the several stages of its evolution may have been
+intended, and they may have been intended for their own sakes as well as
+for the sake of the collective evolution or its final result." Now that
+such _may have been_ the case, I have been careful to insist in Chapter V.;
+all I am now concerned with is to show that, in view of the considerations
+adduced in Chapter IV., there is no longer any evidence to prove, or even
+to indicate, that such _has been_ the case. And with reference to this
+opportune quotation from Professor Huxley I may remark, that the
+"thoroughgoing evolutionist" is now no longer "at the mercy of the
+theologian" to any further extent than that of not being able to disprove a
+purely metaphysical hypothesis, which is as certainly superfluous, in any
+scientific sense, as the fundamental data of science are certainly true.
+
+It may seem almost unnecessary to extend this postscript by pursuing
+further the criticism on Professor Flint's exposition in the light of "a
+single new reason ... for the denial of design" which he challenges; but
+there are nevertheless one or two other points which it seems desirable to
+consider. Professor Flint writes:--
+
+"M. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference from design, from the
+order and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when he has
+pointed out the physical conditions through which that order and stability
+are secured, and the process by which they have been obtained.... Now the
+assertion that the peculiarities which make the solar system stable and the
+earth habitable have flowed naturally and necessarily from the simple
+mutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter is one which greatly
+requires proof, but which has never received it. In saying this, we do not
+challenge the proof of the nebular theory itself. That theory may or may
+not be true. We are quite willing to suppose it true--to grant that it has
+been scientifically established. What we maintain is, that even if we admit
+unreservedly that the earth and the whole system to which it belongs once
+existed in a nebulous state, from which they were gradually evolved into
+their present condition conformably to physical laws, we are in no degree
+entitled to infer from the admission the conclusion which Comte and others
+have drawn. The man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that the
+law of gravitation, or any other physical law, has of itself determined the
+course of cosmical evolution, so that there is no need for believing in the
+existence and operation of a divine mind, proves merely that he is not
+exempt from reasoning very illogically. The solar system could only have
+been evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now presents if
+the nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form, and constitution, if it
+was neither too fluid nor too tenacious--if its atoms were all numbered,
+its elements all weighed, its constituents all disposed in due relation to
+one another; that is to say, only if the nebula was in reality as much a
+system of order, which Intelligence alone could account for, as the worlds
+which have been developed from it. The origin of the nebula thus presents
+itself to reason as a problem which demands solution no less than the
+origin of the planets. All the properties and laws of the nebula require to
+be accounted for. What origin are we to give them? It must be either reason
+or unreason. We may go back as far as we please, but, at every step and
+stage of the regress we must find ourselves confronted with the same
+question, the same alternative--intelligent purpose or colossal chance."
+
+Now, so far as Comte is here guilty of the fallacy I have already dwelt
+upon of building a destructive argument upon a demonstration of mere
+orderly processes in nature, as distinguished from a demonstration of the
+natural cause of these processes, it is not for me to defend him. All we
+can say with regard to him in this connection is, that, having a sort of
+scientific presentiment that if the knowledge of his day were sufficiently
+advanced it would prove destructive of supernaturalism in the higher and
+more abstruse provinces of physical speculation, as it had previously
+proved in the lower and less abstruse of these provinces, Comte allowed his
+inferences to outrun their legitimate basis. Being necessarily ignorant of
+the one generating cause of orderly processes in nature, he improperly
+allowed himself to found conclusions on the basis of these processes alone,
+which could only be properly founded on the basis of their cause. But
+freely granting this much to Professor Flint, and the rest of his remarks
+in this connection will be found, in view of the altered standing of this
+subject, to be open to amendment. For, in the first place, no one need now
+resort to the illogical supposition that "the law of gravitation or any
+other physical law has of itself determined the course of cosmical
+evolution." What we may argue, and what must be conceded to us, is, that
+the common substratum of all physical laws was at one time sufficient to
+produce the simplest physical laws, and that throughout the whole course of
+evolution this common substratum has always been sufficient to produce the
+more complex laws in the ascending series of their ever-increasing number
+and variety. And hence it becomes obvious that the "origin of the nebula"
+presents a difficulty neither greater nor less than "the origin of the
+planets," since, "if we may go back as far as we please," we can entertain
+no _scientific_ doubt that we should come to a time, prior even to the
+nebula, when the substance of the solar system existed merely as
+such--_i.e._, in an almost or in a wholly undifferentiated form, the
+product, no doubt, of endless cycles of previous evolutions and
+dissolutions of formal differentiations. Therefore, although it is
+undoubtedly true that "the solar system could only have been evolved out of
+its nebulous state into that which it now presents if the nebula possessed"
+those particular attributes which were necessity to the evolution of such a
+product, this consideration is clearly deprived of all its force from our
+present point of view. For unless it can be shown that there is some
+independent reason for believing these particular attributes--which must
+have been of a more and more simple a character the further we recede in
+time--to have been miraculously imposed, the analogy is overwhelming that
+they all progressively arose _by way of natural law_. And if so, the
+universe which has been thus produced is the only universe in this
+particular point of space and time which could have been thus produced.
+That it is an _orderly_ universe we have seen _ad nauseam_ to be no
+argument in favour of its having been a _designed_ universe, so long as the
+cause of its order--general laws--can be seen to admit of a natural
+explanation.
+
+Thus there is clearly nothing to be gained on the side of teleology by
+going back to the dim and dismal birth of the nebula; for no "thoroughgoing
+evolutionist" would for one moment entertain the supposition that natural
+law in the simplest phases of its development partook any more of a
+miraculous character than it does in its more recent and vastly more
+complex phases. The absence of knowledge must not be used as equivalent to
+its presence; and if analogy can be held to justify any inference
+whatsoever, surely we may conclude with confidence that if existing general
+laws admit of being conceivably attributed to a natural genesis, the
+primordial laws of a condensing nebula must have been the same.
+
+There is another passage in Professor Flint's work to which it seems
+desirable to refer. It begins thus: "There is the law of heredity: like
+produces like. But why is there such a law? Why does like produce like?...
+Physical science cannot answer these questions; but that is no reason why
+they should not both be asked and answered. I can conceive of no other
+intelligent answer being given to them than that there is a God of wisdom,
+who designed that the world should be for all ages the abode of life," &c.
+
+Now here we have in another form that same vicious tendency to take refuge
+in the more obscure cases of physical causation as proofs of supernatural
+design--the obscurity in this case arising from the _complexity_ of the
+causes and work, as in the former case it arose from their _remoteness_ in
+time. But in both cases the same answer is patent, viz., that although
+"physical science cannot answer these questions" by pointing out the
+precise sequence of causes and effects, physical science is nevertheless
+quite as certain that this precise sequence arises in its last resort from
+the persistence of force, as she would be were she able to trace the whole
+process. And therefore, in view of the considerations set forth in Chapter
+IV. of this work, it is no longer open to Professor Flint or to any other
+writer logically to assert--"I can conceive of no other intelligent answer
+being given to" such questions "than that there is a God of wisdom."
+
+The same answer awaits this author's further disquisition on other
+biological laws, so it is needless to make any further quotations in this
+connection. But there is one other principle embodied in some of these
+passages which it seems undesirable to overlook. It is said, for instance,
+"Natural selection might have had no materials, or altogether insufficient
+materials, to work with, or the circumstances might have been such that the
+lowest organisms were the best endowed for the struggle for life. If the
+earth were covered with water, fish would survive and higher creatures
+would perish."
+
+Now the principle here embodied--viz., that had the conditions of evolution
+been other than they were, the results would have been different--is, of
+course, true; but clearly, on the view that _all_ natural laws spring from
+the persistence of force, no other conditions than those which actually
+occurred, or are now occurring, could ever have occurred,--the whole course
+of evolution must have been, in all its phases and in all its processes, an
+unconditional necessity. But if it is said, How fortunate that the outcome,
+being unconditionally necessary, has happened to be so good as it is; I
+answer that the remark is legitimate enough if it is not intended to convey
+an implication that the general quality of the outcome points to beneficent
+design as to its cause. Such an implication would not be legitimate,
+because, in the first place, we have no means of knowing in how many cases,
+whether in planets, stars, or systems, the course of evolution has failed
+to produce life and mind--the one known case of this earth, whether or not
+it is the one success out of millions of abortions, being of necessity the
+only known case. In how vastly greater a number of cases the course of
+evolution may have been, so to speak, deflected by some even slight, though
+strictly necessary, cause from producing self-conscious intelligence, it is
+impossible to conjecture. But this consideration, be it observed, is not
+here adduced in order to _disprove_ the assertion that telluric evolution
+has been effected by Intelligence; it is merely adduced to prove that such
+an assertion cannot rest on the single known result of telluric evolution,
+so long as an infinite number of the results of evolution elsewhere remain
+unknown.
+
+And now, lastly, it must be observed that even in the one case with which
+we are acquainted, the net product of evolution is not such as can of
+itself point us to _beneficent_ design. Professor Flint, indeed, in common
+with theologians generally, argues that it does. I will therefore briefly
+criticise his remarks on this subject, believing, as I do, that they form a
+very admirable illustration of what I conceive to be a general
+principle--viz., that minds which already believe in the existence of a
+Deity are, as a rule, not in a position to view this question of
+beneficence in nature in a perfectly impartial manner. For if the existence
+of a Deity is presupposed, a mind with any particle of that most noble
+quality--reverence--will naturally hesitate to draw conclusions that
+partake of the nature of blasphemy; and therefore, unconsciously perhaps to
+themselves, they endeavour in various ways to evade the evidence which, if
+honestly and impartially considered, can scarcely fail to negative the
+argument from beneficence in the universe.
+
+Professor Flint argues that the "law of over-production," and the
+consequent struggle for existence, being "the reason why the world is so
+wonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life," is "a means to an end
+worthy of Divine Wisdom." "Although involving privation, pain, and
+conflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections of
+sentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion has
+gained its strength, the deer its speed, and the dog its sagacity. The
+inference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be attained
+by it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of the
+advantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering which the
+conflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals for some
+higher end than happiness--that he cares for animal perfection as well as
+for animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying that the ends
+which the conflict actually serves it was intended to serve."
+
+Now, whatever may be thought of such an argument as an attempted
+justification of beneficent design already on independent ground believed
+to exist, it is manifestly no argument at all as establishing any
+presumption in favour of such design, unless it could be shown that the
+Deity is so far limited in his power of adapting means to ends that the
+particular method adopted in this case was the best, all things considered,
+that he was able to adopt. For supposing the Deity to be, what Professor
+Flint maintains that he is--viz., omnipotent--and there can be no inference
+more transparent than that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends
+designed, exhibits an incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the
+divine character than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human
+characters. For let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in
+nature means. Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of
+millions of animals must be supposed to have been sentient. Since that time
+till the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations
+of millions of millions of individuals. And throughout all this period of
+incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms have
+been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to the
+outcome, we find that more than half of the species which have survived the
+ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and insentient
+forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find teeth and
+talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for
+torment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, and sickness, with oozing
+blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence that
+dimly close in deaths of brutal torture! Is it said that there are
+compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the enjoyments I
+plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the pains, and this
+whether or not evolution is due to design. Therefore all I am concerned
+with is to show, that if such a state of things is due to "omnipotent
+design," the omnipotent designer must be concluded, so far as reason can
+infer, to be non-beneficent. And this it is not difficult to show. When I
+see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a spring-trap, I abhor the
+devilish nature of the being who, with full powers of realising what pain
+means, can deliberately employ his noble faculties of invention in
+contriving a thing so hideously cruel. But if I could believe that there is
+a being who, with yet higher faculties of thought and knowledge, and with
+an unlimited choice of means to secure his ends, has contrived untold
+thousands of mechanisms no less diabolical than a spring-trap; I should
+call that being a fiend, were all the world besides to call him God. Am I
+told that this is arrogance? It is nothing of the kind; it is plain
+morality, and to say otherwise would be to hide our eyes from murder
+because we dread the Murderer. Am I told that I am not competent to judge
+the purposes of the Almighty? I answer that if these are _purposes_, I _am_
+able to judge of them so far as I can see; and if I am expected to judge of
+his purposes when they appear to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged
+also to judge of them when they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no
+possible extenuation of the latter to point to the "final result" as "order
+and beauty," so long as the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent_ Designer"
+are known to have been so revolting. All that we could legitimately assert
+in this case would be, that so far as observation can extend, "he cares for
+animal perfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment," and even to
+the _total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely
+be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God.
+
+The dilemma, therefore, which Epicurus has stated with great lucidity, and
+which Professor Flint quotes, appears to me so obvious as scarcely to
+require statement. The dilemma is, that, looking to the facts of organic
+nature, theists must abandon their belief, either in the divine
+omnipotence, or in the divine beneficence. And yet, such is the warping
+effect of preformed beliefs on the mind, that even so candid a writer as
+Professor Flint can thus write of this most obvious truth:--
+
+"The late Mr. John Stuart Mill, for no better reason than that nature
+sometimes drowns men and burns them, and that childbirth is a painful
+process, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall not
+say what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed by such an
+argument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the littleness
+of man. The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it tries to
+measure the attributes and limit the greatness of its Creator."
+
+But the argument--or rather the truism--in question is an attempt to do
+neither the one nor the other; it simply asserts the patent fact that, if
+God is omnipotent, and so had an unlimited choice of means whereby to
+accomplish the ends of "animal perfection," "animal enjoyment," and the
+rest; then the fact of his having chosen to adopt the means which he has
+adopted is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his beneficence. And on
+the other hand, if he is beneficent, the fact of his having adopted these
+means in order that the sum of ultimate enjoyment might exceed the sum of
+concomitant pain, is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his
+omnipotence. To a man who already believes, on independent grounds, in an
+omnipotent and beneficent Deity, it is no doubt possible to avoid facing
+this dilemma, and to rest content with the assumption that, in a sense
+beyond the reach of human reason, or even of human conception, the two
+horns of this dilemma must be united in some transcendental reconciliation;
+but if a man undertakes to reason on the subject at all, as he must and
+ought when the question is as to the _existence_ of such a Deity, then
+clearly he has no alternative but to allow that the dilemma is a hopeless
+one. With inverted meaning, therefore, may we quote Professor Flint's words
+against himself:--"The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it
+tries to measure the attributes ... of its Creator;" for certainly, if
+Professor Flint's usually candid mind has had a Creator, it nowhere
+displays the "littleness" of prejudice in so marked a degree as it does
+when "measuring his attributes."
+
+Thus in a subsequent chapter he deals at greater length with this
+difficulty of the apparent failure of beneficence in nature, arguing, in
+effect, that as pain and suffering "serve many good ends" in the way of
+warning animals of danger to life, &c., therefore we ought to conclude
+that, if we could see farther, we should see pain and suffering to be
+unmitigated good, or nearly so. Now this argument, as I have previously
+said, may possibly be admissible as between Christians or others who
+_already_ believe in the existence and in the beneficence of God; but it is
+only the blindest prejudice which can fail to perceive that the argument is
+quite without relevancy when the question is as to the _evidences_ of such
+existence and the _evidences_ of such character. For where the _fact_ of
+such an existence and character is the question in dispute, it clearly can
+be no argument to state its bare assumption by saying that if we knew more
+of nature we should find the relative preponderance of good over evil to be
+immeasurably greater than that which we now perceive. The platform of
+argument on which the question of "Theism" must be discussed is that of the
+observable Cosmos; and if, as Dr. Flint is constrained to admit, there is a
+fearful spectacle of misery presented by this Cosmos, it becomes mere
+question-begging to gloss over this aspect of the subject by any vague
+assumption that the misery must have some unobservable ends of so
+transcendentally beneficent a nature, that were they known they would
+justify the means. Indeed, this kind of discussion seems to me worse than
+useless for the purposes which the Professor has in view; for it only
+serves by contrast to throw out into stronger relief the natural and the
+unstrained character of the adverse interpretation of the facts. According
+to this adverse interpretation, sentiency has been evolved by natural
+selection to secure the benefits which are pointed out by Professor Flint;
+and therefore the fact of this, its cause, having been a _mindless_ cause,
+clearly implies that the _restriction_ of pain and suffering cannot be an
+active principle, or a _vera causa_, as between species and species, though
+it must be such within the limits of the same organism, and to a lesser
+extent within the limits of the same species. And this is just what we find
+to be the case. Therefore, without the need of resorting to wholly
+arbitrary assumptions concerning transcendental reconciliations between
+apparently needless suffering and a supposed almighty beneficence, the
+non-theistic hypothesis is saved by merely opening our eyes to the
+observable facts around us, and there seeing that pain and misery, alike in
+the benefits which they bring and in the frightful excesses which they
+manifest, play just that part in nature which this hypothesis would lead us
+to expect.
+
+Therefore, to sum up these considerations on physical suffering, the case
+between a theist and a sceptic as to the question of divine beneficence is
+seen to be a case of extreme simplicity. The theist believes in such
+beneficence by purposely concealing from his mind all adverse
+evidence--feeling, on the one side, that to entertain the doubt to which
+this evidence points would be to hold dalliance with blasphemy, and, on the
+other side, that the subject is of so transcendental a nature that, in view
+of so great a risk, it is better to avoid impartial reasoning upon it. A
+sceptic, on the other hand, is under no such obligation to preconceived
+ideas, and is therefore free to draw unbiassed inferences as to the
+character of God, if he exists, to the extent which such character is
+indicated by the sphere of observable nature. And, as I have said, when the
+subject is so viewed, the inference is unavoidable that, so far as human
+reason can penetrate, God, if he exists, must either be non-infinite in his
+resources, or non-beneficent in his designs. Therefore it is evident that
+when the _being_ of God, as distinguished from his _character_, is the
+subject in dispute, Theism can gain nothing by an appeal to evidences of
+_beneficent_ designs. If such evidences were unequivocal, then indeed the
+argument which they would establish to an intelligent cause of nature would
+be almost irresistible; for the fact of the external world being in harmony
+with the moral nature of man would be unaccountable except on the
+supposition of both having derived their origin from a common _moral_
+source; and morality implies intelligence. But as it is, all the so-called
+evidence of divine beneficence in nature is, without any exception of a
+kind that is worthless as proving _design_; for all the facts admit of
+being explained equally well on the supposition of their having been due to
+purely physical processes, acting through the various biological laws which
+we are now only beginning to understand. And further than this, so far are
+these facts from proving the existence of a moral cause, that, in view of
+the alternative just stated, they even ground a positive argument to its
+negation. For, as we have seen, all these facts are just of such a kind as
+we should expect to be the facts, on the supposition of their having been
+due to natural causes--_i.e._, causes which could have had no moral
+solicitude for animal happiness as such. Let us now, in conclusion, dwell
+on this antithesis at somewhat greater length.
+
+If natural selection has played any large share in the process of organic
+evolution, it is evident that animal enjoyment, being an important factor
+in this natural cause, must always have been furthered _to the extent in
+which it was necessary for the adaptation of organisms to their
+environment_ that it should. And such we invariably find to be the limits
+within which animal enjoyments _are_ confined. On the other hand, so long
+as the adaptations in question are not complete, so long must more or less
+of suffering be entailed--the capacity for suffering, as for enjoyment,
+being no doubt itself a product of natural selection. But as all specific
+types are perpetually struggling together, it is manifest that the
+competition must prevent any considerable number of types from becoming so
+far adapted to their environment of other types as to become exempt from
+suffering as a result of this competition. There being no one integrating
+cause of an intelligent or moral nature to supply the conditions of
+happiness to each organic type without the misery of this competition, such
+happiness as animals have is derived from the heavy expenditure of pain
+suffered by themselves and by their ancestry.
+
+Thus, whether we look to animal pleasures or to animal pains, the result is
+alike just what we should expect to find on the supposition of these
+pleasures and pains having been due to necessary and physical, as
+distinguished from intelligent and moral, antecedents; for how different is
+that which is from that which might have been! Not only might beneficent
+selection have eliminated the countless species of parasites which now
+destroy the health and happiness of all the higher organisms; not only
+might survival of the fittest, in a moral sense, have determined that
+rapacious and carnivorous animals should yield their places in the world to
+harmless and gentle ones; not only might life have been without sickness
+and death without pain;--but how might the exigences and the welfare of
+species have been consulted by the structures and the habits of one
+another! But no! Amid all the millions of mechanisms and habits in organic
+nature, all of which are so beautifully adapted to the needs of the species
+presenting them, there is _no single instance_ of any mechanism or habit
+occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of another
+species--although, as we should expect on the non-theistic theory, there
+are some comparatively few cases of a mechanism or a habit which is of
+benefit to its possessor being also utilised by other species. Yet, on the
+beneficent-design theory, it is impossible to understand why, when all
+mechanisms and habits in the same species are invariably correlated for the
+benefit of that species, there should never be any such correlation between
+mechanisms and habits of different species. For how magnificent, how
+sublime a display of supreme beneficence would nature have afforded if all
+her sentient animals had been so inter-related as to minister to each
+other's happiness! Organic species might then have been likened to a
+countless multitude of voices, all singing to their Creator in one
+harmonious psalm of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such
+correlation; every species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome
+of the always and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life.
+
+So much, then, for the case of _physical_ evil; but Dr. Flint also treats
+of the case of _moral_ evil. Let us see what this well-equipped writer can
+make of this old problem in the present year of grace. He says--"But it
+will be objected, could not God have made moral creatures who would be
+certain always to choose what is right, always to acquiesce in His holy
+will?... Well, far be it from me to deny that God could have originated a
+sinless moral system.... But if questioned as to why He has not done
+better, I feel no shame in confessing my ignorance. It seems to me that
+when you have resolved the problem of the origin of moral evil into the
+question, Why has God not originated a moral universe in which the lowest
+moral being would be as excellent as the archangels are? you have at once
+shown it to be _speculatively incapable of solution_ [italics mine], and
+practically without importance[!]. The question is one which would
+obviously give rise to another, Why has God not created only moral beings
+as much superior to the archangels as they are superior to the lowest
+Australian aborigines? But no complete answer can be given to a question
+which may be followed by a series of similar questions to which there is no
+end. We have, besides, neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such
+questions."[46]
+
+Now I confess that this argument presents to my mind more of subtlety than
+sense. I had previously imagined that the archangels were supposed to enjoy
+a condition of moral existence which might fairly be thought to remove them
+from any association with that of the Australian aborigines. But as this
+question is one that belongs to Divinity, I am here quite prepared to bow
+to Professor Flint's authority--hoping, however, that he is prepared to
+take the responsibility should the archangels ever care to accuse me of
+calumny. But, as a logician, I must be permitted to observe, that if I ask,
+Why am I not better than I am? it is no answer to tell me, Because the
+archangels are not better than they are. For aught that I know to the
+contrary, the archangels may be morally _perfect_--as an authority in such
+matters has told us that even "just men" may become,--and therefore, for
+aught that I know to the contrary, Professor Flint's regress of moral
+degrees _ad infinitum_, may be an ontological absurdity. But granting, for
+the sake of argument, that archangels fall infinitely short of moral
+perfection, and I should only be able to see in the fact a hopeless
+aggravation of my previous difficulty. If it is hard to reconcile the
+supreme goodness of God with the moral turpitude of man, much more would it
+be hard to do so if his very angels are depraved. Therefore, if the
+reasonable question which I originally put "may be followed by a series of
+similar questions to which there is no end," the goodness of God must
+simply be pronounced a delusion. For the question which I originally put
+was no mere flimsy question of a stupidly unreal description. My own moral
+depravity is a matter of painful certainty to me, and I want to know why,
+if there is a God of infinite power and goodness, he should have made me
+thus. And in answer I am told that my question is "practically without
+importance," because there may be an endless series of beings who, in their
+several degrees, are in a similar predicament to myself. Perhaps they are;
+but if so, the moral evil with which I am directly acquainted is made all
+the blacker by the fact that it is thus but a drop in an infinite ocean of
+moral imperfection. When, therefore, Professor Flint goes on to say, "We
+ought to be content if we can show that what God has done is wise and
+right, and not perplex ourselves as to why He has not done an infinity of
+other things," I answer, Most certainly; but _can_ we show that what God
+has done is wise and right? Unquestionably not. That what he has done _may_
+be wise and right, could we see his whole scheme of things, no careful
+thinker will deny; but to suppose it can be _shown_ that he has done this,
+is an instance of purblind fanaticism which is most startling in a work on
+_Theism_. "The best world, _we may be assured_, that our fancies can feign,
+would in reality be far inferior to the world God has made, whatever
+imperfections we may think we see in it." Are we leading a sermon on the
+datum "God is love"? No; but a work on the questions, Is there a God? and,
+if so, Is he a God of love? And yet the work is written by a man who
+evidently tries to argue fairly. What shall we say of the despotism of
+preformed beliefs? May we not say at least this much--that those who
+endeavour to reconcile their theories of divine goodness with the facts of
+human evil might well appropriate to themselves the words above quoted, "We
+have neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such questions"? For the
+"facts" indeed are absent, and the "faculties" of impartial thought must be
+absent also, if this obvious truth cannot be seen--that "these questions"
+only derive their "speculatively unanswerable" character from the rational
+falsity of the manner by which it is sought to answer them. The "facts" of
+our moral nature, so far as honest reason can perceive, belie the
+hypothesis of Theism; and although the "faculties" of man may be forced by
+prejudice into an acceptance of contradictory propositions, the truth is
+obvious that only by the hypothesis of Evolution can that old-tied knot be
+cut--the Origin of Evil. The form of Theism for which Dr. Flint is arguing
+is the current form, viz., that there is a God who combines in himself the
+attributes of _infinite_ power and _perfect_ goodness--a God at once
+_omnipotent_ and _wholly_ moral. But, in view of the fact that moral evil
+exists in man, the proposition that God is omnipotent and the proposition
+that he is wholly moral become contradictory; and therefore the fact of
+moral evil can only be met, either by abandoning one or other of these
+propositions, or by altogether rejecting the hypothesis of Theism.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+III.
+
+THE SPECULATIVE STANDING OF MATERIALISM.
+
+As a continuation of my criticism on Mr. Fiske's views, I think it is
+desirable to add a few words concerning the speculative annihilation with
+which he supposes Mr. Spencer's doctrines to have visited Materialism. Of
+course it is a self-evident truism that the doctrine of Relativity is
+destructive of Materialism, if by Materialism we mean a theory which
+ignores that doctrine. In other words, the doctrine of Relativity, if
+accepted, clearly excludes the doctrine that Matter, _as known
+phenomenally_, is at all likely to be a true representative of whatever
+_thing-in-itself_ it may be that constitutes Mind. But this position is
+fully established by the doctrine of Relativity alone, and is therefore not
+in the least affected, either by way of confirmation or otherwise, by Mr.
+Spencer's extended doctrine of the Unknowable--it being only because the
+latter doctrine presupposes the doctrine of Relativity that it is exclusive
+of Materialism in the sense which has just been stated. So far, therefore,
+Mr. Spencer's writings cannot be held to have any special bearing on the
+doctrine of Materialism. Such a special bearing is only exerted by these
+writings when they proceed to show that "it seems an imaginable possibility
+that units of external force may be identical in nature with the units of
+the force known as feeling." Let us then ascertain how far it is true that
+the argument already quoted, and which leads to this conclusion, is utterly
+destructive of Materialism.
+
+In the first place, I may observe that this argument differs in several
+instructive particulars from the anti-materialistic argument of Locke,
+which we have already had occasion to consider. For while Locke erroneously
+imagined that the test of inconceivability is of equivalent value
+_wherever_ it is applied, save only where it conflicts with preconceived
+ideas on the subject of Theism (see Appendix A.), Spencer, of course, is
+much too careful a thinker to fall into so obvious a fallacy. But again, it
+is curious to observe that in the anti-materialistic argument of Spencer
+the test of inconceivability is used in a manner the precise opposite of
+that in which it is used in the anti-materialistic argument of Locke. For
+while the ground of Locke's argument is that Materialism must be untrue
+because it is inconceivable that Matter (and Force) should be of a
+psychical nature; the ground of Spencer's argument is that what we know as
+Force (and Matter) may _not_ inconceivably be of a psychical nature. For my
+own part, I think that Spencer's argument is, psychologically speaking, the
+more valid of the two; but nevertheless I think that, logically speaking,
+it is likewise invalid to a perceptibly great, and to a further indefinite,
+degree. For the argument sets out with the reflection that we can only know
+Matter and Force as symbols of consciousness, while we know consciousness
+directly, and therefore that we can go further in conceivably translating
+Matter and Force into terms of Mind than _vice versa_. And this is true,
+but it does not therefore follow that the truth is more likely to lie in
+the direction that thought can most easily travel. For although I am at one
+with Mr. Spencer, whom Mr. Fiske follows, in regarding his test of
+truth--viz., inconceivability of a negation--as the most _ultimate_ test
+within our reach, I cannot agree with him that in this particular case it
+is the most _trustworthy_ test within our reach. I cannot do so because the
+reflection is forced upon me that, "as the terms which are contemplated in
+this particular case are respectively the highest abstractions of objective
+and of subjective existence, the test of truth in question is neutralised
+by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that exists between
+subject and object." Or, in other words, as before stated, "_whatever_ the
+cause of Mind may be, we can clearly perceive it to be a subjective
+necessity of the case that, in ultimate analysis, we should find it more
+easy to conceive of this cause as resembling Mind--the only entity of which
+we are directly conscious--than to conceive of it as any other entity of
+which we are only indirectly conscious." When, therefore, Mr. Spencer
+argues that "it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of
+outer existence," while it is not so impossible to interpret outer
+existence in terms of inner existence, the fact is merely what we should in
+any case expect _a priori_ to be the fact, and therefore as a fact it is
+not a very surprising discovery _a posteriori_. So that when Mr. Fiske
+proceeds to make this fact the basis of his argument, that because we can
+more conceivably regard objective existence as like in kind to subjective
+existence than conversely, therefore we should conclude that there is a
+corresponding probability in favour of the more conceivable proposition, I
+demur to his argument. For, fully accepting the fact on which the argument
+rests, and it seems to me, in view of what I have said, that the latter
+assigns an altogether disproportionate value to the test of
+inconceivability in this case. Far from endowing this test with so great an
+authority in this case, I should regard it not only as perceptibly of very
+small validity, but, as I have said, invalid to a degree which we have no
+means of ascertaining. If it be asked, What other gauge of probability can
+we have in this matter other than such a direct appeal to consciousness? I
+answer, that this appeal being here _a priori_ invalid, we are left to fall
+back upon the formal probability which is established by an application of
+scientific canons to objective phenomena. (See footnote in Sec. 14.) For, be
+it carefully observed, Mr. Spencer, and his disciple Mr. Fiske, are not
+idealists. Were this the case, of course the test of an immediate appeal to
+consciousness would be to them the only test available. But, on the
+contrary, as all the world knows, Mr. Spencer asserts the existence of an
+unknown Reality, of which all phenomena are the manifestations.
+Consequently, what we call Force and Matter are, according to this
+doctrine, phenomenal manifestations of this objective Reality. That is to
+say, for aught that we can know, Force and Matter may be anything within
+the whole range of the possible; and the only limitation that can be
+assigned to them is, that they are modes of existence which are independent
+of, or objective to, our individual consciousness, but which are uniformly
+translated into consciousness as Force and Matter. Now it does not signify
+one iota for the purposes of Materialism whether these our symbolical
+representations of Force and Matter are accurate or inaccurate
+representations of their corresponding realities,--unless, of course, some
+_independent_ reason could be shown for supposing that in their reality
+they resemble Mind. Call Force _x_ and Matter _y_, and so long as we are
+agreed that _x_ and _y_ are _objective realities which are uniformly
+translated into consciousness as Force and Matter_, the materialistic
+deductions remain unaffected by this mere change in our terminology; these
+essential facts are allowed to remain substantially as before, namely, that
+there is an external something or external somethings--Matter and Force, or
+_x_ and _y_--which themselves display no observable tokens of
+consciousness, but which are invariably associated with consciousness in a
+highly distinctive manner.
+
+I dwell at length upon this subject, because although Mr. Spencer himself
+does not appear to attach much weight to his argument, Mr. Fiske, as we
+have seen, elevates it into a basis for "Cosmic Theism." Yet so far is this
+argument from "ruling out," as Mr. Fiske asserts, the essential doctrine of
+Materialism--_i.e._, the doctrine that what we know as Mind is an effect of
+certain collocations and distributions of _what we know_ as Matter and
+Force--that the argument might be employed with almost the same degree of
+effect, or absence of effect, to disprove any instance of recognised
+causation. Thus, for example, the doctrine of Materialism is no more "ruled
+out" by the reflection that what we cognise as cerebral matter is only
+cognised relatively, than would the doctrine of chemical equivalents be
+"ruled out" by the parallel reflection that what we cognise as chemical
+elements are only cognised relatively. I say advisedly, "with _almost_ the
+same degree of effect," because, to be strictly accurate, we ought not
+altogether to ignore the indefinitely slender presumption which Mr.
+Spencer's subjective test of inconceivability establishes on the side of
+Spiritualism, as against the objective evidence of causation on the side of
+Materialism. As this is an important subject, I will be a little more
+explicit. We are agreed that Force and Matter are entities external to
+consciousness, of which we can possess only symbolical knowledge.
+Therefore, as we have said, Force and Matter may be anything within the
+whole range of the possible. But we know that Mind is a possible entity,
+while we have no certain knowledge of any other possible entity. Hence we
+are justified in saying, It is possible that Force and Matter may be
+identical with the only entity which we know as certainly possible; but
+forasmuch as we do not know the sum of possible entities, we have no means
+of calculating the chances there are that what we know as Force and Matter
+are identical in nature with Mind. Still, that there is _a_ chance we
+cannot dispute; all we can assert is, that we are unable to determine its
+value, and that it would be a mistake to suppose we can do so, even in the
+lowest degree, by Mr. Spencer's test of inconceivability. Nevertheless, the
+fact that there is such a chance renders it in some indeterminate degree
+more probable that what we know as Force and Matter are identical with what
+we know as Mind, than that what we know as oxygen and hydrogen are
+identical with what we know as water. So that to this extent the essential
+doctrine of Materialism is "ruled out" in a further degree by the
+philosophy of the Unknowable than is the chemical doctrine of equivalents.
+But, of course, this indefinite possibility of what we know as Force and
+Matter being identical with what we know as Mind does not neutralise, in
+any determinable degree, the considerations whereby Materialism in its
+present shape infers that what we know as Force and Matter are probably
+distinct from what we know as Mind.
+
+But I see no reason why Materialism should be restricted to this "its
+present shape." Even if we admit to the fullest extent the validity of Mr.
+Spencer's argument, and conclude with Professor Clifford as a matter of
+probability that "the universe consists entirely of Mind-stuff," I do not
+see that the admission would affect Materialism in any essential respect.
+For here again the admission would amount to little else, so far as
+Materialism is directly concerned, than a change of terminology: instead of
+calling objective existence "Matter," we call it "Mind-stuff." I say "to
+_little_ else," because no doubt in one particular there is here some
+change introduced in the speculative standing of the subject. So long as
+Matter and Mind, _x_ and _y_, are held to be antithetically opposed in
+substance, so long must Materialism suppose that a connection of
+_causality_ subsists between the two, such that the former substance is
+_produced_ in some unaccountable way by the latter. But when Matter and
+Mind, _x_ and _y_, are supposed to be identical in substance, the need for
+any additional supposition as to a causal connection is excluded. But
+unless we hold, what seems to me an uncalled-for opinion, that the
+essential feature of Materialism consists in a postulation of a causal
+connection between _x_ and _y_, it would appear that the only effect of
+supposing _x_ and _y_ to be really but one substance _z_, must be that of
+_strengthening_ the essential doctrine of Materialism--the doctrine,
+namely, that conscious intellectual existence is _necessarily_ associated
+with that form of existence which we know phenomenally as Matter and
+Motion. If it is true that a "a moving molecule of inorganic matter does
+not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a small piece of
+Mind-stuff," then assuredly the central position of Materialism is shown to
+be impregnable. For while it remains as true as ever that mind and
+consciousness can only emerge when what we know phenomenally as "Matter
+takes the complex form of a living brain," we have abolished the necessity
+for assuming even a causal connection between the substance of what we know
+phenomenally as Matter and the substance of what we know phenomenally as
+Mind: we have found that, in the last resort, the phenomenal connection
+between what we know as Matter and what we know as Mind is actually even
+more intimate than a connection of causality; we have found that it is a
+substantial identity.
+
+To sum up this discussion. We have considered the bearing of modern
+speculation on the doctrine of Materialism in three successive stages of
+argument. First, we had to consider the bearing on Materialism of the
+simple doctrine of Relativity. Here we saw that Materialism was only
+affected to the extent of being compelled to allow that what we know as
+Matter and Motion are not known as they are in themselves. But we also saw
+that, as the inscrutable realities are uniformly translated into
+consciousness as Matter and Motion, it still remains as true as ever that
+_what we know_ as Matter and Motion may be the causes of what we know as
+Mind. Even, therefore, if the supposition of causality is taken to be an
+essential feature of Materialism, Materialism would be in no wise affected
+by substituting for the words Matter and Motion the symbols _x_ and _y_.
+
+The second of the three stages consisted in showing that Mr. Spencer's
+argument as to the possible identity of Force and Feeling is not in itself
+sufficient to overthrow the doctrine that what we know as Matter and Motion
+may be the cause of what we know as Mind. For the mere fact of its being
+more _conceivable_ that units of Force should resemble units of Feeling
+than conversely, is no warrant for concluding that in reality any
+corresponding probability obtains. The test of conceivability, although the
+most ultimate test that is available, is here rendered vague and valueless
+by the _a priori_ consideration that _whatever_ the cause of Mind may be
+(if it has a cause), we must find it more easy to conceive of this cause as
+resembling Mind than to conceive of it as resembling any other entity of
+which we are only conscious indirectly.
+
+Lastly, in the third place, we saw that even if Mr. Spencer's argument were
+fully subscribed to, and Mind in its substantial essence were conceded to
+be causeless, the central position of Materialism would still remain
+unaffected. For Mr. Spencer does not suppose that his "units of Force" are
+themselves endowed with consciousness, any more than Professor Clifford
+supposes his "moving molecules of inorganic matter" to be thus endowed. So
+that the only change which these possibilities, even if conceded to be
+actualities, produce in the speculative standing of Materialism, is to show
+that the raw material of consciousness, instead of requiring to be _caused_
+by other substances--Matter and Force, _x_ and _y_,--occurs ready made as
+those substances. But the essential feature of Materialism remains
+untouched--namely, that what we know as Mind is dependent (whether by way
+of causality or not is immaterial) on highly complex forms of _what we
+know_ as Matter, in association with highly peculiar distributions of _what
+we know_ as Force.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+IV.
+
+THE FINAL MYSTERY OF THINGS.
+
+Some physicists are inclined to dispute the fundamental proposition in
+which the whole of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy may be said to
+rest--the proposition, namely, that the fact of the "persistence of force"
+constitutes the ultimate basis of science. For my own part, I cannot but
+believe that any disagreement on this matter only arises from some want of
+mutual understanding; and, therefore, in order to anticipate any criticisms
+to which the present work may be open on this score, I append this
+explanatory note.
+
+I readily grant that the term "persistence of force" is not a happy one,
+seeing that the word "force," as used by physicists, does not at the
+present time convey the full meaning which Mr. Spencer desires it to
+convey. But I think that any impartial physicist will be prepared to admit
+that, in the present state of his science, we are entitled to conclude that
+energy of position is merely the result of energy of motion; or, in other
+words, that potential energy is merely an expression of the fact that the
+universe, as a whole, is replete with actual energy, whose essential
+characteristic is that it is indestructible. And this may be concluded
+without committing ourselves to any particular theory as to the physical
+explanation of gravity; all we need assert is, that in some way or other
+gravity is the result of ubiquitous energy. And this, it seems to me, we
+must assert, or else conclude that gravity can never admit of a physical
+explanation. For all that we mean by a physical explanation is the proved
+establishment of an equation between two quantities of energy; so that if
+energy of position does not admit of being interpreted in terms of energy
+of motion, we must conclude that it does not admit of being interpreted at
+all--at least not in any physical sense.
+
+Throughout the foregoing essays, therefore, I have assumed that all forms
+of energy are but relatively varying expressions of the same fact--the
+fact, namely, which Mr. Spencer means to express when he says that force is
+persistent. And it seems to me almost needless to show that this fact is
+really the basis of all science. For unless this fact is assumed as a
+postulate, not only would scientific inquiry become impossible, but all
+experience would become chaotic. The physicist could not prosecute his
+researches unless he presupposed that the forces which he measures are of a
+permanent nature, any more than could the chemist prosecute his researches
+unless he presupposed that the materials which he estimates by energy-units
+are likewise of a permanent nature. And similarly with all the other
+sciences, as well as with every judgment in our daily experience. If,
+therefore, any one should be hypercritical enough to dispute the position
+that the doctrine of the conservation of energy constitutes the "ultimate
+datum" of science, I think it will be enough to observe that if this is
+_not_ the "ultimate datum" of science, science can have no "ultimate datum"
+at all. For any datum more ultimate than permanent existence is manifestly
+impossible, while any such datum as non-permanent existence would clearly
+render science impossible. Even, therefore, if such hypercriticism had a
+valid basis of apparently adverse fact whereon to stand, I should feel
+myself justified in neglecting it on _a priori_ grounds; but the only basis
+on which such hypercriticism can rest is, not the knowledge of any adverse
+facts, but the ignorance of certain facts which we must either conclude to
+be facts or else conclude that science can have no ultimate datum whereon
+to rest. In the foregoing essays, therefore, I have not scrupled to
+maintain that the ultimate datum of science is destructive of teleology as
+a scientific argument for Theism; because, unless we deny the possibility
+of any such ultimate datum, and so land ourselves in hopeless scepticism,
+we must conclude that there can be no datum more ultimate than
+this--Permanent Existence; and this is just the datum which we have seen to
+be destructive of teleology as a scientific argument for Theism.
+
+It may be well to point out that from this ultimate datum of science--or
+rather, let us say, of experience--there follows a deductive explanation of
+the law of causation. For this law, when stripped of all the metaphysical
+corruptions with which it has been so cumbersomely clothed, simply means
+that a given collocation of antecedents unconditionally produces a certain
+consequent. But this fact, otherwise stated, amounts to nothing more than a
+re-statement of the ultimate datum of experience--the fact that energy is
+indestructible. For if this latter fact be granted, it is obvious that the
+so-called law of causation follows as a deductive necessity--or rather, as
+I have said, that this law becomes but another way of expressing the same
+fact. This is obvious if we reflect that the only means we have of
+ascertaining that energy is _not_ destructible, is by observing that
+similar antecedents _do_ invariably determine similar consequents. It is as
+a vast induction from all those particular cases of sequence-changes which
+collectively we call causation that we conclude energy to be
+indestructible. And, obversely, having concluded energy to be
+indestructible, we can plainly see that in any particular cases of its
+manifestation in sequence-phenomena, the unconditional resemblance between
+effects due to similar causes which is formulated by the law of causation
+is merely the direct expression of the fact which we had previously
+concluded. It seems to me, therefore, that the old-standing question
+concerning the nature of causation ought now properly to be considered as
+obsolete. Doubtless there will long remain a sort of hereditary tendency in
+metaphysical minds to look upon cause-connection as "a mysterious tie"
+between antecedent and consequent; but henceforth there is no need for
+scientific minds to regard this "tie" as "mysterious" in any other sense
+than the existence of energy is "mysterious." To state the law of causation
+is merely to state the fact that energy is indestructible.
+
+And from this there also arises at once the explanation and the
+justification of our belief in the uniformity of nature. If energy is, in
+its relation to us, ubiquitous and persistent, it clearly follows that in
+all its manifestations which collectively we call nature, similar preceding
+manifestations must always determine similar succeeding manifestations; for
+otherwise the energy concerned would require on one or on both of the
+occasions, either to have become augmented by creation, or dissipated by
+annihilation. Thus our belief in the uniformity of nature, as in the
+validity of the law of causation, is merely an expression of our belief in
+the ubiquitous and indestructible character of energy.
+
+Such being the case, we may fairly conclude that all these old-standing
+"mysteries" are now merged in the one mystery of existence. And deeper than
+this it is manifestly impossible that they can be merged; for it is
+manifestly impossible that Existence in the abstract can ever admit of what
+we call explanation. Hence we can clearly see that, in a scientific sense,
+there must always remain a final mystery of things. But although we can
+thus see that, from the very meaning of what we call explanation, it
+follows that at the base of all our explanations there must lie a great
+Inexplicable, I think that the mystery of Existence in the abstract may be
+rendered less appalling if we reflect that, as opposed to Existence, there
+is only one logical alternative--Non-existence. Supposing, then, our
+physical explanations to have reached their highest limits by resolving all
+modes of Existence into one mode--force, matter, life, and mind, being
+shown but different manifestations of the same Infinite Existence--the
+final mystery of things would then become resolved into the simple
+question, Why is there Existence?--Why is there not Nothing?
+
+Let us then first ask, What is "Nothing"? Is it a mere word, which presents
+no meaning as corresponding to any objective reality, or has the word a
+meaning notwithstanding its being an inconceivable one? Or, otherwise
+phrased, is Nothing possible or impossible? Now, although in ordinary
+conversation it is generally taken for granted that Nothing is possible,
+there is certainly no more ground for this supposition than there is for
+its converse--viz., that Nothing is merely a word which signifies the
+negation of possibility. For analysis will show that the choice between
+these two counter-suppositions can only be made in the presence of
+knowledge which is necessarily absent--the knowledge whether the universe
+of Existence is finite or infinite. If the universe as a whole is finite,
+the word Nothing would stand as a symbol to denote an unthinkable blank of
+which a finite universe is the content. And forasmuch as Something and
+Nothing would then become actual, as distinguished from nominal
+correlatives, we could have no guarantee that, in an absolute or
+transcendental sense, it may not be possible, although it is inconceivable,
+for Something to become Nothing or Nothing Something. Hence, if Existence
+is finite, No-existence becomes possible; and the doctrine of the
+indestructibility of Existence becomes, for aught that we can tell, of a
+merely relative signification. But, on the other hand, if Existence is
+infinite, No-existence becomes impossible; and the doctrine of the
+indestructibility of Existence becomes, in a logical sense, of an absolute
+signification. For it is manifest that if the universe of Existence is
+without end in space and time, the possibility of No-existence is of
+necessity excluded, and the word "Nothing" thus becomes a mere negation of
+possibility.[47]
+
+Thus, if it be conceded that the universe as a whole is infinite both in
+space and time, the concession amounts to an abolition of the final mystery
+of things. For all that we mean by a mystery is something that requires an
+explanation, and the whole of the final mystery of things is therefore
+embodied in the question, "Why is there Existence?--Why is there not
+Nothing?" But if the universe of Existence be conceded infinite, this
+question is sufficiently met by the answer, "Because Existence is, and
+Nothing is not." If it is retorted, But this is no real answer; I reply, It
+is as real as the question. For to ask, Why is there Existence? is, upon
+the supposition which has been conceded, equivalent to asking, Why is the
+possible possible? And if such questions cannot be answered, it is scarcely
+right to say that on this account they embody a mystery; because the
+questions are really not rational questions, and therefore the fact of
+their not admitting of any rational answer cannot be held to show that the
+questions embody any rational mystery. That there _is_ a rational mystery,
+in the sense of there being something which can never be _explained_, I do
+not dispute; all I assert is, that this mystery is inexplicable, only
+_because there is nothing to explain_; the mystery being ultimate, to ask
+for an explanation of that which, being ultimate, requires no explanation,
+is irrational. Or, to state the case in another way, if it is asked, Why is
+there not Nothing? it is a sufficient answer, on supposition of the
+universe being infinite, to say, Because Nothing is nothing; it is merely a
+word which presents no meaning, and which, so far as anything can be
+conceived to the contrary, never can present any meaning.
+
+The above discussion has proceeded on the supposition of Existence being
+infinite; but practically the same result would follow on the
+counter-supposition of Existence being finite. For although in this case,
+as we have seen, Non-entity would still be included within the range of
+possibility, it would still be no more conceivable as such than is Entity;
+and hence the question, Why is there not Nothing? would still be
+irrational, seeing that, even if the possibility which the question
+supposes were realised, it would in no wise tend to explain the mystery of
+Something. And even if it could, the final mystery would not be thus
+excluded; it would merely be transferred from the mystery of Existence to
+the mystery of Non-existence. Thus under every conceivable supposition we
+arrive at the same termination--viz., that in the last resort there must be
+a final mystery, which, as forming the basis of all possible explanations,
+cannot itself receive any explanation, and which therefore is really not,
+in any proper sense of the term, a mystery at all. It is merely a fact
+which itself requires no explanation, because it is a fact than which none
+can be more ultimate. So that even if we suppose this ultimate fact to be
+an Intelligent Being, it is clearly impossible that he should be able to
+_explain_ his own existence, since the possibility of any such explanation
+would imply that his existence could not be ultimate. In the sense,
+therefore, of not admitting of any explanation, his existence would require
+to be a mystery to himself, rendering it impossible for him to state
+anything further with regard to it than this--"I am that I am."
+
+I do not doubt that this way of looking at the subject will be deemed
+unsatisfactory at first sight, because it seems to be, as it were, a merely
+logical way of cheating our intelligence out of an intuitively felt
+justification for its own curiosity in this matter. But the fault really
+lies in this intuitive feeling of justification not being itself
+justifiable. For this particular question, it will be observed, differs
+from all other possible questions with which the mind has to deal. All
+other questions being questions concerning manifestations of existence
+presupposed as existing, it is perfectly legitimate to seek for an
+explanation of one series of manifestations in another--_i.e._, to refer a
+less known group to a group better known. But the case is manifestly quite
+otherwise when, having merged one group of manifestations into another
+group, and this into another for an indefinite number of stages, we
+suddenly make a leap to the last possible stage and ask, "Into what group
+are we to merge the basis of all our previous groups, and of all groups
+which can possibly be formed in the future? How are we to classify that
+which contains all possible classes? Where are we to look for an
+explanation of Existence?" When thus clearly stated, the question, is, as I
+have said, manifestly irrational; but the point with which I am now
+concerned is this--When in plain reason the question is _seen_ to be
+irrational, why in intuitive sentiment should it not be _felt_ to be so?
+The answer, I think, is, that the interrogative faculty being usually
+occupied with questions which admit of rational answers, we acquire a sort
+of intellectual habit of presupposing every wherefore to have a therefore,
+and thus, when eventually we arrive at the last of all possible wherefores,
+which itself supplies the basis of all possible therefores, we fail at
+first to recognise the exceptional character of our position. We fail at
+first to perceive that, from the very nature of this particular case, our
+wherefore is deprived of the rational meaning which it had in all the
+previous cases, where the possibility of a corresponding therefore was
+presupposed. And failing fully to perceive this truth, our organised habit
+of expecting an answer to our question asserts itself, and we experience
+the same sense of intellectual unrest in the presence of this wholly
+meaningless and absurd question, as we experience in the presence of
+questions significant and rational.
+
+THE END.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+Notes
+
+[1] The above was written before Mr. Mill's essay on Theism was published.
+Lest, therefore, my refutation may be deemed too curt, I supplement it with
+Mr. Mill's remarks upon the same subject. "It may still be maintained that
+the feelings of morality make the existence of God eminently desirable. No
+doubt they do, and that is the great reason why we find that good men and
+women cling to the belief, and are pained by its being questioned. But,
+surely, it is not legitimate to assume that, in the order of the universe,
+whatever is desirable is true. Optimism, even when a God is already
+believed in, is a thorny doctrine to maintain, and had to be taken by
+Leibnitz in the limited sense, that the universe being made by a good
+being, is the best universe possible, not the best absolutely: that the
+Divine power, in short, was not equal to making it more free from
+imperfections than it is. But optimism, prior to belief in a God, and as
+the ground of that belief, seems one of the oddest of all speculative
+delusions. Nothing, however, I believe, contributes more to keep up the
+belief in the general mind of humanity than the feeling of its
+desirableness, which, when clothed, as it very often is, in the form of an
+argument, is a _naive_ expression of the tendency of the human mind to
+believe whatever is agreeable to it. Positive value the argument of course
+has none." For Mill's remarks on the version of the argument dealt with in
+Sec. 5, see his "Three Essays," p. 204.
+
+[2] The words "or not conceivable," are here used in the sense of "not
+relatively conceivable," as explained in Chap. vi.
+
+[3] For the full discussion from which the above is an extract, see _System
+of Logic_, vol. i. pp. 409-426 (8th ed.). But, substituting "psychical" for
+"volitional," see also, for some mitigation of the severity of the above
+statement, the closing paragraphs of my supplementary essay on "Cosmic
+Theism."
+
+[4] Essay on Understanding--Existence of God.
+
+[5] Locke, _loc. cit._
+
+[6] See Appendix A.
+
+[7] Viz., the constant association within experience of mind with certain
+highly peculiar material forms; the constant proportion which is found to
+subsist between the quantity of cerebral matter and the degree of
+intellectual capacity--a proportion which may be clearly traced throughout
+the ascending series of vertebrated animals, and which is very generally
+manifested in individuals of the human species; the effects of cerebral
+anaemia, anaesthetics, stimulants, narcotic poisons, and lesions of cerebral
+substance. There can, in short, be no question that the whole series of
+observable facts bearing upon the subject are precisely such as they ought
+to be upon supposition of the materialistic theory being true; while,
+contrariwise, there is a total absence of any known facts tending to
+negative that theory. At the same time it must be carefully noted, that the
+observed facts (and any additional number of the like kind) do not
+logically warrant us in concluding that mental states are necessarily
+_dependent_ upon material changes. Nevertheless, it must also be noted,
+that, in the absence of positive proof of causation, it is certainly in
+accordance with scientific procedure, to yield our provisional assent to an
+hypothesis which undoubtedly connects a large order of constant
+_accompaniments_, rather than to an hypothesis which is confessedly framed
+to meet but a single one of the facts.
+
+Professor Clifford, in a lecture on "Body and Mind" which he delivered at
+St. George's Hall, and afterwards published in the _Fortnightly Review_,
+argues against the existence of God on the ground that, as Mind is always
+associated with Matter within experience, there arises a presumption
+against Mind existing anywhere without being thus associated, so that
+unless we can trace in the disposition of the heavenly bodies some
+resemblance to the conformation of cerebral structure, we are to conclude
+that there is a considerable balance of probability in favour of Atheism.
+Now, as this argument--if we rid it of the grotesque allusion to the
+heavenly bodies--is one that is frequently met with, it seems desirable in
+this place briefly to analyse it. First of all, then, the validity of the
+argument depends upon the probability there is that the constant associated
+of Mind with Matter within experience is due to a _causal_ connection; for
+if the association in question is merely an _association_ and nothing more,
+the origin of known mind is as far from being explained as it would be were
+Mind never known as associated with Matter. But, in the next place,
+supposing the constant association in question to be due to a causal
+connection, it by no means follows that because Mind is due to Matter
+within experience, therefore Mind cannot exist in any other mode beyond
+experience.
+
+Doubtless, from analogy, there is a presumption against the hypothesis that
+the same entity should exist in more than one mode at the same time; but
+clearly in this case we are quite unable to estimate the value of this
+presumption. Consequently, even assuming a causal connection between Matter
+and Human Mind, if there is any, the slightest, indications supplied by any
+other facts of experience pointing to the existence of a Divine Mind, such
+indications should be allowed as much argumentative weight as they would
+have had in the absence of the presumption we are considering. Hence
+Professor Clifford's conclusion cannot be regarded as valid until all the
+other arguments in favour of Theism have been separately refuted. Doubtless
+Professor Clifford will be the first to recognise the cogency of this
+criticism--if indeed it has not already occurred to him; for as I know that
+he is much too clear a thinker not to perceive the validity of these
+considerations, I am willing to believe that the substance of them was
+omitted from his essay merely for the sake of brevity; but, for the sake of
+less thoughtful persons, I have deemed it desirable to state thus clearly
+that the problem of Theism cannot be solved on grounds of Materialism
+alone. [This note was written before I had the advantage of Professor
+Clifford's acquaintance, but now I leave it, as I leave all other parts of
+this essay--viz., as it was originally written.--1878.]
+
+[8] To avoid burdening the text, I have omitted another criticism which may
+be made on Locke's argument. "Triangle" is a word by which we designate a
+certain figure, one of the properties of which is that the sum of its
+angles is equal to two right angles. In other words, any figure which does
+not exhibit this property is not that figure which we designate a triangle.
+Hence, when Locke says he cannot conceive of a triangle which does not
+present this property, it may be answered that his inability arises merely
+from the fact that any figure which fails to present this property is not a
+figure to which the term "triangle" can apply. Thus viewed, however, the
+illustration would obviously be absurd, for the same reason that the
+question of the clown is absurd, "Can you think of a horse that is just
+like a cow?" What Locke evidently means is, that we cannot conceive of any
+geometrical figure which presents all the other properties of a triangle
+without also presenting the property in question. Now, even admitting, with
+Locke, that it is as inconceivable that the entity known to us as Matter
+should possess the property of causing thought as it is that the figure
+which we term a triangle should posses the property of containing more than
+two right angles, still it remains, for the purposes of Locke's supposed
+theistic demonstration, to prove that it is an inconceivable for the entity
+which we call Mind _not_ to be due to another Mind, as it is for a triangle
+_not_ to contain, other than two right angles. But, further, even if it
+were possible to prove this, the demonstration would make as much against
+Theism as in favour of it; for if, as the illustration of the triangle
+implies, we restrict the meaning of the word "Mind" to an entity one of
+whose essential qualities is that it should be caused by another Mind, the
+words "Supreme and Uncaused Mind" involve a contradiction in terms, just as
+much as would the words "A square triangle having four right angles." It
+would, therefore, seem that if we adhere to Locke's argument, and pursue it
+to its conclusion, the only logical outcome would be this:--Seeing that by
+the word "Mind," I expressly connote the quality of derivation from a prior
+Mind, as a quality belonging no less essentially to Mind than the quality
+of presenting two right angles belongs to a triangle; therefore, whatever
+other attributes I ascribe to the First Cause, I must clearly exclude the
+attribute Mind; and hence, whatever else such a Cause may be, it follows
+from my argument that it certainly is--Not Mind.
+
+[9] Hamilton.
+
+[10] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 25-31.
+
+[11] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 542.
+
+[12] _Loc. cit._, p. 543.
+
+[13] Appendix to Discussions, pp. 614, 165.
+
+[14] Mill, in the lengthy chapter which he devotes to the freedom of the
+will in his Examination, does not notice this point.
+
+[15] If more evidence can be wanted, it is supplied in some suggestive
+facts of Psychology. For example, "From our earliest childhood, the idea of
+doing wrong (that is, of doing what is forbidden, or what is injurious to
+others) and the idea of punishment are presented to the mind together, and
+the intense character of the impressions causes the association between
+them to attain the highest degree of closeness and intimacy. Is it strange,
+or unlike the usual processes of the human mind, that in these
+circumstances we should retain the feeling and forget the reason on which
+it is grounded? But why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reason
+has never, in our early education, been presented to the mind. The only
+ideas presented have been those of wrong and punishment, and an inseparable
+association has been created between these directly, without the help of
+any intervening idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous feelings
+of mankind regard punishment and a wrong-doer as naturally fitted to each
+other--as a conjunction appropriate in itself, independently of any
+consequences," &c.--Mill, Examination of Hamilton, p. 599.
+
+[16] Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107.
+
+[17] Throughout these considerations I have confined myself to the
+_positive_ side of the subject. My argument being of the nature of a
+criticism on the erroneous inferences which are drawn from the _good_
+qualities of our moral nature, I thought it desirable, for the sake of
+clearness, not to burden that argument by the additional one as to the
+source of the _evil_ qualities of that nature. This additional argument,
+however, will be found briefly stated at the close of my supplementary
+essay on Professor Flint's "Theism." On reading that additional argument, I
+think that any candid and unbiassed mind must conclude that, alike in what
+it is _not_ as well as in what it _is_, our moral nature points to a
+natural genesis, as distinguished from a supernatural cause.
+
+[18] The illustration to which I refer is that of the watershed of a
+country being precisely adapted to draining purposes. The rivers just fit
+their own particular beds: the latter occupy the lowest grounds, and get
+broader and deeper as they advance; pebbles, gravel, and sand all occupy
+the best teleological situations, &c., &c.
+
+[19] "Order of Nature," by the Rev. Baden Powell, M.A., F.R.S., &c., 1859,
+pp. 228-241.
+
+[20] I think it desirable to state that I perceived this great truth before
+I was aware that it had been perceived also by Mr. Spencer. His statement
+of it now occurs in the short chapter of _First Principles_ entitled
+"Relations between Forces." So far as I an able to ascertain, no one has
+hitherto considered this important doctrine in its immediate relation to
+the question of Theism.
+
+In using the term "persistence of force," I am aware that I am using a term
+which is not unopen to criticism. But as Mr. Spencer's writings have
+brought this term into such general use among speculative thinkers, it
+seemed to me undesirable to modify it. Questions of mere terminology are
+without any importance in a discussion of this kind, provided that the
+terms are universally understood to mean what they are intended to mean;
+and I think that the signification which Mr. Spencer attaches to his term,
+"persistence of force," is sufficiently precise. Therefore, adopting his
+usage, whenever throughout the following pages I speak of force as
+persisting, what I intend to be understood is, that there is a
+something--call it force, or energy, or _x_--which, so far as experience or
+imagination can extend, is, in its relation to us, ubiquitous and
+illimitable; or, in other words, that it universally presents the property
+of permanence. (See, for a more detailed explanation, supplementary essay,
+"On the Final Mystery of Things.")
+
+[21] Hamilton may here be especially noticed, because he went so far as to
+maintain that the phenomena of the external world, taken by themselves,
+would ground a valid argument to the negation of God. Although I cannot but
+think that this position was a conspicuously irrational one for any
+competent thinker to occupy before the scientific doctrine of the
+correlation of the forces had been enunciated, nevertheless I cannot lose
+the opportunity of alluding to this remarkable feature in Sir William
+Hamilton's philosophy, showing as it does that same prophetic forestalling
+of the results which have since followed from the discovery of the
+conservation of energy, as was shown by his no less remarkable theory of
+causation. (See supplementary essay "On the Final Mystery of Things.")
+
+[22] Mr. N. Lockyer's work is now supplying important evidence on these
+points.--1878.
+
+[23] It will of course be observed that if matter and force are identical,
+the unification is complete.
+
+[24] Herbert Spencer.
+
+[25] It may here be observed that the above discussion would not be
+affected by the view of Professor Clifford and others, that natural law is
+to be regarded as having a subjective rather than an objective
+signification--that what we call a natural law is merely an arbitrary
+selection made by ourselves of certain among natural processes. The
+discussion would not be affected by this view, because the argument is
+really based upon the existence of a cosmos as distinguished from a chaos;
+and therefore it would be rather an intensification of the argument than
+otherwise to point out that, for the maintenance of a cosmos, natural laws,
+as conceived by us, would be inadequate. And this seems a fitting place to
+make the almost superfluous remark, that throughout this present essay I
+have used the words "Natural Law," "Supreme Law-giver," &c., in an
+apparently unguarded sense, merely in order to avoid needless obscurity.
+Fully sensible as I am of the misleading nature of the analogy which these
+words embody, I have yet adopted them for the sake of perspicuity--being
+careful, however, never to allow the false analogy which they express to
+enter into an argument on either side of the question. Thus, even where it
+is said that the existence of Natural Law points to the existence of a
+Supreme Law-maker, the argument might equally well be phrased: The
+existence of an orderly cosmos points to the existence of a disposing mind.
+
+[26] First Principles, pp. 27-29.
+
+[27] It may be here observed that this quality of indefiniteness on the
+part of such reasoning is merely a practical outcome of the theoretical
+considerations adduced in Chapter V. For as we there saw that the ratio
+between the known and the unknown is in this case wholly indefinite, it
+follows that any symbols derived from the region of the known--even though
+such symbols be the highest generalities which the latter region
+affords--must be wholly indefinite when projected into the region of the
+unknown. Or rather let us say, that as the region of the unknown is but a
+progressive continuation of the region of the known, the determinate value
+of symbols of thought varies inversely as the distance--or, not improbably,
+as the square of the distance--from the sphere of the known at which they
+are applied.
+
+[28] _i.e._, illegitimate in a _relative_ sense. The conclusion is
+legitimate enough in a _formal_ sense, and as establishing a probability of
+some _unassignable_ degree of value. But it would be illegitimate if this
+quality of indefiniteness were disregarded, and the conclusion supposed to
+possess the same character of actual probability as it has of formal
+definition.
+
+[29] In order not to burden the text with details, I have presented these
+reflections in their most general terms. Thus, if it be granted that cosmic
+harmony results from the combined action of general laws, and that these
+laws are the necessary result of the primary qualities of force and matter,
+this the most general statement of the atheistic position includes all more
+special considerations as a genus includes its species; and therefore it
+would not signify, for the purposes of the atheistic argument, whether or
+not any such more special considerations are possible. Nevertheless, for
+the sake of completeness, I may here observe that we are not wholly without
+indications in nature of the physical causation whereby the effect of
+cosmic harmony is produced. The universal tendency of motion to become
+rhythmical--itself, as Mr. Spencer was the first to show, a necessary
+consequence of the persistence of force--is, so to speak, a conservative
+tendency: it sets a premium against natural cataclysms. But a more
+important consideration is this,--that during the evolution of natural law
+in the way suggested in Chapter IV., as every newly evolved law came into
+existence it must have been, as it were, grafted on the stock of all
+pre-existing natural laws, and so would not enter the cosmic system as an
+element of confusion, but rather as an element of further progress. For
+instance, when, with the origin of organic nature, the law of natural
+selection entered upon the cosmos, it was grafted upon the pre-existing
+stock of other natural laws, and so combined within them in unity. And a
+little thought will show that it was impossible that it should do
+otherwise; for it was impossible that natural selection could ever produce
+organisms which would ever be able by their existence to conflict with the
+pre-existing system of astronomic or geologic laws; seeing that organisms,
+being a product of later evolution than these laws, would either have to be
+adapted to them or perish. And hence the new law of natural selection,
+which consists in so adapting organisms to the pre-existing laws that they
+must either conform to them or die. Now, I have chosen the case of natural
+selection because, as alluded to in the text, it is the law of all others
+which is the most conspicuously effective in producing the harmonious
+complexity of nature. But the same kind of considerations may be seen to
+apply to most of the other general laws with which we are acquainted,
+particularly if we bear in mind that the general outcome of their united
+action as we observe it--the cosmic harmony on which so much stress is
+laid--is not _perfectly_ harmonious. Cataclysms--whether it be the capture
+of an insect, or the ruin of a star--although events of comparatively rare
+occurrence if at any given time we take into account the total number of
+insects or the total number of stars, are events which nevertheless do
+occasionally happen. And the fact that even cataclysms take place in
+accordance with so-called natural law, serves but to emphasise the
+consideration on which we are engaged--viz., that the total result of the
+combined action of general laws is not such as to produce perfect order.
+Lastly, if the answer is made that human ideas of perfect order may not
+correspond with the highest ideal of such order, I observe that to make
+such a answer is merely to abandon the subject of discussion; for if a
+theist rests his argument on the basis of our human conception of order, he
+is not free to maintain his argument and at the same time to abandon its
+basis at whatever point the latter may be shown untenable.
+
+[30] Since the above was written, the first volume of Mr. Spencer's
+"Sociology" has been published; and those who may not as yet have read the
+first half of that work are here strongly recommended to do so; for Mr.
+Spencer has there shown, in a more connected and conclusive manner than has
+ever been shown before, how strictly natural is the growth of all
+superstitions and religions--_i.e._, of all the theories of personal agency
+in nature.--1878.
+
+[31] Herbert Spencer's Essays, vol. iii. pp. 246-249 (1874).
+
+[32] This is the truly inconceivable element in the physical theory. As I
+have shown in the pleading on the side of Atheism, the supposed
+inconceivability of cosmic harmony being due to mindless forces, is not of
+such a kind as wholly refuses to be surmounted by symbolic conceptions of a
+sufficiently abstract character. But it is impossible, by the aid of any
+symbols, to gain a conception of an eternal existence. And I may here point
+out, that if Mind is said to be the cause of evolution, not only does the
+statement involve the inconceivable proposition that such a Mind must be
+infinite in respect to its powers of supervision, direction, &c.; but the
+statement also involves a necessary alternative between two additional
+inconceivable propositions--viz., either that such a Mind must have been
+eternal, or that it must have come into existence without a cause. In this
+respect, therefore, it would seem that the theory of Atheism has the
+advantage over that of Theism; for while the former theory is under the
+necessity of embodying only a single inconceivable term, the latter theory
+is under the necessity of embodying two such terms.
+
+[33] Mr. Herbert Spencer has treated of this subject in his memorable
+controversy with Mill on the "Universal Postulate" (see _Psychology_, Sec.
+427), and refuses to entertain the term "Inconceivable" as applicable to
+any propositions other than those wherein "the terms cannot, by any effort,
+be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition
+asserts between them." That is to say, he limits the term "Inconceivable"
+to that which is _absolutely_ inconceivable; and he then proceeds to affirm
+that all propositions "which admit of being framed in thought, but which
+are so much at variance with experience, in which its terms have habitually
+been otherwise united, that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation
+without effort," ought properly to be termed "_incredible_" propositions.
+Now I cannot see that the class "Incredible propositions" is, as this
+definition asserts, identical with the class which I have termed
+"Relatively inconceivable" propositions. For example, it is a familiar
+observation that, on looking at the setting sun, we experience an almost,
+if not quite, insuperable difficulty in _conceiving_ the sun's apparent
+motion as due to our own actual motion, and yet we experience no difficulty
+in _believing_ it. Conversely, I entertain but little difficulty in
+_conceiving_--_i.e._, imagining--a shark with a mammalian heart, and yet it
+would require extremely strong evidence to make me _believe_ that such an
+animal exists. The truth appears to be that our language is deficient in
+terms whereby to distinguish between that which is wholly inconceivable
+from that which is with difficulty conceivable. This, it seems to me, was
+the principle reason of the dispute between Spencer and Mill above alluded
+to,--the former writer having always used the word "Inconceivable" in the
+sense of "Absolutely inconceivable," and the latter having apparently used
+it--in his _Logic_ and elsewhere--in both senses. I have endeavoured to
+remedy this defect in the language by introducing the qualifying words,
+"Absolutely" and "Relatively," which, although not appropriate words, are
+the best that I am able to supply. The conceptive faculty of the individual
+having been determined by the experience of the race, that which is
+inconceivable by the intelligence of the race may be said to be
+inconceivable to the intelligence of the individual in an _absolute_ sense;
+no effort on his part can enable him to surmount the organically imposed
+conditions of his conceptive faculty. But that which is inconceivable
+merely to one individual or generation, while it is not inconceivable to
+the intelligence of the race, may properly be said to be inconceivable to
+the intelligence of that individual or generation only in a _relative_
+sense; apart from the special condition to which the individual
+intelligence has been subjected, there is nothing in the conditions of
+human intelligence as such to prevent the thing from being conceived.
+[While this work has been passing through the press, I have found that Mr.
+G. H. Lewes has already employed the above terms in precisely the same
+sense as that which is above explained.--1878.]
+
+[34] I should here like to have added some considerations on Sir W.
+Hamilton's remarks concerning the effect of training upon the mind in this
+connection; but, to avoid being tedious, I shall condense what I have to
+say into a few sentences. What Hamilton maintains is very true, viz., that
+the study of classics, moral and mental philosophy, &c., renders the mind
+more capable of believing in a God than does the study of physical science.
+The question, however, is, Which class of studies ought to be considered
+the more authoritative in this matter? I certainly cannot see what title
+classics, history, political economy, &c., have to be regarded at all; and
+although the mental and moral sciences have doubtless a better claim, still
+I think they must be largely subordinate to those sciences which deal with
+the whole domain of nature besides. Further, I should say that there is no
+very strong _affirmative_ influence created on the mind in this respect by
+any class of studies; and that the only reason why we so generally find
+Theism and classics, &c., united, is because we so seldom find classics,
+&c., and physical science united; the _negative_ influence of the latter,
+in the case of classical minds, being therefore generally absent.
+
+[35] The qualities named are only known in a relative sense, and therefore
+the apparent contradiction may be destitute of meaning in an absolute
+sense.
+
+[36] All the quotations in this Appendix have been taken from the chapter
+on "Our knowledge of the existence of a God," and from the early part of
+that on "The extent of human knowledge," together with the appended letter
+to the Bishop of Worcester.
+
+[37] A criticism of Mr. John Fiske's proposed system of theology as
+expounded in his work on "Cosmic Philosophy" (Macmillan & Co., 1874).
+
+[38] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 87-89.
+
+[39] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 429, 430.
+
+[40] Ibid., p. 441.
+
+[41] Ibid., pp. 450, 451.
+
+[42] Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pp. 159-161.
+
+[43] We thus see that the question whether there may not be "something
+quasi-psychical in the constitution of things" is a question which does not
+affect the position of Theism as it has been left by a negation of the
+self-conscious personality of God. But as the speculations on which this
+question has been reared are in themselves of much philosophical interest,
+I may here observe that, in one form or another, they have been dimly
+floating in men's minds for a long time past. Thus, excepting the degree of
+certainty with which it is taught, we have in Mr. Spencer's words above
+quoted a reversion to the doctrine of Buddha; for, as "force is
+persistent," all that would happen on death, supposing the doctrine true,
+would be an escape of the "circumscribed aggregate" of units forming the
+individual consciousness into the unlimited abyss of similar units
+constituting the "Absolute Being" of the Cosmists, or the "Divine Essence"
+of the Buddhists. Again, the doctrine in a vague form pervades the
+philosophy of Spinoza, and is next clearly enunciated by Wundt. Lastly, in
+a recently published very remarkable essay "On the Nature of Things in
+Themselves," Professor Clifford arrives at a similar doctrine by a
+different route. The following is the conclusion to which he
+arrives:--"That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplest
+feeling is a complex, I shall call _Mind-stuff_. A moving molecule of
+inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a
+small piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to
+form the film on the under side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff
+which go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of
+Sentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and
+nervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff
+are so combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say,
+changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked
+together that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other.
+When matters take the complex form of a living human brain, the
+corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having
+intelligence and volition." (Mind, January, 1878.)
+
+[44] Theism, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the
+University of Edinburgh, &c.
+
+[45] Such being the objects in view, I have not thought it necessary to
+extend this criticism into anything resembling a review of Professor
+Flint's work as a whole; but, on the contrary, I have aimed rather at
+confining my observations to those parts of his treatise which embody the
+current arguments from teleology alone. I may here observe, however, in
+general terms, that I consider all his arguments to have been answered by
+anticipation in the foregoing examination of Theism. I may also here
+observe, that throughout the following essay I have used the word "design"
+in the sense in which it is used by Professor Flint himself. This sense is
+distinctly a different one from that which the word bears in the writings
+of the Paley, Bell, and Chalmers school. For while in the latter writings,
+as pointed out in Chapter III., the word bears its natural meaning of a
+certain _process of thought_, in Professor Flint's work it is used rather
+as expressive of a _product of intelligence_. In other words, "design," as
+used by Professor Flint, is synonymous with _intention_, irrespective of
+the particular psychological process by which the intention may have been
+put into effect.
+
+[46] Op. cit., pp. 255-257.
+
+[47] Let it be observed that there is a distinction between what I may call
+substantial and formal existence. Thus there is no doubt that flowers as
+flowers perish, or become non-existent; but the substances of which they
+were composed persist. And, in this connection, I may here point out that
+if the universe is infinite in space and time, the universe as a whole
+would present substantial existence as standing out of relation to space
+and time, whereas innumerable portions of the universe present only formal
+existences, because standing in relation both to space and time. Thus, for
+instance, the solar system, as a solar system, must have an end in time as
+it has a boundary in space; but as the substance of which it consists will
+not become extinguished by the extinction of the system, it may not now
+stand in any real relation to what we call space and time. I am inclined to
+think that it is upon the idea of non-existence in this formal sense that
+we construct a pseud-idea of non-existence in a substantial sense; but it
+is evident that if the universe as a whole is absolute, this pseud-idea
+must represent as impossibility. And from this it follows, that if
+existence is infinite in space and time, every _quantum_ of it with which
+our experience comes into relation must represent, as its essential
+quality, that quality which we find to be presented by the substance of
+things--the quality, that is, of persistence.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Candid Examination of Theism, by
+George John Romanes
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+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM ***
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