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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/19003-8.txt b/19003-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b0b91d --- /dev/null +++ b/19003-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6777 @@ +Project Gutenberg's A Candid Examination of Theism, by George John Romanes + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Candid Examination of Theism + +Author: George John Romanes + +Release Date: August 7, 2006 [EBook #19003] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of +public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital +Libraries.) + + + + + +A + +CANDID EXAMINATION + +OF + +THEISM. + +BY + +PHYSICUS. + +BOSTON: +HOUGHTON, OSGOOD, & COMPANY. +1878. +[_All rights reserved_] + + * * * * * + + +_CANST THOU BY SEARCHING FIND OUT GOD?_ + + * * * * * + + +PREFACE. + + * * * * * + +The following essay was written several years ago; but I have hitherto +refrained from publishing it, lest, after having done so, I should find +that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the essay sets +forth. Judging, however, that it is now more than ever improbable that I +shall myself be able to detect any errors in my reasoning, I feel that it +is time to present the latter to the contemplation of other minds; and in +doing so, I make this explanation only because I feel it desirable to state +at the outset that the present treatise was written before the publication +of Mr. Mill's treatise on the same subject. It is desirable to make this +statement, first, because in several instances the trains of reasoning in +the two essays are parallel, and next, because in other instances I have +quoted passages from Mr. Mill's essay in connections which would be +scarcely intelligible were it not understood that these passages are +insertions made after the present essay had been completed. I have also +added several supplementary essays which have been written since the main +essay was finished. + +It is desirable further to observe, that the only reason why I publish this +edition anonymously is because I feel very strongly that, in matters of the +kind with which the present essay deals, opinions and arguments should be +allowed to produce the exact degree of influence to which as opinions and +arguments they are entitled: they should be permitted to stand upon their +own intrinsic merits alone, and quite beyond the shadow of that unfair +prejudication which cannot but arise so soon as their author's authority, +or absence of authority, becomes known. Notwithstanding this avowal, +however, I fear that many who glance over the following pages will read in +the "Physicus" of the first one a very different motive. There is at the +present time a wonderfully wide-spread sentiment pervading all classes of +society--a sentiment which it would not be easy to define, but the +practical outcome of which is, that to discuss the question of which this +essay treats is, in some way or other, morally wrong. Many, therefore, who +share this sentiment will doubtless attribute my reticence to a puerile +fear on my part to meet it. I can only say that such is not the case. +Although I allude to this sentiment with all respect--believing as I do +that it is an offshoot from the stock which contains all that is best and +greatest in human nature--nevertheless it seems to me impossible to deny +that the sentiment in question is as unreasonable as the frame of mind +which harbours it must be unreasoning. If there is no God, where can be the +harm in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence? If there is a +God, surely our first duty towards him must be to exert to our utmost, in +our attempts to find him, the most noble faculty with which he has endowed +us--as carefully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to +furnish of his own existence as we investigate the evidence of inferior +things in his dependent creation. To say that there is one rule or method +for ascertaining truth in the latter case, which it is not legitimate to +apply in the former case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity, +if he exists, has not supplied us with rational evidence of his existence. +For my own part, I feel that such an assertion cannot but embody far more +unworthy conceptions of a Personal God than are represented by any amount +of earnest inquiry into whatever evidence of his existence there may be +present; but, neglecting this reflection, if there is a God, it is certain +that reason is the faculty by which he has enabled man to discover truth, +and it is no less certain that the scientific methods have proved +themselves by far the most trustworthy for reason to adopt. To my mind, +therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, looking to this +undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific methods as ways to truth, whether +or not there is a God, the question as to his existence is both more +morally and more reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a +problem for methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other +light. Or, stating the case in other words, I believe that in whatever +degree we intentionally abstain from using in this case what we _know_ to +be the most trustworthy methods of inquiry in other cases, in that degree +are we either unworthily closing our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we are +guilty of the worst among human sins--"Depart from us, for we desire not +the knowledge of thy ways." If it is said that, supposing man to be in a +state of probation, faith, and not reason, must be the instrument of his +trial, I am ready to admit the validity of the remark; but I must also ask +it to be remembered, that unless faith has _some_ basis of reason whereon +to rest, it differs in nothing from superstition; and hence that it is +still our duty to investigate the _rational_ standing of the question +before us by the _scientific_ methods alone. And I may here observe +parenthetically, that the same reasoning applies to all investigations +concerning the reality of a supposed revelation. With such investigations, +however, the present essay has nothing to do, although, I may remark that +if there is any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible in the structure of a +professing revelation, such evidence, in whatever degree present, would be +of the best possible kind for substantiating the hypothesis of Theism. + +Such being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the most +truly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the following +pages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion were more +negative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice in me _for this +reason_ to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of the present kind +could ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism, there might be much +for its author to regret, but nothing for him to be ashamed of; and, by +parity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result of such an inquiry is +seen to have a tendency to negative the theistic theory, the author should +not be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his conviction as to the degree of +such tendency, provided only that his conviction is an _honest_ one, and +that he is conscious of its having been reached by using his faculties with +the utmost care of which he is capable. + +If it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate a +character that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I reply +that they are nevertheless the _best_ methods available, and hence that the +retort is without pertinence: the question is still to be regarded as a +scientific one, although we may perceive that neither an affirmative nor a +negative answer can be given to it with any approach to a full +demonstration. But if the question is thus conceded to be one falling +within the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that the mere +fact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently impossible should +not deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a well-recognised +principle of scientific research, that however difficult or impossible it +may be to _prove_ a given theory true or false, the theory should +nevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being tested, by the full +rigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration cannot be hoped for, +it still remains desirable to reduce the question at issue to the last +analysis of which it is capable. + +Adopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the following +analysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour of the +theory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of light which +the progress of modern science--physical and speculative--has shed upon it. +And forasmuch as it is impossible that demonstrated truth can ever be shown +untrue, and forasmuch as the demonstrated truths on which the present +examination rests are the most fundamental which it is possible for the +human mind to reach, I do not think it presumptuous to assert what appears +to me a necessary deduction from these facts--namely, that, possible errors +in reasoning apart, the rational position of Theism as here defined must +remain without material modification as long as our intelligence remains +human. + +LONDON, 1878. + + * * * * * + + +ANALYSIS. + +CHAPTER I. + +EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. + +SECT. + +1. Introductory. + +2. Object of the chapter. + +3. The Argument from the Inconceivability of Self-existence. + +4. The Argument from the Desirability of there being a God. + +5. The Argument from the Presence of Human Aspirations. + +6. The Argument from Consciousness. + +7. The Argument for a First Cause. + +CHAPTER II. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. + +8. Introductory. + +9. Examination of the Argument, and the independent coincidence of my views +regarding it with those of Mr. Mill. + +10. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a re-enunciation of it in the +form of a Syllogism. + +11. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot explain Mind in the abstract. +Mill quoted and answered. This defect in the Syllogism clearly defined. + +12. The Syllogism further defective, in that it assumes Intelligence to be +the only possible cause of Intelligence. This assumption amounts to begging +the whole question as to the being of a God. Inconceivability of Matter +thinking no proof that it may not think. Locke himself strangely concedes +this. His fallacies and self-contradictions pointed out in an Appendix. + +13. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a Materialist, but assuming that +he is one, he is as much entitled to the hypothesis that Matter thinks as a +Theist is to his hypothesis that it does not. + +14. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly equivalent value, save that +while Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a certain basis of fact to rest +upon. This basis defined in a footnote, where also Professor Clifford's +essay on "Body and Mind" is briefly examined. Difficulty of estimating the +worth of the Argument as to the _most_ conceivable being _most_ likely +true. + +15. Locke's comparison between certainty of the Inconceivability Argument +as applied to Theism and to mathematics shown to contain a _virtual_ though +not a _formal_ fallacy. + +16. Summary of considerations as to the value of this Argument from +Inconceivability. + +17. Introductory to the other Arguments in favour of the conclusion that +only Intelligence can have caused Intelligence. + +18. Locke's presentation of the view that the cause must contain all that +is contained in the effects. His statements contradicted. Mill quoted to +show that the analogy of Nature is against the doctrine of higher +perfections never growing out of lower ones. + +19. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in favour of the proposition +that only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. Hamilton quoted to show that +in his philosophy the entire question as to the being of a God hinges upon +that as to whether or not human volitions are caused. + +20. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. Hamilton erroneously +identified this theory with the fact that we possess a moral sense. His +resulting dilemma. + +21. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus identifying genuine fact with +spurious theory, yet his Argument from the fact of our having a moral sense +remains to be considered. + +22. The question here is merely as to whether or not the presence of the +moral sense can be explained by natural causes. _A priori_ probability of +the moral sense having been evolved. _A posteriori_ confirmation supplied +by Utilitarianism, &c. + +23. Mill's presentation of the Argument a resuscitation of Paley's. His +criticism on Paley shown to be unfair. + +24. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation pointed out. + +25. The same fallacy pointed out in another way. + +26. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in order to illustrate the +root fallacy of his Argument from Design. Mill's observations upon this +Argument criticised. + +27. Result yielded by the present analysis of the Argument from Design. The +Argument shown to be a _petitio principii_. + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS. + +28. My belief that no competent writer in favour of the Argument from +Design could have written upon it at all, had it not been for his +instinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument from General +Laws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency insisted upon. + +29. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws prior to the +enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The Rev. Baden +Powell quoted. + +30. The nature of General Laws when these are interpreted in terms of the +doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The word "Law" defined in terms of +this doctrine. + +31. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws subsequent to +the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. + +32. The self-evolution of General Laws, or the objective aspect of the +question as to whether we may infer the presence of Mind in Nature because +Nature admits of being intelligently interrogated. + +33. The subjective aspect of this question, according to the data afforded +by evolutionary psychology. + +34. Correspondence between products due to human intelligence and products +supposed due to Divine Intelligence, a correspondence which is only +generic. Illustrations drawn from prodigality in Nature. Further +illustrations. Illogical manner in which natural theologians deal with such +difficulties. The generic resemblance contemplated is just what we should +expect to find, if the doctrine of evolutionary psychology be true. + +35. The last three sections parenthetical. Necessary nature of the +conclusion which follows from the last five sections. + +CHAPTER V. + +THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD. + +36. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion reached in the previous +chapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely scientific, and not of +logical conclusiveness. Preparation for considering the question in its +purely logical form. + +37. The logic of probability in general explained, and canon of +interpretation enunciated. + +38. Application of this canon to the particular case of Theism. + +39. Exposition of the logical state of the question. + +40. Exposition continued. + +41. Result of the exposition; "Suspended Judgment" the only logical +attitude of mind with regard to the question of Theism. + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY. + +42. Statement of the position to which the question of Theism has been +reduced by the foregoing analysis. + +43. Distinction between a scientific and a metaphysical teleology. +Statement of the latter in legitimate terms. Criticism of this statement +legitimately made on the side of Atheism as being gratuitous. Impartial +judgment on this criticism. + +44. Examination of the question as to whether the metaphysical system of +teleology is really destitute of all rational support. Pleading of a +supposed Theist in support of the system. The principle of correlation of +general laws. The complexity of Nature. + +45. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and judgment that it fairly removes +from the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology the charge of the latter +being gratuitous. + +46. Examination of the degree of probability that is presented by the +hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising an examination of the +Theistic objection to the scientific train of reasoning on account of its +symbolism, and showing that a no less cogent objection lies against the +metaphysical train of reasoning on account of its embodying the supposition +of unknowable causes. Distinction between "inconceivability" in a formal or +symbolical, and in a material or realisable sense. Reply of a supposed +Atheist to the previous pleading of the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencer +quoted on inconceivability of cosmic evolution as due to Mind. + +47. Final judgment on the rational value of a metaphysical system of +teleology. Distinction between "inconceivability" in an absolute and in a +relative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of mind which it is rational +to adopt towards the question of Theism. The desirability and the +rationality of tolerance in this particular case. + +CHAPTER VII. + +GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. + +48. General summary of the whole essay. + +49. Concluding remarks. + +APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. + +APPENDIX. + +A Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument against +the possibility of Matter thinking on grounds of its being inconceivable +that it should. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY I. + +Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and criticism to +show that it is inadequate to sustain the doctrine of "Cosmic Theism" which +Mr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY II. + +A Critical Examination of the Rev. Professor Flint's work on "Theism". + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY III. + +On the Speculative Standing of Materialism. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IV. + +On the Final Mystery of Things. + + * * * * * + + +THEISM. + + * * * * * + +CHAPTER I. + +EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. + +§ 1. Few subjects have occupied so much attention among speculative +thinkers as that which relates to the being of God. Notwithstanding, +however, the great amount that has been written on this subject, I am not +aware that any one has successfully endeavoured to approach it, on all its +various sides, from the ground of pure reason alone, and thus to fix, as +nearly as possible, the exact position which, in pure reason, this subject +ought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought that an exception to this +statement ought to be made in favour of John Stuart Mill's posthumous essay +on Theism; but from my great respect for this author, I should rather be +inclined to regard that essay as a criticism on illogical arguments, than +as a _careful_ or _matured_ attempt to formulate the strictly rational +_status_ of the question in all its bearings. Nevertheless, as this essay +is in some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yet +appeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came from +the pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most serious +attention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the course of +the following pages. + +Seeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer has +hitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question as +to the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any attempt, +however imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of every +school--the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious rapidity which +of late years has marked the advance both of physical and of speculative +science, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting us towards a +reasonable and, I think, a final decision as to the strictly logical +standing of this important matter. However, be my attempt welcome or no, I +feel that it is my obvious duty to publish the results which have been +yielded by an honest and careful analysis. + +§ 2. I may most fitly begin this analysis by briefly disposing of such +arguments in favour of Theism as are manifestly erroneous. And I do this +the more willingly because, as these arguments are at the present time most +in vogue, an exposure of their fallacies may perhaps deter our popular +apologists of the future from drawing upon themselves the silent contempt +of every reader whose intellect is not either prejudiced or imbecile. + +§ 3. A favourite piece of apologetic juggling is that of first demolishing +Atheism, Pantheism, Materialism, &c., by successively calling upon them to +explain the mystery of self-existence, and then tacitly assuming that the +need of such an explanation is absent in the case of Theism--as though the +attribute in question were more conceivable when posited in a Deity than +when posited elsewhere. + +It is, I hope, unnecessary to observe that, so far as the ultimate mystery +of existence is concerned, any and every theory of things is equally +entitled to the inexplicable fact that something is; and that any endeavour +on the part of the votaries of one theory to shift from themselves to the +votaries of another theory the _onus_ of explaining the necessarily +inexplicable, is an instance of irrationality which borders on the +ludicrous. + +§ 4. Another argument, or semblance of an argument, is the very prevalent +one, "Our heart requires a God; therefore it is probable that there is a +God:" as though such a subjective necessity, even if made out, could ever +prove an objective existence.[1] + +§ 5. If it is said that the theistic aspirations of the human heart, by the +mere fact of their presence, point to the existence of a God as to their +explanatory cause, I answer that the argument would only be valid after the +possibility of any more proximate causes having been in action has been +excluded--else the theistic explanation violates the fundamental rule of +science, the Law of Parcimony, or the law which forbids us to assume the +action of more remote causes where more proximate ones are found sufficient +to explain the effects. Consequently, the validity of the argument now +under consideration is inversely proportional to the number of +possibilities there are of the aspirations in question being due to the +agency of physical causes; and forasmuch as our ignorance of psychological +causation is well-nigh total, the Law of Parcimony forbids us to allow any +determinate degree of logical value to the present argument. In other +words, we must not use the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its +presence--must not argue from our ignorance of psychological possibilities, +as though this ignorance were knowledge of corresponding impossibilities. +The burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and from the nature of +the case this burden cannot be discharged until the science of psychology +shall have been fully perfected. I may add that, for my own part, I cannot +help feeling that, even in the present embryonic condition of this science, +we are not without some indications of the manner in which the aspirations +in question arose; but even were this not so, the above considerations +prove that the argument before us is invalid. If it is retorted that the +fact of these aspirations having had _proximate_ causes to account for +their origin, even if made out, would not negative the inference of these +being due to a Deity as to their _ultimate_ cause; I answer that this is +not to use the argument from the presence of these aspirations; it is +merely to beg the question as to the being of a God. + +§ 6. Next, we may consider the argument from consciousness. Many persons +ground their belief in the existence of a Deity upon a real or supposed +necessity of their own subjective thought. I say "real or supposed," +because, in its bearing upon rational argument, it is of no consequence of +which character the alleged necessity actually is. Even if the necessity of +thought be real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to affirm is, that +it is impossible for _him_, by any effort of thinking, to rid himself of +the persuasion that God exists; he is not entitled to affirm that this +persuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the human mind. +Or, as Mill puts it, "One man cannot by proclaiming with ever so much +confidence that _he_ perceives an object, convince other people that they +see it too.... When no claim is set up to any peculiar gift, but we are +told that all of us are as capable of seeing what he sees, feeling what he +feels, nay, that we actually do so, and when the utmost effort of which we +are capable fails to make us aware of what we are told, we perceive this +supposed universal faculty of intuition is but + + 'The Dark Lantern of the Spirit + Which none see by but those who bear it.'" + +It is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument must, +from its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save its +assertor; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is not +universal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument. + +And now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether the +alleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a +_real_ necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are the +victims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable that +their minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute from the +minds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the above +quotation, "They may fairly be asked to consider, whether it is not more +likely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in their +minds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an impression +in theirs." No doubt it is true that education and habits of thought may so +stereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what is conceivable to +one man or generation may not be so to another;[2] but to adduce this +consideration in this place would clearly be but to destroy the argument +from the _intuitive_ necessity of believing in a God. + +Lastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if the +impossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law of +human mind--which it certainly is not--the fact of his existence could not +be thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much more probable than it +now is--as probable, for instance, if not more probable, than is the +existence of an external world;--but still it would not be necessarily +true. + +§ 7. The argument from the general consent of mankind is so clearly +fallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I shall pass it over and +proceed at once to the last of the untenable arguments--that, namely, from +the existence of a First Cause. And here I should like to express myself +indebted to Mr. Mill for the following ideas:--"The cause of every change +is a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there were no new +antecedent, there would be no new consequent. If the state of facts which +brings the phenomenon into existence, had existed always or for an +indefinite duration, the effect also would have existed always or been +produced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of +causation, within the sphere of experience, that the causes as well as the +effects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem, +therefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for a +first cause, is repugnant to it; and that the very essence of causation, as +it exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First +Cause." + +The rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are tolerably +obvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his essay. I +shall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them. + +"But it is necessary to look more particularly into this matter, and +analyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have +experience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have a +beginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had no +beginning, this permanent element may with some justice be termed a first +or universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself to cause +anything, it enters as a con-cause into all causation." + +He then shows that the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy supplies us +with such a datum, and thus the conclusion easily follows--"It would seem, +then, that the only sense in which experience supports, in any shape, the +doctrine of a First Cause, viz., as the primæval and universal element of +all causes, the First Cause can be no other than Force." + +Still, however, it may be maintained that "all force is will-force." But +"if there be any truth in the doctrine of Conservation of Force, ... this +doctrine does not change from true to false when it reaches the field of +voluntary agency. The will does not, any more than other agencies, create +Force: granting that it originates motion, it has no means of doing so but +by converting into that particular manifestation, a portion of Force which +already existed in other forms. It is known that the source from which this +portion of Force is derived, is chiefly, or entirely, the force evolved in +the processes of chemical composition and decomposition which constitute +the body of nutrition: the force so liberated becomes a fund upon which +every muscular and every nervous action, as of a train of thought, is a +draft. It is in this sense only that, according to the best lights of +science, volition is an originating cause. Volition, therefore, does not +answer to the idea of a First Cause; since Force must, in every instance, +be assumed as prior to it; and there is not the slightest colour, derived +from experience, for supposing Force itself to have been created by a +volition. As far as anything can be concluded from human experience, Force +has all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated.... + +"All that can be affirmed (even) by the strongest assertion of the Freedom +of the Will, is that volitions are themselves uncaused and are, therefore, +alone fit to be the first or universal cause. But, even assuming volitions +to be uncaused, the properties of matter, so far as experience discloses, +are uncaused also, and have the advantage over any particular volition, in +being, so far as experience can show, eternal. Theism, therefore, in so far +as it rests on the necessity of a First Cause, has no support from +experience." + +Such may be taken as a sufficient refutation of the argument that, as human +volition is apparently a cause in nature, and moreover constitutes the +basis of our conception of all causation, therefore all causation is +probably volitional in character. But as this is a favourite argument with +some theists, I shall introduce another quotation from Mr. Mill, which is +taken from a different work. + +"Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervous +action, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves. +Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient and +not merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the +particular phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that cause; +are we therefore to say with these writers that since we know of no other +efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there _is_ +no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A more +outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among the +infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a +particular mode of action of certain nerves which has for its cause and, as +we are now supposing, for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and +because this is the only efficient cause of "which we are conscious, being +the only one of which, in the nature of the case, we _can_ be conscious, +since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify +us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of +efficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly +human or animal phenomenon?" It is then shown that a logical parallel to +this mode of inference is that of generalising from the one known instance +of the earth being inhabited, to the conclusion that "every heavenly body +without exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star, or nebula, is +inhabited, and must be so from the inherent constitution of things." After +which the passage continues, "It is true there are cases in which, with +acknowledged propriety, we generalise from a single instance to a multitude +of instances. But they must be instances which resemble the one known +instance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with it except +that of being instances.... But the supporters of the volition theory ask +us to infer that volition causes everything, for no other reason except +that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from +being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws +bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether +of inorganic or of organic nature."[3] + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. + +§ 8. Leaving now the obviously untenable arguments, we next come to those +which, in my opinion, may properly be termed scientific. + +It will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under one +or other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of Theism +will be found to range themselves. + +§ 9. We have first the argument drawn from the existence of the human mind. +This is an argument which, for at least the last three centuries, and +especially during the present one, has been more relied upon than any other +by philosophical thinkers. It consists in the reflection that the being of +our own subjective intelligence is the most certain fact which our +experience supplies, that this fact demands an adequate cause for its +explanation, and that the only adequate cause of our intelligence must be +some other intelligence. Granting the existence of a conditioned +intelligence (and no one could reasonably suppose his own intelligence to +be otherwise), and the existence of an unconditioned intelligence becomes a +logical necessity, unless we deny either the validity of the principle that +every effect must have an adequate cause, or else that the only adequate +cause of Mind is Mind. + +It has been a great satisfaction to me to find that my examination of this +argument--an examination which was undertaken and completed several months +before Mr. Mill's essay appeared--has been minutely corroborated by that of +our great logician. I mention this circumstance here, as on previous +occasions, not for the petty motive of vindicating my own originality, but +because in matters of this kind the accuracy of the reasoning employed, and +therefore the logical validity of the conclusions attained, are guaranteed +in the best possible manner, if the trains of thought have been +independently pursued by different minds. + +§ 10. Seeing that, among the advocates of this argument, Locke went so far +as to maintain that by it alone he could render the existence of a Deity as +certain as any mathematical demonstration, it is only fair, preparatory to +our examining this argument, to present it in the words of this great +thinker. + +He says:--"There was a time when there was no knowing (_i.e._, conscious) +being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a +knowing being from all eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no +being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all +understanding, I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have +been any knowledge: it being as impossible that things wholly void of +knowledge, and operating blindly, and without perception, should produce a +knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three +angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of +senseless matter, that it should put into itself, sense, perception, and +knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put +into itself greater angles than two right ones."[4] + +Now, although this argument has been more fully elaborated by other +writers, the above presentation contains its whole essence. It will be seen +that it has the great advantage of resting _immediately_ upon the +foundation from which all argument concerning this or any other matter, +must necessarily arise, viz.,--upon the very existence of our argumentative +faculty itself. For the sake of a critical examination, it is desirable to +throw the argument before us into the syllogistic form. It will then stand +thus:-- + +All known minds are caused by an unknown mind. Our mind is a known mind; +therefore, our mind is caused by an unknown mind. + +§ 11. Now the major premiss of this syllogism is inadmissible for two +reasons: in the first place, it is assumed that known mind can only be +caused by unknown mind; and, in the second place, even if this assumption +were granted, it would not explain the existence of Mind as Mind. To take +the last of these objections first, in the words of Mr. Mill, "If the mere +existence of Mind is supposed to require, as a necessary antecedent, +another Mind greater and more powerful, the difficulty is not removed by +going one step back: the creating mind stands as much in need of another +mind to be the source of its existence as the created mind. Be it +remembered that we have no direct knowledge (at least apart from +Revelation) of a mind which is even apparently eternal, as Force and Matter +are: an eternal mind is, as far as the present argument is concerned, a +simple hypothesis to account for the minds which we know to exist. Now it +is essential to an hypothesis that, if admitted, it should at least remove +the difficulty and account for the facts. But it does not account for mind +to refer our mind to a prior mind for its origin. The problem remains +unsolved, nay, rather increased." + +Nevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, "My object is +not to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more than it is +my object to explain Existence itself in the abstract--to either of which +absurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally applicable;--but I +seek for an explanation of _my own individual finite mind_, which I know to +have had a beginning in time, and which, therefore, in accordance with the +widest and most complete analogy that experience supplies, I believe to +have been _caused_. And if there is no other objection to my believing in +Intelligence as the cause of my intelligence, than that I cannot prove my +own intelligence caused, then I am satisfied to let the matter rest here; +for as every argument must have _some_ basis of assumption to stand upon, I +am well pleased to find that the basis in this case is the most solid which +experience can supply, viz.,--the law of causation. Fully admitting that it +does not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior +mind for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, _does_ account for the +fact that _my mind_ exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intended +to cover. For to endeavour to _explain_ the existence of an _eternal_ mind, +could only be done by those who do not understand the meaning of these +words." + +Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would so +far be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis _does_ supply a provisional +explanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, an +explanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain. +But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation of +his own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in the +abstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypothetically +explaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing a +probability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind. Only if +he has some independent reason to infer that such an Unknown Mind exists, +could such a probability be made out, and his hypothetical explanation of +known mind become of more value than a guess. In other words, although the +theistic hypothesis supplies _a possible_ explanation of known mind, we +have no reason to conclude that it is _the true_ explanation, unless other +reasons can be shown to justify, on independent grounds, the validity of +the theistic hypothesis. Hence it is manifestly absurd to adduce this +explanation as evidence of the hypothesis on which it rests--to argue that +Theism must therefore be true; because we assume it to be so, in order to +explain _known_ mind, as distinguished from _Mind_. If it be answered, We +are justified in assuming Theism true, because we are justified in assuming +that known mind can _only_ have been caused by an unknown mind, and hence +that Mind must somewhere be self-existing, then this is to lead us to the +second objection to the above syllogism. + +§ 12. And this second objection is of a most serious nature. "Mind can only +be caused by Mind," and, therefore, Mind must either be uncaused, or caused +by a Mind. What is our warrant for ranking this assertion? Where is the +proof that nothing can have caused a mind except another mind? Answer to +this question there is none. For aught that we can ever know to the +contrary, anything within the whole range of the Possible may be competent +to produce a self-conscious intelligence--and to assume that Mind is so far +an entity _sui generis_, that it must either be self-existing, or derived +from another mind which is self-existing, is merely to beg the whole +question as to the being of a God. In other words, if we can prove that the +order of existence to which Mind belongs, is so essentially different from +that order, or those orders, to which all else belongs, as to render it +_abstractedly impossible_ that the latter can produce the former--if we can +prove this, we have likewise proved the existence of a Deity. But this is +just the point in dispute, and to set out with a bare affirmation of it is +merely to beg the question and to abandon the discussion. Doubtless, by the +mere act of consulting their own consciousness, the fact now in dispute +appears to some persons self-evident. But in matters of such high +abstraction as this, even the evidence of self-evidence must not be relied +upon too implicitly. To the country boor it appears self-evident that wood +is annihilated by combustion; and even to the mind of the greatest +philosophers of antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt that the sun moved +over a stationary earth. Much more, therefore, may our broad distinction +between "cogitative and incogitative being"[5] not be a distinction which +is "legitimated by the conditions of external reality." + +Doubtless many will fall back upon the position already indicated, "It is +as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into +itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of +a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right +ones." But, granting this, and also that conscious matter is the sole +alternative, and what follows? Not surely that matter cannot perceive, and +feel, and know, merely because it is repugnant to our idea of it that it +should. Granting that there is no other alternative in the whole +possibility of things, than that matter must be conscious, or that +self-conscious Mind must somewhere be self-existing; and granting that it +is quite "impossible for us to conceive" of consciousness as an attribute +of matter; still surely it would be a prodigious leap to conclude that for +this reason matter cannot possess this attribute. Indeed, Locke himself +elsewhere strangely enough insists that thought may be a property of +matter, if only the Deity chose to unite that attribute with that +substance. Why it should be deemed abstractedly impossible for matter to +think if there is no God, and yet abstractedly possible that it should +think if there is a God, I confess myself quite unable to determine; but I +conceive that it is very important clearly to point out this peculiarity in +Locke's views, for he is a favourite authority with theists, and this +peculiarity amounts to nothing less than a suicide of his entire argument. +The mere circumstance that he assumed the Deity capable of endowing matter +with the faculty of thinking, could not have enabled him to _conceive_ of +matter as thinking, any more than he could _conceive_ of this in the +absence of his assumption. Yet in the one case he recognises the +possibility of matter thinking, and in the other case denies such +possibility, _and this on the sole ground of its being inconceivable_! +However, I am not here concerned with Locke's eccentricities:[6] I am +merely engaged with the general principle, that a subjective inability to +establish certain relations in thought is no sufficient warrant for +concluding that corresponding objective relations may not obtain. + +§ 13. Hence, an objector to the above syllogism need not be a materialist; +it is not even necessary that he should hold any theory of things at all. +Nevertheless, for the sake of definition, I shall assume that he is a +materialist. As a materialist, then, he would appear to be as much entitled +to his hypothesis as a theist is to his--in respect, I mean, of this +particular argument. For although I think, as before shown, that in strict +reasoning a theist might have taken exception to the last-quoted passage +from Mill in its connection with the law of causation, that passage, if +considered in the present connection, is certainly unanswerable. What is +the state of the present argument as between a materialist and a theist? +The mystery of existence and the inconceivability of matter thinking are +their common data. Upon these data the materialist, justly arguing that he +has no right to make his own conceptive faculty the unconditional test of +objective possibility, is content to merge the mystery of his own mind's +existence into that of Existence in general; while the theist, compelled to +accept without explanation the mystery of Existence in general, +nevertheless has recourse to inventing a wholly gratuitous hypothesis to +explain one mode of existence in particular. If it is said that the latter +hypothesis has the merit of causing the mystery of material existence and +the mystery of mental existence to be united in a thinkable manner--viz., +in a self-existing Mind,--I reply, It is not so; for in whatever degree it +is unthinkable that Matter should be the cause of Mind, in that precise +degree must it be unthinkable that Mind was ever the cause of Matter, the +correlatives being in each case the same, and experience affording no +evidence of causality in either. + +§ 14. The two hypotheses, therefore, are of exactly equivalent value, save +that while the one has a certain basis of fact to rest upon,[7] the other +is wholly arbitrary. But it may still be retorted, 'Is not that which is +_most_ conceivable _most likely_ to be true? and if it is more conceivable +that my intelligence is caused by another Intelligence than that it is +caused by Non-intelligence, may I not regard the more conceivable +hypothesis as also the more probable one? It is somewhat difficult to say +how far this argument is, in this case, valid; only I think it is quite +evident that its validity is open to grave dispute. For nothing can be more +evident to a philosophical thinker than that the substance of Mind must--so +far at least as we can at present see--_necessarily_ be unknowable; so that +if Matter (and Force) be this substance, we should antecedently expect to +find that the actual causal connection should, in this particular case, be +more inconceivable than some imaginary one: it would be more natural for +the mind to infer that something conceivably more akin to itself should be +its cause, than that this cause should be the entity which really gives +rise to the unthinkable connection. But even waiving this reflection, and +granting that the above argument is _valid_, it is still to an indefinite +degree _valueless_, seeing that we are unable to tell _how much it is more +likely_ that the more conceivable should here be true than that the less +conceivable should be so. + +§ 15. Returning then to Locke's comparison between the certainty of this +argument and that which proves the sum of the angles of a triangle to be +equal to two right-angles, I should say that there is a _virtual_, though +not a _formal_, fallacy in his presentation. For mathematical science being +confessedly but of relative significance, any comparison between the degree +of certainty attained by reasoning upon so transcendental a subject as the +present, and that of mathematical demonstrations regarding relative truth, +must be misleading. In the present instance, the whole strain of the +argument comes upon the adequacy of the proposed test of truth, viz., our +being able to conceive it if true. Now, will any one undertake to say that +this test of truth is of equivalent value when it is applied to a triangle +and when it is applied to the Deity. In the one case we are dealing with a +geometrical figure of an exceedingly simple type, with which our experience +is well acquainted, and presenting a very limited number of relations for +us to contemplate. In the other case we are endeavouring to deal with the +_summum genus_ of all mystery, with reference to which experience is quite +impossible, and which in its mention contains all the relations that are to +us unknown and unknowable. Here, then, is the oversight. Because men find +conceivability a valid test of truth in the affairs of everyday life--as it +is easy to show _à priori_ that it must be, if our experience has been +formed under a given code of constant and general laws--therefore they +conclude that it must be equally valid _wherever_ it is applied; forgetting +that its validity must perforce decrease in proportion to the distance at +which the test is applied from the sphere of experience.[8] + +§ 16. Upon the whole, then, I think it is transparently obvious that the +mere fact of our being unable to conceive, say, how any disposition of +matter and motion could possibly give rise to a self-conscious +intelligence, in no wise warrants us in concluding that for this reason no +such disposition is possible. The only question would appear to be, whether +the test which is here proposed as an unconditional criterion of truth +should be allowed any the smallest degree of credit. Seeing, on the one +hand, how very fallible the test in question is known to have proved itself +in many cases of much less speculative difficulty--seeing, too, that even +now "the philosophy of the condition proves that things there are which +may, nay must, be true, of which nevertheless the mind is unable to +construe to itself the possibility;"[9] and seeing, on the other hand, that +the substance of Mind, whatever it is, must necessarily be +unknowable;--seeing these things, if any question remains as to whether the +test of inconceivability should in this case be regarded as having any +degree of validity at all, there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt that +such degree should be regarded as of the smallest. + +§ 17. Let us then turn to the other considerations which have been supposed +to justify the assertion that nothing can have caused our mind save another +Mind. Neglecting the crushing fact that "it does not account for Mind to +refer it to another Mind for its origin," let as see what positive reasons +there are for concluding that no other influence than Intelligence can +possibly have produced our intelligence. + +§ 18. First we may notice the argument which is well and tersely presented +by Locke, thus:--"Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily +contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can +ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it +hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily +follows that the first eternal being cannot be Matter." Now, as this +presentation is strictly formal, I shall first meet it with a formal reply, +and this reply consists in a direct contradiction. It is simply untrue that +"whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and +actually have, at least, all the perfections that can after exist;" or that +it can never "give to another any perfection that it hath not actually in +itself." In a sense, no doubt, a cause contains all that is contained in +its effects; the latter content being _potentially_ present in the former. +But to say that a cause already contains _actually_ all that its effects +may afterwards so contain, is a statement which logic and common sense +alike condemn as absurd. + +Nevertheless, although the argument now before us thus admits of a +childishly easy refutation on strictly formal grounds, I suspect that in +substance the argument in a general way is often relied upon as one of very +considerable weight. Even though it is clearly illogical to say that causes +cannot give to their effects any perfection which they themselves do not +actually present, yet it seems in a general way incredible that gross +matter could contain, even potentially, the faculty of thinking. +Nevertheless, this is but to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability; +to do which, even were it here legitimate, would, as we have seen, be +unavailing. But to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability in this +case would _not_ be legitimate; for we are in possession of an abundant +analogy to render the supposition in question, not only conceivable, but +credible. In the words of Mr. Mill, "Apart from experience, and arguing on +what is called reason, that is, on supposed self-evidence, the notion seems +to be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious or +elevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the known +analogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are +the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which, and by +the properties of which, they are raised up! The tendency of all recent +speculation is towards the opinion that the development of inferior orders +of existence into superior, the substitution of greater elaboration, and +higher organisation for lower, is the general rule of nature. Whether this +is so or not, there are at least in nature a multitude of facts bearing +that character, and this is sufficient for the argument." + +§ 19. We now come to the last of the arguments which, so far as I know, +have ever been adduced in support of the assertion that there can be no +other cause of our intelligence than another and superior Intelligence. The +argument is chiefly remarkable for the very great prominence which was +given to it by Sir W. Hamilton. + +This learned and able author says:--"The Deity is not an object of +immediate contemplation; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our +reach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only +warranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary to +account for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties are +supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressive +inference from the existence of a special class of effects to the existence +of a special character of cause, it is evident that the whole argument +hinges on the fact,--Does a state of things really exist such as is only +possible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For if it can be shown that +such a state of things does not really exist, then our inference to the +kind of cause requisite to account for it is necessarily null. + +"This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class of +phænomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity is +exclusively given in the phænomena of mind,--that the phænomena of matter +taken by themselves, (you will observe the qualification taken by +themselves) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, +would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation. + +"If, in man, intelligence be a free power,--in so far as its liberty +extends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter; and a +power independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an +immaterial subject,--that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence +of intelligence on matter in the human constitution, in other words, if the +spirituality of mind in man be supposed a datum of observation, in this +datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we have +only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the +same relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the first +positive condition of a Deity is established in the establishment of the +absolute priority of a free creative intelligence."[10] + +§ 20. Thus, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the whole question as to the +being of a God depends upon that as to whether our "intelligence be a free +power,"--or, as he elsewhere states it himself, "Theology is wholly +dependent upon Psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature of man +stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity." It will be observed +that I am not at present engaged with the legitimacy of this author's +decision upon the comparative merits of the different arguments in favour +of Theism: I am merely showing the high opinion he entertained of the +particular argument before us. He positively affirms that, unless the +freedom of the human will be a matter of experience, Atheism is the sole +alternative. Doubtless most well-informed readers will feel that the +solitary basis thus provided for Theism is a very insecure one, while many +such readers will at once conclude that if this is the only basis which +reason can provide for Theism to stand upon, Theism is without any rational +basis to stand upon at all. I have no hesitation in saying that the +last-mentioned opinion is the one to which I myself subscribe, for I am +quite unable to understand how any one at the present day, and with the +most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself to +embrace the theory of Free-will. I may add that I cannot but believe that +those who do embrace this theory with an honest conviction, must have +failed to understand the issue to which modern thought has reduced the +question. Here, however, is not the place to discuss this question. It will +be sufficient for my purpose to show that even Sir W. Hamilton himself +considered it a very difficult one; and although he thought upon the whole +that the will must be free, he nevertheless allowed--nay, insisted--that he +was unable to conceive how it could be so. Such inability in itself does +not of course show the Free-will theory to be untrue; and I merely point +out the circumstance that Hamilton allowed the supposed fact unthinkable, +in order to show how very precarious, even in his eyes, the argument which +we are considering must have appeared. Let us then, for this purpose, +contemplate his attitude with regard to it a little more closely. He says, +"It would have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity +are both incomprehensible, as beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but +that though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so +neither can it be speculatively disproved; while we may claim for it as a +fact of real actuality, though of inconceivable possibility, the testimony +of consciousness, that we are morally free, as we are morally accountable +for our actions. In this manner the whole question of free- and bond-will +is in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all +the moral instincts of Man entire."[11] + +From this passage it is clear that Sir W. Hamilton regarded these two +counter-theories as of precisely equivalent value in everything save "the +testimony of consciousness;" or, as he elsewhere states it, "as equally +unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus +theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral +law ... gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the +doctrine of fate." + +But the whole question concerning the freedom of the will has now come to +be as to whether or not consciousness _does_ give its verdict on the side +of freedom. Supposing we grant that "we are warranted to rely on a +deliverance of consciousness, when that deliverance is _that_ a thing is, +although we may be unable to think _how_ it can be,"[12] in this case the +question still remains, whether our opponents have rightly interpreted the +deliverance of their consciousness. I, for one, am quite persuaded that I +never perform any action without some appropriate motive, or set of +motives, having induced me to perform it. However, I am not discussing this +question, and I have merely made the above quotations for the purpose of +showing that Sir W. Hamilton appears to identify the _theory_ of Free-will +with the _fact_ that we possess a moral sense. He argues throughout as +though the theory he advocates were the only one that can explain a given +"fact of real actuality." But no one with whom we have to deal questions +the fact of our having a moral sense; and to identify this "deliverance of +consciousness" with belief in the theory that volitions are uncaused, is, +or would now be, merely to abandon the only questions in dispute. + +It is very instructive, from this point of view, to observe the dilemma +into which Hamilton found himself driven by this identification of genuine +fact with spurious theory. He believed that the fact of man possessing an +ethical faculty could only be explained by the theory that man's will was +not determined by motives; for otherwise man could not be the author of his +own actions. But when he considered the matter in its other aspect, he +found that his theory of Free-will was as little compatible with moral +responsibility as was the opposing theory of "Bond-will;" for not only did +he candidly confess that he could not conceive of will as acting without +motives, but he further allowed the unquestionable truth "that, though +inconceivable, a motiveless volition would, if conceived, be conceived as +morally worthless."[13] I say this is very instructive, because it shows +that in Hamilton's view each theory was alike irreconcilable with "the +deliverance of consciousness," and that he only chose the one in preference +to the other, because, although not any more conceivable a solution, it +seemed to him a more possible one.[14] + +§ 21. Such, then, is the speculative basis on which, according to Sir W. +Hamilton, our belief in a Deity can alone be grounded. + +Those who at the present day are still confused enough in their notions +regarding the Free-will question to suppose that any further rational +question remains, may here be left to ruminate over this _bolus_, and to +draw from it such nourishment as they can in support of their belief in a +God; but to those who can see as plainly as daylight that the doctrine of +Determinism not only harmonises with all the facts of observation, but +alone affords a possible condition for, and a satisfactory explanation of, +the existence of our ethical faculty,--to such persons the question will +naturally arise:--"Although Hamilton was wrong in identifying a known fact +with a false theory, yet may he not have been right in the deductions which +he drew from the fact?" In other words, granting that his theory of +Free-will was wrong, does not his argument from the existence of a moral +sense in man to the existence of a moral Governor of the Universe remain as +intact as ever? Now, it is quite true that whatever degree of cogency the +argument from the presence of the moral sense may at any time have had, +this degree remains unaffected by the explosion of erroneous theories to +account for such presence. We have, therefore, still to face the fact that +the moral sense of man undoubtedly exists. + +§ 22. The question we have to determine is, What evidence have we to show +that the moral part of man was created in the image of God; and if there is +any such evidence, what counter-existence is there to show that the moral +existence of man may be due to natural causes? In deciding this question, +just as in deciding any other question of a purely scientific character, we +must be guided in our examination by the Law of Parcimony; we must not +assume the agency of supernatural causes if we can discover the agency of +natural causes; neither must we merge the supposed mystery directly into +the highest mystery, until we are quite sure that it does not admit of +being proximately explained by the action of proximate influences. + +Now, whether or not Mr. Darwin's theory as to the origin and development of +the moral sense be considered satisfactory, there can, I think, be very +little doubt in any impartial mind which duly considers the subject, that +in _some way or other_ the moral sense has been evolved. The body of +scientific evidence which has now been collected in favour of the general +theory of evolution is simply overwhelming; and in the presence of so large +an analogy, it would require a vast amount of contradictory evidence to +remove the presumption that human conscience, like everything else, has +been evolved. Now, for my own part, I am quite unable to distinguish any +such evidence, while, on the other hand, in support of the _à priori_ +presumption that conscience has been evolved, I cannot conceal from myself +that there is a large amount of _à posteriori_ confirmation. I am quite +unable to distinguish anything in my sense of right and wrong which I +cannot easily conceive to have been brought about during the evolution of +my intelligence from lower forms of psychical life. On the contrary, +everything that I can find in my sense of right and wrong is precisely what +I should expect to find on the supposition of this sense having been +moulded by the progressive requirements of social development. Read in the +light of evolution, Conscience, in its every detail, is deductively +explained. + +And, as though there were not sufficient evidence of this kind to justify +the conclusion drawn from the theory of evolution, the doctrine of +utilitarianism--separately conceived and separately worked out on +altogether independent grounds--the doctrine of utilitarianism comes in +with irresistible force to confirm that _à priori_ conclusion by the widest +and most unexceptionable of inductions.[15] + +In the supernatural interpretation of the facts, the whole stress of the +argument comes upon the character of conscience as a _spontaneously +admonishing influence which acts independently of our own volition_. For it +is from this character alone that the inference can arise that conscience +is the delegate of the will of another. Thus, to render the whole argument +in the singularly beautiful words of Dr. Newman:--"If, as is the case, we +feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voice +of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, +before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing +wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us +on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming serenity +of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight, which follows on one +receiving praise from a father,--we certainly have within us the image of +some person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find +our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in +whose anger we waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for +their exciting cause an intelligent being; we are not affectionate towards +a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse +or compunction in breaking mere human law. Yet so it is; conscience emits +all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and, +on the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a +resignation, and a hope which there is no sensible, no earthly object to +elicit. 'The wicked flees when no one pursueth;' then why does he flee? +whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the +hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not +belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is +directed must be supernatural and divine; and thus the phenomena of +conscience as a dictate avail to impress the imagination with the picture +of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, +retributive."[16] + +Now I have quoted this passage because it seems to me to convey in a +concise form the whole of the argument from Conscience. But how tremendous +are the inferences which are drawn from the facts! As the first step in our +criticism, it is necessary to point out that two very different orders of +feelings are here treated by Dr. Newman. There is first the pure or +uncompounded ethical feelings, which spring directly from the moral sense +alone, and which all men experience in varying degrees. And next there are +what we may term the _ethico-theological_ feelings, which can only spring +from a blending of the moral sense with a belief in a personal God, or +other supernatural agents. The former class of feelings, or the +uncompounded ethical class, have exclusive reference to the moral +obligations that subsist between ourselves and other human beings, or +sentient organisms. The latter class of feelings, or the ethico-theological +class, have reference to the moral obligations that are believed to subsist +between ourselves and the Deity, or other supernatural beings. Now, in +order not to lose sight of this all-important distinction, I shall +criticise Dr. Newman's rendering of the ordinary argument from Conscience +in each of these two points of views separately. To begin, then, with the +uncompounded ethical feelings. + +Such emotions as attend the operation of conscience in those who follow its +light alone without any theories as to its supernatural origin, are all of +the character of _reasonable_ or _explicable_ emotions. Granting that +fellow-feeling has been for the benefit of the race, and therefore that it +has been developed by natural causes, certainly there is nothing +_mysterious_ in the emotions that attend the violating or the following of +the dictates of conscience. For conscience is, by this naturalistic +supposition, nothing more than an organised body of certain psychological +elements, which, by long inheritance, have come to inform us, by way of +intuitive feeling, how we should act for the interests of society; so that, +if this hypothesis is correct, there cannot be anything more mysterious or +supernatural in the working of conscience than there is in the working of +any of our other faculties. That the disagreeable feeling of +_self-reproach_, as distinguished from _religious_ feeling, should follow +upon a violation of such an organized body of psychological elements, +cannot be thought surprising, if it is remembered that one of these +elements is natural fellow-feeling, and the others the elements which lead +us to know directly that we have violated the interests of other persons. +And as regards the mere fact that the working of conscience is independent +of the will, surely this is not more than we find, in varying degrees, to +be true of all our emotions; and conscience, according to the evolution +theory, has its root in the emotions. Hence, it is no more an argument to +say that the irrepressible character of conscience refers us to a God of +morality, than it would be to say that the sometimes resistless force of +the ludicrous refers us to a god of laughter. Love, again, is an emotion +which cannot be subdued by volition, and in its tendency to persist bears +just such a striking resemblance to the feelings of morality as we should +expect to find on the supposition of the former having played an important +part in the genesis of the latter. The _dictating_ character of conscience, +therefore, is clearly in itself of no avail as pointing to a superhuman +Dictator. Thus, for example, to take Dr. Newman's own illustration, why +should we feel such tearful, broken-hearted sorrow on intentionally or +carelessly hurting a mother? We see no shadow of a reason for resorting to +any supernatural hypothesis to explain the fact--love between mother and +offspring being an essential condition to the existence of higher animals. +Yet this is a simple case of truly conscientious feeling, where the thought +of any _personal_ cause of conscience _need_ not be entertained, and is +certainly not necessary to explain the effects. And similarly with _all_ +cases of conscientious feeling, _except in cases where it refers directly +to its supposed author_. But these latter cases, or the ethico-theological +class of feelings, are in no way surprising. If the moral sense has had a +natural genesis in the actual relations between man and man, as soon as an +ideal "image" of "a holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive" God is +firmly believed to have an objective existence, as a matter of course moral +feelings must become transferred to the relations which are believed to +obtain between ourselves and this most holy God. Indeed, it is these very +feelings which, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, must be +concluded, in accordance with the law of parcimony, to have _generated_ +this idea of God as "holy, just," and good. And the mere fact that, when +the complex system of religious belief has once been built up, conscience +is strongly wrought upon by that belief and its accompanying emotions, is +surely a fact the very reverse of mysterious. Suppose, for the sake of +argument, that the moral sense has been evolved from the social feelings, +and should we not certainly expect that, when the belief in a moral and +all-seeing God is superadded, conscience should be distracted at the +thought of offending him, and experience a "soothing, satisfactory delight" +in the belief that we are pleasing him? And as to the argument, "Why does +the wicked flee when none pursueth? whence his terror?" the question admits +of only too easy an answer. Indeed, the form into which the question is +thrown would almost seem--were it not written by Dr. Newman--to imply a +sarcastic reference to the power of superstition. "Who is it that," not +only Dr. Newman, but the haunted savage, the mediæval sorcerer, or the +frightened child, "sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of +his heart?" Who but the "image" of his own thought? "If the cause of these +emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his +perception is directed must be supernatural and divine." Assuredly; but +what an inference from what an assumption! Whether or not the moral sense +has been developed by natural causes, "these emotions" of terror at the +thought of offending beings "supernatural and divine" are not of such +unique occurrence "in the visible world" as to give Dr. Newman the monopoly +of his particular "Object." With a deeper meaning, therefore, than he +intends may we repeat, "The phenomena of conscience as a dictate _avail_ to +impress the _imagination_ with the _picture_ of a Supreme Governor." But +criticism here is positively painful. Let it be enough to say that those of +us who do not already believe in any such particular "Object"--be it ghost, +shape, demon, or deity--are strangers, utter and complete, to any such +supernatural pursuers. The fact, therefore, of these various religious +emotions being associated with conscience in the minds of theists, can in +itself be no proof of Theism, seeing that it is the theory of Theism which +itself _engenders_ these emotions; those who do not believe in this theory +experiencing none of these feelings of personal dread, responsibility to an +unknown God, and the feelings of doing injury to, or of receiving praise +from, a parent. To such of us the violation of conscience is its own +punishment, as the pursuit of virtue is its own reward. For we know that +not more certainly than fire will burn, any violation of the deeply-rooted +feelings of our humanity will leave a gaping wound which even time may not +always heal. And when it is shown us that our natural dread of fire is due +to a supernatural cause, we may be prepared to entertain the argument that +our natural dread of sin, as distinguished from our dread of God, is +likewise due to such a cause. But until this can be done we must, as +reasonable men, _whose minds have been trained in the school of nature_, +forbear to allow that the one fact is of any greater cogency than the +other, so far as the question of a supernatural cause of either is +concerned. For, as we have already seen, the law of parcimony forbids us to +ascribe "the phenomena of conscience as a dictate" to a supernatural cause, +until the science of psychology shall have proved that they cannot have +been due to natural causes. But, as we have also seen, the science of +psychology is now beginning, as quick and thoroughly as can be expected, to +prove the very converse; so that the probability is now overwhelming that +our moral sense, like all our other faculties, has been evolved. Therefore, +while the burden of proof really lies on the side of Theism--or with those +who account for the natural phenomena of conscience by the hypothesis of a +supernatural origin--this burden is now being rapidly discharged by the +opposite side. That is to say, while the proofs which are now beginning to +substantiate the naturalistic hypothesis are all in full accord with the +ordinary lines of scientific explanations, the vague and feeble reflections +of those who still maintain that Conscience is evidence of Deity, are all +such as run counter to the very truisms of scientific method. + +In the face of all the facts, therefore, I find it impossible to recognise +as valid any inference which is drawn from the existence of our moral sense +to the existence of a God; although, of course, all inferences drawn from +the existence of our moral sense to the _character_ of a God already +believed to exist remain unaffected by the foregoing considerations.[17] + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. + +§ 23. The argument from Design, as presented by Mill, is merely a +resuscitation of it as presented by Paley. True it is that the logical +penetration of the former enabled him to perceive that the latter had "put +the case much too strongly;" although, even here, he has failed to see +wherein Paley's error consisted. He says:--"If I found a watch on an +apparently desolate island, I should indeed infer that it had been left +there by a human being; but the inference would not be from the marks of +design, but because I already know by direct experience that watches are +made by men." Now I submit that this misses the whole point of Paley's +meaning; for it is evident that there would be no argument at all unless +this author be understood to say what he clearly enough expresses, viz., +that the evidence of design supposed to be afforded by the watch is +supposed to be afforded by examination of its mechanism only, and not by +any previous knowledge as to how that particular mechanism called a watch +is made. Paley, I take it, only chose a watch for his example because he +knew that no reader would dispute the fact that watches are constructed by +design: except for the purpose of pointing out that mechanism is in some +cases admitted to be due to intelligence, for all the other purposes of his +argument he might as well have chosen for his illustration any case of +mechanism occurring in nature. What the real fallacy in Paley's argument +is, is another question, and this I shall now endeavour to answer; for, as +Mill's argument is clearly the same in kind as that of Paley and his +numberless followers, in examining the one I am also examining the other. + +§ 24. In nature, then, we see innumerable examples of apparent design: are +these of equal value in testifying to the presence of a designing +intelligence as are similar examples of human contrivance, and if not, why +not? The answer to the first of these questions is patent. If such examples +were of the same value in the one case as they are in the other, the +existence of a Deity would be, as Paley appears to have thought it was, +demonstrated by the fact. A brief and yet satisfactory answer to the second +question is not so easy, and we may best approach it by assuming the +existence of a Deity. If, then, there is a God, it by no means follows that +every apparent contrivance in nature is an actual contrivance, in the same +sense as is any human contrivance. The eye of a vertebrated animal, for +instance, exhibits as much apparent design as does a watch; but no one--at +the present day, at least--will undertake to affirm that the evidence of +divine thought furnished by one example is as conclusive as is the evidence +of human thought furnished by the other--and this even assuming a Deity to +exist. Why is this? The reason, I think, is, that we know by our personal +experience what are our own relations to the material world, and to the +laws which preside over the action of physical forces; while we can have no +corresponding knowledge of the relations subsisting between the Deity and +these same objects of our own experience. Hence, to suppose that the Deity +constructed the eye by any such process of thought as we know that men +construct watches, is to make an assumption not only incapable of proof, +but destitute of any assignable degree of likelihood. Take an example. The +relation in which a bee stands to the external world is to a large extent a +matter of observation, and, therefore, no one imagines that the formation +of its scientifically-constructed cells is due to any profound study on the +bee's part. Whatever the origin of the cell-making instinct may have been, +its nature is certainly not the same as it would have been in man, +supposing him to have had occasion to construct honeycombs. It may be said +that the requisite calculations have been made for the bees by the Deity; +but, even if this assumption were true, it would be nothing to the point, +which is merely that even within the limits of the animal kingdom the +relations of intelligence to the external world are so diverse, that the +same results may be accomplished by totally different intellectual +processes. And as this example is parallel to the case on which we are +engaged in everything save the _observability_ of the relations involved, +it supplies us with the exact measure of the probability we are trying to +estimate. Hence it is evident that so long as we remain ignorant of the +element essential to the argument from design in its Paleyerian form--viz., +knowledge or presumption of the relations subsisting between an +hypothetical Deity and his creation--so long must that argument remain, not +only unassignably weak, but incapable of being strengthened by any number +of examples similar in kind. + +§ 25. To put the case in another way. The root fallacy in Paley's argument +consisted in reasoning from a particular to an universal. Because he knew +that design was the cause of adaptation in some cases, and because the +phenomena of life exhibited more instances of adaptation than any other +class of phenomena in nature, he pointed to these phenomena as affording an +exceptional kind of proof of the presence in nature of intelligent agency. +Yet, if it is admitted--and of this, even in Paley's days, there was a +strong analogical presumption--that the phenomena of life are throughout +their history as much subject to law as are any other phenomena +whatsoever,--that the method of the divine government, supposing such to +exist, is the same here as elsewhere; then nothing can be clearer than that +any amount of observable adaptation of means to ends within this class of +phenomena cannot afford any different kind of evidence of _design_ than is +afforded by any other class of phenomena whatsoever. Either we know the +relations of the Deity to his creation, or we do not. If we do, then we +must know whether or not _every_ physical change which occurs in accordance +with law--_i.e._, every change occurring within experience, and so, until +contrary evidence is produced, presumably every change occurring beyond +experience--was separately planned by the Deity. If we do not, then we have +no more reason to suppose that any one set of physical changes rather than +another has been separately planned by him, unless we could point (as Paley +virtually pointed) to one particular set of changes and assert, These are +not subject to the same method of divine government which we observe +elsewhere, or, in other words, to law. If it is retorted that _in some way +or other_ all these wonderful adaptations must ultimately have been due to +intelligence, this is merely to shift the argument to a ground which we +shall presently have to consider: all we are now engaged upon is to show +that we have no right to found arguments on the assumed _mode_, _manner_, +or _process_ by which the supposed intelligence is thought to have +operated. We can here see, then, more clearly where Paley stumbled. He +virtually assumed that the relations subsisting between the Deity and the +universe were such, that the exceptional adaptations met with in the +organised part of the latter cannot have been due to the same intellectual +_processes_ as was the rest of the universe--or that, if they were, still +they yielded better evidence of having been due to these processes than +does the rest of the universe. And it is easy to perceive that his error +arose from his pre-formed belief in special creation. So long as a man +regards every living organism which he sees as the lineal descendant of a +precisely similar organism originally struck out by the immediate fiat of +Deity, so long is he justified in holding his axiom, "Contrivance must have +had a contriver." For "adaptation" then becomes to our minds the synonym of +"contrivance"--it being utterly inconceivable that the numberless +adaptations found in any living organism could have resulted in any other +way than by intelligent contrivance, at the time when this organism was in +the first instance _suddenly_ introduced into its complex conditions of +life. Still, as an argument, this is of course merely reasoning in a +circle: we adopt a hypothesis which presupposes the existence of a Deity as +the first step in the proof of his existence. I do not say that Paley +committed this error expressly, but merely that if it had not been for his +pre-formed conviction as to the truth of the special-creation theory, he +would probably not have written his "Natural Theology." + +§ 26. Thus let us take a case of his own choosing, and the one which is +adduced by him as typical of "the application of the argument." "I know of +no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of comparing a +single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As +far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same +proof that the eye was made for vision as there is that the telescope was +made for assisting it. They are both made upon the same principles, both +being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays +of light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves; +but these laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted to +them. For instance: these laws require, in order to produce the same +effect, that the rays of light, in passing through water into the eye, +should be refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of air +into the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of +it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial +animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this +difference?" But what, let us ask, is the proximate cause of this +difference? 'The immediate volition of the Deity, manifested in special +creation,' virtually answers Paley; while we of to-day are able to reply, +'The agency of natural laws, to wit, inheritance, variation, survival of +the fittest, and probably of other laws as yet not discovered.' Now, of +course, according to the former of these two premises, there can be no more +legitimate conclusion than that the difference in question is due to +intelligent and special design; but, according to the other premise, it is +equally clear that no conclusion can be more unwarranted; for, under the +latter view, the greater rotundity of the crystalline lens in a fish's eye +no more exhibits the presence of any special design than does the +adaptation of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means of +excavating. When, therefore, Paley goes on to ask:--"How is it possible, +under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of +equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the case of the eye, yet to +acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest +and clearest of all propositions, in the case of the telescope?" the answer +is sufficiently obvious, namely, that the "evidence" in the two cases is +_not_ "equal;"--any more than is the existence, say, of the Nile of equal +value in point of evidence that it was designed for traffic, as is the +existence of the Suez Canal that it was so designed. And the mere fact that +the problem of achromatism was solved by "the mind of a sagacious optician +inquiring how this matter was managed in the eye," no more proves that +"this could not be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the +optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose," than would +the fact, say, of the winnowing of corn having suggested the +fanning-machine prove that air currents were designed for the purpose of +eliminating chaff from grain. In short, the real substance of the argument +from Design must eventually merge into that which Paley, in the +above-quoted passage, expressly passes over--viz., "the origin of the laws +themselves;" for so long as there is any reason to suppose that any +apparent "adaptation" to a certain set of "fixed laws" is itself due to the +influence of other "fixed laws," so long have we as little right to say +that the latter set of fixed laws exhibit any better indications of +intelligent adaptation to the former set, than the former do to that of the +latter--the eye to light, than light to the eye. Hence I conceive that Mill +is entirely wrong when he says of Paley's argument, "It surpasses analogy +exactly as induction surpasses it," because "the instances chosen are +particular instances of a circumstance which experience shows to have a +real connection with an intelligent origin--the fact of conspiring to an +end." Experience shows as this, but it shows us more besides; it shows us +that there is no _necessary_ or _uniform_ connection between an +"intelligent origin" and the fact of apparent "means conspiring to an +[apparent] end." If the reader will take the trouble to compare this +quotation just made from Mill, and the long train of reasoning that +follows, with an admirable illustration in Mr. Wallace's "Natural +Selection," he will be well rewarded by finding all the steps in Mr. Mill's +reasoning so closely paralleled by the caricature, that but for the +respective dates of publication, one might have thought the latter had an +express reference to the former.[18] True, Mr. Mill closes his argument +with a brief allusion to the "principle of the survival of the fittest," +observing that "creative forethought is not absolutely the only link by +which the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connected +with the fact of sight." I am surprised, however, that a man of Mr. Mill's +penetration did not see that whatever view we may take as to "the adequacy +of this principle (_i.e._, Natural Selection) to account for such truly +admirable combinations as some of those in nature," the argument from +_Design_ is not materially affected. So far as this argument is concerned, +the issue is not Design _versus_ Natural Selection, but it is Design +_versus_ Natural Law. By all means, "leaving this remarkable speculation +(_i.e._, Mr. Darwin's) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have +in store for it," and it by no means follows that "in the present state of +knowledge the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability +in favour of creation by intelligence." For whatever we may think of this +special theory as to the _mode_, there can be no longer any reasonable +doubt, "in the present state of our knowledge," as to the truth of the +general theory of _Evolution_; and the latter, if accepted, is as +destructive to the argument from _Design_ as would the former be if proved. +In a word, it is the _fact_ and not the _method_ of Evolution which is +subversive of Teleology in its Paleyerian form. + +§ 27. We have come then to this:--Apparent intellectual adaptations are +perfectly valid indications of design, so long as their authorship is known +to be confined to human intelligence; for then we know from experience what +are our relations to these laws, and so in any given case can argue _à +posteriori_ that such an adaptation to such a set of laws by such an +intelligence can only have been due to such a process. But when we overstep +the limits of experience, we are not entitled to argue anything _à priori_ +of any other intelligence in this respect, even supposing any such +intelligence to exist. The analogy by which the unknown relations are +inferred from the known is "infinitely precarious;" seeing that two of the +analogous terms--to wit, the divine intelligence and the human--may differ +to an immeasurable extent in their properties--nay, are supposed thus to +differ, the one being supposed omniscient, omnipotent, &c., and the other +not. And, as a final step, we may now see that the argument from Design, in +its last resort, resolves itself into a _petitio principii_. For, +ultimately, the only point which the analogical argument in question is +adduced to prove is, that the relations subsisting between an Unknown Cause +and certain physical forces are so far identical with the relations known +to subsist between human intelligence and these same forces, that similar +intellectual processes are required in the two cases to account for the +production of similar effects--and hence that the Unknown Cause is +intelligent. But it is evident that the analogy itself can have no +existence, except upon the presupposition that these two sets of relations +_are_ thus identical. The point which the analogy is adduced to prove is +therefore postulated by the fact of its being adduced at all, and the whole +argument resolves itself into a case of _petitio principii_. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS. + +§ 28. Turning now to an important error of Mr. Mill's in respect of +omission, I firmly believe that all competent writers who have ever +undertaken to support the argument from Design, have been moved to do so by +their instinctive appreciation of the much more important argument, which +Mill does not mention at all and which we now proceed to consider--the +argument from General Laws. That is to say, I cannot think that any one +competent writer ever seriously believed, had he taken time to analyse his +beliefs, that the cogency of his argument lay in assuming any knowledge +concerning the _process_ of divine thought; he must have really believed +that it lay entirely in his observation of the _product_ of divine +thought--or rather, let us say, of divine intelligence. Now this is the +whole difference between the argument from Design and the argument from +General Laws. The argument from Design says, There must be a God, because +such and such an organic structure must have been due to such and such an +intellectual _process_. The argument from General Laws says, There must be +a God, because such and such an organic structure must _in some way or +other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence. Nor does this argument end +here. Not only must such and such an organic structure have been ultimately +due to intelligence, but every such structure--nay, every phenomenon in the +universe--must have been the same; for all phenomena are alike subject to +the same method of sequence. The argument is thus a cumulative one; for as +there is no single known exception to this universal mode of existence, the +united effect of so vast a body of evidence is all but irresistible, and +its tendency is clearly to point us to some _one_ explanatory cause. The +scope of this argument is therefore co-extensive with the universe; it +draws alike upon all phenomena with which experience is acquainted. For +instance, it contains all the phenomena covered by the Design argument, +just as a genus contains any one of its species; it being manifest, from +what was said in the last section, that if the general doctrine of +Evolution is accepted, the argument from Design must of necessity merge +into that from General Laws. And this wide basis, we may be sure, must be +the most legitimate one whereon to rest an argument in favour of Theism. If +there is any such thing as such an argument at all, the most unassailable +field for its display must be the universe as a whole, seeing that if we +separate any one section of the universe from the rest, and suppose that we +here discover a different kind of testimony to intelligence from that which +we can discover elsewhere, we may from analogy be abundantly sure that on +the confines of our division there must be second causes and general laws +at work (whether discoverable or not), which are the immediate agents in +the production of the observed results. Of course I do not deny that some +classes of phenomena afford us more and better proofs of intellectual +agency than do others, in the sense of the laws in operation being more +numerous, subtle, and complex; but it will be seen that this is a different +interpretation of the evidence from that against which I am contending. +Thus, if there are tokens of divine intention (as distinguished from +design) to be met with in the eye,--if it is inconceivable that so "nice +and intricate a structure" should exist without intelligence as its +_ultimate_ cause; then the discovery of natural selection, or of any other +law, as the _manner_ in which this intelligence wrought in no wise +attenuates the proof as to the fact of an intelligent cause. On the +contrary, it tends rather to confirm it; for, besides the evidence before +existing, there is added that which arises from the conformity of the +method to that which is observable in the rest of the universe. + +Thus, notwithstanding what Hamilton, Chalmers, and others have said, I +cannot but feel that the ubiquitous action of general laws is, of all facts +supplied by experience, the most cogent in its bearing upon teleology. If +perpetual and uninterrupted uniformity of method does not indicate the +existence of a presiding intelligence, it becomes a question whether any +other kind of method--short of the intelligently miraculous--could possibly +do so; seeing that the further the divine _modus operandi_ (supposing such +to exist) were removed from absolute uniformity, the greater would be the +room for our interpreting it as mere fortuity. But forasmuch as the +progress of science has shown that within experience the method of the +Supreme Causality is absolutely uniform, the hypothesis of fortuity is +rendered irrational; and let us think of this Supreme Causality as we may, +the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive influence of +uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous magnitude and exact +precision, worthy of our highest possible conceptions of Deity. + +§ 29. Had it been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I doubt not +that I should have regarded the foregoing considerations as final: I should +have concluded that there was an overwhelming balance of rational +probability in favour of Theism; and I think I should also have insisted +that this balance of rational probability would require to continue as it +was till the end of time. I should have maintained, in some such words as +the following, in which the Rev. Baden Powell conveys this argument:--"The +very essence of the whole argument is the invariable preservation of the +principle of _order_: not necessarily such as we can directly recognise, +but the universal conviction of the unfailing subordination of everything +to _some_ grand principles of _law_, however imperfectly apprehended in our +partial conceptions, and the successive subordination of such laws to +others of still higher generality, to an extent transcending our +conceptions, and constituting the true chain of universal causation which +culminates in the sublime conception of the COSMOS. + +"It is in immediate connection with this enlarged view of universal +immutable natural order that I have regarded the narrow notions of those +who obscure the sublime prospect by imagining so unworthy an idea as that +of occasional interruptions in the physical economy of the world. + +"The only instance considered was that of the alleged sudden supernatural +origination of new species of organised beings in remote geological epochs. +It is in relation to the broad principle of law, if once rightly +apprehended, that such inferences are seen to be wholly unwarranted by +science, and such fancies utterly derogatory and inadmissible in +philosophy; while, even in those instances properly understood, the real +scientific conclusions of the invariable and indissoluble chain of +causation stand vindicated in the sublime contemplations with which they +are thus associated. + +"To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, the one essential +requisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this +_one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather constituting the +very idea of nature_;--which forms the vital essence of the whole of +inductive science, and the sole assurance of those higher inferences from +the inductive study of natural causes which are the vindications of a +supreme intelligence and a moral cause. + +"_The whole of the ensuing discussion must stand or fall with the admission +of this grand principle_. Those who are not prepared to embrace it in its +full extent may probably not accept the conclusions; but they must be sent +back to the school of inductive science, where alone it must be +independently imbibed and thoroughly assimilated with the mind of the +student in the first instance. + +"On the slightest consideration of the nature, the foundations, and general +results of inductive science,... we recognise the powers of intellect fitly +employed in the study of nature,... pre-eminently leading us to perceive +_in nature_, and in the invariable and universal constancy of its laws, the +indications of universal, unchangeable, and recondite arrangement, +dependence, and connection in reason.... + +"We thus see the importance of taking a more enlarged view of the great +argument of natural theology; and the necessity for so doing becomes the +more apparent when we reflect on the injury to which these sublime +inferences are exposed from the narrow and unworthy form in which the +reasoning has been too often conducted.... + +"The satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those more +enlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation of +cosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences from the +_past_, but to proofs of the _ever-present_ mind and reason in nature. + +"If we read a book which it requires much thought and exercise of reason to +understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as +we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present +comprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason _exist +in that book_ irrespectively of our minds, and equally so of any question +as to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly exists, and is ever +open to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case under a slightly +different form:--When the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or the +naturalist notes down a series of observed facts or measured dates, he is +not an _author_ expressing his own ideas,--he is a mere _amanuensis_ taking +down the dictations of nature: his observation book is the record of the +thoughts of _another mind_: he has but set down literally what he himself +does not understand, or only very imperfectly. On further examination, and +after deep and anxious study, he perhaps begins to decipher the meaning, by +perceiving some law which gives a signification to the facts; and the +further he pursues the investigation up to any more comprehensive theory, +the more fully he perceives that there is a higher reason, of which his own +is but the humbler interpreter, and into whose depths he may penetrate +continually further, to discover yet more profound and invariable order and +system, always indicating still deeper and more hidden abysses yet +unfathomed, but throughout which he is assured the same recondite and +immutable arrangement ever prevails. + +"That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself +thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must +be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is but partial, then +the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the +student. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the +necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast +extent and compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and its +reality, as _existing in the immutably connected order of objects +examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator. + +"But considerations of this kind, just and transcendently important as they +are in themselves, give us no aid in any inquiry into the _origin_ of the +order of things thus investigated, or the _nature_ or other attributes of +the mind evinced in them. + +"The real argument for universal _intelligence_, manifested in the +universality of order and law in the material world, is very different from +any attempt to give a form to our conceptions, even by the language of +analogy, as to the _nature_ or _mode of existence_ or operation of that +intelligence [_i.e._, as I have stated the case, the argument can only rest +on a study of the _products_, as distinguished from the _processes_ of such +intelligence]: and still more different from any extension of our inference +from what _is_ to what _may have been_, from _present_ order to a supposed +_origination_, first adjustment, or planning of that order. + +"By keeping these distinctions steadily in view, we appreciate properly +both the limits and the extent and compass of what we may appropriately +call COSMOTHEOLOGY."[19] + +I have quoted these passages at length, because they convey in a more +forcible, guarded, and accurate manner than any others with which I am +acquainted, the strictly rational standing of this great subject prior to +the date at which the above-quoted passage was written. Therefore, as I +have said, if it had been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I +should certainly have rested in these "sublime conceptions" as in an +argument supreme and irrefutable. I should have felt that the progress of +physical knowledge could never exert any other influence on Theism than +that of ever tending more and more to confirm that magnificent belief, by +continuously expanding our human thoughts into progressively advancing +conceptions, ever grander and yet more grand, of that tremendous Origin of +Things--the Mind of God. Such would have been my hope--such would have been +my prayer. But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has so +terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now +behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, +uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed, and +burying our highest life in mindless desolation. Science, whom erstwhile we +thought a very Angel of God, pointing to that great barrier of Law, and +proclaiming to the restless sea of changing doubt, "Hitherto shalt thou +come, but no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed,"--even +Science has now herself thrown down this trusted barrier; the flood-gates +of infidelity are open, and Atheism overwhelming is upon us. + +§ 30. All and every law follows as a necessary consequence from the +persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter.[20] That this +must be so is evident if we consider that, were it not so, force could not +be permanent nor matter constant. For instance, if action and reaction were +not invariably equal and opposite, force would not be invariably +persistent, seeing that in no case can the formula fail, unless some one or +other of the forces concerned, or parts of them, disappear. And as with a +simple law of this kind, so with every other natural law and +inter-operation of laws, howsoever complex such inter-operation may be; for +it is manifest that if in any case similar antecedents did not determine +similar consequents, on one or other of these occasions some quantum of +force, or of matter, or of both, must have disappeared--or, which is the +same thing, the law of causation cannot have been constant. Every natural +law, therefore, may be defined as the formula of a sequence, which must +either ensue upon certain forces of a given intensity impinging upon +certain given quantities, kinds, and forms of matter, or else, by not +ensuing, prove that the force or the matter concerned were not of a +permanent nature. + +§ 31. The argument, then, which was elaborated in § 29, and which has so +long and so generally received the popular sanction in the common-sense +epitome, that in the last record there must be mind in external nature, +since "that which it requires thought and reason to understand must itself +be thought and reason,"--this argument, I say, must now for ever be +abandoned by reasonable men. No doubt it would be easy to point to several +speculative thinkers who have previously combated this argument,[21] and +from this fact some readers will perhaps be inclined to judge, from a false +analogy, that as the argument in question has withstood previous assaults, +it need not necessarily succumb to the present one. Be it observed, +however, that the present assault differs from all previous assaults, just +as demonstration differs from speculation. What has hitherto been but mere +guess and unwarrantable assertion has now become a matter of the greatest +certainty. That the argument from General Laws is a futile argument, is no +longer a matter of unverifiable opinion: it is as sure as is the most +fundamental axiom of science. That the argument will long remain in +illogical minds, I doubt not; but that it is from henceforth quite +inadmissible in accurate thinking, there can be no question. For the sake, +however, of impressing this fact still more strongly upon such readers as +have been accustomed to rely upon this argument, and so find it difficult +thus abruptly to reverse the whole current of their thoughts,--for the sake +of such, I shall here add a few remarks with the view of facilitating the +conception of an universal Order existing independently of Mind. + +§ 32. Interpreting the mazy nexus of phenomena only by the facts which +science has revealed, and what conclusion are we driven to accept? Clearly, +looking to what has been said in the last two sections, that from the time +when the process of evolution first began,--from the time before the +condensation of the nebula had showed any signs of commencing,--every +subsequent change or event of evolution was _necessarily bound_ to ensue; +else force and matter have not been persistent. How then, it will be asked, +did the vast nexus of natural laws which is now observable ever begin or +continue to be? In this way. When the first womb of things was pregnant +with all the future, there would probably have been existent at any rate +not more than one of the formulæ which we now call natural laws. This one +law, of course, would have been the law of gravitation. Here we may take +our stand. It does not signify whether there ever was a time when +gravitation was not,--_i.e._, if ever there was a time when matter, _as we +now know it_, was not in existence;--for if there ever was such a time, +there is no reason to doubt, but every reason to conclude, that the +evolution of matter, as we now know it, was accomplished in accordance with +law. Similarly, we are not concerned with the question as to how the law of +gravitation came to be associated with matter; for it is overwhelmingly +probable, from the extent of the analogy, that if our knowledge concerning +molecular physics were sufficiently great, the existence of the law in +question would be found to follow as a necessary deduction from the primary +qualities of matter and force, just as we can now see that, when present, +its peculiar quantitative action necessarily follows from the primary +qualities of space. + +Starting, then, with these data,--matter, force, and the law of +gravitation,--what must happen? We have the strongest scientific reason to +believe that the matter of the solar system primordially existed in a +highly diffused or nebulous form. By mutual gravitation, therefore, all the +substance of the nebula must have begun to concentrate upon itself, or to +condense. Now, from this point onwards, I wish it to be clearly understood +that the mere consideration of the supposed facts not admitting of +scientific proof, or of scientific explanation if true, in no wise affects +the certainty of the doctrine which these facts are here adduced to +establish. Fully granting that the alleged facts are not beyond dispute, +and that, even if true, innumerable other unknown and unknowable facts must +have been associated with them--fully admitting, in short, that our ideas +concerning the genesis of the solar system are of the crudest and least +trustworthy character; still, if it be admitted, what at the present day +only ignorance or prejudice can deny, viz., that, as a whole, evolution has +been the method of the universe; then it follows that the doctrine here +contended for is as certainly true as it would be were we fully acquainted +with every cause and every change which has acted and ensued throughout the +whole process of the genesis of things. + +Now, bearing this caveat in mind, we have next to observe that when once +the nebula began to condense, new relations among its constituent parts +would, _for this reason_, begin to be established. "Given a rare and widely +diffused mass of nebulous matter,... what are the successive changes that +will take place? Mutual gravitation will approximate its atoms, but their +approximation will be opposed by atomic repulsion, the overcoming of which +implies the evolution of heat." That is to say, the condensation of the +nebula as a whole of necessity implies at least the origination of these +new material and dynamical relations among its constituent parts. "As fast +as this heat partially escapes by radiation, further approximation will +take place, attended by further evolution of heat, and so on continuously: +the processes not occurring separately, as here described, but +simultaneously, uninterruptedly, and with increasing activity." Hence the +newly established relations continuously acquire new increments of +intensity. But now observe a more important point. The previous essential +conditions remaining unaltered--viz., the persistence of matter and force, +as well as, or rather let us say and consequently, the law of +gravitation--these conditions, I say, remaining constant, and the newly +established relations would necessarily _of themselves_ give origin to +_new_ laws. For whenever two given quantities of force and matter met in +one of the novel relations, they would of necessity give rise to novel +effects; and whenever, on any future occasion, similar quantities of force +and matter again so met, precisely similar effects would of necessity +require to occur: but the occurrence of similar effects under similar +conditions is all that we mean by a natural law. + +Continuing, then, our quotation from Mr. Herbert Spencer's terse and lucid +exposition of the nebular theory, we find this doctrine virtually embodied +in the next sentences:--"Eventually this slow movement of the atoms towards +their common centre of gravity will bring about phenomena of another order. + +"Arguing from the known laws of atomic combination, it will happen that, +when the nebulous mass has reached a particular stage of condensation--when +its internally situated atoms have approached to within certain distances, +have generated a certain amount of heat, and are subject to a certain +mutual pressure (the heat and pressure increasing as the aggregation +progresses), some of them will suddenly enter into chemical union. Whether +the binary atoms so produced be of kinds such as we know, which is +possible, or whether they be of kinds simpler than any we know, which is +more probable, matters not to the argument. It suffices that molecular +combinations of some species will finally take place." We have, then, here +a new and important change of relations. Matter, primordially uniform, has +itself become heterogeneous; and in as many places as it has thus changed +its state, it must, in virtue of the fact, give rise to other hitherto +novel relations, and so, in many cases, to new laws.[22] + +It would be tedious and unnecessary to trace this genesis of natural law +any further: indeed, it would be quite impossible so to trace it for any +considerable distance without feeling that the ever-multiplying mazes of +relations renders all speculation as to the actual processes quite useless. +This fact, however, as before insisted, in no wise affects the only +doctrine which I here enunciate--viz., that the self-generation of natural +law is a necessary corollary from the persistence of matter and force. And +that this must be so is now, I hope, sufficiently evident. Just as in the +first dawn of things, when the proto-binary compounds of matter gave rise +to new relations together with their appropriate laws, so throughout the +whole process of evolution, as often as matter acquired a hitherto novel +state, or in one of its old states entered into hitherto novel relations, +so often would non-existent or even impossible laws become at once possible +and necessary. And in this way I cannot see that there is any reason to +stop until we arrive at all the marvellous complexity of things as they +are. For aught that speculative reason can ever from henceforth show to the +contrary, the evolution of all the diverse phenomena of inorganic nature, +of life, and of mind, appears to be as necessary and as self-determined as +is the being of that mysterious Something which is Everything,--the Entity +we must all believe in, which without condition and beyond relation holds +its existence in itself. + +§ 33. Does it still seem incredible that, notwithstanding it requires +mental processes to interpret external nature, external nature may +nevertheless be destitute of mind? Then let us look at the subject on its +obverse aspect. + +According to the theory of evolution--which, be it always remembered, is no +mere gratuitous supposition, but a genuine scientific theory--human +intelligence, like everything else, has been evolved. Now in what does the +evolution of intelligence consist? Any one acquainted with the writings of +our great philosopher can have no hesitation in answering: Clearly and only +in the establishment of more and more numerous and complex internal or +psychological relations. In other words, the law of intelligence being +"that the strengths of the inner cohesions between psychical states must be +proportionate to the persistences of the outer relations symbolised," it +follows that the development of intelligence is "secured by the one simple +principle that experience of the outer relations _produces_ inner +cohesions, and makes the inner cohesions strong in proportion as the outer +relations are persistent." Now the question before us at present is merely +this:--Must we not infer that these outer relations are regulated by mind, +seeing that order is undoubtedly apparent among them, and that it requires +mental processes on our part to interpret this order? The only legitimate +answer to this question is, that these outer relations _may_ be regulated +by mind, but that, in view of the evolution theory, we are certainly not +entitled to infer that they _are_ so regulated, _merely_ because it +requires mental processes on our part to interpret their orderly character. +For if it is true that the human mind was itself evolved by these outer +relations--ever continuously moulded into conformity with them as the prime +condition of its existence--then its process of interpreting them is but +reflecting (as it were) in consciousness these outer relations by which the +inner ones were originally produced. Granting that, as a matter of fact, an +objective macrocosm exists, and if we can prove or render probable that +this objective macrocosm is _of itself_ sufficient to evolve a subjective +microcosm, I do not see any the faintest reason for the latter to conclude +that a self-conscious intelligence is inherent in the former, merely +because it is able to trace in the macrocosm some of those orderly +objective relations by which its own corresponding subjective relations +were originally produced. If it is said that it is impossible to conceive +how, apart from mind, the orderly objective relations themselves can ever +have originated, I reply that this is merely to shift the ground of +discussion to that which occupied us in the last section: all we are now +engaged upon is,--Granting that the existence of such orderly relations is +actual, whether with or without mind to account for them; and granting also +that these relations are _of themselves_ sufficient to produce +corresponding subjective relations; then the mere fact of our conscious +intelligence being able to discover numerous and complex outer relations +answering to those which they themselves have caused in our intelligence, +does not warrant the latter in concluding that the causal connection +between intelligence and non-intelligence has ever been reversed--that +these outer relations in turn are caused by a similar conscious +intelligence. How such a thing as a conscious intelligence is possible is +another and wholly unanswerable question (though not more so than that as +to the existence of force and matter, and would not be rendered less so by +merging the fact in a hypothetical Deity); but granting, as we must, that +such an entity does exist, and supposing it to have been evolved by natural +causes, then it would appear incontestably to follow, that whether or not +objective existence is presided over by objective mind, our subjective mind +would _alike_ and _equally_ require to read in the facts of the external +world an indication, whether true or false, of some such presiding agency. +The subjective mind being, by the supposition, but the obverse aspect of +the sum total of such among objective relations as have had a share in its +production, when, as in observation and reflection, this obverse aspect is +again inverted upon its die, it naturally fits more or less exactly into +all the prints. + +§ 34. This last illustration, however, serves to introduce us to another +point. The supposed evidence from which the existence of mind in nature is +inferred does not always depend upon such minute correspondences between +subjective method and objective method as the illustration suggests. Every +natural theologian has experienced more or less difficulty in explaining +the fact, that while there is a tolerably general similarity between the +contrivances due to human thought and the apparent contrivances in nature +which he regards as due to divine thought, the similarity is nevertheless +_only_ general. For instance, if a man has occasion to devise any +artificial appliance, he does so with the least possible cost of labour to +himself, and with the least possible expenditure of material. Yet it is +obvious that in nature as a whole no such economic considerations obtain. +Doubtless by superficial minds this assertion will be met at first with an +indignant denial: they have been accustomed to accumulate instances of this +very principle of economy in nature; perhaps written about it in books, and +illustrated it in lectures,--totally ignoring the fact that the instances +of economy in nature bear no proportion at all to the instances of +prodigality. Conceive of the force which is being quite uselessly expended +by all the wind-currents which are at this moment blowing over the face of +Europe. Imagine the energy that must have been dissipated during the +secular cooling of this single planet. Feebly try to think of what the sun +is radiating into space. If it is retorted that we are incompetent to judge +of the purposes of the Almighty, I reply that this is but to abandon the +argument from economy whenever it is found untenable: we presume to be +competent judges of almighty purposes so long as they appear to imitate our +own; but so soon as there is any divergence observable, we change front. By +thus selecting all the instances of economy in nature, and disregarding all +the vastly greater instances of reckless waste, we are merely laying +ourselves open to the charge of an unfair eclecticism. And this formal +refutation of the argument from economy admits of being further justified +in a strikingly substantial manner; for if all the examples of economy in +nature that were ever observed, or admit being observed, were collected +into one view, I undertake to affirm that, without exception, they would be +found to marshal themselves in one great company--the subjects whose law is +_survival of the fittest_. One question only will I here ask. Is it +possible at the present day for any degree of prejudice, after due +consideration, to withstand the fact that the solitary exceptions to the +universal prodigality so painfully conspicuous in nature are to be found +where there is also to be found a full and adequate physical explanation of +their occurrence? + +But, again, prodigality is only one of several particulars wherein the +modes and the means of the supposed divine intelligence differ from those +of its human counterpart. Comparative anatomists can point to organic +structures which are far from being theoretically perfect: even the mind of +man in these cases, notwithstanding its confessed deficiencies in respect +both of cognitive and cogitative powers, is competent to suggest +improvements to an intelligence supposed to be omniscient and all-wise! And +what shall we say of the numerous cases in which the supposed purposes of +this intelligence could have been attained by other and less roundabout +means? In short, not needlessly to prolong discussion, it is admitted, even +by natural theologians themselves, that the difficulties of reconciling, +even approximately, the supposed processes of divine thought with the known +processes of human thought are quite insuperable. The fact is expressed by +such writers in various ways,--_e.g._, that it would be presumptuous in man +to expect complete conformity in all cases; that the counsels of God are +past finding out; that his ways are not as our ways, and so on. Observing +only, as before, that in thus ignoring adverse cases natural theologians +are guilty of an unfair eclecticism, it is evident that all such +expressions concede the fact, that even in those provinces of nature where +the evidence of superhuman intelligence appears most plain, the resemblance +of its apparent products to those of human intelligence consists in a +general approximation of method rather than in any precise similarity of +particulars: the likeness is generic rather than specific. + +Now this is exactly what we should expect to be the case, if the similarity +in question be due to the cause which the present section endeavours to set +forth. If all natural laws are self-evolved, and if human intelligence is +but a subjective photograph of certain among their interrelations, it seems +but natural that when this photograph compares itself with the whole +external world from parts of which it was taken, its subjective lights and +shadows should be found to correspond with some of the objective lights and +shadows much more perfectly than with others. Still there would doubtless +be sufficient general conformity to lead the thinking photograph to +conclude that the great world of objective reality, instead of being the +_cause_ of such conformity as exists, was itself the _effect_ of some +common cause,--that it too was of the nature of a picture. Dropping the +figure, if it is true that human intelligence has been evolved by natural +law, then in view of all that has been said it must now, I think, be +tolerably apparent, _that as by the hypothesis human intelligence has +always been required to think and to act in conformity with law, human +intelligence must at last be in danger of confusing or identifying the fact +of action in conformity with law with the existence and the action of a +self-conscious intelligence. Reading then in external nature innumerable +examples of action in conformity with law, human intelligence falls back +upon the unwarrantable identification, and out of the bare fact that law +exists in nature concludes that beyond nature there is an Intelligent +Lawgiver._ + +§ 35. From what has been said in the last five sections, it manifestly +follows that all the varied phenomena of the universe not only may, but +must, depend upon the persistence of force and the primary qualities of +matter.[23] Be it remembered that the object of the last three sections was +merely to "_facilitate conception_" of the fact that it does not at all +follow, because the phenomena of external nature admit of being +intelligently inquired into, therefore they are due to an intelligent +cause. The last three sections are hence in a manner parenthetical, and it +is of comparatively little importance whether or not they have been +successful in their object; for, from what went before, it is abundantly +manifest that, whether or not the subjective side of the question admits of +satisfactory elucidation, there can be no doubt that the objective side of +it is as certain as are the fundamental axioms of science. It does not +admit of one moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the +exquisite beauty and melodious harmony of nature follow as necessarily and +as inevitably from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of +matter, as it is certainly true that force is persistent, or that matter is +extended and impenetrable. No doubt this generalisation is too vast to be +adequately conceived, but there can be equally little doubt that it is +necessarily true. If matter and force have been eternal, so far as human +mind can soar it can discover no need of a superior mind to explain the +varied phenomena of existence. Man has truly become in a new sense the +measure of the universe, and in this the latest and most appalling of his +soundings, indications are returned from the infinite voids of space and +time by which he is surrounded, that his intelligence, with all its noble +capacities for love and adoration, is yet alone--destitute of kith or kin +in all this universe of being. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD. + +§ 36. But the discussion must not end here. Inexorable logic has forced us +to conclude that, viewing the question as to the existence of a God only by +the light which modern science has shed upon it, there no longer appears to +be any semblance of an argument in its favour. Let us then turn upon +science herself, and question her right to be our sole guide in this +matter. Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the +hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as certainly +superfluous is the very basis of all science is certainly true. There can +no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a God is wholly +unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the universe, than there is +doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall upon the table. Nay, the +doubt is even less than this, because while the knowledge that my pen will +fall if I allow it to do so is founded chiefly upon empirical knowledge (I +could not predict with _à priori_ certainty that it would so fall, for the +pen might be in an electrical state, or subject to some set of unknown +natural laws antagonistic to gravity), the knowledge that a Deity is +superfluous as an explanation of anything, being grounded on the doctrine +of the persistence of force, is grounded on an _à priori_ necessity of +reason--_i.e._, if this fact were not so, our science, our thought, our +very existence itself, would be scientifically impossible. + +But now, having thus stated the case as strongly as I am able, it remains +to question how far the authority of science extends. Even our knowledge of +the persistence of force and of the primary qualities of matter is but of +relative significance. Deeper than the foundations of our experience, +"deeper than demonstration--deeper even than definite cognition,--deep as +the very nature of mind,"[24] are these the most ultimate of known truths; +but where from this is our warrant for concluding with certainty that these +known truths are everywhere and eternally true? It will be said that there +is a strong analogical probability. Perhaps so, but of this next: I am not +now speaking of probability; I am speaking of certainty; and unless we deny +the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, we cannot but conclude that +there is no absolute certainty in this case. As I deem this consideration +one of great importance, I shall proceed to develop it at some length. It +will be observed, then, that the consideration really amounts to +this:--Although it must on all hands be admitted that the fact of the +theistic hypothesis not being required to explain any of the phenomena of +nature is a fact which has been demonstrated _scientifically_, nevertheless +it must likewise on all hands be admitted that this fact has not, and +cannot be, demonstrated _logically_. Or thus, although it is unquestionably +true that so far as science can penetrate she cannot discern any +speculative necessity for a God, it may nevertheless be true that if +science could penetrate further she might discern some such necessity. Now +the present discussion would clearly be incomplete if it neglected to +define as carefully this the logical standing of our subject, as it has +hitherto endeavoured to define its scientific standing. As a final step in +our analysis, therefore, we must altogether quit the region of experience, +and, ignoring even the very foundations of science and so all the most +certain of relative truths, pass into the transcendental region of purely +formal considerations. In this region theist and atheist must alike consent +to forego all their individual predilections, and, after regarding the +subject as it were in the abstract and by the light of pure logic alone, +finally come to an agreement as to the transcendental probability of the +question before them. Disregarding the actual probability which they +severally feel to exist in relation to their own individual intelligences, +they must apply themselves to ascertain the probability which exists in +relation to those fundamental laws of thought which preside over the +intelligence of our race. In fine, it will now, I hope, be understood that, +as we have hitherto been endeavouring to determine, by deductions drawn +from the very foundations of all possible science, the _relative_ +probability as to the existence of a God, so we shall next apply ourselves +to the task of ascertaining the _absolute_ probability of such +existence--or, more correctly, what is the strictly _formal_ probability of +such existence when its possibility is contemplated in an absolute sense. + +§ 37. To begin then. In the last resort, the value of every probability is +fixed by "ratiocination." In endeavouring, therefore, to fix the degree of +strictly formal probability that is present in any given case, our method +of procedure should be, first to ascertain the ultimate ratios on which the +probability depends, and then to estimate the comparative value of these +ratios. Now I think there can be no doubt that the value of any probability +in this its last analysis is determined by the number, the importance, and +the definiteness of the relations known, as compared with those of the +relations unknown; and, consequently, that in all cases where the sum of +the unknown relations is larger, or more important, or more indefinite than +is the sum of the known relations, it is an essential principle that the +value of the probability decreases in exact proportion to the decrease in +the similarity between the two sets of relations, whether this decrease +consists in the number, in the importance, or in the definiteness of the +relations involved. This rule or canon is self-evident as soon as pointed +out, and has been formulated by Professor Bain in his "Logic" when treating +of Analogy, but not with sufficient precision; for, while recognising the +elements of number and importance, he has overlooked that of definiteness. +This element, however, is a very essential one--indeed the most essential +of the three; for there are many analogical inferences in which either the +character or the extent of the unknown relations is quite indefinite; and +it is obvious that, whenever this is the case, the value of the analogy is +proportionably diminished, and diminished in a much more material +particular than it is when the diminution of value arises from a mere +excess of the unknown relations over the known ones in respect of their +number or of their importance. For it is evident that, in the latter case, +however little value the analogy may possess, the exact degree of such +value admits of being _determined_; while it is no less evident that, in +the former case, we are precluded from estimating the value of the analogy +at all, and this just in proportion to the indefiniteness of the unknown +relations. + +§ 38. Now the particular instance with which we are concerned is somewhat +peculiar. Notwithstanding we have the entire sphere of human experience +from which to argue, we are still unable to gauge the strictly logical +probability of any argument whatsoever; for the unknown relations in this +case are so wholly indefinite, both as to their character and extent, that +any attempt to institute a definite comparison between them and the known +relations is felt at once to be absurd. The question discussed, being the +most ultimate of all possible questions, must eventually contain in itself +all that is to man unknown and unknowable; the whole orbit of human +knowledge is here insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to institute +the required measurements. + +§ 39. I think it is desirable to insist upon this truth at somewhat greater +length, and, for the sake of impressing it still more deeply, I shall +present it in another form. No one can for a single moment deny that, +beyond and around the sphere of the Knowable, there exists the unfathomable +abyss of the Unknowable. I do not here use this latter word as embodying +any theory: I merely wish it to state the undoubted fact, which all must +admit, viz., that beneath all our possible explanations there lies a great +Inexplicable. Now let us see what is the effect of making this necessary +admission. In the first place, it clearly follows that, while our +conceptions as to what the Unknowable contains may or may not represent the +truth, it is certain that we can never discover whether or not they do. +Further, it is impossible for us to determine even a definite _probability_ +as to the existence (much less the nature) of anything which we may suppose +the Unknowable to contain. We may, of course, perceive that such and such a +supposition is more _conceivable_ than such and such; but, as already +indicated, the fact does not show that the one is in itself more definitely +_probable_ than the other, unless it has been previously shown, either that +the capacity of our conceptions is a _fully adequate measure_ of the +Possible, or that the proportion between such capacity and the extent of +the Possible is a proportion that can be _determined_. In either of these +cases, the Conceivable would be a fair measure of the Possible: in the +former case, an exact equivalent (_e.g._, in any instance of contradictory +propositions, the most conceivable would _certainly_ be true); in the +latter case, a measure any degree less than an exact equivalent--the degree +depending upon the _then_ ascertainable disparity between the extent of the +Possible and the extent of the Conceivable. Now the Unknowable (including +of course the Inconceivable Existent) is a species of the Possible, and in +its name carries the declaration that the disparity between its extent and +the extent of the Conceivable (_i.e._, the other species of the Possible) +is a disparity that cannot be determined. We are hence driven to the +conclusion that the most apparently probable of all propositions, if +predicated of anything within the Unknowable, may not in reality be a whit +more so than is the most apparently improbable proposition which it is +possible to make; for if it is admitted (as of course it must be) that we +are necessarily precluded from comparing the extent of the Conceivable with +that of the Unknowable, then it necessarily follows that in no case +whatever are we competent to judge how far an _apparent_ probability +relating to the latter province is an _actual_ probability. In other words, +did we know the proportion subsisting between the Conceivable and the +Unknowable in respect of relative extent and character, and so of inherent +probabilities, we should then be able to estimate the actual value of any +apparent probability relating to the latter province; but, as it is, our +ability to make this estimate varies inversely as our inability to estimate +our ignorance in this particular. And as our ignorance in this particular +is total--_i.e._, since we cannot even approximately determine the +proportion that subsists between the Conceivable and the Unknowable,--the +result is that our ability to make the required estimate in any given case +is absolutely _nil_. + +§ 40. I have purposely rendered this presentation in terms of the highest +abstraction, partly to avoid the possibility of any one, whatever his +theory of things may be, finding anything at which to object, and partly in +order that my meaning may be understood to include all things which are +beyond the range of possible knowledge. Most of all, therefore, must this +presentation (if it contains anything of truth) apply to the question +regarding the existence of Deity; for the _Ens Realissimum_ must of all +things be furthest removed from the range of possible knowledge. Hence, if +this presentation contains anything of truth--and of its rigidly accurate +truth I think there can be no question--the assertion that the +Self-existing Substance is a Personal and Intelligent Being, and the +assertion that this Substance is an Impersonal and Non-Intelligent Being, +are alike assertions wholly destitute of any assignable degree of logical +probability, I say _assignable_ degree of logical probability, because that +_some_ degree of such probability may exist I do not undertake to deny. All +I assert is, that if we are here able to institute any such probability at +all, we are unable logically to assign to it any determinate degree of +value. Or, in other words, although we may establish some probability in a +sense relative to ourselves, we are unable to know how far this probability +is a probability in an absolute sense. Or again, the case is not as though +we were altogether unacquainted with the Possible. Experience undoubtedly +affords us some information regarding this, although, comparatively +speaking, we are unable to know how much. Consequently, we must suppose +that, in any given case, it is more likely that the Conceivable should be +Possible than that the Inconceivable should be so, and that the Conceivably +Probable should exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: in +neither case, however, can we know _what degree_ of such likelihood is +present. + +§ 41. From the foregoing considerations, then, it would appear that the +only attitude which in strict logic it is admissible to adopt towards the +question concerning the being of a God is that of "suspended judgment." +Formally speaking, it is alike illegitimate to affirm or to deny +Intelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And here I would desire it to +be observed, that this is the attitude which the majority of +scientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted with regard to +this matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet endeavoured to +formulate the justification of this attitude; and as I think there can be +no doubt that the above presentation contains in a logical shape the whole +of such justification, I cannot but think that some important ends will +have been secured by it. For we are here in possession, not merely of a +vague and general impression that the Ultimate is super-scientific, and so +beyond the range of legitimate prediction; but we are also in possession of +a logical formula whereby at once to vindicate the rationality of our +opinion, and to measure the precise degree of its technical value. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY. + +§ 42. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of the formal considerations +which have been adduced in the last chapter on the scientific +considerations which were dealt with in the previous chapters. In these +previous chapters the proposition was clearly established that, just as +certainly as the fundamental data of science are true, so certainly is it +true that the theory of Theism in any shape is, scientifically considered, +superfluous; for these chapters have clearly shown that, if there is a God, +his existence, considered as a cause of things, is as certainly unnecessary +as it is certainly true that force is persistent and that matter is +indestructible. But after this proposition had been carefully justified, it +remained to show that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelled +us to carry our discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. For +although we observed that the essential qualities of matter and of force +are the most ultimate data of human knowledge, and although, by showing how +far the question of Theism depended on these data, we carried the +discussion of that question to the utmost possible limits of scientific +thought, it still devolved on us to contemplate the fact that even these +the most ultimate data of science are only known to be of relative +significance. And the bearing of this fact to the question of Theism was +seen to be most important. For, without waiting to recapitulate the +substance of a chapter so recently concluded, it will be remembered that +its effect was to establish this position beyond all controversy--viz., +that when ideas which have been formed by our experience within the region +of phenomenal actuality are projected into the region of ontological +possibility, they become utterly worthless; seeing that we can never have +any means whereby to test the actual value of whatever transcendental +probabilities they may appear to establish. Therefore it is that even the +most ultimate of relative truths with which, as we have seen, the question +of Theism is so vitally associated, is almost without meaning when +contemplated in an absolute sense. What, then, is the effect of these +metaphysical considerations on the position of Theism as we have seen it to +be left by the highest generalisations of physical science? Let us +contemplate this question with the care which it deserves. + +In the first place, it is evident that the effect of these purely formal +considerations is to render all reasonings on the subject of Theism equally +illegitimate, unless it is constantly borne in mind that such reasonings +can only be of relative signification. Thus, as a matter of pure logic, +these considerations are destructive of all assignable validity of any such +reasoning whatsoever. Still, even a strictly relative probability is, in +some undefinable degree, of more value than no probability at all, as we +have seen these same formal considerations to show (see § 40); and, +moreover, even were this not so, the human mind will never rest until it +attains to the furthest probability which to its powers is accessible. +Therefore, if we do not forget the merely relative nature of the +considerations which are about to be adduced, by adducing them we may at +the same time satisfy our own minds and abstain from violating the +conditions of sound logic. + +The shape, then, to which the subject has now been reduced is simply +this:--Seeing that the theory of Evolution in its largest sense has shown +the theory of Theism to be superfluous in a scientific sense, does it not +follow that the theory of Theism is thus shown to be superfluous in any +sense? For it would seem from the discussion, so far as it has hitherto +gone, that the only rational basis on which the theory of Theism can rest +is a basis of teleology; and if, as has been clearly shown, the theory of +evolution, by deducing the genesis of natural law from the primary data of +science, irrevocably destroys this basis, does it not follow that the +theory of evolution has likewise destroyed the theory which rested on that +basis? Now I conclude, as stated at the close of Chapter IV., that the +question here put must certainly be answered in the affirmative, so far as +its scientific aspect is concerned. But when we consider the question in +its purely logical aspect, as we have done in Chapter V., the case is +otherwise. For although, so far as the utmost reach of scientific vision +enables us to see, we can discern no evidence of Deity, it does not +therefore follow that beyond the range of such vision Deity does not exist. +Science indeed has proved that if there is a Divine Mind in nature, and if +by the hypothesis such a Mind exerts any causative influence on the +phenomena of nature, such influence is exerted beyond the sphere of +experience. And this achievement of science, be it never forgotten, is an +achievement of prodigious importance, effectually destroying, as it does, +all vestiges of a scientific teleology. But be it now carefully observed, +although all vestiges of a _scientific_ teleology are thus completely and +permanently ruined, the formal considerations adduced in the last chapter +supply the conditions for constructing what may be termed a _metaphysical_ +teleology. I use these terms advisedly, because I think they will serve to +bring out with great clearness the condition to which our analysis of the +teleological argument has now been reduced. + +§ 43. In the first place, let it be understood that I employ the terms +"scientific" and "metaphysical" in the convenient sense in which they are +employed by Mr. Lewes, viz., as respectively designating a theory that is +verifiable and a theory that is not. Consequently, by the term "scientific +teleology" I mean to denote a form of teleology which admits either of +being proved or disproved, while by the term "metaphysical teleology" I +mean to denote a form of teleology which does not admit either of being +proved or of being disproved. Now, with these significations clearly +understood, it will be seen that the forms of teleology which we have +hitherto considered belong entirely to the scientific class. That the +Paleyerian form of the argument did so is manifest, first because this +argument itself treats the problem of Theism as a problem that is +susceptible of scientific demonstration, and next because we have seen that +the advance of science has proved this argument susceptible of scientific +refutation. In other words, from the supposed axiom, "There cannot be +apparent design without a designer," adaptations in nature become logically +available as purely scientific evidence of an intelligent cause; and that +Paley himself regarded them exclusively in this light is manifest, both +from his own "statement of the argument," and from the character of the +evidence by which he seeks to establish the argument when stated--witness +the typical passage before quoted (§ 26). On the other hand, we have +clearly seen that this Paleyerian system of natural theology has been +effectually demolished by the scientific theory of natural selection--the +fundamental axiom of the former having been shown by the latter to be +scientifically untrue. Hence the term "scientific teleology" is without +question applicable to the Paleyerian system. + +Nor is the case essentially different with the more refined form of the +teleological argument which we have had to consider--the argument, namely, +from General Laws. For here, likewise, we have clearly seen that the +inference from the ubiquitous operation of General Laws to the existence of +an omniscient Law-maker is quite as illegitimate as is the inference from +apparent Design to the existence of a Supreme Designer. In other words, +science, by establishing the doctrine of the persistence of force and the +indestructibility of matter, has effectually disproved the hypothesis that +the presence of Law in nature is of itself sufficient to prove the +existence of an intelligent Law-giver. + +Thus it is that scientific teleology in any form is now and for ever +obsolete. But not so with what I have termed metaphysical teleology. For as +we have seen that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge precludes us +from asserting, or even from inferring, that beyond the region of the +Knowable Mind does not exist, it remains logically possible to institute a +metaphysical hypothesis that beyond this region of the Knowable Mind does +exist. There being a necessary absence of any positive information whereby +to refute this metaphysical hypothesis, any one who chooses to adopt it is +fully justified in doing so, provided only he remembers that the purely +metaphysical quality whereby the hypothesis is ensured against disproof, +likewise, and in the same degree, precludes it from the possibility of +proof. He must remember that it is no longer open to him to point to any +particular set of general laws and to assert, these proclaim Intelligence +as their cause; for we have repeatedly seen that the known states of matter +and force themselves afford sufficient explanation of the facts to which he +points. And he must remember that the only reason why his hypothesis does +not conflict with any of the truths known to science, is because he has +been careful to rest that hypothesis upon a basis of purely formal +considerations, which lie beyond even the most fundamental truths of which +science is cognisant. + +Thus, for example, he may present his metaphysical theory of Theism in some +such terms as these:--'Fully conceding what reason shows must be conceded, +and there still remains this possible supposition--viz., that there is a +presiding Mind in nature, which exerts its causative influence beyond the +sphere of experience, thus rendering it impossible for us to obtain +scientific evidence of its action. For such a Mind, exerting such an +influence beyond experience, may direct affairs within experience by +methods conceivable or inconceivable to us--producing, possibly, +innumerable and highly varied results, which in turn may produce their +effects within experience, their introduction being then, of course, in the +ordinary way of natural law. For instance, there can be no question that by +the intelligent creation or dissipation of energy, all the phenomena of +cosmic evolution might have been directed, and, for aught that science can +show to the contrary, thus only rendered possible. Hence there is at least +one nameable way in which, even in accordance with observed facts, a +Supreme Mind could be competent to direct the phenomena of observable +nature. But we are not necessarily restricted to the limits of the nameable +in this matter, so that it is of no argumentative importance whether or not +this suggested method is the method which the supposed Mind actually +adopts, seeing that there may still be other possible methods, which, +nevertheless, we are unable to suggest.' + +Doubtless the hypothesis of Theism, as thus presented, will be deemed by +many persons but of very slender probability. I am not, however, concerned +with whatever character of probability it may be supposed to exhibit. I am +merely engaged in carefully presenting the only hypothesis which can be +presented, if the theory as to an Intelligent Author of nature is any +longer to be maintained on grounds of a rational teleology. No doubt, +scientifically considered, the hypothesis in question is purely gratuitous; +for, so far as the light of science can penetrate, there is no need of any +such hypothesis at all. Thus it may well seem, at first sight, that no +hypothesis could well have less to recommend it; and, so far as the +presentation has yet gone, it is therefore fully legitimate for an atheist +to reply:--'All that this so-called metaphysical theory amounts to is a +wholly gratuitous assumption. No doubt it is always difficult, and usually +impossible, logically or unequivocally to prove a negative. If my adversary +chose to imagine that nature is presided over by a demon with horns and +hoofs, or by a dragon with claws and tail, I should be as unable to +disprove this his supposed theory as I am now unable to disprove his actual +theory. But in all cases reasonable men ought to be guided in their beliefs +by such positive evidence as is available; and if, as in the present case, +the alternative belief is wholly gratuitous--adopted not only without any +evidence, but against all that great body of evidence which the sum-total +of science supplies--surely we ought not to hesitate for one moment in the +choice of our creed?' + +Now all this is quite sound in principle, provided only that the +metaphysical theory of Theism _is_ wholly gratuitous, in the sense of being +utterly destitute of evidential support. That it is destitute of all +_scientific_ support, we have already and repeatedly seen; but the question +remains as to whether it is similarly destitute of _metaphysical_ support. + +§ 44. To this question, then, let us next address ourselves. From the +theistic pleading which we have just heard, it is abundantly manifest that +the formal conditions of a metaphysical teleology are present: the question +now before us is as to whether or not any actual evidence exists in favour +of such a theory. In order to discuss this question, let us begin by +allowing the theist to continue his pleading. 'You have shown me,' he may +say, 'that a scientific or demonstrable system of teleology is no longer +possible, and, therefore, as I have already conceded, I must take my stand +on a metaphysical or non-demonstrable system. But I reflect that the latter +term is a loose one, seeing that it embraces all possible degrees of +evidence short of actual proof. The question, therefore, I conceive to be, +What amount of evidence is there in favour of this metaphysical system of +teleology? And this question I answer by the following considerations:--As +general laws separately have all been shown to be the necessary outcome of +the primary data of science, it certainly follows that general laws +collectively must be the same--_i.e._, that the whole system of general +laws must be, so far as the lights of our science can penetrate, the +necessary outcome of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of +matter. But you have also dearly shown me that these lights are of the +feeblest conceivable character when they are brought to illuminate the +final mystery of things. I therefore feel at liberty to assert, that if +there is any one principle to be observed in the collective operation of +general laws which cannot conceivably be explained by any cause other than +that of intelligent guidance, I am still free to fall back on such a +principle and to maintain--Although the collective operation of general +laws follows as a necessary consequence from the primary data of science, +this one principle which pervades their united action, and which cannot be +conceivably explained by any hypothesis other than that of intelligent +guidance, is a principle which still remains to be accounted for; and as it +cannot conceivably be accounted for on grounds of physical science, I may +legitimately account for it on grounds of metaphysical teleology. Now I +cannot open my eyes without perceiving such a principle everywhere +characterising the collective operation of general laws. Universally I +behold in nature, order, beauty, harmony,--that is, a perfect _correlation_ +among general laws. But this ubiquitous correlation among general laws, +considered as the cause of cosmic harmony, itself requires some explanatory +cause such as the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter +cannot conceivably be made to supply. For unless we postulate some one +integrating cause, the greater the number of general laws in nature, the +less likelihood is there of such laws being so correlated as to produce +harmony by their combined action. And forasmuch as the only cause that I am +able to imagine as competent to produce such effects is that of intelligent +guidance, I accept the metaphysical hypothesis that beyond the sphere of +the Knowable there exists an Unknown God.[25] + +'If it is retorted that the above argument involves an absurd +contradiction, in that while it sets out with an explicit avowal of the +fact that the collective operation of general laws follows as a necessary +consequence from the primary data of physical science, it nevertheless +afterwards proceeds to explain an effect of such collective operation by a +metaphysical hypothesis; I answer that it was expressly for the purpose of +eliciting this retort that I threw my argument into the above form. For the +position which I wish to establish is this, that fully accepting the +logical cogency of the reasoning whereby the action of every law is deduced +from the primary data of science, I wish to show that when this train of +reasoning is followed to its ultimate term, it leads us into the presence +of a fact for which it is inadequate to account. If, then, my contention be +granted--viz., that to human faculties it is not conceivable how, in the +absence of a directing intelligence, general laws could be so correlated as +to produce universal harmony--then I have brought the matter to this +issue:--Notwithstanding the scientific train of argument being complete in +itself, it still leaves us in the presence of a fact which it cannot +conceivably explain; and it is this unexplained residuum--this total +product of the operation of general laws--that I appeal to as the logical +justification for a system of metaphysical teleology--a system which offers +the only conceivable explanation of this stupendous fact. + +'And here I may further observe, that the scientific train of reasoning is +of the kind which embodies what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls "symbolic +conceptions of the illegitimate order."[26] That is to say, we can see how +such simple laws as that action and reaction are equal and opposite may +have been self-evolved, and from this fact we go on generalising and +generalising, until we land ourselves in wholly symbolic and--a paradox is +here legitimate--inconceivable conceptions. Now the farther we travel into +this region of unrealisable ideas, the less trustworthy is the report that +we are able to bring back. The method is in a sense scientific; but when +even scientific method is projected into a region of really +super-scientific possibility, it ceases to have that character of undoubted +certainty which it enjoys when dealing with verifiable subjects of inquiry. +The demonstrations are formal, but they are not real. + +'Therefore, looking to this necessarily suspicious character of the +scientific train of reasoning, and then observing that, even if accepted, +it leaves the fact of cosmic harmony unexplained, I maintain, that whatever +probability the phenomena of nature may in former times have been thought +to establish in favour of the theory as to an intelligent Author of nature, +that probability has been in no wise annihilated--nor apparently can it +ever be annihilated--by the advance of science. And not only so, but I +question whether this probability has been even seriously impaired by such +advance, seeing that although this advance has revealed a speculative +_raison d'être_ of the mechanical precision of nature, it has at the same +time shown the baffling complexity of nature; and therefore, in view of +what has just been said, leaves the balance of probability concerning the +existence of a God very much where it always was. For stay awhile to +contemplate this astounding complexity of harmonious nature! Think of how +much we already know of its innumerable laws and processes, and then think +that this knowledge only serves to reveal, in a glimmering way, the huge +immensity of the unknown. Try to picture the meshwork of contending rhythms +which must have been before organic nature was built up, and then let us +ask, Is it conceivable, is it credible, that all this can have been the +work of blind fate? Must we not feel that had there not been intelligent +agency at work somewhere, other and less terrifically intricate results +would have ensued? And if we further try to symbolise in thought the +unimaginable complexity of the material and dynamical changes in virtue of +which that thought itself exists,--if we then extend our symbols to +represent all the history of all the orderly changes which must have taken +place to evolve human intelligence into what it is,--and if we still +further extend our symbols to try if it be possible, even in the language +of symbols, to express the number and the subtlety of those natural laws +which now preside over the human will;--in the face of so vast an +assumption as that all this has been self-evolved, I am content still to +rest in the faith of my forefathers.' + +§ 45. Now I think it must be admitted that we have here a valid argument. +That is to say, the considerations which we have just adduced must, I +think, in fairness be allowed to have established this position:--That the +system of metaphysical teleology for which we have supposed a candid theist +to plead, is something more than a purely gratuitous system--that it does +not belong to the same category of baseless imaginings as that to which the +atheist at first sight, and in view of the scientific deductions alone, +might be inclined to assign it. For we have seen that our supposed theist, +while fully admitting the formal cogency of the scientific train of +reasoning, is nevertheless able to point to a fact which, in his opinion, +lies without that train of reasoning. For he declares that it is beyond his +powers of conception to regard the complex harmony of nature otherwise than +as a product of some one integrating cause; and that the only cause of +which he is able to conceive as adequate to produce such an effect is that +of a conscious Intelligence. Pointing, therefore, to this complex harmony +of nature as to a fact which cannot to his mind be conceivably explained by +any deductions from physical science, he feels that he is justified in +explaining this fact by the aid of a metaphysical hypothesis. And in so +doing he is in my opinion perfectly justified, at any rate to this +extent--that his antagonist cannot fairly dispose of this metaphysical +hypothesis as a purely gratuitous hypothesis. How far it is a probable +hypothesis is another question, and to this question we shall now address +ourselves. + +§ 46. If it is true that the deductions from physical science cannot be +conceived to explain some among the observed facts of nature, and if it is +true that these particular facts admit of being conceivably explained by +the metaphysical hypothesis in question, then, beyond all controversy, this +metaphysical hypothesis must be provisionally accepted. Let us then +carefully examine the premises which are thus adduced to justify acceptance +of this hypothesis as their conclusion. + +In the first place, it is not--cannot--be denied, even by a theist, that +the deductions from physical science _do_ embrace the fact of cosmic +harmony in their explanation, seeing that, as they explain the operation of +general laws collectively, they must be regarded as also explaining every +effect of such operation. And this, as we have seen, is a consideration to +which our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did he meet it? He met +it by the considerations--1st. That the scientific train of reasoning +evolved this conclusion only by employing, in a wholly unrestricted manner, +"symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order;" and, 2d. That when the +conclusion thus illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with the +fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to be +beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to +such a cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on the +scientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be no +question that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which that +train of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weakness +to the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think, +be equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who would +venture honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of cosmic +harmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific train of +reasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an atheist may +reply, that although the objections of his antagonist against this symbolic +method of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the nature of the +case, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which is available. +If, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his antagonist for pointing +out a source of weakness in this method of reasoning--a source of weakness, +be it observed, which renders it impossible for him to estimate the actual, +as distinguished from the apparent, probability of the conclusion +attained--this is all that he can be expected to do: he cannot be expected +to abandon the only scientific method of reasoning available, in favour of +a metaphysical method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leaping +with a single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to the +inference of an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist may +well point out that, however objectionable his scientific method of +reasoning may be on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must at +any rate be preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbols +throughout refer to known causes.[27] With regard, then, to this stricture +on the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although the caveat +which it contains should never be lost sight of by atheists, it is not of +sufficient cogency to justify theists in abandoning a scientific in favour +of a metaphysical mode of reasoning. + +How then does it fare with the other stricture, or the consideration that, +"when the conclusion thus illegitimately[28] evolved is confronted with the +fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, we find it to be +beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to +such a cause"? The atheist may answer, in the first place, that a great +deal here turns on the precise meaning which we assign to the word +"conceive." For we have just seen that, by employing "symbolic +conceptions," we _are_ able to frame what we may term a _formal_ conception +of universal harmony as due to the persistence of force and the primary +qualities of matter. That is to say, we have seen that such universal +harmony as nature presents must be regarded as an effect of the collective +operation of general laws; and we have previously arrived at a formal +conception of general laws as singly and collectively the product of +self-evolution. Consequently, the word "conceive," as used in the theistic +argument, must be taken to mean our ability to frame what we may term a +_material_ conception, or a representation in thought of the whole history +of cosmic evolution, which representation shall be in some satisfactory +degree intellectually realisable. Observing, then, this important +difference between an inconceivability which arises from an impossibility +of establishing relations in thought between certain _abstract_ or +_symbolic_ conceptions, and an inconceivability which arises from a mere +failure to realise in imagination the results which must follow among +external relations if the symbolically conceivable combinations among them +ever took place, an atheist may here argue as follows; and it does not +appear that there is any legitimate escape from his reasonings. + +'I first consider the undoubted fact that the existence of a Supreme Mind +in nature is, scientifically considered, unnecessary; and, therefore, that +the only reason we require to entertain the supposition of any such +existence at all is, that the complexity of nature being so great, we are +unable adequately to conceive of its self-evolution--notwithstanding our +reason tells us plainly that, given a self-existing universe of force and +matter, and such self-evolution becomes abstractedly possible. I then +reflect that this is a negative and not a positive ground of belief. If the +hypothesis of self-evolution is true, we should _à priori_ expect that by +the time evolution had advanced sufficiently far to admit of the production +of a reasoning intelligence, the complexity of nature must be so great that +the nascent reasoning powers would be completely baffled in their attempts +to comprehend the various processes going on around them. This seems to be +about the state of things which we now experience. Still, as reason +advances more and more, we may expect, both from general _à priori_ +principles and from particular historical analogies, that more and more of +the processes of nature will admit of being interpreted by reason, and that +in proportion as our ability to _understand_ the frame and the constitution +of things progresses, so our ability to _conceive_ of them as all naturally +and necessarily evolved will likewise and concurrently progress. Thus, for +example, how vast a number of the most intricate and delicate correlations +in nature have been rendered at once intelligible and conceivably due to +non-intelligent causes, by the discovery of a single principle in +nature--the principle of natural selection. + +'In the adverse argument, conceivability is again made the unconditional +test of truth, just as it was in the argument against the possibility of +matter thinking. We reject the hypothesis of self-evolution, not because it +is the more remote one, but simply because we experience a subjective +incapacity adequately to frame the requisite generalisations in thought, or +to frame them with as much clearness as we could wish. Yet our reason tells +us as plainly as it tells us any general truth which is too large to be +presented in detail, that there is nothing in the nature of things +themselves, as far as we can see, antagonistic to the supposition of their +having been self-evolved. Only on the ground, therefore, of our own +intellectual deficiencies; only because as yet, by the self-evolutionary +hypothesis, the inner order does not completely answer to the outer order; +only because the number and complexity of subjective relations have not yet +been able to rival those of the objective relations producing them; only on +this ground do we refuse to assent to the obvious deductions of our +reason.[29] + +'And here I may observe, further, that the presumption in favour of atheism +which these deductions establish is considerably fortified by certain _à +posteriori_ considerations which we cannot afford to overlook. In +particular, I reflect that, as a matter of fact, the theistic theory is +born of highly suspicious parentage,--that Fetichism, or the crudest form +of the theory of personal agency in external nature, admits of being easily +traced to the laws of a primitive psychology; that the step from this to +Polytheism is easy; and that the step from this to Monotheism is necessary. +If it is objected to this view that it does not follow that because some +theories of personal agency have proved themselves false, therefore all +such theories must be so--I answer, Unquestionably not; but the above +considerations are not adduced in order to _negative_ the theistic theory: +they are merely adduced to show that the human mind has hitherto +undoubtedly exhibited an undue and a vicious tendency to interpret the +objective processes of nature in terms of its own subjective processes; and +as we can see quite well that the current theory of personal agency in +nature, whether or not true, is a necessary outcome of intellectual +evolution, I think that the fact of so abundant an historical analogy ought +to be allowed to lend a certain degree of antecedent suspicion to this +theory--although, of course, the suspicion is of a kind which would admit +of immediate destruction before any satisfactory positive evidence in +favour of the theory.[30] + +'But what is 'the satisfactory positive evidence' that is offered me? +Nothing, save an alleged subjective incapacity on the part of my opponent +adequately to conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony as due to physical +causation alone. Now I have already commented on the weakness of his +position; but as my opponent will doubtless resort to the consideration +that inconceivability of an opposite is, after all, the best criterion of +truth which at any given stage of intellectual evolution is available, I +will now conclude my overthrow by pointing out that, even if we take the +argument from teleology in its widest possible sense--the argument, I mean, +from the general order and beauty of nature, as well as the gross +constituent part of it from design--even taking this argument in its widest +sense and upon its own ground (which ground, I presume, it is now +sufficiently obvious _can_ only be that of the inconceivability of its +negation), I will conclude my examination of this argument by showing that +it is quite as inconceivable to predicate cosmic harmony an effect of +Intelligence, as it is to predicate it an effect of Non-intelligence; and +therefore that the argument from inconceivability admits of being turned +with quite as terrible a force upon Theism as it can be made to exert upon +Atheism. + +'"In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded and +accepted as quite believable are absolutely inconceivable. There is a +perpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but pseud-ideas. +No distinction is made between propositions that contain real thoughts and +propositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A thinkable proposition +is one of which the _two terms can be brought together in consciousness +under the relation said to exist between them_. But very often, when the +subject of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and when +the predicate of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and +when the relation alleged between them has been thought of as a known +relation, it is supposed that the proposition itself has been thought. The +thinking separately of the elements of a proposition is mistaken for the +thinking of them in the combination which the proposition affirms. And +hence it continually happens that propositions which cannot be rendered +into thought at all are supposed to be not only thought but believed. The +proposition that Evolution is caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two +terms are separately intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relation +of effect and cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them together +in this relation. + +'"The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his own +states of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his own, +he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to +frame a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits under which +alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know nothing of +thought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to the effects +wrought by objects on me. A mental act is an unintelligible phrase if I am +not to regard it as an act in which states of consciousness are severally +known as like other states in the series that has gone by, and in which the +relations between them are severally known as like past relations in the +series. If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an 'originating +Mind,' I must conceive this Mind as having attributes akin to those of the +only mind I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind at all. + +'"I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by asking how +the 'originating Mind' is to be thought of as having states produced by +things objective to it, as discriminating among these states, and classing +them as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective result to another. +I will simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the 'originating Mind' the +character absolutely essential to the conception of mind, that it consists +of a series of states of consciousness? Put a series of states of +consciousness as cause and the evolving universe as effect, and then +endeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I find it possible to +imagine in some dim way a series of states of consciousness serving as +antecedent to any one of the movements I see going on; for my own states of +consciousness are often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But +how if I attempt to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions +throughout the universe--to the motions of the multitudinous stars +throughout space, to the revolutions of all their planets round them, to +the gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infinitely +multiplied physical processes going on in each of these suns and planets? I +cannot think of a single series of states of consciousness as causing even +the relatively small groups of actions going on over the earth's surface. I +cannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various winds and the +dissolving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the rivers, and the +grinding actions of all the glaciers; still less can I think of it as +antecedent to the infinity of processes simultaneously going on in all the +plants that cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowded +tropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that roam among them, +and the millions of millions of insects that buzz about them. Even a single +small set of these multitudinous terrestrial changes I cannot conceive as +antecedent a single series of states of consciousness--cannot, for +instance, think of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that are at +this instant curling over on the shores of England. How, then, is it +possible for me to conceive an 'originating Mind,' which I must represent +to myself as a _single_ series of states of consciousness, working the +infinitely multiplied sets of changes _simultaneously_ going on in worlds +too numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that baffles +imagination? + +'"If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere going +on, 'Mind must be conceived as there' 'under the guise of simple Dynamics,' +then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind must be divested of all +attributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when thus divested of +its distinguishing attributes, the conception disappears--the word Mind +stands for a blank.... + +'"Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an 'originating Mind' is the +cause of evolution is a proposition that can be entertained so long only as +no attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the alleged +relation. That it should be accepted as a matter of _faith_ may be a +defensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should be so +accepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of _understanding_--as +a statement making the order of the universe comprehensible--is a quite +indefensible position."'[31] + +§ 47. We have now heard the pleading on both sides of the ultimate issue to +which it is possible that the argument from teleology can ever be reduced. +It therefore devolves on us very briefly to adjudicate upon the contending +opinions. And this it is not difficult to do; for throughout the pleading +on both sides I have been careful to exclude all arguments and +considerations which are not logically valid. It is therefore impossible +for me now to pass any criticisms on the pleading of either side which have +not already been passed by the pleading of the other. But nevertheless, in +my capacity of an impartial judge, I feel it desirable to conclude this +chapter with a few general considerations. + +In the first place, I think that the theist's antecedent objection to a +scientific mode of reasoning on the score of its symbolism, may be regarded +as fairly balanced by the atheist's antecedent objection to a metaphysical +mode of reasoning on the score of its postulating an unknowable cause. And +it must be allowed that the force of this antecedent objection is +considerably increased by the reflection that the _kind_ of unknowable +cause which is thus postulated is that which the human mind has always +shown an overweening tendency to postulate as a cause of natural phenomena. + +I think, therefore, that neither disputant has the right to regard the _à +priori_ standing of his opponent's theory as much more suspicious than that +of his own; for it is obvious that neither disputant has the means whereby +to estimate the actual value of these antecedent objections. + +With regard, then, to the _à posteriori_ evidence in favour of the rival +theories, I think that the final test of their validity--_i.e._, the +inconceivability of their respective negations--fails equally in the case +of both theories; for in the case of each theory any proposition which +embodies it must itself contain an infinite, _i.e._, an +inconceivable--term. Thus, whether we speak of an Infinite Mind as the +cause of evolution, or of evolution as due to an infinite duration of +physical processes, we are alike open to the charge of employing +unthinkable propositions. + +Hence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is an +eternity of matter and of force,[32] and the other an Infinite Mind, so +that in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; and +therefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon the +subject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the other +from an appeal to the test of inconceivability. + +Yet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more ultimate. +What then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion concerning +the rational standing of the teleological argument? The answer, I think, to +this question is, that in strict reasoning the teleological argument, in +its every shape, is inadequate to form a basis of Theism; or, in other +words, that the logical cogency of this argument is insufficient to justify +a wholly impartial mind in accepting the theory of Theism on so insecure a +foundation. Nevertheless, if the further question were directly put to me, +'After having heard the pleading both for and against the most refined +expression of the argument from teleology, with what degree of strictly +rational probability do you accredit it?'--I should reply as follows:--'The +question which you put I take to be a question which it is wholly +impossible to answer, and this for the simple reason that the degree of +even rational probability may here legitimately vary with the character of +the mind which contemplates it.' This statement, no doubt, sounds +paradoxical; but I think it is justified by the following considerations. +When we say that one proposition is more conceivable than another, we may +mean either of two very different things, and this quite apart from the +distinction previously drawn between symbolic conceptions and realisable +conceptions. For we may mean that one of the two propositions presents +terms which cannot possibly be rendered into thought at all in the relation +which the proposition alleges to subsist between them; or we may mean that +one of the two propositions presents terms in a relation which is more +congruous with the habitual tenor of our thoughts than does the other +proposition. Thus, as an example of the former usage, we may say, It is +more conceivable that two and two should make four than that two and two +should make five; and, as an example of the latter usage, we may say, It is +more conceivable that a man should be able to walk than that he should be +able to fly. Now, for the sake of distinction, I shall call the first of +these usages the test of _absolute_ inconceivability, and the second the +test of _relative_ inconceivability. Doubtless, when the word +"inconceivability" is used in the sense of relative inconceivability, it is +incorrectly used, unless it is qualified in some way; because, if used +without qualification, there is danger of its being confused with +inconceivability in its absolute sense. Nevertheless, if used with some +qualifying epithet, it becomes quite unexceptionable. For the process of +conception being in all cases the process of establishing relations in +thought, we may properly say, It is relatively more conceivable that a man +should walk than that a man should fly, since it is _more easy_ to +establish, the necessary relations in thought in the case of the former +than in the case of the latter proposition. The only difference, then, +between what I have called absolute inconceivability and what I have called +relative inconceivability consists in this--that while the latter admits of +_degrees_, the former does not.[33] + +With this distinction clearly understood, I may now proceed to observe that +in everyday life we constantly apply the test of relative inconceivability +as a test of truth. And in the vast majority of cases this test of relative +inconceivability is, for all practical purposes, as valid a test of truth +as is the test of absolute conceivability. For as every man is more or less +in harmony with his environment, his habits of thought with regard to his +environment are for the most part stereotyped correctly; so that the most +ready and the most trustworthy gauge of probability that he has is an +immediate appeal to consciousness as to whether he _feels_ the probability. +Thus every man learns for himself to endow his own sense of probability +with a certain undefined but massive weight of authority. Now it is this +test of relative conceivability which all men apply in varying degrees to +the question of Theism. For if, from education and organised habits of +thought, the probability in this matter appears to a man to incline in a +certain direction, when this probability is called in question, the whole +body of this organised system of thought rises in opposition to the +questioning, and being individually conscious of this strong feeling of +subjective opposition, the man declares the sceptical propositions to be +more inconceivable to him than are the counter-propositions. And in so +saying he is, of course, perfectly right. Hence I conceive that the +acceptance or the rejection of metaphysical teleology as probable will +depend entirely upon individual habits of thought. The test of absolute +inconceivability making equally for and against the doctrine of Theism, +disputants are compelled to fall back on the test of relative +inconceivability; and as the direction in which the more inconceivable +proposition will here seem to lie will be determined by previous habits of +thought, it follows that while to a theist metaphysical teleology will +appear a probable argument, to an atheist it will appear an improbable one. +Thus to a theist it will no doubt appear more conceivable that the Supreme +Mind should be such that in some of its attributes it resembles the human +mind, while in other of its attributes--among which he will place +omnipresence, omnipotence, and directive agency--it transcends the human +mind as greatly as the latter "transcends mechanical motion;" and therefore +that although it is true, as a matter of logical terminology, that we ought +to designate such an entity "Not mind" or "Blank," still, as a matter of +psychology, we may come nearer to the truth by assimilating in thought this +entity with the nearest analogies which experience supplies, than by +assimilating it in thought with any other entity--such as force or +matter--which are felt to be in all likelihood still more remote from it in +nature. On the other hand, to an atheist it will no doubt appear more +conceivable, because more simple, to accept the dogma of an eternal +self-existence of something which we call force and matter, and with this +dogma to accept the implication of a necessary self-evolution of cosmic +harmony, than to resort to the additional and no less inconceivable +supposition of a self-existing Agent which must be regarded both as Mind +and as Not-mind at the same time. But in both cases, in whatever degree +this test of relative inconceivability of a negative is held by the +disputants to be valid in solving the problem of Theism, in that degree is +each man entitled to his respective estimate of the probability in +question. And thus we arrive at the judgment that the rational probability +of Theism legitimately varies with the character of the mind which +contemplates it. For, as the test of absolute inconceivability is equally +annihilative in whichever direction it is applied, the test of relative +inconceivability is the only one that remains; and as the formal conditions +of a metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and +the formal conditions of a physical explanation of cosmic harmony are no +less undoubtedly present on the other hand, it follows that a theist and an +atheist have an equal right to employ this test of relative +inconceivability. And as there is no more ultimate court of appeal whereby +to decide the question than the universe as a whole, each man has here an +equal argumentative right to abide by the decision which that court awards +_to him individually_--to accept whatever probability the sum-total of +phenomena appears to present to his particular understanding. And it is +needless to say that experience shows, even among well-informed and +accurate reasoners, how large an allowance must thus be made for personal +equations. To some men the facts of external nature seem to proclaim a God +with clarion voice, while to other men the same facts bring no whisper of +such a message. All, therefore, that a logician can here do is to remark, +that the individuals in each class--provided they bear in mind the strictly +_relative_ character of their belief--have a similar right to be regarded +as holding a rational creed: the grounds of belief in this case logically +vary with the natural disposition and the subsequent training of different +minds.[34] + +It only remains to show that disputants on either side are apt to endow +this test of relative inconceivability with far more than its real logical +worth. Being accustomed to apply this test of truth in daily life, and +there finding it a trustworthy test, most men are apt to forget that its +value as a test must clearly diminish in proportion to the distance from +experience at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to be the case even +with the test of absolute inconceivability (see Chapter V.), but much more +must it be the case with this test of relative inconceivability. For, +without comment, it is manifest that our acquired sense of probability, as +distinguished from our innate sense of possibility, with regard to any +particular question of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparable +with its value in the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which our +sense of probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although, +therefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain a +belief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally entitled +to be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in whatever +degree either party considers their belief as of a higher validity than the +grounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in that degree must the +members of that party be deemed irrational. In other words, not only must a +man be careful not to confuse the test of relative inconceivability with +that of absolute conceivability--not to suppose that his sense of +probability in this matter is determined by an innate psychological +inability to conceive a proposition, when in reality it is only determined +by the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have long been habitually +associated;--but he must also be careful to remember that the test of +relative inconceivability in this matter is only valid as justifying a +belief of the most diffident possible kind. + +And from this the practical deduction is--tolerance. Let no man think that +he has any argumentative right to expect that the mere subjective habit or +tone of his own mind should exert any influence on that of his fellow; but +rather let him always remember that the only legitimate weapons of his +intellectual warfare are those the _material_ of which is derived from the +external world, and only the _form_ of which is due to the forging process +of his own mind. And if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted on +the hardened armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardened +armoury of confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must not +too confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of his +own weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need we +all stand of this caution:--Knowing how greatly the value of arguments is +affected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame of mind in +which we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not to +over-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is actually +superior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is surely +needless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us to bear +in mind this further caution:--Knowing with what great subjective +opposition arguments are met when they conflict with our established modes +of thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard the sanctuary of our +judgment from the polluting tyranny of habit. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER VII. + +GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. + +§ 48. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here suffice +to convey an epitomised recollection of the numerous facts and conclusions +which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first disposed of the +conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of things, or the mystery +of existence, admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any +further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the +argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a +subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to +prove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with regard +to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations point to +God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to observe that the +argument could only be admissible after the possibility of the operation of +natural causes had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed +intuitive necessity of individual thought was found to be untenable, first, +because, even if the supposed necessity were a real one, it would only +possess an individual applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, +it is extremely improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity +even for the individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that +it is not such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the +general consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts +and principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a +first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument +that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is +probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of +inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced worthless. + +Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in favour of +Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds are caused +by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our mind is caused +by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible for two reasons. +In the first place, "it does not account for mind (in the abstract) to +refer it to a prior mind for its origin;" and therefore, although the +hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of _known_ mind, it is +useless as an argument for the existence of the unknown mind, the +assumption of which forms the basis of that explanation. Again, in the next +place, if it be said that mind is so far an entity _sui generis_ that it +must be either self-existing or caused by another mind, there is no +assignable warrant for the assertion. And this is the second objection to +the above syllogism; for anything within the whole range of the possible +may, for aught that we can tell, be competent to produce a self-conscious +intelligence. Thus an objector to the above syllogism need not hold any +theory of things at all; but even as opposed to the definite theory of +materialism, the above syllogism has not so valid an argumentative basis to +stand upon. We know that what we call matter and force are to all +appearance eternal, while we have no corresponding evidence of a "mind that +is even apparently eternal." Further, within experience mind is invariably +associated with highly differentiated collocations of matter and +distributions of force, and many facts go to prove, and none to negative, +the conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or +at least is associated with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. +There is thus both a qualitative and a quantitative relation between +intelligence and cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and +motion cannot produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they +should, we have seen at some length that this is no conclusive +consideration as applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental +nature, and that in the present case it is particularly inconclusive, +because, as it is speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be +unknowable, it seems _à priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the +unknowable reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into +thought in that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which +is imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_ +conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is in +this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly, the +statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects can +contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by everyday +experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the will and +the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively by the +theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of utilitarianism. On +the whole, then, with regard to the argument from the existence of the +human mind, we were compelled to decide that it is destitute of any +assignable weight, there being nothing more to lead to the conclusion that +our mind has been caused by another mind, than to the conclusion that it +has been caused by anything else whatsoever. + +With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that Mill's +presentation of it is merely a resuscitation of the argument as presented +by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers. And indeed we saw that the first-named writer +treated this whole subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising +in him; for while he has failed to assign anything like due weight to the +inductive evidence of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a +supernatural explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed +signally in his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common +with all previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly +impossible for us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer +stands to the Designed,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme +Mind, even supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any +particular intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the +Design argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be +due to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that +this Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and +such cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise the +supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of the +existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after all, of +very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the _methods_ +of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that, _in some way +or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due to Intelligence +of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the first to endorse this +remark. It has always appeared to me one of the most unaccountable things +in the history of speculation that so many competent writers can have +insisted upon _Design_ as an argument for Theism, when they must all have +known perfectly well that they have no means of ascertaining the subjective +psychology of that Supreme Mind whose existence the argument is adduced to +demonstrate. The truth is, that the argument from teleology must, and can +only, rest upon the observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the +intellectual _processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been +accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this is +merely to change the teleological argument from its gross Paleyerian form, +into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws. And we saw +that this transformation is now a rational necessity. How far the great +principle of natural selection may have been instrumental in the evolution +of organic forms, is not here, as Mill erroneously imagined, the question; +the question is simply as to whether we are to accept the theory of special +creation or the theory of organic evolution. And forasmuch as no competent +judge at the present time can hesitate for one moment in answering this +question, the argument from a proximate teleology must be regarded as no +longer having any rational existence. + +How then does it fare with the last of the arguments--the argument from an +ultimate teleology? Doubtless at first sight this argument seems a very +powerful one, inasmuch as it is a generic argument, which embraces not only +biological phenomena, but all the phenomena of the universe. But +nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent power +dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if force and +matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have resulted by +way of necessary consequence. It will be remembered that I dwelt at +considerable length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only +because of its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but +also because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation. + +The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the conclusion that +was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless collapse of all the +possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully demonstrated that +there is no shadow of a positive argument in support of the theistic +theory, there arose the danger that some persons might erroneously conclude +that for this reason the theistic theory must be untrue. It therefore +became necessary to point out, that although, as far as we can see, nature +does not require an Intelligent Cause to account for any of her phenomena, +yet it is possible that, if we could see farther, we should see that nature +could not be what she is unless she had owed her existence to an +Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words, the probability there is that an +Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of nature, +is only equal to the probability there is that the doctrine of the +persistence of force is everywhere and eternally true. + +As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the +region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science, +and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the discussion +into the transcendental region of purely formal considerations. And here we +laid down the canon, "that the value of any probability, in its last +analysis, is determined by the number, the importance, and the definiteness +of the relations known, as compared with those of the relations unknown;" +and, consequently, that in cases where the unknown relations are more +numerous, more important, or more indefinite than are the known relations, +the value of our inference varies inversely as the difference in these +respects between the relations compared. From which canon it followed, that +as the problem of Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so +contains in its unknown relations all that is to man unknown and +unknowable, these relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all +relations that it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, +that although we have here the entire range of experience from which to +argue, we are unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. +The unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite, +both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the known +relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite probability +either for or against the being of a God. Therefore, although it is true +that, so far as human science can penetrate or human thought infer, we can +perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right on this account to +conclude that there is no God. The probability, therefore, that nature is +devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest kind if regarded +scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific demonstration,--is +nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically. Notwithstanding it is +as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of all experience +that, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a cause of the +universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that, if there had +never been a God, the universe could never have existed. + +Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter how +great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative sense, we +have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute sense. From +which position there emerged the possibility of another argument in favour +of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of the teleological +argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing that these formal +considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for or against Deity in +an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such reasoning in a relative +sense, if there yet remain any theistic deductions which may properly be +drawn from experience, these may now be adduced to balance the atheistic +deductions from the persistence of force. For although the latter +deductions have clearly shown the existence of Deity to be superfluous in a +scientific sense, the formal considerations in question have no less +clearly opened up beyond the sphere of science a possible _locus_ for the +existence of Deity; so that if there are any facts supplied by experience +for which the atheistic deductions appear insufficient to account, we are +still free to account for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of +Theism. And, it may be urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in +the correlation of general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It +signifies nothing, the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the +methods whereby the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor +does it signify that its operation must now be relegated to a +super-scientific province. What does signify is that, taking a general view +of nature, we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of +her harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation. +Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be +remembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to +distinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in +contradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction, it +will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms of +teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible reach of +science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific refutation, +the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis which is +clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be susceptible of +scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system of teleology does +rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it accepts the most +ultimate truths of which science can ever be cognisant--viz., the +persistence of force and the consequently necessary genesis of natural +law,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of regarding Mind as the +ultimate cause of things is not on this account removed; and, therefore, +that if science now requires the operation of a Supreme Mind to be posited +in a super-scientific sphere, then in a super-scientific sphere it ought to +be posited. No doubt this hypothesis at first sight seems gratuitous, +seeing that, so far as science can penetrate, there is no need of any such +hypothesis at all--cosmic harmony resulting as a physically necessary +consequence from the combined action of natural laws, which in turn result +as a physically necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the +primary qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that +metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered scientifically, +it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if considered +psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable that Mind should +be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the persistence of force +should be so, then it is not irrational to accept the more conceivable +hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable one, provided that the +choice is made with the diffidence which is required by the considerations +adduced in Chapter V. + +I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, +although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense +legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this +argument can rest--viz., the position that the fundamental postulate of +Atheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of +Theism--we have seen two important objections to lie. + +For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" is +here used is that of the impossibility of framing _realisable_ relations in +the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_ relations +in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is true that +the complexity of the human organisation and its functions is +inconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much less +weight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without waiting +again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative standing of +Materialism) how far even the genuine test of inconceivability ought to be +allowed to make against an inference which there is a body of scientific +evidence to substantiate, we went on to the second objection against this +fundamental position of metaphysical teleology. This objection, it will be +remembered, was, that it is as impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as +an effect of Mind, as it is to conceive of it as an effect of mindless +evolution. The argument from inconceivability, therefore, admits of being +turned with quite as terrible an effect on Theism, as it can possibly be +made to exert on Atheism. + +Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and +which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of Theism, +is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its metaphysical +character it has escaped the opposition of physical science, only to +encounter a new opposition in the region of pure psychology to which it +fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry, therefore, it devolved on us to +determine the relative magnitudes of these opposing forces. And in doing +this we first observed that, if the supporters of metaphysical teleology +objected _à priori_ to the method whereby the genesis of natural law was +deduced from the datum of the persistence of force, in that this method +involved an unrestricted use of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it +is no less open to an atheist to object _à priori_ to the method whereby a +directing Mind was inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this +method involved the population of an unknowable cause,--and this of a +character which the whole history of human thought has proved the human +mind to exhibit an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of +natural phenomena. On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as +their respective standing _à priori_ is concerned, both theories may be +regarded as about equally suspicious. And similar with regard to their +standing _à posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least +one infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely +inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the +two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a +question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of +absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a man +wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by what I +have designated relative inconceivability--_i.e._, in accordance with the +verdict given by his individual sense of probability as determined by his +previous habits of thought. And forasmuch as the test of relative +inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to vary with the +character of the mind which applies it, the strictly rational probability +of the question to which it is applied varies in like manner. Or, otherwise +presented, the only alternative for any man in this matter is either to +discipline himself into an attitude of pure scepticism, and thus to refuse +in thought to entertain either a probability or an improbability concerning +the existence of a God; or else to incline in thought towards an +affirmation or a negation of God, according as his previous habits of +thought have rendered such an inclination more facile in the one direction +than in the other. And although, under such circumstances, I should +consider that man the more rational who carefully suspended his judgment, I +conclude that if this course is departed from, neither the metaphysical +teleologist nor the scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over +the other in respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a +metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the +formal conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on +the other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein +the pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be +made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas. + +Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the abstract +nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which at the +present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the confusing +amount of good, bad, and indifferent literature on both sides of the +controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not think that +the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the score of its +lacking precision. At a time like the present, when traditional beliefs +respecting Theism are so generally accepted and so commonly concluded, as a +matter of course, to have a large and valid basis of induction whereon to +rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this short essay, by showing how +very concise the scientific _status_ of the subject really is, will do more +to settle the minds of most readers as to the exact standing at the present +time of all the probabilities of the question, than could a perusal of all +the rest of the literature upon this subject. And, looking to the present +condition of speculative philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost +importance to have clearly shown that the advance of science has now +entitled us to assert, without the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of +Mind in nature is as certainly superfluous to account for any of the +phenomena of nature, as the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force +and the indestructibility of matter is certainly true. + +On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical +aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite as +has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter which +does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of necessity be +left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears this +consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly complain of my +not having done my utmost in this case to define as sharply as possible the +character and the limits of this margin. + +§ 49. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any +antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is +unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with the +utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here +worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save the +strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society to +give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they may he worth. +Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the most profitable +for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual endeavour to attain +it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed and sincere, ought +without hesitation to be made the common property of all men, no matter in +what direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend. And so +far as the ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can have +a more lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency of +my work. So far as I am individually concerned, the result of this analysis +has been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower +plane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely +formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all +belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my +intellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest +scepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with those +who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable +substitute for the waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to +confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost +its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work +while it is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the +terribly intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no +man can work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the +appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was +mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such times +I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my +nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being +sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be +due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were +the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for +others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of +Hamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but +of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has become transformed into the +terrific oracle to Oedipus-- + + "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art." + + * * * * * + + +APPENDIX + +AND + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. + + * * * * * + + +APPENDIX. + + * * * * * + +A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF A FALLACY IN LOCKE'S USE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST +THE POSSIBILITY OF MATTER THINKING ON GROUNDS OF ITS BEING INCONCEIVABLE +THAT IT SHOULD. + +Lest it should be thought that I am doing injustice to the views of this +illustrious theist, I here quote his own words:--"We have the ideas of +matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any +mere material being thinks or no, it being impossible for us, by the +contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether +omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a power +to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a +thinking immaterial substance; it being, in respect of our notions, not +much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if He +pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that He should +superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know +not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substance the Almighty +has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, +but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I see no +contradiction in it that the first eternal thinking being should, if he +pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together +as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, +as I think, I have proved, lib. iv., ch. 10 and 14, &c., it is no less than +a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature +void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-thinking being. +What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such +as, _e.g._, pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, +after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be +in an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as +far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body; and +motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce +nothing but motion: so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, +or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond +our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For +since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way +conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He +could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive +capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of +matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way +lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality, &c.... It is a point which +seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge; and he who will +give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate +part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him +fixedly for or against the soul's materiality. Since on which side soever +he views it, either as an unextended substance or as a thinking extended +matter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in +his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which +some men take with themselves, who, because of the inconceivableness of +something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary +hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed +understanding." + +This passage, I do not hesitate to say, is one of the most remarkable in +the whole range of philosophical literature, in respect of showing how even +the strongest and most candid intellect may have its reasoning faculty +impaired by the force of a preformed conviction. Here we have a mind of +unsurpassed penetration and candour, which has left us side by side two +parallel trains of reasoning. In the one, the object is to show that the +author's preformed conviction as to the being of a God is justifiable on +grounds of reason; in the other, the object is to show that, granting the +existence of a God, and it is not impossible that he may have endowed +matter with the faculty of thinking. Now, in the former train of reasoning, +the whole proof rests entirely upon the fact that "it is impossible to +conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking +intelligent being." Clearly, if this proposition is true, it must destroy +one or other of the trains of reasoning; for it is common to them both, and +in one of them it is made the sole ground for concluding that matter cannot +think, while in the other it is made compatible with the supposition that +matter may think. This extraordinary inconsistency no doubt arose from the +fact that the author was antecedently persuaded of the existence of an +_Omnipotent_ Mind, and having been long accustomed in his intellectual +symbols to regard it presumptuous in him to impose any limitations on this +almighty power, when he asked himself whether it would be possible for this +almighty power, if it so willed, to endow matter with the faculty of +thinking, he argued that it might be possible, notwithstanding his being +unable to conceive the possibility. But when he banished from his mind the +idea of this personal and almighty power, and with that idea banished all +its associations, he then felt that he had a right to argue more freely, +and forthwith made his conceptive faculty a test of abstract possibility. +Yet _the sum total of abstract possibility, in relation to him, must have +been the same in the two cases_; so that in whichever of the two trains of +reasoning his argument was sound, in the other it must certainly have been +null. + +We may well feel amazed that so able a thinker can have fallen into so +obvious an error, and afterwards have persisted in it through pages and +pages of his work. It will be instructive, however, to those who rely upon +Locke's exposition of the argument from Inconceivability to see how +effectually he has himself destroyed it. For this purpose, therefore, I +shall make some further quotations from the same train of reasoning. The +statement of Locke's opinion that the Almighty could endow matter with the +faculty of thinking if He so willed, called down some remonstrances and +rebukes from the then Bishop of Worcester. Locke's reply was a very lengthy +one, and from it the following extracts are taken. I merely request the +reader throughout to substitute for the words God, Creator, Almighty, +Omipotency, &c., the words _Summum genus_ of Possibility. + +"But it is further urged that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I +grant it, but to argue from thence that God therefore cannot give to matter +a faculty of thinking is to say God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow +compass because man's understanding is so, and brings down God's infinite +power to the size of our capacities.... + +"If God can give no power to any parts of matter but what men can account +for from the essence of matter in general; if all such qualities and +properties must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties of +matter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be +the natural consequence of that essence; it is plain that the essence of +matter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of the +sensible parts of this our system. For it is visible that all the planets +have revolutions about certain remote centres, which I would have any one +explain or make conceivable by the bare essence, or natural powers +depending on the essence of matter in general, without something added to +that essence which we cannot conceive; for the moving of matter in a +crooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can be +said in the case; either of which it is above our reach to derive from the +essence of matter or body in general, though one of these two must +unavoidably be allowed to be superadded, in this instance, to the essence +of matter in general. The omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the +making of the world, and His ways are not the less excellent because they +are past finding out.... + +"In all such cases, the superinducement of greater perfections and nobler +qualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that were there +before, unless there can be showed a manifest repugnancy between them; but +all the proof offered for that is only that we cannot conceive how matter, +without such superadded perfections, can produce such effects; which is, in +truth, no more than to say matter in general, or every part of matter, as +matter, has them not, but is no reason to prove that God, if He pleases, +cannot superadd them to some parts of matter, unless it can be proved to be +a contradiction that God should give to some parts of matter qualities and +perfections which matter in general has not, though we cannot conceive how +matter is invested with them, or how it operates by virtue of those new +endowments; nor is it to be wondered that we cannot, whilst we limit all +its operations to those qualities it had before, and would explain them by +the known properties of matter in general, without any such induced +perfections. For if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing to +be because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be, I shall desire +them who use it to stick to this rule, and see what work it will make both +in divinity as well as philosophy, and whether they can advance anything +more in favour of scepticism. + +"For to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking and +self-motion bestowed by omnipotent power in some parts of matter: the +objection to this is, I cannot conceive how matter should think. What is +the consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this stand +for a good reason, and then proceed in other cases by the same. + +"You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance, much +less at the distance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it such a +power: you cannot conceive how matter should feel or move itself, or affect +any material being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it such +powers: which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution of the +planets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, without sense or +spontaneous motion; and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary motion. + +"Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an +extended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think: +can you conceive how your own soul or any substance thinks? You find, +indeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how the +action of thinking is performed: this, I confess, is beyond my conception; +and I would be glad any one who conceives it would explain it to me. + +"God, I find, has given me this faculty; and since I cannot but be +convinced of His power in this instance, which, though I every moment +experience in myself, yet I cannot conceive the manner of, what would it be +less than an insolent absurdity to deny His power in other like cases, only +for this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?... + +"That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at the +same time, I think with due reverence [diffidence?[35]] we may say; but +that a solid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers, +which have no natural or visibly necessary connection with solidity and +extension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing) +to be positive in. + +"If God cannot join things together by connections inconceivable to us, we +must deny even the consistency and being of matter itself; since every +particle of it having some bulk, has its parts connected by ways +inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raised against +the thinking of matter, from our ignorance or narrow conceptions, stand not +at all in the way of the power of God, if He pleases to ordain it so; nor +prove anything against His having actually endowed some parcels of matter, +so disposed as He thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can he +shown that it contains a contradiction to suppose it. + +"Though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general, in the +foregoing discourse I have spoke of sense in brutes as distinct from +thinking; because your lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in brutes. +But here I take liberty to observe, that if your lordship allows brutes to +have sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to some +parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking, or that all animals +have immaterial, and consequently, according to your lordship, immortal +souls, as well as men; and to say that fleas and mites, &c., have immortal +souls as well as men, will possibly be looked on as going a great way to +serve an hypothesis.... + +"It is true, I say, 'That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else,' and +so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their +operation. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's +incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power +in this point by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards +matter, by way unconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God +can, if He pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation above what +can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know +of matter, but also an unquestionable and everywhere visible instance that +He has done so. And therefore, in the next edition of my book, I will take +care to have that passage rectified.... + +"As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks, 'What is there like +self-consciousness in matter?' Nothing at all in matter as matter. But that +God cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and with +it self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking how is it possible to +apprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive? The +weakness of our apprehension I grant in the case: I confess as much as you +please, that we cannot conceive how an unsolid created substance thinks; +but this weakness of our apprehension reaches not the power of God, whose +weakness is stronger than anything in man." + +Lastly, Locke turns upon his opponent the power of the _odium theologicum_. + +"Let it be as hard a matter as it will to give an account what it is that +should keep the parts of a material soul together after it is separated +from the body, yet it will be always as easy to give an account of it as to +give an account what it is that shall keep together a material and +immaterial substance. And yet the difficulty that there is to give an +account of that, I hope, does not, with your lordship, weaken the +credibility of the inseparable union of soul and body to eternity; and I +persuade myself that the men of sense, to whom your lordship appeals in +this case, do not find their belief of this fundamental point much weakened +by that difficulty.... But you will say, you speak only of the soul; and +your words are, that it is no easy matter to give an account how the soul +should be capable of immortality unless it be a material substance. I grant +it, but crave leave to say, that there is not any one of these difficulties +that are or can be raised about the manner how a material soul can be +immortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body.... + +"But your lordship, as I guess from your following words, would argue that +a material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby I suppose you only +mean that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance should begin, +stop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, that when +you can make it conceivable how any created, finite, dependent substance +can move itself, I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow +this power on a solid than an unsolid created substance.... But though you +cannot see how any created substance, solid or not solid, can be a free +agent (pardon me, my lord, if I put in both, till your lordship please to +explain it of either, and show the manner how either of them can of itself +move itself or anything else), yet I do not think you will so far deny men +to be free agents, from the difficulty there is to see how they are free +agents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough for the day of +judgment." + +Let us now, for the sake of contrast, turn to some passages which occur in +the other train of reasoning. + +"If we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can never +begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or +without motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, perception, +and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and +knowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every +particle of it." There is a double fallacy here. In the first place, +conceivability is made the unconditional test of possibility; and, in the +next place, it is asserted that unless every particle of matter can think, +no collocation of such particles can possibly do so. This latter fallacy is +further insisted upon thus:--"If they will not allow matter as matter, that +is, every particle of matter, to be as well cogitative as extended, they +will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative +being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended +parts, if I may so speak.... Every particle of matter, as matter, is +capable of all the same figures and motions of any other, and I challenge +any one in his thoughts to add anything else to one above another." Now, as +we have seen, Locke himself has shown in his other trains of argument that +this challenge is thoroughly futile as a refutation of possibilities; but +the point to which I now wish to draw attention is this--It does not follow +because certain and highly complex collocations of material particles may +be supposed capable of thinking, that therefore every particle of matter +must be regarded as having this attribute. We have innumerable analogies in +nature of a certain collocation of matter and force producing certain +results which another somewhat similar collocation could not produce: in +such cases we do not assume that all the resulting attributes of the one +collocation must be presented also by the other--still less that these +resulting attributes must belong to the primary qualities of matter and +force. Hence, it is not fair to assume that thought must either be inherent +in every particle of matter, or else not producible by any possible +collocation of such particles, unless it has previously been shown that so +to produce it by any possible collocation is in the nature of things +impossible. But no one could refute this fallacy better than Locke himself +has done in some of the passages already quoted from his other train of +reasoning. + +But to continue the quotation:--"If, therefore, it be evident that +something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident that +that something must necessarily be a cogitative being; for it is as +impossible [_inconceivable_] that incogitative matter should produce a +cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should +produce a positive being or matter." Again,--"For unthinking particles of +matter, however put together, can have [_can be taught to have_] nothing +thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is +impossible [_inconceivable_] should give thought and knowledge to them." + +It is unnecessary to multiply these quotations, for, in effect, they would +all be merely repetitions of one another. It is enough to have seen that +this able author undertakes to demonstrate the existence of a God, and that +his whole demonstration resolves itself into the unwarrantable inference, +that as we are unable to conceive how thought can be a property of matter, +therefore a property of matter thought cannot be. That such an erroneous +inference should occur in any writings of so old a date as those of Locke +is not in itself surprising. What is surprising is the fact, that in the +same writings, and in the course of the same discussion, the fallacy of +this very inference is repeatedly pointed out and insisted upon in a great +variety of ways; and it has been chiefly for the sake of showing the +pernicious influence which preformed opinion may exert--viz., even to +blinding the eyes of one of the most clear-sighted and thoughtful men that +ever lived to a glaring contradiction repeated over and over again in the +course of a few pages,--it has been chiefly for this reason that I have +extended this Appendix to so great a length. I shall now conclude it by +quoting some sentences which occur on the very next page after that from +which the last quoted sentences were taken. Our author here again returns +to his defence of the omnipotency of God; and as he now again thus +personifies the sum total of possibility, his mind abruptly reverts to all +its other class of associations. In this case the transition is +particularly interesting, not only on account of its suddenness, but also +because the correlations contemplated happen to be exactly the same in the +two cases--viz., matter as the cause of mind, and mind as the cause of +matter. Remember that on the last page this great philosopher supposed he +had demonstrated the abstract impossibility of matter being the cause of +mind on the ground of a causal connection being inconceivable, let us now +observe what he says upon this page regarding the abstract possibility of +mind being the cause of matter. "Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate +ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would +reach to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some +dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to +exist by the power of that eternal first being.... But you will say, Is it +not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, since we +cannot possibly conceive it? I answer--No; because it is not reasonable to +deny the power of an infinite being [this phrase, in the absence of +hypothesis, _i.e._, in Locke's other train of reasoning, is of course +equivalent to the sum-total of possibility] because we cannot comprehend +its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we +cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive +how anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is not a +reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant +experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which +are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our minds, and are +not, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of the blind +matter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or +choice to alter it. For example, my right hand writes, whilst my left hand +is still: what causes rest in one and motion in the other? Nothing but my +will, a thought in my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests, +and the left hands moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: +explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to +understand creation."[36] + + * * * * * + + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. + + * * * * * + +I. + +COSMIC THEISM.[37] + +Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable is a doctrine of so much +speculative importance, that it behoves all students of philosophy to have +clear views respecting its character and implications. Mr. Spencer has +himself so fully explained the character of this doctrine, that no +attentive reader can fail to understand it; but concerning those of its +implications which may be termed theological--as distinguished from +religious--Mr. Spencer is silent. Within the last two or three years, +however, there has appeared a valuable work by an able exponent of the new +philosophy; and in this work the writer, adopting his master's teaching of +the Unknowable, proceeds to develop it into a definite system of what may +be termed scientific theology. And not only so, but he assures the world +that this system of scientific theology is the highest, the purest, and the +most ennobling form of religion that mankind has ever been privileged to +know in the past, or, from the nature of the case, can ever be destined to +know in the future. It is a system, we are told, wherein the most +fundamental truths of Theism are taught as necessary deductions from the +highest truths of Science; it is a system wherein no single doctrine +appeals for its acceptance to any principle of blind or credulous faith, +but wherein every doctrine can be fully justified by the searching light of +reason; it is a system wherein the noblest of our aspirations and the most +sublime of our emotions are able to find an object far more worthy and much +more glorious than has ever been supplied to them by any of the older forms +of Theism; and it is a system, therefore, in which, with a greatly enlarged +and intensified meaning, we may worship God, and all that is within us +bless His holy name. Assuredly a proclamation such as this, emanating from +the most authoritative expounders of modern thought, as the highest and the +greatest result to which a rigorous philosophic synthesis has led, is a +proclamation which cannot fail to arrest our most serious attention. Nay, +may it not do more than this? May it not appeal to hearts which long have +ceased to worship? May it not once more revive a hope--long banished, +perhaps, but still the dearest which our poor natures have +experienced--that somewhere, sometime, or in some way, it may yet be +possible to feel that God is not far from any one of us? For to those who +have known the anguish of a shattered faith, it will not seem so childish +that our hearts should beat the quicker when we once more hear a voice +announcing to a world of superstitious idolaters--"Whom ye ignorantly +worship, Him declare I unto you." But if, when we have listened to the glad +tidings of the new gospel, we find that the preacher, though apparently in +earnest, is not worthy to be heard again on this matter; and if, as we turn +away, our eyes grow dim with the memory of a vanished dream, surely we may +feel that the preacher is deserving of our blame for obtruding thus upon +the most sacred of our sorrows. + +Mr. John Fiske is, as is well known, an author who unites in himself the +qualities of a well-read student of philosophy, a clear and accurate +thinker, a thorough master of the principles which in his recent work he +undertakes to explain and to extend, and a writer gifted in a remarkable +degree with the power of lucid exposition. Such being the intellectual +calibre of the man who elaborates this new system of scientific theology, I +confess that, on first seeing his work, I experienced a faint hope that, in +the higher departments of the Philosophy of Evolution as conceived by Mr. +Spencer and elaborated by his disciple, there might be found some rational +justification for an attenuated form of Theism. But on examination I find +that the bread which these fathers have offered us turns out to be a stone; +and thinking that it is desirable to warn other of the children--whether of +the family Philosophical or Theological--against swallowing on trust a +morsel so injurious, I shall endeavour to point out what I conceive to be +the true nature of "Cosmic Theism." + +Starting from the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, Mr. Fiske, +following Mr. Spencer, proceeds to show how the doctrine implies that there +must be a mode of Being to which human knowledge is non-relative. Or, in +other words, he shows that the postulation of phenomena necessitates the +further postulation of noumena of which phenomena are the manifestations. +Now what may we affirm of noumena without departing from a scientific or +objective mode of philosophising? We may affirm at least this much of +noumena, that they constitute a mode of existence which need not +necessarily vanish were our consciousness to perish; and, therefore, that +they now stand out of necessary relation to our consciousness. Or, in other +words, so far as human consciousness is concerned, noumena must be regarded +as absolute. "But now, what do we mean by this affirmation of absolute +reality independent of the conditions of the process of knowing? Do we mean +to ... affirm, in language savouring strongly of scholasticism, that +beneath the phenomena which we call subjective there is an occult +substratum Mind, and beneath the phenomena which we call objective there is +an occult substratum Matter? Our conclusion cannot be stated in any such +form.... Our conclusion is simply this, that no theory of phenomena, +external or internal, can be framed without postulating an Absolute +Existence of which phenomena are the manifestations. And now let us +carefully note what follows. We cannot identify this Absolute Existence +with Mind, since what we know as Mind is a series of phenomenal +manifestations.... Nor can we identify this Absolute Existence with Matter, +since what we know as Matter is a series of phenomenal manifestations.... +Absolute Existence, therefore,--the Reality which persists independently of +us, and of which Mind and Matter are the phenomenal manifestations,--cannot +be identified either with Mind or with Matter. Thus is Materialism included +in the same condemnation with Idealism.... See then how far we have +travelled from the scholastic theory of occult substrata underlying each +group of phenomena. These substrata were but the ghosts of the phenomena +themselves; behind the tree or the mountain a sort of phantom tree or +mountain, which persists after the body of perception has gone away with +the departure of the percipient mind. Clearly this is no scientific +interpretation of the facts, but is rather a specimen of naïve barbaric +thought surviving in metaphysics. The tree or mountain being groups of +phenomena, what we assert as persisting independently of the percipient +mind is a something which we are unable to condition either as tree or as +mountain. + +"And now we come down to the very bottom of the problem. Since we do +postulate Absolute Existence, and do not postulate a particular occult +substance underlying each group of phenomena, are we to be understood as +implying that there is a single Being of which all phenomena, internal and +external to consciousness, are manifestations? Such must seem to be the +inevitable conclusion, since we are able to carry on thinking at all only +under the relations of Difference and No-difference.... It may seem that, +since we cannot attribute to the Absolute Reality any relations of +Difference, we must positively ascribe to it No-difference. Or, what is the +same thing, in refusing to predicate multiplicity of it, do we not +virtually predicate of it unity? We do, simply because we cannot think +without so doing."[38] + +A single Absolute Reality being thus posited, our author proceeds, towards +the close of his work, to argue that as this Reality cannot be conceived as +limited either in space or time, it constitutes a Being which corresponds +with our essential conception of Deity. True it is devoid of certain +accessory attributes, such as personality, intelligence, and volition; but +for this very reason, it is insisted, the theistic ideal as thus presented +is a purer, and therefore a better, ideal than has ever been presented +before. Nay, it is the highest possible form of this ideal, as the +following considerations will show. In what has consisted that continuous +purification of Theism which the history of thought shows to have been +effected, from the grossest form of belief in supernatural agency as +exhibited in Fetichism, through its more refined form as exhibited in +Polytheism, to its still more refined form as exhibited in Monotheism? In +nothing but in a continuous process of what Mr. Fiske calls +"deanthropomorphisation." Consequently, must we not conclude that when we +carry this process yet one step further, and divest our conception of Deity +of all the yet lingering remnants of anthropomorphism which occur in the +current conceptions of Deity, we are but still further purifying that +conception? Assuredly, the attributes of personality, intelligence, and so +forth, are only known as attributes of Humanity, and therefore to ascribe +them to Deity is but to foster, in a more refined form, the anthropomorphic +teachings of previous religions. But if we carefully refuse to limit Deity +by the ascription of any human attributes whatever, and if the only +attributes which we do ascribe are such as on grounds of pure reason alone +we are compelled to ascribe, must we not conclude that the form of Theism +which results is the purest and the most refined form in which it is +possible for Theism to exist? "From the anthropomorphic point of view it +will quite naturally be urged in objection, that this apparently desirable +result is reached through the degradation of Deity from an 'intelligent +personality' to a 'blind force,' and is therefore in reality an undesirable +and perhaps quasi-atheistic result."[39] But the question which really +presents itself is, "theologically phrased, whether the creature is to be +taken as a measure of the Creator. Scientifically phrased, the question is +whether the highest form of Being as yet suggested to one petty race of +creatures by its ephemeral experience of what is going on in one tiny +corner of the universe, is necessarily to be taken as the equivalent of +that absolutely highest form of Being in which all the possibilities of +existence are alike comprehended."[40] Therefore, in conclusion, "whether +or not it is true that, within the bounds of the phenomenal universe the +highest type of existence is that which we know as humanity, the conclusion +is in every way forced upon us that, quite independently of limiting +conditions in space or time, there is a form of Being which can neither be +assimilated to humanity nor to any lower type of existence. We have no +alternative, therefore, but to regard it as higher than humanity, even 'as +the heavens are higher than the earth,' and except for the intellectual +arrogance which the arguments of theologians show lurking beneath their +expressions of humility, there is no reason why this admission should not +be made unreservedly, without the anthropomorphic qualifications by which +its effect is commonly nullified. The time is surely coming when the +slowness of men in accepting such a conclusion will be marvelled at, and +when the very inadequacy of human language to express Divinity will be +regarded as a reason for a deeper faith and more solemn adoration."[41] + +I have now sufficiently detailed the leading principles of Cosmic Theism to +render a clear and just conception of those fundamental parts of the system +which I am about to criticise; but it is needless to say that, for all +minor details of this system, I must refer those who may not already have +perused them to Mr. Fiske's somewhat elaborate essays. In now beginning my +criticisms, it may be well to state at the outset, that they are to be +restricted to the philosophical aspect of the subject. With matters of +sentiment I do not intend to deal,--partly because to do so would be unduly +to extend this essay, and partly also because I believe that, so far as the +acceptance or the rejection of Cosmic Theism is to be determined by +sentiment, much, if not all, will depend on individual habits of thought. +For whether or not Cosmic Theism is to be regarded as a religion adapted to +the needs of any individual man, will depend on what these needs are felt +to be by that man himself: we cannot assert magisterially that this +religion must be adapted to his needs because we have found it to be +adapted to our own. And if it is retorted that, human nature being +everywhere the same, a form of religion that is adapted to one man must on +this account be adapted to another, I reply that it is not so. For if a man +who is what Mr. Fiske calls an "Anthropomorphic Theist" finds from +experience that his system of religion--say Christianity--creates and +sustains a class of emotions and general habits of thought which he feels +to be the highest and the best of which he is capable, it is useless for a +"Cosmic Theist" to offer such a man another system of religion, in which +the conditions essential to the existence of these particular emotions and +habits of thought are manifestly absent. For such a man cannot but feel +that the proffered substitution would be tantamount, if accepted, to an +utter destruction of all that he regards as essentially religious. He will +tell us that he finds it perfectly easy to understand and to appreciate +those feelings of vague awe and "worship of the silent kind" which the +Cosmic Theist declares to be fostered by Cosmic Theism; but he will also +tell us that those feelings, which he has experienced with equal vividness +under his own system of Anthropomorphic Theism, are to him but as +non-religious dross compared with the unspeakable felicity of holding +definite commune with the Almighty and Most Merciful, or of rendering +worship that is a glad hosanna--a fearless shout of joy. On the other hand, +I believe that it is possible for philosophic habits of thought so to +discipline the mind that the feelings of vague awe and silent worship in +the presence of an appalling Mystery become more deep and steady than a +theist proper can well believe. It is therefore impossible that either +party can fully appreciate those sentiments of the other which they have +never fully experienced themselves; for even in those cases where an +anthropomorphic theist has been compelled to abandon his creed, as the +change must take place in mature life, his tone of mind has been determined +before it does take place; and therefore in sentiment, though not in faith, +he is more or less of a theist for the rest of his life: the only effect of +the change is to create a troubled interference between his desires and his +beliefs. + +However, I do not intend to develop this branch of the subject further than +thus to point out, in a general way, that religion-mongers as a class are +apt to show too little regard for the sentiments, as distinguished from the +beliefs, of those to whom they offer their wares. But although I do not +intend to constitute myself a champion of theology by pointing out the +defects of Cosmic Theism in the aspect which it presents to current modes +of thought, there is one such defect which I must here dwell upon, because +we shall afterwards have occasion to refer to it. A theologian may very +naturally make this objection to Cosmic Theism as presented by Mr. +Fiske--viz., that the argument on which this philosopher throughout relies +as a self-evident demonstration that the new system of Theism is a further +and a final improvement on all the previous systems of Theism, is a +fallacious argument. As we have already seen, this argument is, that as the +progress in the purification of Theism has throughout consisted in a +process of "deanthropomorphisation," therefore the terminal phase in this +process, which Cosmic Theism introduces, must be still in the direction of +that progress. But to this argument a theologian may not unreasonably +object, that this terminal phase differs from all the previous phases in +one all-important feature--viz., in effecting a _total abolition_ of the +anthropomorphic element. Before, therefore, it can be shown that this +terminal phase is a further development of _Theism_, it must he shown that +Theism still remains Theism after this hitherto characteristic element has +been removed. If it is true, as Mr. Fiske very properly insists, that all +the various forms of belief in God have thus far had this as a common +factor, that they ascribed to God the attributes of Man; it becomes a +question whether we may properly abstract this hitherto invariable factor +of a belief, and still call that belief by the same name. Or, to put the +matter in another light, as cosmists maintain that Theism, in all the +phases of its development, has been the product of a probably erroneous +theory of personal agency in nature, when this theory is expressly +discarded--as it is by the doctrine of the Unknowable--is it +philosophically legitimate for cosmists to render their theory of things in +terms which belong to the totally different theory which they discard? No +doubt it is true that the progressive refinement of Theism has throughout +consisted in a progressive discarding of anthropomorphic qualities; but +this fact does not touch the consideration that, when we proceed to strip +off the last remnants of these qualities, we are committing an act which +differs _toto coelo_ from all the previous acts which are cited as +precedents; for by this terminal act we are not, as heretofore, _refining_ +the theory of Theism--we are completely _transforming_ it by removing an +element which, both genetically and historically, would seem to constitute +the very essence of Theism. + +Or the case may be presented in yet another light. The only use of terms, +whether in daily talk or in philosophical disquisition, is that of +designating certain things or attributes to which by general custom we +agree to affix them; so that if anyone applies a term to some thing or +attribute which general custom does not warrant him in so applying, he is +merely laying himself open to the charge of abusing that term. Now apply +these elementary principles to the case before us. We have but to think of +the disgust with which the vast majority of living persons would regard the +sense in which Mr. Fiske uses the term "Theism," to perceive how intimate +is the association of that term with the idea of a Personal God. Such +persons will feel strongly that, by this final act of purification, Mr. +Fiske has simply purified the Deity altogether out of existence. And I +scarcely think it is here competent to reply that all previous acts of +purification were at first similarly regarded as destructive, because it is +evident that none of these previous acts affected, as this one does, the +central core of Theism. And, lastly, if it should be still further +objected, that by declaring the theory of Personal Agency the central core +of Theism, I am begging the question as to the appropriateness of Mr. +Fiske's use of the word "Theism,"--seeing he appears to regard the +essential meaning of this word to be that of a postulation of merely Causal +Agency,--I answer, More of this anon; but meanwhile let it be observed that +any charge of question-begging lies rather at the door of Mr. Fiske, in +that he assumes, without any expressed justification, that the essence of +Theism _does_ consist in such a postulation and in nothing more. And as he +unquestionably has against him the present world of theists no less than +the history of Theism in the past, I do not see how he is to meet this +charge except by confessing to an abuse of the term in question. + +I will now proceed to examine the structure of Cosmic Theism. We are all, I +suppose, at one in allowing that there are only three "verbally +intelligible" theories of the universe,--viz., that it is self-existent, or +that it is self-created, or that it has been created by some other and +external Being. It is usual to call the first of these theories Atheism, +the second Pantheism, and the third Theism. Now as there are here three +distinct nameable theories, it is necessary, if the term "Cosmic Theism" is +to be justified as an appropriate term, that the particular theory which it +designates should be shown to be in its essence theistic--_i.e._, that the +theory should present those distinguishing features in virtue of which +Theism differs from Atheism on the one hand, and from Pantheism on the +other. Now what are these features? The postulate of an Eternal +Self-existing Something is common to Theism and to Atheism. Here Atheism +ends. Theism, however, is generally said to assume Personality, +Intelligence, and Creative Power as attributes of the single self-existing +substance. Lastly, Pantheism assumes the Something now existing to have +been self-created. To which, then, of these distinct theories is Cosmic +Theism most nearly allied? For the purpose of answering this question, I +shall render that theory in terms of a formula which Mr. Fiske presents as +a full and complete statement of the theory:--"_There exists a_ POWER, _to +which no limit in space or time is conceivable, of which all phenomena, as +presented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can only know +through these manifestations._" But although the word "Power" is here so +strongly emphasised, we are elsewhere told that it is not to be regarded as +having more than a strictly relative or symbolic meaning; so that, in point +of fact, some more neutral word, such as "Something," "Being," or +"Substance," ought in strictness to be here substituted for the word +"Power." Well, if this is done, we have the postulation of a Being which is +self-existing, infinite, and eternal--relatively, at all events, to our +powers of conception. Thus far, therefore, it would seem that we are still +on the common standing-ground of Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism; for as it +is not, so far as I can see, incumbent on Pantheism to affirm that "thought +is a measure of things," the _apparent_ or _relative_ eternity which the +Primal Something must be supposed to present may not be _actual_ or +_absolute_ eternity. Nevertheless, as Mr. Fiske, by predicating Divinity of +the Primal Something, implicitly attributes to it the quality of an +_eternal_ self-existence, I infer that Cosmic Theism may be concluded at +this point to part company with Pantheism. There remain, then, Theism and +Atheism. + +Now undoubtedly, at first sight, Cosmic Theism appears to differ from +Atheism in one all-important particular. For we have seen that, by means of +a subtle though perfectly logical argument, Cosmic Philosophy has evolved +this conclusion--that all phenomena as presented in consciousness are +manifestations of a not improbable Single Self-existing Power, of whose +existence these manifestations alone can make us cognisant. From which it +apparently follows, that this hypothetical Power must be regarded as +existing out of necessary relation to the phenomenal universe; that it is, +therefore, beyond question "Absolute Being;" and that, as such, we are +entitled to call it Deity. But in the train of reasoning of which this is a +very condensed epitome, it is evident that the legitimacy of denominating +this Absolute Being Deity, must depend on the exact meaning which we attach +to the word "Absolute"--and this, be it observed, quite apart from the +question, before touched upon, as to whether Personality and Intelligence +are not to be considered as attributes essential to Deity. In what sense, +then, is the word "Absolute" used? It is used in this sense. As from the +relativity of knowledge we cannot know things in themselves, but only +symbolical representations of such things, therefore things in themselves +are absolute to consciousness: but analysis shows that we cannot +conceivably predicate Difference among things in themselves, so that we are +at liberty, with due diffidence, to predicate of them No-difference: hence +the noumena of the schoolmen admit of being collected into a _summum genus_ +of noumenal existence; and since, before their colligation noumena were +severally absolute, after their colligation they become collectively +absolute: therefore it is legitimate to designate this sum-total of +noumenal existence, "Absolute Being." Now there is clearly no exception to +be taken to the formal accuracy of this reasoning; the only question is as +to whether the "Absolute Being" which it evolves is absolute in the sense +required by Theism. I confess that to me this Being appears to be absolute +in a widely different sense from that in which Deity must be regarded as +absolute. For this Being is thus seen to be absolute in no other sense than +as holding--to quote from Mr. Fiske--"existence independent of the +conditions of the process of knowing." In other words, it is absolute only +as standing out of necessary relation to _human consciousness_. But Theism +requires, as an essential feature, that Deity should be absolute as +standing out of necessary relation to _all else_. Before, therefore, the +Absolute Being of Cosmism can be shown, by the reasoning adopted, to +deserve, even in part, the appellation of Deity, it must be shown that +there is no other mode of Being in existence save our own subjective +consciousness and the Absolute Reality which becomes objective to it +through the world of phenomena. But any attempt to establish this position +would involve a disregard of the doctrine that knowledge is relative; and +to do this, it is needless to say, would be to destroy the basis of the +argument whereby the Absolute Being of Cosmism was posited. + +Or, to state this part of the criticism in other words, as the first step +in justifying the predication of Deity, it must be shown that the Being of +which the predication is made is absolute, and this not merely as +independent of human consciousness, but as independent of the whole +noumenal universe--Deity itself alone excepted. That is, the Being of which +Deity is predicated must be Unconditioned. Hence it is incumbent on Cosmic +Theism to prove, either that the Causal Agent which it denominates Deity is +itself the whole noumenal universe, or that it created the rest of a +noumenal universe; else there is nothing to show that this Causal Agent was +not itself created--seeing that, even if we assume the existence of a God, +there is nothing to indicate that the Causal Agent of Cosmism is that God. + +It would appear therefore from this, that whatever else the Cosmist's +theory of things may be, it certainly is not Theism; and I think that +closer inspection will tend to confirm this judgment. To this then let us +proceed. + +Mr. Fiske is very hard on the atheists, and so will probably repudiate with +scorn any insinuations to the effect that his theory of things is +"quasi-atheistic." Nevertheless, it seems to me that he is very unjust to +the atheists, in that while he spares no pains to "purify" and "refine" the +theory of the theists, so as at last to leave nothing but what he regards +as the distilled essence of Theism behind; he habitually leaves the theory +of the atheists as he finds it, without making any attempt either to +"purify" it by removing its weak and unnecessary ingredients, or to +"refine" it by adding such sublimated ingredients as modern speculation has +supplied. Thus, while he despises the atheists of the eighteenth century +for their irrationality in believing in the self-existence of a +_phenomenal_ universe, and reviles them for their irreligion in denying +that "the religious sentiment needed satisfaction;" he does not wait to +inquire whether, in its essential substance, the theory of these men is not +the one that has proved itself best able to withstand the grinding action +of more recent thought. But let us in fairness ask, What was the essential +substance of that theory? Apparently it was the bare statement of the +unthinkable fact that Something Is. It therefore seems to me useless in Mr. +Fiske to lay so much stress on the fact that this Something was originally +identified by atheists with the phenomenal universe. It seems useless to do +this, because such identification is clearly no part of the _essence_ of +Atheism, which, as just stated, I take to consist in the single dogma of +self-existence as itself sufficient to constitute a theory of things. And, +if so, it is a matter of scarcely any moment, as regards that theory, +whether we are _immediately_ cognisant of that which is self-existent, or +only become so through the world of phenomena--the vital point of the +theory being, that Self-existence, _wherever posited_, is itself the only +admissible explanation of phenomena. Or, in other words, it does not seem +that there is anything in the atheistic theory, as such, which is +incompatible with the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge; so that +whatever cogency there may be in the train of reasoning whereby a single +Causal Agent is deduced from that doctrine, it would seem that an atheist +has as much right to the benefit of this reasoning as a theist; and there +is thus no more apparent reason why this single Causal Agent should be +appropriated as the God of Theism, than that it should be appropriated as +the Self-existing X of Atheism. Indeed, there seems to be less reason. For +an atheist of to-day may very properly argue:--'So far from beholding +anything divine in this Single Being absolute to human consciousness, it is +just precisely the form of Being which my theory postulates as the +Self-existing All. In order to constitute such a Being God, it must be +shown, as we have already seen, to be something more than a merely Causal +Agent which is absolute in the grotesquely restricted sense of being +independent of 'one petty race of creatures with an ephemeral experience of +what is going on in one tiny corner of the universe;' it must be shown to +be something more than absolute even in the wholly unrestricted sense of +being Unconditioned; it must be shown to possess such other attributes as +are distinctive of Deity. For I maintain that even Unconditioned Being, +_merely as such_, would only then have a right to the name of God when it +has been shown that the theory of Theism has a right to monopolise the +doctrine of Relativity.' + +In thus endeavouring to "purify" the theory of Atheism, by divesting it of +all superfluous accessories, and laying bare what I conceive to be its +essential substance; it may be well to state that, even apart from their +irreligious character, I have no sympathy with the atheists of the past +century. I mean, that these men do not seem to me to deserve any credit for +advanced powers of speculation merely because they adopted a theory of +things which in its essential features now promises to be the most +enduring. For it is evident that the strength of this theory now lies in +its _simplicity_,--in its undertaking to explain, so far as explanation is +possible, the sum-total of phenomena by the single postulate of +self-existence. But it seems to me that in the last century there were no +sufficient data for rendering such a theory of things a rational theory; +for so long as the quality of self-existence was supposed to reside in +phenomena themselves, the very simplicity of the theory, as expressed in +words, must have seemed to render it inapplicable as a reasonable theory of +things. The astounding variety, complexity, and harmony which are +everywhere so conspicuous in the world of phenomena must have seemed to +necessitate as an explanation some one integrating cause; and it is +impossible that in the eighteenth century any such integrating cause can +have been conceivable other than Intelligence. Therefore I think, with Mr. +Fiske, that the atheists of the eighteenth century were irrational in +applying their single postulate of self-existence as alone a sufficient +explanation of things. But of course the aspect of the case is now +completely changed, when we regard it in all the flood of light which has +been shed on it by recent science, physical and speculative. For the +demonstration of the fact that energy is indestructible, coupled with the +corollary that every so-called natural law is a physically necessary +consequence of that fact, clearly supply us with a completely novel datum +as the ultimate source of experience--and a datum, moreover, which is as +different as can well be imagined from the ever-changing, ever-fleeting, +world of phenomena. We have, therefore, but to apply the postulate of +self-existence to this single ultimate datum, and we have a theory of +things as rational as the Atheism of the last century was irrational. +Nevertheless, that this theory is more akin to the Atheism of the last +century than to any other theory of that time, is, I think, unquestionable; +for while we retain the central doctrine of self-existence as alone a +scientifically admissible, or non-gratuitous, explanation of things, we +only change the original theory by transferring the application of this +doctrine from the world of manifestations to that which causes the +manifestations: we do not resort to any of the _additional_ doctrines +whereby the other theories of the universe were distinguished from the +theory of Atheism in its original form. However, as by our recognition of +the relativity of knowledge we are precluded from dogmatically denying any +theory of the universe that may be proposed, it would clearly be erroneous +to identify the doctrine of the Unknowable with the theory of Atheism: all +we can say is, that, so far as speculative thought can soar, the permanent +self-existence of an inconceivable Something, which manifests itself to +consciousness as force and matter, constitutes the only datum that can be +shown to be required for the purposes of a rational ontology. + +To sum up. In the theory which Mr. Fiske calls Cosmic Theism, while I am +able to discern the elements which I think may properly be regarded as +common to Theism and to Atheism, I am not able to discern any single +element that is specifically distinctive of Theism. Still I am far from +concluding that the theory in question is the theory of Atheism. All I wish +to insist upon is this--that as the Absolute Being of Cosmism presents no +other qualities than such as are required by the renovated theory of +Atheism, its postulation supplies a basis, not for Theism, but for +Non-theism: a man with such a postulate ought in strictness to abstain from +either affirming or denying the existence of God. And this, I may observe, +appears to be the position which Mr. Spencer himself has adopted as the +only logical outcome of his doctrine of the Unknowable--a position which, +in my opinion, it is most undesirable to obscure by endeavouring to give it +a quasi-theistic interpretation. I may further observe, that we here seem +to have a philosophical justification of the theological sentiment +previously alluded to--the sentiment, namely, that by his attempt at a +final purification of Theism, Mr. Fiske has destroyed those essential +features of the theory in virtue of which alone it exists as Theism. For +seeing it is impossible, from the relativity of knowledge, that the +Absolute Being of Cosmism can ever be shown absolute in the sense required +by Theism, and, even if it could, that it would still be but the +Unconditioned Being of Atheism; it follows that if this Absolute Being is +to be shown even in part to deserve the appellation of Deity, it must be +shown to possess the only remaining attributes which are distinctive of +Deity--to wit, personality and intelligence. But forasmuch as the final act +of purifying the conception of Deity consists, according to Mr. Fiske, in +expressly removing these particular attributes from the object of that +conception, does it not follow that the conception which remains is, as I +have said, not theistic, but non-theistic? + +Here my criticism might properly have ended, were it not that Mr. Fiske, +after having divested the Deity of all his psychical attributes, forthwith +proceeds to show how it may be dimly possible to reinvest him with +attributes that are "quasi-psychical." Mr. Fiske is, of course, far too +subtle a thinker not to see that his previous argument from relativity +precludes him from assigning much weight to the ontological speculations in +which he here indulges, seeing that in whatever degree the relativity of +knowledge renders legitimate the non-ascription to Deity of known psychical +attributes, in some such degree at least must it render illegitimate the +ascription to Deity of unknown psychical attributes. But in the part of his +work in which he treats of the quasi-psychical attributes, Mr. Fiske is +merely engaged in showing that the speculative standing of the +"materialists" is inferior to that of the "spiritualists;" so that, as this +is a subject distinct from Theism, he is not open to the charge of +inconsistency. Well, feeble as these speculations undoubtedly are in the +support which they render to Theism, it nevertheless seems desirable to +consider them before closing this review. The speculations in question are +quoted from Mr. Spencer, and are as follows:-- + +"Mind, as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of +activities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another, +throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of which +they are the activities. But the same experiences which make him aware of +this coherent aggregate of mental activities, simultaneously make him aware +of activities that are not included in it--outlying activities which become +known by their effects on this aggregate, but which are experimentally +proved to be not coherent with it, and to be coherent with one another +(_First Principles_, §§ 43, 44). As, by the definition of them, these +external activities cannot be brought within the aggregate of activities +distinguished as those of Mind, they must for ever remain to him nothing +more than the unknown correlatives of their effects on this aggregate; and +can be thought of only in terms furnished by this aggregate. Hence, if he +regards his conceptions of these activities lying beyond Mind as +constituting knowledge of them, he is deluding himself: he is but +representing these activities in terms of Mind, and can never do otherwise. +Eventually he is obliged to admit that his ideas of Matter and Motion, +merely symbolic of unknowable realities, are complex states of +consciousness built out of units of feeling. But if, after admitting this, +he persists in asking whether units of feeling are of the same nature as +the units of force distinguished as external, or whether the units of force +distinguished as external are of the same nature as units of feeling; then +the reply, still substantially the same, is that we may go further towards +conceiving units of external force to be identical with units of feeling, +than we can towards conceiving units of feeling to be identical with units +of external force. Clearly, if units of external force are regarded as +absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into +them is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And if +they are what they are supposed to be by those who identify them with their +symbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is +insurmountable: if Force as it objectively exists is absolutely alien in +nature from that which exists subjectively as Feeling, then the +transformation of Force into Feeling is unthinkable. Either way, therefore, +it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence. +But if, on the other hand, units of Force as they exist objectively are +essentially the same in nature with those manifested subjectively as units +of Feeling, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of +that aggregate of activities constituting a consciousness is known as +belonging to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond the +limits of this coherent aggregate of activities exist activities quite +independent of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine, +then, that by their exclusion from the circumscribed activities +constituting consciousness, these outer activities, though of the same +intrinsic nature, become antithetically opposed in aspect. Being +disconnected from consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are thereby +rendered foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, or +linked with these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it +were, run through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious--are +symbolised as having the nature called material, as opposed to that called +spiritual. While, however, it thus seems an imaginable possibility that +units of external Force may be identical in nature with units of the force +known as Feeling, yet we cannot by so representing them get any nearer to a +comprehension of external Force. For, as already shown, supposing all forms +of Mind to be composed of homogeneous units of feeling variously +aggregated, the resolution of them into such units leaves us as unable as +before to think of the substance of Mind as it exists in such units; and +thus, even could we really figure to ourselves all units of external Force +as being essentially like units of the force known as Feeling, and as so +constituting a universal sentiency, we should be as far as ever from +forming a conception of that which is universally sentient."[42] + +Now while I agree with Mr. Fiske that we have here "the most subtle +conclusion now within the ken of the scientific speculator, reached without +any disregard of the canons prescribed by the doctrine of relativity," I +would like to point out to minds less clear-sighted than his, that this +same "doctrine of relativity" effectually debars us from using this +"conclusion" as an argument of any assignable value in favour of Theism. +For the value of conceivability as a test of truth, on which this +conclusion is founded, is here vitiated by the consideration that, +_whatever_ the nature of Force-units may be, we can clearly perceive it to +be a subjective necessity of the case that they should admit of being more +easily conceived by us to be of the nature of Feeling-units than to be of +any other nature. For as units of Feeling are the only entities of which we +are, or can be, conscious, they are the entities into which units of Force +must be, so to speak, subjectively translated before we can cognise their +existence at all. Therefore, _whatever_ the real nature of Force-units may +be, ultimate analysis must show that it is more conceivable to identify +them in thought with the only units of which we are cognisant, than it is +to think of them as units of which we are not cognisant, and concerning +which, therefore, conception is necessarily impossible. Or thus, the only +alternative with respect to the classifying of Force-units lies between +refusing to classify them at all, or classifying them with the only +ultimate units with which we are acquainted. But this restriction, for +aught that can ever be shown to the contrary, arises only from the +subjective conditions of our own consciousness; there is nothing to +indicate that, in objective reality, units of Force are in any wise akin to +units of Feeling. Conceivability, therefore, as a test of truth, is in this +particular case of no assignable degree of value; for as the entities to +which it is applied are respectively the highest known abstractions of +subjective and objective existence, the test of conceivability is +neutralised by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that +subsists between subject and object. I think, therefore, it is evident that +these ontological speculations present no sufficient warrant for an +inference, even of the slenderest kind, that the Absolute Being of Cosmism +possesses attributes of a nature quasi-psychical; and, if so, it follows +that these speculations are incompetent to form the basis of a theory +which, even by the greatest stretch of courtesy, can in any legitimate +sense be termed quasi-theistic.[43] + +On the whole, then, I conclude that the term "Cosmic Theism" is not an +appropriate term whereby to denote the theory of things set forth in +"Cosmic Philosophy;" and that it would therefore be more judicious to leave +the doctrine of the Unknowable as Mr. Spencer has left it--that is, without +theological implications of any kind. But in now taking leave of this +subject, I should like it to be understood that the only reason why I have +ventured thus to take exception to a part of Mr. Fiske's work is because I +regret that a treatise which displays so much of literary excellence and +philosophic power should lend itself to promoting what I regard as mistaken +views concerning the ontological tendencies of recent thought, and this +with no other apparent motive than that of unworthily retaining in the new +philosophy a religious term the distinctive connotations of which are +considered by that philosophy to have become obsolete. + + * * * * * + + +II. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IN REPLY TO A RECENT WORK ON THEISM.[44] + +On perusing my main essay several years after its completion, it occurred +to me that another very effectual way of demonstrating the immense +difference between the nature of all previous attacks upon the teleological +argument and the nature of the present attack, would be briefly to review +the reasonable objections to which all the previous attacks were open. Very +opportunely a work on Theism has just been published which states these +objections with great lucidity, and answers them with much ability. The +work to which I allude is by the Rev. Professor Flint, and as it is +characterised by temperate candour in tone and logical care in exposition, +I felt on reading it that the work was particularly well suited for +displaying the enormous change in the speculative standing of Theism which +the foregoing considerations must be rationally deemed to have effected. I +therefore determined on throwing my supplementary essay, which I had +previously intended to write, into the form of a criticism on Professor +Flint's treatise, and I adopted this course the more willingly because +there are several other points dwelt upon in that treatise which it seems +desirable for me to consider in the present one, although, for the sake of +conciseness, I abstained from discussing them in my previous essay. With +these two objects in view, therefore, I undertook the following +criticism.[45] + +In the first place, it is needful to protest against an argument which our +author adopts on the authority of Professor Clark Maxwell. The argument is +now a well-known one, and is thus stated by Professor Maxwell in his +presidential address before the British Association for the Advancement of +Science, 1870:--"None of the processes of nature, since the time when +nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of +any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of +the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any +of the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact quality +of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John +Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, +and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. Thus we have +been led along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which +science must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the external +mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from +investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing +back the history of matter, science is arrested when she assures herself, +on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that +it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural." + +Now it is obvious that we have here no real argument, since it is obvious +that science can never be in a position to assert that atoms, the very +existence of which is hypothetical, were never "made by any of the +processes we call natural." The mere fact that in the universe, as we now +know it, the evolution of material atoms is not observed to be taking place +"by any of the processes we call natural," cannot possibly be taken as +proof, or even as presumption, that there ever was a time when the material +atoms now in existence were created by a supernatural cause. The fact +cannot be taken to justify any such inference for the following reasons. In +the first place, assuming the atomic theory to be true, and there is +nothing in the argument to show that the now-existing atoms are not +self-existing atoms, endowed with their peculiar and severally distinctive +properties from all eternity. Doubtless the argument is, that as there +appear to be some sixty or more elementary atoms constituting the raw +material of the observable universe, it is incredible that they can all +have owed their correlated properties to any cause other than that of a +designing and manufacturing intelligence. But, in the next place--and here +comes the demolishing force of the criticism--science is not in a position +to assert that these sixty or more elementary atoms are in any real sense +of the term elementary. The mere fact that chemistry is as yet in too +undeveloped a condition to pronounce whether or not all the forms of matter +known to her are modifications of some smaller number of elements, or even +of a single element, cannot possibly be taken as a warrant for so huge an +inference as that there are really more than sixty elements all endowed +with absolutely distinctive properties by a supernatural cause. Now this +consideration, which arises immediately from the doctrine of the relativity +of knowledge, is alone amply sufficient to destroy the present argument. +But we must not on this account lose sight of the fact that, even to our +strictly relative science in its present embryonic condition, we are not +without decided indications, not only that the so-called elements are +probably for the most part compounds, but even that matter as a whole is +one substance, which is itself probably but some modification of energy. +Indeed, the whole tendency of recent scientific speculation is towards the +view that the universe consists of some one substance, which, whether +self-existing or created, is diverse only in its relation to ignorance. And +if this view is correct, how obvious is the inference which I have +elaborated in § 32, that all the diverse forms of matter, as we know them, +were probably evolved by natural causes. So obvious, indeed, is this +inference, that to resort to any supernatural hypothesis to explain the +diverse properties of the various chemical elements appears to me a most +glaring violation of the law of parcimony--as much more glaring, for +instance, than the violation of this law by Paley, as the number and +variety of organic species are greater than the number and variety of +chemical species. And if it was illegitimate in Paley to use a mere absence +of knowledge as to how the transmutation of apparently fixed species of +animals was effected as equivalent to the possession of knowledge that such +transmutation had not been effected, how much more illegitimate must it be +to commit a similar sin against logic in the case of the chemical elements, +where our classification is confessedly beset with numberless difficulties, +and when we begin to discern that in all probability it is a classification +essentially artificial. Lastly, the mere fact that the transmutation of +chemical species and the evolution of chemical "atoms" are processes which +we do not now observe as occurring in nature, is surely a consideration of +a far more feeble kind than it is even in the case of biological species +and biological evolution; seeing that nature's laboratory must be now so +inconceivably different from what it was during the condensation of the +nebula. What an atrocious piece of arrogance, therefore, it is to assert +that "none of the processes of nature, _since the time when nature began_, +have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule!" +No one can entertain a higher respect for Professor Clark Maxwell than I +do; but a single sentence of such a kind as this cannot leave two opinions +in any impartial mind concerning his competency to deal with such subjects. + +I am therefore sorry to see this absurd argument approvingly incorporated +in Professor Flint's work. He says, "I believe that no reply to these words +of Professor Clark Maxwell is possible from any one who holds the ordinary +view of scientific men as to the ultimate constitution of matter. They must +suppose every atom, every molecule, to be of such a nature, to be so +related to others and to the universe generally, that things may be such as +we see them to be; but this their fitness to be built up into the structure +of the universe is a proof that they have been made fit, and since natural +forces could not have acted on them while not yet existent, a supernatural +power must have created them, and created them with a view to their +manifold uses." Here the inference so confidently drawn would have been a +weak one even were we not able to see that the doctrine of natural +evolution probably applies to inorganic nature no less than to organic. For +the inference is drawn from considerations of a character so transcendental +and so remote from science, that unless we wish to be deceived by a merely +verbal argument, we must feel that the possibilities of error in the +inference are so numerous and indefinite, that the inference itself is +well-nigh worthless as a basis of belief. But when we add that in Chapter +IV. of the foregoing essay it has been shown to be within the legitimate +scope of scientific reasoning to conclude that material atoms have been +progressively evolved _pari passu_ with the natural laws of chemical +combination, it is evident that any force which the present argument could +ever have had must now be pronounced as neutralised. Natural causes have +been shown, so far as scientific inference can extend, as not improbably +sufficient to produce the observed effects; and therefore we are no longer +free to invoke the hypothetical action of any supernatural cause. + +The same observations apply to Professor Flint's theistic argument drawn +from recent scientific speculations as to the vortex-ring construction of +matter. If these speculations are sound, their only influence on Theism +would be that of supplying a scientific demonstration of the substantial +identity of Force and Matter, and so of supplying a still more valid basis +for the theory as to the natural genesis of matter from a single primordial +substance, in the manner sketched out in Chapter IV. For the argument +adduced by Professor Flint, that as the manner in which the vorticial +motion of a ring is originated has not as yet been suggested, therefore its +origination must have been due to a "Divine impulse," is an argument which +again uses the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its possession. We are +in the presence of a very novel and highly abstruse theory, or rather +hypothesis, in physics, which was originally suggested by, and has hitherto +been mainly indebted to, empirical experiments as distinguished from +mathematical calculations; and from the mere fact that, in the case of such +a hypothesis, mathematicians have not as yet been able to determine the +physical conditions required to originate vorticial motion, we are expected +to infer that no such conditions can ever have existed, and therefore that +every such vortex system, if it exists, is a miracle! + +And substantially the same criticism applies to the argument which +Professor Flint adduces--the argument also on which Professors Balfour and +Tait lay so much stress in their work on the _Unseen Universe_--the +argument, namely, as to the non-eternal character of heat. The calculations +on which this argument depends would only be valid as sustaining this +argument if they were based upon a knowledge of the universe _as a whole_; +and therefore, as before, the absence of requisite knowledge must not be +used as equivalent to its possession. + +These, however, are the weakest parts of Professor Flint's work. I +therefore gladly turn to those parts which are exceedingly cogent as +written from his standpoint, but which, in view of the strictures on the +teleological argument that I have adduced in Chapters IV. and VI., I submit +to be now wholly valueless. + +"How could matter of itself produce order, even if it were self-existent +and eternal? It is far more unreasonable to believe that the atoms or +constituents of matter produced of themselves, without the action of a +Supreme Mind, this wonderful universe, than that the letters of the English +alphabet produced the plays of Shakespeare, without the slightest +assistance from the human mind known by that famous name. These atoms +might, perhaps, now and then, here and there, at great distances and long +intervals, produce by a chance contact some curious collocation or +compound; but never could they produce order or organisation on an +extensive scale, or of a durable character, unless ordered, arranged, and +adjusted in ways of which intelligence alone can be the ultimate +explanation. To believe that these fortuitous and indirected movements +could originate the universe, and all the harmonies and utilities and +beauties which abound in it, evinces a credulity far more extravagant than +has ever been displayed by the most superstitious of religionists. Yet no +consistent materialist can refuse to accept this colossal chance +hypothesis. All the explanations of the order of the universe which +materialists, from Democritus and Epicurus to Diderot and Lange, have +devised, rest on the assumption that the elements of matter, being eternal, +must pass through infinite combinations, and that one of these must be our +present world--a special collocation among the countless millions of +collocations, past and future. Throw the letters of the Greek alphabet, it +has been said, an infinite number of times, and you must produce the +'Iliad' and all the Greek books. The theory of probabilities, I need hardly +say, requires us to believe nothing so absurd.... But what is the 'Iliad' +to the hymn of creation and the drama of providence?" &c. + +Now this I conceive to have been a fully valid argument at the time it was +published, and indeed the most convincing of all the arguments in favour of +Theism. But, as already so frequently pointed out, the considerations +adduced in Chapter IV. of the present work are utterly destructive of this +argument. For this argument assumes, rightly enough, that the only +alternative we have in choosing our hypothesis concerning the final +explanation of things is either to regard that explanation as Intelligence +or as Fortuity. This, I say, was a legitimate argument a few months ago, +because up to that time no one had shown that strictly natural causes, as +distinguished from chances, could conceivably be able to produce a cosmos; +and although the several previous writers to whom Professor Flint +alludes--and he might have alluded to others in this +connection--entertained a dim anticipation of the fact that natural causes +might alone be sufficient to produce the observed universe, still these dim +anticipations were worthless as _arguments_ so long as it remained +impossible to suggest any natural _principle_ whereby such a result could +have been conceivably effected by such causes. But it is evident that +Professor Flint's time-honoured argument is now completely overthrown, +unless it can be proved that there is some radical error in the reasoning +whereby I have endeavoured to show that natural causes not only _may_, but +_must_, have produced existing order. The overthrow is complete, because +the very groundwork of the argument in question is knocked away; a third +possibility, of the nature of a necessity, is introduced, and therefore the +alternative is no longer between Intelligence and Fortuity, but between +Intelligence and Natural Causation. Whereas the overwhelming strength of +the argument from Order has hitherto consisted in the supposition of +Intelligence as the one and only conceivable cause of the integration of +things, my exposition in Chapter IV. has shown that such integration must +have been due, at all events in a relative or proximate sense, to a +strictly physical cause--the persistence of force and the consequent +self-evolution of natural law. And the question as to whether or not +Intelligence may not have been the absolute or ultimate cause is manifestly +a question altogether alien to the argument from Order; for if existing +order admits of being accounted for, in a relative or proximate sense, by +merely physical causes, the argument from a relative or proximate order is +not at liberty to infer or to assume the existence of any higher or more +ultimate cause. Although, therefore, in Chapter V., I have been careful to +point out that the fact of existing order having been due to proximate or +natural causes does not actually _disprove_ the possible existence of an +ultimate and supernatural cause, still it must be carefully observed that +this _negative_ fact cannot possibly justify any _positive_ inference to +the existence of such a cause. + +Thus, upon the whole, it may be said, without danger of reasonable dispute, +that as the argument from Order has hitherto derived its immense weight +entirely from the fact that Intelligence appeared to be the one and only +cause sufficient to produce the observed integration of the cosmos, this +immense weight has now been completely counterpoised by the demonstration +that other causes of a strictly physical kind must have been instrumental, +if not themselves alone sufficient, to produce this integration, So that, +just as in the case of Astronomy the demonstration of the one natural +principle of gravity was sufficient to classify under one physical +explanation several observed facts which many persons had previously +attributed to supernatural causes; and just as in the more complex science +of Geology the demonstration of the one principle of uniformitarianism was +sufficient to explain, without the aid of supernaturalism, a still greater +number of facts; and, lastly, just as in the case of the still more complex +science of Biology the demonstration of the one principle of natural +selection was sufficient to marshal under one scientific, or natural, +hypothesis an almost incalculable number of facts which were previously +explained by the metaphysical hypothesis of supernatural design; so in the +science which includes all other sciences, and which we may term the +science of Cosmology, I assert with confidence that in the one principle of +the persistence of force we have a demonstrably harmonising principle, +whereby all the facts within our experience admit of being collocated under +one natural explanation, without there being the smallest reason to +attribute these facts to any supernatural cause. + +But perhaps the immense change which these considerations must logically be +regarded as having produced in the speculative standing of the argument +from teleology will be better appreciated if I continue to quote from +Professor Flint's very forcible and thoroughly logical exposition of the +previous standing of this argument. He says:-- + +"To ascribe the origination of order to _law_ is a manifest evasion of the +real problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be explained. The +question is--Has law a reason, or is it without a reason? The unperverted +human mind cannot believe it to be without a reason." + +I do not know where a more terse and accurate statement of the case could +be found; and to my mind the question so lucidly put admits of the direct +answer--Law clearly has a reason of a purely physical kind. And therefore I +submit that the following quotation which Professor Flint makes from +Professor Jevons, logical as it was when written, must now be regarded as +embodying an argument which is obsolete. + +"As an unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in an +unlimited number of modes of distribution, there must, even granting matter +to have had all its laws from eternity, have been at some moment in time, +out of the unlimited choices and distributions possible, that one choice +and distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe that now +exists. Only out of rational choice can order have come." + +But clearly the alternative is now no longer one between chance and choice. +If natural laws arise by way of necessary consequence from the persistence +of a single self-existing substance, it becomes a matter of scientific +(though not of logical) demonstration that "the fair and orderly universe +that now exists" is the one and only universe that, in the nature of +things, _can_ exist. But to continue this interesting passage from Dr. +Flint's work--interesting not only because it sets forth the previous +standing of this subject with so much clearness, but also because the work +is of such very recent publication. + +"The most common mode, perhaps, of evading the problem which order presents +to reason is the indication of the process by which the order has been +realised. From Democritus to the latest Darwinian there have been men who +supposed they had completely explained away the evidences of design in +nature when they had described the physical antecedents of the arrangements +appealed to as evidences. Aristotle showed the absurdity of this +supposition more than 2200 years ago." + +Now this is a perfectly valid criticism on all such previous non-theistical +arguments as were drawn from an "indication of the process by which the +order has been realised;" for in all these previous arguments there was an +absence of any physical explanation of the _ultimate_ cause of the process +contemplated, and so long as this ultimate cause remained obscure, although +the evidence of design might by these arguments have been excluded from +particular processes, the evidence of design could not be similarly +excluded from the ultimate cause of these processes. Thus, for instance, it +is doubtless illogical, as Professor Flint points out, in any Darwinian to +argue that because his theory of natural selection supplies him with a +natural explanation of the process whereby organisms have been adapted to +their surroundings, therefore this process need not itself have been +designed. That is to say, in general terms, as insisted upon in the +foregoing essay, the discovery of a natural law or orderly process cannot +of itself justify the inference that this law or method of orderly +procedure is not itself a product of supernatural Intelligence; but, on the +contrary, the very existence of such orderly processes, considered only in +relation to their products, must properly be regarded as evidence of the +best possible kind in favour of supernatural Intelligence, _provided that +no natural cause can be suggested as adequate to explain the origin of +these processes_. But this is precisely what the persistence of force, +considered as a natural cause, must be pronounced as necessarily competent +to achieve; for we can clearly see that all these processes obviously must +and actually do derive their origin from this one causative principle. And +whether or not behind this one causative principle of natural law there +exists a still more ultimate cause in the form of a supernatural +Intelligence, this is a question altogether foreign to any argument from +teleology, seeing that teleology, in so far as it is _teleology_, can only +rest upon the observed facts of the cosmos; and if these facts admit of +being explained by the action of a single causative principle inherent in +the cosmos itself, teleology is not free to assume the action of any +causative principle of a more ultimate character. Still, as I have +repeatedly insisted, these considerations do not entitle us dogmatically to +deny the existence of some such more ultimate principle; all that these +considerations do is to remove any rational argument from teleological +sources that any such more ultimate principle exists. Therefore I am, of +course, quite at one with Professor Flint when he says Professor Huxley +"admits that the most thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume 'a +primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe +are the consequences,' and 'is thereby at the mercy of the theologist, who +can defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not +intended to involve the phenomena of the universe.' Granting this much, he +is logically bound to grant more. If the entire evolution of the universe +may have been intended, the several stages of its evolution may have been +intended, and they may have been intended for their own sakes as well as +for the sake of the collective evolution or its final result." Now that +such _may have been_ the case, I have been careful to insist in Chapter V.; +all I am now concerned with is to show that, in view of the considerations +adduced in Chapter IV., there is no longer any evidence to prove, or even +to indicate, that such _has been_ the case. And with reference to this +opportune quotation from Professor Huxley I may remark, that the +"thoroughgoing evolutionist" is now no longer "at the mercy of the +theologian" to any further extent than that of not being able to disprove a +purely metaphysical hypothesis, which is as certainly superfluous, in any +scientific sense, as the fundamental data of science are certainly true. + +It may seem almost unnecessary to extend this postscript by pursuing +further the criticism on Professor Flint's exposition in the light of "a +single new reason ... for the denial of design" which he challenges; but +there are nevertheless one or two other points which it seems desirable to +consider. Professor Flint writes:-- + +"M. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference from design, from the +order and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when he has +pointed out the physical conditions through which that order and stability +are secured, and the process by which they have been obtained.... Now the +assertion that the peculiarities which make the solar system stable and the +earth habitable have flowed naturally and necessarily from the simple +mutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter is one which greatly +requires proof, but which has never received it. In saying this, we do not +challenge the proof of the nebular theory itself. That theory may or may +not be true. We are quite willing to suppose it true--to grant that it has +been scientifically established. What we maintain is, that even if we admit +unreservedly that the earth and the whole system to which it belongs once +existed in a nebulous state, from which they were gradually evolved into +their present condition conformably to physical laws, we are in no degree +entitled to infer from the admission the conclusion which Comte and others +have drawn. The man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that the +law of gravitation, or any other physical law, has of itself determined the +course of cosmical evolution, so that there is no need for believing in the +existence and operation of a divine mind, proves merely that he is not +exempt from reasoning very illogically. The solar system could only have +been evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now presents if +the nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form, and constitution, if it +was neither too fluid nor too tenacious--if its atoms were all numbered, +its elements all weighed, its constituents all disposed in due relation to +one another; that is to say, only if the nebula was in reality as much a +system of order, which Intelligence alone could account for, as the worlds +which have been developed from it. The origin of the nebula thus presents +itself to reason as a problem which demands solution no less than the +origin of the planets. All the properties and laws of the nebula require to +be accounted for. What origin are we to give them? It must be either reason +or unreason. We may go back as far as we please, but, at every step and +stage of the regress we must find ourselves confronted with the same +question, the same alternative--intelligent purpose or colossal chance." + +Now, so far as Comte is here guilty of the fallacy I have already dwelt +upon of building a destructive argument upon a demonstration of mere +orderly processes in nature, as distinguished from a demonstration of the +natural cause of these processes, it is not for me to defend him. All we +can say with regard to him in this connection is, that, having a sort of +scientific presentiment that if the knowledge of his day were sufficiently +advanced it would prove destructive of supernaturalism in the higher and +more abstruse provinces of physical speculation, as it had previously +proved in the lower and less abstruse of these provinces, Comte allowed his +inferences to outrun their legitimate basis. Being necessarily ignorant of +the one generating cause of orderly processes in nature, he improperly +allowed himself to found conclusions on the basis of these processes alone, +which could only be properly founded on the basis of their cause. But +freely granting this much to Professor Flint, and the rest of his remarks +in this connection will be found, in view of the altered standing of this +subject, to be open to amendment. For, in the first place, no one need now +resort to the illogical supposition that "the law of gravitation or any +other physical law has of itself determined the course of cosmical +evolution." What we may argue, and what must be conceded to us, is, that +the common substratum of all physical laws was at one time sufficient to +produce the simplest physical laws, and that throughout the whole course of +evolution this common substratum has always been sufficient to produce the +more complex laws in the ascending series of their ever-increasing number +and variety. And hence it becomes obvious that the "origin of the nebula" +presents a difficulty neither greater nor less than "the origin of the +planets," since, "if we may go back as far as we please," we can entertain +no _scientific_ doubt that we should come to a time, prior even to the +nebula, when the substance of the solar system existed merely as +such--_i.e._, in an almost or in a wholly undifferentiated form, the +product, no doubt, of endless cycles of previous evolutions and +dissolutions of formal differentiations. Therefore, although it is +undoubtedly true that "the solar system could only have been evolved out of +its nebulous state into that which it now presents if the nebula possessed" +those particular attributes which were necessity to the evolution of such a +product, this consideration is clearly deprived of all its force from our +present point of view. For unless it can be shown that there is some +independent reason for believing these particular attributes--which must +have been of a more and more simple a character the further we recede in +time--to have been miraculously imposed, the analogy is overwhelming that +they all progressively arose _by way of natural law_. And if so, the +universe which has been thus produced is the only universe in this +particular point of space and time which could have been thus produced. +That it is an _orderly_ universe we have seen _ad nauseam_ to be no +argument in favour of its having been a _designed_ universe, so long as the +cause of its order--general laws--can be seen to admit of a natural +explanation. + +Thus there is clearly nothing to be gained on the side of teleology by +going back to the dim and dismal birth of the nebula; for no "thoroughgoing +evolutionist" would for one moment entertain the supposition that natural +law in the simplest phases of its development partook any more of a +miraculous character than it does in its more recent and vastly more +complex phases. The absence of knowledge must not be used as equivalent to +its presence; and if analogy can be held to justify any inference +whatsoever, surely we may conclude with confidence that if existing general +laws admit of being conceivably attributed to a natural genesis, the +primordial laws of a condensing nebula must have been the same. + +There is another passage in Professor Flint's work to which it seems +desirable to refer. It begins thus: "There is the law of heredity: like +produces like. But why is there such a law? Why does like produce like?... +Physical science cannot answer these questions; but that is no reason why +they should not both be asked and answered. I can conceive of no other +intelligent answer being given to them than that there is a God of wisdom, +who designed that the world should be for all ages the abode of life," &c. + +Now here we have in another form that same vicious tendency to take refuge +in the more obscure cases of physical causation as proofs of supernatural +design--the obscurity in this case arising from the _complexity_ of the +causes and work, as in the former case it arose from their _remoteness_ in +time. But in both cases the same answer is patent, viz., that although +"physical science cannot answer these questions" by pointing out the +precise sequence of causes and effects, physical science is nevertheless +quite as certain that this precise sequence arises in its last resort from +the persistence of force, as she would be were she able to trace the whole +process. And therefore, in view of the considerations set forth in Chapter +IV. of this work, it is no longer open to Professor Flint or to any other +writer logically to assert--"I can conceive of no other intelligent answer +being given to" such questions "than that there is a God of wisdom." + +The same answer awaits this author's further disquisition on other +biological laws, so it is needless to make any further quotations in this +connection. But there is one other principle embodied in some of these +passages which it seems undesirable to overlook. It is said, for instance, +"Natural selection might have had no materials, or altogether insufficient +materials, to work with, or the circumstances might have been such that the +lowest organisms were the best endowed for the struggle for life. If the +earth were covered with water, fish would survive and higher creatures +would perish." + +Now the principle here embodied--viz., that had the conditions of evolution +been other than they were, the results would have been different--is, of +course, true; but clearly, on the view that _all_ natural laws spring from +the persistence of force, no other conditions than those which actually +occurred, or are now occurring, could ever have occurred,--the whole course +of evolution must have been, in all its phases and in all its processes, an +unconditional necessity. But if it is said, How fortunate that the outcome, +being unconditionally necessary, has happened to be so good as it is; I +answer that the remark is legitimate enough if it is not intended to convey +an implication that the general quality of the outcome points to beneficent +design as to its cause. Such an implication would not be legitimate, +because, in the first place, we have no means of knowing in how many cases, +whether in planets, stars, or systems, the course of evolution has failed +to produce life and mind--the one known case of this earth, whether or not +it is the one success out of millions of abortions, being of necessity the +only known case. In how vastly greater a number of cases the course of +evolution may have been, so to speak, deflected by some even slight, though +strictly necessary, cause from producing self-conscious intelligence, it is +impossible to conjecture. But this consideration, be it observed, is not +here adduced in order to _disprove_ the assertion that telluric evolution +has been effected by Intelligence; it is merely adduced to prove that such +an assertion cannot rest on the single known result of telluric evolution, +so long as an infinite number of the results of evolution elsewhere remain +unknown. + +And now, lastly, it must be observed that even in the one case with which +we are acquainted, the net product of evolution is not such as can of +itself point us to _beneficent_ design. Professor Flint, indeed, in common +with theologians generally, argues that it does. I will therefore briefly +criticise his remarks on this subject, believing, as I do, that they form a +very admirable illustration of what I conceive to be a general +principle--viz., that minds which already believe in the existence of a +Deity are, as a rule, not in a position to view this question of +beneficence in nature in a perfectly impartial manner. For if the existence +of a Deity is presupposed, a mind with any particle of that most noble +quality--reverence--will naturally hesitate to draw conclusions that +partake of the nature of blasphemy; and therefore, unconsciously perhaps to +themselves, they endeavour in various ways to evade the evidence which, if +honestly and impartially considered, can scarcely fail to negative the +argument from beneficence in the universe. + +Professor Flint argues that the "law of over-production," and the +consequent struggle for existence, being "the reason why the world is so +wonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life," is "a means to an end +worthy of Divine Wisdom." "Although involving privation, pain, and +conflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections of +sentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion has +gained its strength, the deer its speed, and the dog its sagacity. The +inference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be attained +by it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of the +advantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering which the +conflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals for some +higher end than happiness--that he cares for animal perfection as well as +for animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying that the ends +which the conflict actually serves it was intended to serve." + +Now, whatever may be thought of such an argument as an attempted +justification of beneficent design already on independent ground believed +to exist, it is manifestly no argument at all as establishing any +presumption in favour of such design, unless it could be shown that the +Deity is so far limited in his power of adapting means to ends that the +particular method adopted in this case was the best, all things considered, +that he was able to adopt. For supposing the Deity to be, what Professor +Flint maintains that he is--viz., omnipotent--and there can be no inference +more transparent than that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends +designed, exhibits an incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the +divine character than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human +characters. For let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in +nature means. Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of +millions of animals must be supposed to have been sentient. Since that time +till the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations +of millions of millions of individuals. And throughout all this period of +incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms have +been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to the +outcome, we find that more than half of the species which have survived the +ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and insentient +forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find teeth and +talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for +torment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, and sickness, with oozing +blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence that +dimly close in deaths of brutal torture! Is it said that there are +compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the enjoyments I +plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the pains, and this +whether or not evolution is due to design. Therefore all I am concerned +with is to show, that if such a state of things is due to "omnipotent +design," the omnipotent designer must be concluded, so far as reason can +infer, to be non-beneficent. And this it is not difficult to show. When I +see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a spring-trap, I abhor the +devilish nature of the being who, with full powers of realising what pain +means, can deliberately employ his noble faculties of invention in +contriving a thing so hideously cruel. But if I could believe that there is +a being who, with yet higher faculties of thought and knowledge, and with +an unlimited choice of means to secure his ends, has contrived untold +thousands of mechanisms no less diabolical than a spring-trap; I should +call that being a fiend, were all the world besides to call him God. Am I +told that this is arrogance? It is nothing of the kind; it is plain +morality, and to say otherwise would be to hide our eyes from murder +because we dread the Murderer. Am I told that I am not competent to judge +the purposes of the Almighty? I answer that if these are _purposes_, I _am_ +able to judge of them so far as I can see; and if I am expected to judge of +his purposes when they appear to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged +also to judge of them when they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no +possible extenuation of the latter to point to the "final result" as "order +and beauty," so long as the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent_ Designer" +are known to have been so revolting. All that we could legitimately assert +in this case would be, that so far as observation can extend, "he cares for +animal perfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment," and even to +the _total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely +be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God. + +The dilemma, therefore, which Epicurus has stated with great lucidity, and +which Professor Flint quotes, appears to me so obvious as scarcely to +require statement. The dilemma is, that, looking to the facts of organic +nature, theists must abandon their belief, either in the divine +omnipotence, or in the divine beneficence. And yet, such is the warping +effect of preformed beliefs on the mind, that even so candid a writer as +Professor Flint can thus write of this most obvious truth:-- + +"The late Mr. John Stuart Mill, for no better reason than that nature +sometimes drowns men and burns them, and that childbirth is a painful +process, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall not +say what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed by such an +argument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the littleness +of man. The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it tries to +measure the attributes and limit the greatness of its Creator." + +But the argument--or rather the truism--in question is an attempt to do +neither the one nor the other; it simply asserts the patent fact that, if +God is omnipotent, and so had an unlimited choice of means whereby to +accomplish the ends of "animal perfection," "animal enjoyment," and the +rest; then the fact of his having chosen to adopt the means which he has +adopted is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his beneficence. And on +the other hand, if he is beneficent, the fact of his having adopted these +means in order that the sum of ultimate enjoyment might exceed the sum of +concomitant pain, is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his +omnipotence. To a man who already believes, on independent grounds, in an +omnipotent and beneficent Deity, it is no doubt possible to avoid facing +this dilemma, and to rest content with the assumption that, in a sense +beyond the reach of human reason, or even of human conception, the two +horns of this dilemma must be united in some transcendental reconciliation; +but if a man undertakes to reason on the subject at all, as he must and +ought when the question is as to the _existence_ of such a Deity, then +clearly he has no alternative but to allow that the dilemma is a hopeless +one. With inverted meaning, therefore, may we quote Professor Flint's words +against himself:--"The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it +tries to measure the attributes ... of its Creator;" for certainly, if +Professor Flint's usually candid mind has had a Creator, it nowhere +displays the "littleness" of prejudice in so marked a degree as it does +when "measuring his attributes." + +Thus in a subsequent chapter he deals at greater length with this +difficulty of the apparent failure of beneficence in nature, arguing, in +effect, that as pain and suffering "serve many good ends" in the way of +warning animals of danger to life, &c., therefore we ought to conclude +that, if we could see farther, we should see pain and suffering to be +unmitigated good, or nearly so. Now this argument, as I have previously +said, may possibly be admissible as between Christians or others who +_already_ believe in the existence and in the beneficence of God; but it is +only the blindest prejudice which can fail to perceive that the argument is +quite without relevancy when the question is as to the _evidences_ of such +existence and the _evidences_ of such character. For where the _fact_ of +such an existence and character is the question in dispute, it clearly can +be no argument to state its bare assumption by saying that if we knew more +of nature we should find the relative preponderance of good over evil to be +immeasurably greater than that which we now perceive. The platform of +argument on which the question of "Theism" must be discussed is that of the +observable Cosmos; and if, as Dr. Flint is constrained to admit, there is a +fearful spectacle of misery presented by this Cosmos, it becomes mere +question-begging to gloss over this aspect of the subject by any vague +assumption that the misery must have some unobservable ends of so +transcendentally beneficent a nature, that were they known they would +justify the means. Indeed, this kind of discussion seems to me worse than +useless for the purposes which the Professor has in view; for it only +serves by contrast to throw out into stronger relief the natural and the +unstrained character of the adverse interpretation of the facts. According +to this adverse interpretation, sentiency has been evolved by natural +selection to secure the benefits which are pointed out by Professor Flint; +and therefore the fact of this, its cause, having been a _mindless_ cause, +clearly implies that the _restriction_ of pain and suffering cannot be an +active principle, or a _vera causa_, as between species and species, though +it must be such within the limits of the same organism, and to a lesser +extent within the limits of the same species. And this is just what we find +to be the case. Therefore, without the need of resorting to wholly +arbitrary assumptions concerning transcendental reconciliations between +apparently needless suffering and a supposed almighty beneficence, the +non-theistic hypothesis is saved by merely opening our eyes to the +observable facts around us, and there seeing that pain and misery, alike in +the benefits which they bring and in the frightful excesses which they +manifest, play just that part in nature which this hypothesis would lead us +to expect. + +Therefore, to sum up these considerations on physical suffering, the case +between a theist and a sceptic as to the question of divine beneficence is +seen to be a case of extreme simplicity. The theist believes in such +beneficence by purposely concealing from his mind all adverse +evidence--feeling, on the one side, that to entertain the doubt to which +this evidence points would be to hold dalliance with blasphemy, and, on the +other side, that the subject is of so transcendental a nature that, in view +of so great a risk, it is better to avoid impartial reasoning upon it. A +sceptic, on the other hand, is under no such obligation to preconceived +ideas, and is therefore free to draw unbiassed inferences as to the +character of God, if he exists, to the extent which such character is +indicated by the sphere of observable nature. And, as I have said, when the +subject is so viewed, the inference is unavoidable that, so far as human +reason can penetrate, God, if he exists, must either be non-infinite in his +resources, or non-beneficent in his designs. Therefore it is evident that +when the _being_ of God, as distinguished from his _character_, is the +subject in dispute, Theism can gain nothing by an appeal to evidences of +_beneficent_ designs. If such evidences were unequivocal, then indeed the +argument which they would establish to an intelligent cause of nature would +be almost irresistible; for the fact of the external world being in harmony +with the moral nature of man would be unaccountable except on the +supposition of both having derived their origin from a common _moral_ +source; and morality implies intelligence. But as it is, all the so-called +evidence of divine beneficence in nature is, without any exception of a +kind that is worthless as proving _design_; for all the facts admit of +being explained equally well on the supposition of their having been due to +purely physical processes, acting through the various biological laws which +we are now only beginning to understand. And further than this, so far are +these facts from proving the existence of a moral cause, that, in view of +the alternative just stated, they even ground a positive argument to its +negation. For, as we have seen, all these facts are just of such a kind as +we should expect to be the facts, on the supposition of their having been +due to natural causes--_i.e._, causes which could have had no moral +solicitude for animal happiness as such. Let us now, in conclusion, dwell +on this antithesis at somewhat greater length. + +If natural selection has played any large share in the process of organic +evolution, it is evident that animal enjoyment, being an important factor +in this natural cause, must always have been furthered _to the extent in +which it was necessary for the adaptation of organisms to their +environment_ that it should. And such we invariably find to be the limits +within which animal enjoyments _are_ confined. On the other hand, so long +as the adaptations in question are not complete, so long must more or less +of suffering be entailed--the capacity for suffering, as for enjoyment, +being no doubt itself a product of natural selection. But as all specific +types are perpetually struggling together, it is manifest that the +competition must prevent any considerable number of types from becoming so +far adapted to their environment of other types as to become exempt from +suffering as a result of this competition. There being no one integrating +cause of an intelligent or moral nature to supply the conditions of +happiness to each organic type without the misery of this competition, such +happiness as animals have is derived from the heavy expenditure of pain +suffered by themselves and by their ancestry. + +Thus, whether we look to animal pleasures or to animal pains, the result is +alike just what we should expect to find on the supposition of these +pleasures and pains having been due to necessary and physical, as +distinguished from intelligent and moral, antecedents; for how different is +that which is from that which might have been! Not only might beneficent +selection have eliminated the countless species of parasites which now +destroy the health and happiness of all the higher organisms; not only +might survival of the fittest, in a moral sense, have determined that +rapacious and carnivorous animals should yield their places in the world to +harmless and gentle ones; not only might life have been without sickness +and death without pain;--but how might the exigences and the welfare of +species have been consulted by the structures and the habits of one +another! But no! Amid all the millions of mechanisms and habits in organic +nature, all of which are so beautifully adapted to the needs of the species +presenting them, there is _no single instance_ of any mechanism or habit +occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of another +species--although, as we should expect on the non-theistic theory, there +are some comparatively few cases of a mechanism or a habit which is of +benefit to its possessor being also utilised by other species. Yet, on the +beneficent-design theory, it is impossible to understand why, when all +mechanisms and habits in the same species are invariably correlated for the +benefit of that species, there should never be any such correlation between +mechanisms and habits of different species. For how magnificent, how +sublime a display of supreme beneficence would nature have afforded if all +her sentient animals had been so inter-related as to minister to each +other's happiness! Organic species might then have been likened to a +countless multitude of voices, all singing to their Creator in one +harmonious psalm of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such +correlation; every species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome +of the always and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life. + +So much, then, for the case of _physical_ evil; but Dr. Flint also treats +of the case of _moral_ evil. Let us see what this well-equipped writer can +make of this old problem in the present year of grace. He says--"But it +will be objected, could not God have made moral creatures who would be +certain always to choose what is right, always to acquiesce in His holy +will?... Well, far be it from me to deny that God could have originated a +sinless moral system.... But if questioned as to why He has not done +better, I feel no shame in confessing my ignorance. It seems to me that +when you have resolved the problem of the origin of moral evil into the +question, Why has God not originated a moral universe in which the lowest +moral being would be as excellent as the archangels are? you have at once +shown it to be _speculatively incapable of solution_ [italics mine], and +practically without importance[!]. The question is one which would +obviously give rise to another, Why has God not created only moral beings +as much superior to the archangels as they are superior to the lowest +Australian aborigines? But no complete answer can be given to a question +which may be followed by a series of similar questions to which there is no +end. We have, besides, neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such +questions."[46] + +Now I confess that this argument presents to my mind more of subtlety than +sense. I had previously imagined that the archangels were supposed to enjoy +a condition of moral existence which might fairly be thought to remove them +from any association with that of the Australian aborigines. But as this +question is one that belongs to Divinity, I am here quite prepared to bow +to Professor Flint's authority--hoping, however, that he is prepared to +take the responsibility should the archangels ever care to accuse me of +calumny. But, as a logician, I must be permitted to observe, that if I ask, +Why am I not better than I am? it is no answer to tell me, Because the +archangels are not better than they are. For aught that I know to the +contrary, the archangels may be morally _perfect_--as an authority in such +matters has told us that even "just men" may become,--and therefore, for +aught that I know to the contrary, Professor Flint's regress of moral +degrees _ad infinitum_, may be an ontological absurdity. But granting, for +the sake of argument, that archangels fall infinitely short of moral +perfection, and I should only be able to see in the fact a hopeless +aggravation of my previous difficulty. If it is hard to reconcile the +supreme goodness of God with the moral turpitude of man, much more would it +be hard to do so if his very angels are depraved. Therefore, if the +reasonable question which I originally put "may be followed by a series of +similar questions to which there is no end," the goodness of God must +simply be pronounced a delusion. For the question which I originally put +was no mere flimsy question of a stupidly unreal description. My own moral +depravity is a matter of painful certainty to me, and I want to know why, +if there is a God of infinite power and goodness, he should have made me +thus. And in answer I am told that my question is "practically without +importance," because there may be an endless series of beings who, in their +several degrees, are in a similar predicament to myself. Perhaps they are; +but if so, the moral evil with which I am directly acquainted is made all +the blacker by the fact that it is thus but a drop in an infinite ocean of +moral imperfection. When, therefore, Professor Flint goes on to say, "We +ought to be content if we can show that what God has done is wise and +right, and not perplex ourselves as to why He has not done an infinity of +other things," I answer, Most certainly; but _can_ we show that what God +has done is wise and right? Unquestionably not. That what he has done _may_ +be wise and right, could we see his whole scheme of things, no careful +thinker will deny; but to suppose it can be _shown_ that he has done this, +is an instance of purblind fanaticism which is most startling in a work on +_Theism_. "The best world, _we may be assured_, that our fancies can feign, +would in reality be far inferior to the world God has made, whatever +imperfections we may think we see in it." Are we leading a sermon on the +datum "God is love"? No; but a work on the questions, Is there a God? and, +if so, Is he a God of love? And yet the work is written by a man who +evidently tries to argue fairly. What shall we say of the despotism of +preformed beliefs? May we not say at least this much--that those who +endeavour to reconcile their theories of divine goodness with the facts of +human evil might well appropriate to themselves the words above quoted, "We +have neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such questions"? For the +"facts" indeed are absent, and the "faculties" of impartial thought must be +absent also, if this obvious truth cannot be seen--that "these questions" +only derive their "speculatively unanswerable" character from the rational +falsity of the manner by which it is sought to answer them. The "facts" of +our moral nature, so far as honest reason can perceive, belie the +hypothesis of Theism; and although the "faculties" of man may be forced by +prejudice into an acceptance of contradictory propositions, the truth is +obvious that only by the hypothesis of Evolution can that old-tied knot be +cut--the Origin of Evil. The form of Theism for which Dr. Flint is arguing +is the current form, viz., that there is a God who combines in himself the +attributes of _infinite_ power and _perfect_ goodness--a God at once +_omnipotent_ and _wholly_ moral. But, in view of the fact that moral evil +exists in man, the proposition that God is omnipotent and the proposition +that he is wholly moral become contradictory; and therefore the fact of +moral evil can only be met, either by abandoning one or other of these +propositions, or by altogether rejecting the hypothesis of Theism. + + * * * * * + + +III. + +THE SPECULATIVE STANDING OF MATERIALISM. + +As a continuation of my criticism on Mr. Fiske's views, I think it is +desirable to add a few words concerning the speculative annihilation with +which he supposes Mr. Spencer's doctrines to have visited Materialism. Of +course it is a self-evident truism that the doctrine of Relativity is +destructive of Materialism, if by Materialism we mean a theory which +ignores that doctrine. In other words, the doctrine of Relativity, if +accepted, clearly excludes the doctrine that Matter, _as known +phenomenally_, is at all likely to be a true representative of whatever +_thing-in-itself_ it may be that constitutes Mind. But this position is +fully established by the doctrine of Relativity alone, and is therefore not +in the least affected, either by way of confirmation or otherwise, by Mr. +Spencer's extended doctrine of the Unknowable--it being only because the +latter doctrine presupposes the doctrine of Relativity that it is exclusive +of Materialism in the sense which has just been stated. So far, therefore, +Mr. Spencer's writings cannot be held to have any special bearing on the +doctrine of Materialism. Such a special bearing is only exerted by these +writings when they proceed to show that "it seems an imaginable possibility +that units of external force may be identical in nature with the units of +the force known as feeling." Let us then ascertain how far it is true that +the argument already quoted, and which leads to this conclusion, is utterly +destructive of Materialism. + +In the first place, I may observe that this argument differs in several +instructive particulars from the anti-materialistic argument of Locke, +which we have already had occasion to consider. For while Locke erroneously +imagined that the test of inconceivability is of equivalent value +_wherever_ it is applied, save only where it conflicts with preconceived +ideas on the subject of Theism (see Appendix A.), Spencer, of course, is +much too careful a thinker to fall into so obvious a fallacy. But again, it +is curious to observe that in the anti-materialistic argument of Spencer +the test of inconceivability is used in a manner the precise opposite of +that in which it is used in the anti-materialistic argument of Locke. For +while the ground of Locke's argument is that Materialism must be untrue +because it is inconceivable that Matter (and Force) should be of a +psychical nature; the ground of Spencer's argument is that what we know as +Force (and Matter) may _not_ inconceivably be of a psychical nature. For my +own part, I think that Spencer's argument is, psychologically speaking, the +more valid of the two; but nevertheless I think that, logically speaking, +it is likewise invalid to a perceptibly great, and to a further indefinite, +degree. For the argument sets out with the reflection that we can only know +Matter and Force as symbols of consciousness, while we know consciousness +directly, and therefore that we can go further in conceivably translating +Matter and Force into terms of Mind than _vice versa_. And this is true, +but it does not therefore follow that the truth is more likely to lie in +the direction that thought can most easily travel. For although I am at one +with Mr. Spencer, whom Mr. Fiske follows, in regarding his test of +truth--viz., inconceivability of a negation--as the most _ultimate_ test +within our reach, I cannot agree with him that in this particular case it +is the most _trustworthy_ test within our reach. I cannot do so because the +reflection is forced upon me that, "as the terms which are contemplated in +this particular case are respectively the highest abstractions of objective +and of subjective existence, the test of truth in question is neutralised +by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that exists between +subject and object." Or, in other words, as before stated, "_whatever_ the +cause of Mind may be, we can clearly perceive it to be a subjective +necessity of the case that, in ultimate analysis, we should find it more +easy to conceive of this cause as resembling Mind--the only entity of which +we are directly conscious--than to conceive of it as any other entity of +which we are only indirectly conscious." When, therefore, Mr. Spencer +argues that "it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of +outer existence," while it is not so impossible to interpret outer +existence in terms of inner existence, the fact is merely what we should in +any case expect _à priori_ to be the fact, and therefore as a fact it is +not a very surprising discovery _à posteriori_. So that when Mr. Fiske +proceeds to make this fact the basis of his argument, that because we can +more conceivably regard objective existence as like in kind to subjective +existence than conversely, therefore we should conclude that there is a +corresponding probability in favour of the more conceivable proposition, I +demur to his argument. For, fully accepting the fact on which the argument +rests, and it seems to me, in view of what I have said, that the latter +assigns an altogether disproportionate value to the test of +inconceivability in this case. Far from endowing this test with so great an +authority in this case, I should regard it not only as perceptibly of very +small validity, but, as I have said, invalid to a degree which we have no +means of ascertaining. If it be asked, What other gauge of probability can +we have in this matter other than such a direct appeal to consciousness? I +answer, that this appeal being here _à priori_ invalid, we are left to fall +back upon the formal probability which is established by an application of +scientific canons to objective phenomena. (See footnote in § 14.) For, be +it carefully observed, Mr. Spencer, and his disciple Mr. Fiske, are not +idealists. Were this the case, of course the test of an immediate appeal to +consciousness would be to them the only test available. But, on the +contrary, as all the world knows, Mr. Spencer asserts the existence of an +unknown Reality, of which all phenomena are the manifestations. +Consequently, what we call Force and Matter are, according to this +doctrine, phenomenal manifestations of this objective Reality. That is to +say, for aught that we can know, Force and Matter may be anything within +the whole range of the possible; and the only limitation that can be +assigned to them is, that they are modes of existence which are independent +of, or objective to, our individual consciousness, but which are uniformly +translated into consciousness as Force and Matter. Now it does not signify +one iota for the purposes of Materialism whether these our symbolical +representations of Force and Matter are accurate or inaccurate +representations of their corresponding realities,--unless, of course, some +_independent_ reason could be shown for supposing that in their reality +they resemble Mind. Call Force _x_ and Matter _y_, and so long as we are +agreed that _x_ and _y_ are _objective realities which are uniformly +translated into consciousness as Force and Matter_, the materialistic +deductions remain unaffected by this mere change in our terminology; these +essential facts are allowed to remain substantially as before, namely, that +there is an external something or external somethings--Matter and Force, or +_x_ and _y_--which themselves display no observable tokens of +consciousness, but which are invariably associated with consciousness in a +highly distinctive manner. + +I dwell at length upon this subject, because although Mr. Spencer himself +does not appear to attach much weight to his argument, Mr. Fiske, as we +have seen, elevates it into a basis for "Cosmic Theism." Yet so far is this +argument from "ruling out," as Mr. Fiske asserts, the essential doctrine of +Materialism--_i.e._, the doctrine that what we know as Mind is an effect of +certain collocations and distributions of _what we know_ as Matter and +Force--that the argument might be employed with almost the same degree of +effect, or absence of effect, to disprove any instance of recognised +causation. Thus, for example, the doctrine of Materialism is no more "ruled +out" by the reflection that what we cognise as cerebral matter is only +cognised relatively, than would the doctrine of chemical equivalents be +"ruled out" by the parallel reflection that what we cognise as chemical +elements are only cognised relatively. I say advisedly, "with _almost_ the +same degree of effect," because, to be strictly accurate, we ought not +altogether to ignore the indefinitely slender presumption which Mr. +Spencer's subjective test of inconceivability establishes on the side of +Spiritualism, as against the objective evidence of causation on the side of +Materialism. As this is an important subject, I will be a little more +explicit. We are agreed that Force and Matter are entities external to +consciousness, of which we can possess only symbolical knowledge. +Therefore, as we have said, Force and Matter may be anything within the +whole range of the possible. But we know that Mind is a possible entity, +while we have no certain knowledge of any other possible entity. Hence we +are justified in saying, It is possible that Force and Matter may be +identical with the only entity which we know as certainly possible; but +forasmuch as we do not know the sum of possible entities, we have no means +of calculating the chances there are that what we know as Force and Matter +are identical in nature with Mind. Still, that there is _a_ chance we +cannot dispute; all we can assert is, that we are unable to determine its +value, and that it would be a mistake to suppose we can do so, even in the +lowest degree, by Mr. Spencer's test of inconceivability. Nevertheless, the +fact that there is such a chance renders it in some indeterminate degree +more probable that what we know as Force and Matter are identical with what +we know as Mind, than that what we know as oxygen and hydrogen are +identical with what we know as water. So that to this extent the essential +doctrine of Materialism is "ruled out" in a further degree by the +philosophy of the Unknowable than is the chemical doctrine of equivalents. +But, of course, this indefinite possibility of what we know as Force and +Matter being identical with what we know as Mind does not neutralise, in +any determinable degree, the considerations whereby Materialism in its +present shape infers that what we know as Force and Matter are probably +distinct from what we know as Mind. + +But I see no reason why Materialism should be restricted to this "its +present shape." Even if we admit to the fullest extent the validity of Mr. +Spencer's argument, and conclude with Professor Clifford as a matter of +probability that "the universe consists entirely of Mind-stuff," I do not +see that the admission would affect Materialism in any essential respect. +For here again the admission would amount to little else, so far as +Materialism is directly concerned, than a change of terminology: instead of +calling objective existence "Matter," we call it "Mind-stuff." I say "to +_little_ else," because no doubt in one particular there is here some +change introduced in the speculative standing of the subject. So long as +Matter and Mind, _x_ and _y_, are held to be antithetically opposed in +substance, so long must Materialism suppose that a connection of +_causality_ subsists between the two, such that the former substance is +_produced_ in some unaccountable way by the latter. But when Matter and +Mind, _x_ and _y_, are supposed to be identical in substance, the need for +any additional supposition as to a causal connection is excluded. But +unless we hold, what seems to me an uncalled-for opinion, that the +essential feature of Materialism consists in a postulation of a causal +connection between _x_ and _y_, it would appear that the only effect of +supposing _x_ and _y_ to be really but one substance _z_, must be that of +_strengthening_ the essential doctrine of Materialism--the doctrine, +namely, that conscious intellectual existence is _necessarily_ associated +with that form of existence which we know phenomenally as Matter and +Motion. If it is true that a "a moving molecule of inorganic matter does +not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a small piece of +Mind-stuff," then assuredly the central position of Materialism is shown to +be impregnable. For while it remains as true as ever that mind and +consciousness can only emerge when what we know phenomenally as "Matter +takes the complex form of a living brain," we have abolished the necessity +for assuming even a causal connection between the substance of what we know +phenomenally as Matter and the substance of what we know phenomenally as +Mind: we have found that, in the last resort, the phenomenal connection +between what we know as Matter and what we know as Mind is actually even +more intimate than a connection of causality; we have found that it is a +substantial identity. + +To sum up this discussion. We have considered the bearing of modern +speculation on the doctrine of Materialism in three successive stages of +argument. First, we had to consider the bearing on Materialism of the +simple doctrine of Relativity. Here we saw that Materialism was only +affected to the extent of being compelled to allow that what we know as +Matter and Motion are not known as they are in themselves. But we also saw +that, as the inscrutable realities are uniformly translated into +consciousness as Matter and Motion, it still remains as true as ever that +_what we know_ as Matter and Motion may be the causes of what we know as +Mind. Even, therefore, if the supposition of causality is taken to be an +essential feature of Materialism, Materialism would be in no wise affected +by substituting for the words Matter and Motion the symbols _x_ and _y_. + +The second of the three stages consisted in showing that Mr. Spencer's +argument as to the possible identity of Force and Feeling is not in itself +sufficient to overthrow the doctrine that what we know as Matter and Motion +may be the cause of what we know as Mind. For the mere fact of its being +more _conceivable_ that units of Force should resemble units of Feeling +than conversely, is no warrant for concluding that in reality any +corresponding probability obtains. The test of conceivability, although the +most ultimate test that is available, is here rendered vague and valueless +by the _à priori_ consideration that _whatever_ the cause of Mind may be +(if it has a cause), we must find it more easy to conceive of this cause as +resembling Mind than to conceive of it as resembling any other entity of +which we are only conscious indirectly. + +Lastly, in the third place, we saw that even if Mr. Spencer's argument were +fully subscribed to, and Mind in its substantial essence were conceded to +be causeless, the central position of Materialism would still remain +unaffected. For Mr. Spencer does not suppose that his "units of Force" are +themselves endowed with consciousness, any more than Professor Clifford +supposes his "moving molecules of inorganic matter" to be thus endowed. So +that the only change which these possibilities, even if conceded to be +actualities, produce in the speculative standing of Materialism, is to show +that the raw material of consciousness, instead of requiring to be _caused_ +by other substances--Matter and Force, _x_ and _y_,--occurs ready made as +those substances. But the essential feature of Materialism remains +untouched--namely, that what we know as Mind is dependent (whether by way +of causality or not is immaterial) on highly complex forms of _what we +know_ as Matter, in association with highly peculiar distributions of _what +we know_ as Force. + + * * * * * + + +IV. + +THE FINAL MYSTERY OF THINGS. + +Some physicists are inclined to dispute the fundamental proposition in +which the whole of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy may be said to +rest--the proposition, namely, that the fact of the "persistence of force" +constitutes the ultimate basis of science. For my own part, I cannot but +believe that any disagreement on this matter only arises from some want of +mutual understanding; and, therefore, in order to anticipate any criticisms +to which the present work may be open on this score, I append this +explanatory note. + +I readily grant that the term "persistence of force" is not a happy one, +seeing that the word "force," as used by physicists, does not at the +present time convey the full meaning which Mr. Spencer desires it to +convey. But I think that any impartial physicist will be prepared to admit +that, in the present state of his science, we are entitled to conclude that +energy of position is merely the result of energy of motion; or, in other +words, that potential energy is merely an expression of the fact that the +universe, as a whole, is replete with actual energy, whose essential +characteristic is that it is indestructible. And this may be concluded +without committing ourselves to any particular theory as to the physical +explanation of gravity; all we need assert is, that in some way or other +gravity is the result of ubiquitous energy. And this, it seems to me, we +must assert, or else conclude that gravity can never admit of a physical +explanation. For all that we mean by a physical explanation is the proved +establishment of an equation between two quantities of energy; so that if +energy of position does not admit of being interpreted in terms of energy +of motion, we must conclude that it does not admit of being interpreted at +all--at least not in any physical sense. + +Throughout the foregoing essays, therefore, I have assumed that all forms +of energy are but relatively varying expressions of the same fact--the +fact, namely, which Mr. Spencer means to express when he says that force is +persistent. And it seems to me almost needless to show that this fact is +really the basis of all science. For unless this fact is assumed as a +postulate, not only would scientific inquiry become impossible, but all +experience would become chaotic. The physicist could not prosecute his +researches unless he presupposed that the forces which he measures are of a +permanent nature, any more than could the chemist prosecute his researches +unless he presupposed that the materials which he estimates by energy-units +are likewise of a permanent nature. And similarly with all the other +sciences, as well as with every judgment in our daily experience. If, +therefore, any one should be hypercritical enough to dispute the position +that the doctrine of the conservation of energy constitutes the "ultimate +datum" of science, I think it will be enough to observe that if this is +_not_ the "ultimate datum" of science, science can have no "ultimate datum" +at all. For any datum more ultimate than permanent existence is manifestly +impossible, while any such datum as non-permanent existence would clearly +render science impossible. Even, therefore, if such hypercriticism had a +valid basis of apparently adverse fact whereon to stand, I should feel +myself justified in neglecting it on _à priori_ grounds; but the only basis +on which such hypercriticism can rest is, not the knowledge of any adverse +facts, but the ignorance of certain facts which we must either conclude to +be facts or else conclude that science can have no ultimate datum whereon +to rest. In the foregoing essays, therefore, I have not scrupled to +maintain that the ultimate datum of science is destructive of teleology as +a scientific argument for Theism; because, unless we deny the possibility +of any such ultimate datum, and so land ourselves in hopeless scepticism, +we must conclude that there can be no datum more ultimate than +this--Permanent Existence; and this is just the datum which we have seen to +be destructive of teleology as a scientific argument for Theism. + +It may be well to point out that from this ultimate datum of science--or +rather, let us say, of experience--there follows a deductive explanation of +the law of causation. For this law, when stripped of all the metaphysical +corruptions with which it has been so cumbersomely clothed, simply means +that a given collocation of antecedents unconditionally produces a certain +consequent. But this fact, otherwise stated, amounts to nothing more than a +re-statement of the ultimate datum of experience--the fact that energy is +indestructible. For if this latter fact be granted, it is obvious that the +so-called law of causation follows as a deductive necessity--or rather, as +I have said, that this law becomes but another way of expressing the same +fact. This is obvious if we reflect that the only means we have of +ascertaining that energy is _not_ destructible, is by observing that +similar antecedents _do_ invariably determine similar consequents. It is as +a vast induction from all those particular cases of sequence-changes which +collectively we call causation that we conclude energy to be +indestructible. And, obversely, having concluded energy to be +indestructible, we can plainly see that in any particular cases of its +manifestation in sequence-phenomena, the unconditional resemblance between +effects due to similar causes which is formulated by the law of causation +is merely the direct expression of the fact which we had previously +concluded. It seems to me, therefore, that the old-standing question +concerning the nature of causation ought now properly to be considered as +obsolete. Doubtless there will long remain a sort of hereditary tendency in +metaphysical minds to look upon cause-connection as "a mysterious tie" +between antecedent and consequent; but henceforth there is no need for +scientific minds to regard this "tie" as "mysterious" in any other sense +than the existence of energy is "mysterious." To state the law of causation +is merely to state the fact that energy is indestructible. + +And from this there also arises at once the explanation and the +justification of our belief in the uniformity of nature. If energy is, in +its relation to us, ubiquitous and persistent, it clearly follows that in +all its manifestations which collectively we call nature, similar preceding +manifestations must always determine similar succeeding manifestations; for +otherwise the energy concerned would require on one or on both of the +occasions, either to have become augmented by creation, or dissipated by +annihilation. Thus our belief in the uniformity of nature, as in the +validity of the law of causation, is merely an expression of our belief in +the ubiquitous and indestructible character of energy. + +Such being the case, we may fairly conclude that all these old-standing +"mysteries" are now merged in the one mystery of existence. And deeper than +this it is manifestly impossible that they can be merged; for it is +manifestly impossible that Existence in the abstract can ever admit of what +we call explanation. Hence we can clearly see that, in a scientific sense, +there must always remain a final mystery of things. But although we can +thus see that, from the very meaning of what we call explanation, it +follows that at the base of all our explanations there must lie a great +Inexplicable, I think that the mystery of Existence in the abstract may be +rendered less appalling if we reflect that, as opposed to Existence, there +is only one logical alternative--Non-existence. Supposing, then, our +physical explanations to have reached their highest limits by resolving all +modes of Existence into one mode--force, matter, life, and mind, being +shown but different manifestations of the same Infinite Existence--the +final mystery of things would then become resolved into the simple +question, Why is there Existence?--Why is there not Nothing? + +Let us then first ask, What is "Nothing"? Is it a mere word, which presents +no meaning as corresponding to any objective reality, or has the word a +meaning notwithstanding its being an inconceivable one? Or, otherwise +phrased, is Nothing possible or impossible? Now, although in ordinary +conversation it is generally taken for granted that Nothing is possible, +there is certainly no more ground for this supposition than there is for +its converse--viz., that Nothing is merely a word which signifies the +negation of possibility. For analysis will show that the choice between +these two counter-suppositions can only be made in the presence of +knowledge which is necessarily absent--the knowledge whether the universe +of Existence is finite or infinite. If the universe as a whole is finite, +the word Nothing would stand as a symbol to denote an unthinkable blank of +which a finite universe is the content. And forasmuch as Something and +Nothing would then become actual, as distinguished from nominal +correlatives, we could have no guarantee that, in an absolute or +transcendental sense, it may not be possible, although it is inconceivable, +for Something to become Nothing or Nothing Something. Hence, if Existence +is finite, No-existence becomes possible; and the doctrine of the +indestructibility of Existence becomes, for aught that we can tell, of a +merely relative signification. But, on the other hand, if Existence is +infinite, No-existence becomes impossible; and the doctrine of the +indestructibility of Existence becomes, in a logical sense, of an absolute +signification. For it is manifest that if the universe of Existence is +without end in space and time, the possibility of No-existence is of +necessity excluded, and the word "Nothing" thus becomes a mere negation of +possibility.[47] + +Thus, if it be conceded that the universe as a whole is infinite both in +space and time, the concession amounts to an abolition of the final mystery +of things. For all that we mean by a mystery is something that requires an +explanation, and the whole of the final mystery of things is therefore +embodied in the question, "Why is there Existence?--Why is there not +Nothing?" But if the universe of Existence be conceded infinite, this +question is sufficiently met by the answer, "Because Existence is, and +Nothing is not." If it is retorted, But this is no real answer; I reply, It +is as real as the question. For to ask, Why is there Existence? is, upon +the supposition which has been conceded, equivalent to asking, Why is the +possible possible? And if such questions cannot be answered, it is scarcely +right to say that on this account they embody a mystery; because the +questions are really not rational questions, and therefore the fact of +their not admitting of any rational answer cannot be held to show that the +questions embody any rational mystery. That there _is_ a rational mystery, +in the sense of there being something which can never be _explained_, I do +not dispute; all I assert is, that this mystery is inexplicable, only +_because there is nothing to explain_; the mystery being ultimate, to ask +for an explanation of that which, being ultimate, requires no explanation, +is irrational. Or, to state the case in another way, if it is asked, Why is +there not Nothing? it is a sufficient answer, on supposition of the +universe being infinite, to say, Because Nothing is nothing; it is merely a +word which presents no meaning, and which, so far as anything can be +conceived to the contrary, never can present any meaning. + +The above discussion has proceeded on the supposition of Existence being +infinite; but practically the same result would follow on the +counter-supposition of Existence being finite. For although in this case, +as we have seen, Non-entity would still be included within the range of +possibility, it would still be no more conceivable as such than is Entity; +and hence the question, Why is there not Nothing? would still be +irrational, seeing that, even if the possibility which the question +supposes were realised, it would in no wise tend to explain the mystery of +Something. And even if it could, the final mystery would not be thus +excluded; it would merely be transferred from the mystery of Existence to +the mystery of Non-existence. Thus under every conceivable supposition we +arrive at the same termination--viz., that in the last resort there must be +a final mystery, which, as forming the basis of all possible explanations, +cannot itself receive any explanation, and which therefore is really not, +in any proper sense of the term, a mystery at all. It is merely a fact +which itself requires no explanation, because it is a fact than which none +can be more ultimate. So that even if we suppose this ultimate fact to be +an Intelligent Being, it is clearly impossible that he should be able to +_explain_ his own existence, since the possibility of any such explanation +would imply that his existence could not be ultimate. In the sense, +therefore, of not admitting of any explanation, his existence would require +to be a mystery to himself, rendering it impossible for him to state +anything further with regard to it than this--"I am that I am." + +I do not doubt that this way of looking at the subject will be deemed +unsatisfactory at first sight, because it seems to be, as it were, a merely +logical way of cheating our intelligence out of an intuitively felt +justification for its own curiosity in this matter. But the fault really +lies in this intuitive feeling of justification not being itself +justifiable. For this particular question, it will be observed, differs +from all other possible questions with which the mind has to deal. All +other questions being questions concerning manifestations of existence +presupposed as existing, it is perfectly legitimate to seek for an +explanation of one series of manifestations in another--_i.e._, to refer a +less known group to a group better known. But the case is manifestly quite +otherwise when, having merged one group of manifestations into another +group, and this into another for an indefinite number of stages, we +suddenly make a leap to the last possible stage and ask, "Into what group +are we to merge the basis of all our previous groups, and of all groups +which can possibly be formed in the future? How are we to classify that +which contains all possible classes? Where are we to look for an +explanation of Existence?" When thus clearly stated, the question, is, as I +have said, manifestly irrational; but the point with which I am now +concerned is this--When in plain reason the question is _seen_ to be +irrational, why in intuitive sentiment should it not be _felt_ to be so? +The answer, I think, is, that the interrogative faculty being usually +occupied with questions which admit of rational answers, we acquire a sort +of intellectual habit of presupposing every wherefore to have a therefore, +and thus, when eventually we arrive at the last of all possible wherefores, +which itself supplies the basis of all possible therefores, we fail at +first to recognise the exceptional character of our position. We fail at +first to perceive that, from the very nature of this particular case, our +wherefore is deprived of the rational meaning which it had in all the +previous cases, where the possibility of a corresponding therefore was +presupposed. And failing fully to perceive this truth, our organised habit +of expecting an answer to our question asserts itself, and we experience +the same sense of intellectual unrest in the presence of this wholly +meaningless and absurd question, as we experience in the presence of +questions significant and rational. + +THE END. + + * * * * * + + +Notes + +[1] The above was written before Mr. Mill's essay on Theism was published. +Lest, therefore, my refutation may be deemed too curt, I supplement it with +Mr. Mill's remarks upon the same subject. "It may still be maintained that +the feelings of morality make the existence of God eminently desirable. No +doubt they do, and that is the great reason why we find that good men and +women cling to the belief, and are pained by its being questioned. But, +surely, it is not legitimate to assume that, in the order of the universe, +whatever is desirable is true. Optimism, even when a God is already +believed in, is a thorny doctrine to maintain, and had to be taken by +Leibnitz in the limited sense, that the universe being made by a good +being, is the best universe possible, not the best absolutely: that the +Divine power, in short, was not equal to making it more free from +imperfections than it is. But optimism, prior to belief in a God, and as +the ground of that belief, seems one of the oddest of all speculative +delusions. Nothing, however, I believe, contributes more to keep up the +belief in the general mind of humanity than the feeling of its +desirableness, which, when clothed, as it very often is, in the form of an +argument, is a _naive_ expression of the tendency of the human mind to +believe whatever is agreeable to it. Positive value the argument of course +has none." For Mill's remarks on the version of the argument dealt with in +§ 5, see his "Three Essays," p. 204. + +[2] The words "or not conceivable," are here used in the sense of "not +relatively conceivable," as explained in Chap. vi. + +[3] For the full discussion from which the above is an extract, see _System +of Logic_, vol. i. pp. 409-426 (8th ed.). But, substituting "psychical" for +"volitional," see also, for some mitigation of the severity of the above +statement, the closing paragraphs of my supplementary essay on "Cosmic +Theism." + +[4] Essay on Understanding--Existence of God. + +[5] Locke, _loc. cit._ + +[6] See Appendix A. + +[7] Viz., the constant association within experience of mind with certain +highly peculiar material forms; the constant proportion which is found to +subsist between the quantity of cerebral matter and the degree of +intellectual capacity--a proportion which may be clearly traced throughout +the ascending series of vertebrated animals, and which is very generally +manifested in individuals of the human species; the effects of cerebral +anæmia, anæsthetics, stimulants, narcotic poisons, and lesions of cerebral +substance. There can, in short, be no question that the whole series of +observable facts bearing upon the subject are precisely such as they ought +to be upon supposition of the materialistic theory being true; while, +contrariwise, there is a total absence of any known facts tending to +negative that theory. At the same time it must be carefully noted, that the +observed facts (and any additional number of the like kind) do not +logically warrant us in concluding that mental states are necessarily +_dependent_ upon material changes. Nevertheless, it must also be noted, +that, in the absence of positive proof of causation, it is certainly in +accordance with scientific procedure, to yield our provisional assent to an +hypothesis which undoubtedly connects a large order of constant +_accompaniments_, rather than to an hypothesis which is confessedly framed +to meet but a single one of the facts. + +Professor Clifford, in a lecture on "Body and Mind" which he delivered at +St. George's Hall, and afterwards published in the _Fortnightly Review_, +argues against the existence of God on the ground that, as Mind is always +associated with Matter within experience, there arises a presumption +against Mind existing anywhere without being thus associated, so that +unless we can trace in the disposition of the heavenly bodies some +resemblance to the conformation of cerebral structure, we are to conclude +that there is a considerable balance of probability in favour of Atheism. +Now, as this argument--if we rid it of the grotesque allusion to the +heavenly bodies--is one that is frequently met with, it seems desirable in +this place briefly to analyse it. First of all, then, the validity of the +argument depends upon the probability there is that the constant associated +of Mind with Matter within experience is due to a _causal_ connection; for +if the association in question is merely an _association_ and nothing more, +the origin of known mind is as far from being explained as it would be were +Mind never known as associated with Matter. But, in the next place, +supposing the constant association in question to be due to a causal +connection, it by no means follows that because Mind is due to Matter +within experience, therefore Mind cannot exist in any other mode beyond +experience. + +Doubtless, from analogy, there is a presumption against the hypothesis that +the same entity should exist in more than one mode at the same time; but +clearly in this case we are quite unable to estimate the value of this +presumption. Consequently, even assuming a causal connection between Matter +and Human Mind, if there is any, the slightest, indications supplied by any +other facts of experience pointing to the existence of a Divine Mind, such +indications should be allowed as much argumentative weight as they would +have had in the absence of the presumption we are considering. Hence +Professor Clifford's conclusion cannot be regarded as valid until all the +other arguments in favour of Theism have been separately refuted. Doubtless +Professor Clifford will be the first to recognise the cogency of this +criticism--if indeed it has not already occurred to him; for as I know that +he is much too clear a thinker not to perceive the validity of these +considerations, I am willing to believe that the substance of them was +omitted from his essay merely for the sake of brevity; but, for the sake of +less thoughtful persons, I have deemed it desirable to state thus clearly +that the problem of Theism cannot be solved on grounds of Materialism +alone. [This note was written before I had the advantage of Professor +Clifford's acquaintance, but now I leave it, as I leave all other parts of +this essay--viz., as it was originally written.--1878.] + +[8] To avoid burdening the text, I have omitted another criticism which may +be made on Locke's argument. "Triangle" is a word by which we designate a +certain figure, one of the properties of which is that the sum of its +angles is equal to two right angles. In other words, any figure which does +not exhibit this property is not that figure which we designate a triangle. +Hence, when Locke says he cannot conceive of a triangle which does not +present this property, it may be answered that his inability arises merely +from the fact that any figure which fails to present this property is not a +figure to which the term "triangle" can apply. Thus viewed, however, the +illustration would obviously be absurd, for the same reason that the +question of the clown is absurd, "Can you think of a horse that is just +like a cow?" What Locke evidently means is, that we cannot conceive of any +geometrical figure which presents all the other properties of a triangle +without also presenting the property in question. Now, even admitting, with +Locke, that it is as inconceivable that the entity known to us as Matter +should possess the property of causing thought as it is that the figure +which we term a triangle should posses the property of containing more than +two right angles, still it remains, for the purposes of Locke's supposed +theistic demonstration, to prove that it is an inconceivable for the entity +which we call Mind _not_ to be due to another Mind, as it is for a triangle +_not_ to contain, other than two right angles. But, further, even if it +were possible to prove this, the demonstration would make as much against +Theism as in favour of it; for if, as the illustration of the triangle +implies, we restrict the meaning of the word "Mind" to an entity one of +whose essential qualities is that it should be caused by another Mind, the +words "Supreme and Uncaused Mind" involve a contradiction in terms, just as +much as would the words "A square triangle having four right angles." It +would, therefore, seem that if we adhere to Locke's argument, and pursue it +to its conclusion, the only logical outcome would be this:--Seeing that by +the word "Mind," I expressly connote the quality of derivation from a prior +Mind, as a quality belonging no less essentially to Mind than the quality +of presenting two right angles belongs to a triangle; therefore, whatever +other attributes I ascribe to the First Cause, I must clearly exclude the +attribute Mind; and hence, whatever else such a Cause may be, it follows +from my argument that it certainly is--Not Mind. + +[9] Hamilton. + +[10] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 25-31. + +[11] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 542. + +[12] _Loc. cit._, p. 543. + +[13] Appendix to Discussions, pp. 614, 165. + +[14] Mill, in the lengthy chapter which he devotes to the freedom of the +will in his Examination, does not notice this point. + +[15] If more evidence can be wanted, it is supplied in some suggestive +facts of Psychology. For example, "From our earliest childhood, the idea of +doing wrong (that is, of doing what is forbidden, or what is injurious to +others) and the idea of punishment are presented to the mind together, and +the intense character of the impressions causes the association between +them to attain the highest degree of closeness and intimacy. Is it strange, +or unlike the usual processes of the human mind, that in these +circumstances we should retain the feeling and forget the reason on which +it is grounded? But why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reason +has never, in our early education, been presented to the mind. The only +ideas presented have been those of wrong and punishment, and an inseparable +association has been created between these directly, without the help of +any intervening idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous feelings +of mankind regard punishment and a wrong-doer as naturally fitted to each +other--as a conjunction appropriate in itself, independently of any +consequences," &c.--Mill, Examination of Hamilton, p. 599. + +[16] Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107. + +[17] Throughout these considerations I have confined myself to the +_positive_ side of the subject. My argument being of the nature of a +criticism on the erroneous inferences which are drawn from the _good_ +qualities of our moral nature, I thought it desirable, for the sake of +clearness, not to burden that argument by the additional one as to the +source of the _evil_ qualities of that nature. This additional argument, +however, will be found briefly stated at the close of my supplementary +essay on Professor Flint's "Theism." On reading that additional argument, I +think that any candid and unbiassed mind must conclude that, alike in what +it is _not_ as well as in what it _is_, our moral nature points to a +natural genesis, as distinguished from a supernatural cause. + +[18] The illustration to which I refer is that of the watershed of a +country being precisely adapted to draining purposes. The rivers just fit +their own particular beds: the latter occupy the lowest grounds, and get +broader and deeper as they advance; pebbles, gravel, and sand all occupy +the best teleological situations, &c., &c. + +[19] "Order of Nature," by the Rev. Baden Powell, M.A., F.R.S., &c., 1859, +pp. 228-241. + +[20] I think it desirable to state that I perceived this great truth before +I was aware that it had been perceived also by Mr. Spencer. His statement +of it now occurs in the short chapter of _First Principles_ entitled +"Relations between Forces." So far as I an able to ascertain, no one has +hitherto considered this important doctrine in its immediate relation to +the question of Theism. + +In using the term "persistence of force," I am aware that I am using a term +which is not unopen to criticism. But as Mr. Spencer's writings have +brought this term into such general use among speculative thinkers, it +seemed to me undesirable to modify it. Questions of mere terminology are +without any importance in a discussion of this kind, provided that the +terms are universally understood to mean what they are intended to mean; +and I think that the signification which Mr. Spencer attaches to his term, +"persistence of force," is sufficiently precise. Therefore, adopting his +usage, whenever throughout the following pages I speak of force as +persisting, what I intend to be understood is, that there is a +something--call it force, or energy, or _x_--which, so far as experience or +imagination can extend, is, in its relation to us, ubiquitous and +illimitable; or, in other words, that it universally presents the property +of permanence. (See, for a more detailed explanation, supplementary essay, +"On the Final Mystery of Things.") + +[21] Hamilton may here be especially noticed, because he went so far as to +maintain that the phenomena of the external world, taken by themselves, +would ground a valid argument to the negation of God. Although I cannot but +think that this position was a conspicuously irrational one for any +competent thinker to occupy before the scientific doctrine of the +correlation of the forces had been enunciated, nevertheless I cannot lose +the opportunity of alluding to this remarkable feature in Sir William +Hamilton's philosophy, showing as it does that same prophetic forestalling +of the results which have since followed from the discovery of the +conservation of energy, as was shown by his no less remarkable theory of +causation. (See supplementary essay "On the Final Mystery of Things.") + +[22] Mr. N. Lockyer's work is now supplying important evidence on these +points.--1878. + +[23] It will of course be observed that if matter and force are identical, +the unification is complete. + +[24] Herbert Spencer. + +[25] It may here be observed that the above discussion would not be +affected by the view of Professor Clifford and others, that natural law is +to be regarded as having a subjective rather than an objective +signification--that what we call a natural law is merely an arbitrary +selection made by ourselves of certain among natural processes. The +discussion would not be affected by this view, because the argument is +really based upon the existence of a cosmos as distinguished from a chaos; +and therefore it would be rather an intensification of the argument than +otherwise to point out that, for the maintenance of a cosmos, natural laws, +as conceived by us, would be inadequate. And this seems a fitting place to +make the almost superfluous remark, that throughout this present essay I +have used the words "Natural Law," "Supreme Law-giver," &c., in an +apparently unguarded sense, merely in order to avoid needless obscurity. +Fully sensible as I am of the misleading nature of the analogy which these +words embody, I have yet adopted them for the sake of perspicuity--being +careful, however, never to allow the false analogy which they express to +enter into an argument on either side of the question. Thus, even where it +is said that the existence of Natural Law points to the existence of a +Supreme Law-maker, the argument might equally well be phrased: The +existence of an orderly cosmos points to the existence of a disposing mind. + +[26] First Principles, pp. 27-29. + +[27] It may be here observed that this quality of indefiniteness on the +part of such reasoning is merely a practical outcome of the theoretical +considerations adduced in Chapter V. For as we there saw that the ratio +between the known and the unknown is in this case wholly indefinite, it +follows that any symbols derived from the region of the known--even though +such symbols be the highest generalities which the latter region +affords--must be wholly indefinite when projected into the region of the +unknown. Or rather let us say, that as the region of the unknown is but a +progressive continuation of the region of the known, the determinate value +of symbols of thought varies inversely as the distance--or, not improbably, +as the square of the distance--from the sphere of the known at which they +are applied. + +[28] _i.e._, illegitimate in a _relative_ sense. The conclusion is +legitimate enough in a _formal_ sense, and as establishing a probability of +some _unassignable_ degree of value. But it would be illegitimate if this +quality of indefiniteness were disregarded, and the conclusion supposed to +possess the same character of actual probability as it has of formal +definition. + +[29] In order not to burden the text with details, I have presented these +reflections in their most general terms. Thus, if it be granted that cosmic +harmony results from the combined action of general laws, and that these +laws are the necessary result of the primary qualities of force and matter, +this the most general statement of the atheistic position includes all more +special considerations as a genus includes its species; and therefore it +would not signify, for the purposes of the atheistic argument, whether or +not any such more special considerations are possible. Nevertheless, for +the sake of completeness, I may here observe that we are not wholly without +indications in nature of the physical causation whereby the effect of +cosmic harmony is produced. The universal tendency of motion to become +rhythmical--itself, as Mr. Spencer was the first to show, a necessary +consequence of the persistence of force--is, so to speak, a conservative +tendency: it sets a premium against natural cataclysms. But a more +important consideration is this,--that during the evolution of natural law +in the way suggested in Chapter IV., as every newly evolved law came into +existence it must have been, as it were, grafted on the stock of all +pre-existing natural laws, and so would not enter the cosmic system as an +element of confusion, but rather as an element of further progress. For +instance, when, with the origin of organic nature, the law of natural +selection entered upon the cosmos, it was grafted upon the pre-existing +stock of other natural laws, and so combined within them in unity. And a +little thought will show that it was impossible that it should do +otherwise; for it was impossible that natural selection could ever produce +organisms which would ever be able by their existence to conflict with the +pre-existing system of astronomic or geologic laws; seeing that organisms, +being a product of later evolution than these laws, would either have to be +adapted to them or perish. And hence the new law of natural selection, +which consists in so adapting organisms to the pre-existing laws that they +must either conform to them or die. Now, I have chosen the case of natural +selection because, as alluded to in the text, it is the law of all others +which is the most conspicuously effective in producing the harmonious +complexity of nature. But the same kind of considerations may be seen to +apply to most of the other general laws with which we are acquainted, +particularly if we bear in mind that the general outcome of their united +action as we observe it--the cosmic harmony on which so much stress is +laid--is not _perfectly_ harmonious. Cataclysms--whether it be the capture +of an insect, or the ruin of a star--although events of comparatively rare +occurrence if at any given time we take into account the total number of +insects or the total number of stars, are events which nevertheless do +occasionally happen. And the fact that even cataclysms take place in +accordance with so-called natural law, serves but to emphasise the +consideration on which we are engaged--viz., that the total result of the +combined action of general laws is not such as to produce perfect order. +Lastly, if the answer is made that human ideas of perfect order may not +correspond with the highest ideal of such order, I observe that to make +such a answer is merely to abandon the subject of discussion; for if a +theist rests his argument on the basis of our human conception of order, he +is not free to maintain his argument and at the same time to abandon its +basis at whatever point the latter may be shown untenable. + +[30] Since the above was written, the first volume of Mr. Spencer's +"Sociology" has been published; and those who may not as yet have read the +first half of that work are here strongly recommended to do so; for Mr. +Spencer has there shown, in a more connected and conclusive manner than has +ever been shown before, how strictly natural is the growth of all +superstitions and religions--_i.e._, of all the theories of personal agency +in nature.--1878. + +[31] Herbert Spencer's Essays, vol. iii. pp. 246-249 (1874). + +[32] This is the truly inconceivable element in the physical theory. As I +have shown in the pleading on the side of Atheism, the supposed +inconceivability of cosmic harmony being due to mindless forces, is not of +such a kind as wholly refuses to be surmounted by symbolic conceptions of a +sufficiently abstract character. But it is impossible, by the aid of any +symbols, to gain a conception of an eternal existence. And I may here point +out, that if Mind is said to be the cause of evolution, not only does the +statement involve the inconceivable proposition that such a Mind must be +infinite in respect to its powers of supervision, direction, &c.; but the +statement also involves a necessary alternative between two additional +inconceivable propositions--viz., either that such a Mind must have been +eternal, or that it must have come into existence without a cause. In this +respect, therefore, it would seem that the theory of Atheism has the +advantage over that of Theism; for while the former theory is under the +necessity of embodying only a single inconceivable term, the latter theory +is under the necessity of embodying two such terms. + +[33] Mr. Herbert Spencer has treated of this subject in his memorable +controversy with Mill on the "Universal Postulate" (see _Psychology_, § +427), and refuses to entertain the term "Inconceivable" as applicable to +any propositions other than those wherein "the terms cannot, by any effort, +be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition +asserts between them." That is to say, he limits the term "Inconceivable" +to that which is _absolutely_ inconceivable; and he then proceeds to affirm +that all propositions "which admit of being framed in thought, but which +are so much at variance with experience, in which its terms have habitually +been otherwise united, that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation +without effort," ought properly to be termed "_incredible_" propositions. +Now I cannot see that the class "Incredible propositions" is, as this +definition asserts, identical with the class which I have termed +"Relatively inconceivable" propositions. For example, it is a familiar +observation that, on looking at the setting sun, we experience an almost, +if not quite, insuperable difficulty in _conceiving_ the sun's apparent +motion as due to our own actual motion, and yet we experience no difficulty +in _believing_ it. Conversely, I entertain but little difficulty in +_conceiving_--_i.e._, imagining--a shark with a mammalian heart, and yet it +would require extremely strong evidence to make me _believe_ that such an +animal exists. The truth appears to be that our language is deficient in +terms whereby to distinguish between that which is wholly inconceivable +from that which is with difficulty conceivable. This, it seems to me, was +the principle reason of the dispute between Spencer and Mill above alluded +to,--the former writer having always used the word "Inconceivable" in the +sense of "Absolutely inconceivable," and the latter having apparently used +it--in his _Logic_ and elsewhere--in both senses. I have endeavoured to +remedy this defect in the language by introducing the qualifying words, +"Absolutely" and "Relatively," which, although not appropriate words, are +the best that I am able to supply. The conceptive faculty of the individual +having been determined by the experience of the race, that which is +inconceivable by the intelligence of the race may be said to be +inconceivable to the intelligence of the individual in an _absolute_ sense; +no effort on his part can enable him to surmount the organically imposed +conditions of his conceptive faculty. But that which is inconceivable +merely to one individual or generation, while it is not inconceivable to +the intelligence of the race, may properly be said to be inconceivable to +the intelligence of that individual or generation only in a _relative_ +sense; apart from the special condition to which the individual +intelligence has been subjected, there is nothing in the conditions of +human intelligence as such to prevent the thing from being conceived. +[While this work has been passing through the press, I have found that Mr. +G. H. Lewes has already employed the above terms in precisely the same +sense as that which is above explained.--1878.] + +[34] I should here like to have added some considerations on Sir W. +Hamilton's remarks concerning the effect of training upon the mind in this +connection; but, to avoid being tedious, I shall condense what I have to +say into a few sentences. What Hamilton maintains is very true, viz., that +the study of classics, moral and mental philosophy, &c., renders the mind +more capable of believing in a God than does the study of physical science. +The question, however, is, Which class of studies ought to be considered +the more authoritative in this matter? I certainly cannot see what title +classics, history, political economy, &c., have to be regarded at all; and +although the mental and moral sciences have doubtless a better claim, still +I think they must be largely subordinate to those sciences which deal with +the whole domain of nature besides. Further, I should say that there is no +very strong _affirmative_ influence created on the mind in this respect by +any class of studies; and that the only reason why we so generally find +Theism and classics, &c., united, is because we so seldom find classics, +&c., and physical science united; the _negative_ influence of the latter, +in the case of classical minds, being therefore generally absent. + +[35] The qualities named are only known in a relative sense, and therefore +the apparent contradiction may be destitute of meaning in an absolute +sense. + +[36] All the quotations in this Appendix have been taken from the chapter +on "Our knowledge of the existence of a God," and from the early part of +that on "The extent of human knowledge," together with the appended letter +to the Bishop of Worcester. + +[37] A criticism of Mr. John Fiske's proposed system of theology as +expounded in his work on "Cosmic Philosophy" (Macmillan & Co., 1874). + +[38] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 87-89. + +[39] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 429, 430. + +[40] Ibid., p. 441. + +[41] Ibid., pp. 450, 451. + +[42] Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pp. 159-161. + +[43] We thus see that the question whether there may not be "something +quasi-psychical in the constitution of things" is a question which does not +affect the position of Theism as it has been left by a negation of the +self-conscious personality of God. But as the speculations on which this +question has been reared are in themselves of much philosophical interest, +I may here observe that, in one form or another, they have been dimly +floating in men's minds for a long time past. Thus, excepting the degree of +certainty with which it is taught, we have in Mr. Spencer's words above +quoted a reversion to the doctrine of Buddha; for, as "force is +persistent," all that would happen on death, supposing the doctrine true, +would be an escape of the "circumscribed aggregate" of units forming the +individual consciousness into the unlimited abyss of similar units +constituting the "Absolute Being" of the Cosmists, or the "Divine Essence" +of the Buddhists. Again, the doctrine in a vague form pervades the +philosophy of Spinoza, and is next clearly enunciated by Wundt. Lastly, in +a recently published very remarkable essay "On the Nature of Things in +Themselves," Professor Clifford arrives at a similar doctrine by a +different route. The following is the conclusion to which he +arrives:--"That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplest +feeling is a complex, I shall call _Mind-stuff_. A moving molecule of +inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a +small piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to +form the film on the under side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff +which go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of +Sentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and +nervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff +are so combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say, +changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked +together that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other. +When matters take the complex form of a living human brain, the +corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having +intelligence and volition." (Mind, January, 1878.) + +[44] Theism, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the +University of Edinburgh, &c. + +[45] Such being the objects in view, I have not thought it necessary to +extend this criticism into anything resembling a review of Professor +Flint's work as a whole; but, on the contrary, I have aimed rather at +confining my observations to those parts of his treatise which embody the +current arguments from teleology alone. I may here observe, however, in +general terms, that I consider all his arguments to have been answered by +anticipation in the foregoing examination of Theism. I may also here +observe, that throughout the following essay I have used the word "design" +in the sense in which it is used by Professor Flint himself. This sense is +distinctly a different one from that which the word bears in the writings +of the Paley, Bell, and Chalmers school. For while in the latter writings, +as pointed out in Chapter III., the word bears its natural meaning of a +certain _process of thought_, in Professor Flint's work it is used rather +as expressive of a _product of intelligence_. In other words, "design," as +used by Professor Flint, is synonymous with _intention_, irrespective of +the particular psychological process by which the intention may have been +put into effect. + +[46] Op. cit., pp. 255-257. + +[47] Let it be observed that there is a distinction between what I may call +substantial and formal existence. Thus there is no doubt that flowers as +flowers perish, or become non-existent; but the substances of which they +were composed persist. And, in this connection, I may here point out that +if the universe is infinite in space and time, the universe as a whole +would present substantial existence as standing out of relation to space +and time, whereas innumerable portions of the universe present only formal +existences, because standing in relation both to space and time. Thus, for +instance, the solar system, as a solar system, must have an end in time as +it has a boundary in space; but as the substance of which it consists will +not become extinguished by the extinction of the system, it may not now +stand in any real relation to what we call space and time. I am inclined to +think that it is upon the idea of non-existence in this formal sense that +we construct a pseud-idea of non-existence in a substantial sense; but it +is evident that if the universe as a whole is absolute, this pseud-idea +must represent as impossibility. And from this it follows, that if +existence is infinite in space and time, every _quantum_ of it with which +our experience comes into relation must represent, as its essential +quality, that quality which we find to be presented by the substance of +things--the quality, that is, of persistence. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Candid Examination of Theism, by +George John Romanes + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM *** + +***** This file should be named 19003-8.txt or 19003-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/9/0/0/19003/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of +public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital +Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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left: 92%; font-size: smaller; text-align: left;} /* sidenotes */ + .note {margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; + font-size: small; } /* footnote */ + + .nobo {border: thin;} + .red {color: red;} + .figure, .figcenter, .figright, .figleft + {padding: 1em; margin: 0; text-align: center; font-size: 0.8em;} + .figure img, .figcenter img, .figright img, .figleft img + {border: none;} + .figure p, .figcenter p, .figright p, .figleft p + {margin: 0; text-indent: 1em;} + .figure p.in, .figcenter p.in, .figright p.in, .figleft p.in + {margin: 0; text-indent: 8em;} + .figcenter {margin: auto;} + .figright {float: right;} + .figleft {float: left;} + // --> + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's A Candid Examination of Theism, by George John Romanes + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Candid Examination of Theism + +Author: George John Romanes + +Release Date: August 7, 2006 [EBook #19003] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of +public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital +Libraries.) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<h4>A</h4> + +<h1>CANDID EXAMINATION</h1> + +<h4>OF</h4> + +<h1>THEISM.</h1> + +<h4>BY</h4> + +<h2>PHYSICUS.</h2> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;">BOSTON:<br /> +HOUGHTON, OSGOOD, & COMPANY.<br /> +1878.<br /> +[<i>All rights reserved</i>]</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><i>CANST THOU BY SEARCHING FIND OUT GOD?</i></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h2>PREFACE.</h2> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="short" /> + + <p>The following essay was written several years ago; but I have hitherto + refrained from publishing it, lest, after having done so, I should find + that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the essay + sets forth. Judging, however, that it is now more than ever improbable + that I shall myself be able to detect any errors in my reasoning, I feel + that it is time to present the latter to the contemplation of other + minds; and in doing so, I make this explanation only because I feel it + desirable to state at the outset that the present treatise was written + before the publication of Mr. Mill's treatise on the same subject. It is + desirable to make this statement, first, because in several instances the + trains of reasoning in the two essays are parallel, and next, because in + other instances I have quoted passages from Mr. Mill's essay in + connections which would be scarcely intelligible were it not understood + that these passages are insertions made after the present essay had been + completed. I have also added several supplementary essays which have been + written since the main essay was finished.</p> + + <p>It is desirable further to observe, that the only reason why I publish + this edition anonymously is because I feel very strongly that, in matters + of the kind with which the present essay deals, opinions and arguments + should be allowed to produce the exact degree of influence to which as + opinions and arguments they are entitled: they should be permitted to + stand upon their own intrinsic merits alone, and quite beyond the shadow + of that unfair prejudication which cannot but arise so soon as their + author's authority, or absence of authority, becomes known. + Notwithstanding this avowal, however, I fear that many who glance over + the following pages will read in the "Physicus" of the first one a very + different motive. There is at the present time a wonderfully wide-spread + sentiment pervading all classes of society—a sentiment which it + would not be easy to define, but the practical outcome of which is, that + to discuss the question of which this essay treats is, in some way or + other, morally wrong. Many, therefore, who share this sentiment will + doubtless attribute my reticence to a puerile fear on my part to meet it. + I can only say that such is not the case. Although I allude to this + sentiment with all respect—believing as I do that it is an offshoot + from the stock which contains all that is best and greatest in human + nature—nevertheless it seems to me impossible to deny that the + sentiment in question is as unreasonable as the frame of mind which + harbours it must be unreasoning. If there is no God, where can be the + harm in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence? If there is + a God, surely our first duty towards him must be to exert to our utmost, + in our attempts to find him, the most noble faculty with which he has + endowed us—as carefully to investigate the evidence which he has + seen fit to furnish of his own existence as we investigate the evidence + of inferior things in his dependent creation. To say that there is one + rule or method for ascertaining truth in the latter case, which it is not + legitimate to apply in the former case, is merely a covert way of saying + that the Deity, if he exists, has not supplied us with rational evidence + of his existence. For my own part, I feel that such an assertion cannot + but embody far more unworthy conceptions of a Personal God than are + represented by any amount of earnest inquiry into whatever evidence of + his existence there may be present; but, neglecting this reflection, if + there is a God, it is certain that reason is the faculty by which he has + enabled man to discover truth, and it is no less certain that the + scientific methods have proved themselves by far the most trustworthy for + reason to adopt. To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the + conclusion that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific + methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the question as + to his existence is both more morally and more reverently contemplated if + we regard it purely as a problem for methodical analysis to solve, than + if we regard it in any other light. Or, stating the case in other words, + I believe that in whatever degree we intentionally abstain from using in + this case what we <i>know</i> to be the most trustworthy methods of + inquiry in other cases, in that degree are we either unworthily closing + our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we are guilty of the worst among human + sins—"Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways." + If it is said that, supposing man to be in a state of probation, faith, + and not reason, must be the instrument of his trial, I am ready to admit + the validity of the remark; but I must also ask it to be remembered, that + unless faith has <i>some</i> basis of reason whereon to rest, it differs + in nothing from superstition; and hence that it is still our duty to + investigate the <i>rational</i> standing of the question before us by the + <i>scientific</i> methods alone. And I may here observe parenthetically, + that the same reasoning applies to all investigations concerning the + reality of a supposed revelation. With such investigations, however, the + present essay has nothing to do, although, I may remark that if there is + any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible in the structure of a + professing revelation, such evidence, in whatever degree present, would + be of the best possible kind for substantiating the hypothesis of + Theism.</p> + + <p>Such being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the + most truly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the + following pages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion were + more negative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice in me + <i>for this reason</i> to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of + the present kind could ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism, + there might be much for its author to regret, but nothing for him to be + ashamed of; and, by parity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result of + such an inquiry is seen to have a tendency to negative the theistic + theory, the author should not be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his + conviction as to the degree of such tendency, provided only that his + conviction is an <i>honest</i> one, and that he is conscious of its + having been reached by using his faculties with the utmost care of which + he is capable.</p> + + <p>If it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate + a character that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I + reply that they are nevertheless the <i>best</i> methods available, and + hence that the retort is without pertinence: the question is still to be + regarded as a scientific one, although we may perceive that neither an + affirmative nor a negative answer can be given to it with any approach to + a full demonstration. But if the question is thus conceded to be one + falling within the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that + the mere fact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently + impossible should not deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a + well-recognised principle of scientific research, that however difficult + or impossible it may be to <i>prove</i> a given theory true or false, the + theory should nevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being + tested, by the full rigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration + cannot be hoped for, it still remains desirable to reduce the question at + issue to the last analysis of which it is capable.</p> + + <p>Adopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the + following analysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour + of the theory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of + light which the progress of modern science—physical and + speculative—has shed upon it. And forasmuch as it is impossible + that demonstrated truth can ever be shown untrue, and forasmuch as the + demonstrated truths on which the present examination rests are the most + fundamental which it is possible for the human mind to reach, I do not + think it presumptuous to assert what appears to me a necessary deduction + from these facts—namely, that, possible errors in reasoning apart, + the rational position of Theism as here defined must remain without + material modification as long as our intelligence remains human.</p> + +<font class="sc">London</font>, 1878. + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h2>ANALYSIS.</h2> + +<h3><a href="#ChapI">CHAPTER I</a>.</h3> + +<h4>EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR +OF THEISM.</h4> + +<font class="sc">sect</font>. + + <p><a href="#Sect1">1</a>. Introductory.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect2">2</a>. Object of the chapter.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect3">3</a>. The Argument from the Inconceivability of + Self-existence.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect4">4</a>. The Argument from the Desirability of there + being a God.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect5">5</a>. The Argument from the Presence of Human + Aspirations.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect6">6</a>. The Argument from Consciousness.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect7">7</a>. The Argument for a First Cause.</p> + +<h3><a href="#ChapII">CHAPTER II</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND.</h4> + + <p><a href="#Sect8">8</a>. Introductory.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect9">9</a>. Examination of the Argument, and the + independent coincidence of my views regarding it with those of Mr. + Mill.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect10">10</a>. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a + re-enunciation of it in the form of a Syllogism.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect11">11</a>. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot + explain Mind in the abstract. Mill quoted and answered. This defect in + the Syllogism clearly defined.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect12">12</a>. The Syllogism further defective, in that it + assumes Intelligence to be the only possible cause of Intelligence. This + assumption amounts to begging the whole question as to the being of a + God. Inconceivability of Matter thinking no proof that it may not think. + Locke himself strangely concedes this. His fallacies and + self-contradictions pointed out in an Appendix.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect13">13</a>. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a + Materialist, but assuming that he is one, he is as much entitled to the + hypothesis that Matter thinks as a Theist is to his hypothesis that it + does not.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect14">14</a>. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly + equivalent value, save that while Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a + certain basis of fact to rest upon. This basis defined in a footnote, + where also Professor Clifford's essay on "Body and Mind" is briefly + examined. Difficulty of estimating the worth of the Argument as to the + <i>most</i> conceivable being <i>most</i> likely true.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect15">15</a>. Locke's comparison between certainty of the + Inconceivability Argument as applied to Theism and to mathematics shown + to contain a <i>virtual</i> though not a <i>formal</i> fallacy.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect16">16</a>. Summary of considerations as to the value of + this Argument from Inconceivability.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect17">17</a>. Introductory to the other Arguments in + favour of the conclusion that only Intelligence can have caused + Intelligence.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect18">18</a>. Locke's presentation of the view that the + cause must contain all that is contained in the effects. His statements + contradicted. Mill quoted to show that the analogy of Nature is against + the doctrine of higher perfections never growing out of lower ones.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect19">19</a>. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in + favour of the proposition that only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. + Hamilton quoted to show that in his philosophy the entire question as to + the being of a God hinges upon that as to whether or not human volitions + are caused.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect20">20</a>. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. + Hamilton erroneously identified this theory with the fact that we possess + a moral sense. His resulting dilemma.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect21">21</a>. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus + identifying genuine fact with spurious theory, yet his Argument from the + fact of our having a moral sense remains to be considered.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect22">22</a>. The question here is merely as to whether or + not the presence of the moral sense can be explained by natural causes. + <i>A priori</i> probability of the moral sense having been evolved. <i>A + posteriori</i> confirmation supplied by Utilitarianism, &c.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect23">23</a>. Mill's presentation of the Argument a + resuscitation of Paley's. His criticism on Paley shown to be unfair.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect24">24</a>. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation + pointed out.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect25">25</a>. The same fallacy pointed out in another + way.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect26">26</a>. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in + order to illustrate the root fallacy of his Argument from Design. Mill's + observations upon this Argument criticised.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect27">27</a>. Result yielded by the present analysis of + the Argument from Design. The Argument shown to be a <i>petitio + principii</i>.</p> + +<h3><a href="#ChapIV">CHAPTER IV</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS.</h4> + + <p><a href="#Sect28">28</a>. My belief that no competent writer in favour + of the Argument from Design could have written upon it at all, had it not + been for his instinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument + from General Laws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency + insisted upon.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect29">29</a>. The rational standing of the Argument from + General Laws prior to the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation + of Energy. The Rev. Baden Powell quoted.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect30">30</a>. The nature of General Laws when these are + interpreted in terms of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The + word "Law" defined in terms of this doctrine.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect31">31</a>. The rational standing of the Argument from + General Laws subsequent to the enunciation of the doctrine of the + Conservation of Energy.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect32">32</a>. The self-evolution of General Laws, or the + objective aspect of the question as to whether we may infer the presence + of Mind in Nature because Nature admits of being intelligently + interrogated.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect33">33</a>. The subjective aspect of this question, + according to the data afforded by evolutionary psychology.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect34">34</a>. Correspondence between products due to human + intelligence and products supposed due to Divine Intelligence, a + correspondence which is only generic. Illustrations drawn from + prodigality in Nature. Further illustrations. Illogical manner in which + natural theologians deal with such difficulties. The generic resemblance + contemplated is just what we should expect to find, if the doctrine of + evolutionary psychology be true.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect35">35</a>. The last three sections parenthetical. + Necessary nature of the conclusion which follows from the last five + sections.</p> + +<h3><a href="#ChapV">CHAPTER V</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE +BEING OF A GOD.</h4> + + <p><a href="#Sect36">36</a>. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion + reached in the previous chapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely + scientific, and not of logical conclusiveness. Preparation for + considering the question in its purely logical form.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect37">37</a>. The logic of probability in general + explained, and canon of interpretation enunciated.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect38">38</a>. Application of this canon to the particular + case of Theism.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect39">39</a>. Exposition of the logical state of the + question.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect40">40</a>. Exposition continued.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect41">41</a>. Result of the exposition; "Suspended + Judgment" the only logical attitude of mind with regard to the question + of Theism.</p> + +<h3><a href="#ChapVI">CHAPTER VI</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.</h4> + + <p><a href="#Sect42">42</a>. Statement of the position to which the + question of Theism has been reduced by the foregoing analysis.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect43">43</a>. Distinction between a scientific and a + metaphysical teleology. Statement of the latter in legitimate terms. + Criticism of this statement legitimately made on the side of Atheism as + being gratuitous. Impartial judgment on this criticism.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect44">44</a>. Examination of the question as to whether + the metaphysical system of teleology is really destitute of all rational + support. Pleading of a supposed Theist in support of the system. The + principle of correlation of general laws. The complexity of Nature.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect45">45</a>. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and + judgment that it fairly removes from the hypothesis of metaphysical + teleology the charge of the latter being gratuitous.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect46">46</a>. Examination of the degree of probability + that is presented by the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising + an examination of the Theistic objection to the scientific train of + reasoning on account of its symbolism, and showing that a no less cogent + objection lies against the metaphysical train of reasoning on account of + its embodying the supposition of unknowable causes. Distinction between + "inconceivability" in a formal or symbolical, and in a material or + realisable sense. Reply of a supposed Atheist to the previous pleading of + the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencer quoted on inconceivability of cosmic + evolution as due to Mind.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect47">47</a>. Final judgment on the rational value of a + metaphysical system of teleology. Distinction between "inconceivability" + in an absolute and in a relative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of + mind which it is rational to adopt towards the question of Theism. The + desirability and the rationality of tolerance in this particular + case.</p> + +<h3><a href="#ChapVII">CHAPTER VII</a>.</h3> + +<h4>GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.</h4> + + <p><a href="#Sect48">48</a>. General summary of the whole essay.</p> + + <p><a href="#Sect49">49</a>. Concluding remarks.</p> + +<h3>APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.</h3> + + <p><a href="#Appendix"><font class="sc">Appendix</font>.</a></p> + + <p>A Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument + against the possibility of Matter thinking on grounds of its being + inconceivable that it should.</p> + + <p><a href="#SuppEssI"><font class="sc">Supplementary Essay</font> + I.</a></p> + + <p>Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and + criticism to show that it is inadequate to sustain the doctrine of + "Cosmic Theism" which Mr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it.</p> + + <p><a href="#SuppEssII"><font class="sc">Supplementary Essay</font> + II.</a></p> + + <p>A Critical Examination of the Rev. Professor Flint's work on + "Theism".</p> + + <p><a href="#SuppEssIII"><font class="sc">Supplementary Essay</font> + III.</a></p> + + <p>On the Speculative Standing of Materialism.</p> + + <p><a href="#SuppEssIV"><font class="sc">Supplementary Essay</font> + IV.</a></p> + + <p>On the Final Mystery of Things.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h1>THEISM.</h1> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="short" /> + +<h3><a name="ChapI">CHAPTER I</a>.</h3> + +<h4>EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR +OF THEISM.</h4> + + <p><a name="Sect1">§ 1</a>. Few subjects have occupied so much attention + among speculative thinkers as that which relates to the being of God. + Notwithstanding, however, the great amount that has been written on this + subject, I am not aware that any one has successfully endeavoured to + approach it, on all its various sides, from the ground of pure reason + alone, and thus to fix, as nearly as possible, the exact position which, + in pure reason, this subject ought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought + that an exception to this statement ought to be made in favour of John + Stuart Mill's posthumous essay on Theism; but from my great respect for + this author, I should rather be inclined to regard that essay as a + criticism on illogical arguments, than as a <i>careful</i> or + <i>matured</i> attempt to formulate the strictly rational <i>status</i> + of the question in all its bearings. Nevertheless, as this essay is in + some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yet + appeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came + from the pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most + serious attention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the + course of the following pages.</p> + + <p>Seeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer has + hitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question as + to the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any + attempt, however imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of + every school—the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious + rapidity which of late years has marked the advance both of physical and + of speculative science, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting + us towards a reasonable and, I think, a final decision as to the strictly + logical standing of this important matter. However, be my attempt welcome + or no, I feel that it is my obvious duty to publish the results which + have been yielded by an honest and careful analysis.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect2">§ 2</a>. I may most fitly begin this analysis by + briefly disposing of such arguments in favour of Theism as are manifestly + erroneous. And I do this the more willingly because, as these arguments + are at the present time most in vogue, an exposure of their fallacies may + perhaps deter our popular apologists of the future from drawing upon + themselves the silent contempt of every reader whose intellect is not + either prejudiced or imbecile.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect3">§ 3</a>. A favourite piece of apologetic juggling is + that of first demolishing Atheism, Pantheism, Materialism, &c., by + successively calling upon them to explain the mystery of self-existence, + and then tacitly assuming that the need of such an explanation is absent + in the case of Theism—as though the attribute in question were more + conceivable when posited in a Deity than when posited elsewhere.</p> + + <p>It is, I hope, unnecessary to observe that, so far as the ultimate + mystery of existence is concerned, any and every theory of things is + equally entitled to the inexplicable fact that something is; and that any + endeavour on the part of the votaries of one theory to shift from + themselves to the votaries of another theory the <i>onus</i> of + explaining the necessarily inexplicable, is an instance of irrationality + which borders on the ludicrous.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect4">§ 4</a>. Another argument, or semblance of an + argument, is the very prevalent one, "Our heart requires a God; therefore + it is probable that there is a God:" as though such a subjective + necessity, even if made out, could ever prove an objective existence.<a + name="footnotetag1" href="#footnote1"><sup>[1]</sup></a></p> + + <p><a name="Sect5">§ 5</a>. If it is said that the theistic aspirations + of the human heart, by the mere fact of their presence, point to the + existence of a God as to their explanatory cause, I answer that the + argument would only be valid after the possibility of any more proximate + causes having been in action has been excluded—else the theistic + explanation violates the fundamental rule of science, the Law of + Parcimony, or the law which forbids us to assume the action of more + remote causes where more proximate ones are found sufficient to explain + the effects. Consequently, the validity of the argument now under + consideration is inversely proportional to the number of possibilities + there are of the aspirations in question being due to the agency of + physical causes; and forasmuch as our ignorance of psychological + causation is well-nigh total, the Law of Parcimony forbids us to allow + any determinate degree of logical value to the present argument. In other + words, we must not use the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its + presence—must not argue from our ignorance of psychological + possibilities, as though this ignorance were knowledge of corresponding + impossibilities. The burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and + from the nature of the case this burden cannot be discharged until the + science of psychology shall have been fully perfected. I may add that, + for my own part, I cannot help feeling that, even in the present + embryonic condition of this science, we are not without some indications + of the manner in which the aspirations in question arose; but even were + this not so, the above considerations prove that the argument before us + is invalid. If it is retorted that the fact of these aspirations having + had <i>proximate</i> causes to account for their origin, even if made + out, would not negative the inference of these being due to a Deity as to + their <i>ultimate</i> cause; I answer that this is not to use the + argument from the presence of these aspirations; it is merely to beg the + question as to the being of a God.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect6">§ 6</a>. Next, we may consider the argument from + consciousness. Many persons ground their belief in the existence of a + Deity upon a real or supposed necessity of their own subjective thought. + I say "real or supposed," because, in its bearing upon rational argument, + it is of no consequence of which character the alleged necessity actually + is. Even if the necessity of thought be real, all that the fact entitles + the thinker to affirm is, that it is impossible for <i>him</i>, by any + effort of thinking, to rid himself of the persuasion that God exists; he + is not entitled to affirm that this persuasion is necessarily bound up + with the constitution of the human mind. Or, as Mill puts it, "One man + cannot by proclaiming with ever so much confidence that <i>he</i> + perceives an object, convince other people that they see it too.... When + no claim is set up to any peculiar gift, but we are told that all of us + are as capable of seeing what he sees, feeling what he feels, nay, that + we actually do so, and when the utmost effort of which we are capable + fails to make us aware of what we are told, we perceive this supposed + universal faculty of intuition is but</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'The Dark Lantern of the Spirit</p> + <p>Which none see by but those who bear it.'"</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>It is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument + must, from its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save + its assertor; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is + not universal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument.</p> + + <p>And now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether + the alleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a + <i>real</i> necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are + the victims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable + that their minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute + from the minds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the + above quotation, "They may fairly be asked to consider, whether it is not + more likely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in + their minds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an + impression in theirs." No doubt it is true that education and habits of + thought may so stereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what + is conceivable to one man or generation may not be so to another;<a + name="footnotetag2" href="#footnote2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> but to adduce + this consideration in this place would clearly be but to destroy the + argument from the <i>intuitive</i> necessity of believing in a God.</p> + + <p>Lastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if + the impossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law + of human mind—which it certainly is not—the fact of his + existence could not be thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much + more probable than it now is—as probable, for instance, if not more + probable, than is the existence of an external world;—but still it + would not be necessarily true.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect7">§ 7</a>. The argument from the general consent of + mankind is so clearly fallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I + shall pass it over and proceed at once to the last of the untenable + arguments—that, namely, from the existence of a First Cause. And + here I should like to express myself indebted to Mr. Mill for the + following ideas:—"The cause of every change is a prior change; and + such it cannot but be; for if there were no new antecedent, there would + be no new consequent. If the state of facts which brings the phenomenon + into existence, had existed always or for an indefinite duration, the + effect also would have existed always or been produced an indefinite time + ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of causation, within the + sphere of experience, that the causes as well as the effects had a + beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem, therefore, + that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for a first cause, + is repugnant to it; and that the very essence of causation, as it exists + within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First + Cause."</p> + + <p>The rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are + tolerably obvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his + essay. I shall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them.</p> + + <p>"But it is necessary to look more particularly into this matter, and + analyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have + experience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have a + beginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had no + beginning, this permanent element may with some justice be termed a first + or universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself to cause + anything, it enters as a con-cause into all causation."</p> + + <p>He then shows that the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy supplies + us with such a datum, and thus the conclusion easily follows—"It + would seem, then, that the only sense in which experience supports, in + any shape, the doctrine of a First Cause, viz., as the primæval and + universal element of all causes, the First Cause can be no other than + Force."</p> + + <p>Still, however, it may be maintained that "all force is will-force." + But "if there be any truth in the doctrine of Conservation of Force, ... + this doctrine does not change from true to false when it reaches the + field of voluntary agency. The will does not, any more than other + agencies, create Force: granting that it originates motion, it has no + means of doing so but by converting into that particular manifestation, a + portion of Force which already existed in other forms. It is known that + the source from which this portion of Force is derived, is chiefly, or + entirely, the force evolved in the processes of chemical composition and + decomposition which constitute the body of nutrition: the force so + liberated becomes a fund upon which every muscular and every nervous + action, as of a train of thought, is a draft. It is in this sense only + that, according to the best lights of science, volition is an originating + cause. Volition, therefore, does not answer to the idea of a First Cause; + since Force must, in every instance, be assumed as prior to it; and there + is not the slightest colour, derived from experience, for supposing Force + itself to have been created by a volition. As far as anything can be + concluded from human experience, Force has all the attributes of a thing + eternal and uncreated....</p> + + <p>"All that can be affirmed (even) by the strongest assertion of the + Freedom of the Will, is that volitions are themselves uncaused and are, + therefore, alone fit to be the first or universal cause. But, even + assuming volitions to be uncaused, the properties of matter, so far as + experience discloses, are uncaused also, and have the advantage over any + particular volition, in being, so far as experience can show, eternal. + Theism, therefore, in so far as it rests on the necessity of a First + Cause, has no support from experience."</p> + + <p>Such may be taken as a sufficient refutation of the argument that, as + human volition is apparently a cause in nature, and moreover constitutes + the basis of our conception of all causation, therefore all causation is + probably volitional in character. But as this is a favourite argument + with some theists, I shall introduce another quotation from Mr. Mill, + which is taken from a different work.</p> + + <p>"Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervous + action, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves. + Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient and + not merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the + particular phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that cause; + are we therefore to say with these writers that since we know of no other + efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there + <i>is</i> no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A + more outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among + the infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a + particular mode of action of certain nerves which has for its cause and, + as we are now supposing, for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; + and because this is the only efficient cause of "which we are conscious, + being the only one of which, in the nature of the case, we <i>can</i> be + conscious, since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does + this justify us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same + kind of efficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and + peculiarly human or animal phenomenon?" It is then shown that a logical + parallel to this mode of inference is that of generalising from the one + known instance of the earth being inhabited, to the conclusion that + "every heavenly body without exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, + fixed star, or nebula, is inhabited, and must be so from the inherent + constitution of things." After which the passage continues, "It is true + there are cases in which, with acknowledged propriety, we generalise from + a single instance to a multitude of instances. But they must be instances + which resemble the one known instance, and not such as have no + circumstance in common with it except that of being instances.... But the + supporters of the volition theory ask us to infer that volition causes + everything, for no other reason except that it causes one particular + thing; although that one phenomenon, far from being a type of all natural + phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws bearing scarcely any + resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether of inorganic or of + organic nature."<a name="footnotetag3" + href="#footnote3"><sup>[3]</sup></a></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3><a name="ChapII">CHAPTER II</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE +HUMAN MIND.</h4> + + <p><a name="Sect8">§ 8</a>. Leaving now the obviously untenable + arguments, we next come to those which, in my opinion, may properly be + termed scientific.</p> + + <p>It will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under + one or other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of + Theism will be found to range themselves.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect9">§ 9</a>. We have first the argument drawn from the + existence of the human mind. This is an argument which, for at least the + last three centuries, and especially during the present one, has been + more relied upon than any other by philosophical thinkers. It consists in + the reflection that the being of our own subjective intelligence is the + most certain fact which our experience supplies, that this fact demands + an adequate cause for its explanation, and that the only adequate cause + of our intelligence must be some other intelligence. Granting the + existence of a conditioned intelligence (and no one could reasonably + suppose his own intelligence to be otherwise), and the existence of an + unconditioned intelligence becomes a logical necessity, unless we deny + either the validity of the principle that every effect must have an + adequate cause, or else that the only adequate cause of Mind is Mind.</p> + + <p>It has been a great satisfaction to me to find that my examination of + this argument—an examination which was undertaken and completed + several months before Mr. Mill's essay appeared—has been minutely + corroborated by that of our great logician. I mention this circumstance + here, as on previous occasions, not for the petty motive of vindicating + my own originality, but because in matters of this kind the accuracy of + the reasoning employed, and therefore the logical validity of the + conclusions attained, are guaranteed in the best possible manner, if the + trains of thought have been independently pursued by different minds.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect10">§ 10</a>. Seeing that, among the advocates of this + argument, Locke went so far as to maintain that by it alone he could + render the existence of a Deity as certain as any mathematical + demonstration, it is only fair, preparatory to our examining this + argument, to present it in the words of this great thinker.</p> + + <p>He says:—"There was a time when there was no knowing + (<i>i.e.</i>, conscious) being, and when knowledge began to be; or else + there has been also a knowing being from all eternity. If it be said, + there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being + was void of all understanding, I reply, that then it was impossible there + should ever have been any knowledge: it being as impossible that things + wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without perception, + should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle + should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as + repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into + itself, sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea + of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two + right ones."<a name="footnotetag4" + href="#footnote4"><sup>[4]</sup></a></p> + + <p>Now, although this argument has been more fully elaborated by other + writers, the above presentation contains its whole essence. It will be + seen that it has the great advantage of resting <i>immediately</i> upon + the foundation from which all argument concerning this or any other + matter, must necessarily arise, viz.,—upon the very existence of + our argumentative faculty itself. For the sake of a critical examination, + it is desirable to throw the argument before us into the syllogistic + form. It will then stand thus:—</p> + + <p>All known minds are caused by an unknown mind. Our mind is a known + mind; therefore, our mind is caused by an unknown mind.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect11">§ 11</a>. Now the major premiss of this syllogism is + inadmissible for two reasons: in the first place, it is assumed that + known mind can only be caused by unknown mind; and, in the second place, + even if this assumption were granted, it would not explain the existence + of Mind as Mind. To take the last of these objections first, in the words + of Mr. Mill, "If the mere existence of Mind is supposed to require, as a + necessary antecedent, another Mind greater and more powerful, the + difficulty is not removed by going one step back: the creating mind + stands as much in need of another mind to be the source of its existence + as the created mind. Be it remembered that we have no direct knowledge + (at least apart from Revelation) of a mind which is even apparently + eternal, as Force and Matter are: an eternal mind is, as far as the + present argument is concerned, a simple hypothesis to account for the + minds which we know to exist. Now it is essential to an hypothesis that, + if admitted, it should at least remove the difficulty and account for the + facts. But it does not account for mind to refer our mind to a prior mind + for its origin. The problem remains unsolved, nay, rather increased."</p> + + <p>Nevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, "My + object is not to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more + than it is my object to explain Existence itself in the abstract—to + either of which absurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally + applicable;—but I seek for an explanation of <i>my own individual + finite mind</i>, which I know to have had a beginning in time, and which, + therefore, in accordance with the widest and most complete analogy that + experience supplies, I believe to have been <i>caused</i>. And if there + is no other objection to my believing in Intelligence as the cause of my + intelligence, than that I cannot prove my own intelligence caused, then I + am satisfied to let the matter rest here; for as every argument must have + <i>some</i> basis of assumption to stand upon, I am well pleased to find + that the basis in this case is the most solid which experience can + supply, viz.,—the law of causation. Fully admitting that it does + not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior mind + for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, <i>does</i> account for + the fact that <i>my mind</i> exists; and this is all that my hypothesis + is intended to cover. For to endeavour to <i>explain</i> the existence of + an <i>eternal</i> mind, could only be done by those who do not understand + the meaning of these words."</p> + + <p>Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, + would so far be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis <i>does</i> supply a + provisional explanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, + therefore, an explanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be + allowed to retain. But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this + provisional explanation of his own mind's existence with that of the + existence of Mind in the abstract; he must not be allowed to suppose + that, by thus hypothetically explaining the existence of known minds, he + is thereby establishing a probability in favour of that hypothetical + cause, an Unknown Mind. Only if he has some independent reason to infer + that such an Unknown Mind exists, could such a probability be made out, + and his hypothetical explanation of known mind become of more value than + a guess. In other words, although the theistic hypothesis supplies <i>a + possible</i> explanation of known mind, we have no reason to conclude + that it is <i>the true</i> explanation, unless other reasons can be shown + to justify, on independent grounds, the validity of the theistic + hypothesis. Hence it is manifestly absurd to adduce this explanation as + evidence of the hypothesis on which it rests—to argue that Theism + must therefore be true; because we assume it to be so, in order to + explain <i>known</i> mind, as distinguished from <i>Mind</i>. If it be + answered, We are justified in assuming Theism true, because we are + justified in assuming that known mind can <i>only</i> have been caused by + an unknown mind, and hence that Mind must somewhere be self-existing, + then this is to lead us to the second objection to the above + syllogism.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect12">§ 12</a>. And this second objection is of a most + serious nature. "Mind can only be caused by Mind," and, therefore, Mind + must either be uncaused, or caused by a Mind. What is our warrant for + ranking this assertion? Where is the proof that nothing can have caused a + mind except another mind? Answer to this question there is none. For + aught that we can ever know to the contrary, anything within the whole + range of the Possible may be competent to produce a self-conscious + intelligence—and to assume that Mind is so far an entity <i>sui + generis</i>, that it must either be self-existing, or derived from + another mind which is self-existing, is merely to beg the whole question + as to the being of a God. In other words, if we can prove that the order + of existence to which Mind belongs, is so essentially different from that + order, or those orders, to which all else belongs, as to render it + <i>abstractedly impossible</i> that the latter can produce the + former—if we can prove this, we have likewise proved the existence + of a Deity. But this is just the point in dispute, and to set out with a + bare affirmation of it is merely to beg the question and to abandon the + discussion. Doubtless, by the mere act of consulting their own + consciousness, the fact now in dispute appears to some persons + self-evident. But in matters of such high abstraction as this, even the + evidence of self-evidence must not be relied upon too implicitly. To the + country boor it appears self-evident that wood is annihilated by + combustion; and even to the mind of the greatest philosophers of + antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt that the sun moved over a + stationary earth. Much more, therefore, may our broad distinction between + "cogitative and incogitative being"<a name="footnotetag5" + href="#footnote5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> not be a distinction which is + "legitimated by the conditions of external reality."</p> + + <p>Doubtless many will fall back upon the position already indicated, "It + is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into + itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea + of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two + right ones." But, granting this, and also that conscious matter is the + sole alternative, and what follows? Not surely that matter cannot + perceive, and feel, and know, merely because it is repugnant to our idea + of it that it should. Granting that there is no other alternative in the + whole possibility of things, than that matter must be conscious, or that + self-conscious Mind must somewhere be self-existing; and granting that it + is quite "impossible for us to conceive" of consciousness as an attribute + of matter; still surely it would be a prodigious leap to conclude that + for this reason matter cannot possess this attribute. Indeed, Locke + himself elsewhere strangely enough insists that thought may be a property + of matter, if only the Deity chose to unite that attribute with that + substance. Why it should be deemed abstractedly impossible for matter to + think if there is no God, and yet abstractedly possible that it should + think if there is a God, I confess myself quite unable to determine; but + I conceive that it is very important clearly to point out this + peculiarity in Locke's views, for he is a favourite authority with + theists, and this peculiarity amounts to nothing less than a suicide of + his entire argument. The mere circumstance that he assumed the Deity + capable of endowing matter with the faculty of thinking, could not have + enabled him to <i>conceive</i> of matter as thinking, any more than he + could <i>conceive</i> of this in the absence of his assumption. Yet in + the one case he recognises the possibility of matter thinking, and in the + other case denies such possibility, <i>and this on the sole ground of its + being inconceivable</i>! However, I am not here concerned with Locke's + eccentricities:<a name="footnotetag6" + href="#footnote6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> I am merely engaged with the general + principle, that a subjective inability to establish certain relations in + thought is no sufficient warrant for concluding that corresponding + objective relations may not obtain.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect13">§ 13</a>. Hence, an objector to the above syllogism + need not be a materialist; it is not even necessary that he should hold + any theory of things at all. Nevertheless, for the sake of definition, I + shall assume that he is a materialist. As a materialist, then, he would + appear to be as much entitled to his hypothesis as a theist is to + his—in respect, I mean, of this particular argument. For although I + think, as before shown, that in strict reasoning a theist might have + taken exception to the last-quoted passage from Mill in its connection + with the law of causation, that passage, if considered in the present + connection, is certainly unanswerable. What is the state of the present + argument as between a materialist and a theist? The mystery of existence + and the inconceivability of matter thinking are their common data. Upon + these data the materialist, justly arguing that he has no right to make + his own conceptive faculty the unconditional test of objective + possibility, is content to merge the mystery of his own mind's existence + into that of Existence in general; while the theist, compelled to accept + without explanation the mystery of Existence in general, nevertheless has + recourse to inventing a wholly gratuitous hypothesis to explain one mode + of existence in particular. If it is said that the latter hypothesis has + the merit of causing the mystery of material existence and the mystery of + mental existence to be united in a thinkable manner—viz., in a + self-existing Mind,—I reply, It is not so; for in whatever degree + it is unthinkable that Matter should be the cause of Mind, in that + precise degree must it be unthinkable that Mind was ever the cause of + Matter, the correlatives being in each case the same, and experience + affording no evidence of causality in either.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect14">§ 14</a>. The two hypotheses, therefore, are of + exactly equivalent value, save that while the one has a certain basis of + fact to rest upon,<a name="footnotetag7" + href="#footnote7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> the other is wholly arbitrary. But + it may still be retorted, 'Is not that which is <i>most</i> conceivable + <i>most likely</i> to be true? and if it is more conceivable that my + intelligence is caused by another Intelligence than that it is caused by + Non-intelligence, may I not regard the more conceivable hypothesis as + also the more probable one? It is somewhat difficult to say how far this + argument is, in this case, valid; only I think it is quite evident that + its validity is open to grave dispute. For nothing can be more evident to + a philosophical thinker than that the substance of Mind must—so far + at least as we can at present see—<i>necessarily</i> be unknowable; + so that if Matter (and Force) be this substance, we should antecedently + expect to find that the actual causal connection should, in this + particular case, be more inconceivable than some imaginary one: it would + be more natural for the mind to infer that something conceivably more + akin to itself should be its cause, than that this cause should be the + entity which really gives rise to the unthinkable connection. But even + waiving this reflection, and granting that the above argument is + <i>valid</i>, it is still to an indefinite degree <i>valueless</i>, + seeing that we are unable to tell <i>how much it is more likely</i> that + the more conceivable should here be true than that the less conceivable + should be so.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect15">§ 15</a>. Returning then to Locke's comparison + between the certainty of this argument and that which proves the sum of + the angles of a triangle to be equal to two right-angles, I should say + that there is a <i>virtual</i>, though not a <i>formal</i>, fallacy in + his presentation. For mathematical science being confessedly but of + relative significance, any comparison between the degree of certainty + attained by reasoning upon so transcendental a subject as the present, + and that of mathematical demonstrations regarding relative truth, must be + misleading. In the present instance, the whole strain of the argument + comes upon the adequacy of the proposed test of truth, viz., our being + able to conceive it if true. Now, will any one undertake to say that this + test of truth is of equivalent value when it is applied to a triangle and + when it is applied to the Deity. In the one case we are dealing with a + geometrical figure of an exceedingly simple type, with which our + experience is well acquainted, and presenting a very limited number of + relations for us to contemplate. In the other case we are endeavouring to + deal with the <i>summum genus</i> of all mystery, with reference to which + experience is quite impossible, and which in its mention contains all the + relations that are to us unknown and unknowable. Here, then, is the + oversight. Because men find conceivability a valid test of truth in the + affairs of everyday life—as it is easy to show <i>à priori</i> that + it must be, if our experience has been formed under a given code of + constant and general laws—therefore they conclude that it must be + equally valid <i>wherever</i> it is applied; forgetting that its validity + must perforce decrease in proportion to the distance at which the test is + applied from the sphere of experience.<a name="footnotetag8" + href="#footnote8"><sup>[8]</sup></a></p> + + <p><a name="Sect16">§ 16</a>. Upon the whole, then, I think it is + transparently obvious that the mere fact of our being unable to conceive, + say, how any disposition of matter and motion could possibly give rise to + a self-conscious intelligence, in no wise warrants us in concluding that + for this reason no such disposition is possible. The only question would + appear to be, whether the test which is here proposed as an unconditional + criterion of truth should be allowed any the smallest degree of credit. + Seeing, on the one hand, how very fallible the test in question is known + to have proved itself in many cases of much less speculative + difficulty—seeing, too, that even now "the philosophy of the + condition proves that things there are which may, nay must, be true, of + which nevertheless the mind is unable to construe to itself the + possibility;"<a name="footnotetag9" href="#footnote9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> + and seeing, on the other hand, that the substance of Mind, whatever it + is, must necessarily be unknowable;—seeing these things, if any + question remains as to whether the test of inconceivability should in + this case be regarded as having any degree of validity at all, there can, + I think, be no reasonable doubt that such degree should be regarded as of + the smallest.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect17">§ 17</a>. Let us then turn to the other + considerations which have been supposed to justify the assertion that + nothing can have caused our mind save another Mind. Neglecting the + crushing fact that "it does not account for Mind to refer it to another + Mind for its origin," let as see what positive reasons there are for + concluding that no other influence than Intelligence can possibly have + produced our intelligence.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect18">§ 18</a>. First we may notice the argument which is + well and tersely presented by Locke, thus:—"Whatsoever is first of + all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, + all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to + another any perfection that it hath not actually in itself, or at least + in a higher degree; it necessarily follows that the first eternal being + cannot be Matter." Now, as this presentation is strictly formal, I shall + first meet it with a formal reply, and this reply consists in a direct + contradiction. It is simply untrue that "whatsoever is first of all + things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all + the perfections that can after exist;" or that it can never "give to + another any perfection that it hath not actually in itself." In a sense, + no doubt, a cause contains all that is contained in its effects; the + latter content being <i>potentially</i> present in the former. But to say + that a cause already contains <i>actually</i> all that its effects may + afterwards so contain, is a statement which logic and common sense alike + condemn as absurd.</p> + + <p>Nevertheless, although the argument now before us thus admits of a + childishly easy refutation on strictly formal grounds, I suspect that in + substance the argument in a general way is often relied upon as one of + very considerable weight. Even though it is clearly illogical to say that + causes cannot give to their effects any perfection which they themselves + do not actually present, yet it seems in a general way incredible that + gross matter could contain, even potentially, the faculty of thinking. + Nevertheless, this is but to appeal to the argument from + Inconceivability; to do which, even were it here legitimate, would, as we + have seen, be unavailing. But to appeal to the argument from + Inconceivability in this case would <i>not</i> be legitimate; for we are + in possession of an abundant analogy to render the supposition in + question, not only conceivable, but credible. In the words of Mr. Mill, + "Apart from experience, and arguing on what is called reason, that is, on + supposed self-evidence, the notion seems to be that no causes can give + rise to products of a more precious or elevated kind than themselves. But + this is at variance with the known analogies of nature. How vastly nobler + and more precious, for instance, are the vegetables and animals than the + soil and manure out of which, and by the properties of which, they are + raised up! The tendency of all recent speculation is towards the opinion + that the development of inferior orders of existence into superior, the + substitution of greater elaboration, and higher organisation for lower, + is the general rule of nature. Whether this is so or not, there are at + least in nature a multitude of facts bearing that character, and this is + sufficient for the argument."</p> + + <p><a name="Sect19">§ 19</a>. We now come to the last of the arguments + which, so far as I know, have ever been adduced in support of the + assertion that there can be no other cause of our intelligence than + another and superior Intelligence. The argument is chiefly remarkable for + the very great prominence which was given to it by Sir W. Hamilton.</p> + + <p>This learned and able author says:—"The Deity is not an object + of immediate contemplation; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our + reach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only + warranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary + to account for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties + are supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a + regressive inference from the existence of a special class of effects to + the existence of a special character of cause, it is evident that the + whole argument hinges on the fact,—Does a state of things really + exist such as is only possible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For + if it can be shown that such a state of things does not really exist, + then our inference to the kind of cause requisite to account for it is + necessarily null.</p> + + <p>"This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class of + phænomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity is + exclusively given in the phænomena of mind,—that the phænomena of + matter taken by themselves, (you will observe the qualification taken by + themselves) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a + God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation.</p> + + <p>"If, in man, intelligence be a free power,—in so far as its + liberty extends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and + matter; and a power independent of matter necessarily implies the + existence of an immaterial subject,—that is, a spirit. If, then, + the original independence of intelligence on matter in the human + constitution, in other words, if the spirituality of mind in man be + supposed a datum of observation, in this datum is also given both the + condition and the proof of a God. For we have only to infer, what analogy + entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the same relative supremacy in + the universe which it holds in us, and the first positive condition of a + Deity is established in the establishment of the absolute priority of a + free creative intelligence."<a name="footnotetag10" + href="#footnote10"><sup>[10]</sup></a></p> + + <p><a name="Sect20">§ 20</a>. Thus, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the + whole question as to the being of a God depends upon that as to whether + our "intelligence be a free power,"—or, as he elsewhere states it + himself, "Theology is wholly dependent upon Psychology, for with the + proof of the moral nature of man stands or falls the proof of the + existence of a Deity." It will be observed that I am not at present + engaged with the legitimacy of this author's decision upon the + comparative merits of the different arguments in favour of Theism: I am + merely showing the high opinion he entertained of the particular argument + before us. He positively affirms that, unless the freedom of the human + will be a matter of experience, Atheism is the sole alternative. + Doubtless most well-informed readers will feel that the solitary basis + thus provided for Theism is a very insecure one, while many such readers + will at once conclude that if this is the only basis which reason can + provide for Theism to stand upon, Theism is without any rational basis to + stand upon at all. I have no hesitation in saying that the last-mentioned + opinion is the one to which I myself subscribe, for I am quite unable to + understand how any one at the present day, and with the most moderate + powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself to embrace the + theory of Free-will. I may add that I cannot but believe that those who + do embrace this theory with an honest conviction, must have failed to + understand the issue to which modern thought has reduced the question. + Here, however, is not the place to discuss this question. It will be + sufficient for my purpose to show that even Sir W. Hamilton himself + considered it a very difficult one; and although he thought upon the + whole that the will must be free, he nevertheless allowed—nay, + insisted—that he was unable to conceive how it could be so. Such + inability in itself does not of course show the Free-will theory to be + untrue; and I merely point out the circumstance that Hamilton allowed the + supposed fact unthinkable, in order to show how very precarious, even in + his eyes, the argument which we are considering must have appeared. Let + us then, for this purpose, contemplate his attitude with regard to it a + little more closely. He says, "It would have been better to show + articulately that Liberty and Necessity are both incomprehensible, as + beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but that though the Free-agency + of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so neither can it be speculatively + disproved; while we may claim for it as a fact of real actuality, though + of inconceivable possibility, the testimony of consciousness, that we are + morally free, as we are morally accountable for our actions. In this + manner the whole question of free- and bond-will is in theory abolished, + leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all the moral instincts of + Man entire."<a name="footnotetag11" + href="#footnote11"><sup>[11]</sup></a></p> + + <p>From this passage it is clear that Sir W. Hamilton regarded these two + counter-theories as of precisely equivalent value in everything save "the + testimony of consciousness;" or, as he elsewhere states it, "as equally + unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus + theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral + law ... gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over + the doctrine of fate."</p> + + <p>But the whole question concerning the freedom of the will has now come + to be as to whether or not consciousness <i>does</i> give its verdict on + the side of freedom. Supposing we grant that "we are warranted to rely on + a deliverance of consciousness, when that deliverance is <i>that</i> a + thing is, although we may be unable to think <i>how</i> it can be,"<a + name="footnotetag12" href="#footnote12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> in this case + the question still remains, whether our opponents have rightly + interpreted the deliverance of their consciousness. I, for one, am quite + persuaded that I never perform any action without some appropriate + motive, or set of motives, having induced me to perform it. However, I am + not discussing this question, and I have merely made the above quotations + for the purpose of showing that Sir W. Hamilton appears to identify the + <i>theory</i> of Free-will with the <i>fact</i> that we possess a moral + sense. He argues throughout as though the theory he advocates were the + only one that can explain a given "fact of real actuality." But no one + with whom we have to deal questions the fact of our having a moral sense; + and to identify this "deliverance of consciousness" with belief in the + theory that volitions are uncaused, is, or would now be, merely to + abandon the only questions in dispute.</p> + + <p>It is very instructive, from this point of view, to observe the + dilemma into which Hamilton found himself driven by this identification + of genuine fact with spurious theory. He believed that the fact of man + possessing an ethical faculty could only be explained by the theory that + man's will was not determined by motives; for otherwise man could not be + the author of his own actions. But when he considered the matter in its + other aspect, he found that his theory of Free-will was as little + compatible with moral responsibility as was the opposing theory of + "Bond-will;" for not only did he candidly confess that he could not + conceive of will as acting without motives, but he further allowed the + unquestionable truth "that, though inconceivable, a motiveless volition + would, if conceived, be conceived as morally worthless."<a + name="footnotetag13" href="#footnote13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> I say this is + very instructive, because it shows that in Hamilton's view each theory + was alike irreconcilable with "the deliverance of consciousness," and + that he only chose the one in preference to the other, because, although + not any more conceivable a solution, it seemed to him a more possible + one.<a name="footnotetag14" href="#footnote14"><sup>[14]</sup></a></p> + + <p><a name="Sect21">§ 21</a>. Such, then, is the speculative basis on + which, according to Sir W. Hamilton, our belief in a Deity can alone be + grounded.</p> + + <p>Those who at the present day are still confused enough in their + notions regarding the Free-will question to suppose that any further + rational question remains, may here be left to ruminate over this + <i>bolus</i>, and to draw from it such nourishment as they can in support + of their belief in a God; but to those who can see as plainly as daylight + that the doctrine of Determinism not only harmonises with all the facts + of observation, but alone affords a possible condition for, and a + satisfactory explanation of, the existence of our ethical + faculty,—to such persons the question will naturally + arise:—"Although Hamilton was wrong in identifying a known fact + with a false theory, yet may he not have been right in the deductions + which he drew from the fact?" In other words, granting that his theory of + Free-will was wrong, does not his argument from the existence of a moral + sense in man to the existence of a moral Governor of the Universe remain + as intact as ever? Now, it is quite true that whatever degree of cogency + the argument from the presence of the moral sense may at any time have + had, this degree remains unaffected by the explosion of erroneous + theories to account for such presence. We have, therefore, still to face + the fact that the moral sense of man undoubtedly exists.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect22">§ 22</a>. The question we have to determine is, What + evidence have we to show that the moral part of man was created in the + image of God; and if there is any such evidence, what counter-existence + is there to show that the moral existence of man may be due to natural + causes? In deciding this question, just as in deciding any other question + of a purely scientific character, we must be guided in our examination by + the Law of Parcimony; we must not assume the agency of supernatural + causes if we can discover the agency of natural causes; neither must we + merge the supposed mystery directly into the highest mystery, until we + are quite sure that it does not admit of being proximately explained by + the action of proximate influences.</p> + + <p>Now, whether or not Mr. Darwin's theory as to the origin and + development of the moral sense be considered satisfactory, there can, I + think, be very little doubt in any impartial mind which duly considers + the subject, that in <i>some way or other</i> the moral sense has been + evolved. The body of scientific evidence which has now been collected in + favour of the general theory of evolution is simply overwhelming; and in + the presence of so large an analogy, it would require a vast amount of + contradictory evidence to remove the presumption that human conscience, + like everything else, has been evolved. Now, for my own part, I am quite + unable to distinguish any such evidence, while, on the other hand, in + support of the <i>à priori</i> presumption that conscience has been + evolved, I cannot conceal from myself that there is a large amount of + <i>à posteriori</i> confirmation. I am quite unable to distinguish + anything in my sense of right and wrong which I cannot easily conceive to + have been brought about during the evolution of my intelligence from + lower forms of psychical life. On the contrary, everything that I can + find in my sense of right and wrong is precisely what I should expect to + find on the supposition of this sense having been moulded by the + progressive requirements of social development. Read in the light of + evolution, Conscience, in its every detail, is deductively explained.</p> + + <p>And, as though there were not sufficient evidence of this kind to + justify the conclusion drawn from the theory of evolution, the doctrine + of utilitarianism—separately conceived and separately worked out on + altogether independent grounds—the doctrine of utilitarianism comes + in with irresistible force to confirm that <i>à priori</i> conclusion by + the widest and most unexceptionable of inductions.<a name="footnotetag15" + href="#footnote15"><sup>[15]</sup></a></p> + + <p>In the supernatural interpretation of the facts, the whole stress of + the argument comes upon the character of conscience as a <i>spontaneously + admonishing influence which acts independently of our own volition</i>. + For it is from this character alone that the inference can arise that + conscience is the delegate of the will of another. Thus, to render the + whole argument in the singularly beautiful words of Dr. + Newman:—"If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, + are frightened at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies + that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, + whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same + tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; + if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming serenity of mind, the same + soothing, satisfactory delight, which follows on one receiving praise + from a father,—we certainly have within us the image of some person + to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our + happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in + whose anger we waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for + their exciting cause an intelligent being; we are not affectionate + towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no + remorse or compunction in breaking mere human law. Yet so it is; + conscience emits all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, + self-condemnation; and, on the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, + a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope which there is no + sensible, no earthly object to elicit. 'The wicked flees when no one + pursueth;' then why does he flee? whence his terror? Who is it that he + sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If + the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the + Object to which his perception is directed must be supernatural and + divine; and thus the phenomena of conscience as a dictate avail to + impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, + holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive."<a name="footnotetag16" + href="#footnote16"><sup>[16]</sup></a></p> + + <p>Now I have quoted this passage because it seems to me to convey in a + concise form the whole of the argument from Conscience. But how + tremendous are the inferences which are drawn from the facts! As the + first step in our criticism, it is necessary to point out that two very + different orders of feelings are here treated by Dr. Newman. There is + first the pure or uncompounded ethical feelings, which spring directly + from the moral sense alone, and which all men experience in varying + degrees. And next there are what we may term the + <i>ethico-theological</i> feelings, which can only spring from a blending + of the moral sense with a belief in a personal God, or other supernatural + agents. The former class of feelings, or the uncompounded ethical class, + have exclusive reference to the moral obligations that subsist between + ourselves and other human beings, or sentient organisms. The latter class + of feelings, or the ethico-theological class, have reference to the moral + obligations that are believed to subsist between ourselves and the Deity, + or other supernatural beings. Now, in order not to lose sight of this + all-important distinction, I shall criticise Dr. Newman's rendering of + the ordinary argument from Conscience in each of these two points of + views separately. To begin, then, with the uncompounded ethical + feelings.</p> + + <p>Such emotions as attend the operation of conscience in those who + follow its light alone without any theories as to its supernatural + origin, are all of the character of <i>reasonable</i> or + <i>explicable</i> emotions. Granting that fellow-feeling has been for the + benefit of the race, and therefore that it has been developed by natural + causes, certainly there is nothing <i>mysterious</i> in the emotions that + attend the violating or the following of the dictates of conscience. For + conscience is, by this naturalistic supposition, nothing more than an + organised body of certain psychological elements, which, by long + inheritance, have come to inform us, by way of intuitive feeling, how we + should act for the interests of society; so that, if this hypothesis is + correct, there cannot be anything more mysterious or supernatural in the + working of conscience than there is in the working of any of our other + faculties. That the disagreeable feeling of <i>self-reproach</i>, as + distinguished from <i>religious</i> feeling, should follow upon a + violation of such an organized body of psychological elements, cannot be + thought surprising, if it is remembered that one of these elements is + natural fellow-feeling, and the others the elements which lead us to know + directly that we have violated the interests of other persons. And as + regards the mere fact that the working of conscience is independent of + the will, surely this is not more than we find, in varying degrees, to be + true of all our emotions; and conscience, according to the evolution + theory, has its root in the emotions. Hence, it is no more an argument to + say that the irrepressible character of conscience refers us to a God of + morality, than it would be to say that the sometimes resistless force of + the ludicrous refers us to a god of laughter. Love, again, is an emotion + which cannot be subdued by volition, and in its tendency to persist bears + just such a striking resemblance to the feelings of morality as we should + expect to find on the supposition of the former having played an + important part in the genesis of the latter. The <i>dictating</i> + character of conscience, therefore, is clearly in itself of no avail as + pointing to a superhuman Dictator. Thus, for example, to take Dr. + Newman's own illustration, why should we feel such tearful, + broken-hearted sorrow on intentionally or carelessly hurting a mother? We + see no shadow of a reason for resorting to any supernatural hypothesis to + explain the fact—love between mother and offspring being an + essential condition to the existence of higher animals. Yet this is a + simple case of truly conscientious feeling, where the thought of any + <i>personal</i> cause of conscience <i>need</i> not be entertained, and + is certainly not necessary to explain the effects. And similarly with + <i>all</i> cases of conscientious feeling, <i>except in cases where it + refers directly to its supposed author</i>. But these latter cases, or + the ethico-theological class of feelings, are in no way surprising. If + the moral sense has had a natural genesis in the actual relations between + man and man, as soon as an ideal "image" of "a holy, just, powerful, + all-seeing, retributive" God is firmly believed to have an objective + existence, as a matter of course moral feelings must become transferred + to the relations which are believed to obtain between ourselves and this + most holy God. Indeed, it is these very feelings which, in the absence of + any proof to the contrary, must be concluded, in accordance with the law + of parcimony, to have <i>generated</i> this idea of God as "holy, just," + and good. And the mere fact that, when the complex system of religious + belief has once been built up, conscience is strongly wrought upon by + that belief and its accompanying emotions, is surely a fact the very + reverse of mysterious. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the moral + sense has been evolved from the social feelings, and should we not + certainly expect that, when the belief in a moral and all-seeing God is + superadded, conscience should be distracted at the thought of offending + him, and experience a "soothing, satisfactory delight" in the belief that + we are pleasing him? And as to the argument, "Why does the wicked flee + when none pursueth? whence his terror?" the question admits of only too + easy an answer. Indeed, the form into which the question is thrown would + almost seem—were it not written by Dr. Newman—to imply a + sarcastic reference to the power of superstition. "Who is it that," not + only Dr. Newman, but the haunted savage, the mediæval sorcerer, or the + frightened child, "sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers + of his heart?" Who but the "image" of his own thought? "If the cause of + these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which + his perception is directed must be supernatural and divine." Assuredly; + but what an inference from what an assumption! Whether or not the moral + sense has been developed by natural causes, "these emotions" of terror at + the thought of offending beings "supernatural and divine" are not of such + unique occurrence "in the visible world" as to give Dr. Newman the + monopoly of his particular "Object." With a deeper meaning, therefore, + than he intends may we repeat, "The phenomena of conscience as a dictate + <i>avail</i> to impress the <i>imagination</i> with the <i>picture</i> of + a Supreme Governor." But criticism here is positively painful. Let it be + enough to say that those of us who do not already believe in any such + particular "Object"—be it ghost, shape, demon, or deity—are + strangers, utter and complete, to any such supernatural pursuers. The + fact, therefore, of these various religious emotions being associated + with conscience in the minds of theists, can in itself be no proof of + Theism, seeing that it is the theory of Theism which itself + <i>engenders</i> these emotions; those who do not believe in this theory + experiencing none of these feelings of personal dread, responsibility to + an unknown God, and the feelings of doing injury to, or of receiving + praise from, a parent. To such of us the violation of conscience is its + own punishment, as the pursuit of virtue is its own reward. For we know + that not more certainly than fire will burn, any violation of the + deeply-rooted feelings of our humanity will leave a gaping wound which + even time may not always heal. And when it is shown us that our natural + dread of fire is due to a supernatural cause, we may be prepared to + entertain the argument that our natural dread of sin, as distinguished + from our dread of God, is likewise due to such a cause. But until this + can be done we must, as reasonable men, <i>whose minds have been trained + in the school of nature</i>, forbear to allow that the one fact is of any + greater cogency than the other, so far as the question of a supernatural + cause of either is concerned. For, as we have already seen, the law of + parcimony forbids us to ascribe "the phenomena of conscience as a + dictate" to a supernatural cause, until the science of psychology shall + have proved that they cannot have been due to natural causes. But, as we + have also seen, the science of psychology is now beginning, as quick and + thoroughly as can be expected, to prove the very converse; so that the + probability is now overwhelming that our moral sense, like all our other + faculties, has been evolved. Therefore, while the burden of proof really + lies on the side of Theism—or with those who account for the + natural phenomena of conscience by the hypothesis of a supernatural + origin—this burden is now being rapidly discharged by the opposite + side. That is to say, while the proofs which are now beginning to + substantiate the naturalistic hypothesis are all in full accord with the + ordinary lines of scientific explanations, the vague and feeble + reflections of those who still maintain that Conscience is evidence of + Deity, are all such as run counter to the very truisms of scientific + method.</p> + + <p>In the face of all the facts, therefore, I find it impossible to + recognise as valid any inference which is drawn from the existence of our + moral sense to the existence of a God; although, of course, all + inferences drawn from the existence of our moral sense to the + <i>character</i> of a God already believed to exist remain unaffected by + the foregoing considerations.<a name="footnotetag17" + href="#footnote17"><sup>[17]</sup></a></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3><a name="ChapIII">CHAPTER III</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN.</h4> + + <p><a name="Sect23">§ 23</a>. The argument from Design, as presented by + Mill, is merely a resuscitation of it as presented by Paley. True it is + that the logical penetration of the former enabled him to perceive that + the latter had "put the case much too strongly;" although, even here, he + has failed to see wherein Paley's error consisted. He says:—"If I + found a watch on an apparently desolate island, I should indeed infer + that it had been left there by a human being; but the inference would not + be from the marks of design, but because I already know by direct + experience that watches are made by men." Now I submit that this misses + the whole point of Paley's meaning; for it is evident that there would be + no argument at all unless this author be understood to say what he + clearly enough expresses, viz., that the evidence of design supposed to + be afforded by the watch is supposed to be afforded by examination of its + mechanism only, and not by any previous knowledge as to how that + particular mechanism called a watch is made. Paley, I take it, only chose + a watch for his example because he knew that no reader would dispute the + fact that watches are constructed by design: except for the purpose of + pointing out that mechanism is in some cases admitted to be due to + intelligence, for all the other purposes of his argument he might as well + have chosen for his illustration any case of mechanism occurring in + nature. What the real fallacy in Paley's argument is, is another + question, and this I shall now endeavour to answer; for, as Mill's + argument is clearly the same in kind as that of Paley and his numberless + followers, in examining the one I am also examining the other.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect24">§ 24</a>. In nature, then, we see innumerable + examples of apparent design: are these of equal value in testifying to + the presence of a designing intelligence as are similar examples of human + contrivance, and if not, why not? The answer to the first of these + questions is patent. If such examples were of the same value in the one + case as they are in the other, the existence of a Deity would be, as + Paley appears to have thought it was, demonstrated by the fact. A brief + and yet satisfactory answer to the second question is not so easy, and we + may best approach it by assuming the existence of a Deity. If, then, + there is a God, it by no means follows that every apparent contrivance in + nature is an actual contrivance, in the same sense as is any human + contrivance. The eye of a vertebrated animal, for instance, exhibits as + much apparent design as does a watch; but no one—at the present + day, at least—will undertake to affirm that the evidence of divine + thought furnished by one example is as conclusive as is the evidence of + human thought furnished by the other—and this even assuming a Deity + to exist. Why is this? The reason, I think, is, that we know by our + personal experience what are our own relations to the material world, and + to the laws which preside over the action of physical forces; while we + can have no corresponding knowledge of the relations subsisting between + the Deity and these same objects of our own experience. Hence, to suppose + that the Deity constructed the eye by any such process of thought as we + know that men construct watches, is to make an assumption not only + incapable of proof, but destitute of any assignable degree of likelihood. + Take an example. The relation in which a bee stands to the external world + is to a large extent a matter of observation, and, therefore, no one + imagines that the formation of its scientifically-constructed cells is + due to any profound study on the bee's part. Whatever the origin of the + cell-making instinct may have been, its nature is certainly not the same + as it would have been in man, supposing him to have had occasion to + construct honeycombs. It may be said that the requisite calculations have + been made for the bees by the Deity; but, even if this assumption were + true, it would be nothing to the point, which is merely that even within + the limits of the animal kingdom the relations of intelligence to the + external world are so diverse, that the same results may be accomplished + by totally different intellectual processes. And as this example is + parallel to the case on which we are engaged in everything save the + <i>observability</i> of the relations involved, it supplies us with the + exact measure of the probability we are trying to estimate. Hence it is + evident that so long as we remain ignorant of the element essential to + the argument from design in its Paleyerian form—viz., knowledge or + presumption of the relations subsisting between an hypothetical Deity and + his creation—so long must that argument remain, not only + unassignably weak, but incapable of being strengthened by any number of + examples similar in kind.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect25">§ 25</a>. To put the case in another way. The root + fallacy in Paley's argument consisted in reasoning from a particular to + an universal. Because he knew that design was the cause of adaptation in + some cases, and because the phenomena of life exhibited more instances of + adaptation than any other class of phenomena in nature, he pointed to + these phenomena as affording an exceptional kind of proof of the presence + in nature of intelligent agency. Yet, if it is admitted—and of + this, even in Paley's days, there was a strong analogical + presumption—that the phenomena of life are throughout their history + as much subject to law as are any other phenomena whatsoever,—that + the method of the divine government, supposing such to exist, is the same + here as elsewhere; then nothing can be clearer than that any amount of + observable adaptation of means to ends within this class of phenomena + cannot afford any different kind of evidence of <i>design</i> than is + afforded by any other class of phenomena whatsoever. Either we know the + relations of the Deity to his creation, or we do not. If we do, then we + must know whether or not <i>every</i> physical change which occurs in + accordance with law—<i>i.e.</i>, every change occurring within + experience, and so, until contrary evidence is produced, presumably every + change occurring beyond experience—was separately planned by the + Deity. If we do not, then we have no more reason to suppose that any one + set of physical changes rather than another has been separately planned + by him, unless we could point (as Paley virtually pointed) to one + particular set of changes and assert, These are not subject to the same + method of divine government which we observe elsewhere, or, in other + words, to law. If it is retorted that <i>in some way or other</i> all + these wonderful adaptations must ultimately have been due to + intelligence, this is merely to shift the argument to a ground which we + shall presently have to consider: all we are now engaged upon is to show + that we have no right to found arguments on the assumed <i>mode</i>, + <i>manner</i>, or <i>process</i> by which the supposed intelligence is + thought to have operated. We can here see, then, more clearly where Paley + stumbled. He virtually assumed that the relations subsisting between the + Deity and the universe were such, that the exceptional adaptations met + with in the organised part of the latter cannot have been due to the same + intellectual <i>processes</i> as was the rest of the universe—or + that, if they were, still they yielded better evidence of having been due + to these processes than does the rest of the universe. And it is easy to + perceive that his error arose from his pre-formed belief in special + creation. So long as a man regards every living organism which he sees as + the lineal descendant of a precisely similar organism originally struck + out by the immediate fiat of Deity, so long is he justified in holding + his axiom, "Contrivance must have had a contriver." For "adaptation" then + becomes to our minds the synonym of "contrivance"—it being utterly + inconceivable that the numberless adaptations found in any living + organism could have resulted in any other way than by intelligent + contrivance, at the time when this organism was in the first instance + <i>suddenly</i> introduced into its complex conditions of life. Still, as + an argument, this is of course merely reasoning in a circle: we adopt a + hypothesis which presupposes the existence of a Deity as the first step + in the proof of his existence. I do not say that Paley committed this + error expressly, but merely that if it had not been for his pre-formed + conviction as to the truth of the special-creation theory, he would + probably not have written his "Natural Theology."</p> + + <p><a name="Sect26">§ 26</a>. Thus let us take a case of his own + choosing, and the one which is adduced by him as typical of "the + application of the argument." "I know of no better method of introducing + so large a subject than that of comparing a single thing with a single + thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the examination + of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye + was made for vision as there is that the telescope was made for assisting + it. They are both made upon the same principles, both being adjusted to + the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays of light are + regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves; but these + laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted to them. For + instance: these laws require, in order to produce the same effect, that + the rays of light, in passing through water into the eye, should be + refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of air into + the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of it + called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial + animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this + difference?" But what, let us ask, is the proximate cause of this + difference? 'The immediate volition of the Deity, manifested in special + creation,' virtually answers Paley; while we of to-day are able to reply, + 'The agency of natural laws, to wit, inheritance, variation, survival of + the fittest, and probably of other laws as yet not discovered.' Now, of + course, according to the former of these two premises, there can be no + more legitimate conclusion than that the difference in question is due to + intelligent and special design; but, according to the other premise, it + is equally clear that no conclusion can be more unwarranted; for, under + the latter view, the greater rotundity of the crystalline lens in a + fish's eye no more exhibits the presence of any special design than does + the adaptation of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means + of excavating. When, therefore, Paley goes on to ask:—"How is it + possible, under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the + operation of equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the case of the + eye, yet to acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as + the plainest and clearest of all propositions, in the case of the + telescope?" the answer is sufficiently obvious, namely, that the + "evidence" in the two cases is <i>not</i> "equal;"—any more than is + the existence, say, of the Nile of equal value in point of evidence that + it was designed for traffic, as is the existence of the Suez Canal that + it was so designed. And the mere fact that the problem of achromatism was + solved by "the mind of a sagacious optician inquiring how this matter was + managed in the eye," no more proves that "this could not be in the eye + without purpose, which suggested to the optician the only effectual means + of attaining that purpose," than would the fact, say, of the winnowing of + corn having suggested the fanning-machine prove that air currents were + designed for the purpose of eliminating chaff from grain. In short, the + real substance of the argument from Design must eventually merge into + that which Paley, in the above-quoted passage, expressly passes + over—viz., "the origin of the laws themselves;" for so long as + there is any reason to suppose that any apparent "adaptation" to a + certain set of "fixed laws" is itself due to the influence of other + "fixed laws," so long have we as little right to say that the latter set + of fixed laws exhibit any better indications of intelligent adaptation to + the former set, than the former do to that of the latter—the eye to + light, than light to the eye. Hence I conceive that Mill is entirely + wrong when he says of Paley's argument, "It surpasses analogy exactly as + induction surpasses it," because "the instances chosen are particular + instances of a circumstance which experience shows to have a real + connection with an intelligent origin—the fact of conspiring to an + end." Experience shows as this, but it shows us more besides; it shows us + that there is no <i>necessary</i> or <i>uniform</i> connection between an + "intelligent origin" and the fact of apparent "means conspiring to an + [apparent] end." If the reader will take the trouble to compare this + quotation just made from Mill, and the long train of reasoning that + follows, with an admirable illustration in Mr. Wallace's "Natural + Selection," he will be well rewarded by finding all the steps in Mr. + Mill's reasoning so closely paralleled by the caricature, that but for + the respective dates of publication, one might have thought the latter + had an express reference to the former.<a name="footnotetag18" + href="#footnote18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> True, Mr. Mill closes his argument + with a brief allusion to the "principle of the survival of the fittest," + observing that "creative forethought is not absolutely the only link by + which the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connected + with the fact of sight." I am surprised, however, that a man of Mr. + Mill's penetration did not see that whatever view we may take as to "the + adequacy of this principle (<i>i.e.</i>, Natural Selection) to account + for such truly admirable combinations as some of those in nature," the + argument from <i>Design</i> is not materially affected. So far as this + argument is concerned, the issue is not Design <i>versus</i> Natural + Selection, but it is Design <i>versus</i> Natural Law. By all means, + "leaving this remarkable speculation (<i>i.e.</i>, Mr. Darwin's) to + whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store for it," and it + by no means follows that "in the present state of knowledge the + adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favour of + creation by intelligence." For whatever we may think of this special + theory as to the <i>mode</i>, there can be no longer any reasonable + doubt, "in the present state of our knowledge," as to the truth of the + general theory of <i>Evolution</i>; and the latter, if accepted, is as + destructive to the argument from <i>Design</i> as would the former be if + proved. In a word, it is the <i>fact</i> and not the <i>method</i> of + Evolution which is subversive of Teleology in its Paleyerian form.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect27">§ 27</a>. We have come then to this:—Apparent + intellectual adaptations are perfectly valid indications of design, so + long as their authorship is known to be confined to human intelligence; + for then we know from experience what are our relations to these laws, + and so in any given case can argue <i>à posteriori</i> that such an + adaptation to such a set of laws by such an intelligence can only have + been due to such a process. But when we overstep the limits of + experience, we are not entitled to argue anything <i>à priori</i> of any + other intelligence in this respect, even supposing any such intelligence + to exist. The analogy by which the unknown relations are inferred from + the known is "infinitely precarious;" seeing that two of the analogous + terms—to wit, the divine intelligence and the human—may + differ to an immeasurable extent in their properties—nay, are + supposed thus to differ, the one being supposed omniscient, omnipotent, + &c., and the other not. And, as a final step, we may now see that the + argument from Design, in its last resort, resolves itself into a + <i>petitio principii</i>. For, ultimately, the only point which the + analogical argument in question is adduced to prove is, that the + relations subsisting between an Unknown Cause and certain physical forces + are so far identical with the relations known to subsist between human + intelligence and these same forces, that similar intellectual processes + are required in the two cases to account for the production of similar + effects—and hence that the Unknown Cause is intelligent. But it is + evident that the analogy itself can have no existence, except upon the + presupposition that these two sets of relations <i>are</i> thus + identical. The point which the analogy is adduced to prove is therefore + postulated by the fact of its being adduced at all, and the whole + argument resolves itself into a case of <i>petitio principii</i>.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3><a name="ChapIV">CHAPTER IV</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS.</h4> + + <p><a name="Sect28">§ 28</a>. Turning now to an important error of Mr. + Mill's in respect of omission, I firmly believe that all competent + writers who have ever undertaken to support the argument from Design, + have been moved to do so by their instinctive appreciation of the much + more important argument, which Mill does not mention at all and which we + now proceed to consider—the argument from General Laws. That is to + say, I cannot think that any one competent writer ever seriously + believed, had he taken time to analyse his beliefs, that the cogency of + his argument lay in assuming any knowledge concerning the <i>process</i> + of divine thought; he must have really believed that it lay entirely in + his observation of the <i>product</i> of divine thought—or rather, + let us say, of divine intelligence. Now this is the whole difference + between the argument from Design and the argument from General Laws. The + argument from Design says, There must be a God, because such and such an + organic structure must have been due to such and such an intellectual + <i>process</i>. The argument from General Laws says, There must be a God, + because such and such an organic structure must <i>in some way or other + have been ultimately due to</i> intelligence. Nor does this argument end + here. Not only must such and such an organic structure have been + ultimately due to intelligence, but every such structure—nay, every + phenomenon in the universe—must have been the same; for all + phenomena are alike subject to the same method of sequence. The argument + is thus a cumulative one; for as there is no single known exception to + this universal mode of existence, the united effect of so vast a body of + evidence is all but irresistible, and its tendency is clearly to point us + to some <i>one</i> explanatory cause. The scope of this argument is + therefore co-extensive with the universe; it draws alike upon all + phenomena with which experience is acquainted. For instance, it contains + all the phenomena covered by the Design argument, just as a genus + contains any one of its species; it being manifest, from what was said in + the last section, that if the general doctrine of Evolution is accepted, + the argument from Design must of necessity merge into that from General + Laws. And this wide basis, we may be sure, must be the most legitimate + one whereon to rest an argument in favour of Theism. If there is any such + thing as such an argument at all, the most unassailable field for its + display must be the universe as a whole, seeing that if we separate any + one section of the universe from the rest, and suppose that we here + discover a different kind of testimony to intelligence from that which we + can discover elsewhere, we may from analogy be abundantly sure that on + the confines of our division there must be second causes and general laws + at work (whether discoverable or not), which are the immediate agents in + the production of the observed results. Of course I do not deny that some + classes of phenomena afford us more and better proofs of intellectual + agency than do others, in the sense of the laws in operation being more + numerous, subtle, and complex; but it will be seen that this is a + different interpretation of the evidence from that against which I am + contending. Thus, if there are tokens of divine intention (as + distinguished from design) to be met with in the eye,—if it is + inconceivable that so "nice and intricate a structure" should exist + without intelligence as its <i>ultimate</i> cause; then the discovery of + natural selection, or of any other law, as the <i>manner</i> in which + this intelligence wrought in no wise attenuates the proof as to the fact + of an intelligent cause. On the contrary, it tends rather to confirm it; + for, besides the evidence before existing, there is added that which + arises from the conformity of the method to that which is observable in + the rest of the universe.</p> + + <p>Thus, notwithstanding what Hamilton, Chalmers, and others have said, I + cannot but feel that the ubiquitous action of general laws is, of all + facts supplied by experience, the most cogent in its bearing upon + teleology. If perpetual and uninterrupted uniformity of method does not + indicate the existence of a presiding intelligence, it becomes a question + whether any other kind of method—short of the intelligently + miraculous—could possibly do so; seeing that the further the divine + <i>modus operandi</i> (supposing such to exist) were removed from + absolute uniformity, the greater would be the room for our interpreting + it as mere fortuity. But forasmuch as the progress of science has shown + that within experience the method of the Supreme Causality is absolutely + uniform, the hypothesis of fortuity is rendered irrational; and let us + think of this Supreme Causality as we may, the fact remains that from it + there emanates a directive influence of uninterrupted consistency, on a + scale of stupendous magnitude and exact precision, worthy of our highest + possible conceptions of Deity.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect29">§ 29</a>. Had it been my lot to have lived in the + last generation, I doubt not that I should have regarded the foregoing + considerations as final: I should have concluded that there was an + overwhelming balance of rational probability in favour of Theism; and I + think I should also have insisted that this balance of rational + probability would require to continue as it was till the end of time. I + should have maintained, in some such words as the following, in which the + Rev. Baden Powell conveys this argument:—"The very essence of the + whole argument is the invariable preservation of the principle of + <i>order</i>: not necessarily such as we can directly recognise, but the + universal conviction of the unfailing subordination of everything to + <i>some</i> grand principles of <i>law</i>, however imperfectly + apprehended in our partial conceptions, and the successive subordination + of such laws to others of still higher generality, to an extent + transcending our conceptions, and constituting the true chain of + universal causation which culminates in the sublime conception of the + <font class="sc">Cosmos</font>.</p> + + <p>"It is in immediate connection with this enlarged view of universal + immutable natural order that I have regarded the narrow notions of those + who obscure the sublime prospect by imagining so unworthy an idea as that + of occasional interruptions in the physical economy of the world.</p> + + <p>"The only instance considered was that of the alleged sudden + supernatural origination of new species of organised beings in remote + geological epochs. It is in relation to the broad principle of law, if + once rightly apprehended, that such inferences are seen to be wholly + unwarranted by science, and such fancies utterly derogatory and + inadmissible in philosophy; while, even in those instances properly + understood, the real scientific conclusions of the invariable and + indissoluble chain of causation stand vindicated in the sublime + contemplations with which they are thus associated.</p> + + <p>"To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, the one essential + requisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this + <i>one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather constituting + the very idea of nature</i>;—which forms the vital essence of the + whole of inductive science, and the sole assurance of those higher + inferences from the inductive study of natural causes which are the + vindications of a supreme intelligence and a moral cause.</p> + + <p>"<i>The whole of the ensuing discussion must stand or fall with the + admission of this grand principle</i>. Those who are not prepared to + embrace it in its full extent may probably not accept the conclusions; + but they must be sent back to the school of inductive science, where + alone it must be independently imbibed and thoroughly assimilated with + the mind of the student in the first instance.</p> + + <p>"On the slightest consideration of the nature, the foundations, and + general results of inductive science,... we recognise the powers of + intellect fitly employed in the study of nature,... pre-eminently leading + us to perceive <i>in nature</i>, and in the invariable and universal + constancy of its laws, the indications of universal, unchangeable, and + recondite arrangement, dependence, and connection in reason....</p> + + <p>"We thus see the importance of taking a more enlarged view of the + great argument of natural theology; and the necessity for so doing + becomes the more apparent when we reflect on the injury to which these + sublime inferences are exposed from the narrow and unworthy form in which + the reasoning has been too often conducted....</p> + + <p>"The satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those + more enlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation + of cosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences from + the <i>past</i>, but to proofs of the <i>ever-present</i> mind and reason + in nature.</p> + + <p>"If we read a book which it requires much thought and exercise of + reason to understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and + reason as we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can + at present comprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and + reason <i>exist in that book</i> irrespectively of our minds, and equally + so of any question as to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly + exists, and is ever open to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case + under a slightly different form:—When the astronomer, the + physicist, the geologist, or the naturalist notes down a series of + observed facts or measured dates, he is not an <i>author</i> expressing + his own ideas,—he is a mere <i>amanuensis</i> taking down the + dictations of nature: his observation book is the record of the thoughts + of <i>another mind</i>: he has but set down literally what he himself + does not understand, or only very imperfectly. On further examination, + and after deep and anxious study, he perhaps begins to decipher the + meaning, by perceiving some law which gives a signification to the facts; + and the further he pursues the investigation up to any more comprehensive + theory, the more fully he perceives that there is a higher reason, of + which his own is but the humbler interpreter, and into whose depths he + may penetrate continually further, to discover yet more profound and + invariable order and system, always indicating still deeper and more + hidden abysses yet unfathomed, but throughout which he is assured the + same recondite and immutable arrangement ever prevails.</p> + + <p>"That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself + thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must + be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is but partial, + then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of + the student. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the + necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the + vast extent and compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, + and its reality, as <i>existing in the immutably connected order of + objects examined</i>, independently of the mind of the investigator.</p> + + <p>"But considerations of this kind, just and transcendently important as + they are in themselves, give us no aid in any inquiry into the + <i>origin</i> of the order of things thus investigated, or the + <i>nature</i> or other attributes of the mind evinced in them.</p> + + <p>"The real argument for universal <i>intelligence</i>, manifested in + the universality of order and law in the material world, is very + different from any attempt to give a form to our conceptions, even by the + language of analogy, as to the <i>nature</i> or <i>mode of existence</i> + or operation of that intelligence [<i>i.e.</i>, as I have stated the + case, the argument can only rest on a study of the <i>products</i>, as + distinguished from the <i>processes</i> of such intelligence]: and still + more different from any extension of our inference from what <i>is</i> to + what <i>may have been</i>, from <i>present</i> order to a supposed + <i>origination</i>, first adjustment, or planning of that order.</p> + + <p>"By keeping these distinctions steadily in view, we appreciate + properly both the limits and the extent and compass of what we may + appropriately call <font class="sc">cosmotheology</font>."<a + name="footnotetag19" href="#footnote19"><sup>[19]</sup></a></p> + + <p>I have quoted these passages at length, because they convey in a more + forcible, guarded, and accurate manner than any others with which I am + acquainted, the strictly rational standing of this great subject prior to + the date at which the above-quoted passage was written. Therefore, as I + have said, if it had been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I + should certainly have rested in these "sublime conceptions" as in an + argument supreme and irrefutable. I should have felt that the progress of + physical knowledge could never exert any other influence on Theism than + that of ever tending more and more to confirm that magnificent belief, by + continuously expanding our human thoughts into progressively advancing + conceptions, ever grander and yet more grand, of that tremendous Origin + of Things—the Mind of God. Such would have been my hope—such + would have been my prayer. But now, how changed! Never in the history of + man has so terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who + look may now behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, + resistless in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our + most precious creed, and burying our highest life in mindless desolation. + Science, whom erstwhile we thought a very Angel of God, pointing to that + great barrier of Law, and proclaiming to the restless sea of changing + doubt, "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further, and here shall thy + proud waves be stayed,"—even Science has now herself thrown down + this trusted barrier; the flood-gates of infidelity are open, and Atheism + overwhelming is upon us.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect30">§ 30</a>. All and every law follows as a necessary + consequence from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of + matter.<a name="footnotetag20" href="#footnote20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> + That this must be so is evident if we consider that, were it not so, + force could not be permanent nor matter constant. For instance, if action + and reaction were not invariably equal and opposite, force would not be + invariably persistent, seeing that in no case can the formula fail, + unless some one or other of the forces concerned, or parts of them, + disappear. And as with a simple law of this kind, so with every other + natural law and inter-operation of laws, howsoever complex such + inter-operation may be; for it is manifest that if in any case similar + antecedents did not determine similar consequents, on one or other of + these occasions some quantum of force, or of matter, or of both, must + have disappeared—or, which is the same thing, the law of causation + cannot have been constant. Every natural law, therefore, may be defined + as the formula of a sequence, which must either ensue upon certain forces + of a given intensity impinging upon certain given quantities, kinds, and + forms of matter, or else, by not ensuing, prove that the force or the + matter concerned were not of a permanent nature.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect31">§ 31</a>. The argument, then, which was elaborated in + <a href="#Sect29">§ 29</a>, and which has so long and so generally + received the popular sanction in the common-sense epitome, that in the + last record there must be mind in external nature, since "that which it + requires thought and reason to understand must itself be thought and + reason,"—this argument, I say, must now for ever be abandoned by + reasonable men. No doubt it would be easy to point to several speculative + thinkers who have previously combated this argument,<a + name="footnotetag21" href="#footnote21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> and from this + fact some readers will perhaps be inclined to judge, from a false + analogy, that as the argument in question has withstood previous + assaults, it need not necessarily succumb to the present one. Be it + observed, however, that the present assault differs from all previous + assaults, just as demonstration differs from speculation. What has + hitherto been but mere guess and unwarrantable assertion has now become a + matter of the greatest certainty. That the argument from General Laws is + a futile argument, is no longer a matter of unverifiable opinion: it is + as sure as is the most fundamental axiom of science. That the argument + will long remain in illogical minds, I doubt not; but that it is from + henceforth quite inadmissible in accurate thinking, there can be no + question. For the sake, however, of impressing this fact still more + strongly upon such readers as have been accustomed to rely upon this + argument, and so find it difficult thus abruptly to reverse the whole + current of their thoughts,—for the sake of such, I shall here add a + few remarks with the view of facilitating the conception of an universal + Order existing independently of Mind.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect32">§ 32</a>. Interpreting the mazy nexus of phenomena + only by the facts which science has revealed, and what conclusion are we + driven to accept? Clearly, looking to what has been said in the last two + sections, that from the time when the process of evolution first + began,—from the time before the condensation of the nebula had + showed any signs of commencing,—every subsequent change or event of + evolution was <i>necessarily bound</i> to ensue; else force and matter + have not been persistent. How then, it will be asked, did the vast nexus + of natural laws which is now observable ever begin or continue to be? In + this way. When the first womb of things was pregnant with all the future, + there would probably have been existent at any rate not more than one of + the formulæ which we now call natural laws. This one law, of course, + would have been the law of gravitation. Here we may take our stand. It + does not signify whether there ever was a time when gravitation was + not,—<i>i.e.</i>, if ever there was a time when matter, <i>as we + now know it</i>, was not in existence;—for if there ever was such a + time, there is no reason to doubt, but every reason to conclude, that the + evolution of matter, as we now know it, was accomplished in accordance + with law. Similarly, we are not concerned with the question as to how the + law of gravitation came to be associated with matter; for it is + overwhelmingly probable, from the extent of the analogy, that if our + knowledge concerning molecular physics were sufficiently great, the + existence of the law in question would be found to follow as a necessary + deduction from the primary qualities of matter and force, just as we can + now see that, when present, its peculiar quantitative action necessarily + follows from the primary qualities of space.</p> + + <p>Starting, then, with these data,—matter, force, and the law of + gravitation,—what must happen? We have the strongest scientific + reason to believe that the matter of the solar system primordially + existed in a highly diffused or nebulous form. By mutual gravitation, + therefore, all the substance of the nebula must have begun to concentrate + upon itself, or to condense. Now, from this point onwards, I wish it to + be clearly understood that the mere consideration of the supposed facts + not admitting of scientific proof, or of scientific explanation if true, + in no wise affects the certainty of the doctrine which these facts are + here adduced to establish. Fully granting that the alleged facts are not + beyond dispute, and that, even if true, innumerable other unknown and + unknowable facts must have been associated with them—fully + admitting, in short, that our ideas concerning the genesis of the solar + system are of the crudest and least trustworthy character; still, if it + be admitted, what at the present day only ignorance or prejudice can + deny, viz., that, as a whole, evolution has been the method of the + universe; then it follows that the doctrine here contended for is as + certainly true as it would be were we fully acquainted with every cause + and every change which has acted and ensued throughout the whole process + of the genesis of things.</p> + + <p>Now, bearing this caveat in mind, we have next to observe that when + once the nebula began to condense, new relations among its constituent + parts would, <i>for this reason</i>, begin to be established. "Given a + rare and widely diffused mass of nebulous matter,... what are the + successive changes that will take place? Mutual gravitation will + approximate its atoms, but their approximation will be opposed by atomic + repulsion, the overcoming of which implies the evolution of heat." That + is to say, the condensation of the nebula as a whole of necessity implies + at least the origination of these new material and dynamical relations + among its constituent parts. "As fast as this heat partially escapes by + radiation, further approximation will take place, attended by further + evolution of heat, and so on continuously: the processes not occurring + separately, as here described, but simultaneously, uninterruptedly, and + with increasing activity." Hence the newly established relations + continuously acquire new increments of intensity. But now observe a more + important point. The previous essential conditions remaining + unaltered—viz., the persistence of matter and force, as well as, or + rather let us say and consequently, the law of gravitation—these + conditions, I say, remaining constant, and the newly established + relations would necessarily <i>of themselves</i> give origin to + <i>new</i> laws. For whenever two given quantities of force and matter + met in one of the novel relations, they would of necessity give rise to + novel effects; and whenever, on any future occasion, similar quantities + of force and matter again so met, precisely similar effects would of + necessity require to occur: but the occurrence of similar effects under + similar conditions is all that we mean by a natural law.</p> + + <p>Continuing, then, our quotation from Mr. Herbert Spencer's terse and + lucid exposition of the nebular theory, we find this doctrine virtually + embodied in the next sentences:—"Eventually this slow movement of + the atoms towards their common centre of gravity will bring about + phenomena of another order.</p> + + <p>"Arguing from the known laws of atomic combination, it will happen + that, when the nebulous mass has reached a particular stage of + condensation—when its internally situated atoms have approached to + within certain distances, have generated a certain amount of heat, and + are subject to a certain mutual pressure (the heat and pressure + increasing as the aggregation progresses), some of them will suddenly + enter into chemical union. Whether the binary atoms so produced be of + kinds such as we know, which is possible, or whether they be of kinds + simpler than any we know, which is more probable, matters not to the + argument. It suffices that molecular combinations of some species will + finally take place." We have, then, here a new and important change of + relations. Matter, primordially uniform, has itself become heterogeneous; + and in as many places as it has thus changed its state, it must, in + virtue of the fact, give rise to other hitherto novel relations, and so, + in many cases, to new laws.<a name="footnotetag22" + href="#footnote22"><sup>[22]</sup></a></p> + + <p>It would be tedious and unnecessary to trace this genesis of natural + law any further: indeed, it would be quite impossible so to trace it for + any considerable distance without feeling that the ever-multiplying mazes + of relations renders all speculation as to the actual processes quite + useless. This fact, however, as before insisted, in no wise affects the + only doctrine which I here enunciate—viz., that the self-generation + of natural law is a necessary corollary from the persistence of matter + and force. And that this must be so is now, I hope, sufficiently evident. + Just as in the first dawn of things, when the proto-binary compounds of + matter gave rise to new relations together with their appropriate laws, + so throughout the whole process of evolution, as often as matter acquired + a hitherto novel state, or in one of its old states entered into hitherto + novel relations, so often would non-existent or even impossible laws + become at once possible and necessary. And in this way I cannot see that + there is any reason to stop until we arrive at all the marvellous + complexity of things as they are. For aught that speculative reason can + ever from henceforth show to the contrary, the evolution of all the + diverse phenomena of inorganic nature, of life, and of mind, appears to + be as necessary and as self-determined as is the being of that mysterious + Something which is Everything,—the Entity we must all believe in, + which without condition and beyond relation holds its existence in + itself.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect33">§ 33</a>. Does it still seem incredible that, + notwithstanding it requires mental processes to interpret external + nature, external nature may nevertheless be destitute of mind? Then let + us look at the subject on its obverse aspect.</p> + + <p>According to the theory of evolution—which, be it always + remembered, is no mere gratuitous supposition, but a genuine scientific + theory—human intelligence, like everything else, has been evolved. + Now in what does the evolution of intelligence consist? Any one + acquainted with the writings of our great philosopher can have no + hesitation in answering: Clearly and only in the establishment of more + and more numerous and complex internal or psychological relations. In + other words, the law of intelligence being "that the strengths of the + inner cohesions between psychical states must be proportionate to the + persistences of the outer relations symbolised," it follows that the + development of intelligence is "secured by the one simple principle that + experience of the outer relations <i>produces</i> inner cohesions, and + makes the inner cohesions strong in proportion as the outer relations are + persistent." Now the question before us at present is merely + this:—Must we not infer that these outer relations are regulated by + mind, seeing that order is undoubtedly apparent among them, and that it + requires mental processes on our part to interpret this order? The only + legitimate answer to this question is, that these outer relations + <i>may</i> be regulated by mind, but that, in view of the evolution + theory, we are certainly not entitled to infer that they <i>are</i> so + regulated, <i>merely</i> because it requires mental processes on our part + to interpret their orderly character. For if it is true that the human + mind was itself evolved by these outer relations—ever continuously + moulded into conformity with them as the prime condition of its + existence—then its process of interpreting them is but reflecting + (as it were) in consciousness these outer relations by which the inner + ones were originally produced. Granting that, as a matter of fact, an + objective macrocosm exists, and if we can prove or render probable that + this objective macrocosm is <i>of itself</i> sufficient to evolve a + subjective microcosm, I do not see any the faintest reason for the latter + to conclude that a self-conscious intelligence is inherent in the former, + merely because it is able to trace in the macrocosm some of those orderly + objective relations by which its own corresponding subjective relations + were originally produced. If it is said that it is impossible to conceive + how, apart from mind, the orderly objective relations themselves can ever + have originated, I reply that this is merely to shift the ground of + discussion to that which occupied us in the last section: all we are now + engaged upon is,—Granting that the existence of such orderly + relations is actual, whether with or without mind to account for them; + and granting also that these relations are <i>of themselves</i> + sufficient to produce corresponding subjective relations; then the mere + fact of our conscious intelligence being able to discover numerous and + complex outer relations answering to those which they themselves have + caused in our intelligence, does not warrant the latter in concluding + that the causal connection between intelligence and non-intelligence has + ever been reversed—that these outer relations in turn are caused by + a similar conscious intelligence. How such a thing as a conscious + intelligence is possible is another and wholly unanswerable question + (though not more so than that as to the existence of force and matter, + and would not be rendered less so by merging the fact in a hypothetical + Deity); but granting, as we must, that such an entity does exist, and + supposing it to have been evolved by natural causes, then it would appear + incontestably to follow, that whether or not objective existence is + presided over by objective mind, our subjective mind would <i>alike</i> + and <i>equally</i> require to read in the facts of the external world an + indication, whether true or false, of some such presiding agency. The + subjective mind being, by the supposition, but the obverse aspect of the + sum total of such among objective relations as have had a share in its + production, when, as in observation and reflection, this obverse aspect + is again inverted upon its die, it naturally fits more or less exactly + into all the prints.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect34">§ 34</a>. This last illustration, however, serves to + introduce us to another point. The supposed evidence from which the + existence of mind in nature is inferred does not always depend upon such + minute correspondences between subjective method and objective method as + the illustration suggests. Every natural theologian has experienced more + or less difficulty in explaining the fact, that while there is a + tolerably general similarity between the contrivances due to human + thought and the apparent contrivances in nature which he regards as due + to divine thought, the similarity is nevertheless <i>only</i> general. + For instance, if a man has occasion to devise any artificial appliance, + he does so with the least possible cost of labour to himself, and with + the least possible expenditure of material. Yet it is obvious that in + nature as a whole no such economic considerations obtain. Doubtless by + superficial minds this assertion will be met at first with an indignant + denial: they have been accustomed to accumulate instances of this very + principle of economy in nature; perhaps written about it in books, and + illustrated it in lectures,—totally ignoring the fact that the + instances of economy in nature bear no proportion at all to the instances + of prodigality. Conceive of the force which is being quite uselessly + expended by all the wind-currents which are at this moment blowing over + the face of Europe. Imagine the energy that must have been dissipated + during the secular cooling of this single planet. Feebly try to think of + what the sun is radiating into space. If it is retorted that we are + incompetent to judge of the purposes of the Almighty, I reply that this + is but to abandon the argument from economy whenever it is found + untenable: we presume to be competent judges of almighty purposes so long + as they appear to imitate our own; but so soon as there is any divergence + observable, we change front. By thus selecting all the instances of + economy in nature, and disregarding all the vastly greater instances of + reckless waste, we are merely laying ourselves open to the charge of an + unfair eclecticism. And this formal refutation of the argument from + economy admits of being further justified in a strikingly substantial + manner; for if all the examples of economy in nature that were ever + observed, or admit being observed, were collected into one view, I + undertake to affirm that, without exception, they would be found to + marshal themselves in one great company—the subjects whose law is + <i>survival of the fittest</i>. One question only will I here ask. Is it + possible at the present day for any degree of prejudice, after due + consideration, to withstand the fact that the solitary exceptions to the + universal prodigality so painfully conspicuous in nature are to be found + where there is also to be found a full and adequate physical explanation + of their occurrence?</p> + + <p>But, again, prodigality is only one of several particulars wherein the + modes and the means of the supposed divine intelligence differ from those + of its human counterpart. Comparative anatomists can point to organic + structures which are far from being theoretically perfect: even the mind + of man in these cases, notwithstanding its confessed deficiencies in + respect both of cognitive and cogitative powers, is competent to suggest + improvements to an intelligence supposed to be omniscient and all-wise! + And what shall we say of the numerous cases in which the supposed + purposes of this intelligence could have been attained by other and less + roundabout means? In short, not needlessly to prolong discussion, it is + admitted, even by natural theologians themselves, that the difficulties + of reconciling, even approximately, the supposed processes of divine + thought with the known processes of human thought are quite insuperable. + The fact is expressed by such writers in various ways,—<i>e.g.</i>, + that it would be presumptuous in man to expect complete conformity in all + cases; that the counsels of God are past finding out; that his ways are + not as our ways, and so on. Observing only, as before, that in thus + ignoring adverse cases natural theologians are guilty of an unfair + eclecticism, it is evident that all such expressions concede the fact, + that even in those provinces of nature where the evidence of superhuman + intelligence appears most plain, the resemblance of its apparent products + to those of human intelligence consists in a general approximation of + method rather than in any precise similarity of particulars: the likeness + is generic rather than specific.</p> + + <p>Now this is exactly what we should expect to be the case, if the + similarity in question be due to the cause which the present section + endeavours to set forth. If all natural laws are self-evolved, and if + human intelligence is but a subjective photograph of certain among their + interrelations, it seems but natural that when this photograph compares + itself with the whole external world from parts of which it was taken, + its subjective lights and shadows should be found to correspond with some + of the objective lights and shadows much more perfectly than with others. + Still there would doubtless be sufficient general conformity to lead the + thinking photograph to conclude that the great world of objective + reality, instead of being the <i>cause</i> of such conformity as exists, + was itself the <i>effect</i> of some common cause,—that it too was + of the nature of a picture. Dropping the figure, if it is true that human + intelligence has been evolved by natural law, then in view of all that + has been said it must now, I think, be tolerably apparent, <i>that as by + the hypothesis human intelligence has always been required to think and + to act in conformity with law, human intelligence must at last be in + danger of confusing or identifying the fact of action in conformity with + law with the existence and the action of a self-conscious intelligence. + Reading then in external nature innumerable examples of action in + conformity with law, human intelligence falls back upon the unwarrantable + identification, and out of the bare fact that law exists in nature + concludes that beyond nature there is an Intelligent Lawgiver.</i></p> + + <p><a name="Sect35">§ 35</a>. From what has been said in the last five + sections, it manifestly follows that all the varied phenomena of the + universe not only may, but must, depend upon the persistence of force and + the primary qualities of matter.<a name="footnotetag23" + href="#footnote23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> Be it remembered that the object + of the last three sections was merely to "<i>facilitate conception</i>" + of the fact that it does not at all follow, because the phenomena of + external nature admit of being intelligently inquired into, therefore + they are due to an intelligent cause. The last three sections are hence + in a manner parenthetical, and it is of comparatively little importance + whether or not they have been successful in their object; for, from what + went before, it is abundantly manifest that, whether or not the + subjective side of the question admits of satisfactory elucidation, there + can be no doubt that the objective side of it is as certain as are the + fundamental axioms of science. It does not admit of one moment's + questioning that it is as certainly true that all the exquisite beauty + and melodious harmony of nature follow as necessarily and as inevitably + from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter, as it + is certainly true that force is persistent, or that matter is extended + and impenetrable. No doubt this generalisation is too vast to be + adequately conceived, but there can be equally little doubt that it is + necessarily true. If matter and force have been eternal, so far as human + mind can soar it can discover no need of a superior mind to explain the + varied phenomena of existence. Man has truly become in a new sense the + measure of the universe, and in this the latest and most appalling of his + soundings, indications are returned from the infinite voids of space and + time by which he is surrounded, that his intelligence, with all its noble + capacities for love and adoration, is yet alone—destitute of kith + or kin in all this universe of being.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3><a name="ChapV">CHAPTER V</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO +THE BEING OF A GOD.</h4> + + <p><a name="Sect36">§ 36</a>. But the discussion must not end here. + Inexorable logic has forced us to conclude that, viewing the question as + to the existence of a God only by the light which modern science has shed + upon it, there no longer appears to be any semblance of an argument in + its favour. Let us then turn upon science herself, and question her right + to be our sole guide in this matter. Undoubtedly we have no alternative + but to conclude that the hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically + proved to be as certainly superfluous is the very basis of all science is + certainly true. There can no longer be any more doubt that the existence + of a God is wholly unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the + universe, than there is doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall + upon the table. Nay, the doubt is even less than this, because while the + knowledge that my pen will fall if I allow it to do so is founded chiefly + upon empirical knowledge (I could not predict with <i>à priori</i> + certainty that it would so fall, for the pen might be in an electrical + state, or subject to some set of unknown natural laws antagonistic to + gravity), the knowledge that a Deity is superfluous as an explanation of + anything, being grounded on the doctrine of the persistence of force, is + grounded on an <i>à priori</i> necessity of reason—<i>i.e.</i>, if + this fact were not so, our science, our thought, our very existence + itself, would be scientifically impossible.</p> + + <p>But now, having thus stated the case as strongly as I am able, it + remains to question how far the authority of science extends. Even our + knowledge of the persistence of force and of the primary qualities of + matter is but of relative significance. Deeper than the foundations of + our experience, "deeper than demonstration—deeper even than + definite cognition,—deep as the very nature of mind,"<a + name="footnotetag24" href="#footnote24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> are these the + most ultimate of known truths; but where from this is our warrant for + concluding with certainty that these known truths are everywhere and + eternally true? It will be said that there is a strong analogical + probability. Perhaps so, but of this next: I am not now speaking of + probability; I am speaking of certainty; and unless we deny the doctrine + of the relativity of knowledge, we cannot but conclude that there is no + absolute certainty in this case. As I deem this consideration one of + great importance, I shall proceed to develop it at some length. It will + be observed, then, that the consideration really amounts to + this:—Although it must on all hands be admitted that the fact of + the theistic hypothesis not being required to explain any of the + phenomena of nature is a fact which has been demonstrated + <i>scientifically</i>, nevertheless it must likewise on all hands be + admitted that this fact has not, and cannot be, demonstrated + <i>logically</i>. Or thus, although it is unquestionably true that so far + as science can penetrate she cannot discern any speculative necessity for + a God, it may nevertheless be true that if science could penetrate + further she might discern some such necessity. Now the present discussion + would clearly be incomplete if it neglected to define as carefully this + the logical standing of our subject, as it has hitherto endeavoured to + define its scientific standing. As a final step in our analysis, + therefore, we must altogether quit the region of experience, and, + ignoring even the very foundations of science and so all the most certain + of relative truths, pass into the transcendental region of purely formal + considerations. In this region theist and atheist must alike consent to + forego all their individual predilections, and, after regarding the + subject as it were in the abstract and by the light of pure logic alone, + finally come to an agreement as to the transcendental probability of the + question before them. Disregarding the actual probability which they + severally feel to exist in relation to their own individual + intelligences, they must apply themselves to ascertain the probability + which exists in relation to those fundamental laws of thought which + preside over the intelligence of our race. In fine, it will now, I hope, + be understood that, as we have hitherto been endeavouring to determine, + by deductions drawn from the very foundations of all possible science, + the <i>relative</i> probability as to the existence of a God, so we shall + next apply ourselves to the task of ascertaining the <i>absolute</i> + probability of such existence—or, more correctly, what is the + strictly <i>formal</i> probability of such existence when its possibility + is contemplated in an absolute sense.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect37">§ 37</a>. To begin then. In the last resort, the + value of every probability is fixed by "ratiocination." In endeavouring, + therefore, to fix the degree of strictly formal probability that is + present in any given case, our method of procedure should be, first to + ascertain the ultimate ratios on which the probability depends, and then + to estimate the comparative value of these ratios. Now I think there can + be no doubt that the value of any probability in this its last analysis + is determined by the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the + relations known, as compared with those of the relations unknown; and, + consequently, that in all cases where the sum of the unknown relations is + larger, or more important, or more indefinite than is the sum of the + known relations, it is an essential principle that the value of the + probability decreases in exact proportion to the decrease in the + similarity between the two sets of relations, whether this decrease + consists in the number, in the importance, or in the definiteness of the + relations involved. This rule or canon is self-evident as soon as pointed + out, and has been formulated by Professor Bain in his "Logic" when + treating of Analogy, but not with sufficient precision; for, while + recognising the elements of number and importance, he has overlooked that + of definiteness. This element, however, is a very essential + one—indeed the most essential of the three; for there are many + analogical inferences in which either the character or the extent of the + unknown relations is quite indefinite; and it is obvious that, whenever + this is the case, the value of the analogy is proportionably diminished, + and diminished in a much more material particular than it is when the + diminution of value arises from a mere excess of the unknown relations + over the known ones in respect of their number or of their importance. + For it is evident that, in the latter case, however little value the + analogy may possess, the exact degree of such value admits of being + <i>determined</i>; while it is no less evident that, in the former case, + we are precluded from estimating the value of the analogy at all, and + this just in proportion to the indefiniteness of the unknown + relations.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect38">§ 38</a>. Now the particular instance with which we + are concerned is somewhat peculiar. Notwithstanding we have the entire + sphere of human experience from which to argue, we are still unable to + gauge the strictly logical probability of any argument whatsoever; for + the unknown relations in this case are so wholly indefinite, both as to + their character and extent, that any attempt to institute a definite + comparison between them and the known relations is felt at once to be + absurd. The question discussed, being the most ultimate of all possible + questions, must eventually contain in itself all that is to man unknown + and unknowable; the whole orbit of human knowledge is here insufficient + to obtain a parallax whereby to institute the required measurements.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect39">§ 39</a>. I think it is desirable to insist upon this + truth at somewhat greater length, and, for the sake of impressing it + still more deeply, I shall present it in another form. No one can for a + single moment deny that, beyond and around the sphere of the Knowable, + there exists the unfathomable abyss of the Unknowable. I do not here use + this latter word as embodying any theory: I merely wish it to state the + undoubted fact, which all must admit, viz., that beneath all our possible + explanations there lies a great Inexplicable. Now let us see what is the + effect of making this necessary admission. In the first place, it clearly + follows that, while our conceptions as to what the Unknowable contains + may or may not represent the truth, it is certain that we can never + discover whether or not they do. Further, it is impossible for us to + determine even a definite <i>probability</i> as to the existence (much + less the nature) of anything which we may suppose the Unknowable to + contain. We may, of course, perceive that such and such a supposition is + more <i>conceivable</i> than such and such; but, as already indicated, + the fact does not show that the one is in itself more definitely + <i>probable</i> than the other, unless it has been previously shown, + either that the capacity of our conceptions is a <i>fully adequate + measure</i> of the Possible, or that the proportion between such capacity + and the extent of the Possible is a proportion that can be + <i>determined</i>. In either of these cases, the Conceivable would be a + fair measure of the Possible: in the former case, an exact equivalent + (<i>e.g.</i>, in any instance of contradictory propositions, the most + conceivable would <i>certainly</i> be true); in the latter case, a + measure any degree less than an exact equivalent—the degree + depending upon the <i>then</i> ascertainable disparity between the extent + of the Possible and the extent of the Conceivable. Now the Unknowable + (including of course the Inconceivable Existent) is a species of the + Possible, and in its name carries the declaration that the disparity + between its extent and the extent of the Conceivable (<i>i.e.</i>, the + other species of the Possible) is a disparity that cannot be determined. + We are hence driven to the conclusion that the most apparently probable + of all propositions, if predicated of anything within the Unknowable, may + not in reality be a whit more so than is the most apparently improbable + proposition which it is possible to make; for if it is admitted (as of + course it must be) that we are necessarily precluded from comparing the + extent of the Conceivable with that of the Unknowable, then it + necessarily follows that in no case whatever are we competent to judge + how far an <i>apparent</i> probability relating to the latter province is + an <i>actual</i> probability. In other words, did we know the proportion + subsisting between the Conceivable and the Unknowable in respect of + relative extent and character, and so of inherent probabilities, we + should then be able to estimate the actual value of any apparent + probability relating to the latter province; but, as it is, our ability + to make this estimate varies inversely as our inability to estimate our + ignorance in this particular. And as our ignorance in this particular is + total—<i>i.e.</i>, since we cannot even approximately determine the + proportion that subsists between the Conceivable and the + Unknowable,—the result is that our ability to make the required + estimate in any given case is absolutely <i>nil</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect40">§ 40</a>. I have purposely rendered this presentation + in terms of the highest abstraction, partly to avoid the possibility of + any one, whatever his theory of things may be, finding anything at which + to object, and partly in order that my meaning may be understood to + include all things which are beyond the range of possible knowledge. Most + of all, therefore, must this presentation (if it contains anything of + truth) apply to the question regarding the existence of Deity; for the + <i>Ens Realissimum</i> must of all things be furthest removed from the + range of possible knowledge. Hence, if this presentation contains + anything of truth—and of its rigidly accurate truth I think there + can be no question—the assertion that the Self-existing Substance + is a Personal and Intelligent Being, and the assertion that this + Substance is an Impersonal and Non-Intelligent Being, are alike + assertions wholly destitute of any assignable degree of logical + probability, I say <i>assignable</i> degree of logical probability, + because that <i>some</i> degree of such probability may exist I do not + undertake to deny. All I assert is, that if we are here able to institute + any such probability at all, we are unable logically to assign to it any + determinate degree of value. Or, in other words, although we may + establish some probability in a sense relative to ourselves, we are + unable to know how far this probability is a probability in an absolute + sense. Or again, the case is not as though we were altogether + unacquainted with the Possible. Experience undoubtedly affords us some + information regarding this, although, comparatively speaking, we are + unable to know how much. Consequently, we must suppose that, in any given + case, it is more likely that the Conceivable should be Possible than that + the Inconceivable should be so, and that the Conceivably Probable should + exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: in neither case, + however, can we know <i>what degree</i> of such likelihood is + present.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect41">§ 41</a>. From the foregoing considerations, then, it + would appear that the only attitude which in strict logic it is + admissible to adopt towards the question concerning the being of a God is + that of "suspended judgment." Formally speaking, it is alike illegitimate + to affirm or to deny Intelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And + here I would desire it to be observed, that this is the attitude which + the majority of scientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted + with regard to this matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet + endeavoured to formulate the justification of this attitude; and as I + think there can be no doubt that the above presentation contains in a + logical shape the whole of such justification, I cannot but think that + some important ends will have been secured by it. For we are here in + possession, not merely of a vague and general impression that the + Ultimate is super-scientific, and so beyond the range of legitimate + prediction; but we are also in possession of a logical formula whereby at + once to vindicate the rationality of our opinion, and to measure the + precise degree of its technical value.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3><a name="ChapVI">CHAPTER VI</a>.</h3> + +<h4>THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.</h4> + + <p><a name="Sect42">§ 42</a>. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of + the formal considerations which have been adduced in the last chapter on + the scientific considerations which were dealt with in the previous + chapters. In these previous chapters the proposition was clearly + established that, just as certainly as the fundamental data of science + are true, so certainly is it true that the theory of Theism in any shape + is, scientifically considered, superfluous; for these chapters have + clearly shown that, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a + cause of things, is as certainly unnecessary as it is certainly true that + force is persistent and that matter is indestructible. But after this + proposition had been carefully justified, it remained to show that the + doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelled us to carry our + discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. For although we + observed that the essential qualities of matter and of force are the most + ultimate data of human knowledge, and although, by showing how far the + question of Theism depended on these data, we carried the discussion of + that question to the utmost possible limits of scientific thought, it + still devolved on us to contemplate the fact that even these the most + ultimate data of science are only known to be of relative significance. + And the bearing of this fact to the question of Theism was seen to be + most important. For, without waiting to recapitulate the substance of a + chapter so recently concluded, it will be remembered that its effect was + to establish this position beyond all controversy—viz., that when + ideas which have been formed by our experience within the region of + phenomenal actuality are projected into the region of ontological + possibility, they become utterly worthless; seeing that we can never have + any means whereby to test the actual value of whatever transcendental + probabilities they may appear to establish. Therefore it is that even the + most ultimate of relative truths with which, as we have seen, the + question of Theism is so vitally associated, is almost without meaning + when contemplated in an absolute sense. What, then, is the effect of + these metaphysical considerations on the position of Theism as we have + seen it to be left by the highest generalisations of physical science? + Let us contemplate this question with the care which it deserves.</p> + + <p>In the first place, it is evident that the effect of these purely + formal considerations is to render all reasonings on the subject of + Theism equally illegitimate, unless it is constantly borne in mind that + such reasonings can only be of relative signification. Thus, as a matter + of pure logic, these considerations are destructive of all assignable + validity of any such reasoning whatsoever. Still, even a strictly + relative probability is, in some undefinable degree, of more value than + no probability at all, as we have seen these same formal considerations + to show (see <a href="#Sect40">§ 40</a>); and, moreover, even were this + not so, the human mind will never rest until it attains to the furthest + probability which to its powers is accessible. Therefore, if we do not + forget the merely relative nature of the considerations which are about + to be adduced, by adducing them we may at the same time satisfy our own + minds and abstain from violating the conditions of sound logic.</p> + + <p>The shape, then, to which the subject has now been reduced is simply + this:—Seeing that the theory of Evolution in its largest sense has + shown the theory of Theism to be superfluous in a scientific sense, does + it not follow that the theory of Theism is thus shown to be superfluous + in any sense? For it would seem from the discussion, so far as it has + hitherto gone, that the only rational basis on which the theory of Theism + can rest is a basis of teleology; and if, as has been clearly shown, the + theory of evolution, by deducing the genesis of natural law from the + primary data of science, irrevocably destroys this basis, does it not + follow that the theory of evolution has likewise destroyed the theory + which rested on that basis? Now I conclude, as stated at the close of <a + href="#ChapIV">Chapter IV.,</a> that the question here put must certainly + be answered in the affirmative, so far as its scientific aspect is + concerned. But when we consider the question in its purely logical + aspect, as we have done in <a href="#ChapV">Chapter V.,</a> the case is + otherwise. For although, so far as the utmost reach of scientific vision + enables us to see, we can discern no evidence of Deity, it does not + therefore follow that beyond the range of such vision Deity does not + exist. Science indeed has proved that if there is a Divine Mind in + nature, and if by the hypothesis such a Mind exerts any causative + influence on the phenomena of nature, such influence is exerted beyond + the sphere of experience. And this achievement of science, be it never + forgotten, is an achievement of prodigious importance, effectually + destroying, as it does, all vestiges of a scientific teleology. But be it + now carefully observed, although all vestiges of a <i>scientific</i> + teleology are thus completely and permanently ruined, the formal + considerations adduced in the <a href="#ChapV">last chapter</a> supply + the conditions for constructing what may be termed a <i>metaphysical</i> + teleology. I use these terms advisedly, because I think they will serve + to bring out with great clearness the condition to which our analysis of + the teleological argument has now been reduced.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect43">§ 43</a>. In the first place, let it be understood + that I employ the terms "scientific" and "metaphysical" in the convenient + sense in which they are employed by Mr. Lewes, viz., as respectively + designating a theory that is verifiable and a theory that is not. + Consequently, by the term "scientific teleology" I mean to denote a form + of teleology which admits either of being proved or disproved, while by + the term "metaphysical teleology" I mean to denote a form of teleology + which does not admit either of being proved or of being disproved. Now, + with these significations clearly understood, it will be seen that the + forms of teleology which we have hitherto considered belong entirely to + the scientific class. That the Paleyerian form of the argument did so is + manifest, first because this argument itself treats the problem of Theism + as a problem that is susceptible of scientific demonstration, and next + because we have seen that the advance of science has proved this argument + susceptible of scientific refutation. In other words, from the supposed + axiom, "There cannot be apparent design without a designer," adaptations + in nature become logically available as purely scientific evidence of an + intelligent cause; and that Paley himself regarded them exclusively in + this light is manifest, both from his own "statement of the argument," + and from the character of the evidence by which he seeks to establish the + argument when stated—witness the typical passage before quoted (<a + href="#Sect26">§ 26</a>). On the other hand, we have clearly seen that + this Paleyerian system of natural theology has been effectually + demolished by the scientific theory of natural selection—the + fundamental axiom of the former having been shown by the latter to be + scientifically untrue. Hence the term "scientific teleology" is without + question applicable to the Paleyerian system.</p> + + <p>Nor is the case essentially different with the more refined form of + the teleological argument which we have had to consider—the + argument, namely, from General Laws. For here, likewise, we have clearly + seen that the inference from the ubiquitous operation of General Laws to + the existence of an omniscient Law-maker is quite as illegitimate as is + the inference from apparent Design to the existence of a Supreme + Designer. In other words, science, by establishing the doctrine of the + persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter, has effectually + disproved the hypothesis that the presence of Law in nature is of itself + sufficient to prove the existence of an intelligent Law-giver.</p> + + <p>Thus it is that scientific teleology in any form is now and for ever + obsolete. But not so with what I have termed metaphysical teleology. For + as we have seen that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge + precludes us from asserting, or even from inferring, that beyond the + region of the Knowable Mind does not exist, it remains logically possible + to institute a metaphysical hypothesis that beyond this region of the + Knowable Mind does exist. There being a necessary absence of any positive + information whereby to refute this metaphysical hypothesis, any one who + chooses to adopt it is fully justified in doing so, provided only he + remembers that the purely metaphysical quality whereby the hypothesis is + ensured against disproof, likewise, and in the same degree, precludes it + from the possibility of proof. He must remember that it is no longer open + to him to point to any particular set of general laws and to assert, + these proclaim Intelligence as their cause; for we have repeatedly seen + that the known states of matter and force themselves afford sufficient + explanation of the facts to which he points. And he must remember that + the only reason why his hypothesis does not conflict with any of the + truths known to science, is because he has been careful to rest that + hypothesis upon a basis of purely formal considerations, which lie beyond + even the most fundamental truths of which science is cognisant.</p> + + <p>Thus, for example, he may present his metaphysical theory of Theism in + some such terms as these:—'Fully conceding what reason shows must + be conceded, and there still remains this possible + supposition—viz., that there is a presiding Mind in nature, which + exerts its causative influence beyond the sphere of experience, thus + rendering it impossible for us to obtain scientific evidence of its + action. For such a Mind, exerting such an influence beyond experience, + may direct affairs within experience by methods conceivable or + inconceivable to us—producing, possibly, innumerable and highly + varied results, which in turn may produce their effects within + experience, their introduction being then, of course, in the ordinary way + of natural law. For instance, there can be no question that by the + intelligent creation or dissipation of energy, all the phenomena of + cosmic evolution might have been directed, and, for aught that science + can show to the contrary, thus only rendered possible. Hence there is at + least one nameable way in which, even in accordance with observed facts, + a Supreme Mind could be competent to direct the phenomena of observable + nature. But we are not necessarily restricted to the limits of the + nameable in this matter, so that it is of no argumentative importance + whether or not this suggested method is the method which the supposed + Mind actually adopts, seeing that there may still be other possible + methods, which, nevertheless, we are unable to suggest.'</p> + + <p>Doubtless the hypothesis of Theism, as thus presented, will be deemed + by many persons but of very slender probability. I am not, however, + concerned with whatever character of probability it may be supposed to + exhibit. I am merely engaged in carefully presenting the only hypothesis + which can be presented, if the theory as to an Intelligent Author of + nature is any longer to be maintained on grounds of a rational teleology. + No doubt, scientifically considered, the hypothesis in question is purely + gratuitous; for, so far as the light of science can penetrate, there is + no need of any such hypothesis at all. Thus it may well seem, at first + sight, that no hypothesis could well have less to recommend it; and, so + far as the presentation has yet gone, it is therefore fully legitimate + for an atheist to reply:—'All that this so-called metaphysical + theory amounts to is a wholly gratuitous assumption. No doubt it is + always difficult, and usually impossible, logically or unequivocally to + prove a negative. If my adversary chose to imagine that nature is + presided over by a demon with horns and hoofs, or by a dragon with claws + and tail, I should be as unable to disprove this his supposed theory as I + am now unable to disprove his actual theory. But in all cases reasonable + men ought to be guided in their beliefs by such positive evidence as is + available; and if, as in the present case, the alternative belief is + wholly gratuitous—adopted not only without any evidence, but + against all that great body of evidence which the sum-total of science + supplies—surely we ought not to hesitate for one moment in the + choice of our creed?'</p> + + <p>Now all this is quite sound in principle, provided only that the + metaphysical theory of Theism <i>is</i> wholly gratuitous, in the sense + of being utterly destitute of evidential support. That it is destitute of + all <i>scientific</i> support, we have already and repeatedly seen; but + the question remains as to whether it is similarly destitute of + <i>metaphysical</i> support.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect44">§ 44</a>. To this question, then, let us next address + ourselves. From the theistic pleading which we have just heard, it is + abundantly manifest that the formal conditions of a metaphysical + teleology are present: the question now before us is as to whether or not + any actual evidence exists in favour of such a theory. In order to + discuss this question, let us begin by allowing the theist to continue + his pleading. 'You have shown me,' he may say, 'that a scientific or + demonstrable system of teleology is no longer possible, and, therefore, + as I have already conceded, I must take my stand on a metaphysical or + non-demonstrable system. But I reflect that the latter term is a loose + one, seeing that it embraces all possible degrees of evidence short of + actual proof. The question, therefore, I conceive to be, What amount of + evidence is there in favour of this metaphysical system of teleology? And + this question I answer by the following considerations:—As general + laws separately have all been shown to be the necessary outcome of the + primary data of science, it certainly follows that general laws + collectively must be the same—<i>i.e.</i>, that the whole system of + general laws must be, so far as the lights of our science can penetrate, + the necessary outcome of the persistence of force and the + indestructibility of matter. But you have also dearly shown me that these + lights are of the feeblest conceivable character when they are brought to + illuminate the final mystery of things. I therefore feel at liberty to + assert, that if there is any one principle to be observed in the + collective operation of general laws which cannot conceivably be + explained by any cause other than that of intelligent guidance, I am + still free to fall back on such a principle and to + maintain—Although the collective operation of general laws follows + as a necessary consequence from the primary data of science, this one + principle which pervades their united action, and which cannot be + conceivably explained by any hypothesis other than that of intelligent + guidance, is a principle which still remains to be accounted for; and as + it cannot conceivably be accounted for on grounds of physical science, I + may legitimately account for it on grounds of metaphysical teleology. Now + I cannot open my eyes without perceiving such a principle everywhere + characterising the collective operation of general laws. Universally I + behold in nature, order, beauty, harmony,—that is, a perfect + <i>correlation</i> among general laws. But this ubiquitous correlation + among general laws, considered as the cause of cosmic harmony, itself + requires some explanatory cause such as the persistence of force and the + indestructibility of matter cannot conceivably be made to supply. For + unless we postulate some one integrating cause, the greater the number of + general laws in nature, the less likelihood is there of such laws being + so correlated as to produce harmony by their combined action. And + forasmuch as the only cause that I am able to imagine as competent to + produce such effects is that of intelligent guidance, I accept the + metaphysical hypothesis that beyond the sphere of the Knowable there + exists an Unknown God.<a name="footnotetag25" + href="#footnote25"><sup>[25]</sup></a></p> + + <p>'If it is retorted that the above argument involves an absurd + contradiction, in that while it sets out with an explicit avowal of the + fact that the collective operation of general laws follows as a necessary + consequence from the primary data of physical science, it nevertheless + afterwards proceeds to explain an effect of such collective operation by + a metaphysical hypothesis; I answer that it was expressly for the purpose + of eliciting this retort that I threw my argument into the above form. + For the position which I wish to establish is this, that fully accepting + the logical cogency of the reasoning whereby the action of every law is + deduced from the primary data of science, I wish to show that when this + train of reasoning is followed to its ultimate term, it leads us into the + presence of a fact for which it is inadequate to account. If, then, my + contention be granted—viz., that to human faculties it is not + conceivable how, in the absence of a directing intelligence, general laws + could be so correlated as to produce universal harmony—then I have + brought the matter to this issue:—Notwithstanding the scientific + train of argument being complete in itself, it still leaves us in the + presence of a fact which it cannot conceivably explain; and it is this + unexplained residuum—this total product of the operation of general + laws—that I appeal to as the logical justification for a system of + metaphysical teleology—a system which offers the only conceivable + explanation of this stupendous fact.</p> + + <p>'And here I may further observe, that the scientific train of + reasoning is of the kind which embodies what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls + "symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order."<a name="footnotetag26" + href="#footnote26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> That is to say, we can see how + such simple laws as that action and reaction are equal and opposite may + have been self-evolved, and from this fact we go on generalising and + generalising, until we land ourselves in wholly symbolic and—a + paradox is here legitimate—inconceivable conceptions. Now the + farther we travel into this region of unrealisable ideas, the less + trustworthy is the report that we are able to bring back. The method is + in a sense scientific; but when even scientific method is projected into + a region of really super-scientific possibility, it ceases to have that + character of undoubted certainty which it enjoys when dealing with + verifiable subjects of inquiry. The demonstrations are formal, but they + are not real.</p> + + <p>'Therefore, looking to this necessarily suspicious character of the + scientific train of reasoning, and then observing that, even if accepted, + it leaves the fact of cosmic harmony unexplained, I maintain, that + whatever probability the phenomena of nature may in former times have + been thought to establish in favour of the theory as to an intelligent + Author of nature, that probability has been in no wise + annihilated—nor apparently can it ever be annihilated—by the + advance of science. And not only so, but I question whether this + probability has been even seriously impaired by such advance, seeing that + although this advance has revealed a speculative <i>raison d'être</i> of + the mechanical precision of nature, it has at the same time shown the + baffling complexity of nature; and therefore, in view of what has just + been said, leaves the balance of probability concerning the existence of + a God very much where it always was. For stay awhile to contemplate this + astounding complexity of harmonious nature! Think of how much we already + know of its innumerable laws and processes, and then think that this + knowledge only serves to reveal, in a glimmering way, the huge immensity + of the unknown. Try to picture the meshwork of contending rhythms which + must have been before organic nature was built up, and then let us ask, + Is it conceivable, is it credible, that all this can have been the work + of blind fate? Must we not feel that had there not been intelligent + agency at work somewhere, other and less terrifically intricate results + would have ensued? And if we further try to symbolise in thought the + unimaginable complexity of the material and dynamical changes in virtue + of which that thought itself exists,—if we then extend our symbols + to represent all the history of all the orderly changes which must have + taken place to evolve human intelligence into what it is,—and if we + still further extend our symbols to try if it be possible, even in the + language of symbols, to express the number and the subtlety of those + natural laws which now preside over the human will;—in the face of + so vast an assumption as that all this has been self-evolved, I am + content still to rest in the faith of my forefathers.'</p> + + <p><a name="Sect45">§ 45</a>. Now I think it must be admitted that we + have here a valid argument. That is to say, the considerations which we + have just adduced must, I think, in fairness be allowed to have + established this position:—That the system of metaphysical + teleology for which we have supposed a candid theist to plead, is + something more than a purely gratuitous system—that it does not + belong to the same category of baseless imaginings as that to which the + atheist at first sight, and in view of the scientific deductions alone, + might be inclined to assign it. For we have seen that our supposed + theist, while fully admitting the formal cogency of the scientific train + of reasoning, is nevertheless able to point to a fact which, in his + opinion, lies without that train of reasoning. For he declares that it is + beyond his powers of conception to regard the complex harmony of nature + otherwise than as a product of some one integrating cause; and that the + only cause of which he is able to conceive as adequate to produce such an + effect is that of a conscious Intelligence. Pointing, therefore, to this + complex harmony of nature as to a fact which cannot to his mind be + conceivably explained by any deductions from physical science, he feels + that he is justified in explaining this fact by the aid of a metaphysical + hypothesis. And in so doing he is in my opinion perfectly justified, at + any rate to this extent—that his antagonist cannot fairly dispose + of this metaphysical hypothesis as a purely gratuitous hypothesis. How + far it is a probable hypothesis is another question, and to this question + we shall now address ourselves.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect46">§ 46</a>. If it is true that the deductions from + physical science cannot be conceived to explain some among the observed + facts of nature, and if it is true that these particular facts admit of + being conceivably explained by the metaphysical hypothesis in question, + then, beyond all controversy, this metaphysical hypothesis must be + provisionally accepted. Let us then carefully examine the premises which + are thus adduced to justify acceptance of this hypothesis as their + conclusion.</p> + + <p>In the first place, it is not—cannot—be denied, even by a + theist, that the deductions from physical science <i>do</i> embrace the + fact of cosmic harmony in their explanation, seeing that, as they explain + the operation of general laws collectively, they must be regarded as also + explaining every effect of such operation. And this, as we have seen, is + a consideration to which our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did + he meet it? He met it by the considerations—1st. That the + scientific train of reasoning evolved this conclusion only by employing, + in a wholly unrestricted manner, "symbolic conceptions of the + illegitimate order;" and, 2d. That when the conclusion thus + illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with the fact of cosmic + harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to be beyond the + powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to such a + cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on the + scientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be no + question that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which that + train of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weakness + to the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think, + be equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who would + venture honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of + cosmic harmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific + train of reasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an + atheist may reply, that although the objections of his antagonist against + this symbolic method of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the + nature of the case, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which + is available. If, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his + antagonist for pointing out a source of weakness in this method of + reasoning—a source of weakness, be it observed, which renders it + impossible for him to estimate the actual, as distinguished from the + apparent, probability of the conclusion attained—this is all that + he can be expected to do: he cannot be expected to abandon the only + scientific method of reasoning available, in favour of a metaphysical + method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leaping with a + single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to the inference of + an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist may well point + out that, however objectionable his scientific method of reasoning may be + on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must at any rate be + preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbols throughout + refer to known causes.<a name="footnotetag27" + href="#footnote27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> With regard, then, to this + stricture on the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although + the caveat which it contains should never be lost sight of by atheists, + it is not of sufficient cogency to justify theists in abandoning a + scientific in favour of a metaphysical mode of reasoning.</p> + + <p>How then does it fare with the other stricture, or the consideration + that, "when the conclusion thus illegitimately<a name="footnotetag28" + href="#footnote28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> evolved is confronted with the + fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, we find it to be + beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due + to such a cause"? The atheist may answer, in the first place, that a + great deal here turns on the precise meaning which we assign to the word + "conceive." For we have just seen that, by employing "symbolic + conceptions," we <i>are</i> able to frame what we may term a + <i>formal</i> conception of universal harmony as due to the persistence + of force and the primary qualities of matter. That is to say, we have + seen that such universal harmony as nature presents must be regarded as + an effect of the collective operation of general laws; and we have + previously arrived at a formal conception of general laws as singly and + collectively the product of self-evolution. Consequently, the word + "conceive," as used in the theistic argument, must be taken to mean our + ability to frame what we may term a <i>material</i> conception, or a + representation in thought of the whole history of cosmic evolution, which + representation shall be in some satisfactory degree intellectually + realisable. Observing, then, this important difference between an + inconceivability which arises from an impossibility of establishing + relations in thought between certain <i>abstract</i> or <i>symbolic</i> + conceptions, and an inconceivability which arises from a mere failure to + realise in imagination the results which must follow among external + relations if the symbolically conceivable combinations among them ever + took place, an atheist may here argue as follows; and it does not appear + that there is any legitimate escape from his reasonings.</p> + + <p>'I first consider the undoubted fact that the existence of a Supreme + Mind in nature is, scientifically considered, unnecessary; and, + therefore, that the only reason we require to entertain the supposition + of any such existence at all is, that the complexity of nature being so + great, we are unable adequately to conceive of its + self-evolution—notwithstanding our reason tells us plainly that, + given a self-existing universe of force and matter, and such + self-evolution becomes abstractedly possible. I then reflect that this is + a negative and not a positive ground of belief. If the hypothesis of + self-evolution is true, we should <i>à priori</i> expect that by the time + evolution had advanced sufficiently far to admit of the production of a + reasoning intelligence, the complexity of nature must be so great that + the nascent reasoning powers would be completely baffled in their + attempts to comprehend the various processes going on around them. This + seems to be about the state of things which we now experience. Still, as + reason advances more and more, we may expect, both from general <i>à + priori</i> principles and from particular historical analogies, that more + and more of the processes of nature will admit of being interpreted by + reason, and that in proportion as our ability to <i>understand</i> the + frame and the constitution of things progresses, so our ability to + <i>conceive</i> of them as all naturally and necessarily evolved will + likewise and concurrently progress. Thus, for example, how vast a number + of the most intricate and delicate correlations in nature have been + rendered at once intelligible and conceivably due to non-intelligent + causes, by the discovery of a single principle in nature—the + principle of natural selection.</p> + + <p>'In the adverse argument, conceivability is again made the + unconditional test of truth, just as it was in the argument against the + possibility of matter thinking. We reject the hypothesis of + self-evolution, not because it is the more remote one, but simply because + we experience a subjective incapacity adequately to frame the requisite + generalisations in thought, or to frame them with as much clearness as we + could wish. Yet our reason tells us as plainly as it tells us any general + truth which is too large to be presented in detail, that there is nothing + in the nature of things themselves, as far as we can see, antagonistic to + the supposition of their having been self-evolved. Only on the ground, + therefore, of our own intellectual deficiencies; only because as yet, by + the self-evolutionary hypothesis, the inner order does not completely + answer to the outer order; only because the number and complexity of + subjective relations have not yet been able to rival those of the + objective relations producing them; only on this ground do we refuse to + assent to the obvious deductions of our reason.<a name="footnotetag29" + href="#footnote29"><sup>[29]</sup></a></p> + + <p>'And here I may observe, further, that the presumption in favour of + atheism which these deductions establish is considerably fortified by + certain <i>à posteriori</i> considerations which we cannot afford to + overlook. In particular, I reflect that, as a matter of fact, the + theistic theory is born of highly suspicious parentage,—that + Fetichism, or the crudest form of the theory of personal agency in + external nature, admits of being easily traced to the laws of a primitive + psychology; that the step from this to Polytheism is easy; and that the + step from this to Monotheism is necessary. If it is objected to this view + that it does not follow that because some theories of personal agency + have proved themselves false, therefore all such theories must be + so—I answer, Unquestionably not; but the above considerations are + not adduced in order to <i>negative</i> the theistic theory: they are + merely adduced to show that the human mind has hitherto undoubtedly + exhibited an undue and a vicious tendency to interpret the objective + processes of nature in terms of its own subjective processes; and as we + can see quite well that the current theory of personal agency in nature, + whether or not true, is a necessary outcome of intellectual evolution, I + think that the fact of so abundant an historical analogy ought to be + allowed to lend a certain degree of antecedent suspicion to this + theory—although, of course, the suspicion is of a kind which would + admit of immediate destruction before any satisfactory positive evidence + in favour of the theory.<a name="footnotetag30" + href="#footnote30"><sup>[30]</sup></a></p> + + <p>'But what is 'the satisfactory positive evidence' that is offered me? + Nothing, save an alleged subjective incapacity on the part of my opponent + adequately to conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony as due to physical + causation alone. Now I have already commented on the weakness of his + position; but as my opponent will doubtless resort to the consideration + that inconceivability of an opposite is, after all, the best criterion of + truth which at any given stage of intellectual evolution is available, I + will now conclude my overthrow by pointing out that, even if we take the + argument from teleology in its widest possible sense—the argument, + I mean, from the general order and beauty of nature, as well as the gross + constituent part of it from design—even taking this argument in its + widest sense and upon its own ground (which ground, I presume, it is now + sufficiently obvious <i>can</i> only be that of the inconceivability of + its negation), I will conclude my examination of this argument by showing + that it is quite as inconceivable to predicate cosmic harmony an effect + of Intelligence, as it is to predicate it an effect of Non-intelligence; + and therefore that the argument from inconceivability admits of being + turned with quite as terrible a force upon Theism as it can be made to + exert upon Atheism.</p> + + <p>'"In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded and + accepted as quite believable are absolutely inconceivable. There is a + perpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but + pseud-ideas. No distinction is made between propositions that contain + real thoughts and propositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A + thinkable proposition is one of which the <i>two terms can be brought + together in consciousness under the relation said to exist between + them</i>. But very often, when the subject of a proposition has been + thought of as something known, and when the predicate of a proposition + has been thought of as something known, and when the relation alleged + between them has been thought of as a known relation, it is supposed that + the proposition itself has been thought. The thinking separately of the + elements of a proposition is mistaken for the thinking of them in the + combination which the proposition affirms. And hence it continually + happens that propositions which cannot be rendered into thought at all + are supposed to be not only thought but believed. The proposition that + Evolution is caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two terms are + separately intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relation of + effect and cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them together + in this relation.</p> + + <p>'"The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his own + states of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his own, + he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to + frame a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits under + which alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know + nothing of thought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to + the effects wrought by objects on me. A mental act is an unintelligible + phrase if I am not to regard it as an act in which states of + consciousness are severally known as like other states in the series that + has gone by, and in which the relations between them are severally known + as like past relations in the series. If, then, I have to conceive + evolution as caused by an 'originating Mind,' I must conceive this Mind + as having attributes akin to those of the only mind I know, and without + which I cannot conceive mind at all.</p> + + <p>'"I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by + asking how the 'originating Mind' is to be thought of as having states + produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these states, + and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective + result to another. I will simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the + 'originating Mind' the character absolutely essential to the conception + of mind, that it consists of a series of states of consciousness? Put a + series of states of consciousness as cause and the evolving universe as + effect, and then endeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I + find it possible to imagine in some dim way a series of states of + consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of the movements I see + going on; for my own states of consciousness are often indirectly the + antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt to think of such a + series as antecedent to <i>all</i> actions throughout the + universe—to the motions of the multitudinous stars throughout + space, to the revolutions of all their planets round them, to the + gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infinitely + multiplied physical processes going on in each of these suns and planets? + I cannot think of a single series of states of consciousness as causing + even the relatively small groups of actions going on over the earth's + surface. I cannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various winds + and the dissolving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the rivers, + and the grinding actions of all the glaciers; still less can I think of + it as antecedent to the infinity of processes simultaneously going on in + all the plants that cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to + crowded tropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that roam + among them, and the millions of millions of insects that buzz about them. + Even a single small set of these multitudinous terrestrial changes I + cannot conceive as antecedent a single series of states of + consciousness—cannot, for instance, think of it as causing the + hundred thousand breakers that are at this instant curling over on the + shores of England. How, then, is it possible for me to conceive an + 'originating Mind,' which I must represent to myself as a <i>single</i> + series of states of consciousness, working the infinitely multiplied sets + of changes <i>simultaneously</i> going on in worlds too numerous to + count, dispersed throughout a space that baffles imagination?</p> + + <p>'"If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere + going on, 'Mind must be conceived as there' 'under the guise of simple + Dynamics,' then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind must be + divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when + thus divested of its distinguishing attributes, the conception + disappears—the word Mind stands for a blank....</p> + + <p>'"Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an 'originating Mind' is + the cause of evolution is a proposition that can be entertained so long + only as no attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the + alleged relation. That it should be accepted as a matter of <i>faith</i> + may be a defensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should + be so accepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of + <i>understanding</i>—as a statement making the order of the + universe comprehensible—is a quite indefensible position."'<a + name="footnotetag31" href="#footnote31"><sup>[31]</sup></a></p> + + <p><a name="Sect47">§ 47</a>. We have now heard the pleading on both + sides of the ultimate issue to which it is possible that the argument + from teleology can ever be reduced. It therefore devolves on us very + briefly to adjudicate upon the contending opinions. And this it is not + difficult to do; for throughout the pleading on both sides I have been + careful to exclude all arguments and considerations which are not + logically valid. It is therefore impossible for me now to pass any + criticisms on the pleading of either side which have not already been + passed by the pleading of the other. But nevertheless, in my capacity of + an impartial judge, I feel it desirable to conclude this chapter with a + few general considerations.</p> + + <p>In the first place, I think that the theist's antecedent objection to + a scientific mode of reasoning on the score of its symbolism, may be + regarded as fairly balanced by the atheist's antecedent objection to a + metaphysical mode of reasoning on the score of its postulating an + unknowable cause. And it must be allowed that the force of this + antecedent objection is considerably increased by the reflection that the + <i>kind</i> of unknowable cause which is thus postulated is that which + the human mind has always shown an overweening tendency to postulate as a + cause of natural phenomena.</p> + + <p>I think, therefore, that neither disputant has the right to regard the + <i>à priori</i> standing of his opponent's theory as much more suspicious + than that of his own; for it is obvious that neither disputant has the + means whereby to estimate the actual value of these antecedent + objections.</p> + + <p>With regard, then, to the <i>à posteriori</i> evidence in favour of + the rival theories, I think that the final test of their + validity—<i>i.e.</i>, the inconceivability of their respective + negations—fails equally in the case of both theories; for in the + case of each theory any proposition which embodies it must itself contain + an infinite, <i>i.e.</i>, an inconceivable—term. Thus, whether we + speak of an Infinite Mind as the cause of evolution, or of evolution as + due to an infinite duration of physical processes, we are alike open to + the charge of employing unthinkable propositions.</p> + + <p>Hence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is + an eternity of matter and of force,<a name="footnotetag32" + href="#footnote32"><sup>[32]</sup></a> and the other an Infinite Mind, so + that in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; and + therefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon the + subject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the other + from an appeal to the test of inconceivability.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect47.1"></a></p> + + <p>Yet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more + ultimate. What then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion + concerning the rational standing of the teleological argument? The + answer, I think, to this question is, that in strict reasoning the + teleological argument, in its every shape, is inadequate to form a basis + of Theism; or, in other words, that the logical cogency of this argument + is insufficient to justify a wholly impartial mind in accepting the + theory of Theism on so insecure a foundation. Nevertheless, if the + further question were directly put to me, 'After having heard the + pleading both for and against the most refined expression of the argument + from teleology, with what degree of strictly rational probability do you + accredit it?'—I should reply as follows:—'The question which + you put I take to be a question which it is wholly impossible to answer, + and this for the simple reason that the degree of even rational + probability may here legitimately vary with the character of the mind + which contemplates it.' This statement, no doubt, sounds paradoxical; but + I think it is justified by the following considerations. When we say that + one proposition is more conceivable than another, we may mean either of + two very different things, and this quite apart from the distinction + previously drawn between symbolic conceptions and realisable conceptions. + For we may mean that one of the two propositions presents terms which + cannot possibly be rendered into thought at all in the relation which the + proposition alleges to subsist between them; or we may mean that one of + the two propositions presents terms in a relation which is more congruous + with the habitual tenor of our thoughts than does the other proposition. + Thus, as an example of the former usage, we may say, It is more + conceivable that two and two should make four than that two and two + should make five; and, as an example of the latter usage, we may say, It + is more conceivable that a man should be able to walk than that he should + be able to fly. Now, for the sake of distinction, I shall call the first + of these usages the test of <i>absolute</i> inconceivability, and the + second the test of <i>relative</i> inconceivability. Doubtless, when the + word "inconceivability" is used in the sense of relative + inconceivability, it is incorrectly used, unless it is qualified in some + way; because, if used without qualification, there is danger of its being + confused with inconceivability in its absolute sense. Nevertheless, if + used with some qualifying epithet, it becomes quite unexceptionable. For + the process of conception being in all cases the process of establishing + relations in thought, we may properly say, It is relatively more + conceivable that a man should walk than that a man should fly, since it + is <i>more easy</i> to establish, the necessary relations in thought in + the case of the former than in the case of the latter proposition. The + only difference, then, between what I have called absolute + inconceivability and what I have called relative inconceivability + consists in this—that while the latter admits of <i>degrees</i>, + the former does not.<a name="footnotetag33" + href="#footnote33"><sup>[33]</sup></a></p> + + <p>With this distinction clearly understood, I may now proceed to observe + that in everyday life we constantly apply the test of relative + inconceivability as a test of truth. And in the vast majority of cases + this test of relative inconceivability is, for all practical purposes, as + valid a test of truth as is the test of absolute conceivability. For as + every man is more or less in harmony with his environment, his habits of + thought with regard to his environment are for the most part stereotyped + correctly; so that the most ready and the most trustworthy gauge of + probability that he has is an immediate appeal to consciousness as to + whether he <i>feels</i> the probability. Thus every man learns for + himself to endow his own sense of probability with a certain undefined + but massive weight of authority. Now it is this test of relative + conceivability which all men apply in varying degrees to the question of + Theism. For if, from education and organised habits of thought, the + probability in this matter appears to a man to incline in a certain + direction, when this probability is called in question, the whole body of + this organised system of thought rises in opposition to the questioning, + and being individually conscious of this strong feeling of subjective + opposition, the man declares the sceptical propositions to be more + inconceivable to him than are the counter-propositions. And in so saying + he is, of course, perfectly right. Hence I conceive that the acceptance + or the rejection of metaphysical teleology as probable will depend + entirely upon individual habits of thought. The test of absolute + inconceivability making equally for and against the doctrine of Theism, + disputants are compelled to fall back on the test of relative + inconceivability; and as the direction in which the more inconceivable + proposition will here seem to lie will be determined by previous habits + of thought, it follows that while to a theist metaphysical teleology will + appear a probable argument, to an atheist it will appear an improbable + one. Thus to a theist it will no doubt appear more conceivable that the + Supreme Mind should be such that in some of its attributes it resembles + the human mind, while in other of its attributes—among which he + will place omnipresence, omnipotence, and directive agency—it + transcends the human mind as greatly as the latter "transcends mechanical + motion;" and therefore that although it is true, as a matter of logical + terminology, that we ought to designate such an entity "Not mind" or + "Blank," still, as a matter of psychology, we may come nearer to the + truth by assimilating in thought this entity with the nearest analogies + which experience supplies, than by assimilating it in thought with any + other entity—such as force or matter—which are felt to be in + all likelihood still more remote from it in nature. On the other hand, to + an atheist it will no doubt appear more conceivable, because more simple, + to accept the dogma of an eternal self-existence of something which we + call force and matter, and with this dogma to accept the implication of a + necessary self-evolution of cosmic harmony, than to resort to the + additional and no less inconceivable supposition of a self-existing Agent + which must be regarded both as Mind and as Not-mind at the same time. But + in both cases, in whatever degree this test of relative inconceivability + of a negative is held by the disputants to be valid in solving the + problem of Theism, in that degree is each man entitled to his respective + estimate of the probability in question. And thus we arrive at the + judgment that the rational probability of Theism legitimately varies with + the character of the mind which contemplates it. For, as the test of + absolute inconceivability is equally annihilative in whichever direction + it is applied, the test of relative inconceivability is the only one that + remains; and as the formal conditions of a metaphysical teleology are + undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formal conditions of a + physical explanation of cosmic harmony are no less undoubtedly present on + the other hand, it follows that a theist and an atheist have an equal + right to employ this test of relative inconceivability. And as there is + no more ultimate court of appeal whereby to decide the question than the + universe as a whole, each man has here an equal argumentative right to + abide by the decision which that court awards <i>to him + individually</i>—to accept whatever probability the sum-total of + phenomena appears to present to his particular understanding. And it is + needless to say that experience shows, even among well-informed and + accurate reasoners, how large an allowance must thus be made for personal + equations. To some men the facts of external nature seem to proclaim a + God with clarion voice, while to other men the same facts bring no + whisper of such a message. All, therefore, that a logician can here do is + to remark, that the individuals in each class—provided they bear in + mind the strictly <i>relative</i> character of their belief—have a + similar right to be regarded as holding a rational creed: the grounds of + belief in this case logically vary with the natural disposition and the + subsequent training of different minds.<a name="footnotetag34" + href="#footnote34"><sup>[34]</sup></a></p> + + <p>It only remains to show that disputants on either side are apt to + endow this test of relative inconceivability with far more than its real + logical worth. Being accustomed to apply this test of truth in daily + life, and there finding it a trustworthy test, most men are apt to forget + that its value as a test must clearly diminish in proportion to the + distance from experience at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to + be the case even with the test of absolute inconceivability (see <a + href="#ChapV">Chapter V.</a>), but much more must it be the case with + this test of relative inconceivability. For, without comment, it is + manifest that our acquired sense of probability, as distinguished from + our innate sense of possibility, with regard to any particular question + of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparable with its value in + the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which our sense of + probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although, + therefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain a + belief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally + entitled to be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in + whatever degree either party considers their belief as of a higher + validity than the grounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in + that degree must the members of that party be deemed irrational. In other + words, not only must a man be careful not to confuse the test of relative + inconceivability with that of absolute conceivability—not to + suppose that his sense of probability in this matter is determined by an + innate psychological inability to conceive a proposition, when in reality + it is only determined by the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have + long been habitually associated;—but he must also be careful to + remember that the test of relative inconceivability in this matter is + only valid as justifying a belief of the most diffident possible + kind.</p> + + <p>And from this the practical deduction is—tolerance. Let no man + think that he has any argumentative right to expect that the mere + subjective habit or tone of his own mind should exert any influence on + that of his fellow; but rather let him always remember that the only + legitimate weapons of his intellectual warfare are those the + <i>material</i> of which is derived from the external world, and only the + <i>form</i> of which is due to the forging process of his own mind. And + if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted on the hardened + armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardened armoury of + confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must not too + confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of his own + weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need we + all stand of this caution:—Knowing how greatly the value of + arguments is affected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame + of mind in which we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not + to over-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is + actually superior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is + surely needless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us + to bear in mind this further caution:—Knowing with what great + subjective opposition arguments are met when they conflict with our + established modes of thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard + the sanctuary of our judgment from the polluting tyranny of habit.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3><a name="ChapVII">CHAPTER VII</a>.</h3> + +<h4>GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.</h4> + + <p><a name="Sect48">§ 48</a>. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very + few words will here suffice to convey an epitomised recollection of the + numerous facts and conclusions which we have found it necessary to + contemplate. We first disposed of the conspicuously absurd supposition + that the origin of things, or the mystery of existence, admits of being + explained by the theory of Theism in any further degree than by the + theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the argument "Our heart + requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a subjective necessity, even + if made out, could not be sufficient to prove—or even to render + probable—an objective existence. And with regard to the further + argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations point to God as to + their explanatory cause, it became necessary to observe that the argument + could only be admissible after the possibility of the operation of + natural causes had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the + supposed intuitive necessity of individual thought was found to be + untenable, first, because, even if the supposed necessity were a real + one, it would only possess an individual applicability; and second, that, + as a matter of fact, it is extremely improbable that the supposed + necessity is a real necessity even for the individual who asserts it, + while it is absolutely certain that it is not such to the vast majority + of the race. The argument from the general consent of mankind, being so + obviously fallacious both as to facts and principles, was passed over + without comment; while the argument from a first cause was found to + involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument that, as human volition + is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is probably volitional in + character, was shown to consist in a stretch of inference so outrageous + that the argument had to be pronounced worthless.</p> + + <p>Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in favour of + Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds are caused + by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our mind is + caused by an unknown mind,—is a syllogism that is inadmissible for + two reasons. In the first place, "it does not account for mind (in the + abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin;" and therefore, + although the hypothesis, if admitted, would be <i>an</i> explanation of + <i>known</i> mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of the + unknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of that + explanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so far + an entity <i>sui generis</i> that it must be either self-existing or + caused by another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. + And this is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything + within the whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, + be competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector + to the above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but + even as opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above + syllogism has not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know + that what we call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while + we have no corresponding evidence of a "mind that is even apparently + eternal." Further, within experience mind is invariably associated with + highly differentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, + and many facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the + grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associated + with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus both a + qualitative and a quantitative relation between intelligence and cerebral + organisation. And if it is said that matter and motion cannot produce + consciousness because it is inconceivable that they should, we have seen + at some length that this is no conclusive consideration as applied to a + subject of a confessedly transcendental nature, and that in the present + case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it is speculatively + certain that the substance of mind must be unknowable, it seems <i>à + priori</i> probable that, whatever is the cause of the unknowable + reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into thought in + that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which is + imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the <i>more</i> + conceivable cause is the <i>more</i> probable cause, we have seen that it + is in this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. + Lastly, the statement that the cause must contain actually all that its + effects can contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and + contradicted by everyday experience; while the argument from the supposed + freedom of the will and the existence of the moral sense was negatived + both deductively by the theory of evolution, and inductively by the + doctrine of utilitarianism. On the whole, then, with regard to the + argument from the existence of the human mind, we were compelled to + decide that it is destitute of any assignable weight, there being nothing + more to lead to the conclusion that our mind has been caused by another + mind, than to the conclusion that it has been caused by anything else + whatsoever.</p> + + <p>With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that Mill's + presentation of it is merely a resuscitation of the argument as presented + by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers. And indeed we saw that the first-named + writer treated this whole subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy very + surprising in him; for while he has failed to assign anything like due + weight to the inductive evidence of organic evolution, he did not + hesitate to rush into a supernatural explanation of biological phenomena. + Moreover, he has failed signally in his <i>analysis</i> of the Design + argument, seeing that, in common with all previous writers, he failed to + observe that it is utterly impossible for us to know the relations in + which the supposed Designer stands to the Designed,—much less to + argue from the fact that the Supreme Mind, even supposing it to exist, + caused the observable products by any particular intellectual + <i>process</i>. In other words, all advocates of the Design argument have + failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be due to a creating + Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that this Mind can + only have exerted its creative power by means of such and such cogitative + operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise the supposed + evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of the existence of + a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after all, of very + little importance whether or not we are able to divine the <i>methods</i> + of creation, so long as the <i>facts</i> are there to attest that, <i>in + some way or other</i>, the observable phenomena of nature must be due to + Intelligence of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the first to + endorse this remark. It has always appeared to me one of the most + unaccountable things in the history of speculation that so many competent + writers can have insisted upon <i>Design</i> as an argument for Theism, + when they must all have known perfectly well that they have no means of + ascertaining the subjective psychology of that Supreme Mind whose + existence the argument is adduced to demonstrate. The truth is, that the + argument from teleology must, and can only, rest upon the observable + <i>facts</i> of nature, without reference to the intellectual + <i>processes</i> by which these facts may be supposed to have been + accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this + is merely to change the teleological argument from its gross Paleyerian + form, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws. + And we saw that this transformation is now a rational necessity. How far + the great principle of natural selection may have been instrumental in + the evolution of organic forms, is not here, as Mill erroneously + imagined, the question; the question is simply as to whether we are to + accept the theory of special creation or the theory of organic evolution. + And forasmuch as no competent judge at the present time can hesitate for + one moment in answering this question, the argument from a proximate + teleology must be regarded as no longer having any rational + existence.</p> + + <p>How then does it fare with the last of the arguments—the + argument from an ultimate teleology? Doubtless at first sight this + argument seems a very powerful one, inasmuch as it is a generic argument, + which embraces not only biological phenomena, but all the phenomena of + the universe. But nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its + apparent power dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, + if force and matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must + have resulted by way of necessary consequence. It will be remembered that + I dwelt at considerable length and with much earnestness upon this truth, + not only because of its enormous importance in its bearing upon our + subject, but also because no one has hitherto considered it in that + relation.</p> + + <p>The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the conclusion + that was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless collapse of all + the possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully demonstrated + that there is no shadow of a positive argument in support of the theistic + theory, there arose the danger that some persons might erroneously + conclude that for this reason the theistic theory must be untrue. It + therefore became necessary to point out, that although, as far as we can + see, nature does not require an Intelligent Cause to account for any of + her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we could see farther, we + should see that nature could not be what she is unless she had owed her + existence to an Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words, the probability + there is that an Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to explain any of the + phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probability there is that the + doctrine of the persistence of force is everywhere and eternally + true.</p> + + <p>As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the + region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science, + and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the discussion + into the transcendental region of purely formal considerations. And here + we laid down the canon, "that the value of any probability, in its last + analysis, is determined by the number, the importance, and the + definiteness of the relations known, as compared with those of the + relations unknown;" and, consequently, that in cases where the unknown + relations are more numerous, more important, or more indefinite than are + the known relations, the value of our inference varies inversely as the + difference in these respects between the relations compared. From which + canon it followed, that as the problem of Theism is the most ultimate of + all problems, and so contains in its unknown relations all that is to man + unknown and unknowable, these relations must be pronounced the most + indefinite of all relations that it is possible for man to contemplate; + and, consequently, that although we have here the entire range of + experience from which to argue, we are unable to estimate the real value + of any argument whatsoever. The unknown relations in our attempted + induction being wholly indefinite, both in respect of their number and + importance, as compared with the known relations, it is impossible for us + to determine any definite probability either for or against the being of + a God. Therefore, although it is true that, so far as human science can + penetrate or human thought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God, yet + we have no right on this account to conclude that there is no God. The + probability, therefore, that nature is devoid of Deity, while it is of + the strongest kind if regarded scientifically—amounting, in fact, + to a scientific demonstration,—is nevertheless wholly worthless if + regarded logically. Notwithstanding it is as true as is the fundamental + basis of all science and of all experience that, if there is a God, his + existence, considered as a cause of the universe, is superfluous, it may + nevertheless be true that, if there had never been a God, the universe + could never have existed.</p> + + <p>Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter + how great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative + sense, we have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute + sense. From which position there emerged the possibility of another + argument in favour of Theism—or rather let us say, of a + reappearance of the teleological argument in another form. For it may be + said, seeing that these formal considerations exclude legitimate + reasoning either for or against Deity in an absolute sense, while they do + not exclude such reasoning in a relative sense, if there yet remain any + theistic deductions which may properly be drawn from experience, these + may now be adduced to balance the atheistic deductions from the + persistence of force. For although the latter deductions have clearly + shown the existence of Deity to be superfluous in a scientific sense, the + formal considerations in question have no less clearly opened up beyond + the sphere of science a possible <i>locus</i> for the existence of Deity; + so that if there are any facts supplied by experience for which the + atheistic deductions appear insufficient to account, we are still free to + account for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of Theism. And, it + may be urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in the correlation + of general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It signifies + nothing, the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the methods + whereby the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor does + it signify that its operation must now be relegated to a super-scientific + province. What does signify is that, taking a general view of nature, we + find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of her + harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation. Now + this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be remembered, + I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to distinguish it + from all previous forms of that argument, which, in contradistinction I + denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction, it will be + remembered, consisted in this—that while all previous forms of + teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible reach + of science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific + refutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis + which is clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be + susceptible of scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system + of teleology does rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it + accepts the most ultimate truths of which science can ever be + cognisant—viz., the persistence of force and the consequently + necessary genesis of natural law,—it nevertheless maintains that + the necessity of regarding Mind as the ultimate cause of things is not on + this account removed; and, therefore, that if science now requires the + operation of a Supreme Mind to be posited in a super-scientific sphere, + then in a super-scientific sphere it ought to be posited. No doubt this + hypothesis at first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as + science can penetrate, there is no need of any such hypothesis at + all—cosmic harmony resulting as a physically necessary consequence + from the combined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a + physically necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the + primary qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true + that metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered + scientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if + considered psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable + that Mind should be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the + persistence of force should be so, then it is not irrational to accept + the more conceivable hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable + one, provided that the choice is made with the diffidence which is + required by the considerations adduced in <a href="#ChapV">Chapter + V.</a></p> + + <p>I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, + although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense + legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this + argument can rest—viz., the position that the fundamental postulate + of Atheism is more <i>inconceivable</i> than is the fundamental postulate + of Theism—we have seen two important objections to lie.</p> + + <p>For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" + is here used is that of the impossibility of framing <i>realisable</i> + relations in the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing + <i>abstract</i> relations in thought. In the same sense, though in a + lower degree, it is true that the complexity of the human organisation + and its functions is inconceivable; but in this sense the word + "inconceivable" has much less weight in an argument than it has in its + true sense. And, without waiting again to dispute (as we did in the case + of the speculative standing of Materialism) how far even the genuine test + of inconceivability ought to be allowed to make against an inference + which there is a body of scientific evidence to substantiate, we went on + to the second objection against this fundamental position of metaphysical + teleology. This objection, it will be remembered, was, that it is as + impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as an effect of Mind, as it is + to conceive of it as an effect of mindless evolution. The argument from + inconceivability, therefore, admits of being turned with quite as + terrible an effect on Theism, as it can possibly be made to exert on + Atheism.</p> + + <p>Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, + and which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of + Theism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its + metaphysical character it has escaped the opposition of physical science, + only to encounter a new opposition in the region of pure psychology to + which it fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry, therefore, it + devolved on us to determine the relative magnitudes of these opposing + forces. And in doing this we first observed that, if the supporters of + metaphysical teleology objected <i>à priori</i> to the method whereby the + genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of the persistence of + force, in that this method involved an unrestricted use of illegitimate + symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to an atheist to object + <i>à priori</i> to the method whereby a directing Mind was inferred from + the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involved the population + of an unknowable cause,—and this of a character which the whole + history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibit an + overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena. On + these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as their respective + standing <i>à priori</i> is concerned, both theories may be regarded as + about equally suspicious. And similar with regard to their standing <i>à + posteriori</i>; for as both theories require to embody at least one + infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely + inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the + two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a + question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of + absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a + man wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by + what I have designated relative inconceivability—<i>i.e.</i>, in + accordance with the verdict given by his individual sense of probability + as determined by his previous habits of thought. And forasmuch as the + test of relative inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately + to vary with the character of the mind which applies it, the strictly + rational probability of the question to which it is applied varies in + like manner. Or, otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man in + this matter is either to discipline himself into an attitude of pure + scepticism, and thus to refuse in thought to entertain either a + probability or an improbability concerning the existence of a God; or + else to incline in thought towards an affirmation or a negation of God, + according as his previous habits of thought have rendered such an + inclination more facile in the one direction than in the other. And + although, under such circumstances, I should consider that man the more + rational who carefully suspended his judgment, I conclude that if this + course is departed from, neither the metaphysical teleologist nor the + scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over the other in + respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a metaphysical + teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formal + conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on the + other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein the + pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be + made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.</p> + + <p>Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the abstract + nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which at the + present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the confusing + amount of good, bad, and indifferent literature on both sides of the + controversy which is extant;—considering these things, I do not + think that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the + score of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, when + traditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted and so + commonly concluded, as a matter of course, to have a large and valid + basis of induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of + this short essay, by showing how very concise the scientific + <i>status</i> of the subject really is, will do more to settle the minds + of most readers as to the exact standing at the present time of all the + probabilities of the question, than could a perusal of all the rest of + the literature upon this subject. And, looking to the present condition + of speculative philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to + have clearly shown that the advance of science has now entitled us to + assert, without the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in + nature is as certainly superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of + nature, as the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and the + indestructibility of matter is certainly true.</p> + + <p>On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical + aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite as + has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter which + does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of necessity be + left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears this + consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly complain of my + not having done my utmost in this case to define as sharply as possible + the character and the limits of this margin.</p> + + <p><a name="Sect49">§ 49</a>. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is + desirable to state that any antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I + individually possess is unquestionably on the side of traditional + beliefs. It is therefore with the utmost sorrow that I find myself + compelled to accept the conclusions here worked out; and nothing would + have induced me to publish them, save the strength of my conviction that + it is the duty of every member of society to give his fellows the benefit + of his labours for whatever they may he worth. Just as I am confident + that truth must in the end be the most profitable for the race, so I am + persuaded that every individual endeavour to attain it, provided only + that such endeavour is unbiassed and sincere, ought without hesitation to + be made the common property of all men, no matter in what direction the + results of its promulgation may appear to tend. And so far as the + ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can have a more + lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency of my + work. So far as I am individually concerned, the result of this analysis + has been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the + lower plane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of + purely formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to + stifle all belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to + discipline my intellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of + the purest scepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree + with those who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a + desirable substitute for the waning splendour of "the old," I am not + ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to + me has lost its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the + precept to "work while it is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified + force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words that "the night + cometh when no man can work," yet when at times I think, as think at + times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of + that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as + now I find it,—at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to + avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible. For whether it + be due to my intelligence not being sufficiently advanced to meet the + requirements of the age, or whether it be due to the memory of those + sacred associations which to me at least were the sweetest that life has + given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for others who think as I do, + there is a dreadful truth in those words of Hamilton,—Philosophy + having become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation, the + precept <i>know thyself</i> has become transformed into the terrific + oracle to Œdipus—</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>"Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."</p> + </div> + </div> + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h2>APPENDIX</h2> + +<h4>AND</h4> + +<h2>SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.</h2> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + + <p><a name="Appendix"></a></p> + +<h2>APPENDIX.</h2> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="short" /> + +<h4>A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF A FALLACY IN LOCKE'S +USE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY +OF MATTER THINKING ON GROUNDS OF +ITS BEING INCONCEIVABLE THAT IT SHOULD.</h4> + + <p>Lest it should be thought that I am doing injustice to the views of + this illustrious theist, I here quote his own words:—"We have the + ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know + whether any mere material being thinks or no, it being impossible for us, + by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover + whether omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly + disposed a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to + matter so disposed a thinking immaterial substance; it being, in respect + of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive + that God can, if He pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, + than that He should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of + thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort + of substance the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which + cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and + bounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction in it that the first + eternal thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of + created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of + sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have proved, lib. + iv., ch. 10 and 14, &c., it is no less than a contradiction to + suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and + thought) should be that eternal first-thinking being. What certainty of + knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such as, <i>e.g.</i>, + pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a + certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an + immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as far + as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body; and + motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce + nothing but motion: so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, + or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go + beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our + Maker. For since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we + can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to + conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject + we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot + conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, + that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality, + &c.... It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of + our knowledge; and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and + look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce + find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's + materiality. Since on which side soever he views it, either as an + unextended substance or as a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to + conceive either will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still drive + him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some men take with + themselves, who, because of the inconceivableness of something they find + in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though + altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding."</p> + + <p>This passage, I do not hesitate to say, is one of the most remarkable + in the whole range of philosophical literature, in respect of showing how + even the strongest and most candid intellect may have its reasoning + faculty impaired by the force of a preformed conviction. Here we have a + mind of unsurpassed penetration and candour, which has left us side by + side two parallel trains of reasoning. In the one, the object is to show + that the author's preformed conviction as to the being of a God is + justifiable on grounds of reason; in the other, the object is to show + that, granting the existence of a God, and it is not impossible that he + may have endowed matter with the faculty of thinking. Now, in the former + train of reasoning, the whole proof rests entirely upon the fact that "it + is impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should + produce a thinking intelligent being." Clearly, if this proposition is + true, it must destroy one or other of the trains of reasoning; for it is + common to them both, and in one of them it is made the sole ground for + concluding that matter cannot think, while in the other it is made + compatible with the supposition that matter may think. This extraordinary + inconsistency no doubt arose from the fact that the author was + antecedently persuaded of the existence of an <i>Omnipotent</i> Mind, and + having been long accustomed in his intellectual symbols to regard it + presumptuous in him to impose any limitations on this almighty power, + when he asked himself whether it would be possible for this almighty + power, if it so willed, to endow matter with the faculty of thinking, he + argued that it might be possible, notwithstanding his being unable to + conceive the possibility. But when he banished from his mind the idea of + this personal and almighty power, and with that idea banished all its + associations, he then felt that he had a right to argue more freely, and + forthwith made his conceptive faculty a test of abstract possibility. Yet + <i>the sum total of abstract possibility, in relation to him, must have + been the same in the two cases</i>; so that in whichever of the two + trains of reasoning his argument was sound, in the other it must + certainly have been null.</p> + + <p>We may well feel amazed that so able a thinker can have fallen into so + obvious an error, and afterwards have persisted in it through pages and + pages of his work. It will be instructive, however, to those who rely + upon Locke's exposition of the argument from Inconceivability to see how + effectually he has himself destroyed it. For this purpose, therefore, I + shall make some further quotations from the same train of reasoning. The + statement of Locke's opinion that the Almighty could endow matter with + the faculty of thinking if He so willed, called down some remonstrances + and rebukes from the then Bishop of Worcester. Locke's reply was a very + lengthy one, and from it the following extracts are taken. I merely + request the reader throughout to substitute for the words God, Creator, + Almighty, Omipotency, &c., the words <i>Summum genus</i> of + Possibility.</p> + + <p>"But it is further urged that we cannot conceive how matter can think. + I grant it, but to argue from thence that God therefore cannot give to + matter a faculty of thinking is to say God's omnipotency is limited to a + narrow compass because man's understanding is so, and brings down God's + infinite power to the size of our capacities....</p> + + <p>"If God can give no power to any parts of matter but what men can + account for from the essence of matter in general; if all such qualities + and properties must destroy the essence, or change the essential + properties of matter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we + cannot conceive to be the natural consequence of that essence; it is + plain that the essence of matter is destroyed, and its essential + properties changed, in most of the sensible parts of this our system. For + it is visible that all the planets have revolutions about certain remote + centres, which I would have any one explain or make conceivable by the + bare essence, or natural powers depending on the essence of matter in + general, without something added to that essence which we cannot + conceive; for the moving of matter in a crooked line, or the attraction + of matter by matter, is all that can be said in the case; either of which + it is above our reach to derive from the essence of matter or body in + general, though one of these two must unavoidably be allowed to be + superadded, in this instance, to the essence of matter in general. The + omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the making of the world, and + His ways are not the less excellent because they are past finding + out....</p> + + <p>"In all such cases, the superinducement of greater perfections and + nobler qualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that were + there before, unless there can be showed a manifest repugnancy between + them; but all the proof offered for that is only that we cannot conceive + how matter, without such superadded perfections, can produce such + effects; which is, in truth, no more than to say matter in general, or + every part of matter, as matter, has them not, but is no reason to prove + that God, if He pleases, cannot superadd them to some parts of matter, + unless it can be proved to be a contradiction that God should give to + some parts of matter qualities and perfections which matter in general + has not, though we cannot conceive how matter is invested with them, or + how it operates by virtue of those new endowments; nor is it to be + wondered that we cannot, whilst we limit all its operations to those + qualities it had before, and would explain them by the known properties + of matter in general, without any such induced perfections. For if this + be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing to be because we cannot + conceive the manner how it comes to be, I shall desire them who use it to + stick to this rule, and see what work it will make both in divinity as + well as philosophy, and whether they can advance anything more in favour + of scepticism.</p> + + <p>"For to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking and + self-motion bestowed by omnipotent power in some parts of matter: the + objection to this is, I cannot conceive how matter should think. What is + the consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this + stand for a good reason, and then proceed in other cases by the same.</p> + + <p>"You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance, + much less at the distance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it + such a power: you cannot conceive how matter should feel or move itself, + or affect any material being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it + such powers: which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution of + the planets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, without sense or + spontaneous motion; and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary + motion.</p> + + <p>"Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an + extended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it + think: can you conceive how your own soul or any substance thinks? You + find, indeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how + the action of thinking is performed: this, I confess, is beyond my + conception; and I would be glad any one who conceives it would explain it + to me.</p> + + <p>"God, I find, has given me this faculty; and since I cannot but be + convinced of His power in this instance, which, though I every moment + experience in myself, yet I cannot conceive the manner of, what would it + be less than an insolent absurdity to deny His power in other like cases, + only for this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?...</p> + + <p>"That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at + the same time, I think with due reverence [diffidence?<a + name="footnotetag35" href="#footnote35"><sup>[35]</sup></a>] we may say; + but that a solid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and + powers, which have no natural or visibly necessary connection with + solidity and extension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and + know nothing) to be positive in.</p> + + <p>"If God cannot join things together by connections inconceivable to + us, we must deny even the consistency and being of matter itself; since + every particle of it having some bulk, has its parts connected by ways + inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raised against + the thinking of matter, from our ignorance or narrow conceptions, stand + not at all in the way of the power of God, if He pleases to ordain it so; + nor prove anything against His having actually endowed some parcels of + matter, so disposed as He thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it + can he shown that it contains a contradiction to suppose it.</p> + + <p>"Though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general, in + the foregoing discourse I have spoke of sense in brutes as distinct from + thinking; because your lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in + brutes. But here I take liberty to observe, that if your lordship allows + brutes to have sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth + give to some parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking, or + that all animals have immaterial, and consequently, according to your + lordship, immortal souls, as well as men; and to say that fleas and + mites, &c., have immortal souls as well as men, will possibly be + looked on as going a great way to serve an hypothesis....</p> + + <p>"It is true, I say, 'That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing + else,' and so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way + of their operation. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. + Newton's incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit + God's power in this point by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of + matter towards matter, by way unconceivable to me, is not only a + demonstration that God can, if He pleases, put into bodies powers and + ways of operation above what can be derived from our idea of body, or can + be explained by what we know of matter, but also an unquestionable and + everywhere visible instance that He has done so. And therefore, in the + next edition of my book, I will take care to have that passage + rectified....</p> + + <p>"As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks, 'What is there like + self-consciousness in matter?' Nothing at all in matter as matter. But + that God cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and + with it self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking how is it + possible to apprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth + perceive? The weakness of our apprehension I grant in the case: I confess + as much as you please, that we cannot conceive how an unsolid created + substance thinks; but this weakness of our apprehension reaches not the + power of God, whose weakness is stronger than anything in man."</p> + + <p>Lastly, Locke turns upon his opponent the power of the <i>odium + theologicum</i>.</p> + + <p>"Let it be as hard a matter as it will to give an account what it is + that should keep the parts of a material soul together after it is + separated from the body, yet it will be always as easy to give an account + of it as to give an account what it is that shall keep together a + material and immaterial substance. And yet the difficulty that there is + to give an account of that, I hope, does not, with your lordship, weaken + the credibility of the inseparable union of soul and body to eternity; + and I persuade myself that the men of sense, to whom your lordship + appeals in this case, do not find their belief of this fundamental point + much weakened by that difficulty.... But you will say, you speak only of + the soul; and your words are, that it is no easy matter to give an + account how the soul should be capable of immortality unless it be a + material substance. I grant it, but crave leave to say, that there is not + any one of these difficulties that are or can be raised about the manner + how a material soul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the + immortality of the body....</p> + + <p>"But your lordship, as I guess from your following words, would argue + that a material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby I suppose you + only mean that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance should + begin, stop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, + that when you can make it conceivable how any created, finite, dependent + substance can move itself, I suppose you will find it no harder for God + to bestow this power on a solid than an unsolid created substance.... But + though you cannot see how any created substance, solid or not solid, can + be a free agent (pardon me, my lord, if I put in both, till your lordship + please to explain it of either, and show the manner how either of them + can of itself move itself or anything else), yet I do not think you will + so far deny men to be free agents, from the difficulty there is to see + how they are free agents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough + for the day of judgment."</p> + + <p>Let us now, for the sake of contrast, turn to some passages which + occur in the other train of reasoning.</p> + + <p>"If we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can + never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either + with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, + perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, + perception, and knowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from + matter and every particle of it." There is a double fallacy here. In the + first place, conceivability is made the unconditional test of + possibility; and, in the next place, it is asserted that unless every + particle of matter can think, no collocation of such particles can + possibly do so. This latter fallacy is further insisted upon + thus:—"If they will not allow matter as matter, that is, every + particle of matter, to be as well cogitative as extended, they will have + as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative being out of + incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts, if + I may so speak.... Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all + the same figures and motions of any other, and I challenge any one in his + thoughts to add anything else to one above another." Now, as we have + seen, Locke himself has shown in his other trains of argument that this + challenge is thoroughly futile as a refutation of possibilities; but the + point to which I now wish to draw attention is this—It does not + follow because certain and highly complex collocations of material + particles may be supposed capable of thinking, that therefore every + particle of matter must be regarded as having this attribute. We have + innumerable analogies in nature of a certain collocation of matter and + force producing certain results which another somewhat similar + collocation could not produce: in such cases we do not assume that all + the resulting attributes of the one collocation must be presented also by + the other—still less that these resulting attributes must belong to + the primary qualities of matter and force. Hence, it is not fair to + assume that thought must either be inherent in every particle of matter, + or else not producible by any possible collocation of such particles, + unless it has previously been shown that so to produce it by any possible + collocation is in the nature of things impossible. But no one could + refute this fallacy better than Locke himself has done in some of the + passages already quoted from his other train of reasoning.</p> + + <p>But to continue the quotation:—"If, therefore, it be evident + that something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as + evident that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being; for + it is as impossible [<i>inconceivable</i>] that incogitative matter + should produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of + all being, should produce a positive being or matter." Again,—"For + unthinking particles of matter, however put together, can have [<i>can be + taught to have</i>] nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of + position, which it is impossible [<i>inconceivable</i>] should give + thought and knowledge to them."</p> + + <p>It is unnecessary to multiply these quotations, for, in effect, they + would all be merely repetitions of one another. It is enough to have seen + that this able author undertakes to demonstrate the existence of a God, + and that his whole demonstration resolves itself into the unwarrantable + inference, that as we are unable to conceive how thought can be a + property of matter, therefore a property of matter thought cannot be. + That such an erroneous inference should occur in any writings of so old a + date as those of Locke is not in itself surprising. What is surprising is + the fact, that in the same writings, and in the course of the same + discussion, the fallacy of this very inference is repeatedly pointed out + and insisted upon in a great variety of ways; and it has been chiefly for + the sake of showing the pernicious influence which preformed opinion may + exert—viz., even to blinding the eyes of one of the most + clear-sighted and thoughtful men that ever lived to a glaring + contradiction repeated over and over again in the course of a few + pages,—it has been chiefly for this reason that I have extended + this Appendix to so great a length. I shall now conclude it by quoting + some sentences which occur on the very next page after that from which + the last quoted sentences were taken. Our author here again returns to + his defence of the omnipotency of God; and as he now again thus + personifies the sum total of possibility, his mind abruptly reverts to + all its other class of associations. In this case the transition is + particularly interesting, not only on account of its suddenness, but also + because the correlations contemplated happen to be exactly the same in + the two cases—viz., matter as the cause of mind, and mind as the + cause of matter. Remember that on the last page this great philosopher + supposed he had demonstrated the abstract impossibility of matter being + the cause of mind on the ground of a causal connection being + inconceivable, let us now observe what he says upon this page regarding + the abstract possibility of mind being the cause of matter. "Nay, + possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise + our thoughts as far as they would reach to a closer contemplation of + things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how + matter might at first be made and begin to exist by the power of that + eternal first being.... But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit + of the making anything out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive + it? I answer—No; because it is not reasonable to deny the power of + an infinite being [this phrase, in the absence of hypothesis, + <i>i.e.</i>, in Locke's other train of reasoning, is of course equivalent + to the sum-total of possibility] because we cannot comprehend its + operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we + cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot + conceive how anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is + not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant + experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, + which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our minds, + and are not, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of + the blind matter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in + our power or choice to alter it. For example, my right hand writes, + whilst my left hand is still: what causes rest in one and motion in the + other? Nothing but my will, a thought in my mind; my thought only + changing, the right hand rests, and the left hands moves. This is matter + of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this and make it intelligible, + and then the next step will be to understand creation."<a + name="footnotetag36" href="#footnote36"><sup>[36]</sup></a></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + + <p><a name="SuppEssI"></a></p> + +<h2>SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.</h2> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="short" /> + +<h3>I.</h3> + +<h3>COSMIC THEISM.<a name="footnotetag37" href="#footnote37"><sup>[37]</sup></a></h3> + + <p>Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable is a doctrine of so + much speculative importance, that it behoves all students of philosophy + to have clear views respecting its character and implications. Mr. + Spencer has himself so fully explained the character of this doctrine, + that no attentive reader can fail to understand it; but concerning those + of its implications which may be termed theological—as + distinguished from religious—Mr. Spencer is silent. Within the last + two or three years, however, there has appeared a valuable work by an + able exponent of the new philosophy; and in this work the writer, + adopting his master's teaching of the Unknowable, proceeds to develop it + into a definite system of what may be termed scientific theology. And not + only so, but he assures the world that this system of scientific theology + is the highest, the purest, and the most ennobling form of religion that + mankind has ever been privileged to know in the past, or, from the nature + of the case, can ever be destined to know in the future. It is a system, + we are told, wherein the most fundamental truths of Theism are taught as + necessary deductions from the highest truths of Science; it is a system + wherein no single doctrine appeals for its acceptance to any principle of + blind or credulous faith, but wherein every doctrine can be fully + justified by the searching light of reason; it is a system wherein the + noblest of our aspirations and the most sublime of our emotions are able + to find an object far more worthy and much more glorious than has ever + been supplied to them by any of the older forms of Theism; and it is a + system, therefore, in which, with a greatly enlarged and intensified + meaning, we may worship God, and all that is within us bless His holy + name. Assuredly a proclamation such as this, emanating from the most + authoritative expounders of modern thought, as the highest and the + greatest result to which a rigorous philosophic synthesis has led, is a + proclamation which cannot fail to arrest our most serious attention. Nay, + may it not do more than this? May it not appeal to hearts which long have + ceased to worship? May it not once more revive a hope—long + banished, perhaps, but still the dearest which our poor natures have + experienced—that somewhere, sometime, or in some way, it may yet be + possible to feel that God is not far from any one of us? For to those who + have known the anguish of a shattered faith, it will not seem so childish + that our hearts should beat the quicker when we once more hear a voice + announcing to a world of superstitious idolaters—"Whom ye + ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you." But if, when we have + listened to the glad tidings of the new gospel, we find that the + preacher, though apparently in earnest, is not worthy to be heard again + on this matter; and if, as we turn away, our eyes grow dim with the + memory of a vanished dream, surely we may feel that the preacher is + deserving of our blame for obtruding thus upon the most sacred of our + sorrows.</p> + + <p>Mr. John Fiske is, as is well known, an author who unites in himself + the qualities of a well-read student of philosophy, a clear and accurate + thinker, a thorough master of the principles which in his recent work he + undertakes to explain and to extend, and a writer gifted in a remarkable + degree with the power of lucid exposition. Such being the intellectual + calibre of the man who elaborates this new system of scientific theology, + I confess that, on first seeing his work, I experienced a faint hope + that, in the higher departments of the Philosophy of Evolution as + conceived by Mr. Spencer and elaborated by his disciple, there might be + found some rational justification for an attenuated form of Theism. But + on examination I find that the bread which these fathers have offered us + turns out to be a stone; and thinking that it is desirable to warn other + of the children—whether of the family Philosophical or + Theological—against swallowing on trust a morsel so injurious, I + shall endeavour to point out what I conceive to be the true nature of + "Cosmic Theism."</p> + + <p>Starting from the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, Mr. Fiske, + following Mr. Spencer, proceeds to show how the doctrine implies that + there must be a mode of Being to which human knowledge is non-relative. + Or, in other words, he shows that the postulation of phenomena + necessitates the further postulation of noumena of which phenomena are + the manifestations. Now what may we affirm of noumena without departing + from a scientific or objective mode of philosophising? We may affirm at + least this much of noumena, that they constitute a mode of existence + which need not necessarily vanish were our consciousness to perish; and, + therefore, that they now stand out of necessary relation to our + consciousness. Or, in other words, so far as human consciousness is + concerned, noumena must be regarded as absolute. "But now, what do we + mean by this affirmation of absolute reality independent of the + conditions of the process of knowing? Do we mean to ... affirm, in + language savouring strongly of scholasticism, that beneath the phenomena + which we call subjective there is an occult substratum Mind, and beneath + the phenomena which we call objective there is an occult substratum + Matter? Our conclusion cannot be stated in any such form.... Our + conclusion is simply this, that no theory of phenomena, external or + internal, can be framed without postulating an Absolute Existence of + which phenomena are the manifestations. And now let us carefully note + what follows. We cannot identify this Absolute Existence with Mind, since + what we know as Mind is a series of phenomenal manifestations.... Nor can + we identify this Absolute Existence with Matter, since what we know as + Matter is a series of phenomenal manifestations.... Absolute Existence, + therefore,—the Reality which persists independently of us, and of + which Mind and Matter are the phenomenal manifestations,—cannot be + identified either with Mind or with Matter. Thus is Materialism included + in the same condemnation with Idealism.... See then how far we have + travelled from the scholastic theory of occult substrata underlying each + group of phenomena. These substrata were but the ghosts of the phenomena + themselves; behind the tree or the mountain a sort of phantom tree or + mountain, which persists after the body of perception has gone away with + the departure of the percipient mind. Clearly this is no scientific + interpretation of the facts, but is rather a specimen of naïve barbaric + thought surviving in metaphysics. The tree or mountain being groups of + phenomena, what we assert as persisting independently of the percipient + mind is a something which we are unable to condition either as tree or as + mountain.</p> + + <p>"And now we come down to the very bottom of the problem. Since we do + postulate Absolute Existence, and do not postulate a particular occult + substance underlying each group of phenomena, are we to be understood as + implying that there is a single Being of which all phenomena, internal + and external to consciousness, are manifestations? Such must seem to be + the inevitable conclusion, since we are able to carry on thinking at all + only under the relations of Difference and No-difference.... It may seem + that, since we cannot attribute to the Absolute Reality any relations of + Difference, we must positively ascribe to it No-difference. Or, what is + the same thing, in refusing to predicate multiplicity of it, do we not + virtually predicate of it unity? We do, simply because we cannot think + without so doing."<a name="footnotetag38" + href="#footnote38"><sup>[38]</sup></a></p> + + <p>A single Absolute Reality being thus posited, our author proceeds, + towards the close of his work, to argue that as this Reality cannot be + conceived as limited either in space or time, it constitutes a Being + which corresponds with our essential conception of Deity. True it is + devoid of certain accessory attributes, such as personality, + intelligence, and volition; but for this very reason, it is insisted, the + theistic ideal as thus presented is a purer, and therefore a better, + ideal than has ever been presented before. Nay, it is the highest + possible form of this ideal, as the following considerations will show. + In what has consisted that continuous purification of Theism which the + history of thought shows to have been effected, from the grossest form of + belief in supernatural agency as exhibited in Fetichism, through its more + refined form as exhibited in Polytheism, to its still more refined form + as exhibited in Monotheism? In nothing but in a continuous process of + what Mr. Fiske calls "deanthropomorphisation." Consequently, must we not + conclude that when we carry this process yet one step further, and divest + our conception of Deity of all the yet lingering remnants of + anthropomorphism which occur in the current conceptions of Deity, we are + but still further purifying that conception? Assuredly, the attributes of + personality, intelligence, and so forth, are only known as attributes of + Humanity, and therefore to ascribe them to Deity is but to foster, in a + more refined form, the anthropomorphic teachings of previous religions. + But if we carefully refuse to limit Deity by the ascription of any human + attributes whatever, and if the only attributes which we do ascribe are + such as on grounds of pure reason alone we are compelled to ascribe, must + we not conclude that the form of Theism which results is the purest and + the most refined form in which it is possible for Theism to exist? "From + the anthropomorphic point of view it will quite naturally be urged in + objection, that this apparently desirable result is reached through the + degradation of Deity from an 'intelligent personality' to a 'blind + force,' and is therefore in reality an undesirable and perhaps + quasi-atheistic result."<a name="footnotetag39" + href="#footnote39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> But the question which really + presents itself is, "theologically phrased, whether the creature is to be + taken as a measure of the Creator. Scientifically phrased, the question + is whether the highest form of Being as yet suggested to one petty race + of creatures by its ephemeral experience of what is going on in one tiny + corner of the universe, is necessarily to be taken as the equivalent of + that absolutely highest form of Being in which all the possibilities of + existence are alike comprehended."<a name="footnotetag40" + href="#footnote40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> Therefore, in conclusion, "whether + or not it is true that, within the bounds of the phenomenal universe the + highest type of existence is that which we know as humanity, the + conclusion is in every way forced upon us that, quite independently of + limiting conditions in space or time, there is a form of Being which can + neither be assimilated to humanity nor to any lower type of existence. We + have no alternative, therefore, but to regard it as higher than humanity, + even 'as the heavens are higher than the earth,' and except for the + intellectual arrogance which the arguments of theologians show lurking + beneath their expressions of humility, there is no reason why this + admission should not be made unreservedly, without the anthropomorphic + qualifications by which its effect is commonly nullified. The time is + surely coming when the slowness of men in accepting such a conclusion + will be marvelled at, and when the very inadequacy of human language to + express Divinity will be regarded as a reason for a deeper faith and more + solemn adoration."<a name="footnotetag41" + href="#footnote41"><sup>[41]</sup></a></p> + + <p>I have now sufficiently detailed the leading principles of Cosmic + Theism to render a clear and just conception of those fundamental parts + of the system which I am about to criticise; but it is needless to say + that, for all minor details of this system, I must refer those who may + not already have perused them to Mr. Fiske's somewhat elaborate essays. + In now beginning my criticisms, it may be well to state at the outset, + that they are to be restricted to the philosophical aspect of the + subject. With matters of sentiment I do not intend to deal,—partly + because to do so would be unduly to extend this essay, and partly also + because I believe that, so far as the acceptance or the rejection of + Cosmic Theism is to be determined by sentiment, much, if not all, will + depend on individual habits of thought. For whether or not Cosmic Theism + is to be regarded as a religion adapted to the needs of any individual + man, will depend on what these needs are felt to be by that man himself: + we cannot assert magisterially that this religion must be adapted to his + needs because we have found it to be adapted to our own. And if it is + retorted that, human nature being everywhere the same, a form of religion + that is adapted to one man must on this account be adapted to another, I + reply that it is not so. For if a man who is what Mr. Fiske calls an + "Anthropomorphic Theist" finds from experience that his system of + religion—say Christianity—creates and sustains a class of + emotions and general habits of thought which he feels to be the highest + and the best of which he is capable, it is useless for a "Cosmic Theist" + to offer such a man another system of religion, in which the conditions + essential to the existence of these particular emotions and habits of + thought are manifestly absent. For such a man cannot but feel that the + proffered substitution would be tantamount, if accepted, to an utter + destruction of all that he regards as essentially religious. He will tell + us that he finds it perfectly easy to understand and to appreciate those + feelings of vague awe and "worship of the silent kind" which the Cosmic + Theist declares to be fostered by Cosmic Theism; but he will also tell us + that those feelings, which he has experienced with equal vividness under + his own system of Anthropomorphic Theism, are to him but as non-religious + dross compared with the unspeakable felicity of holding definite commune + with the Almighty and Most Merciful, or of rendering worship that is a + glad hosanna—a fearless shout of joy. On the other hand, I believe + that it is possible for philosophic habits of thought so to discipline + the mind that the feelings of vague awe and silent worship in the + presence of an appalling Mystery become more deep and steady than a + theist proper can well believe. It is therefore impossible that either + party can fully appreciate those sentiments of the other which they have + never fully experienced themselves; for even in those cases where an + anthropomorphic theist has been compelled to abandon his creed, as the + change must take place in mature life, his tone of mind has been + determined before it does take place; and therefore in sentiment, though + not in faith, he is more or less of a theist for the rest of his life: + the only effect of the change is to create a troubled interference + between his desires and his beliefs.</p> + + <p>However, I do not intend to develop this branch of the subject further + than thus to point out, in a general way, that religion-mongers as a + class are apt to show too little regard for the sentiments, as + distinguished from the beliefs, of those to whom they offer their wares. + But although I do not intend to constitute myself a champion of theology + by pointing out the defects of Cosmic Theism in the aspect which it + presents to current modes of thought, there is one such defect which I + must here dwell upon, because we shall afterwards have occasion to refer + to it. A theologian may very naturally make this objection to Cosmic + Theism as presented by Mr. Fiske—viz., that the argument on which + this philosopher throughout relies as a self-evident demonstration that + the new system of Theism is a further and a final improvement on all the + previous systems of Theism, is a fallacious argument. As we have already + seen, this argument is, that as the progress in the purification of + Theism has throughout consisted in a process of "deanthropomorphisation," + therefore the terminal phase in this process, which Cosmic Theism + introduces, must be still in the direction of that progress. But to this + argument a theologian may not unreasonably object, that this terminal + phase differs from all the previous phases in one all-important + feature—viz., in effecting a <i>total abolition</i> of the + anthropomorphic element. Before, therefore, it can be shown that this + terminal phase is a further development of <i>Theism</i>, it must he + shown that Theism still remains Theism after this hitherto characteristic + element has been removed. If it is true, as Mr. Fiske very properly + insists, that all the various forms of belief in God have thus far had + this as a common factor, that they ascribed to God the attributes of Man; + it becomes a question whether we may properly abstract this hitherto + invariable factor of a belief, and still call that belief by the same + name. Or, to put the matter in another light, as cosmists maintain that + Theism, in all the phases of its development, has been the product of a + probably erroneous theory of personal agency in nature, when this theory + is expressly discarded—as it is by the doctrine of the + Unknowable—is it philosophically legitimate for cosmists to render + their theory of things in terms which belong to the totally different + theory which they discard? No doubt it is true that the progressive + refinement of Theism has throughout consisted in a progressive discarding + of anthropomorphic qualities; but this fact does not touch the + consideration that, when we proceed to strip off the last remnants of + these qualities, we are committing an act which differs <i>toto + cœlo</i> from all the previous acts which are cited as precedents; + for by this terminal act we are not, as heretofore, <i>refining</i> the + theory of Theism—we are completely <i>transforming</i> it by + removing an element which, both genetically and historically, would seem + to constitute the very essence of Theism.</p> + + <p>Or the case may be presented in yet another light. The only use of + terms, whether in daily talk or in philosophical disquisition, is that of + designating certain things or attributes to which by general custom we + agree to affix them; so that if anyone applies a term to some thing or + attribute which general custom does not warrant him in so applying, he is + merely laying himself open to the charge of abusing that term. Now apply + these elementary principles to the case before us. We have but to think + of the disgust with which the vast majority of living persons would + regard the sense in which Mr. Fiske uses the term "Theism," to perceive + how intimate is the association of that term with the idea of a Personal + God. Such persons will feel strongly that, by this final act of + purification, Mr. Fiske has simply purified the Deity altogether out of + existence. And I scarcely think it is here competent to reply that all + previous acts of purification were at first similarly regarded as + destructive, because it is evident that none of these previous acts + affected, as this one does, the central core of Theism. And, lastly, if + it should be still further objected, that by declaring the theory of + Personal Agency the central core of Theism, I am begging the question as + to the appropriateness of Mr. Fiske's use of the word + "Theism,"—seeing he appears to regard the essential meaning of this + word to be that of a postulation of merely Causal Agency,—I answer, + More of this anon; but meanwhile let it be observed that any charge of + question-begging lies rather at the door of Mr. Fiske, in that he + assumes, without any expressed justification, that the essence of Theism + <i>does</i> consist in such a postulation and in nothing more. And as he + unquestionably has against him the present world of theists no less than + the history of Theism in the past, I do not see how he is to meet this + charge except by confessing to an abuse of the term in question.</p> + + <p>I will now proceed to examine the structure of Cosmic Theism. We are + all, I suppose, at one in allowing that there are only three "verbally + intelligible" theories of the universe,—viz., that it is + self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it has been created by + some other and external Being. It is usual to call the first of these + theories Atheism, the second Pantheism, and the third Theism. Now as + there are here three distinct nameable theories, it is necessary, if the + term "Cosmic Theism" is to be justified as an appropriate term, that the + particular theory which it designates should be shown to be in its + essence theistic—<i>i.e.</i>, that the theory should present those + distinguishing features in virtue of which Theism differs from Atheism on + the one hand, and from Pantheism on the other. Now what are these + features? The postulate of an Eternal Self-existing Something is common + to Theism and to Atheism. Here Atheism ends. Theism, however, is + generally said to assume Personality, Intelligence, and Creative Power as + attributes of the single self-existing substance. Lastly, Pantheism + assumes the Something now existing to have been self-created. To which, + then, of these distinct theories is Cosmic Theism most nearly allied? For + the purpose of answering this question, I shall render that theory in + terms of a formula which Mr. Fiske presents as a full and complete + statement of the theory:—"<i>There exists a</i> POWER, <i>to which + no limit in space or time is conceivable, of which all phenomena, as + presented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can only + know through these manifestations.</i>" But although the word "Power" is + here so strongly emphasised, we are elsewhere told that it is not to be + regarded as having more than a strictly relative or symbolic meaning; so + that, in point of fact, some more neutral word, such as "Something," + "Being," or "Substance," ought in strictness to be here substituted for + the word "Power." Well, if this is done, we have the postulation of a + Being which is self-existing, infinite, and eternal—relatively, at + all events, to our powers of conception. Thus far, therefore, it would + seem that we are still on the common standing-ground of Atheism, + Pantheism, and Theism; for as it is not, so far as I can see, incumbent + on Pantheism to affirm that "thought is a measure of things," the + <i>apparent</i> or <i>relative</i> eternity which the Primal Something + must be supposed to present may not be <i>actual</i> or <i>absolute</i> + eternity. Nevertheless, as Mr. Fiske, by predicating Divinity of the + Primal Something, implicitly attributes to it the quality of an + <i>eternal</i> self-existence, I infer that Cosmic Theism may be + concluded at this point to part company with Pantheism. There remain, + then, Theism and Atheism.</p> + + <p>Now undoubtedly, at first sight, Cosmic Theism appears to differ from + Atheism in one all-important particular. For we have seen that, by means + of a subtle though perfectly logical argument, Cosmic Philosophy has + evolved this conclusion—that all phenomena as presented in + consciousness are manifestations of a not improbable Single Self-existing + Power, of whose existence these manifestations alone can make us + cognisant. From which it apparently follows, that this hypothetical Power + must be regarded as existing out of necessary relation to the phenomenal + universe; that it is, therefore, beyond question "Absolute Being;" and + that, as such, we are entitled to call it Deity. But in the train of + reasoning of which this is a very condensed epitome, it is evident that + the legitimacy of denominating this Absolute Being Deity, must depend on + the exact meaning which we attach to the word "Absolute"—and this, + be it observed, quite apart from the question, before touched upon, as to + whether Personality and Intelligence are not to be considered as + attributes essential to Deity. In what sense, then, is the word + "Absolute" used? It is used in this sense. As from the relativity of + knowledge we cannot know things in themselves, but only symbolical + representations of such things, therefore things in themselves are + absolute to consciousness: but analysis shows that we cannot conceivably + predicate Difference among things in themselves, so that we are at + liberty, with due diffidence, to predicate of them No-difference: hence + the noumena of the schoolmen admit of being collected into a <i>summum + genus</i> of noumenal existence; and since, before their colligation + noumena were severally absolute, after their colligation they become + collectively absolute: therefore it is legitimate to designate this + sum-total of noumenal existence, "Absolute Being." Now there is clearly + no exception to be taken to the formal accuracy of this reasoning; the + only question is as to whether the "Absolute Being" which it evolves is + absolute in the sense required by Theism. I confess that to me this Being + appears to be absolute in a widely different sense from that in which + Deity must be regarded as absolute. For this Being is thus seen to be + absolute in no other sense than as holding—to quote from Mr. + Fiske—"existence independent of the conditions of the process of + knowing." In other words, it is absolute only as standing out of + necessary relation to <i>human consciousness</i>. But Theism requires, as + an essential feature, that Deity should be absolute as standing out of + necessary relation to <i>all else</i>. Before, therefore, the Absolute + Being of Cosmism can be shown, by the reasoning adopted, to deserve, even + in part, the appellation of Deity, it must be shown that there is no + other mode of Being in existence save our own subjective consciousness + and the Absolute Reality which becomes objective to it through the world + of phenomena. But any attempt to establish this position would involve a + disregard of the doctrine that knowledge is relative; and to do this, it + is needless to say, would be to destroy the basis of the argument whereby + the Absolute Being of Cosmism was posited.</p> + + <p>Or, to state this part of the criticism in other words, as the first + step in justifying the predication of Deity, it must be shown that the + Being of which the predication is made is absolute, and this not merely + as independent of human consciousness, but as independent of the whole + noumenal universe—Deity itself alone excepted. That is, the Being + of which Deity is predicated must be Unconditioned. Hence it is incumbent + on Cosmic Theism to prove, either that the Causal Agent which it + denominates Deity is itself the whole noumenal universe, or that it + created the rest of a noumenal universe; else there is nothing to show + that this Causal Agent was not itself created—seeing that, even if + we assume the existence of a God, there is nothing to indicate that the + Causal Agent of Cosmism is that God.</p> + + <p>It would appear therefore from this, that whatever else the Cosmist's + theory of things may be, it certainly is not Theism; and I think that + closer inspection will tend to confirm this judgment. To this then let us + proceed.</p> + + <p>Mr. Fiske is very hard on the atheists, and so will probably repudiate + with scorn any insinuations to the effect that his theory of things is + "quasi-atheistic." Nevertheless, it seems to me that he is very unjust to + the atheists, in that while he spares no pains to "purify" and "refine" + the theory of the theists, so as at last to leave nothing but what he + regards as the distilled essence of Theism behind; he habitually leaves + the theory of the atheists as he finds it, without making any attempt + either to "purify" it by removing its weak and unnecessary ingredients, + or to "refine" it by adding such sublimated ingredients as modern + speculation has supplied. Thus, while he despises the atheists of the + eighteenth century for their irrationality in believing in the + self-existence of a <i>phenomenal</i> universe, and reviles them for + their irreligion in denying that "the religious sentiment needed + satisfaction;" he does not wait to inquire whether, in its essential + substance, the theory of these men is not the one that has proved itself + best able to withstand the grinding action of more recent thought. But + let us in fairness ask, What was the essential substance of that theory? + Apparently it was the bare statement of the unthinkable fact that + Something Is. It therefore seems to me useless in Mr. Fiske to lay so + much stress on the fact that this Something was originally identified by + atheists with the phenomenal universe. It seems useless to do this, + because such identification is clearly no part of the <i>essence</i> of + Atheism, which, as just stated, I take to consist in the single dogma of + self-existence as itself sufficient to constitute a theory of things. + And, if so, it is a matter of scarcely any moment, as regards that + theory, whether we are <i>immediately</i> cognisant of that which is + self-existent, or only become so through the world of phenomena—the + vital point of the theory being, that Self-existence, <i>wherever + posited</i>, is itself the only admissible explanation of phenomena. Or, + in other words, it does not seem that there is anything in the atheistic + theory, as such, which is incompatible with the doctrine of the + Relativity of Knowledge; so that whatever cogency there may be in the + train of reasoning whereby a single Causal Agent is deduced from that + doctrine, it would seem that an atheist has as much right to the benefit + of this reasoning as a theist; and there is thus no more apparent reason + why this single Causal Agent should be appropriated as the God of Theism, + than that it should be appropriated as the Self-existing X of Atheism. + Indeed, there seems to be less reason. For an atheist of to-day may very + properly argue:—'So far from beholding anything divine in this + Single Being absolute to human consciousness, it is just precisely the + form of Being which my theory postulates as the Self-existing All. In + order to constitute such a Being God, it must be shown, as we have + already seen, to be something more than a merely Causal Agent which is + absolute in the grotesquely restricted sense of being independent of 'one + petty race of creatures with an ephemeral experience of what is going on + in one tiny corner of the universe;' it must be shown to be something + more than absolute even in the wholly unrestricted sense of being + Unconditioned; it must be shown to possess such other attributes as are + distinctive of Deity. For I maintain that even Unconditioned Being, + <i>merely as such</i>, would only then have a right to the name of God + when it has been shown that the theory of Theism has a right to + monopolise the doctrine of Relativity.'</p> + + <p>In thus endeavouring to "purify" the theory of Atheism, by divesting + it of all superfluous accessories, and laying bare what I conceive to be + its essential substance; it may be well to state that, even apart from + their irreligious character, I have no sympathy with the atheists of the + past century. I mean, that these men do not seem to me to deserve any + credit for advanced powers of speculation merely because they adopted a + theory of things which in its essential features now promises to be the + most enduring. For it is evident that the strength of this theory now + lies in its <i>simplicity</i>,—in its undertaking to explain, so + far as explanation is possible, the sum-total of phenomena by the single + postulate of self-existence. But it seems to me that in the last century + there were no sufficient data for rendering such a theory of things a + rational theory; for so long as the quality of self-existence was + supposed to reside in phenomena themselves, the very simplicity of the + theory, as expressed in words, must have seemed to render it inapplicable + as a reasonable theory of things. The astounding variety, complexity, and + harmony which are everywhere so conspicuous in the world of phenomena + must have seemed to necessitate as an explanation some one integrating + cause; and it is impossible that in the eighteenth century any such + integrating cause can have been conceivable other than Intelligence. + Therefore I think, with Mr. Fiske, that the atheists of the eighteenth + century were irrational in applying their single postulate of + self-existence as alone a sufficient explanation of things. But of course + the aspect of the case is now completely changed, when we regard it in + all the flood of light which has been shed on it by recent science, + physical and speculative. For the demonstration of the fact that energy + is indestructible, coupled with the corollary that every so-called + natural law is a physically necessary consequence of that fact, clearly + supply us with a completely novel datum as the ultimate source of + experience—and a datum, moreover, which is as different as can well + be imagined from the ever-changing, ever-fleeting, world of phenomena. We + have, therefore, but to apply the postulate of self-existence to this + single ultimate datum, and we have a theory of things as rational as the + Atheism of the last century was irrational. Nevertheless, that this + theory is more akin to the Atheism of the last century than to any other + theory of that time, is, I think, unquestionable; for while we retain the + central doctrine of self-existence as alone a scientifically admissible, + or non-gratuitous, explanation of things, we only change the original + theory by transferring the application of this doctrine from the world of + manifestations to that which causes the manifestations: we do not resort + to any of the <i>additional</i> doctrines whereby the other theories of + the universe were distinguished from the theory of Atheism in its + original form. However, as by our recognition of the relativity of + knowledge we are precluded from dogmatically denying any theory of the + universe that may be proposed, it would clearly be erroneous to identify + the doctrine of the Unknowable with the theory of Atheism: all we can say + is, that, so far as speculative thought can soar, the permanent + self-existence of an inconceivable Something, which manifests itself to + consciousness as force and matter, constitutes the only datum that can be + shown to be required for the purposes of a rational ontology.</p> + + <p>To sum up. In the theory which Mr. Fiske calls Cosmic Theism, while I + am able to discern the elements which I think may properly be regarded as + common to Theism and to Atheism, I am not able to discern any single + element that is specifically distinctive of Theism. Still I am far from + concluding that the theory in question is the theory of Atheism. All I + wish to insist upon is this—that as the Absolute Being of Cosmism + presents no other qualities than such as are required by the renovated + theory of Atheism, its postulation supplies a basis, not for Theism, but + for Non-theism: a man with such a postulate ought in strictness to + abstain from either affirming or denying the existence of God. And this, + I may observe, appears to be the position which Mr. Spencer himself has + adopted as the only logical outcome of his doctrine of the + Unknowable—a position which, in my opinion, it is most undesirable + to obscure by endeavouring to give it a quasi-theistic interpretation. I + may further observe, that we here seem to have a philosophical + justification of the theological sentiment previously alluded + to—the sentiment, namely, that by his attempt at a final + purification of Theism, Mr. Fiske has destroyed those essential features + of the theory in virtue of which alone it exists as Theism. For seeing it + is impossible, from the relativity of knowledge, that the Absolute Being + of Cosmism can ever be shown absolute in the sense required by Theism, + and, even if it could, that it would still be but the Unconditioned Being + of Atheism; it follows that if this Absolute Being is to be shown even in + part to deserve the appellation of Deity, it must be shown to possess the + only remaining attributes which are distinctive of Deity—to wit, + personality and intelligence. But forasmuch as the final act of purifying + the conception of Deity consists, according to Mr. Fiske, in expressly + removing these particular attributes from the object of that conception, + does it not follow that the conception which remains is, as I have said, + not theistic, but non-theistic?</p> + + <p>Here my criticism might properly have ended, were it not that Mr. + Fiske, after having divested the Deity of all his psychical attributes, + forthwith proceeds to show how it may be dimly possible to reinvest him + with attributes that are "quasi-psychical." Mr. Fiske is, of course, far + too subtle a thinker not to see that his previous argument from + relativity precludes him from assigning much weight to the ontological + speculations in which he here indulges, seeing that in whatever degree + the relativity of knowledge renders legitimate the non-ascription to + Deity of known psychical attributes, in some such degree at least must it + render illegitimate the ascription to Deity of unknown psychical + attributes. But in the part of his work in which he treats of the + quasi-psychical attributes, Mr. Fiske is merely engaged in showing that + the speculative standing of the "materialists" is inferior to that of the + "spiritualists;" so that, as this is a subject distinct from Theism, he + is not open to the charge of inconsistency. Well, feeble as these + speculations undoubtedly are in the support which they render to Theism, + it nevertheless seems desirable to consider them before closing this + review. The speculations in question are quoted from Mr. Spencer, and are + as follows:—</p> + + <p>"Mind, as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate + of activities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another, + throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of which + they are the activities. But the same experiences which make him aware of + this coherent aggregate of mental activities, simultaneously make him + aware of activities that are not included in it—outlying activities + which become known by their effects on this aggregate, but which are + experimentally proved to be not coherent with it, and to be coherent with + one another (<i>First Principles</i>, §§ 43, 44). As, by the definition + of them, these external activities cannot be brought within the aggregate + of activities distinguished as those of Mind, they must for ever remain + to him nothing more than the unknown correlatives of their effects on + this aggregate; and can be thought of only in terms furnished by this + aggregate. Hence, if he regards his conceptions of these activities lying + beyond Mind as constituting knowledge of them, he is deluding himself: he + is but representing these activities in terms of Mind, and can never do + otherwise. Eventually he is obliged to admit that his ideas of Matter and + Motion, merely symbolic of unknowable realities, are complex states of + consciousness built out of units of feeling. But if, after admitting + this, he persists in asking whether units of feeling are of the same + nature as the units of force distinguished as external, or whether the + units of force distinguished as external are of the same nature as units + of feeling; then the reply, still substantially the same, is that we may + go further towards conceiving units of external force to be identical + with units of feeling, than we can towards conceiving units of feeling to + be identical with units of external force. Clearly, if units of external + force are regarded as absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to + translate units of feeling into them is to translate the known into the + unknown, which is absurd. And if they are what they are supposed to be by + those who identify them with their symbols, then the difficulty of + translating units of feeling into them is insurmountable: if Force as it + objectively exists is absolutely alien in nature from that which exists + subjectively as Feeling, then the transformation of Force into Feeling is + unthinkable. Either way, therefore, it is impossible to interpret inner + existence in terms of outer existence. But if, on the other hand, units + of Force as they exist objectively are essentially the same in nature + with those manifested subjectively as units of Feeling, then a + conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of that aggregate of + activities constituting a consciousness is known as belonging to + consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond the limits of + this coherent aggregate of activities exist activities quite independent + of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine, then, that by + their exclusion from the circumscribed activities constituting + consciousness, these outer activities, though of the same intrinsic + nature, become antithetically opposed in aspect. Being disconnected from + consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are thereby rendered + foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, or linked with + these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it were, run + through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious—are + symbolised as having the nature called material, as opposed to that + called spiritual. While, however, it thus seems an imaginable possibility + that units of external Force may be identical in nature with units of the + force known as Feeling, yet we cannot by so representing them get any + nearer to a comprehension of external Force. For, as already shown, + supposing all forms of Mind to be composed of homogeneous units of + feeling variously aggregated, the resolution of them into such units + leaves us as unable as before to think of the substance of Mind as it + exists in such units; and thus, even could we really figure to ourselves + all units of external Force as being essentially like units of the force + known as Feeling, and as so constituting a universal sentiency, we should + be as far as ever from forming a conception of that which is universally + sentient."<a name="footnotetag42" + href="#footnote42"><sup>[42]</sup></a></p> + + <p>Now while I agree with Mr. Fiske that we have here "the most subtle + conclusion now within the ken of the scientific speculator, reached + without any disregard of the canons prescribed by the doctrine of + relativity," I would like to point out to minds less clear-sighted than + his, that this same "doctrine of relativity" effectually debars us from + using this "conclusion" as an argument of any assignable value in favour + of Theism. For the value of conceivability as a test of truth, on which + this conclusion is founded, is here vitiated by the consideration that, + <i>whatever</i> the nature of Force-units may be, we can clearly perceive + it to be a subjective necessity of the case that they should admit of + being more easily conceived by us to be of the nature of Feeling-units + than to be of any other nature. For as units of Feeling are the only + entities of which we are, or can be, conscious, they are the entities + into which units of Force must be, so to speak, subjectively translated + before we can cognise their existence at all. Therefore, <i>whatever</i> + the real nature of Force-units may be, ultimate analysis must show that + it is more conceivable to identify them in thought with the only units of + which we are cognisant, than it is to think of them as units of which we + are not cognisant, and concerning which, therefore, conception is + necessarily impossible. Or thus, the only alternative with respect to the + classifying of Force-units lies between refusing to classify them at all, + or classifying them with the only ultimate units with which we are + acquainted. But this restriction, for aught that can ever be shown to the + contrary, arises only from the subjective conditions of our own + consciousness; there is nothing to indicate that, in objective reality, + units of Force are in any wise akin to units of Feeling. Conceivability, + therefore, as a test of truth, is in this particular case of no + assignable degree of value; for as the entities to which it is applied + are respectively the highest known abstractions of subjective and + objective existence, the test of conceivability is neutralised by + directly encountering the inconceivable relation that subsists between + subject and object. I think, therefore, it is evident that these + ontological speculations present no sufficient warrant for an inference, + even of the slenderest kind, that the Absolute Being of Cosmism possesses + attributes of a nature quasi-psychical; and, if so, it follows that these + speculations are incompetent to form the basis of a theory which, even by + the greatest stretch of courtesy, can in any legitimate sense be termed + quasi-theistic.<a name="footnotetag43" + href="#footnote43"><sup>[43]</sup></a></p> + + <p>On the whole, then, I conclude that the term "Cosmic Theism" is not an + appropriate term whereby to denote the theory of things set forth in + "Cosmic Philosophy;" and that it would therefore be more judicious to + leave the doctrine of the Unknowable as Mr. Spencer has left + it—that is, without theological implications of any kind. But in + now taking leave of this subject, I should like it to be understood that + the only reason why I have ventured thus to take exception to a part of + Mr. Fiske's work is because I regret that a treatise which displays so + much of literary excellence and philosophic power should lend itself to + promoting what I regard as mistaken views concerning the ontological + tendencies of recent thought, and this with no other apparent motive than + that of unworthily retaining in the new philosophy a religious term the + distinctive connotations of which are considered by that philosophy to + have become obsolete.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + + <p><a name="SuppEssII"></a></p> + +<h3>II.</h3> + +<h3>SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IN REPLY TO A +RECENT WORK ON THEISM.<a name="footnotetag44" href="#footnote44"><sup>[44]</sup></a></h3> + + <p>On perusing my main essay several years after its completion, it + occurred to me that another very effectual way of demonstrating the + immense difference between the nature of all previous attacks upon the + teleological argument and the nature of the present attack, would be + briefly to review the reasonable objections to which all the previous + attacks were open. Very opportunely a work on Theism has just been + published which states these objections with great lucidity, and answers + them with much ability. The work to which I allude is by the Rev. + Professor Flint, and as it is characterised by temperate candour in tone + and logical care in exposition, I felt on reading it that the work was + particularly well suited for displaying the enormous change in the + speculative standing of Theism which the foregoing considerations must be + rationally deemed to have effected. I therefore determined on throwing my + supplementary essay, which I had previously intended to write, into the + form of a criticism on Professor Flint's treatise, and I adopted this + course the more willingly because there are several other points dwelt + upon in that treatise which it seems desirable for me to consider in the + present one, although, for the sake of conciseness, I abstained from + discussing them in my previous essay. With these two objects in view, + therefore, I undertook the following criticism.<a name="footnotetag45" + href="#footnote45"><sup>[45]</sup></a></p> + + <p>In the first place, it is needful to protest against an argument which + our author adopts on the authority of Professor Clark Maxwell. The + argument is now a well-known one, and is thus stated by Professor Maxwell + in his presidential address before the British Association for the + Advancement of Science, 1870:—"None of the processes of nature, + since the time when nature began, have produced the slightest difference + in the properties of any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe + either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties + to the operation of any of the causes which we call natural. On the other + hand, the exact quality of each molecule to all others of the same kind + gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well said, the essential character of + a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and + self-existent. Thus we have been led along a strictly scientific path, + very near to the point at which science must stop. Not that science is + debarred from studying the external mechanism of a molecule which she + cannot take to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which + she cannot put together. But in tracing back the history of matter, + science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the + molecule has been made, and, on the other, that it has not been made by + any of the processes we call natural."</p> + + <p>Now it is obvious that we have here no real argument, since it is + obvious that science can never be in a position to assert that atoms, the + very existence of which is hypothetical, were never "made by any of the + processes we call natural." The mere fact that in the universe, as we now + know it, the evolution of material atoms is not observed to be taking + place "by any of the processes we call natural," cannot possibly be taken + as proof, or even as presumption, that there ever was a time when the + material atoms now in existence were created by a supernatural cause. The + fact cannot be taken to justify any such inference for the following + reasons. In the first place, assuming the atomic theory to be true, and + there is nothing in the argument to show that the now-existing atoms are + not self-existing atoms, endowed with their peculiar and severally + distinctive properties from all eternity. Doubtless the argument is, that + as there appear to be some sixty or more elementary atoms constituting + the raw material of the observable universe, it is incredible that they + can all have owed their correlated properties to any cause other than + that of a designing and manufacturing intelligence. But, in the next + place—and here comes the demolishing force of the + criticism—science is not in a position to assert that these sixty + or more elementary atoms are in any real sense of the term elementary. + The mere fact that chemistry is as yet in too undeveloped a condition to + pronounce whether or not all the forms of matter known to her are + modifications of some smaller number of elements, or even of a single + element, cannot possibly be taken as a warrant for so huge an inference + as that there are really more than sixty elements all endowed with + absolutely distinctive properties by a supernatural cause. Now this + consideration, which arises immediately from the doctrine of the + relativity of knowledge, is alone amply sufficient to destroy the present + argument. But we must not on this account lose sight of the fact that, + even to our strictly relative science in its present embryonic condition, + we are not without decided indications, not only that the so-called + elements are probably for the most part compounds, but even that matter + as a whole is one substance, which is itself probably but some + modification of energy. Indeed, the whole tendency of recent scientific + speculation is towards the view that the universe consists of some one + substance, which, whether self-existing or created, is diverse only in + its relation to ignorance. And if this view is correct, how obvious is + the inference which I have elaborated in <a href="#Sect32">§ 32</a>, that + all the diverse forms of matter, as we know them, were probably evolved + by natural causes. So obvious, indeed, is this inference, that to resort + to any supernatural hypothesis to explain the diverse properties of the + various chemical elements appears to me a most glaring violation of the + law of parcimony—as much more glaring, for instance, than the + violation of this law by Paley, as the number and variety of organic + species are greater than the number and variety of chemical species. And + if it was illegitimate in Paley to use a mere absence of knowledge as to + how the transmutation of apparently fixed species of animals was effected + as equivalent to the possession of knowledge that such transmutation had + not been effected, how much more illegitimate must it be to commit a + similar sin against logic in the case of the chemical elements, where our + classification is confessedly beset with numberless difficulties, and + when we begin to discern that in all probability it is a classification + essentially artificial. Lastly, the mere fact that the transmutation of + chemical species and the evolution of chemical "atoms" are processes + which we do not now observe as occurring in nature, is surely a + consideration of a far more feeble kind than it is even in the case of + biological species and biological evolution; seeing that nature's + laboratory must be now so inconceivably different from what it was during + the condensation of the nebula. What an atrocious piece of arrogance, + therefore, it is to assert that "none of the processes of nature, + <i>since the time when nature began</i>, have produced the slightest + difference in the properties of any molecule!" No one can entertain a + higher respect for Professor Clark Maxwell than I do; but a single + sentence of such a kind as this cannot leave two opinions in any + impartial mind concerning his competency to deal with such subjects.</p> + + <p>I am therefore sorry to see this absurd argument approvingly + incorporated in Professor Flint's work. He says, "I believe that no reply + to these words of Professor Clark Maxwell is possible from any one who + holds the ordinary view of scientific men as to the ultimate constitution + of matter. They must suppose every atom, every molecule, to be of such a + nature, to be so related to others and to the universe generally, that + things may be such as we see them to be; but this their fitness to be + built up into the structure of the universe is a proof that they have + been made fit, and since natural forces could not have acted on them + while not yet existent, a supernatural power must have created them, and + created them with a view to their manifold uses." Here the inference so + confidently drawn would have been a weak one even were we not able to see + that the doctrine of natural evolution probably applies to inorganic + nature no less than to organic. For the inference is drawn from + considerations of a character so transcendental and so remote from + science, that unless we wish to be deceived by a merely verbal argument, + we must feel that the possibilities of error in the inference are so + numerous and indefinite, that the inference itself is well-nigh worthless + as a basis of belief. But when we add that in <a href="#ChapIV">Chapter + IV.</a> of the foregoing essay it has been shown to be within the + legitimate scope of scientific reasoning to conclude that material atoms + have been progressively evolved <i>pari passu</i> with the natural laws + of chemical combination, it is evident that any force which the present + argument could ever have had must now be pronounced as neutralised. + Natural causes have been shown, so far as scientific inference can + extend, as not improbably sufficient to produce the observed effects; and + therefore we are no longer free to invoke the hypothetical action of any + supernatural cause.</p> + + <p>The same observations apply to Professor Flint's theistic argument + drawn from recent scientific speculations as to the vortex-ring + construction of matter. If these speculations are sound, their only + influence on Theism would be that of supplying a scientific demonstration + of the substantial identity of Force and Matter, and so of supplying a + still more valid basis for the theory as to the natural genesis of matter + from a single primordial substance, in the manner sketched out in <a + href="#ChapIV">Chapter IV.</a> For the argument adduced by Professor + Flint, that as the manner in which the vorticial motion of a ring is + originated has not as yet been suggested, therefore its origination must + have been due to a "Divine impulse," is an argument which again uses the + absence of knowledge as equivalent to its possession. We are in the + presence of a very novel and highly abstruse theory, or rather + hypothesis, in physics, which was originally suggested by, and has + hitherto been mainly indebted to, empirical experiments as distinguished + from mathematical calculations; and from the mere fact that, in the case + of such a hypothesis, mathematicians have not as yet been able to + determine the physical conditions required to originate vorticial motion, + we are expected to infer that no such conditions can ever have existed, + and therefore that every such vortex system, if it exists, is a + miracle!</p> + + <p>And substantially the same criticism applies to the argument which + Professor Flint adduces—the argument also on which Professors + Balfour and Tait lay so much stress in their work on the <i>Unseen + Universe</i>—the argument, namely, as to the non-eternal character + of heat. The calculations on which this argument depends would only be + valid as sustaining this argument if they were based upon a knowledge of + the universe <i>as a whole</i>; and therefore, as before, the absence of + requisite knowledge must not be used as equivalent to its possession.</p> + + <p>These, however, are the weakest parts of Professor Flint's work. I + therefore gladly turn to those parts which are exceedingly cogent as + written from his standpoint, but which, in view of the strictures on the + teleological argument that I have adduced in <a href="#ChapIV">Chapters + IV.</a> and <a href="#ChapVI">VI.</a>, I submit to be now wholly + valueless.</p> + + <p>"How could matter of itself produce order, even if it were + self-existent and eternal? It is far more unreasonable to believe that + the atoms or constituents of matter produced of themselves, without the + action of a Supreme Mind, this wonderful universe, than that the letters + of the English alphabet produced the plays of Shakespeare, without the + slightest assistance from the human mind known by that famous name. These + atoms might, perhaps, now and then, here and there, at great distances + and long intervals, produce by a chance contact some curious collocation + or compound; but never could they produce order or organisation on an + extensive scale, or of a durable character, unless ordered, arranged, and + adjusted in ways of which intelligence alone can be the ultimate + explanation. To believe that these fortuitous and indirected movements + could originate the universe, and all the harmonies and utilities and + beauties which abound in it, evinces a credulity far more extravagant + than has ever been displayed by the most superstitious of religionists. + Yet no consistent materialist can refuse to accept this colossal chance + hypothesis. All the explanations of the order of the universe which + materialists, from Democritus and Epicurus to Diderot and Lange, have + devised, rest on the assumption that the elements of matter, being + eternal, must pass through infinite combinations, and that one of these + must be our present world—a special collocation among the countless + millions of collocations, past and future. Throw the letters of the Greek + alphabet, it has been said, an infinite number of times, and you must + produce the 'Iliad' and all the Greek books. The theory of probabilities, + I need hardly say, requires us to believe nothing so absurd.... But what + is the 'Iliad' to the hymn of creation and the drama of providence?" + &c.</p> + + <p>Now this I conceive to have been a fully valid argument at the time it + was published, and indeed the most convincing of all the arguments in + favour of Theism. But, as already so frequently pointed out, the + considerations adduced in <a href="#ChapIV">Chapter IV.</a> of the + present work are utterly destructive of this argument. For this argument + assumes, rightly enough, that the only alternative we have in choosing + our hypothesis concerning the final explanation of things is either to + regard that explanation as Intelligence or as Fortuity. This, I say, was + a legitimate argument a few months ago, because up to that time no one + had shown that strictly natural causes, as distinguished from chances, + could conceivably be able to produce a cosmos; and although the several + previous writers to whom Professor Flint alludes—and he might have + alluded to others in this connection—entertained a dim anticipation + of the fact that natural causes might alone be sufficient to produce the + observed universe, still these dim anticipations were worthless as + <i>arguments</i> so long as it remained impossible to suggest any natural + <i>principle</i> whereby such a result could have been conceivably + effected by such causes. But it is evident that Professor Flint's + time-honoured argument is now completely overthrown, unless it can be + proved that there is some radical error in the reasoning whereby I have + endeavoured to show that natural causes not only <i>may</i>, but + <i>must</i>, have produced existing order. The overthrow is complete, + because the very groundwork of the argument in question is knocked away; + a third possibility, of the nature of a necessity, is introduced, and + therefore the alternative is no longer between Intelligence and Fortuity, + but between Intelligence and Natural Causation. Whereas the overwhelming + strength of the argument from Order has hitherto consisted in the + supposition of Intelligence as the one and only conceivable cause of the + integration of things, my exposition in <a href="#ChapIV">Chapter IV.</a> + has shown that such integration must have been due, at all events in a + relative or proximate sense, to a strictly physical cause—the + persistence of force and the consequent self-evolution of natural law. + And the question as to whether or not Intelligence may not have been the + absolute or ultimate cause is manifestly a question altogether alien to + the argument from Order; for if existing order admits of being accounted + for, in a relative or proximate sense, by merely physical causes, the + argument from a relative or proximate order is not at liberty to infer or + to assume the existence of any higher or more ultimate cause. Although, + therefore, in <a href="#ChapV">Chapter V.</a>, I have been careful to + point out that the fact of existing order having been due to proximate or + natural causes does not actually <i>disprove</i> the possible existence + of an ultimate and supernatural cause, still it must be carefully + observed that this <i>negative</i> fact cannot possibly justify any + <i>positive</i> inference to the existence of such a cause.</p> + + <p>Thus, upon the whole, it may be said, without danger of reasonable + dispute, that as the argument from Order has hitherto derived its immense + weight entirely from the fact that Intelligence appeared to be the one + and only cause sufficient to produce the observed integration of the + cosmos, this immense weight has now been completely counterpoised by the + demonstration that other causes of a strictly physical kind must have + been instrumental, if not themselves alone sufficient, to produce this + integration, So that, just as in the case of Astronomy the demonstration + of the one natural principle of gravity was sufficient to classify under + one physical explanation several observed facts which many persons had + previously attributed to supernatural causes; and just as in the more + complex science of Geology the demonstration of the one principle of + uniformitarianism was sufficient to explain, without the aid of + supernaturalism, a still greater number of facts; and, lastly, just as in + the case of the still more complex science of Biology the demonstration + of the one principle of natural selection was sufficient to marshal under + one scientific, or natural, hypothesis an almost incalculable number of + facts which were previously explained by the metaphysical hypothesis of + supernatural design; so in the science which includes all other sciences, + and which we may term the science of Cosmology, I assert with confidence + that in the one principle of the persistence of force we have a + demonstrably harmonising principle, whereby all the facts within our + experience admit of being collocated under one natural explanation, + without there being the smallest reason to attribute these facts to any + supernatural cause.</p> + + <p>But perhaps the immense change which these considerations must + logically be regarded as having produced in the speculative standing of + the argument from teleology will be better appreciated if I continue to + quote from Professor Flint's very forcible and thoroughly logical + exposition of the previous standing of this argument. He says:—</p> + + <p>"To ascribe the origination of order to <i>law</i> is a manifest + evasion of the real problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be + explained. The question is—Has law a reason, or is it without a + reason? The unperverted human mind cannot believe it to be without a + reason."</p> + + <p>I do not know where a more terse and accurate statement of the case + could be found; and to my mind the question so lucidly put admits of the + direct answer—Law clearly has a reason of a purely physical kind. + And therefore I submit that the following quotation which Professor Flint + makes from Professor Jevons, logical as it was when written, must now be + regarded as embodying an argument which is obsolete.</p> + + <p>"As an unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in + an unlimited number of modes of distribution, there must, even granting + matter to have had all its laws from eternity, have been at some moment + in time, out of the unlimited choices and distributions possible, that + one choice and distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe + that now exists. Only out of rational choice can order have come."</p> + + <p>But clearly the alternative is now no longer one between chance and + choice. If natural laws arise by way of necessary consequence from the + persistence of a single self-existing substance, it becomes a matter of + scientific (though not of logical) demonstration that "the fair and + orderly universe that now exists" is the one and only universe that, in + the nature of things, <i>can</i> exist. But to continue this interesting + passage from Dr. Flint's work—interesting not only because it sets + forth the previous standing of this subject with so much clearness, but + also because the work is of such very recent publication.</p> + + <p>"The most common mode, perhaps, of evading the problem which order + presents to reason is the indication of the process by which the order + has been realised. From Democritus to the latest Darwinian there have + been men who supposed they had completely explained away the evidences of + design in nature when they had described the physical antecedents of the + arrangements appealed to as evidences. Aristotle showed the absurdity of + this supposition more than 2200 years ago."</p> + + <p>Now this is a perfectly valid criticism on all such previous + non-theistical arguments as were drawn from an "indication of the process + by which the order has been realised;" for in all these previous + arguments there was an absence of any physical explanation of the + <i>ultimate</i> cause of the process contemplated, and so long as this + ultimate cause remained obscure, although the evidence of design might by + these arguments have been excluded from particular processes, the + evidence of design could not be similarly excluded from the ultimate + cause of these processes. Thus, for instance, it is doubtless illogical, + as Professor Flint points out, in any Darwinian to argue that because his + theory of natural selection supplies him with a natural explanation of + the process whereby organisms have been adapted to their surroundings, + therefore this process need not itself have been designed. That is to + say, in general terms, as insisted upon in the foregoing essay, the + discovery of a natural law or orderly process cannot of itself justify + the inference that this law or method of orderly procedure is not itself + a product of supernatural Intelligence; but, on the contrary, the very + existence of such orderly processes, considered only in relation to their + products, must properly be regarded as evidence of the best possible kind + in favour of supernatural Intelligence, <i>provided that no natural cause + can be suggested as adequate to explain the origin of these + processes</i>. But this is precisely what the persistence of force, + considered as a natural cause, must be pronounced as necessarily + competent to achieve; for we can clearly see that all these processes + obviously must and actually do derive their origin from this one + causative principle. And whether or not behind this one causative + principle of natural law there exists a still more ultimate cause in the + form of a supernatural Intelligence, this is a question altogether + foreign to any argument from teleology, seeing that teleology, in so far + as it is <i>teleology</i>, can only rest upon the observed facts of the + cosmos; and if these facts admit of being explained by the action of a + single causative principle inherent in the cosmos itself, teleology is + not free to assume the action of any causative principle of a more + ultimate character. Still, as I have repeatedly insisted, these + considerations do not entitle us dogmatically to deny the existence of + some such more ultimate principle; all that these considerations do is to + remove any rational argument from teleological sources that any such more + ultimate principle exists. Therefore I am, of course, quite at one with + Professor Flint when he says Professor Huxley "admits that the most + thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume 'a primordial molecular + arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe are the + consequences,' and 'is thereby at the mercy of the theologist, who can + defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not + intended to involve the phenomena of the universe.' Granting this much, + he is logically bound to grant more. If the entire evolution of the + universe may have been intended, the several stages of its evolution may + have been intended, and they may have been intended for their own sakes + as well as for the sake of the collective evolution or its final result." + Now that such <i>may have been</i> the case, I have been careful to + insist in <a href="#ChapV">Chapter V.</a>; all I am now concerned with is + to show that, in view of the considerations adduced in Chapter <a + href="#ChapIV">IV.</a>, there is no longer any evidence to prove, or even + to indicate, that such <i>has been</i> the case. And with reference to + this opportune quotation from Professor Huxley I may remark, that the + "thoroughgoing evolutionist" is now no longer "at the mercy of the + theologian" to any further extent than that of not being able to disprove + a purely metaphysical hypothesis, which is as certainly superfluous, in + any scientific sense, as the fundamental data of science are certainly + true.</p> + + <p>It may seem almost unnecessary to extend this postscript by pursuing + further the criticism on Professor Flint's exposition in the light of "a + single new reason ... for the denial of design" which he challenges; but + there are nevertheless one or two other points which it seems desirable + to consider. Professor Flint writes:—</p> + + <p>"M. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference from design, from + the order and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when he + has pointed out the physical conditions through which that order and + stability are secured, and the process by which they have been + obtained.... Now the assertion that the peculiarities which make the + solar system stable and the earth habitable have flowed naturally and + necessarily from the simple mutual gravity of the several parts of + nebulous matter is one which greatly requires proof, but which has never + received it. In saying this, we do not challenge the proof of the nebular + theory itself. That theory may or may not be true. We are quite willing + to suppose it true—to grant that it has been scientifically + established. What we maintain is, that even if we admit unreservedly that + the earth and the whole system to which it belongs once existed in a + nebulous state, from which they were gradually evolved into their present + condition conformably to physical laws, we are in no degree entitled to + infer from the admission the conclusion which Comte and others have + drawn. The man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that the law + of gravitation, or any other physical law, has of itself determined the + course of cosmical evolution, so that there is no need for believing in + the existence and operation of a divine mind, proves merely that he is + not exempt from reasoning very illogically. The solar system could only + have been evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now + presents if the nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form, and + constitution, if it was neither too fluid nor too tenacious—if its + atoms were all numbered, its elements all weighed, its constituents all + disposed in due relation to one another; that is to say, only if the + nebula was in reality as much a system of order, which Intelligence alone + could account for, as the worlds which have been developed from it. The + origin of the nebula thus presents itself to reason as a problem which + demands solution no less than the origin of the planets. All the + properties and laws of the nebula require to be accounted for. What + origin are we to give them? It must be either reason or unreason. We may + go back as far as we please, but, at every step and stage of the regress + we must find ourselves confronted with the same question, the same + alternative—intelligent purpose or colossal chance."</p> + + <p>Now, so far as Comte is here guilty of the fallacy I have already + dwelt upon of building a destructive argument upon a demonstration of + mere orderly processes in nature, as distinguished from a demonstration + of the natural cause of these processes, it is not for me to defend him. + All we can say with regard to him in this connection is, that, having a + sort of scientific presentiment that if the knowledge of his day were + sufficiently advanced it would prove destructive of supernaturalism in + the higher and more abstruse provinces of physical speculation, as it had + previously proved in the lower and less abstruse of these provinces, + Comte allowed his inferences to outrun their legitimate basis. Being + necessarily ignorant of the one generating cause of orderly processes in + nature, he improperly allowed himself to found conclusions on the basis + of these processes alone, which could only be properly founded on the + basis of their cause. But freely granting this much to Professor Flint, + and the rest of his remarks in this connection will be found, in view of + the altered standing of this subject, to be open to amendment. For, in + the first place, no one need now resort to the illogical supposition that + "the law of gravitation or any other physical law has of itself + determined the course of cosmical evolution." What we may argue, and what + must be conceded to us, is, that the common substratum of all physical + laws was at one time sufficient to produce the simplest physical laws, + and that throughout the whole course of evolution this common substratum + has always been sufficient to produce the more complex laws in the + ascending series of their ever-increasing number and variety. And hence + it becomes obvious that the "origin of the nebula" presents a difficulty + neither greater nor less than "the origin of the planets," since, "if we + may go back as far as we please," we can entertain no <i>scientific</i> + doubt that we should come to a time, prior even to the nebula, when the + substance of the solar system existed merely as such—<i>i.e.</i>, + in an almost or in a wholly undifferentiated form, the product, no doubt, + of endless cycles of previous evolutions and dissolutions of formal + differentiations. Therefore, although it is undoubtedly true that "the + solar system could only have been evolved out of its nebulous state into + that which it now presents if the nebula possessed" those particular + attributes which were necessity to the evolution of such a product, this + consideration is clearly deprived of all its force from our present point + of view. For unless it can be shown that there is some independent reason + for believing these particular attributes—which must have been of a + more and more simple a character the further we recede in time—to + have been miraculously imposed, the analogy is overwhelming that they all + progressively arose <i>by way of natural law</i>. And if so, the universe + which has been thus produced is the only universe in this particular + point of space and time which could have been thus produced. That it is + an <i>orderly</i> universe we have seen <i>ad nauseam</i> to be no + argument in favour of its having been a <i>designed</i> universe, so long + as the cause of its order—general laws—can be seen to admit + of a natural explanation.</p> + + <p>Thus there is clearly nothing to be gained on the side of teleology by + going back to the dim and dismal birth of the nebula; for no + "thoroughgoing evolutionist" would for one moment entertain the + supposition that natural law in the simplest phases of its development + partook any more of a miraculous character than it does in its more + recent and vastly more complex phases. The absence of knowledge must not + be used as equivalent to its presence; and if analogy can be held to + justify any inference whatsoever, surely we may conclude with confidence + that if existing general laws admit of being conceivably attributed to a + natural genesis, the primordial laws of a condensing nebula must have + been the same.</p> + + <p>There is another passage in Professor Flint's work to which it seems + desirable to refer. It begins thus: "There is the law of heredity: like + produces like. But why is there such a law? Why does like produce + like?... Physical science cannot answer these questions; but that is no + reason why they should not both be asked and answered. I can conceive of + no other intelligent answer being given to them than that there is a God + of wisdom, who designed that the world should be for all ages the abode + of life," &c.</p> + + <p>Now here we have in another form that same vicious tendency to take + refuge in the more obscure cases of physical causation as proofs of + supernatural design—the obscurity in this case arising from the + <i>complexity</i> of the causes and work, as in the former case it arose + from their <i>remoteness</i> in time. But in both cases the same answer + is patent, viz., that although "physical science cannot answer these + questions" by pointing out the precise sequence of causes and effects, + physical science is nevertheless quite as certain that this precise + sequence arises in its last resort from the persistence of force, as she + would be were she able to trace the whole process. And therefore, in view + of the considerations set forth in <a href="#ChapIV">Chapter IV.</a> of + this work, it is no longer open to Professor Flint or to any other writer + logically to assert—"I can conceive of no other intelligent answer + being given to" such questions "than that there is a God of wisdom."</p> + + <p>The same answer awaits this author's further disquisition on other + biological laws, so it is needless to make any further quotations in this + connection. But there is one other principle embodied in some of these + passages which it seems undesirable to overlook. It is said, for + instance, "Natural selection might have had no materials, or altogether + insufficient materials, to work with, or the circumstances might have + been such that the lowest organisms were the best endowed for the + struggle for life. If the earth were covered with water, fish would + survive and higher creatures would perish."</p> + + <p>Now the principle here embodied—viz., that had the conditions of + evolution been other than they were, the results would have been + different—is, of course, true; but clearly, on the view that + <i>all</i> natural laws spring from the persistence of force, no other + conditions than those which actually occurred, or are now occurring, + could ever have occurred,—the whole course of evolution must have + been, in all its phases and in all its processes, an unconditional + necessity. But if it is said, How fortunate that the outcome, being + unconditionally necessary, has happened to be so good as it is; I answer + that the remark is legitimate enough if it is not intended to convey an + implication that the general quality of the outcome points to beneficent + design as to its cause. Such an implication would not be legitimate, + because, in the first place, we have no means of knowing in how many + cases, whether in planets, stars, or systems, the course of evolution has + failed to produce life and mind—the one known case of this earth, + whether or not it is the one success out of millions of abortions, being + of necessity the only known case. In how vastly greater a number of cases + the course of evolution may have been, so to speak, deflected by some + even slight, though strictly necessary, cause from producing + self-conscious intelligence, it is impossible to conjecture. But this + consideration, be it observed, is not here adduced in order to + <i>disprove</i> the assertion that telluric evolution has been effected + by Intelligence; it is merely adduced to prove that such an assertion + cannot rest on the single known result of telluric evolution, so long as + an infinite number of the results of evolution elsewhere remain + unknown.</p> + + <p>And now, lastly, it must be observed that even in the one case with + which we are acquainted, the net product of evolution is not such as can + of itself point us to <i>beneficent</i> design. Professor Flint, indeed, + in common with theologians generally, argues that it does. I will + therefore briefly criticise his remarks on this subject, believing, as I + do, that they form a very admirable illustration of what I conceive to be + a general principle—viz., that minds which already believe in the + existence of a Deity are, as a rule, not in a position to view this + question of beneficence in nature in a perfectly impartial manner. For if + the existence of a Deity is presupposed, a mind with any particle of that + most noble quality—reverence—will naturally hesitate to draw + conclusions that partake of the nature of blasphemy; and therefore, + unconsciously perhaps to themselves, they endeavour in various ways to + evade the evidence which, if honestly and impartially considered, can + scarcely fail to negative the argument from beneficence in the + universe.</p> + + <p>Professor Flint argues that the "law of over-production," and the + consequent struggle for existence, being "the reason why the world is so + wonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life," is "a means to an end + worthy of Divine Wisdom." "Although involving privation, pain, and + conflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections of + sentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion has + gained its strength, the deer its speed, and the dog its sagacity. The + inference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be + attained by it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of + the advantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering which + the conflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals for + some higher end than happiness—that he cares for animal perfection + as well as for animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying + that the ends which the conflict actually serves it was intended to + serve."</p> + + <p>Now, whatever may be thought of such an argument as an attempted + justification of beneficent design already on independent ground believed + to exist, it is manifestly no argument at all as establishing any + presumption in favour of such design, unless it could be shown that the + Deity is so far limited in his power of adapting means to ends that the + particular method adopted in this case was the best, all things + considered, that he was able to adopt. For supposing the Deity to be, + what Professor Flint maintains that he is—viz., + omnipotent—and there can be no inference more transparent than that + such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends designed, exhibits an + incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the divine character + than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human characters. For + let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in nature means. + Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of millions of + animals must be supposed to have been sentient. Since that time till the + present, there must have been millions and millions of generations of + millions of millions of individuals. And throughout all this period of + incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms have + been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to the + outcome, we find that more than half of the species which have survived + the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and + insentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find + teeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for + torment—everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, and sickness, with + oozing blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of + innocence that dimly close in deaths of brutal torture! Is it said that + there are compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the + enjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the pains, + and this whether or not evolution is due to design. Therefore all I am + concerned with is to show, that if such a state of things is due to + "omnipotent design," the omnipotent designer must be concluded, so far as + reason can infer, to be non-beneficent. And this it is not difficult to + show. When I see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a spring-trap, I + abhor the devilish nature of the being who, with full powers of realising + what pain means, can deliberately employ his noble faculties of invention + in contriving a thing so hideously cruel. But if I could believe that + there is a being who, with yet higher faculties of thought and knowledge, + and with an unlimited choice of means to secure his ends, has contrived + untold thousands of mechanisms no less diabolical than a spring-trap; I + should call that being a fiend, were all the world besides to call him + God. Am I told that this is arrogance? It is nothing of the kind; it is + plain morality, and to say otherwise would be to hide our eyes from + murder because we dread the Murderer. Am I told that I am not competent + to judge the purposes of the Almighty? I answer that if these are + <i>purposes</i>, I <i>am</i> able to judge of them so far as I can see; + and if I am expected to judge of his purposes when they appear to be + beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them when they + appear to be malevolent. And it can be no possible extenuation of the + latter to point to the "final result" as "order and beauty," so long as + the means adopted by the "<i>Omnipotent</i> Designer" are known to have + been so revolting. All that we could legitimately assert in this case + would be, that so far as observation can extend, "he cares for animal + perfection" <i>to the exclusion of</i> "animal enjoyment," and even to + the <i>total disregard</i> of animal suffering. But to assert this would + merely be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God.</p> + + <p>The dilemma, therefore, which Epicurus has stated with great lucidity, + and which Professor Flint quotes, appears to me so obvious as scarcely to + require statement. The dilemma is, that, looking to the facts of organic + nature, theists must abandon their belief, either in the divine + omnipotence, or in the divine beneficence. And yet, such is the warping + effect of preformed beliefs on the mind, that even so candid a writer as + Professor Flint can thus write of this most obvious truth:—</p> + + <p>"The late Mr. John Stuart Mill, for no better reason than that nature + sometimes drowns men and burns them, and that childbirth is a painful + process, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall not + say what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed by such an + argument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the littleness + of man. The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it tries to + measure the attributes and limit the greatness of its Creator."</p> + + <p>But the argument—or rather the truism—in question is an + attempt to do neither the one nor the other; it simply asserts the patent + fact that, if God is omnipotent, and so had an unlimited choice of means + whereby to accomplish the ends of "animal perfection," "animal + enjoyment," and the rest; then the fact of his having chosen to adopt the + means which he has adopted is a fact which is wholly incompatible with + his beneficence. And on the other hand, if he is beneficent, the fact of + his having adopted these means in order that the sum of ultimate + enjoyment might exceed the sum of concomitant pain, is a fact which is + wholly incompatible with his omnipotence. To a man who already believes, + on independent grounds, in an omnipotent and beneficent Deity, it is no + doubt possible to avoid facing this dilemma, and to rest content with the + assumption that, in a sense beyond the reach of human reason, or even of + human conception, the two horns of this dilemma must be united in some + transcendental reconciliation; but if a man undertakes to reason on the + subject at all, as he must and ought when the question is as to the + <i>existence</i> of such a Deity, then clearly he has no alternative but + to allow that the dilemma is a hopeless one. With inverted meaning, + therefore, may we quote Professor Flint's words against + himself:—"The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it + tries to measure the attributes ... of its Creator;" for certainly, if + Professor Flint's usually candid mind has had a Creator, it nowhere + displays the "littleness" of prejudice in so marked a degree as it does + when "measuring his attributes."</p> + + <p>Thus in a subsequent chapter he deals at greater length with this + difficulty of the apparent failure of beneficence in nature, arguing, in + effect, that as pain and suffering "serve many good ends" in the way of + warning animals of danger to life, &c., therefore we ought to + conclude that, if we could see farther, we should see pain and suffering + to be unmitigated good, or nearly so. Now this argument, as I have + previously said, may possibly be admissible as between Christians or + others who <i>already</i> believe in the existence and in the beneficence + of God; but it is only the blindest prejudice which can fail to perceive + that the argument is quite without relevancy when the question is as to + the <i>evidences</i> of such existence and the <i>evidences</i> of such + character. For where the <i>fact</i> of such an existence and character + is the question in dispute, it clearly can be no argument to state its + bare assumption by saying that if we knew more of nature we should find + the relative preponderance of good over evil to be immeasurably greater + than that which we now perceive. The platform of argument on which the + question of "Theism" must be discussed is that of the observable Cosmos; + and if, as Dr. Flint is constrained to admit, there is a fearful + spectacle of misery presented by this Cosmos, it becomes mere + question-begging to gloss over this aspect of the subject by any vague + assumption that the misery must have some unobservable ends of so + transcendentally beneficent a nature, that were they known they would + justify the means. Indeed, this kind of discussion seems to me worse than + useless for the purposes which the Professor has in view; for it only + serves by contrast to throw out into stronger relief the natural and the + unstrained character of the adverse interpretation of the facts. + According to this adverse interpretation, sentiency has been evolved by + natural selection to secure the benefits which are pointed out by + Professor Flint; and therefore the fact of this, its cause, having been a + <i>mindless</i> cause, clearly implies that the <i>restriction</i> of + pain and suffering cannot be an active principle, or a <i>vera causa</i>, + as between species and species, though it must be such within the limits + of the same organism, and to a lesser extent within the limits of the + same species. And this is just what we find to be the case. Therefore, + without the need of resorting to wholly arbitrary assumptions concerning + transcendental reconciliations between apparently needless suffering and + a supposed almighty beneficence, the non-theistic hypothesis is saved by + merely opening our eyes to the observable facts around us, and there + seeing that pain and misery, alike in the benefits which they bring and + in the frightful excesses which they manifest, play just that part in + nature which this hypothesis would lead us to expect.</p> + + <p>Therefore, to sum up these considerations on physical suffering, the + case between a theist and a sceptic as to the question of divine + beneficence is seen to be a case of extreme simplicity. The theist + believes in such beneficence by purposely concealing from his mind all + adverse evidence—feeling, on the one side, that to entertain the + doubt to which this evidence points would be to hold dalliance with + blasphemy, and, on the other side, that the subject is of so + transcendental a nature that, in view of so great a risk, it is better to + avoid impartial reasoning upon it. A sceptic, on the other hand, is under + no such obligation to preconceived ideas, and is therefore free to draw + unbiassed inferences as to the character of God, if he exists, to the + extent which such character is indicated by the sphere of observable + nature. And, as I have said, when the subject is so viewed, the inference + is unavoidable that, so far as human reason can penetrate, God, if he + exists, must either be non-infinite in his resources, or non-beneficent + in his designs. Therefore it is evident that when the <i>being</i> of + God, as distinguished from his <i>character</i>, is the subject in + dispute, Theism can gain nothing by an appeal to evidences of + <i>beneficent</i> designs. If such evidences were unequivocal, then + indeed the argument which they would establish to an intelligent cause of + nature would be almost irresistible; for the fact of the external world + being in harmony with the moral nature of man would be unaccountable + except on the supposition of both having derived their origin from a + common <i>moral</i> source; and morality implies intelligence. But as it + is, all the so-called evidence of divine beneficence in nature is, + without any exception of a kind that is worthless as proving + <i>design</i>; for all the facts admit of being explained equally well on + the supposition of their having been due to purely physical processes, + acting through the various biological laws which we are now only + beginning to understand. And further than this, so far are these facts + from proving the existence of a moral cause, that, in view of the + alternative just stated, they even ground a positive argument to its + negation. For, as we have seen, all these facts are just of such a kind + as we should expect to be the facts, on the supposition of their having + been due to natural causes—<i>i.e.</i>, causes which could have had + no moral solicitude for animal happiness as such. Let us now, in + conclusion, dwell on this antithesis at somewhat greater length.</p> + + <p>If natural selection has played any large share in the process of + organic evolution, it is evident that animal enjoyment, being an + important factor in this natural cause, must always have been furthered + <i>to the extent in which it was necessary for the adaptation of + organisms to their environment</i> that it should. And such we invariably + find to be the limits within which animal enjoyments <i>are</i> confined. + On the other hand, so long as the adaptations in question are not + complete, so long must more or less of suffering be entailed—the + capacity for suffering, as for enjoyment, being no doubt itself a product + of natural selection. But as all specific types are perpetually + struggling together, it is manifest that the competition must prevent any + considerable number of types from becoming so far adapted to their + environment of other types as to become exempt from suffering as a result + of this competition. There being no one integrating cause of an + intelligent or moral nature to supply the conditions of happiness to each + organic type without the misery of this competition, such happiness as + animals have is derived from the heavy expenditure of pain suffered by + themselves and by their ancestry.</p> + + <p>Thus, whether we look to animal pleasures or to animal pains, the + result is alike just what we should expect to find on the supposition of + these pleasures and pains having been due to necessary and physical, as + distinguished from intelligent and moral, antecedents; for how different + is that which is from that which might have been! Not only might + beneficent selection have eliminated the countless species of parasites + which now destroy the health and happiness of all the higher organisms; + not only might survival of the fittest, in a moral sense, have determined + that rapacious and carnivorous animals should yield their places in the + world to harmless and gentle ones; not only might life have been without + sickness and death without pain;—but how might the exigences and + the welfare of species have been consulted by the structures and the + habits of one another! But no! Amid all the millions of mechanisms and + habits in organic nature, all of which are so beautifully adapted to the + needs of the species presenting them, there is <i>no single instance</i> + of any mechanism or habit occurring in one species for the exclusive + benefit of another species—although, as we should expect on the + non-theistic theory, there are some comparatively few cases of a + mechanism or a habit which is of benefit to its possessor being also + utilised by other species. Yet, on the beneficent-design theory, it is + impossible to understand why, when all mechanisms and habits in the same + species are invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there + should never be any such correlation between mechanisms and habits of + different species. For how magnificent, how sublime a display of supreme + beneficence would nature have afforded if all her sentient animals had + been so inter-related as to minister to each other's happiness! Organic + species might then have been likened to a countless multitude of voices, + all singing to their Creator in one harmonious psalm of praise. But, as + it is, we see no vestige of such correlation; every species is for + itself, and for itself alone—an outcome of the always and + everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life.</p> + + <p>So much, then, for the case of <i>physical</i> evil; but Dr. Flint + also treats of the case of <i>moral</i> evil. Let us see what this + well-equipped writer can make of this old problem in the present year of + grace. He says—"But it will be objected, could not God have made + moral creatures who would be certain always to choose what is right, + always to acquiesce in His holy will?... Well, far be it from me to deny + that God could have originated a sinless moral system.... But if + questioned as to why He has not done better, I feel no shame in + confessing my ignorance. It seems to me that when you have resolved the + problem of the origin of moral evil into the question, Why has God not + originated a moral universe in which the lowest moral being would be as + excellent as the archangels are? you have at once shown it to be + <i>speculatively incapable of solution</i> [italics mine], and + practically without importance[!]. The question is one which would + obviously give rise to another, Why has God not created only moral beings + as much superior to the archangels as they are superior to the lowest + Australian aborigines? But no complete answer can be given to a question + which may be followed by a series of similar questions to which there is + no end. We have, besides, neither the facts nor the faculties to answer + such questions."<a name="footnotetag46" + href="#footnote46"><sup>[46]</sup></a></p> + + <p>Now I confess that this argument presents to my mind more of subtlety + than sense. I had previously imagined that the archangels were supposed + to enjoy a condition of moral existence which might fairly be thought to + remove them from any association with that of the Australian aborigines. + But as this question is one that belongs to Divinity, I am here quite + prepared to bow to Professor Flint's authority—hoping, however, + that he is prepared to take the responsibility should the archangels ever + care to accuse me of calumny. But, as a logician, I must be permitted to + observe, that if I ask, Why am I not better than I am? it is no answer to + tell me, Because the archangels are not better than they are. For aught + that I know to the contrary, the archangels may be morally + <i>perfect</i>—as an authority in such matters has told us that + even "just men" may become,—and therefore, for aught that I know to + the contrary, Professor Flint's regress of moral degrees <i>ad + infinitum</i>, may be an ontological absurdity. But granting, for the + sake of argument, that archangels fall infinitely short of moral + perfection, and I should only be able to see in the fact a hopeless + aggravation of my previous difficulty. If it is hard to reconcile the + supreme goodness of God with the moral turpitude of man, much more would + it be hard to do so if his very angels are depraved. Therefore, if the + reasonable question which I originally put "may be followed by a series + of similar questions to which there is no end," the goodness of God must + simply be pronounced a delusion. For the question which I originally put + was no mere flimsy question of a stupidly unreal description. My own + moral depravity is a matter of painful certainty to me, and I want to + know why, if there is a God of infinite power and goodness, he should + have made me thus. And in answer I am told that my question is + "practically without importance," because there may be an endless series + of beings who, in their several degrees, are in a similar predicament to + myself. Perhaps they are; but if so, the moral evil with which I am + directly acquainted is made all the blacker by the fact that it is thus + but a drop in an infinite ocean of moral imperfection. When, therefore, + Professor Flint goes on to say, "We ought to be content if we can show + that what God has done is wise and right, and not perplex ourselves as to + why He has not done an infinity of other things," I answer, Most + certainly; but <i>can</i> we show that what God has done is wise and + right? Unquestionably not. That what he has done <i>may</i> be wise and + right, could we see his whole scheme of things, no careful thinker will + deny; but to suppose it can be <i>shown</i> that he has done this, is an + instance of purblind fanaticism which is most startling in a work on + <i>Theism</i>. "The best world, <i>we may be assured</i>, that our + fancies can feign, would in reality be far inferior to the world God has + made, whatever imperfections we may think we see in it." Are we leading a + sermon on the datum "God is love"? No; but a work on the questions, Is + there a God? and, if so, Is he a God of love? And yet the work is written + by a man who evidently tries to argue fairly. What shall we say of the + despotism of preformed beliefs? May we not say at least this + much—that those who endeavour to reconcile their theories of divine + goodness with the facts of human evil might well appropriate to + themselves the words above quoted, "We have neither the facts nor the + faculties to answer such questions"? For the "facts" indeed are absent, + and the "faculties" of impartial thought must be absent also, if this + obvious truth cannot be seen—that "these questions" only derive + their "speculatively unanswerable" character from the rational falsity of + the manner by which it is sought to answer them. The "facts" of our moral + nature, so far as honest reason can perceive, belie the hypothesis of + Theism; and although the "faculties" of man may be forced by prejudice + into an acceptance of contradictory propositions, the truth is obvious + that only by the hypothesis of Evolution can that old-tied knot be + cut—the Origin of Evil. The form of Theism for which Dr. Flint is + arguing is the current form, viz., that there is a God who combines in + himself the attributes of <i>infinite</i> power and <i>perfect</i> + goodness—a God at once <i>omnipotent</i> and <i>wholly</i> moral. + But, in view of the fact that moral evil exists in man, the proposition + that God is omnipotent and the proposition that he is wholly moral become + contradictory; and therefore the fact of moral evil can only be met, + either by abandoning one or other of these propositions, or by altogether + rejecting the hypothesis of Theism.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + + <p><a name="SuppEssIII"></a></p> + +<h3>III.</h3> + +<h3>THE SPECULATIVE STANDING OF +MATERIALISM.</h3> + + <p>As a continuation of my criticism on Mr. Fiske's views, I think it is + desirable to add a few words concerning the speculative annihilation with + which he supposes Mr. Spencer's doctrines to have visited Materialism. Of + course it is a self-evident truism that the doctrine of Relativity is + destructive of Materialism, if by Materialism we mean a theory which + ignores that doctrine. In other words, the doctrine of Relativity, if + accepted, clearly excludes the doctrine that Matter, <i>as known + phenomenally</i>, is at all likely to be a true representative of + whatever <i>thing-in-itself</i> it may be that constitutes Mind. But this + position is fully established by the doctrine of Relativity alone, and is + therefore not in the least affected, either by way of confirmation or + otherwise, by Mr. Spencer's extended doctrine of the Unknowable—it + being only because the latter doctrine presupposes the doctrine of + Relativity that it is exclusive of Materialism in the sense which has + just been stated. So far, therefore, Mr. Spencer's writings cannot be + held to have any special bearing on the doctrine of Materialism. Such a + special bearing is only exerted by these writings when they proceed to + show that "it seems an imaginable possibility that units of external + force may be identical in nature with the units of the force known as + feeling." Let us then ascertain how far it is true that the argument + already quoted, and which leads to this conclusion, is utterly + destructive of Materialism.</p> + + <p>In the first place, I may observe that this argument differs in + several instructive particulars from the anti-materialistic argument of + Locke, which we have already had occasion to consider. For while Locke + erroneously imagined that the test of inconceivability is of equivalent + value <i>wherever</i> it is applied, save only where it conflicts with + preconceived ideas on the subject of Theism (see <a + href="#Appendix">Appendix A.</a>), Spencer, of course, is much too + careful a thinker to fall into so obvious a fallacy. But again, it is + curious to observe that in the anti-materialistic argument of Spencer the + test of inconceivability is used in a manner the precise opposite of that + in which it is used in the anti-materialistic argument of Locke. For + while the ground of Locke's argument is that Materialism must be untrue + because it is inconceivable that Matter (and Force) should be of a + psychical nature; the ground of Spencer's argument is that what we know + as Force (and Matter) may <i>not</i> inconceivably be of a psychical + nature. For my own part, I think that Spencer's argument is, + psychologically speaking, the more valid of the two; but nevertheless I + think that, logically speaking, it is likewise invalid to a perceptibly + great, and to a further indefinite, degree. For the argument sets out + with the reflection that we can only know Matter and Force as symbols of + consciousness, while we know consciousness directly, and therefore that + we can go further in conceivably translating Matter and Force into terms + of Mind than <i>vice versa</i>. And this is true, but it does not + therefore follow that the truth is more likely to lie in the direction + that thought can most easily travel. For although I am at one with Mr. + Spencer, whom Mr. Fiske follows, in regarding his test of + truth—viz., inconceivability of a negation—as the most + <i>ultimate</i> test within our reach, I cannot agree with him that in + this particular case it is the most <i>trustworthy</i> test within our + reach. I cannot do so because the reflection is forced upon me that, "as + the terms which are contemplated in this particular case are respectively + the highest abstractions of objective and of subjective existence, the + test of truth in question is neutralised by directly encountering the + inconceivable relation that exists between subject and object." Or, in + other words, as before stated, "<i>whatever</i> the cause of Mind may be, + we can clearly perceive it to be a subjective necessity of the case that, + in ultimate analysis, we should find it more easy to conceive of this + cause as resembling Mind—the only entity of which we are directly + conscious—than to conceive of it as any other entity of which we + are only indirectly conscious." When, therefore, Mr. Spencer argues that + "it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer + existence," while it is not so impossible to interpret outer existence in + terms of inner existence, the fact is merely what we should in any case + expect <i>à priori</i> to be the fact, and therefore as a fact it is not + a very surprising discovery <i>à posteriori</i>. So that when Mr. Fiske + proceeds to make this fact the basis of his argument, that because we can + more conceivably regard objective existence as like in kind to subjective + existence than conversely, therefore we should conclude that there is a + corresponding probability in favour of the more conceivable proposition, + I demur to his argument. For, fully accepting the fact on which the + argument rests, and it seems to me, in view of what I have said, that the + latter assigns an altogether disproportionate value to the test of + inconceivability in this case. Far from endowing this test with so great + an authority in this case, I should regard it not only as perceptibly of + very small validity, but, as I have said, invalid to a degree which we + have no means of ascertaining. If it be asked, What other gauge of + probability can we have in this matter other than such a direct appeal to + consciousness? I answer, that this appeal being here <i>à priori</i> + invalid, we are left to fall back upon the formal probability which is + established by an application of scientific canons to objective + phenomena. (See footnote in <a href="#Sect14">§ 14</a>.) For, be it + carefully observed, Mr. Spencer, and his disciple Mr. Fiske, are not + idealists. Were this the case, of course the test of an immediate appeal + to consciousness would be to them the only test available. But, on the + contrary, as all the world knows, Mr. Spencer asserts the existence of an + unknown Reality, of which all phenomena are the manifestations. + Consequently, what we call Force and Matter are, according to this + doctrine, phenomenal manifestations of this objective Reality. That is to + say, for aught that we can know, Force and Matter may be anything within + the whole range of the possible; and the only limitation that can be + assigned to them is, that they are modes of existence which are + independent of, or objective to, our individual consciousness, but which + are uniformly translated into consciousness as Force and Matter. Now it + does not signify one iota for the purposes of Materialism whether these + our symbolical representations of Force and Matter are accurate or + inaccurate representations of their corresponding + realities,—unless, of course, some <i>independent</i> reason could + be shown for supposing that in their reality they resemble Mind. Call + Force <i>x</i> and Matter <i>y</i>, and so long as we are agreed that + <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> are <i>objective realities which are uniformly + translated into consciousness as Force and Matter</i>, the materialistic + deductions remain unaffected by this mere change in our terminology; + these essential facts are allowed to remain substantially as before, + namely, that there is an external something or external + somethings—Matter and Force, or <i>x</i> and <i>y</i>—which + themselves display no observable tokens of consciousness, but which are + invariably associated with consciousness in a highly distinctive + manner.</p> + + <p>I dwell at length upon this subject, because although Mr. Spencer + himself does not appear to attach much weight to his argument, Mr. Fiske, + as we have seen, elevates it into a basis for "Cosmic Theism." Yet so far + is this argument from "ruling out," as Mr. Fiske asserts, the essential + doctrine of Materialism—<i>i.e.</i>, the doctrine that what we know + as Mind is an effect of certain collocations and distributions of <i>what + we know</i> as Matter and Force—that the argument might be employed + with almost the same degree of effect, or absence of effect, to disprove + any instance of recognised causation. Thus, for example, the doctrine of + Materialism is no more "ruled out" by the reflection that what we cognise + as cerebral matter is only cognised relatively, than would the doctrine + of chemical equivalents be "ruled out" by the parallel reflection that + what we cognise as chemical elements are only cognised relatively. I say + advisedly, "with <i>almost</i> the same degree of effect," because, to be + strictly accurate, we ought not altogether to ignore the indefinitely + slender presumption which Mr. Spencer's subjective test of + inconceivability establishes on the side of Spiritualism, as against the + objective evidence of causation on the side of Materialism. As this is an + important subject, I will be a little more explicit. We are agreed that + Force and Matter are entities external to consciousness, of which we can + possess only symbolical knowledge. Therefore, as we have said, Force and + Matter may be anything within the whole range of the possible. But we + know that Mind is a possible entity, while we have no certain knowledge + of any other possible entity. Hence we are justified in saying, It is + possible that Force and Matter may be identical with the only entity + which we know as certainly possible; but forasmuch as we do not know the + sum of possible entities, we have no means of calculating the chances + there are that what we know as Force and Matter are identical in nature + with Mind. Still, that there is <i>a</i> chance we cannot dispute; all we + can assert is, that we are unable to determine its value, and that it + would be a mistake to suppose we can do so, even in the lowest degree, by + Mr. Spencer's test of inconceivability. Nevertheless, the fact that there + is such a chance renders it in some indeterminate degree more probable + that what we know as Force and Matter are identical with what we know as + Mind, than that what we know as oxygen and hydrogen are identical with + what we know as water. So that to this extent the essential doctrine of + Materialism is "ruled out" in a further degree by the philosophy of the + Unknowable than is the chemical doctrine of equivalents. But, of course, + this indefinite possibility of what we know as Force and Matter being + identical with what we know as Mind does not neutralise, in any + determinable degree, the considerations whereby Materialism in its + present shape infers that what we know as Force and Matter are probably + distinct from what we know as Mind.</p> + + <p>But I see no reason why Materialism should be restricted to this "its + present shape." Even if we admit to the fullest extent the validity of + Mr. Spencer's argument, and conclude with Professor Clifford as a matter + of probability that "the universe consists entirely of Mind-stuff," I do + not see that the admission would affect Materialism in any essential + respect. For here again the admission would amount to little else, so far + as Materialism is directly concerned, than a change of terminology: + instead of calling objective existence "Matter," we call it "Mind-stuff." + I say "to <i>little</i> else," because no doubt in one particular there + is here some change introduced in the speculative standing of the + subject. So long as Matter and Mind, <i>x</i> and <i>y</i>, are held to + be antithetically opposed in substance, so long must Materialism suppose + that a connection of <i>causality</i> subsists between the two, such that + the former substance is <i>produced</i> in some unaccountable way by the + latter. But when Matter and Mind, <i>x</i> and <i>y</i>, are supposed to + be identical in substance, the need for any additional supposition as to + a causal connection is excluded. But unless we hold, what seems to me an + uncalled-for opinion, that the essential feature of Materialism consists + in a postulation of a causal connection between <i>x</i> and <i>y</i>, it + would appear that the only effect of supposing <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> to + be really but one substance <i>z</i>, must be that of + <i>strengthening</i> the essential doctrine of Materialism—the + doctrine, namely, that conscious intellectual existence is + <i>necessarily</i> associated with that form of existence which we know + phenomenally as Matter and Motion. If it is true that a "a moving + molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, but + it possesses a small piece of Mind-stuff," then assuredly the central + position of Materialism is shown to be impregnable. For while it remains + as true as ever that mind and consciousness can only emerge when what we + know phenomenally as "Matter takes the complex form of a living brain," + we have abolished the necessity for assuming even a causal connection + between the substance of what we know phenomenally as Matter and the + substance of what we know phenomenally as Mind: we have found that, in + the last resort, the phenomenal connection between what we know as Matter + and what we know as Mind is actually even more intimate than a connection + of causality; we have found that it is a substantial identity.</p> + + <p>To sum up this discussion. We have considered the bearing of modern + speculation on the doctrine of Materialism in three successive stages of + argument. First, we had to consider the bearing on Materialism of the + simple doctrine of Relativity. Here we saw that Materialism was only + affected to the extent of being compelled to allow that what we know as + Matter and Motion are not known as they are in themselves. But we also + saw that, as the inscrutable realities are uniformly translated into + consciousness as Matter and Motion, it still remains as true as ever that + <i>what we know</i> as Matter and Motion may be the causes of what we + know as Mind. Even, therefore, if the supposition of causality is taken + to be an essential feature of Materialism, Materialism would be in no + wise affected by substituting for the words Matter and Motion the symbols + <i>x</i> and <i>y</i>.</p> + + <p>The second of the three stages consisted in showing that Mr. Spencer's + argument as to the possible identity of Force and Feeling is not in + itself sufficient to overthrow the doctrine that what we know as Matter + and Motion may be the cause of what we know as Mind. For the mere fact of + its being more <i>conceivable</i> that units of Force should resemble + units of Feeling than conversely, is no warrant for concluding that in + reality any corresponding probability obtains. The test of + conceivability, although the most ultimate test that is available, is + here rendered vague and valueless by the <i>à priori</i> consideration + that <i>whatever</i> the cause of Mind may be (if it has a cause), we + must find it more easy to conceive of this cause as resembling Mind than + to conceive of it as resembling any other entity of which we are only + conscious indirectly.</p> + + <p>Lastly, in the third place, we saw that even if Mr. Spencer's argument + were fully subscribed to, and Mind in its substantial essence were + conceded to be causeless, the central position of Materialism would still + remain unaffected. For Mr. Spencer does not suppose that his "units of + Force" are themselves endowed with consciousness, any more than Professor + Clifford supposes his "moving molecules of inorganic matter" to be thus + endowed. So that the only change which these possibilities, even if + conceded to be actualities, produce in the speculative standing of + Materialism, is to show that the raw material of consciousness, instead + of requiring to be <i>caused</i> by other substances—Matter and + Force, <i>x</i> and <i>y</i>,—occurs ready made as those + substances. But the essential feature of Materialism remains + untouched—namely, that what we know as Mind is dependent (whether + by way of causality or not is immaterial) on highly complex forms of + <i>what we know</i> as Matter, in association with highly peculiar + distributions of <i>what we know</i> as Force.</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + + <p><a name="SuppEssIV"></a></p> + +<h3>IV.</h3> + +<h3>THE FINAL MYSTERY OF THINGS.</h3> + + <p>Some physicists are inclined to dispute the fundamental proposition in + which the whole of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy may be said to + rest—the proposition, namely, that the fact of the "persistence of + force" constitutes the ultimate basis of science. For my own part, I + cannot but believe that any disagreement on this matter only arises from + some want of mutual understanding; and, therefore, in order to anticipate + any criticisms to which the present work may be open on this score, I + append this explanatory note.</p> + + <p>I readily grant that the term "persistence of force" is not a happy + one, seeing that the word "force," as used by physicists, does not at the + present time convey the full meaning which Mr. Spencer desires it to + convey. But I think that any impartial physicist will be prepared to + admit that, in the present state of his science, we are entitled to + conclude that energy of position is merely the result of energy of + motion; or, in other words, that potential energy is merely an expression + of the fact that the universe, as a whole, is replete with actual energy, + whose essential characteristic is that it is indestructible. And this may + be concluded without committing ourselves to any particular theory as to + the physical explanation of gravity; all we need assert is, that in some + way or other gravity is the result of ubiquitous energy. And this, it + seems to me, we must assert, or else conclude that gravity can never + admit of a physical explanation. For all that we mean by a physical + explanation is the proved establishment of an equation between two + quantities of energy; so that if energy of position does not admit of + being interpreted in terms of energy of motion, we must conclude that it + does not admit of being interpreted at all—at least not in any + physical sense.</p> + + <p>Throughout the foregoing essays, therefore, I have assumed that all + forms of energy are but relatively varying expressions of the same + fact—the fact, namely, which Mr. Spencer means to express when he + says that force is persistent. And it seems to me almost needless to show + that this fact is really the basis of all science. For unless this fact + is assumed as a postulate, not only would scientific inquiry become + impossible, but all experience would become chaotic. The physicist could + not prosecute his researches unless he presupposed that the forces which + he measures are of a permanent nature, any more than could the chemist + prosecute his researches unless he presupposed that the materials which + he estimates by energy-units are likewise of a permanent nature. And + similarly with all the other sciences, as well as with every judgment in + our daily experience. If, therefore, any one should be hypercritical + enough to dispute the position that the doctrine of the conservation of + energy constitutes the "ultimate datum" of science, I think it will be + enough to observe that if this is <i>not</i> the "ultimate datum" of + science, science can have no "ultimate datum" at all. For any datum more + ultimate than permanent existence is manifestly impossible, while any + such datum as non-permanent existence would clearly render science + impossible. Even, therefore, if such hypercriticism had a valid basis of + apparently adverse fact whereon to stand, I should feel myself justified + in neglecting it on <i>à priori</i> grounds; but the only basis on which + such hypercriticism can rest is, not the knowledge of any adverse facts, + but the ignorance of certain facts which we must either conclude to be + facts or else conclude that science can have no ultimate datum whereon to + rest. In the foregoing essays, therefore, I have not scrupled to maintain + that the ultimate datum of science is destructive of teleology as a + scientific argument for Theism; because, unless we deny the possibility + of any such ultimate datum, and so land ourselves in hopeless scepticism, + we must conclude that there can be no datum more ultimate than + this—Permanent Existence; and this is just the datum which we have + seen to be destructive of teleology as a scientific argument for + Theism.</p> + + <p>It may be well to point out that from this ultimate datum of + science—or rather, let us say, of experience—there follows a + deductive explanation of the law of causation. For this law, when + stripped of all the metaphysical corruptions with which it has been so + cumbersomely clothed, simply means that a given collocation of + antecedents unconditionally produces a certain consequent. But this fact, + otherwise stated, amounts to nothing more than a re-statement of the + ultimate datum of experience—the fact that energy is + indestructible. For if this latter fact be granted, it is obvious that + the so-called law of causation follows as a deductive necessity—or + rather, as I have said, that this law becomes but another way of + expressing the same fact. This is obvious if we reflect that the only + means we have of ascertaining that energy is <i>not</i> destructible, is + by observing that similar antecedents <i>do</i> invariably determine + similar consequents. It is as a vast induction from all those particular + cases of sequence-changes which collectively we call causation that we + conclude energy to be indestructible. And, obversely, having concluded + energy to be indestructible, we can plainly see that in any particular + cases of its manifestation in sequence-phenomena, the unconditional + resemblance between effects due to similar causes which is formulated by + the law of causation is merely the direct expression of the fact which we + had previously concluded. It seems to me, therefore, that the + old-standing question concerning the nature of causation ought now + properly to be considered as obsolete. Doubtless there will long remain a + sort of hereditary tendency in metaphysical minds to look upon + cause-connection as "a mysterious tie" between antecedent and consequent; + but henceforth there is no need for scientific minds to regard this "tie" + as "mysterious" in any other sense than the existence of energy is + "mysterious." To state the law of causation is merely to state the fact + that energy is indestructible.</p> + + <p>And from this there also arises at once the explanation and the + justification of our belief in the uniformity of nature. If energy is, in + its relation to us, ubiquitous and persistent, it clearly follows that in + all its manifestations which collectively we call nature, similar + preceding manifestations must always determine similar succeeding + manifestations; for otherwise the energy concerned would require on one + or on both of the occasions, either to have become augmented by creation, + or dissipated by annihilation. Thus our belief in the uniformity of + nature, as in the validity of the law of causation, is merely an + expression of our belief in the ubiquitous and indestructible character + of energy.</p> + + <p>Such being the case, we may fairly conclude that all these + old-standing "mysteries" are now merged in the one mystery of existence. + And deeper than this it is manifestly impossible that they can be merged; + for it is manifestly impossible that Existence in the abstract can ever + admit of what we call explanation. Hence we can clearly see that, in a + scientific sense, there must always remain a final mystery of things. But + although we can thus see that, from the very meaning of what we call + explanation, it follows that at the base of all our explanations there + must lie a great Inexplicable, I think that the mystery of Existence in + the abstract may be rendered less appalling if we reflect that, as + opposed to Existence, there is only one logical + alternative—Non-existence. Supposing, then, our physical + explanations to have reached their highest limits by resolving all modes + of Existence into one mode—force, matter, life, and mind, being + shown but different manifestations of the same Infinite + Existence—the final mystery of things would then become resolved + into the simple question, Why is there Existence?—Why is there not + Nothing?</p> + + <p>Let us then first ask, What is "Nothing"? Is it a mere word, which + presents no meaning as corresponding to any objective reality, or has the + word a meaning notwithstanding its being an inconceivable one? Or, + otherwise phrased, is Nothing possible or impossible? Now, although in + ordinary conversation it is generally taken for granted that Nothing is + possible, there is certainly no more ground for this supposition than + there is for its converse—viz., that Nothing is merely a word which + signifies the negation of possibility. For analysis will show that the + choice between these two counter-suppositions can only be made in the + presence of knowledge which is necessarily absent—the knowledge + whether the universe of Existence is finite or infinite. If the universe + as a whole is finite, the word Nothing would stand as a symbol to denote + an unthinkable blank of which a finite universe is the content. And + forasmuch as Something and Nothing would then become actual, as + distinguished from nominal correlatives, we could have no guarantee that, + in an absolute or transcendental sense, it may not be possible, although + it is inconceivable, for Something to become Nothing or Nothing + Something. Hence, if Existence is finite, No-existence becomes possible; + and the doctrine of the indestructibility of Existence becomes, for aught + that we can tell, of a merely relative signification. But, on the other + hand, if Existence is infinite, No-existence becomes impossible; and the + doctrine of the indestructibility of Existence becomes, in a logical + sense, of an absolute signification. For it is manifest that if the + universe of Existence is without end in space and time, the possibility + of No-existence is of necessity excluded, and the word "Nothing" thus + becomes a mere negation of possibility.<a name="footnotetag47" + href="#footnote47"><sup>[47]</sup></a></p> + + <p>Thus, if it be conceded that the universe as a whole is infinite both + in space and time, the concession amounts to an abolition of the final + mystery of things. For all that we mean by a mystery is something that + requires an explanation, and the whole of the final mystery of things is + therefore embodied in the question, "Why is there Existence?—Why is + there not Nothing?" But if the universe of Existence be conceded + infinite, this question is sufficiently met by the answer, "Because + Existence is, and Nothing is not." If it is retorted, But this is no real + answer; I reply, It is as real as the question. For to ask, Why is there + Existence? is, upon the supposition which has been conceded, equivalent + to asking, Why is the possible possible? And if such questions cannot be + answered, it is scarcely right to say that on this account they embody a + mystery; because the questions are really not rational questions, and + therefore the fact of their not admitting of any rational answer cannot + be held to show that the questions embody any rational mystery. That + there <i>is</i> a rational mystery, in the sense of there being something + which can never be <i>explained</i>, I do not dispute; all I assert is, + that this mystery is inexplicable, only <i>because there is nothing to + explain</i>; the mystery being ultimate, to ask for an explanation of + that which, being ultimate, requires no explanation, is irrational. Or, + to state the case in another way, if it is asked, Why is there not + Nothing? it is a sufficient answer, on supposition of the universe being + infinite, to say, Because Nothing is nothing; it is merely a word which + presents no meaning, and which, so far as anything can be conceived to + the contrary, never can present any meaning.</p> + + <p>The above discussion has proceeded on the supposition of Existence + being infinite; but practically the same result would follow on the + counter-supposition of Existence being finite. For although in this case, + as we have seen, Non-entity would still be included within the range of + possibility, it would still be no more conceivable as such than is + Entity; and hence the question, Why is there not Nothing? would still be + irrational, seeing that, even if the possibility which the question + supposes were realised, it would in no wise tend to explain the mystery + of Something. And even if it could, the final mystery would not be thus + excluded; it would merely be transferred from the mystery of Existence to + the mystery of Non-existence. Thus under every conceivable supposition we + arrive at the same termination—viz., that in the last resort there + must be a final mystery, which, as forming the basis of all possible + explanations, cannot itself receive any explanation, and which therefore + is really not, in any proper sense of the term, a mystery at all. It is + merely a fact which itself requires no explanation, because it is a fact + than which none can be more ultimate. So that even if we suppose this + ultimate fact to be an Intelligent Being, it is clearly impossible that + he should be able to <i>explain</i> his own existence, since the + possibility of any such explanation would imply that his existence could + not be ultimate. In the sense, therefore, of not admitting of any + explanation, his existence would require to be a mystery to himself, + rendering it impossible for him to state anything further with regard to + it than this—"I am that I am."</p> + + <p>I do not doubt that this way of looking at the subject will be deemed + unsatisfactory at first sight, because it seems to be, as it were, a + merely logical way of cheating our intelligence out of an intuitively + felt justification for its own curiosity in this matter. But the fault + really lies in this intuitive feeling of justification not being itself + justifiable. For this particular question, it will be observed, differs + from all other possible questions with which the mind has to deal. All + other questions being questions concerning manifestations of existence + presupposed as existing, it is perfectly legitimate to seek for an + explanation of one series of manifestations in another—<i>i.e.</i>, + to refer a less known group to a group better known. But the case is + manifestly quite otherwise when, having merged one group of + manifestations into another group, and this into another for an + indefinite number of stages, we suddenly make a leap to the last possible + stage and ask, "Into what group are we to merge the basis of all our + previous groups, and of all groups which can possibly be formed in the + future? How are we to classify that which contains all possible classes? + Where are we to look for an explanation of Existence?" When thus clearly + stated, the question, is, as I have said, manifestly irrational; but the + point with which I am now concerned is this—When in plain reason + the question is <i>seen</i> to be irrational, why in intuitive sentiment + should it not be <i>felt</i> to be so? The answer, I think, is, that the + interrogative faculty being usually occupied with questions which admit + of rational answers, we acquire a sort of intellectual habit of + presupposing every wherefore to have a therefore, and thus, when + eventually we arrive at the last of all possible wherefores, which itself + supplies the basis of all possible therefores, we fail at first to + recognise the exceptional character of our position. We fail at first to + perceive that, from the very nature of this particular case, our + wherefore is deprived of the rational meaning which it had in all the + previous cases, where the possibility of a corresponding therefore was + presupposed. And failing fully to perceive this truth, our organised + habit of expecting an answer to our question asserts itself, and we + experience the same sense of intellectual unrest in the presence of this + wholly meaningless and absurd question, as we experience in the presence + of questions significant and rational.</p> + +<h4>THE END.</h4> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3>Notes</h3> +<div class="note"> + <p><a name="footnote1" href="#footnotetag1">[1]</a> The above was written + before Mr. Mill's essay on Theism was published. Lest, therefore, my + refutation may be deemed too curt, I supplement it with Mr. Mill's + remarks upon the same subject. "It may still be maintained that the + feelings of morality make the existence of God eminently desirable. No + doubt they do, and that is the great reason why we find that good men and + women cling to the belief, and are pained by its being questioned. But, + surely, it is not legitimate to assume that, in the order of the + universe, whatever is desirable is true. Optimism, even when a God is + already believed in, is a thorny doctrine to maintain, and had to be + taken by Leibnitz in the limited sense, that the universe being made by a + good being, is the best universe possible, not the best absolutely: that + the Divine power, in short, was not equal to making it more free from + imperfections than it is. But optimism, prior to belief in a God, and as + the ground of that belief, seems one of the oddest of all speculative + delusions. Nothing, however, I believe, contributes more to keep up the + belief in the general mind of humanity than the feeling of its + desirableness, which, when clothed, as it very often is, in the form of + an argument, is a <i>naive</i> expression of the tendency of the human + mind to believe whatever is agreeable to it. Positive value the argument + of course has none." For Mill's remarks on the version of the argument + dealt with in <a href="#Sect5">§ 5</a>, see his "Three Essays," p. + 204.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote2" href="#footnotetag2">[2]</a> The words "or not + conceivable," are here used in the sense of "not relatively conceivable," + as explained in <a href="#Sect47.1">Chap. vi.</a></p> + + <p><a name="footnote3" href="#footnotetag3">[3]</a> For the full + discussion from which the above is an extract, see <i>System of + Logic</i>, vol. i. pp. 409-426 (8th ed.). But, substituting "psychical" + for "volitional," see also, for some mitigation of the severity of the + above statement, the closing paragraphs of my <a + href="#SuppEssI">supplementary essay</a> on "Cosmic Theism."</p> + + <p><a name="footnote4" href="#footnotetag4">[4]</a> Essay on + Understanding—Existence of God.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote5" href="#footnotetag5">[5]</a> Locke, <i>loc. + cit.</i></p> + + <p><a name="footnote6" href="#footnotetag6">[6]</a> See <a + href="#Appendix">Appendix A</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote7" href="#footnotetag7">[7]</a> Viz., the constant + association within experience of mind with certain highly peculiar + material forms; the constant proportion which is found to subsist between + the quantity of cerebral matter and the degree of intellectual + capacity—a proportion which may be clearly traced throughout the + ascending series of vertebrated animals, and which is very generally + manifested in individuals of the human species; the effects of cerebral + anæmia, anæsthetics, stimulants, narcotic poisons, and lesions of + cerebral substance. There can, in short, be no question that the whole + series of observable facts bearing upon the subject are precisely such as + they ought to be upon supposition of the materialistic theory being true; + while, contrariwise, there is a total absence of any known facts tending + to negative that theory. At the same time it must be carefully noted, + that the observed facts (and any additional number of the like kind) do + not logically warrant us in concluding that mental states are necessarily + <i>dependent</i> upon material changes. Nevertheless, it must also be + noted, that, in the absence of positive proof of causation, it is + certainly in accordance with scientific procedure, to yield our + provisional assent to an hypothesis which undoubtedly connects a large + order of constant <i>accompaniments</i>, rather than to an hypothesis + which is confessedly framed to meet but a single one of the facts.</p> + + <p>Professor Clifford, in a lecture on "Body and Mind" which he delivered + at St. George's Hall, and afterwards published in the <i>Fortnightly + Review</i>, argues against the existence of God on the ground that, as + Mind is always associated with Matter within experience, there arises a + presumption against Mind existing anywhere without being thus associated, + so that unless we can trace in the disposition of the heavenly bodies + some resemblance to the conformation of cerebral structure, we are to + conclude that there is a considerable balance of probability in favour of + Atheism. Now, as this argument—if we rid it of the grotesque + allusion to the heavenly bodies—is one that is frequently met with, + it seems desirable in this place briefly to analyse it. First of all, + then, the validity of the argument depends upon the probability there is + that the constant associated of Mind with Matter within experience is due + to a <i>causal</i> connection; for if the association in question is + merely an <i>association</i> and nothing more, the origin of known mind + is as far from being explained as it would be were Mind never known as + associated with Matter. But, in the next place, supposing the constant + association in question to be due to a causal connection, it by no means + follows that because Mind is due to Matter within experience, therefore + Mind cannot exist in any other mode beyond experience.</p> + + <p>Doubtless, from analogy, there is a presumption against the hypothesis + that the same entity should exist in more than one mode at the same time; + but clearly in this case we are quite unable to estimate the value of + this presumption. Consequently, even assuming a causal connection between + Matter and Human Mind, if there is any, the slightest, indications + supplied by any other facts of experience pointing to the existence of a + Divine Mind, such indications should be allowed as much argumentative + weight as they would have had in the absence of the presumption we are + considering. Hence Professor Clifford's conclusion cannot be regarded as + valid until all the other arguments in favour of Theism have been + separately refuted. Doubtless Professor Clifford will be the first to + recognise the cogency of this criticism—if indeed it has not + already occurred to him; for as I know that he is much too clear a + thinker not to perceive the validity of these considerations, I am + willing to believe that the substance of them was omitted from his essay + merely for the sake of brevity; but, for the sake of less thoughtful + persons, I have deemed it desirable to state thus clearly that the + problem of Theism cannot be solved on grounds of Materialism alone. [This + note was written before I had the advantage of Professor Clifford's + acquaintance, but now I leave it, as I leave all other parts of this + essay—viz., as it was originally written.—1878.]</p> + + <p><a name="footnote8" href="#footnotetag8">[8]</a> To avoid burdening + the text, I have omitted another criticism which may be made on Locke's + argument. "Triangle" is a word by which we designate a certain figure, + one of the properties of which is that the sum of its angles is equal to + two right angles. In other words, any figure which does not exhibit this + property is not that figure which we designate a triangle. Hence, when + Locke says he cannot conceive of a triangle which does not present this + property, it may be answered that his inability arises merely from the + fact that any figure which fails to present this property is not a figure + to which the term "triangle" can apply. Thus viewed, however, the + illustration would obviously be absurd, for the same reason that the + question of the clown is absurd, "Can you think of a horse that is just + like a cow?" What Locke evidently means is, that we cannot conceive of + any geometrical figure which presents all the other properties of a + triangle without also presenting the property in question. Now, even + admitting, with Locke, that it is as inconceivable that the entity known + to us as Matter should possess the property of causing thought as it is + that the figure which we term a triangle should posses the property of + containing more than two right angles, still it remains, for the purposes + of Locke's supposed theistic demonstration, to prove that it is an + inconceivable for the entity which we call Mind <i>not</i> to be due to + another Mind, as it is for a triangle <i>not</i> to contain, other than + two right angles. But, further, even if it were possible to prove this, + the demonstration would make as much against Theism as in favour of it; + for if, as the illustration of the triangle implies, we restrict the + meaning of the word "Mind" to an entity one of whose essential qualities + is that it should be caused by another Mind, the words "Supreme and + Uncaused Mind" involve a contradiction in terms, just as much as would + the words "A square triangle having four right angles." It would, + therefore, seem that if we adhere to Locke's argument, and pursue it to + its conclusion, the only logical outcome would be this:—Seeing that + by the word "Mind," I expressly connote the quality of derivation from a + prior Mind, as a quality belonging no less essentially to Mind than the + quality of presenting two right angles belongs to a triangle; therefore, + whatever other attributes I ascribe to the First Cause, I must clearly + exclude the attribute Mind; and hence, whatever else such a Cause may be, + it follows from my argument that it certainly is—Not Mind.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote9" href="#footnotetag9">[9]</a> Hamilton.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote10" href="#footnotetag10">[10]</a> Lectures on + Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 25-31.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote11" href="#footnotetag11">[11]</a> Lectures on + Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 542.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote12" href="#footnotetag12">[12]</a> <i>Loc. cit.</i>, + p. 543.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote13" href="#footnotetag13">[13]</a> Appendix to + Discussions, pp. 614, 165.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote14" href="#footnotetag14">[14]</a> Mill, in the + lengthy chapter which he devotes to the freedom of the will in his + Examination, does not notice this point.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote15" href="#footnotetag15">[15]</a> If more evidence + can be wanted, it is supplied in some suggestive facts of Psychology. For + example, "From our earliest childhood, the idea of doing wrong (that is, + of doing what is forbidden, or what is injurious to others) and the idea + of punishment are presented to the mind together, and the intense + character of the impressions causes the association between them to + attain the highest degree of closeness and intimacy. Is it strange, or + unlike the usual processes of the human mind, that in these circumstances + we should retain the feeling and forget the reason on which it is + grounded? But why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reason has + never, in our early education, been presented to the mind. The only ideas + presented have been those of wrong and punishment, and an inseparable + association has been created between these directly, without the help of + any intervening idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous + feelings of mankind regard punishment and a wrong-doer as naturally + fitted to each other—as a conjunction appropriate in itself, + independently of any consequences," &c.—Mill, Examination of + Hamilton, p. 599.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote16" href="#footnotetag16">[16]</a> Grammar of Assent, + pp. 106, 107.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote17" href="#footnotetag17">[17]</a> Throughout these + considerations I have confined myself to the <i>positive</i> side of the + subject. My argument being of the nature of a criticism on the erroneous + inferences which are drawn from the <i>good</i> qualities of our moral + nature, I thought it desirable, for the sake of clearness, not to burden + that argument by the additional one as to the source of the <i>evil</i> + qualities of that nature. This additional argument, however, will be + found briefly stated at the close of my <a + href="#SuppEssII">supplementary essay</a> on Professor Flint's "Theism." + On reading that additional argument, I think that any candid and + unbiassed mind must conclude that, alike in what it is <i>not</i> as well + as in what it <i>is</i>, our moral nature points to a natural genesis, as + distinguished from a supernatural cause.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote18" href="#footnotetag18">[18]</a> The illustration + to which I refer is that of the watershed of a country being precisely + adapted to draining purposes. The rivers just fit their own particular + beds: the latter occupy the lowest grounds, and get broader and deeper as + they advance; pebbles, gravel, and sand all occupy the best teleological + situations, &c., &c.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote19" href="#footnotetag19">[19]</a> "Order of Nature," + by the Rev. Baden Powell, M.A., F.R.S., &c., 1859, pp. 228-241.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote20" href="#footnotetag20">[20]</a> I think it + desirable to state that I perceived this great truth before I was aware + that it had been perceived also by Mr. Spencer. His statement of it now + occurs in the short chapter of <i>First Principles</i> entitled + "Relations between Forces." So far as I an able to ascertain, no one has + hitherto considered this important doctrine in its immediate relation to + the question of Theism.</p> + + <p>In using the term "persistence of force," I am aware that I am using a + term which is not unopen to criticism. But as Mr. Spencer's writings have + brought this term into such general use among speculative thinkers, it + seemed to me undesirable to modify it. Questions of mere terminology are + without any importance in a discussion of this kind, provided that the + terms are universally understood to mean what they are intended to mean; + and I think that the signification which Mr. Spencer attaches to his + term, "persistence of force," is sufficiently precise. Therefore, + adopting his usage, whenever throughout the following pages I speak of + force as persisting, what I intend to be understood is, that there is a + something—call it force, or energy, or <i>x</i>—which, so far + as experience or imagination can extend, is, in its relation to us, + ubiquitous and illimitable; or, in other words, that it universally + presents the property of permanence. (See, for a more detailed + explanation, <a href="#SuppEssIV">supplementary essay,</a> "On the Final + Mystery of Things.")</p> + + <p><a name="footnote21" href="#footnotetag21">[21]</a> Hamilton may here + be especially noticed, because he went so far as to maintain that the + phenomena of the external world, taken by themselves, would ground a + valid argument to the negation of God. Although I cannot but think that + this position was a conspicuously irrational one for any competent + thinker to occupy before the scientific doctrine of the correlation of + the forces had been enunciated, nevertheless I cannot lose the + opportunity of alluding to this remarkable feature in Sir William + Hamilton's philosophy, showing as it does that same prophetic + forestalling of the results which have since followed from the discovery + of the conservation of energy, as was shown by his no less remarkable + theory of causation. (See <a href="#SuppEssIV">supplementary essay</a> + "On the Final Mystery of Things.")</p> + + <p><a name="footnote22" href="#footnotetag22">[22]</a> Mr. N. Lockyer's + work is now supplying important evidence on these points.—1878.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote23" href="#footnotetag23">[23]</a> It will of course + be observed that if matter and force are identical, the unification is + complete.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote24" href="#footnotetag24">[24]</a> Herbert + Spencer.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote25" href="#footnotetag25">[25]</a> It may here be + observed that the above discussion would not be affected by the view of + Professor Clifford and others, that natural law is to be regarded as + having a subjective rather than an objective signification—that + what we call a natural law is merely an arbitrary selection made by + ourselves of certain among natural processes. The discussion would not be + affected by this view, because the argument is really based upon the + existence of a cosmos as distinguished from a chaos; and therefore it + would be rather an intensification of the argument than otherwise to + point out that, for the maintenance of a cosmos, natural laws, as + conceived by us, would be inadequate. And this seems a fitting place to + make the almost superfluous remark, that throughout this present essay I + have used the words "Natural Law," "Supreme Law-giver," &c., in an + apparently unguarded sense, merely in order to avoid needless obscurity. + Fully sensible as I am of the misleading nature of the analogy which + these words embody, I have yet adopted them for the sake of + perspicuity—being careful, however, never to allow the false + analogy which they express to enter into an argument on either side of + the question. Thus, even where it is said that the existence of Natural + Law points to the existence of a Supreme Law-maker, the argument might + equally well be phrased: The existence of an orderly cosmos points to the + existence of a disposing mind.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote26" href="#footnotetag26">[26]</a> First Principles, + pp. 27-29.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote27" href="#footnotetag27">[27]</a> It may be here + observed that this quality of indefiniteness on the part of such + reasoning is merely a practical outcome of the theoretical considerations + adduced in <a href="#ChapV">Chapter V.</a> For as we there saw that the + ratio between the known and the unknown is in this case wholly + indefinite, it follows that any symbols derived from the region of the + known—even though such symbols be the highest generalities which + the latter region affords—must be wholly indefinite when projected + into the region of the unknown. Or rather let us say, that as the region + of the unknown is but a progressive continuation of the region of the + known, the determinate value of symbols of thought varies inversely as + the distance—or, not improbably, as the square of the + distance—from the sphere of the known at which they are + applied.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote28" href="#footnotetag28">[28]</a> <i>i.e.</i>, + illegitimate in a <i>relative</i> sense. The conclusion is legitimate + enough in a <i>formal</i> sense, and as establishing a probability of + some <i>unassignable</i> degree of value. But it would be illegitimate if + this quality of indefiniteness were disregarded, and the conclusion + supposed to possess the same character of actual probability as it has of + formal definition.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote29" href="#footnotetag29">[29]</a> In order not to + burden the text with details, I have presented these reflections in their + most general terms. Thus, if it be granted that cosmic harmony results + from the combined action of general laws, and that these laws are the + necessary result of the primary qualities of force and matter, this the + most general statement of the atheistic position includes all more + special considerations as a genus includes its species; and therefore it + would not signify, for the purposes of the atheistic argument, whether or + not any such more special considerations are possible. Nevertheless, for + the sake of completeness, I may here observe that we are not wholly + without indications in nature of the physical causation whereby the + effect of cosmic harmony is produced. The universal tendency of motion to + become rhythmical—itself, as Mr. Spencer was the first to show, a + necessary consequence of the persistence of force—is, so to speak, + a conservative tendency: it sets a premium against natural cataclysms. + But a more important consideration is this,—that during the + evolution of natural law in the way suggested in <a + href="#ChapIV">Chapter IV.</a>, as every newly evolved law came into + existence it must have been, as it were, grafted on the stock of all + pre-existing natural laws, and so would not enter the cosmic system as an + element of confusion, but rather as an element of further progress. For + instance, when, with the origin of organic nature, the law of natural + selection entered upon the cosmos, it was grafted upon the pre-existing + stock of other natural laws, and so combined within them in unity. And a + little thought will show that it was impossible that it should do + otherwise; for it was impossible that natural selection could ever + produce organisms which would ever be able by their existence to conflict + with the pre-existing system of astronomic or geologic laws; seeing that + organisms, being a product of later evolution than these laws, would + either have to be adapted to them or perish. And hence the new law of + natural selection, which consists in so adapting organisms to the + pre-existing laws that they must either conform to them or die. Now, I + have chosen the case of natural selection because, as alluded to in the + text, it is the law of all others which is the most conspicuously + effective in producing the harmonious complexity of nature. But the same + kind of considerations may be seen to apply to most of the other general + laws with which we are acquainted, particularly if we bear in mind that + the general outcome of their united action as we observe it—the + cosmic harmony on which so much stress is laid—is not + <i>perfectly</i> harmonious. Cataclysms—whether it be the capture + of an insect, or the ruin of a star—although events of + comparatively rare occurrence if at any given time we take into account + the total number of insects or the total number of stars, are events + which nevertheless do occasionally happen. And the fact that even + cataclysms take place in accordance with so-called natural law, serves + but to emphasise the consideration on which we are engaged—viz., + that the total result of the combined action of general laws is not such + as to produce perfect order. Lastly, if the answer is made that human + ideas of perfect order may not correspond with the highest ideal of such + order, I observe that to make such a answer is merely to abandon the + subject of discussion; for if a theist rests his argument on the basis of + our human conception of order, he is not free to maintain his argument + and at the same time to abandon its basis at whatever point the latter + may be shown untenable.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote30" href="#footnotetag30">[30]</a> Since the above + was written, the first volume of Mr. Spencer's "Sociology" has been + published; and those who may not as yet have read the first half of that + work are here strongly recommended to do so; for Mr. Spencer has there + shown, in a more connected and conclusive manner than has ever been shown + before, how strictly natural is the growth of all superstitions and + religions—<i>i.e.</i>, of all the theories of personal agency in + nature.—1878.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote31" href="#footnotetag31">[31]</a> Herbert Spencer's + Essays, vol. iii. pp. 246-249 (1874).</p> + + <p><a name="footnote32" href="#footnotetag32">[32]</a> This is the truly + inconceivable element in the physical theory. As I have shown in the + pleading on the side of Atheism, the supposed inconceivability of cosmic + harmony being due to mindless forces, is not of such a kind as wholly + refuses to be surmounted by symbolic conceptions of a sufficiently + abstract character. But it is impossible, by the aid of any symbols, to + gain a conception of an eternal existence. And I may here point out, that + if Mind is said to be the cause of evolution, not only does the statement + involve the inconceivable proposition that such a Mind must be infinite + in respect to its powers of supervision, direction, &c.; but the + statement also involves a necessary alternative between two additional + inconceivable propositions—viz., either that such a Mind must have + been eternal, or that it must have come into existence without a cause. + In this respect, therefore, it would seem that the theory of Atheism has + the advantage over that of Theism; for while the former theory is under + the necessity of embodying only a single inconceivable term, the latter + theory is under the necessity of embodying two such terms.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote33" href="#footnotetag33">[33]</a> Mr. Herbert + Spencer has treated of this subject in his memorable controversy with + Mill on the "Universal Postulate" (see <i>Psychology</i>, <a + name="Sect427">§ 427</a>), and refuses to entertain the term + "Inconceivable" as applicable to any propositions other than those + wherein "the terms cannot, by any effort, be brought before consciousness + in that relation which the proposition asserts between them." That is to + say, he limits the term "Inconceivable" to that which is + <i>absolutely</i> inconceivable; and he then proceeds to affirm that all + propositions "which admit of being framed in thought, but which are so + much at variance with experience, in which its terms have habitually been + otherwise united, that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation + without effort," ought properly to be termed "<i>incredible</i>" + propositions. Now I cannot see that the class "Incredible propositions" + is, as this definition asserts, identical with the class which I have + termed "Relatively inconceivable" propositions. For example, it is a + familiar observation that, on looking at the setting sun, we experience + an almost, if not quite, insuperable difficulty in <i>conceiving</i> the + sun's apparent motion as due to our own actual motion, and yet we + experience no difficulty in <i>believing</i> it. Conversely, I entertain + but little difficulty in <i>conceiving</i>—<i>i.e.</i>, + imagining—a shark with a mammalian heart, and yet it would require + extremely strong evidence to make me <i>believe</i> that such an animal + exists. The truth appears to be that our language is deficient in terms + whereby to distinguish between that which is wholly inconceivable from + that which is with difficulty conceivable. This, it seems to me, was the + principle reason of the dispute between Spencer and Mill above alluded + to,—the former writer having always used the word "Inconceivable" + in the sense of "Absolutely inconceivable," and the latter having + apparently used it—in his <i>Logic</i> and elsewhere—in both + senses. I have endeavoured to remedy this defect in the language by + introducing the qualifying words, "Absolutely" and "Relatively," which, + although not appropriate words, are the best that I am able to supply. + The conceptive faculty of the individual having been determined by the + experience of the race, that which is inconceivable by the intelligence + of the race may be said to be inconceivable to the intelligence of the + individual in an <i>absolute</i> sense; no effort on his part can enable + him to surmount the organically imposed conditions of his conceptive + faculty. But that which is inconceivable merely to one individual or + generation, while it is not inconceivable to the intelligence of the + race, may properly be said to be inconceivable to the intelligence of + that individual or generation only in a <i>relative</i> sense; apart from + the special condition to which the individual intelligence has been + subjected, there is nothing in the conditions of human intelligence as + such to prevent the thing from being conceived. [While this work has been + passing through the press, I have found that Mr. G. H. Lewes has already + employed the above terms in precisely the same sense as that which is + above explained.—1878.]</p> + + <p><a name="footnote34" href="#footnotetag34">[34]</a> I should here like + to have added some considerations on Sir W. Hamilton's remarks concerning + the effect of training upon the mind in this connection; but, to avoid + being tedious, I shall condense what I have to say into a few sentences. + What Hamilton maintains is very true, viz., that the study of classics, + moral and mental philosophy, &c., renders the mind more capable of + believing in a God than does the study of physical science. The question, + however, is, Which class of studies ought to be considered the more + authoritative in this matter? I certainly cannot see what title classics, + history, political economy, &c., have to be regarded at all; and + although the mental and moral sciences have doubtless a better claim, + still I think they must be largely subordinate to those sciences which + deal with the whole domain of nature besides. Further, I should say that + there is no very strong <i>affirmative</i> influence created on the mind + in this respect by any class of studies; and that the only reason why we + so generally find Theism and classics, &c., united, is because we so + seldom find classics, &c., and physical science united; the + <i>negative</i> influence of the latter, in the case of classical minds, + being therefore generally absent.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote35" href="#footnotetag35">[35]</a> The qualities + named are only known in a relative sense, and therefore the apparent + contradiction may be destitute of meaning in an absolute sense.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote36" href="#footnotetag36">[36]</a> All the quotations + in this Appendix have been taken from the chapter on "Our knowledge of + the existence of a God," and from the early part of that on "The extent + of human knowledge," together with the appended letter to the Bishop of + Worcester.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote37" href="#footnotetag37">[37]</a> A criticism of Mr. + John Fiske's proposed system of theology as expounded in his work on + "Cosmic Philosophy" (Macmillan & Co., 1874).</p> + + <p><a name="footnote38" href="#footnotetag38">[38]</a> Cosmic Philosophy, + vol. i. pp. 87-89.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote39" href="#footnotetag39">[39]</a> Cosmic Philosophy, + vol. ii. pp. 429, 430.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote40" href="#footnotetag40">[40]</a> Ibid., p. 441.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote41" href="#footnotetag41">[41]</a> Ibid., pp. 450, + 451.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote42" href="#footnotetag42">[42]</a> Principles of + Psychology, vol. i. pp. 159-161.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote43" href="#footnotetag43">[43]</a> We thus see that + the question whether there may not be "something quasi-psychical in the + constitution of things" is a question which does not affect the position + of Theism as it has been left by a negation of the self-conscious + personality of God. But as the speculations on which this question has + been reared are in themselves of much philosophical interest, I may here + observe that, in one form or another, they have been dimly floating in + men's minds for a long time past. Thus, excepting the degree of certainty + with which it is taught, we have in Mr. Spencer's words above quoted a + reversion to the doctrine of Buddha; for, as "force is persistent," all + that would happen on death, supposing the doctrine true, would be an + escape of the "circumscribed aggregate" of units forming the individual + consciousness into the unlimited abyss of similar units constituting the + "Absolute Being" of the Cosmists, or the "Divine Essence" of the + Buddhists. Again, the doctrine in a vague form pervades the philosophy of + Spinoza, and is next clearly enunciated by Wundt. Lastly, in a recently + published very remarkable essay "On the Nature of Things in Themselves," + Professor Clifford arrives at a similar doctrine by a different route. + The following is the conclusion to which he arrives:—"That element + of which, as we have seen, even the simplest feeling is a complex, I + shall call <i>Mind-stuff</i>. A moving molecule of inorganic matter does + not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a small piece of + mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to form the film + on the under side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff which go + along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of + Sentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and + nervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff + are so combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say, + changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked + together that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other. + When matters take the complex form of a living human brain, the + corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having + intelligence and volition." (Mind, January, 1878.)</p> + + <p><a name="footnote44" href="#footnotetag44">[44]</a> Theism, by Robert + Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh, + &c.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote45" href="#footnotetag45">[45]</a> Such being the + objects in view, I have not thought it necessary to extend this criticism + into anything resembling a review of Professor Flint's work as a whole; + but, on the contrary, I have aimed rather at confining my observations to + those parts of his treatise which embody the current arguments from + teleology alone. I may here observe, however, in general terms, that I + consider all his arguments to have been answered by anticipation in the + foregoing examination of Theism. I may also here observe, that throughout + the following essay I have used the word "design" in the sense in which + it is used by Professor Flint himself. This sense is distinctly a + different one from that which the word bears in the writings of the + Paley, Bell, and Chalmers school. For while in the latter writings, as + pointed out in <a href="#ChapIII">Chapter III.</a>, the word bears its + natural meaning of a certain <i>process of thought</i>, in Professor + Flint's work it is used rather as expressive of a <i>product of + intelligence</i>. In other words, "design," as used by Professor Flint, + is synonymous with <i>intention</i>, irrespective of the particular + psychological process by which the intention may have been put into + effect.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote46" href="#footnotetag46">[46]</a> Op. cit., pp. + 255-257.</p> + + <p><a name="footnote47" href="#footnotetag47">[47]</a> Let it be observed + that there is a distinction between what I may call substantial and + formal existence. Thus there is no doubt that flowers as flowers perish, + or become non-existent; but the substances of which they were composed + persist. And, in this connection, I may here point out that if the + universe is infinite in space and time, the universe as a whole would + present substantial existence as standing out of relation to space and + time, whereas innumerable portions of the universe present only formal + existences, because standing in relation both to space and time. Thus, + for instance, the solar system, as a solar system, must have an end in + time as it has a boundary in space; but as the substance of which it + consists will not become extinguished by the extinction of the system, it + may not now stand in any real relation to what we call space and time. I + am inclined to think that it is upon the idea of non-existence in this + formal sense that we construct a pseud-idea of non-existence in a + substantial sense; but it is evident that if the universe as a whole is + absolute, this pseud-idea must represent as impossibility. And from this + it follows, that if existence is infinite in space and time, every + <i>quantum</i> of it with which our experience comes into relation must + represent, as its essential quality, that quality which we find to be + presented by the substance of things—the quality, that is, of + persistence.</p> + +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Candid Examination of Theism, by +George John Romanes + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM *** + +***** This file should be named 19003-h.htm or 19003-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/9/0/0/19003/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of +public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital +Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Candid Examination of Theism + +Author: George John Romanes + +Release Date: August 7, 2006 [EBook #19003] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of +public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital +Libraries.) + + + + + +A + +CANDID EXAMINATION + +OF + +THEISM. + +BY + +PHYSICUS. + +BOSTON: +HOUGHTON, OSGOOD, & COMPANY. +1878. +[_All rights reserved_] + + * * * * * + + +_CANST THOU BY SEARCHING FIND OUT GOD?_ + + * * * * * + + +PREFACE. + + * * * * * + +The following essay was written several years ago; but I have hitherto +refrained from publishing it, lest, after having done so, I should find +that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the essay sets +forth. Judging, however, that it is now more than ever improbable that I +shall myself be able to detect any errors in my reasoning, I feel that it +is time to present the latter to the contemplation of other minds; and in +doing so, I make this explanation only because I feel it desirable to state +at the outset that the present treatise was written before the publication +of Mr. Mill's treatise on the same subject. It is desirable to make this +statement, first, because in several instances the trains of reasoning in +the two essays are parallel, and next, because in other instances I have +quoted passages from Mr. Mill's essay in connections which would be +scarcely intelligible were it not understood that these passages are +insertions made after the present essay had been completed. I have also +added several supplementary essays which have been written since the main +essay was finished. + +It is desirable further to observe, that the only reason why I publish this +edition anonymously is because I feel very strongly that, in matters of the +kind with which the present essay deals, opinions and arguments should be +allowed to produce the exact degree of influence to which as opinions and +arguments they are entitled: they should be permitted to stand upon their +own intrinsic merits alone, and quite beyond the shadow of that unfair +prejudication which cannot but arise so soon as their author's authority, +or absence of authority, becomes known. Notwithstanding this avowal, +however, I fear that many who glance over the following pages will read in +the "Physicus" of the first one a very different motive. There is at the +present time a wonderfully wide-spread sentiment pervading all classes of +society--a sentiment which it would not be easy to define, but the +practical outcome of which is, that to discuss the question of which this +essay treats is, in some way or other, morally wrong. Many, therefore, who +share this sentiment will doubtless attribute my reticence to a puerile +fear on my part to meet it. I can only say that such is not the case. +Although I allude to this sentiment with all respect--believing as I do +that it is an offshoot from the stock which contains all that is best and +greatest in human nature--nevertheless it seems to me impossible to deny +that the sentiment in question is as unreasonable as the frame of mind +which harbours it must be unreasoning. If there is no God, where can be the +harm in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence? If there is a +God, surely our first duty towards him must be to exert to our utmost, in +our attempts to find him, the most noble faculty with which he has endowed +us--as carefully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to +furnish of his own existence as we investigate the evidence of inferior +things in his dependent creation. To say that there is one rule or method +for ascertaining truth in the latter case, which it is not legitimate to +apply in the former case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity, +if he exists, has not supplied us with rational evidence of his existence. +For my own part, I feel that such an assertion cannot but embody far more +unworthy conceptions of a Personal God than are represented by any amount +of earnest inquiry into whatever evidence of his existence there may be +present; but, neglecting this reflection, if there is a God, it is certain +that reason is the faculty by which he has enabled man to discover truth, +and it is no less certain that the scientific methods have proved +themselves by far the most trustworthy for reason to adopt. To my mind, +therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, looking to this +undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific methods as ways to truth, whether +or not there is a God, the question as to his existence is both more +morally and more reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a +problem for methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other +light. Or, stating the case in other words, I believe that in whatever +degree we intentionally abstain from using in this case what we _know_ to +be the most trustworthy methods of inquiry in other cases, in that degree +are we either unworthily closing our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we are +guilty of the worst among human sins--"Depart from us, for we desire not +the knowledge of thy ways." If it is said that, supposing man to be in a +state of probation, faith, and not reason, must be the instrument of his +trial, I am ready to admit the validity of the remark; but I must also ask +it to be remembered, that unless faith has _some_ basis of reason whereon +to rest, it differs in nothing from superstition; and hence that it is +still our duty to investigate the _rational_ standing of the question +before us by the _scientific_ methods alone. And I may here observe +parenthetically, that the same reasoning applies to all investigations +concerning the reality of a supposed revelation. With such investigations, +however, the present essay has nothing to do, although, I may remark that +if there is any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible in the structure of a +professing revelation, such evidence, in whatever degree present, would be +of the best possible kind for substantiating the hypothesis of Theism. + +Such being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the most +truly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the following +pages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion were more +negative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice in me _for this +reason_ to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of the present kind +could ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism, there might be much +for its author to regret, but nothing for him to be ashamed of; and, by +parity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result of such an inquiry is +seen to have a tendency to negative the theistic theory, the author should +not be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his conviction as to the degree of +such tendency, provided only that his conviction is an _honest_ one, and +that he is conscious of its having been reached by using his faculties with +the utmost care of which he is capable. + +If it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate a +character that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I reply +that they are nevertheless the _best_ methods available, and hence that the +retort is without pertinence: the question is still to be regarded as a +scientific one, although we may perceive that neither an affirmative nor a +negative answer can be given to it with any approach to a full +demonstration. But if the question is thus conceded to be one falling +within the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that the mere +fact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently impossible should +not deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a well-recognised +principle of scientific research, that however difficult or impossible it +may be to _prove_ a given theory true or false, the theory should +nevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being tested, by the full +rigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration cannot be hoped for, +it still remains desirable to reduce the question at issue to the last +analysis of which it is capable. + +Adopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the following +analysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour of the +theory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of light which +the progress of modern science--physical and speculative--has shed upon it. +And forasmuch as it is impossible that demonstrated truth can ever be shown +untrue, and forasmuch as the demonstrated truths on which the present +examination rests are the most fundamental which it is possible for the +human mind to reach, I do not think it presumptuous to assert what appears +to me a necessary deduction from these facts--namely, that, possible errors +in reasoning apart, the rational position of Theism as here defined must +remain without material modification as long as our intelligence remains +human. + +LONDON, 1878. + + * * * * * + + +ANALYSIS. + +CHAPTER I. + +EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. + +SECT. + +1. Introductory. + +2. Object of the chapter. + +3. The Argument from the Inconceivability of Self-existence. + +4. The Argument from the Desirability of there being a God. + +5. The Argument from the Presence of Human Aspirations. + +6. The Argument from Consciousness. + +7. The Argument for a First Cause. + +CHAPTER II. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. + +8. Introductory. + +9. Examination of the Argument, and the independent coincidence of my views +regarding it with those of Mr. Mill. + +10. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a re-enunciation of it in the +form of a Syllogism. + +11. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot explain Mind in the abstract. +Mill quoted and answered. This defect in the Syllogism clearly defined. + +12. The Syllogism further defective, in that it assumes Intelligence to be +the only possible cause of Intelligence. This assumption amounts to begging +the whole question as to the being of a God. Inconceivability of Matter +thinking no proof that it may not think. Locke himself strangely concedes +this. His fallacies and self-contradictions pointed out in an Appendix. + +13. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a Materialist, but assuming that +he is one, he is as much entitled to the hypothesis that Matter thinks as a +Theist is to his hypothesis that it does not. + +14. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly equivalent value, save that +while Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a certain basis of fact to rest +upon. This basis defined in a footnote, where also Professor Clifford's +essay on "Body and Mind" is briefly examined. Difficulty of estimating the +worth of the Argument as to the _most_ conceivable being _most_ likely +true. + +15. Locke's comparison between certainty of the Inconceivability Argument +as applied to Theism and to mathematics shown to contain a _virtual_ though +not a _formal_ fallacy. + +16. Summary of considerations as to the value of this Argument from +Inconceivability. + +17. Introductory to the other Arguments in favour of the conclusion that +only Intelligence can have caused Intelligence. + +18. Locke's presentation of the view that the cause must contain all that +is contained in the effects. His statements contradicted. Mill quoted to +show that the analogy of Nature is against the doctrine of higher +perfections never growing out of lower ones. + +19. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in favour of the proposition +that only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. Hamilton quoted to show that +in his philosophy the entire question as to the being of a God hinges upon +that as to whether or not human volitions are caused. + +20. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. Hamilton erroneously +identified this theory with the fact that we possess a moral sense. His +resulting dilemma. + +21. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus identifying genuine fact with +spurious theory, yet his Argument from the fact of our having a moral sense +remains to be considered. + +22. The question here is merely as to whether or not the presence of the +moral sense can be explained by natural causes. _A priori_ probability of +the moral sense having been evolved. _A posteriori_ confirmation supplied +by Utilitarianism, &c. + +23. Mill's presentation of the Argument a resuscitation of Paley's. His +criticism on Paley shown to be unfair. + +24. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation pointed out. + +25. The same fallacy pointed out in another way. + +26. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in order to illustrate the +root fallacy of his Argument from Design. Mill's observations upon this +Argument criticised. + +27. Result yielded by the present analysis of the Argument from Design. The +Argument shown to be a _petitio principii_. + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS. + +28. My belief that no competent writer in favour of the Argument from +Design could have written upon it at all, had it not been for his +instinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument from General +Laws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency insisted upon. + +29. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws prior to the +enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The Rev. Baden +Powell quoted. + +30. The nature of General Laws when these are interpreted in terms of the +doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The word "Law" defined in terms of +this doctrine. + +31. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws subsequent to +the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. + +32. The self-evolution of General Laws, or the objective aspect of the +question as to whether we may infer the presence of Mind in Nature because +Nature admits of being intelligently interrogated. + +33. The subjective aspect of this question, according to the data afforded +by evolutionary psychology. + +34. Correspondence between products due to human intelligence and products +supposed due to Divine Intelligence, a correspondence which is only +generic. Illustrations drawn from prodigality in Nature. Further +illustrations. Illogical manner in which natural theologians deal with such +difficulties. The generic resemblance contemplated is just what we should +expect to find, if the doctrine of evolutionary psychology be true. + +35. The last three sections parenthetical. Necessary nature of the +conclusion which follows from the last five sections. + +CHAPTER V. + +THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD. + +36. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion reached in the previous +chapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely scientific, and not of +logical conclusiveness. Preparation for considering the question in its +purely logical form. + +37. The logic of probability in general explained, and canon of +interpretation enunciated. + +38. Application of this canon to the particular case of Theism. + +39. Exposition of the logical state of the question. + +40. Exposition continued. + +41. Result of the exposition; "Suspended Judgment" the only logical +attitude of mind with regard to the question of Theism. + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY. + +42. Statement of the position to which the question of Theism has been +reduced by the foregoing analysis. + +43. Distinction between a scientific and a metaphysical teleology. +Statement of the latter in legitimate terms. Criticism of this statement +legitimately made on the side of Atheism as being gratuitous. Impartial +judgment on this criticism. + +44. Examination of the question as to whether the metaphysical system of +teleology is really destitute of all rational support. Pleading of a +supposed Theist in support of the system. The principle of correlation of +general laws. The complexity of Nature. + +45. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and judgment that it fairly removes +from the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology the charge of the latter +being gratuitous. + +46. Examination of the degree of probability that is presented by the +hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising an examination of the +Theistic objection to the scientific train of reasoning on account of its +symbolism, and showing that a no less cogent objection lies against the +metaphysical train of reasoning on account of its embodying the supposition +of unknowable causes. Distinction between "inconceivability" in a formal or +symbolical, and in a material or realisable sense. Reply of a supposed +Atheist to the previous pleading of the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencer +quoted on inconceivability of cosmic evolution as due to Mind. + +47. Final judgment on the rational value of a metaphysical system of +teleology. Distinction between "inconceivability" in an absolute and in a +relative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of mind which it is rational +to adopt towards the question of Theism. The desirability and the +rationality of tolerance in this particular case. + +CHAPTER VII. + +GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. + +48. General summary of the whole essay. + +49. Concluding remarks. + +APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. + +APPENDIX. + +A Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument against +the possibility of Matter thinking on grounds of its being inconceivable +that it should. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY I. + +Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and criticism to +show that it is inadequate to sustain the doctrine of "Cosmic Theism" which +Mr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY II. + +A Critical Examination of the Rev. Professor Flint's work on "Theism". + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY III. + +On the Speculative Standing of Materialism. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IV. + +On the Final Mystery of Things. + + * * * * * + + +THEISM. + + * * * * * + +CHAPTER I. + +EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. + +Sec. 1. Few subjects have occupied so much attention among speculative +thinkers as that which relates to the being of God. Notwithstanding, +however, the great amount that has been written on this subject, I am not +aware that any one has successfully endeavoured to approach it, on all its +various sides, from the ground of pure reason alone, and thus to fix, as +nearly as possible, the exact position which, in pure reason, this subject +ought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought that an exception to this +statement ought to be made in favour of John Stuart Mill's posthumous essay +on Theism; but from my great respect for this author, I should rather be +inclined to regard that essay as a criticism on illogical arguments, than +as a _careful_ or _matured_ attempt to formulate the strictly rational +_status_ of the question in all its bearings. Nevertheless, as this essay +is in some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yet +appeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came from +the pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most serious +attention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the course of +the following pages. + +Seeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer has +hitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question as +to the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any attempt, +however imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of every +school--the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious rapidity which +of late years has marked the advance both of physical and of speculative +science, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting us towards a +reasonable and, I think, a final decision as to the strictly logical +standing of this important matter. However, be my attempt welcome or no, I +feel that it is my obvious duty to publish the results which have been +yielded by an honest and careful analysis. + +Sec. 2. I may most fitly begin this analysis by briefly disposing of such +arguments in favour of Theism as are manifestly erroneous. And I do this +the more willingly because, as these arguments are at the present time most +in vogue, an exposure of their fallacies may perhaps deter our popular +apologists of the future from drawing upon themselves the silent contempt +of every reader whose intellect is not either prejudiced or imbecile. + +Sec. 3. A favourite piece of apologetic juggling is that of first demolishing +Atheism, Pantheism, Materialism, &c., by successively calling upon them to +explain the mystery of self-existence, and then tacitly assuming that the +need of such an explanation is absent in the case of Theism--as though the +attribute in question were more conceivable when posited in a Deity than +when posited elsewhere. + +It is, I hope, unnecessary to observe that, so far as the ultimate mystery +of existence is concerned, any and every theory of things is equally +entitled to the inexplicable fact that something is; and that any endeavour +on the part of the votaries of one theory to shift from themselves to the +votaries of another theory the _onus_ of explaining the necessarily +inexplicable, is an instance of irrationality which borders on the +ludicrous. + +Sec. 4. Another argument, or semblance of an argument, is the very prevalent +one, "Our heart requires a God; therefore it is probable that there is a +God:" as though such a subjective necessity, even if made out, could ever +prove an objective existence.[1] + +Sec. 5. If it is said that the theistic aspirations of the human heart, by the +mere fact of their presence, point to the existence of a God as to their +explanatory cause, I answer that the argument would only be valid after the +possibility of any more proximate causes having been in action has been +excluded--else the theistic explanation violates the fundamental rule of +science, the Law of Parcimony, or the law which forbids us to assume the +action of more remote causes where more proximate ones are found sufficient +to explain the effects. Consequently, the validity of the argument now +under consideration is inversely proportional to the number of +possibilities there are of the aspirations in question being due to the +agency of physical causes; and forasmuch as our ignorance of psychological +causation is well-nigh total, the Law of Parcimony forbids us to allow any +determinate degree of logical value to the present argument. In other +words, we must not use the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its +presence--must not argue from our ignorance of psychological possibilities, +as though this ignorance were knowledge of corresponding impossibilities. +The burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and from the nature of +the case this burden cannot be discharged until the science of psychology +shall have been fully perfected. I may add that, for my own part, I cannot +help feeling that, even in the present embryonic condition of this science, +we are not without some indications of the manner in which the aspirations +in question arose; but even were this not so, the above considerations +prove that the argument before us is invalid. If it is retorted that the +fact of these aspirations having had _proximate_ causes to account for +their origin, even if made out, would not negative the inference of these +being due to a Deity as to their _ultimate_ cause; I answer that this is +not to use the argument from the presence of these aspirations; it is +merely to beg the question as to the being of a God. + +Sec. 6. Next, we may consider the argument from consciousness. Many persons +ground their belief in the existence of a Deity upon a real or supposed +necessity of their own subjective thought. I say "real or supposed," +because, in its bearing upon rational argument, it is of no consequence of +which character the alleged necessity actually is. Even if the necessity of +thought be real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to affirm is, that +it is impossible for _him_, by any effort of thinking, to rid himself of +the persuasion that God exists; he is not entitled to affirm that this +persuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the human mind. +Or, as Mill puts it, "One man cannot by proclaiming with ever so much +confidence that _he_ perceives an object, convince other people that they +see it too.... When no claim is set up to any peculiar gift, but we are +told that all of us are as capable of seeing what he sees, feeling what he +feels, nay, that we actually do so, and when the utmost effort of which we +are capable fails to make us aware of what we are told, we perceive this +supposed universal faculty of intuition is but + + 'The Dark Lantern of the Spirit + Which none see by but those who bear it.'" + +It is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument must, +from its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save its +assertor; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is not +universal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument. + +And now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether the +alleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a +_real_ necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are the +victims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable that +their minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute from the +minds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the above +quotation, "They may fairly be asked to consider, whether it is not more +likely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in their +minds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an impression +in theirs." No doubt it is true that education and habits of thought may so +stereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what is conceivable to +one man or generation may not be so to another;[2] but to adduce this +consideration in this place would clearly be but to destroy the argument +from the _intuitive_ necessity of believing in a God. + +Lastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if the +impossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law of +human mind--which it certainly is not--the fact of his existence could not +be thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much more probable than it +now is--as probable, for instance, if not more probable, than is the +existence of an external world;--but still it would not be necessarily +true. + +Sec. 7. The argument from the general consent of mankind is so clearly +fallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I shall pass it over and +proceed at once to the last of the untenable arguments--that, namely, from +the existence of a First Cause. And here I should like to express myself +indebted to Mr. Mill for the following ideas:--"The cause of every change +is a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there were no new +antecedent, there would be no new consequent. If the state of facts which +brings the phenomenon into existence, had existed always or for an +indefinite duration, the effect also would have existed always or been +produced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of +causation, within the sphere of experience, that the causes as well as the +effects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem, +therefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for a +first cause, is repugnant to it; and that the very essence of causation, as +it exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First +Cause." + +The rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are tolerably +obvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his essay. I +shall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them. + +"But it is necessary to look more particularly into this matter, and +analyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have +experience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have a +beginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had no +beginning, this permanent element may with some justice be termed a first +or universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself to cause +anything, it enters as a con-cause into all causation." + +He then shows that the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy supplies us +with such a datum, and thus the conclusion easily follows--"It would seem, +then, that the only sense in which experience supports, in any shape, the +doctrine of a First Cause, viz., as the primaeval and universal element of +all causes, the First Cause can be no other than Force." + +Still, however, it may be maintained that "all force is will-force." But +"if there be any truth in the doctrine of Conservation of Force, ... this +doctrine does not change from true to false when it reaches the field of +voluntary agency. The will does not, any more than other agencies, create +Force: granting that it originates motion, it has no means of doing so but +by converting into that particular manifestation, a portion of Force which +already existed in other forms. It is known that the source from which this +portion of Force is derived, is chiefly, or entirely, the force evolved in +the processes of chemical composition and decomposition which constitute +the body of nutrition: the force so liberated becomes a fund upon which +every muscular and every nervous action, as of a train of thought, is a +draft. It is in this sense only that, according to the best lights of +science, volition is an originating cause. Volition, therefore, does not +answer to the idea of a First Cause; since Force must, in every instance, +be assumed as prior to it; and there is not the slightest colour, derived +from experience, for supposing Force itself to have been created by a +volition. As far as anything can be concluded from human experience, Force +has all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated.... + +"All that can be affirmed (even) by the strongest assertion of the Freedom +of the Will, is that volitions are themselves uncaused and are, therefore, +alone fit to be the first or universal cause. But, even assuming volitions +to be uncaused, the properties of matter, so far as experience discloses, +are uncaused also, and have the advantage over any particular volition, in +being, so far as experience can show, eternal. Theism, therefore, in so far +as it rests on the necessity of a First Cause, has no support from +experience." + +Such may be taken as a sufficient refutation of the argument that, as human +volition is apparently a cause in nature, and moreover constitutes the +basis of our conception of all causation, therefore all causation is +probably volitional in character. But as this is a favourite argument with +some theists, I shall introduce another quotation from Mr. Mill, which is +taken from a different work. + +"Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervous +action, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves. +Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient and +not merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the +particular phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that cause; +are we therefore to say with these writers that since we know of no other +efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there _is_ +no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A more +outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among the +infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a +particular mode of action of certain nerves which has for its cause and, as +we are now supposing, for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and +because this is the only efficient cause of "which we are conscious, being +the only one of which, in the nature of the case, we _can_ be conscious, +since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify +us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of +efficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly +human or animal phenomenon?" It is then shown that a logical parallel to +this mode of inference is that of generalising from the one known instance +of the earth being inhabited, to the conclusion that "every heavenly body +without exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star, or nebula, is +inhabited, and must be so from the inherent constitution of things." After +which the passage continues, "It is true there are cases in which, with +acknowledged propriety, we generalise from a single instance to a multitude +of instances. But they must be instances which resemble the one known +instance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with it except +that of being instances.... But the supporters of the volition theory ask +us to infer that volition causes everything, for no other reason except +that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from +being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws +bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether +of inorganic or of organic nature."[3] + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. + +Sec. 8. Leaving now the obviously untenable arguments, we next come to those +which, in my opinion, may properly be termed scientific. + +It will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under one +or other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of Theism +will be found to range themselves. + +Sec. 9. We have first the argument drawn from the existence of the human mind. +This is an argument which, for at least the last three centuries, and +especially during the present one, has been more relied upon than any other +by philosophical thinkers. It consists in the reflection that the being of +our own subjective intelligence is the most certain fact which our +experience supplies, that this fact demands an adequate cause for its +explanation, and that the only adequate cause of our intelligence must be +some other intelligence. Granting the existence of a conditioned +intelligence (and no one could reasonably suppose his own intelligence to +be otherwise), and the existence of an unconditioned intelligence becomes a +logical necessity, unless we deny either the validity of the principle that +every effect must have an adequate cause, or else that the only adequate +cause of Mind is Mind. + +It has been a great satisfaction to me to find that my examination of this +argument--an examination which was undertaken and completed several months +before Mr. Mill's essay appeared--has been minutely corroborated by that of +our great logician. I mention this circumstance here, as on previous +occasions, not for the petty motive of vindicating my own originality, but +because in matters of this kind the accuracy of the reasoning employed, and +therefore the logical validity of the conclusions attained, are guaranteed +in the best possible manner, if the trains of thought have been +independently pursued by different minds. + +Sec. 10. Seeing that, among the advocates of this argument, Locke went so far +as to maintain that by it alone he could render the existence of a Deity as +certain as any mathematical demonstration, it is only fair, preparatory to +our examining this argument, to present it in the words of this great +thinker. + +He says:--"There was a time when there was no knowing (_i.e._, conscious) +being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a +knowing being from all eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no +being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all +understanding, I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have +been any knowledge: it being as impossible that things wholly void of +knowledge, and operating blindly, and without perception, should produce a +knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three +angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of +senseless matter, that it should put into itself, sense, perception, and +knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put +into itself greater angles than two right ones."[4] + +Now, although this argument has been more fully elaborated by other +writers, the above presentation contains its whole essence. It will be seen +that it has the great advantage of resting _immediately_ upon the +foundation from which all argument concerning this or any other matter, +must necessarily arise, viz.,--upon the very existence of our argumentative +faculty itself. For the sake of a critical examination, it is desirable to +throw the argument before us into the syllogistic form. It will then stand +thus:-- + +All known minds are caused by an unknown mind. Our mind is a known mind; +therefore, our mind is caused by an unknown mind. + +Sec. 11. Now the major premiss of this syllogism is inadmissible for two +reasons: in the first place, it is assumed that known mind can only be +caused by unknown mind; and, in the second place, even if this assumption +were granted, it would not explain the existence of Mind as Mind. To take +the last of these objections first, in the words of Mr. Mill, "If the mere +existence of Mind is supposed to require, as a necessary antecedent, +another Mind greater and more powerful, the difficulty is not removed by +going one step back: the creating mind stands as much in need of another +mind to be the source of its existence as the created mind. Be it +remembered that we have no direct knowledge (at least apart from +Revelation) of a mind which is even apparently eternal, as Force and Matter +are: an eternal mind is, as far as the present argument is concerned, a +simple hypothesis to account for the minds which we know to exist. Now it +is essential to an hypothesis that, if admitted, it should at least remove +the difficulty and account for the facts. But it does not account for mind +to refer our mind to a prior mind for its origin. The problem remains +unsolved, nay, rather increased." + +Nevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, "My object is +not to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more than it is +my object to explain Existence itself in the abstract--to either of which +absurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally applicable;--but I +seek for an explanation of _my own individual finite mind_, which I know to +have had a beginning in time, and which, therefore, in accordance with the +widest and most complete analogy that experience supplies, I believe to +have been _caused_. And if there is no other objection to my believing in +Intelligence as the cause of my intelligence, than that I cannot prove my +own intelligence caused, then I am satisfied to let the matter rest here; +for as every argument must have _some_ basis of assumption to stand upon, I +am well pleased to find that the basis in this case is the most solid which +experience can supply, viz.,--the law of causation. Fully admitting that it +does not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior +mind for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, _does_ account for the +fact that _my mind_ exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intended +to cover. For to endeavour to _explain_ the existence of an _eternal_ mind, +could only be done by those who do not understand the meaning of these +words." + +Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would so +far be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis _does_ supply a provisional +explanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, an +explanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain. +But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation of +his own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in the +abstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypothetically +explaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing a +probability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind. Only if +he has some independent reason to infer that such an Unknown Mind exists, +could such a probability be made out, and his hypothetical explanation of +known mind become of more value than a guess. In other words, although the +theistic hypothesis supplies _a possible_ explanation of known mind, we +have no reason to conclude that it is _the true_ explanation, unless other +reasons can be shown to justify, on independent grounds, the validity of +the theistic hypothesis. Hence it is manifestly absurd to adduce this +explanation as evidence of the hypothesis on which it rests--to argue that +Theism must therefore be true; because we assume it to be so, in order to +explain _known_ mind, as distinguished from _Mind_. If it be answered, We +are justified in assuming Theism true, because we are justified in assuming +that known mind can _only_ have been caused by an unknown mind, and hence +that Mind must somewhere be self-existing, then this is to lead us to the +second objection to the above syllogism. + +Sec. 12. And this second objection is of a most serious nature. "Mind can only +be caused by Mind," and, therefore, Mind must either be uncaused, or caused +by a Mind. What is our warrant for ranking this assertion? Where is the +proof that nothing can have caused a mind except another mind? Answer to +this question there is none. For aught that we can ever know to the +contrary, anything within the whole range of the Possible may be competent +to produce a self-conscious intelligence--and to assume that Mind is so far +an entity _sui generis_, that it must either be self-existing, or derived +from another mind which is self-existing, is merely to beg the whole +question as to the being of a God. In other words, if we can prove that the +order of existence to which Mind belongs, is so essentially different from +that order, or those orders, to which all else belongs, as to render it +_abstractedly impossible_ that the latter can produce the former--if we can +prove this, we have likewise proved the existence of a Deity. But this is +just the point in dispute, and to set out with a bare affirmation of it is +merely to beg the question and to abandon the discussion. Doubtless, by the +mere act of consulting their own consciousness, the fact now in dispute +appears to some persons self-evident. But in matters of such high +abstraction as this, even the evidence of self-evidence must not be relied +upon too implicitly. To the country boor it appears self-evident that wood +is annihilated by combustion; and even to the mind of the greatest +philosophers of antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt that the sun moved +over a stationary earth. Much more, therefore, may our broad distinction +between "cogitative and incogitative being"[5] not be a distinction which +is "legitimated by the conditions of external reality." + +Doubtless many will fall back upon the position already indicated, "It is +as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into +itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of +a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right +ones." But, granting this, and also that conscious matter is the sole +alternative, and what follows? Not surely that matter cannot perceive, and +feel, and know, merely because it is repugnant to our idea of it that it +should. Granting that there is no other alternative in the whole +possibility of things, than that matter must be conscious, or that +self-conscious Mind must somewhere be self-existing; and granting that it +is quite "impossible for us to conceive" of consciousness as an attribute +of matter; still surely it would be a prodigious leap to conclude that for +this reason matter cannot possess this attribute. Indeed, Locke himself +elsewhere strangely enough insists that thought may be a property of +matter, if only the Deity chose to unite that attribute with that +substance. Why it should be deemed abstractedly impossible for matter to +think if there is no God, and yet abstractedly possible that it should +think if there is a God, I confess myself quite unable to determine; but I +conceive that it is very important clearly to point out this peculiarity in +Locke's views, for he is a favourite authority with theists, and this +peculiarity amounts to nothing less than a suicide of his entire argument. +The mere circumstance that he assumed the Deity capable of endowing matter +with the faculty of thinking, could not have enabled him to _conceive_ of +matter as thinking, any more than he could _conceive_ of this in the +absence of his assumption. Yet in the one case he recognises the +possibility of matter thinking, and in the other case denies such +possibility, _and this on the sole ground of its being inconceivable_! +However, I am not here concerned with Locke's eccentricities:[6] I am +merely engaged with the general principle, that a subjective inability to +establish certain relations in thought is no sufficient warrant for +concluding that corresponding objective relations may not obtain. + +Sec. 13. Hence, an objector to the above syllogism need not be a materialist; +it is not even necessary that he should hold any theory of things at all. +Nevertheless, for the sake of definition, I shall assume that he is a +materialist. As a materialist, then, he would appear to be as much entitled +to his hypothesis as a theist is to his--in respect, I mean, of this +particular argument. For although I think, as before shown, that in strict +reasoning a theist might have taken exception to the last-quoted passage +from Mill in its connection with the law of causation, that passage, if +considered in the present connection, is certainly unanswerable. What is +the state of the present argument as between a materialist and a theist? +The mystery of existence and the inconceivability of matter thinking are +their common data. Upon these data the materialist, justly arguing that he +has no right to make his own conceptive faculty the unconditional test of +objective possibility, is content to merge the mystery of his own mind's +existence into that of Existence in general; while the theist, compelled to +accept without explanation the mystery of Existence in general, +nevertheless has recourse to inventing a wholly gratuitous hypothesis to +explain one mode of existence in particular. If it is said that the latter +hypothesis has the merit of causing the mystery of material existence and +the mystery of mental existence to be united in a thinkable manner--viz., +in a self-existing Mind,--I reply, It is not so; for in whatever degree it +is unthinkable that Matter should be the cause of Mind, in that precise +degree must it be unthinkable that Mind was ever the cause of Matter, the +correlatives being in each case the same, and experience affording no +evidence of causality in either. + +Sec. 14. The two hypotheses, therefore, are of exactly equivalent value, save +that while the one has a certain basis of fact to rest upon,[7] the other +is wholly arbitrary. But it may still be retorted, 'Is not that which is +_most_ conceivable _most likely_ to be true? and if it is more conceivable +that my intelligence is caused by another Intelligence than that it is +caused by Non-intelligence, may I not regard the more conceivable +hypothesis as also the more probable one? It is somewhat difficult to say +how far this argument is, in this case, valid; only I think it is quite +evident that its validity is open to grave dispute. For nothing can be more +evident to a philosophical thinker than that the substance of Mind must--so +far at least as we can at present see--_necessarily_ be unknowable; so that +if Matter (and Force) be this substance, we should antecedently expect to +find that the actual causal connection should, in this particular case, be +more inconceivable than some imaginary one: it would be more natural for +the mind to infer that something conceivably more akin to itself should be +its cause, than that this cause should be the entity which really gives +rise to the unthinkable connection. But even waiving this reflection, and +granting that the above argument is _valid_, it is still to an indefinite +degree _valueless_, seeing that we are unable to tell _how much it is more +likely_ that the more conceivable should here be true than that the less +conceivable should be so. + +Sec. 15. Returning then to Locke's comparison between the certainty of this +argument and that which proves the sum of the angles of a triangle to be +equal to two right-angles, I should say that there is a _virtual_, though +not a _formal_, fallacy in his presentation. For mathematical science being +confessedly but of relative significance, any comparison between the degree +of certainty attained by reasoning upon so transcendental a subject as the +present, and that of mathematical demonstrations regarding relative truth, +must be misleading. In the present instance, the whole strain of the +argument comes upon the adequacy of the proposed test of truth, viz., our +being able to conceive it if true. Now, will any one undertake to say that +this test of truth is of equivalent value when it is applied to a triangle +and when it is applied to the Deity. In the one case we are dealing with a +geometrical figure of an exceedingly simple type, with which our experience +is well acquainted, and presenting a very limited number of relations for +us to contemplate. In the other case we are endeavouring to deal with the +_summum genus_ of all mystery, with reference to which experience is quite +impossible, and which in its mention contains all the relations that are to +us unknown and unknowable. Here, then, is the oversight. Because men find +conceivability a valid test of truth in the affairs of everyday life--as it +is easy to show _a priori_ that it must be, if our experience has been +formed under a given code of constant and general laws--therefore they +conclude that it must be equally valid _wherever_ it is applied; forgetting +that its validity must perforce decrease in proportion to the distance at +which the test is applied from the sphere of experience.[8] + +Sec. 16. Upon the whole, then, I think it is transparently obvious that the +mere fact of our being unable to conceive, say, how any disposition of +matter and motion could possibly give rise to a self-conscious +intelligence, in no wise warrants us in concluding that for this reason no +such disposition is possible. The only question would appear to be, whether +the test which is here proposed as an unconditional criterion of truth +should be allowed any the smallest degree of credit. Seeing, on the one +hand, how very fallible the test in question is known to have proved itself +in many cases of much less speculative difficulty--seeing, too, that even +now "the philosophy of the condition proves that things there are which +may, nay must, be true, of which nevertheless the mind is unable to +construe to itself the possibility;"[9] and seeing, on the other hand, that +the substance of Mind, whatever it is, must necessarily be +unknowable;--seeing these things, if any question remains as to whether the +test of inconceivability should in this case be regarded as having any +degree of validity at all, there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt that +such degree should be regarded as of the smallest. + +Sec. 17. Let us then turn to the other considerations which have been supposed +to justify the assertion that nothing can have caused our mind save another +Mind. Neglecting the crushing fact that "it does not account for Mind to +refer it to another Mind for its origin," let as see what positive reasons +there are for concluding that no other influence than Intelligence can +possibly have produced our intelligence. + +Sec. 18. First we may notice the argument which is well and tersely presented +by Locke, thus:--"Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily +contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can +ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it +hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily +follows that the first eternal being cannot be Matter." Now, as this +presentation is strictly formal, I shall first meet it with a formal reply, +and this reply consists in a direct contradiction. It is simply untrue that +"whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and +actually have, at least, all the perfections that can after exist;" or that +it can never "give to another any perfection that it hath not actually in +itself." In a sense, no doubt, a cause contains all that is contained in +its effects; the latter content being _potentially_ present in the former. +But to say that a cause already contains _actually_ all that its effects +may afterwards so contain, is a statement which logic and common sense +alike condemn as absurd. + +Nevertheless, although the argument now before us thus admits of a +childishly easy refutation on strictly formal grounds, I suspect that in +substance the argument in a general way is often relied upon as one of very +considerable weight. Even though it is clearly illogical to say that causes +cannot give to their effects any perfection which they themselves do not +actually present, yet it seems in a general way incredible that gross +matter could contain, even potentially, the faculty of thinking. +Nevertheless, this is but to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability; +to do which, even were it here legitimate, would, as we have seen, be +unavailing. But to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability in this +case would _not_ be legitimate; for we are in possession of an abundant +analogy to render the supposition in question, not only conceivable, but +credible. In the words of Mr. Mill, "Apart from experience, and arguing on +what is called reason, that is, on supposed self-evidence, the notion seems +to be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious or +elevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the known +analogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are +the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which, and by +the properties of which, they are raised up! The tendency of all recent +speculation is towards the opinion that the development of inferior orders +of existence into superior, the substitution of greater elaboration, and +higher organisation for lower, is the general rule of nature. Whether this +is so or not, there are at least in nature a multitude of facts bearing +that character, and this is sufficient for the argument." + +Sec. 19. We now come to the last of the arguments which, so far as I know, +have ever been adduced in support of the assertion that there can be no +other cause of our intelligence than another and superior Intelligence. The +argument is chiefly remarkable for the very great prominence which was +given to it by Sir W. Hamilton. + +This learned and able author says:--"The Deity is not an object of +immediate contemplation; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our +reach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only +warranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary to +account for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties are +supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressive +inference from the existence of a special class of effects to the existence +of a special character of cause, it is evident that the whole argument +hinges on the fact,--Does a state of things really exist such as is only +possible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For if it can be shown that +such a state of things does not really exist, then our inference to the +kind of cause requisite to account for it is necessarily null. + +"This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class of +phaenomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity is +exclusively given in the phaenomena of mind,--that the phaenomena of matter +taken by themselves, (you will observe the qualification taken by +themselves) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, +would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation. + +"If, in man, intelligence be a free power,--in so far as its liberty +extends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter; and a +power independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an +immaterial subject,--that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence +of intelligence on matter in the human constitution, in other words, if the +spirituality of mind in man be supposed a datum of observation, in this +datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we have +only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the +same relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the first +positive condition of a Deity is established in the establishment of the +absolute priority of a free creative intelligence."[10] + +Sec. 20. Thus, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the whole question as to the +being of a God depends upon that as to whether our "intelligence be a free +power,"--or, as he elsewhere states it himself, "Theology is wholly +dependent upon Psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature of man +stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity." It will be observed +that I am not at present engaged with the legitimacy of this author's +decision upon the comparative merits of the different arguments in favour +of Theism: I am merely showing the high opinion he entertained of the +particular argument before us. He positively affirms that, unless the +freedom of the human will be a matter of experience, Atheism is the sole +alternative. Doubtless most well-informed readers will feel that the +solitary basis thus provided for Theism is a very insecure one, while many +such readers will at once conclude that if this is the only basis which +reason can provide for Theism to stand upon, Theism is without any rational +basis to stand upon at all. I have no hesitation in saying that the +last-mentioned opinion is the one to which I myself subscribe, for I am +quite unable to understand how any one at the present day, and with the +most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself to +embrace the theory of Free-will. I may add that I cannot but believe that +those who do embrace this theory with an honest conviction, must have +failed to understand the issue to which modern thought has reduced the +question. Here, however, is not the place to discuss this question. It will +be sufficient for my purpose to show that even Sir W. Hamilton himself +considered it a very difficult one; and although he thought upon the whole +that the will must be free, he nevertheless allowed--nay, insisted--that he +was unable to conceive how it could be so. Such inability in itself does +not of course show the Free-will theory to be untrue; and I merely point +out the circumstance that Hamilton allowed the supposed fact unthinkable, +in order to show how very precarious, even in his eyes, the argument which +we are considering must have appeared. Let us then, for this purpose, +contemplate his attitude with regard to it a little more closely. He says, +"It would have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity +are both incomprehensible, as beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but +that though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so +neither can it be speculatively disproved; while we may claim for it as a +fact of real actuality, though of inconceivable possibility, the testimony +of consciousness, that we are morally free, as we are morally accountable +for our actions. In this manner the whole question of free- and bond-will +is in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all +the moral instincts of Man entire."[11] + +From this passage it is clear that Sir W. Hamilton regarded these two +counter-theories as of precisely equivalent value in everything save "the +testimony of consciousness;" or, as he elsewhere states it, "as equally +unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus +theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral +law ... gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the +doctrine of fate." + +But the whole question concerning the freedom of the will has now come to +be as to whether or not consciousness _does_ give its verdict on the side +of freedom. Supposing we grant that "we are warranted to rely on a +deliverance of consciousness, when that deliverance is _that_ a thing is, +although we may be unable to think _how_ it can be,"[12] in this case the +question still remains, whether our opponents have rightly interpreted the +deliverance of their consciousness. I, for one, am quite persuaded that I +never perform any action without some appropriate motive, or set of +motives, having induced me to perform it. However, I am not discussing this +question, and I have merely made the above quotations for the purpose of +showing that Sir W. Hamilton appears to identify the _theory_ of Free-will +with the _fact_ that we possess a moral sense. He argues throughout as +though the theory he advocates were the only one that can explain a given +"fact of real actuality." But no one with whom we have to deal questions +the fact of our having a moral sense; and to identify this "deliverance of +consciousness" with belief in the theory that volitions are uncaused, is, +or would now be, merely to abandon the only questions in dispute. + +It is very instructive, from this point of view, to observe the dilemma +into which Hamilton found himself driven by this identification of genuine +fact with spurious theory. He believed that the fact of man possessing an +ethical faculty could only be explained by the theory that man's will was +not determined by motives; for otherwise man could not be the author of his +own actions. But when he considered the matter in its other aspect, he +found that his theory of Free-will was as little compatible with moral +responsibility as was the opposing theory of "Bond-will;" for not only did +he candidly confess that he could not conceive of will as acting without +motives, but he further allowed the unquestionable truth "that, though +inconceivable, a motiveless volition would, if conceived, be conceived as +morally worthless."[13] I say this is very instructive, because it shows +that in Hamilton's view each theory was alike irreconcilable with "the +deliverance of consciousness," and that he only chose the one in preference +to the other, because, although not any more conceivable a solution, it +seemed to him a more possible one.[14] + +Sec. 21. Such, then, is the speculative basis on which, according to Sir W. +Hamilton, our belief in a Deity can alone be grounded. + +Those who at the present day are still confused enough in their notions +regarding the Free-will question to suppose that any further rational +question remains, may here be left to ruminate over this _bolus_, and to +draw from it such nourishment as they can in support of their belief in a +God; but to those who can see as plainly as daylight that the doctrine of +Determinism not only harmonises with all the facts of observation, but +alone affords a possible condition for, and a satisfactory explanation of, +the existence of our ethical faculty,--to such persons the question will +naturally arise:--"Although Hamilton was wrong in identifying a known fact +with a false theory, yet may he not have been right in the deductions which +he drew from the fact?" In other words, granting that his theory of +Free-will was wrong, does not his argument from the existence of a moral +sense in man to the existence of a moral Governor of the Universe remain as +intact as ever? Now, it is quite true that whatever degree of cogency the +argument from the presence of the moral sense may at any time have had, +this degree remains unaffected by the explosion of erroneous theories to +account for such presence. We have, therefore, still to face the fact that +the moral sense of man undoubtedly exists. + +Sec. 22. The question we have to determine is, What evidence have we to show +that the moral part of man was created in the image of God; and if there is +any such evidence, what counter-existence is there to show that the moral +existence of man may be due to natural causes? In deciding this question, +just as in deciding any other question of a purely scientific character, we +must be guided in our examination by the Law of Parcimony; we must not +assume the agency of supernatural causes if we can discover the agency of +natural causes; neither must we merge the supposed mystery directly into +the highest mystery, until we are quite sure that it does not admit of +being proximately explained by the action of proximate influences. + +Now, whether or not Mr. Darwin's theory as to the origin and development of +the moral sense be considered satisfactory, there can, I think, be very +little doubt in any impartial mind which duly considers the subject, that +in _some way or other_ the moral sense has been evolved. The body of +scientific evidence which has now been collected in favour of the general +theory of evolution is simply overwhelming; and in the presence of so large +an analogy, it would require a vast amount of contradictory evidence to +remove the presumption that human conscience, like everything else, has +been evolved. Now, for my own part, I am quite unable to distinguish any +such evidence, while, on the other hand, in support of the _a priori_ +presumption that conscience has been evolved, I cannot conceal from myself +that there is a large amount of _a posteriori_ confirmation. I am quite +unable to distinguish anything in my sense of right and wrong which I +cannot easily conceive to have been brought about during the evolution of +my intelligence from lower forms of psychical life. On the contrary, +everything that I can find in my sense of right and wrong is precisely what +I should expect to find on the supposition of this sense having been +moulded by the progressive requirements of social development. Read in the +light of evolution, Conscience, in its every detail, is deductively +explained. + +And, as though there were not sufficient evidence of this kind to justify +the conclusion drawn from the theory of evolution, the doctrine of +utilitarianism--separately conceived and separately worked out on +altogether independent grounds--the doctrine of utilitarianism comes in +with irresistible force to confirm that _a priori_ conclusion by the widest +and most unexceptionable of inductions.[15] + +In the supernatural interpretation of the facts, the whole stress of the +argument comes upon the character of conscience as a _spontaneously +admonishing influence which acts independently of our own volition_. For it +is from this character alone that the inference can arise that conscience +is the delegate of the will of another. Thus, to render the whole argument +in the singularly beautiful words of Dr. Newman:--"If, as is the case, we +feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voice +of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, +before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing +wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us +on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming serenity +of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight, which follows on one +receiving praise from a father,--we certainly have within us the image of +some person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find +our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in +whose anger we waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for +their exciting cause an intelligent being; we are not affectionate towards +a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse +or compunction in breaking mere human law. Yet so it is; conscience emits +all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and, +on the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a +resignation, and a hope which there is no sensible, no earthly object to +elicit. 'The wicked flees when no one pursueth;' then why does he flee? +whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the +hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not +belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is +directed must be supernatural and divine; and thus the phenomena of +conscience as a dictate avail to impress the imagination with the picture +of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, +retributive."[16] + +Now I have quoted this passage because it seems to me to convey in a +concise form the whole of the argument from Conscience. But how tremendous +are the inferences which are drawn from the facts! As the first step in our +criticism, it is necessary to point out that two very different orders of +feelings are here treated by Dr. Newman. There is first the pure or +uncompounded ethical feelings, which spring directly from the moral sense +alone, and which all men experience in varying degrees. And next there are +what we may term the _ethico-theological_ feelings, which can only spring +from a blending of the moral sense with a belief in a personal God, or +other supernatural agents. The former class of feelings, or the +uncompounded ethical class, have exclusive reference to the moral +obligations that subsist between ourselves and other human beings, or +sentient organisms. The latter class of feelings, or the ethico-theological +class, have reference to the moral obligations that are believed to subsist +between ourselves and the Deity, or other supernatural beings. Now, in +order not to lose sight of this all-important distinction, I shall +criticise Dr. Newman's rendering of the ordinary argument from Conscience +in each of these two points of views separately. To begin, then, with the +uncompounded ethical feelings. + +Such emotions as attend the operation of conscience in those who follow its +light alone without any theories as to its supernatural origin, are all of +the character of _reasonable_ or _explicable_ emotions. Granting that +fellow-feeling has been for the benefit of the race, and therefore that it +has been developed by natural causes, certainly there is nothing +_mysterious_ in the emotions that attend the violating or the following of +the dictates of conscience. For conscience is, by this naturalistic +supposition, nothing more than an organised body of certain psychological +elements, which, by long inheritance, have come to inform us, by way of +intuitive feeling, how we should act for the interests of society; so that, +if this hypothesis is correct, there cannot be anything more mysterious or +supernatural in the working of conscience than there is in the working of +any of our other faculties. That the disagreeable feeling of +_self-reproach_, as distinguished from _religious_ feeling, should follow +upon a violation of such an organized body of psychological elements, +cannot be thought surprising, if it is remembered that one of these +elements is natural fellow-feeling, and the others the elements which lead +us to know directly that we have violated the interests of other persons. +And as regards the mere fact that the working of conscience is independent +of the will, surely this is not more than we find, in varying degrees, to +be true of all our emotions; and conscience, according to the evolution +theory, has its root in the emotions. Hence, it is no more an argument to +say that the irrepressible character of conscience refers us to a God of +morality, than it would be to say that the sometimes resistless force of +the ludicrous refers us to a god of laughter. Love, again, is an emotion +which cannot be subdued by volition, and in its tendency to persist bears +just such a striking resemblance to the feelings of morality as we should +expect to find on the supposition of the former having played an important +part in the genesis of the latter. The _dictating_ character of conscience, +therefore, is clearly in itself of no avail as pointing to a superhuman +Dictator. Thus, for example, to take Dr. Newman's own illustration, why +should we feel such tearful, broken-hearted sorrow on intentionally or +carelessly hurting a mother? We see no shadow of a reason for resorting to +any supernatural hypothesis to explain the fact--love between mother and +offspring being an essential condition to the existence of higher animals. +Yet this is a simple case of truly conscientious feeling, where the thought +of any _personal_ cause of conscience _need_ not be entertained, and is +certainly not necessary to explain the effects. And similarly with _all_ +cases of conscientious feeling, _except in cases where it refers directly +to its supposed author_. But these latter cases, or the ethico-theological +class of feelings, are in no way surprising. If the moral sense has had a +natural genesis in the actual relations between man and man, as soon as an +ideal "image" of "a holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive" God is +firmly believed to have an objective existence, as a matter of course moral +feelings must become transferred to the relations which are believed to +obtain between ourselves and this most holy God. Indeed, it is these very +feelings which, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, must be +concluded, in accordance with the law of parcimony, to have _generated_ +this idea of God as "holy, just," and good. And the mere fact that, when +the complex system of religious belief has once been built up, conscience +is strongly wrought upon by that belief and its accompanying emotions, is +surely a fact the very reverse of mysterious. Suppose, for the sake of +argument, that the moral sense has been evolved from the social feelings, +and should we not certainly expect that, when the belief in a moral and +all-seeing God is superadded, conscience should be distracted at the +thought of offending him, and experience a "soothing, satisfactory delight" +in the belief that we are pleasing him? And as to the argument, "Why does +the wicked flee when none pursueth? whence his terror?" the question admits +of only too easy an answer. Indeed, the form into which the question is +thrown would almost seem--were it not written by Dr. Newman--to imply a +sarcastic reference to the power of superstition. "Who is it that," not +only Dr. Newman, but the haunted savage, the mediaeval sorcerer, or the +frightened child, "sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of +his heart?" Who but the "image" of his own thought? "If the cause of these +emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his +perception is directed must be supernatural and divine." Assuredly; but +what an inference from what an assumption! Whether or not the moral sense +has been developed by natural causes, "these emotions" of terror at the +thought of offending beings "supernatural and divine" are not of such +unique occurrence "in the visible world" as to give Dr. Newman the monopoly +of his particular "Object." With a deeper meaning, therefore, than he +intends may we repeat, "The phenomena of conscience as a dictate _avail_ to +impress the _imagination_ with the _picture_ of a Supreme Governor." But +criticism here is positively painful. Let it be enough to say that those of +us who do not already believe in any such particular "Object"--be it ghost, +shape, demon, or deity--are strangers, utter and complete, to any such +supernatural pursuers. The fact, therefore, of these various religious +emotions being associated with conscience in the minds of theists, can in +itself be no proof of Theism, seeing that it is the theory of Theism which +itself _engenders_ these emotions; those who do not believe in this theory +experiencing none of these feelings of personal dread, responsibility to an +unknown God, and the feelings of doing injury to, or of receiving praise +from, a parent. To such of us the violation of conscience is its own +punishment, as the pursuit of virtue is its own reward. For we know that +not more certainly than fire will burn, any violation of the deeply-rooted +feelings of our humanity will leave a gaping wound which even time may not +always heal. And when it is shown us that our natural dread of fire is due +to a supernatural cause, we may be prepared to entertain the argument that +our natural dread of sin, as distinguished from our dread of God, is +likewise due to such a cause. But until this can be done we must, as +reasonable men, _whose minds have been trained in the school of nature_, +forbear to allow that the one fact is of any greater cogency than the +other, so far as the question of a supernatural cause of either is +concerned. For, as we have already seen, the law of parcimony forbids us to +ascribe "the phenomena of conscience as a dictate" to a supernatural cause, +until the science of psychology shall have proved that they cannot have +been due to natural causes. But, as we have also seen, the science of +psychology is now beginning, as quick and thoroughly as can be expected, to +prove the very converse; so that the probability is now overwhelming that +our moral sense, like all our other faculties, has been evolved. Therefore, +while the burden of proof really lies on the side of Theism--or with those +who account for the natural phenomena of conscience by the hypothesis of a +supernatural origin--this burden is now being rapidly discharged by the +opposite side. That is to say, while the proofs which are now beginning to +substantiate the naturalistic hypothesis are all in full accord with the +ordinary lines of scientific explanations, the vague and feeble reflections +of those who still maintain that Conscience is evidence of Deity, are all +such as run counter to the very truisms of scientific method. + +In the face of all the facts, therefore, I find it impossible to recognise +as valid any inference which is drawn from the existence of our moral sense +to the existence of a God; although, of course, all inferences drawn from +the existence of our moral sense to the _character_ of a God already +believed to exist remain unaffected by the foregoing considerations.[17] + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. + +Sec. 23. The argument from Design, as presented by Mill, is merely a +resuscitation of it as presented by Paley. True it is that the logical +penetration of the former enabled him to perceive that the latter had "put +the case much too strongly;" although, even here, he has failed to see +wherein Paley's error consisted. He says:--"If I found a watch on an +apparently desolate island, I should indeed infer that it had been left +there by a human being; but the inference would not be from the marks of +design, but because I already know by direct experience that watches are +made by men." Now I submit that this misses the whole point of Paley's +meaning; for it is evident that there would be no argument at all unless +this author be understood to say what he clearly enough expresses, viz., +that the evidence of design supposed to be afforded by the watch is +supposed to be afforded by examination of its mechanism only, and not by +any previous knowledge as to how that particular mechanism called a watch +is made. Paley, I take it, only chose a watch for his example because he +knew that no reader would dispute the fact that watches are constructed by +design: except for the purpose of pointing out that mechanism is in some +cases admitted to be due to intelligence, for all the other purposes of his +argument he might as well have chosen for his illustration any case of +mechanism occurring in nature. What the real fallacy in Paley's argument +is, is another question, and this I shall now endeavour to answer; for, as +Mill's argument is clearly the same in kind as that of Paley and his +numberless followers, in examining the one I am also examining the other. + +Sec. 24. In nature, then, we see innumerable examples of apparent design: are +these of equal value in testifying to the presence of a designing +intelligence as are similar examples of human contrivance, and if not, why +not? The answer to the first of these questions is patent. If such examples +were of the same value in the one case as they are in the other, the +existence of a Deity would be, as Paley appears to have thought it was, +demonstrated by the fact. A brief and yet satisfactory answer to the second +question is not so easy, and we may best approach it by assuming the +existence of a Deity. If, then, there is a God, it by no means follows that +every apparent contrivance in nature is an actual contrivance, in the same +sense as is any human contrivance. The eye of a vertebrated animal, for +instance, exhibits as much apparent design as does a watch; but no one--at +the present day, at least--will undertake to affirm that the evidence of +divine thought furnished by one example is as conclusive as is the evidence +of human thought furnished by the other--and this even assuming a Deity to +exist. Why is this? The reason, I think, is, that we know by our personal +experience what are our own relations to the material world, and to the +laws which preside over the action of physical forces; while we can have no +corresponding knowledge of the relations subsisting between the Deity and +these same objects of our own experience. Hence, to suppose that the Deity +constructed the eye by any such process of thought as we know that men +construct watches, is to make an assumption not only incapable of proof, +but destitute of any assignable degree of likelihood. Take an example. The +relation in which a bee stands to the external world is to a large extent a +matter of observation, and, therefore, no one imagines that the formation +of its scientifically-constructed cells is due to any profound study on the +bee's part. Whatever the origin of the cell-making instinct may have been, +its nature is certainly not the same as it would have been in man, +supposing him to have had occasion to construct honeycombs. It may be said +that the requisite calculations have been made for the bees by the Deity; +but, even if this assumption were true, it would be nothing to the point, +which is merely that even within the limits of the animal kingdom the +relations of intelligence to the external world are so diverse, that the +same results may be accomplished by totally different intellectual +processes. And as this example is parallel to the case on which we are +engaged in everything save the _observability_ of the relations involved, +it supplies us with the exact measure of the probability we are trying to +estimate. Hence it is evident that so long as we remain ignorant of the +element essential to the argument from design in its Paleyerian form--viz., +knowledge or presumption of the relations subsisting between an +hypothetical Deity and his creation--so long must that argument remain, not +only unassignably weak, but incapable of being strengthened by any number +of examples similar in kind. + +Sec. 25. To put the case in another way. The root fallacy in Paley's argument +consisted in reasoning from a particular to an universal. Because he knew +that design was the cause of adaptation in some cases, and because the +phenomena of life exhibited more instances of adaptation than any other +class of phenomena in nature, he pointed to these phenomena as affording an +exceptional kind of proof of the presence in nature of intelligent agency. +Yet, if it is admitted--and of this, even in Paley's days, there was a +strong analogical presumption--that the phenomena of life are throughout +their history as much subject to law as are any other phenomena +whatsoever,--that the method of the divine government, supposing such to +exist, is the same here as elsewhere; then nothing can be clearer than that +any amount of observable adaptation of means to ends within this class of +phenomena cannot afford any different kind of evidence of _design_ than is +afforded by any other class of phenomena whatsoever. Either we know the +relations of the Deity to his creation, or we do not. If we do, then we +must know whether or not _every_ physical change which occurs in accordance +with law--_i.e._, every change occurring within experience, and so, until +contrary evidence is produced, presumably every change occurring beyond +experience--was separately planned by the Deity. If we do not, then we have +no more reason to suppose that any one set of physical changes rather than +another has been separately planned by him, unless we could point (as Paley +virtually pointed) to one particular set of changes and assert, These are +not subject to the same method of divine government which we observe +elsewhere, or, in other words, to law. If it is retorted that _in some way +or other_ all these wonderful adaptations must ultimately have been due to +intelligence, this is merely to shift the argument to a ground which we +shall presently have to consider: all we are now engaged upon is to show +that we have no right to found arguments on the assumed _mode_, _manner_, +or _process_ by which the supposed intelligence is thought to have +operated. We can here see, then, more clearly where Paley stumbled. He +virtually assumed that the relations subsisting between the Deity and the +universe were such, that the exceptional adaptations met with in the +organised part of the latter cannot have been due to the same intellectual +_processes_ as was the rest of the universe--or that, if they were, still +they yielded better evidence of having been due to these processes than +does the rest of the universe. And it is easy to perceive that his error +arose from his pre-formed belief in special creation. So long as a man +regards every living organism which he sees as the lineal descendant of a +precisely similar organism originally struck out by the immediate fiat of +Deity, so long is he justified in holding his axiom, "Contrivance must have +had a contriver." For "adaptation" then becomes to our minds the synonym of +"contrivance"--it being utterly inconceivable that the numberless +adaptations found in any living organism could have resulted in any other +way than by intelligent contrivance, at the time when this organism was in +the first instance _suddenly_ introduced into its complex conditions of +life. Still, as an argument, this is of course merely reasoning in a +circle: we adopt a hypothesis which presupposes the existence of a Deity as +the first step in the proof of his existence. I do not say that Paley +committed this error expressly, but merely that if it had not been for his +pre-formed conviction as to the truth of the special-creation theory, he +would probably not have written his "Natural Theology." + +Sec. 26. Thus let us take a case of his own choosing, and the one which is +adduced by him as typical of "the application of the argument." "I know of +no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of comparing a +single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As +far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same +proof that the eye was made for vision as there is that the telescope was +made for assisting it. They are both made upon the same principles, both +being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays +of light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves; +but these laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted to +them. For instance: these laws require, in order to produce the same +effect, that the rays of light, in passing through water into the eye, +should be refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of air +into the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of +it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial +animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this +difference?" But what, let us ask, is the proximate cause of this +difference? 'The immediate volition of the Deity, manifested in special +creation,' virtually answers Paley; while we of to-day are able to reply, +'The agency of natural laws, to wit, inheritance, variation, survival of +the fittest, and probably of other laws as yet not discovered.' Now, of +course, according to the former of these two premises, there can be no more +legitimate conclusion than that the difference in question is due to +intelligent and special design; but, according to the other premise, it is +equally clear that no conclusion can be more unwarranted; for, under the +latter view, the greater rotundity of the crystalline lens in a fish's eye +no more exhibits the presence of any special design than does the +adaptation of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means of +excavating. When, therefore, Paley goes on to ask:--"How is it possible, +under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of +equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the case of the eye, yet to +acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest +and clearest of all propositions, in the case of the telescope?" the answer +is sufficiently obvious, namely, that the "evidence" in the two cases is +_not_ "equal;"--any more than is the existence, say, of the Nile of equal +value in point of evidence that it was designed for traffic, as is the +existence of the Suez Canal that it was so designed. And the mere fact that +the problem of achromatism was solved by "the mind of a sagacious optician +inquiring how this matter was managed in the eye," no more proves that +"this could not be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the +optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose," than would +the fact, say, of the winnowing of corn having suggested the +fanning-machine prove that air currents were designed for the purpose of +eliminating chaff from grain. In short, the real substance of the argument +from Design must eventually merge into that which Paley, in the +above-quoted passage, expressly passes over--viz., "the origin of the laws +themselves;" for so long as there is any reason to suppose that any +apparent "adaptation" to a certain set of "fixed laws" is itself due to the +influence of other "fixed laws," so long have we as little right to say +that the latter set of fixed laws exhibit any better indications of +intelligent adaptation to the former set, than the former do to that of the +latter--the eye to light, than light to the eye. Hence I conceive that Mill +is entirely wrong when he says of Paley's argument, "It surpasses analogy +exactly as induction surpasses it," because "the instances chosen are +particular instances of a circumstance which experience shows to have a +real connection with an intelligent origin--the fact of conspiring to an +end." Experience shows as this, but it shows us more besides; it shows us +that there is no _necessary_ or _uniform_ connection between an +"intelligent origin" and the fact of apparent "means conspiring to an +[apparent] end." If the reader will take the trouble to compare this +quotation just made from Mill, and the long train of reasoning that +follows, with an admirable illustration in Mr. Wallace's "Natural +Selection," he will be well rewarded by finding all the steps in Mr. Mill's +reasoning so closely paralleled by the caricature, that but for the +respective dates of publication, one might have thought the latter had an +express reference to the former.[18] True, Mr. Mill closes his argument +with a brief allusion to the "principle of the survival of the fittest," +observing that "creative forethought is not absolutely the only link by +which the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connected +with the fact of sight." I am surprised, however, that a man of Mr. Mill's +penetration did not see that whatever view we may take as to "the adequacy +of this principle (_i.e._, Natural Selection) to account for such truly +admirable combinations as some of those in nature," the argument from +_Design_ is not materially affected. So far as this argument is concerned, +the issue is not Design _versus_ Natural Selection, but it is Design +_versus_ Natural Law. By all means, "leaving this remarkable speculation +(_i.e._, Mr. Darwin's) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have +in store for it," and it by no means follows that "in the present state of +knowledge the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability +in favour of creation by intelligence." For whatever we may think of this +special theory as to the _mode_, there can be no longer any reasonable +doubt, "in the present state of our knowledge," as to the truth of the +general theory of _Evolution_; and the latter, if accepted, is as +destructive to the argument from _Design_ as would the former be if proved. +In a word, it is the _fact_ and not the _method_ of Evolution which is +subversive of Teleology in its Paleyerian form. + +Sec. 27. We have come then to this:--Apparent intellectual adaptations are +perfectly valid indications of design, so long as their authorship is known +to be confined to human intelligence; for then we know from experience what +are our relations to these laws, and so in any given case can argue _a +posteriori_ that such an adaptation to such a set of laws by such an +intelligence can only have been due to such a process. But when we overstep +the limits of experience, we are not entitled to argue anything _a priori_ +of any other intelligence in this respect, even supposing any such +intelligence to exist. The analogy by which the unknown relations are +inferred from the known is "infinitely precarious;" seeing that two of the +analogous terms--to wit, the divine intelligence and the human--may differ +to an immeasurable extent in their properties--nay, are supposed thus to +differ, the one being supposed omniscient, omnipotent, &c., and the other +not. And, as a final step, we may now see that the argument from Design, in +its last resort, resolves itself into a _petitio principii_. For, +ultimately, the only point which the analogical argument in question is +adduced to prove is, that the relations subsisting between an Unknown Cause +and certain physical forces are so far identical with the relations known +to subsist between human intelligence and these same forces, that similar +intellectual processes are required in the two cases to account for the +production of similar effects--and hence that the Unknown Cause is +intelligent. But it is evident that the analogy itself can have no +existence, except upon the presupposition that these two sets of relations +_are_ thus identical. The point which the analogy is adduced to prove is +therefore postulated by the fact of its being adduced at all, and the whole +argument resolves itself into a case of _petitio principii_. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS. + +Sec. 28. Turning now to an important error of Mr. Mill's in respect of +omission, I firmly believe that all competent writers who have ever +undertaken to support the argument from Design, have been moved to do so by +their instinctive appreciation of the much more important argument, which +Mill does not mention at all and which we now proceed to consider--the +argument from General Laws. That is to say, I cannot think that any one +competent writer ever seriously believed, had he taken time to analyse his +beliefs, that the cogency of his argument lay in assuming any knowledge +concerning the _process_ of divine thought; he must have really believed +that it lay entirely in his observation of the _product_ of divine +thought--or rather, let us say, of divine intelligence. Now this is the +whole difference between the argument from Design and the argument from +General Laws. The argument from Design says, There must be a God, because +such and such an organic structure must have been due to such and such an +intellectual _process_. The argument from General Laws says, There must be +a God, because such and such an organic structure must _in some way or +other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence. Nor does this argument end +here. Not only must such and such an organic structure have been ultimately +due to intelligence, but every such structure--nay, every phenomenon in the +universe--must have been the same; for all phenomena are alike subject to +the same method of sequence. The argument is thus a cumulative one; for as +there is no single known exception to this universal mode of existence, the +united effect of so vast a body of evidence is all but irresistible, and +its tendency is clearly to point us to some _one_ explanatory cause. The +scope of this argument is therefore co-extensive with the universe; it +draws alike upon all phenomena with which experience is acquainted. For +instance, it contains all the phenomena covered by the Design argument, +just as a genus contains any one of its species; it being manifest, from +what was said in the last section, that if the general doctrine of +Evolution is accepted, the argument from Design must of necessity merge +into that from General Laws. And this wide basis, we may be sure, must be +the most legitimate one whereon to rest an argument in favour of Theism. If +there is any such thing as such an argument at all, the most unassailable +field for its display must be the universe as a whole, seeing that if we +separate any one section of the universe from the rest, and suppose that we +here discover a different kind of testimony to intelligence from that which +we can discover elsewhere, we may from analogy be abundantly sure that on +the confines of our division there must be second causes and general laws +at work (whether discoverable or not), which are the immediate agents in +the production of the observed results. Of course I do not deny that some +classes of phenomena afford us more and better proofs of intellectual +agency than do others, in the sense of the laws in operation being more +numerous, subtle, and complex; but it will be seen that this is a different +interpretation of the evidence from that against which I am contending. +Thus, if there are tokens of divine intention (as distinguished from +design) to be met with in the eye,--if it is inconceivable that so "nice +and intricate a structure" should exist without intelligence as its +_ultimate_ cause; then the discovery of natural selection, or of any other +law, as the _manner_ in which this intelligence wrought in no wise +attenuates the proof as to the fact of an intelligent cause. On the +contrary, it tends rather to confirm it; for, besides the evidence before +existing, there is added that which arises from the conformity of the +method to that which is observable in the rest of the universe. + +Thus, notwithstanding what Hamilton, Chalmers, and others have said, I +cannot but feel that the ubiquitous action of general laws is, of all facts +supplied by experience, the most cogent in its bearing upon teleology. If +perpetual and uninterrupted uniformity of method does not indicate the +existence of a presiding intelligence, it becomes a question whether any +other kind of method--short of the intelligently miraculous--could possibly +do so; seeing that the further the divine _modus operandi_ (supposing such +to exist) were removed from absolute uniformity, the greater would be the +room for our interpreting it as mere fortuity. But forasmuch as the +progress of science has shown that within experience the method of the +Supreme Causality is absolutely uniform, the hypothesis of fortuity is +rendered irrational; and let us think of this Supreme Causality as we may, +the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive influence of +uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous magnitude and exact +precision, worthy of our highest possible conceptions of Deity. + +Sec. 29. Had it been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I doubt not +that I should have regarded the foregoing considerations as final: I should +have concluded that there was an overwhelming balance of rational +probability in favour of Theism; and I think I should also have insisted +that this balance of rational probability would require to continue as it +was till the end of time. I should have maintained, in some such words as +the following, in which the Rev. Baden Powell conveys this argument:--"The +very essence of the whole argument is the invariable preservation of the +principle of _order_: not necessarily such as we can directly recognise, +but the universal conviction of the unfailing subordination of everything +to _some_ grand principles of _law_, however imperfectly apprehended in our +partial conceptions, and the successive subordination of such laws to +others of still higher generality, to an extent transcending our +conceptions, and constituting the true chain of universal causation which +culminates in the sublime conception of the COSMOS. + +"It is in immediate connection with this enlarged view of universal +immutable natural order that I have regarded the narrow notions of those +who obscure the sublime prospect by imagining so unworthy an idea as that +of occasional interruptions in the physical economy of the world. + +"The only instance considered was that of the alleged sudden supernatural +origination of new species of organised beings in remote geological epochs. +It is in relation to the broad principle of law, if once rightly +apprehended, that such inferences are seen to be wholly unwarranted by +science, and such fancies utterly derogatory and inadmissible in +philosophy; while, even in those instances properly understood, the real +scientific conclusions of the invariable and indissoluble chain of +causation stand vindicated in the sublime contemplations with which they +are thus associated. + +"To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, the one essential +requisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this +_one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather constituting the +very idea of nature_;--which forms the vital essence of the whole of +inductive science, and the sole assurance of those higher inferences from +the inductive study of natural causes which are the vindications of a +supreme intelligence and a moral cause. + +"_The whole of the ensuing discussion must stand or fall with the admission +of this grand principle_. Those who are not prepared to embrace it in its +full extent may probably not accept the conclusions; but they must be sent +back to the school of inductive science, where alone it must be +independently imbibed and thoroughly assimilated with the mind of the +student in the first instance. + +"On the slightest consideration of the nature, the foundations, and general +results of inductive science,... we recognise the powers of intellect fitly +employed in the study of nature,... pre-eminently leading us to perceive +_in nature_, and in the invariable and universal constancy of its laws, the +indications of universal, unchangeable, and recondite arrangement, +dependence, and connection in reason.... + +"We thus see the importance of taking a more enlarged view of the great +argument of natural theology; and the necessity for so doing becomes the +more apparent when we reflect on the injury to which these sublime +inferences are exposed from the narrow and unworthy form in which the +reasoning has been too often conducted.... + +"The satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those more +enlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation of +cosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences from the +_past_, but to proofs of the _ever-present_ mind and reason in nature. + +"If we read a book which it requires much thought and exercise of reason to +understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as +we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present +comprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason _exist +in that book_ irrespectively of our minds, and equally so of any question +as to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly exists, and is ever +open to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case under a slightly +different form:--When the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or the +naturalist notes down a series of observed facts or measured dates, he is +not an _author_ expressing his own ideas,--he is a mere _amanuensis_ taking +down the dictations of nature: his observation book is the record of the +thoughts of _another mind_: he has but set down literally what he himself +does not understand, or only very imperfectly. On further examination, and +after deep and anxious study, he perhaps begins to decipher the meaning, by +perceiving some law which gives a signification to the facts; and the +further he pursues the investigation up to any more comprehensive theory, +the more fully he perceives that there is a higher reason, of which his own +is but the humbler interpreter, and into whose depths he may penetrate +continually further, to discover yet more profound and invariable order and +system, always indicating still deeper and more hidden abysses yet +unfathomed, but throughout which he is assured the same recondite and +immutable arrangement ever prevails. + +"That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself +thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must +be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is but partial, then +the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the +student. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the +necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast +extent and compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and its +reality, as _existing in the immutably connected order of objects +examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator. + +"But considerations of this kind, just and transcendently important as they +are in themselves, give us no aid in any inquiry into the _origin_ of the +order of things thus investigated, or the _nature_ or other attributes of +the mind evinced in them. + +"The real argument for universal _intelligence_, manifested in the +universality of order and law in the material world, is very different from +any attempt to give a form to our conceptions, even by the language of +analogy, as to the _nature_ or _mode of existence_ or operation of that +intelligence [_i.e._, as I have stated the case, the argument can only rest +on a study of the _products_, as distinguished from the _processes_ of such +intelligence]: and still more different from any extension of our inference +from what _is_ to what _may have been_, from _present_ order to a supposed +_origination_, first adjustment, or planning of that order. + +"By keeping these distinctions steadily in view, we appreciate properly +both the limits and the extent and compass of what we may appropriately +call COSMOTHEOLOGY."[19] + +I have quoted these passages at length, because they convey in a more +forcible, guarded, and accurate manner than any others with which I am +acquainted, the strictly rational standing of this great subject prior to +the date at which the above-quoted passage was written. Therefore, as I +have said, if it had been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I +should certainly have rested in these "sublime conceptions" as in an +argument supreme and irrefutable. I should have felt that the progress of +physical knowledge could never exert any other influence on Theism than +that of ever tending more and more to confirm that magnificent belief, by +continuously expanding our human thoughts into progressively advancing +conceptions, ever grander and yet more grand, of that tremendous Origin of +Things--the Mind of God. Such would have been my hope--such would have been +my prayer. But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has so +terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now +behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, +uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed, and +burying our highest life in mindless desolation. Science, whom erstwhile we +thought a very Angel of God, pointing to that great barrier of Law, and +proclaiming to the restless sea of changing doubt, "Hitherto shalt thou +come, but no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed,"--even +Science has now herself thrown down this trusted barrier; the flood-gates +of infidelity are open, and Atheism overwhelming is upon us. + +Sec. 30. All and every law follows as a necessary consequence from the +persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter.[20] That this +must be so is evident if we consider that, were it not so, force could not +be permanent nor matter constant. For instance, if action and reaction were +not invariably equal and opposite, force would not be invariably +persistent, seeing that in no case can the formula fail, unless some one or +other of the forces concerned, or parts of them, disappear. And as with a +simple law of this kind, so with every other natural law and +inter-operation of laws, howsoever complex such inter-operation may be; for +it is manifest that if in any case similar antecedents did not determine +similar consequents, on one or other of these occasions some quantum of +force, or of matter, or of both, must have disappeared--or, which is the +same thing, the law of causation cannot have been constant. Every natural +law, therefore, may be defined as the formula of a sequence, which must +either ensue upon certain forces of a given intensity impinging upon +certain given quantities, kinds, and forms of matter, or else, by not +ensuing, prove that the force or the matter concerned were not of a +permanent nature. + +Sec. 31. The argument, then, which was elaborated in Sec. 29, and which has so +long and so generally received the popular sanction in the common-sense +epitome, that in the last record there must be mind in external nature, +since "that which it requires thought and reason to understand must itself +be thought and reason,"--this argument, I say, must now for ever be +abandoned by reasonable men. No doubt it would be easy to point to several +speculative thinkers who have previously combated this argument,[21] and +from this fact some readers will perhaps be inclined to judge, from a false +analogy, that as the argument in question has withstood previous assaults, +it need not necessarily succumb to the present one. Be it observed, +however, that the present assault differs from all previous assaults, just +as demonstration differs from speculation. What has hitherto been but mere +guess and unwarrantable assertion has now become a matter of the greatest +certainty. That the argument from General Laws is a futile argument, is no +longer a matter of unverifiable opinion: it is as sure as is the most +fundamental axiom of science. That the argument will long remain in +illogical minds, I doubt not; but that it is from henceforth quite +inadmissible in accurate thinking, there can be no question. For the sake, +however, of impressing this fact still more strongly upon such readers as +have been accustomed to rely upon this argument, and so find it difficult +thus abruptly to reverse the whole current of their thoughts,--for the sake +of such, I shall here add a few remarks with the view of facilitating the +conception of an universal Order existing independently of Mind. + +Sec. 32. Interpreting the mazy nexus of phenomena only by the facts which +science has revealed, and what conclusion are we driven to accept? Clearly, +looking to what has been said in the last two sections, that from the time +when the process of evolution first began,--from the time before the +condensation of the nebula had showed any signs of commencing,--every +subsequent change or event of evolution was _necessarily bound_ to ensue; +else force and matter have not been persistent. How then, it will be asked, +did the vast nexus of natural laws which is now observable ever begin or +continue to be? In this way. When the first womb of things was pregnant +with all the future, there would probably have been existent at any rate +not more than one of the formulae which we now call natural laws. This one +law, of course, would have been the law of gravitation. Here we may take +our stand. It does not signify whether there ever was a time when +gravitation was not,--_i.e._, if ever there was a time when matter, _as we +now know it_, was not in existence;--for if there ever was such a time, +there is no reason to doubt, but every reason to conclude, that the +evolution of matter, as we now know it, was accomplished in accordance with +law. Similarly, we are not concerned with the question as to how the law of +gravitation came to be associated with matter; for it is overwhelmingly +probable, from the extent of the analogy, that if our knowledge concerning +molecular physics were sufficiently great, the existence of the law in +question would be found to follow as a necessary deduction from the primary +qualities of matter and force, just as we can now see that, when present, +its peculiar quantitative action necessarily follows from the primary +qualities of space. + +Starting, then, with these data,--matter, force, and the law of +gravitation,--what must happen? We have the strongest scientific reason to +believe that the matter of the solar system primordially existed in a +highly diffused or nebulous form. By mutual gravitation, therefore, all the +substance of the nebula must have begun to concentrate upon itself, or to +condense. Now, from this point onwards, I wish it to be clearly understood +that the mere consideration of the supposed facts not admitting of +scientific proof, or of scientific explanation if true, in no wise affects +the certainty of the doctrine which these facts are here adduced to +establish. Fully granting that the alleged facts are not beyond dispute, +and that, even if true, innumerable other unknown and unknowable facts must +have been associated with them--fully admitting, in short, that our ideas +concerning the genesis of the solar system are of the crudest and least +trustworthy character; still, if it be admitted, what at the present day +only ignorance or prejudice can deny, viz., that, as a whole, evolution has +been the method of the universe; then it follows that the doctrine here +contended for is as certainly true as it would be were we fully acquainted +with every cause and every change which has acted and ensued throughout the +whole process of the genesis of things. + +Now, bearing this caveat in mind, we have next to observe that when once +the nebula began to condense, new relations among its constituent parts +would, _for this reason_, begin to be established. "Given a rare and widely +diffused mass of nebulous matter,... what are the successive changes that +will take place? Mutual gravitation will approximate its atoms, but their +approximation will be opposed by atomic repulsion, the overcoming of which +implies the evolution of heat." That is to say, the condensation of the +nebula as a whole of necessity implies at least the origination of these +new material and dynamical relations among its constituent parts. "As fast +as this heat partially escapes by radiation, further approximation will +take place, attended by further evolution of heat, and so on continuously: +the processes not occurring separately, as here described, but +simultaneously, uninterruptedly, and with increasing activity." Hence the +newly established relations continuously acquire new increments of +intensity. But now observe a more important point. The previous essential +conditions remaining unaltered--viz., the persistence of matter and force, +as well as, or rather let us say and consequently, the law of +gravitation--these conditions, I say, remaining constant, and the newly +established relations would necessarily _of themselves_ give origin to +_new_ laws. For whenever two given quantities of force and matter met in +one of the novel relations, they would of necessity give rise to novel +effects; and whenever, on any future occasion, similar quantities of force +and matter again so met, precisely similar effects would of necessity +require to occur: but the occurrence of similar effects under similar +conditions is all that we mean by a natural law. + +Continuing, then, our quotation from Mr. Herbert Spencer's terse and lucid +exposition of the nebular theory, we find this doctrine virtually embodied +in the next sentences:--"Eventually this slow movement of the atoms towards +their common centre of gravity will bring about phenomena of another order. + +"Arguing from the known laws of atomic combination, it will happen that, +when the nebulous mass has reached a particular stage of condensation--when +its internally situated atoms have approached to within certain distances, +have generated a certain amount of heat, and are subject to a certain +mutual pressure (the heat and pressure increasing as the aggregation +progresses), some of them will suddenly enter into chemical union. Whether +the binary atoms so produced be of kinds such as we know, which is +possible, or whether they be of kinds simpler than any we know, which is +more probable, matters not to the argument. It suffices that molecular +combinations of some species will finally take place." We have, then, here +a new and important change of relations. Matter, primordially uniform, has +itself become heterogeneous; and in as many places as it has thus changed +its state, it must, in virtue of the fact, give rise to other hitherto +novel relations, and so, in many cases, to new laws.[22] + +It would be tedious and unnecessary to trace this genesis of natural law +any further: indeed, it would be quite impossible so to trace it for any +considerable distance without feeling that the ever-multiplying mazes of +relations renders all speculation as to the actual processes quite useless. +This fact, however, as before insisted, in no wise affects the only +doctrine which I here enunciate--viz., that the self-generation of natural +law is a necessary corollary from the persistence of matter and force. And +that this must be so is now, I hope, sufficiently evident. Just as in the +first dawn of things, when the proto-binary compounds of matter gave rise +to new relations together with their appropriate laws, so throughout the +whole process of evolution, as often as matter acquired a hitherto novel +state, or in one of its old states entered into hitherto novel relations, +so often would non-existent or even impossible laws become at once possible +and necessary. And in this way I cannot see that there is any reason to +stop until we arrive at all the marvellous complexity of things as they +are. For aught that speculative reason can ever from henceforth show to the +contrary, the evolution of all the diverse phenomena of inorganic nature, +of life, and of mind, appears to be as necessary and as self-determined as +is the being of that mysterious Something which is Everything,--the Entity +we must all believe in, which without condition and beyond relation holds +its existence in itself. + +Sec. 33. Does it still seem incredible that, notwithstanding it requires +mental processes to interpret external nature, external nature may +nevertheless be destitute of mind? Then let us look at the subject on its +obverse aspect. + +According to the theory of evolution--which, be it always remembered, is no +mere gratuitous supposition, but a genuine scientific theory--human +intelligence, like everything else, has been evolved. Now in what does the +evolution of intelligence consist? Any one acquainted with the writings of +our great philosopher can have no hesitation in answering: Clearly and only +in the establishment of more and more numerous and complex internal or +psychological relations. In other words, the law of intelligence being +"that the strengths of the inner cohesions between psychical states must be +proportionate to the persistences of the outer relations symbolised," it +follows that the development of intelligence is "secured by the one simple +principle that experience of the outer relations _produces_ inner +cohesions, and makes the inner cohesions strong in proportion as the outer +relations are persistent." Now the question before us at present is merely +this:--Must we not infer that these outer relations are regulated by mind, +seeing that order is undoubtedly apparent among them, and that it requires +mental processes on our part to interpret this order? The only legitimate +answer to this question is, that these outer relations _may_ be regulated +by mind, but that, in view of the evolution theory, we are certainly not +entitled to infer that they _are_ so regulated, _merely_ because it +requires mental processes on our part to interpret their orderly character. +For if it is true that the human mind was itself evolved by these outer +relations--ever continuously moulded into conformity with them as the prime +condition of its existence--then its process of interpreting them is but +reflecting (as it were) in consciousness these outer relations by which the +inner ones were originally produced. Granting that, as a matter of fact, an +objective macrocosm exists, and if we can prove or render probable that +this objective macrocosm is _of itself_ sufficient to evolve a subjective +microcosm, I do not see any the faintest reason for the latter to conclude +that a self-conscious intelligence is inherent in the former, merely +because it is able to trace in the macrocosm some of those orderly +objective relations by which its own corresponding subjective relations +were originally produced. If it is said that it is impossible to conceive +how, apart from mind, the orderly objective relations themselves can ever +have originated, I reply that this is merely to shift the ground of +discussion to that which occupied us in the last section: all we are now +engaged upon is,--Granting that the existence of such orderly relations is +actual, whether with or without mind to account for them; and granting also +that these relations are _of themselves_ sufficient to produce +corresponding subjective relations; then the mere fact of our conscious +intelligence being able to discover numerous and complex outer relations +answering to those which they themselves have caused in our intelligence, +does not warrant the latter in concluding that the causal connection +between intelligence and non-intelligence has ever been reversed--that +these outer relations in turn are caused by a similar conscious +intelligence. How such a thing as a conscious intelligence is possible is +another and wholly unanswerable question (though not more so than that as +to the existence of force and matter, and would not be rendered less so by +merging the fact in a hypothetical Deity); but granting, as we must, that +such an entity does exist, and supposing it to have been evolved by natural +causes, then it would appear incontestably to follow, that whether or not +objective existence is presided over by objective mind, our subjective mind +would _alike_ and _equally_ require to read in the facts of the external +world an indication, whether true or false, of some such presiding agency. +The subjective mind being, by the supposition, but the obverse aspect of +the sum total of such among objective relations as have had a share in its +production, when, as in observation and reflection, this obverse aspect is +again inverted upon its die, it naturally fits more or less exactly into +all the prints. + +Sec. 34. This last illustration, however, serves to introduce us to another +point. The supposed evidence from which the existence of mind in nature is +inferred does not always depend upon such minute correspondences between +subjective method and objective method as the illustration suggests. Every +natural theologian has experienced more or less difficulty in explaining +the fact, that while there is a tolerably general similarity between the +contrivances due to human thought and the apparent contrivances in nature +which he regards as due to divine thought, the similarity is nevertheless +_only_ general. For instance, if a man has occasion to devise any +artificial appliance, he does so with the least possible cost of labour to +himself, and with the least possible expenditure of material. Yet it is +obvious that in nature as a whole no such economic considerations obtain. +Doubtless by superficial minds this assertion will be met at first with an +indignant denial: they have been accustomed to accumulate instances of this +very principle of economy in nature; perhaps written about it in books, and +illustrated it in lectures,--totally ignoring the fact that the instances +of economy in nature bear no proportion at all to the instances of +prodigality. Conceive of the force which is being quite uselessly expended +by all the wind-currents which are at this moment blowing over the face of +Europe. Imagine the energy that must have been dissipated during the +secular cooling of this single planet. Feebly try to think of what the sun +is radiating into space. If it is retorted that we are incompetent to judge +of the purposes of the Almighty, I reply that this is but to abandon the +argument from economy whenever it is found untenable: we presume to be +competent judges of almighty purposes so long as they appear to imitate our +own; but so soon as there is any divergence observable, we change front. By +thus selecting all the instances of economy in nature, and disregarding all +the vastly greater instances of reckless waste, we are merely laying +ourselves open to the charge of an unfair eclecticism. And this formal +refutation of the argument from economy admits of being further justified +in a strikingly substantial manner; for if all the examples of economy in +nature that were ever observed, or admit being observed, were collected +into one view, I undertake to affirm that, without exception, they would be +found to marshal themselves in one great company--the subjects whose law is +_survival of the fittest_. One question only will I here ask. Is it +possible at the present day for any degree of prejudice, after due +consideration, to withstand the fact that the solitary exceptions to the +universal prodigality so painfully conspicuous in nature are to be found +where there is also to be found a full and adequate physical explanation of +their occurrence? + +But, again, prodigality is only one of several particulars wherein the +modes and the means of the supposed divine intelligence differ from those +of its human counterpart. Comparative anatomists can point to organic +structures which are far from being theoretically perfect: even the mind of +man in these cases, notwithstanding its confessed deficiencies in respect +both of cognitive and cogitative powers, is competent to suggest +improvements to an intelligence supposed to be omniscient and all-wise! And +what shall we say of the numerous cases in which the supposed purposes of +this intelligence could have been attained by other and less roundabout +means? In short, not needlessly to prolong discussion, it is admitted, even +by natural theologians themselves, that the difficulties of reconciling, +even approximately, the supposed processes of divine thought with the known +processes of human thought are quite insuperable. The fact is expressed by +such writers in various ways,--_e.g._, that it would be presumptuous in man +to expect complete conformity in all cases; that the counsels of God are +past finding out; that his ways are not as our ways, and so on. Observing +only, as before, that in thus ignoring adverse cases natural theologians +are guilty of an unfair eclecticism, it is evident that all such +expressions concede the fact, that even in those provinces of nature where +the evidence of superhuman intelligence appears most plain, the resemblance +of its apparent products to those of human intelligence consists in a +general approximation of method rather than in any precise similarity of +particulars: the likeness is generic rather than specific. + +Now this is exactly what we should expect to be the case, if the similarity +in question be due to the cause which the present section endeavours to set +forth. If all natural laws are self-evolved, and if human intelligence is +but a subjective photograph of certain among their interrelations, it seems +but natural that when this photograph compares itself with the whole +external world from parts of which it was taken, its subjective lights and +shadows should be found to correspond with some of the objective lights and +shadows much more perfectly than with others. Still there would doubtless +be sufficient general conformity to lead the thinking photograph to +conclude that the great world of objective reality, instead of being the +_cause_ of such conformity as exists, was itself the _effect_ of some +common cause,--that it too was of the nature of a picture. Dropping the +figure, if it is true that human intelligence has been evolved by natural +law, then in view of all that has been said it must now, I think, be +tolerably apparent, _that as by the hypothesis human intelligence has +always been required to think and to act in conformity with law, human +intelligence must at last be in danger of confusing or identifying the fact +of action in conformity with law with the existence and the action of a +self-conscious intelligence. Reading then in external nature innumerable +examples of action in conformity with law, human intelligence falls back +upon the unwarrantable identification, and out of the bare fact that law +exists in nature concludes that beyond nature there is an Intelligent +Lawgiver._ + +Sec. 35. From what has been said in the last five sections, it manifestly +follows that all the varied phenomena of the universe not only may, but +must, depend upon the persistence of force and the primary qualities of +matter.[23] Be it remembered that the object of the last three sections was +merely to "_facilitate conception_" of the fact that it does not at all +follow, because the phenomena of external nature admit of being +intelligently inquired into, therefore they are due to an intelligent +cause. The last three sections are hence in a manner parenthetical, and it +is of comparatively little importance whether or not they have been +successful in their object; for, from what went before, it is abundantly +manifest that, whether or not the subjective side of the question admits of +satisfactory elucidation, there can be no doubt that the objective side of +it is as certain as are the fundamental axioms of science. It does not +admit of one moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the +exquisite beauty and melodious harmony of nature follow as necessarily and +as inevitably from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of +matter, as it is certainly true that force is persistent, or that matter is +extended and impenetrable. No doubt this generalisation is too vast to be +adequately conceived, but there can be equally little doubt that it is +necessarily true. If matter and force have been eternal, so far as human +mind can soar it can discover no need of a superior mind to explain the +varied phenomena of existence. Man has truly become in a new sense the +measure of the universe, and in this the latest and most appalling of his +soundings, indications are returned from the infinite voids of space and +time by which he is surrounded, that his intelligence, with all its noble +capacities for love and adoration, is yet alone--destitute of kith or kin +in all this universe of being. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD. + +Sec. 36. But the discussion must not end here. Inexorable logic has forced us +to conclude that, viewing the question as to the existence of a God only by +the light which modern science has shed upon it, there no longer appears to +be any semblance of an argument in its favour. Let us then turn upon +science herself, and question her right to be our sole guide in this +matter. Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the +hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as certainly +superfluous is the very basis of all science is certainly true. There can +no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a God is wholly +unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the universe, than there is +doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall upon the table. Nay, the +doubt is even less than this, because while the knowledge that my pen will +fall if I allow it to do so is founded chiefly upon empirical knowledge (I +could not predict with _a priori_ certainty that it would so fall, for the +pen might be in an electrical state, or subject to some set of unknown +natural laws antagonistic to gravity), the knowledge that a Deity is +superfluous as an explanation of anything, being grounded on the doctrine +of the persistence of force, is grounded on an _a priori_ necessity of +reason--_i.e._, if this fact were not so, our science, our thought, our +very existence itself, would be scientifically impossible. + +But now, having thus stated the case as strongly as I am able, it remains +to question how far the authority of science extends. Even our knowledge of +the persistence of force and of the primary qualities of matter is but of +relative significance. Deeper than the foundations of our experience, +"deeper than demonstration--deeper even than definite cognition,--deep as +the very nature of mind,"[24] are these the most ultimate of known truths; +but where from this is our warrant for concluding with certainty that these +known truths are everywhere and eternally true? It will be said that there +is a strong analogical probability. Perhaps so, but of this next: I am not +now speaking of probability; I am speaking of certainty; and unless we deny +the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, we cannot but conclude that +there is no absolute certainty in this case. As I deem this consideration +one of great importance, I shall proceed to develop it at some length. It +will be observed, then, that the consideration really amounts to +this:--Although it must on all hands be admitted that the fact of the +theistic hypothesis not being required to explain any of the phenomena of +nature is a fact which has been demonstrated _scientifically_, nevertheless +it must likewise on all hands be admitted that this fact has not, and +cannot be, demonstrated _logically_. Or thus, although it is unquestionably +true that so far as science can penetrate she cannot discern any +speculative necessity for a God, it may nevertheless be true that if +science could penetrate further she might discern some such necessity. Now +the present discussion would clearly be incomplete if it neglected to +define as carefully this the logical standing of our subject, as it has +hitherto endeavoured to define its scientific standing. As a final step in +our analysis, therefore, we must altogether quit the region of experience, +and, ignoring even the very foundations of science and so all the most +certain of relative truths, pass into the transcendental region of purely +formal considerations. In this region theist and atheist must alike consent +to forego all their individual predilections, and, after regarding the +subject as it were in the abstract and by the light of pure logic alone, +finally come to an agreement as to the transcendental probability of the +question before them. Disregarding the actual probability which they +severally feel to exist in relation to their own individual intelligences, +they must apply themselves to ascertain the probability which exists in +relation to those fundamental laws of thought which preside over the +intelligence of our race. In fine, it will now, I hope, be understood that, +as we have hitherto been endeavouring to determine, by deductions drawn +from the very foundations of all possible science, the _relative_ +probability as to the existence of a God, so we shall next apply ourselves +to the task of ascertaining the _absolute_ probability of such +existence--or, more correctly, what is the strictly _formal_ probability of +such existence when its possibility is contemplated in an absolute sense. + +Sec. 37. To begin then. In the last resort, the value of every probability is +fixed by "ratiocination." In endeavouring, therefore, to fix the degree of +strictly formal probability that is present in any given case, our method +of procedure should be, first to ascertain the ultimate ratios on which the +probability depends, and then to estimate the comparative value of these +ratios. Now I think there can be no doubt that the value of any probability +in this its last analysis is determined by the number, the importance, and +the definiteness of the relations known, as compared with those of the +relations unknown; and, consequently, that in all cases where the sum of +the unknown relations is larger, or more important, or more indefinite than +is the sum of the known relations, it is an essential principle that the +value of the probability decreases in exact proportion to the decrease in +the similarity between the two sets of relations, whether this decrease +consists in the number, in the importance, or in the definiteness of the +relations involved. This rule or canon is self-evident as soon as pointed +out, and has been formulated by Professor Bain in his "Logic" when treating +of Analogy, but not with sufficient precision; for, while recognising the +elements of number and importance, he has overlooked that of definiteness. +This element, however, is a very essential one--indeed the most essential +of the three; for there are many analogical inferences in which either the +character or the extent of the unknown relations is quite indefinite; and +it is obvious that, whenever this is the case, the value of the analogy is +proportionably diminished, and diminished in a much more material +particular than it is when the diminution of value arises from a mere +excess of the unknown relations over the known ones in respect of their +number or of their importance. For it is evident that, in the latter case, +however little value the analogy may possess, the exact degree of such +value admits of being _determined_; while it is no less evident that, in +the former case, we are precluded from estimating the value of the analogy +at all, and this just in proportion to the indefiniteness of the unknown +relations. + +Sec. 38. Now the particular instance with which we are concerned is somewhat +peculiar. Notwithstanding we have the entire sphere of human experience +from which to argue, we are still unable to gauge the strictly logical +probability of any argument whatsoever; for the unknown relations in this +case are so wholly indefinite, both as to their character and extent, that +any attempt to institute a definite comparison between them and the known +relations is felt at once to be absurd. The question discussed, being the +most ultimate of all possible questions, must eventually contain in itself +all that is to man unknown and unknowable; the whole orbit of human +knowledge is here insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to institute +the required measurements. + +Sec. 39. I think it is desirable to insist upon this truth at somewhat greater +length, and, for the sake of impressing it still more deeply, I shall +present it in another form. No one can for a single moment deny that, +beyond and around the sphere of the Knowable, there exists the unfathomable +abyss of the Unknowable. I do not here use this latter word as embodying +any theory: I merely wish it to state the undoubted fact, which all must +admit, viz., that beneath all our possible explanations there lies a great +Inexplicable. Now let us see what is the effect of making this necessary +admission. In the first place, it clearly follows that, while our +conceptions as to what the Unknowable contains may or may not represent the +truth, it is certain that we can never discover whether or not they do. +Further, it is impossible for us to determine even a definite _probability_ +as to the existence (much less the nature) of anything which we may suppose +the Unknowable to contain. We may, of course, perceive that such and such a +supposition is more _conceivable_ than such and such; but, as already +indicated, the fact does not show that the one is in itself more definitely +_probable_ than the other, unless it has been previously shown, either that +the capacity of our conceptions is a _fully adequate measure_ of the +Possible, or that the proportion between such capacity and the extent of +the Possible is a proportion that can be _determined_. In either of these +cases, the Conceivable would be a fair measure of the Possible: in the +former case, an exact equivalent (_e.g._, in any instance of contradictory +propositions, the most conceivable would _certainly_ be true); in the +latter case, a measure any degree less than an exact equivalent--the degree +depending upon the _then_ ascertainable disparity between the extent of the +Possible and the extent of the Conceivable. Now the Unknowable (including +of course the Inconceivable Existent) is a species of the Possible, and in +its name carries the declaration that the disparity between its extent and +the extent of the Conceivable (_i.e._, the other species of the Possible) +is a disparity that cannot be determined. We are hence driven to the +conclusion that the most apparently probable of all propositions, if +predicated of anything within the Unknowable, may not in reality be a whit +more so than is the most apparently improbable proposition which it is +possible to make; for if it is admitted (as of course it must be) that we +are necessarily precluded from comparing the extent of the Conceivable with +that of the Unknowable, then it necessarily follows that in no case +whatever are we competent to judge how far an _apparent_ probability +relating to the latter province is an _actual_ probability. In other words, +did we know the proportion subsisting between the Conceivable and the +Unknowable in respect of relative extent and character, and so of inherent +probabilities, we should then be able to estimate the actual value of any +apparent probability relating to the latter province; but, as it is, our +ability to make this estimate varies inversely as our inability to estimate +our ignorance in this particular. And as our ignorance in this particular +is total--_i.e._, since we cannot even approximately determine the +proportion that subsists between the Conceivable and the Unknowable,--the +result is that our ability to make the required estimate in any given case +is absolutely _nil_. + +Sec. 40. I have purposely rendered this presentation in terms of the highest +abstraction, partly to avoid the possibility of any one, whatever his +theory of things may be, finding anything at which to object, and partly in +order that my meaning may be understood to include all things which are +beyond the range of possible knowledge. Most of all, therefore, must this +presentation (if it contains anything of truth) apply to the question +regarding the existence of Deity; for the _Ens Realissimum_ must of all +things be furthest removed from the range of possible knowledge. Hence, if +this presentation contains anything of truth--and of its rigidly accurate +truth I think there can be no question--the assertion that the +Self-existing Substance is a Personal and Intelligent Being, and the +assertion that this Substance is an Impersonal and Non-Intelligent Being, +are alike assertions wholly destitute of any assignable degree of logical +probability, I say _assignable_ degree of logical probability, because that +_some_ degree of such probability may exist I do not undertake to deny. All +I assert is, that if we are here able to institute any such probability at +all, we are unable logically to assign to it any determinate degree of +value. Or, in other words, although we may establish some probability in a +sense relative to ourselves, we are unable to know how far this probability +is a probability in an absolute sense. Or again, the case is not as though +we were altogether unacquainted with the Possible. Experience undoubtedly +affords us some information regarding this, although, comparatively +speaking, we are unable to know how much. Consequently, we must suppose +that, in any given case, it is more likely that the Conceivable should be +Possible than that the Inconceivable should be so, and that the Conceivably +Probable should exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: in +neither case, however, can we know _what degree_ of such likelihood is +present. + +Sec. 41. From the foregoing considerations, then, it would appear that the +only attitude which in strict logic it is admissible to adopt towards the +question concerning the being of a God is that of "suspended judgment." +Formally speaking, it is alike illegitimate to affirm or to deny +Intelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And here I would desire it to +be observed, that this is the attitude which the majority of +scientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted with regard to +this matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet endeavoured to +formulate the justification of this attitude; and as I think there can be +no doubt that the above presentation contains in a logical shape the whole +of such justification, I cannot but think that some important ends will +have been secured by it. For we are here in possession, not merely of a +vague and general impression that the Ultimate is super-scientific, and so +beyond the range of legitimate prediction; but we are also in possession of +a logical formula whereby at once to vindicate the rationality of our +opinion, and to measure the precise degree of its technical value. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY. + +Sec. 42. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of the formal considerations +which have been adduced in the last chapter on the scientific +considerations which were dealt with in the previous chapters. In these +previous chapters the proposition was clearly established that, just as +certainly as the fundamental data of science are true, so certainly is it +true that the theory of Theism in any shape is, scientifically considered, +superfluous; for these chapters have clearly shown that, if there is a God, +his existence, considered as a cause of things, is as certainly unnecessary +as it is certainly true that force is persistent and that matter is +indestructible. But after this proposition had been carefully justified, it +remained to show that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelled +us to carry our discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. For +although we observed that the essential qualities of matter and of force +are the most ultimate data of human knowledge, and although, by showing how +far the question of Theism depended on these data, we carried the +discussion of that question to the utmost possible limits of scientific +thought, it still devolved on us to contemplate the fact that even these +the most ultimate data of science are only known to be of relative +significance. And the bearing of this fact to the question of Theism was +seen to be most important. For, without waiting to recapitulate the +substance of a chapter so recently concluded, it will be remembered that +its effect was to establish this position beyond all controversy--viz., +that when ideas which have been formed by our experience within the region +of phenomenal actuality are projected into the region of ontological +possibility, they become utterly worthless; seeing that we can never have +any means whereby to test the actual value of whatever transcendental +probabilities they may appear to establish. Therefore it is that even the +most ultimate of relative truths with which, as we have seen, the question +of Theism is so vitally associated, is almost without meaning when +contemplated in an absolute sense. What, then, is the effect of these +metaphysical considerations on the position of Theism as we have seen it to +be left by the highest generalisations of physical science? Let us +contemplate this question with the care which it deserves. + +In the first place, it is evident that the effect of these purely formal +considerations is to render all reasonings on the subject of Theism equally +illegitimate, unless it is constantly borne in mind that such reasonings +can only be of relative signification. Thus, as a matter of pure logic, +these considerations are destructive of all assignable validity of any such +reasoning whatsoever. Still, even a strictly relative probability is, in +some undefinable degree, of more value than no probability at all, as we +have seen these same formal considerations to show (see Sec. 40); and, +moreover, even were this not so, the human mind will never rest until it +attains to the furthest probability which to its powers is accessible. +Therefore, if we do not forget the merely relative nature of the +considerations which are about to be adduced, by adducing them we may at +the same time satisfy our own minds and abstain from violating the +conditions of sound logic. + +The shape, then, to which the subject has now been reduced is simply +this:--Seeing that the theory of Evolution in its largest sense has shown +the theory of Theism to be superfluous in a scientific sense, does it not +follow that the theory of Theism is thus shown to be superfluous in any +sense? For it would seem from the discussion, so far as it has hitherto +gone, that the only rational basis on which the theory of Theism can rest +is a basis of teleology; and if, as has been clearly shown, the theory of +evolution, by deducing the genesis of natural law from the primary data of +science, irrevocably destroys this basis, does it not follow that the +theory of evolution has likewise destroyed the theory which rested on that +basis? Now I conclude, as stated at the close of Chapter IV., that the +question here put must certainly be answered in the affirmative, so far as +its scientific aspect is concerned. But when we consider the question in +its purely logical aspect, as we have done in Chapter V., the case is +otherwise. For although, so far as the utmost reach of scientific vision +enables us to see, we can discern no evidence of Deity, it does not +therefore follow that beyond the range of such vision Deity does not exist. +Science indeed has proved that if there is a Divine Mind in nature, and if +by the hypothesis such a Mind exerts any causative influence on the +phenomena of nature, such influence is exerted beyond the sphere of +experience. And this achievement of science, be it never forgotten, is an +achievement of prodigious importance, effectually destroying, as it does, +all vestiges of a scientific teleology. But be it now carefully observed, +although all vestiges of a _scientific_ teleology are thus completely and +permanently ruined, the formal considerations adduced in the last chapter +supply the conditions for constructing what may be termed a _metaphysical_ +teleology. I use these terms advisedly, because I think they will serve to +bring out with great clearness the condition to which our analysis of the +teleological argument has now been reduced. + +Sec. 43. In the first place, let it be understood that I employ the terms +"scientific" and "metaphysical" in the convenient sense in which they are +employed by Mr. Lewes, viz., as respectively designating a theory that is +verifiable and a theory that is not. Consequently, by the term "scientific +teleology" I mean to denote a form of teleology which admits either of +being proved or disproved, while by the term "metaphysical teleology" I +mean to denote a form of teleology which does not admit either of being +proved or of being disproved. Now, with these significations clearly +understood, it will be seen that the forms of teleology which we have +hitherto considered belong entirely to the scientific class. That the +Paleyerian form of the argument did so is manifest, first because this +argument itself treats the problem of Theism as a problem that is +susceptible of scientific demonstration, and next because we have seen that +the advance of science has proved this argument susceptible of scientific +refutation. In other words, from the supposed axiom, "There cannot be +apparent design without a designer," adaptations in nature become logically +available as purely scientific evidence of an intelligent cause; and that +Paley himself regarded them exclusively in this light is manifest, both +from his own "statement of the argument," and from the character of the +evidence by which he seeks to establish the argument when stated--witness +the typical passage before quoted (Sec. 26). On the other hand, we have +clearly seen that this Paleyerian system of natural theology has been +effectually demolished by the scientific theory of natural selection--the +fundamental axiom of the former having been shown by the latter to be +scientifically untrue. Hence the term "scientific teleology" is without +question applicable to the Paleyerian system. + +Nor is the case essentially different with the more refined form of the +teleological argument which we have had to consider--the argument, namely, +from General Laws. For here, likewise, we have clearly seen that the +inference from the ubiquitous operation of General Laws to the existence of +an omniscient Law-maker is quite as illegitimate as is the inference from +apparent Design to the existence of a Supreme Designer. In other words, +science, by establishing the doctrine of the persistence of force and the +indestructibility of matter, has effectually disproved the hypothesis that +the presence of Law in nature is of itself sufficient to prove the +existence of an intelligent Law-giver. + +Thus it is that scientific teleology in any form is now and for ever +obsolete. But not so with what I have termed metaphysical teleology. For as +we have seen that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge precludes us +from asserting, or even from inferring, that beyond the region of the +Knowable Mind does not exist, it remains logically possible to institute a +metaphysical hypothesis that beyond this region of the Knowable Mind does +exist. There being a necessary absence of any positive information whereby +to refute this metaphysical hypothesis, any one who chooses to adopt it is +fully justified in doing so, provided only he remembers that the purely +metaphysical quality whereby the hypothesis is ensured against disproof, +likewise, and in the same degree, precludes it from the possibility of +proof. He must remember that it is no longer open to him to point to any +particular set of general laws and to assert, these proclaim Intelligence +as their cause; for we have repeatedly seen that the known states of matter +and force themselves afford sufficient explanation of the facts to which he +points. And he must remember that the only reason why his hypothesis does +not conflict with any of the truths known to science, is because he has +been careful to rest that hypothesis upon a basis of purely formal +considerations, which lie beyond even the most fundamental truths of which +science is cognisant. + +Thus, for example, he may present his metaphysical theory of Theism in some +such terms as these:--'Fully conceding what reason shows must be conceded, +and there still remains this possible supposition--viz., that there is a +presiding Mind in nature, which exerts its causative influence beyond the +sphere of experience, thus rendering it impossible for us to obtain +scientific evidence of its action. For such a Mind, exerting such an +influence beyond experience, may direct affairs within experience by +methods conceivable or inconceivable to us--producing, possibly, +innumerable and highly varied results, which in turn may produce their +effects within experience, their introduction being then, of course, in the +ordinary way of natural law. For instance, there can be no question that by +the intelligent creation or dissipation of energy, all the phenomena of +cosmic evolution might have been directed, and, for aught that science can +show to the contrary, thus only rendered possible. Hence there is at least +one nameable way in which, even in accordance with observed facts, a +Supreme Mind could be competent to direct the phenomena of observable +nature. But we are not necessarily restricted to the limits of the nameable +in this matter, so that it is of no argumentative importance whether or not +this suggested method is the method which the supposed Mind actually +adopts, seeing that there may still be other possible methods, which, +nevertheless, we are unable to suggest.' + +Doubtless the hypothesis of Theism, as thus presented, will be deemed by +many persons but of very slender probability. I am not, however, concerned +with whatever character of probability it may be supposed to exhibit. I am +merely engaged in carefully presenting the only hypothesis which can be +presented, if the theory as to an Intelligent Author of nature is any +longer to be maintained on grounds of a rational teleology. No doubt, +scientifically considered, the hypothesis in question is purely gratuitous; +for, so far as the light of science can penetrate, there is no need of any +such hypothesis at all. Thus it may well seem, at first sight, that no +hypothesis could well have less to recommend it; and, so far as the +presentation has yet gone, it is therefore fully legitimate for an atheist +to reply:--'All that this so-called metaphysical theory amounts to is a +wholly gratuitous assumption. No doubt it is always difficult, and usually +impossible, logically or unequivocally to prove a negative. If my adversary +chose to imagine that nature is presided over by a demon with horns and +hoofs, or by a dragon with claws and tail, I should be as unable to +disprove this his supposed theory as I am now unable to disprove his actual +theory. But in all cases reasonable men ought to be guided in their beliefs +by such positive evidence as is available; and if, as in the present case, +the alternative belief is wholly gratuitous--adopted not only without any +evidence, but against all that great body of evidence which the sum-total +of science supplies--surely we ought not to hesitate for one moment in the +choice of our creed?' + +Now all this is quite sound in principle, provided only that the +metaphysical theory of Theism _is_ wholly gratuitous, in the sense of being +utterly destitute of evidential support. That it is destitute of all +_scientific_ support, we have already and repeatedly seen; but the question +remains as to whether it is similarly destitute of _metaphysical_ support. + +Sec. 44. To this question, then, let us next address ourselves. From the +theistic pleading which we have just heard, it is abundantly manifest that +the formal conditions of a metaphysical teleology are present: the question +now before us is as to whether or not any actual evidence exists in favour +of such a theory. In order to discuss this question, let us begin by +allowing the theist to continue his pleading. 'You have shown me,' he may +say, 'that a scientific or demonstrable system of teleology is no longer +possible, and, therefore, as I have already conceded, I must take my stand +on a metaphysical or non-demonstrable system. But I reflect that the latter +term is a loose one, seeing that it embraces all possible degrees of +evidence short of actual proof. The question, therefore, I conceive to be, +What amount of evidence is there in favour of this metaphysical system of +teleology? And this question I answer by the following considerations:--As +general laws separately have all been shown to be the necessary outcome of +the primary data of science, it certainly follows that general laws +collectively must be the same--_i.e._, that the whole system of general +laws must be, so far as the lights of our science can penetrate, the +necessary outcome of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of +matter. But you have also dearly shown me that these lights are of the +feeblest conceivable character when they are brought to illuminate the +final mystery of things. I therefore feel at liberty to assert, that if +there is any one principle to be observed in the collective operation of +general laws which cannot conceivably be explained by any cause other than +that of intelligent guidance, I am still free to fall back on such a +principle and to maintain--Although the collective operation of general +laws follows as a necessary consequence from the primary data of science, +this one principle which pervades their united action, and which cannot be +conceivably explained by any hypothesis other than that of intelligent +guidance, is a principle which still remains to be accounted for; and as it +cannot conceivably be accounted for on grounds of physical science, I may +legitimately account for it on grounds of metaphysical teleology. Now I +cannot open my eyes without perceiving such a principle everywhere +characterising the collective operation of general laws. Universally I +behold in nature, order, beauty, harmony,--that is, a perfect _correlation_ +among general laws. But this ubiquitous correlation among general laws, +considered as the cause of cosmic harmony, itself requires some explanatory +cause such as the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter +cannot conceivably be made to supply. For unless we postulate some one +integrating cause, the greater the number of general laws in nature, the +less likelihood is there of such laws being so correlated as to produce +harmony by their combined action. And forasmuch as the only cause that I am +able to imagine as competent to produce such effects is that of intelligent +guidance, I accept the metaphysical hypothesis that beyond the sphere of +the Knowable there exists an Unknown God.[25] + +'If it is retorted that the above argument involves an absurd +contradiction, in that while it sets out with an explicit avowal of the +fact that the collective operation of general laws follows as a necessary +consequence from the primary data of physical science, it nevertheless +afterwards proceeds to explain an effect of such collective operation by a +metaphysical hypothesis; I answer that it was expressly for the purpose of +eliciting this retort that I threw my argument into the above form. For the +position which I wish to establish is this, that fully accepting the +logical cogency of the reasoning whereby the action of every law is deduced +from the primary data of science, I wish to show that when this train of +reasoning is followed to its ultimate term, it leads us into the presence +of a fact for which it is inadequate to account. If, then, my contention be +granted--viz., that to human faculties it is not conceivable how, in the +absence of a directing intelligence, general laws could be so correlated as +to produce universal harmony--then I have brought the matter to this +issue:--Notwithstanding the scientific train of argument being complete in +itself, it still leaves us in the presence of a fact which it cannot +conceivably explain; and it is this unexplained residuum--this total +product of the operation of general laws--that I appeal to as the logical +justification for a system of metaphysical teleology--a system which offers +the only conceivable explanation of this stupendous fact. + +'And here I may further observe, that the scientific train of reasoning is +of the kind which embodies what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls "symbolic +conceptions of the illegitimate order."[26] That is to say, we can see how +such simple laws as that action and reaction are equal and opposite may +have been self-evolved, and from this fact we go on generalising and +generalising, until we land ourselves in wholly symbolic and--a paradox is +here legitimate--inconceivable conceptions. Now the farther we travel into +this region of unrealisable ideas, the less trustworthy is the report that +we are able to bring back. The method is in a sense scientific; but when +even scientific method is projected into a region of really +super-scientific possibility, it ceases to have that character of undoubted +certainty which it enjoys when dealing with verifiable subjects of inquiry. +The demonstrations are formal, but they are not real. + +'Therefore, looking to this necessarily suspicious character of the +scientific train of reasoning, and then observing that, even if accepted, +it leaves the fact of cosmic harmony unexplained, I maintain, that whatever +probability the phenomena of nature may in former times have been thought +to establish in favour of the theory as to an intelligent Author of nature, +that probability has been in no wise annihilated--nor apparently can it +ever be annihilated--by the advance of science. And not only so, but I +question whether this probability has been even seriously impaired by such +advance, seeing that although this advance has revealed a speculative +_raison d'etre_ of the mechanical precision of nature, it has at the same +time shown the baffling complexity of nature; and therefore, in view of +what has just been said, leaves the balance of probability concerning the +existence of a God very much where it always was. For stay awhile to +contemplate this astounding complexity of harmonious nature! Think of how +much we already know of its innumerable laws and processes, and then think +that this knowledge only serves to reveal, in a glimmering way, the huge +immensity of the unknown. Try to picture the meshwork of contending rhythms +which must have been before organic nature was built up, and then let us +ask, Is it conceivable, is it credible, that all this can have been the +work of blind fate? Must we not feel that had there not been intelligent +agency at work somewhere, other and less terrifically intricate results +would have ensued? And if we further try to symbolise in thought the +unimaginable complexity of the material and dynamical changes in virtue of +which that thought itself exists,--if we then extend our symbols to +represent all the history of all the orderly changes which must have taken +place to evolve human intelligence into what it is,--and if we still +further extend our symbols to try if it be possible, even in the language +of symbols, to express the number and the subtlety of those natural laws +which now preside over the human will;--in the face of so vast an +assumption as that all this has been self-evolved, I am content still to +rest in the faith of my forefathers.' + +Sec. 45. Now I think it must be admitted that we have here a valid argument. +That is to say, the considerations which we have just adduced must, I +think, in fairness be allowed to have established this position:--That the +system of metaphysical teleology for which we have supposed a candid theist +to plead, is something more than a purely gratuitous system--that it does +not belong to the same category of baseless imaginings as that to which the +atheist at first sight, and in view of the scientific deductions alone, +might be inclined to assign it. For we have seen that our supposed theist, +while fully admitting the formal cogency of the scientific train of +reasoning, is nevertheless able to point to a fact which, in his opinion, +lies without that train of reasoning. For he declares that it is beyond his +powers of conception to regard the complex harmony of nature otherwise than +as a product of some one integrating cause; and that the only cause of +which he is able to conceive as adequate to produce such an effect is that +of a conscious Intelligence. Pointing, therefore, to this complex harmony +of nature as to a fact which cannot to his mind be conceivably explained by +any deductions from physical science, he feels that he is justified in +explaining this fact by the aid of a metaphysical hypothesis. And in so +doing he is in my opinion perfectly justified, at any rate to this +extent--that his antagonist cannot fairly dispose of this metaphysical +hypothesis as a purely gratuitous hypothesis. How far it is a probable +hypothesis is another question, and to this question we shall now address +ourselves. + +Sec. 46. If it is true that the deductions from physical science cannot be +conceived to explain some among the observed facts of nature, and if it is +true that these particular facts admit of being conceivably explained by +the metaphysical hypothesis in question, then, beyond all controversy, this +metaphysical hypothesis must be provisionally accepted. Let us then +carefully examine the premises which are thus adduced to justify acceptance +of this hypothesis as their conclusion. + +In the first place, it is not--cannot--be denied, even by a theist, that +the deductions from physical science _do_ embrace the fact of cosmic +harmony in their explanation, seeing that, as they explain the operation of +general laws collectively, they must be regarded as also explaining every +effect of such operation. And this, as we have seen, is a consideration to +which our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did he meet it? He met +it by the considerations--1st. That the scientific train of reasoning +evolved this conclusion only by employing, in a wholly unrestricted manner, +"symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order;" and, 2d. That when the +conclusion thus illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with the +fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to be +beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to +such a cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on the +scientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be no +question that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which that +train of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weakness +to the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think, +be equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who would +venture honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of cosmic +harmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific train of +reasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an atheist may +reply, that although the objections of his antagonist against this symbolic +method of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the nature of the +case, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which is available. +If, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his antagonist for pointing +out a source of weakness in this method of reasoning--a source of weakness, +be it observed, which renders it impossible for him to estimate the actual, +as distinguished from the apparent, probability of the conclusion +attained--this is all that he can be expected to do: he cannot be expected +to abandon the only scientific method of reasoning available, in favour of +a metaphysical method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leaping +with a single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to the +inference of an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist may +well point out that, however objectionable his scientific method of +reasoning may be on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must at +any rate be preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbols +throughout refer to known causes.[27] With regard, then, to this stricture +on the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although the caveat +which it contains should never be lost sight of by atheists, it is not of +sufficient cogency to justify theists in abandoning a scientific in favour +of a metaphysical mode of reasoning. + +How then does it fare with the other stricture, or the consideration that, +"when the conclusion thus illegitimately[28] evolved is confronted with the +fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, we find it to be +beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to +such a cause"? The atheist may answer, in the first place, that a great +deal here turns on the precise meaning which we assign to the word +"conceive." For we have just seen that, by employing "symbolic +conceptions," we _are_ able to frame what we may term a _formal_ conception +of universal harmony as due to the persistence of force and the primary +qualities of matter. That is to say, we have seen that such universal +harmony as nature presents must be regarded as an effect of the collective +operation of general laws; and we have previously arrived at a formal +conception of general laws as singly and collectively the product of +self-evolution. Consequently, the word "conceive," as used in the theistic +argument, must be taken to mean our ability to frame what we may term a +_material_ conception, or a representation in thought of the whole history +of cosmic evolution, which representation shall be in some satisfactory +degree intellectually realisable. Observing, then, this important +difference between an inconceivability which arises from an impossibility +of establishing relations in thought between certain _abstract_ or +_symbolic_ conceptions, and an inconceivability which arises from a mere +failure to realise in imagination the results which must follow among +external relations if the symbolically conceivable combinations among them +ever took place, an atheist may here argue as follows; and it does not +appear that there is any legitimate escape from his reasonings. + +'I first consider the undoubted fact that the existence of a Supreme Mind +in nature is, scientifically considered, unnecessary; and, therefore, that +the only reason we require to entertain the supposition of any such +existence at all is, that the complexity of nature being so great, we are +unable adequately to conceive of its self-evolution--notwithstanding our +reason tells us plainly that, given a self-existing universe of force and +matter, and such self-evolution becomes abstractedly possible. I then +reflect that this is a negative and not a positive ground of belief. If the +hypothesis of self-evolution is true, we should _a priori_ expect that by +the time evolution had advanced sufficiently far to admit of the production +of a reasoning intelligence, the complexity of nature must be so great that +the nascent reasoning powers would be completely baffled in their attempts +to comprehend the various processes going on around them. This seems to be +about the state of things which we now experience. Still, as reason +advances more and more, we may expect, both from general _a priori_ +principles and from particular historical analogies, that more and more of +the processes of nature will admit of being interpreted by reason, and that +in proportion as our ability to _understand_ the frame and the constitution +of things progresses, so our ability to _conceive_ of them as all naturally +and necessarily evolved will likewise and concurrently progress. Thus, for +example, how vast a number of the most intricate and delicate correlations +in nature have been rendered at once intelligible and conceivably due to +non-intelligent causes, by the discovery of a single principle in +nature--the principle of natural selection. + +'In the adverse argument, conceivability is again made the unconditional +test of truth, just as it was in the argument against the possibility of +matter thinking. We reject the hypothesis of self-evolution, not because it +is the more remote one, but simply because we experience a subjective +incapacity adequately to frame the requisite generalisations in thought, or +to frame them with as much clearness as we could wish. Yet our reason tells +us as plainly as it tells us any general truth which is too large to be +presented in detail, that there is nothing in the nature of things +themselves, as far as we can see, antagonistic to the supposition of their +having been self-evolved. Only on the ground, therefore, of our own +intellectual deficiencies; only because as yet, by the self-evolutionary +hypothesis, the inner order does not completely answer to the outer order; +only because the number and complexity of subjective relations have not yet +been able to rival those of the objective relations producing them; only on +this ground do we refuse to assent to the obvious deductions of our +reason.[29] + +'And here I may observe, further, that the presumption in favour of atheism +which these deductions establish is considerably fortified by certain _a +posteriori_ considerations which we cannot afford to overlook. In +particular, I reflect that, as a matter of fact, the theistic theory is +born of highly suspicious parentage,--that Fetichism, or the crudest form +of the theory of personal agency in external nature, admits of being easily +traced to the laws of a primitive psychology; that the step from this to +Polytheism is easy; and that the step from this to Monotheism is necessary. +If it is objected to this view that it does not follow that because some +theories of personal agency have proved themselves false, therefore all +such theories must be so--I answer, Unquestionably not; but the above +considerations are not adduced in order to _negative_ the theistic theory: +they are merely adduced to show that the human mind has hitherto +undoubtedly exhibited an undue and a vicious tendency to interpret the +objective processes of nature in terms of its own subjective processes; and +as we can see quite well that the current theory of personal agency in +nature, whether or not true, is a necessary outcome of intellectual +evolution, I think that the fact of so abundant an historical analogy ought +to be allowed to lend a certain degree of antecedent suspicion to this +theory--although, of course, the suspicion is of a kind which would admit +of immediate destruction before any satisfactory positive evidence in +favour of the theory.[30] + +'But what is 'the satisfactory positive evidence' that is offered me? +Nothing, save an alleged subjective incapacity on the part of my opponent +adequately to conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony as due to physical +causation alone. Now I have already commented on the weakness of his +position; but as my opponent will doubtless resort to the consideration +that inconceivability of an opposite is, after all, the best criterion of +truth which at any given stage of intellectual evolution is available, I +will now conclude my overthrow by pointing out that, even if we take the +argument from teleology in its widest possible sense--the argument, I mean, +from the general order and beauty of nature, as well as the gross +constituent part of it from design--even taking this argument in its widest +sense and upon its own ground (which ground, I presume, it is now +sufficiently obvious _can_ only be that of the inconceivability of its +negation), I will conclude my examination of this argument by showing that +it is quite as inconceivable to predicate cosmic harmony an effect of +Intelligence, as it is to predicate it an effect of Non-intelligence; and +therefore that the argument from inconceivability admits of being turned +with quite as terrible a force upon Theism as it can be made to exert upon +Atheism. + +'"In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded and +accepted as quite believable are absolutely inconceivable. There is a +perpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but pseud-ideas. +No distinction is made between propositions that contain real thoughts and +propositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A thinkable proposition +is one of which the _two terms can be brought together in consciousness +under the relation said to exist between them_. But very often, when the +subject of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and when +the predicate of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and +when the relation alleged between them has been thought of as a known +relation, it is supposed that the proposition itself has been thought. The +thinking separately of the elements of a proposition is mistaken for the +thinking of them in the combination which the proposition affirms. And +hence it continually happens that propositions which cannot be rendered +into thought at all are supposed to be not only thought but believed. The +proposition that Evolution is caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two +terms are separately intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relation +of effect and cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them together +in this relation. + +'"The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his own +states of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his own, +he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to +frame a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits under which +alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know nothing of +thought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to the effects +wrought by objects on me. A mental act is an unintelligible phrase if I am +not to regard it as an act in which states of consciousness are severally +known as like other states in the series that has gone by, and in which the +relations between them are severally known as like past relations in the +series. If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an 'originating +Mind,' I must conceive this Mind as having attributes akin to those of the +only mind I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind at all. + +'"I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by asking how +the 'originating Mind' is to be thought of as having states produced by +things objective to it, as discriminating among these states, and classing +them as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective result to another. +I will simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the 'originating Mind' the +character absolutely essential to the conception of mind, that it consists +of a series of states of consciousness? Put a series of states of +consciousness as cause and the evolving universe as effect, and then +endeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I find it possible to +imagine in some dim way a series of states of consciousness serving as +antecedent to any one of the movements I see going on; for my own states of +consciousness are often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But +how if I attempt to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions +throughout the universe--to the motions of the multitudinous stars +throughout space, to the revolutions of all their planets round them, to +the gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infinitely +multiplied physical processes going on in each of these suns and planets? I +cannot think of a single series of states of consciousness as causing even +the relatively small groups of actions going on over the earth's surface. I +cannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various winds and the +dissolving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the rivers, and the +grinding actions of all the glaciers; still less can I think of it as +antecedent to the infinity of processes simultaneously going on in all the +plants that cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowded +tropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that roam among them, +and the millions of millions of insects that buzz about them. Even a single +small set of these multitudinous terrestrial changes I cannot conceive as +antecedent a single series of states of consciousness--cannot, for +instance, think of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that are at +this instant curling over on the shores of England. How, then, is it +possible for me to conceive an 'originating Mind,' which I must represent +to myself as a _single_ series of states of consciousness, working the +infinitely multiplied sets of changes _simultaneously_ going on in worlds +too numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that baffles +imagination? + +'"If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere going +on, 'Mind must be conceived as there' 'under the guise of simple Dynamics,' +then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind must be divested of all +attributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when thus divested of +its distinguishing attributes, the conception disappears--the word Mind +stands for a blank.... + +'"Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an 'originating Mind' is the +cause of evolution is a proposition that can be entertained so long only as +no attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the alleged +relation. That it should be accepted as a matter of _faith_ may be a +defensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should be so +accepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of _understanding_--as +a statement making the order of the universe comprehensible--is a quite +indefensible position."'[31] + +Sec. 47. We have now heard the pleading on both sides of the ultimate issue to +which it is possible that the argument from teleology can ever be reduced. +It therefore devolves on us very briefly to adjudicate upon the contending +opinions. And this it is not difficult to do; for throughout the pleading +on both sides I have been careful to exclude all arguments and +considerations which are not logically valid. It is therefore impossible +for me now to pass any criticisms on the pleading of either side which have +not already been passed by the pleading of the other. But nevertheless, in +my capacity of an impartial judge, I feel it desirable to conclude this +chapter with a few general considerations. + +In the first place, I think that the theist's antecedent objection to a +scientific mode of reasoning on the score of its symbolism, may be regarded +as fairly balanced by the atheist's antecedent objection to a metaphysical +mode of reasoning on the score of its postulating an unknowable cause. And +it must be allowed that the force of this antecedent objection is +considerably increased by the reflection that the _kind_ of unknowable +cause which is thus postulated is that which the human mind has always +shown an overweening tendency to postulate as a cause of natural phenomena. + +I think, therefore, that neither disputant has the right to regard the _a +priori_ standing of his opponent's theory as much more suspicious than that +of his own; for it is obvious that neither disputant has the means whereby +to estimate the actual value of these antecedent objections. + +With regard, then, to the _a posteriori_ evidence in favour of the rival +theories, I think that the final test of their validity--_i.e._, the +inconceivability of their respective negations--fails equally in the case +of both theories; for in the case of each theory any proposition which +embodies it must itself contain an infinite, _i.e._, an +inconceivable--term. Thus, whether we speak of an Infinite Mind as the +cause of evolution, or of evolution as due to an infinite duration of +physical processes, we are alike open to the charge of employing +unthinkable propositions. + +Hence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is an +eternity of matter and of force,[32] and the other an Infinite Mind, so +that in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; and +therefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon the +subject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the other +from an appeal to the test of inconceivability. + +Yet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more ultimate. +What then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion concerning +the rational standing of the teleological argument? The answer, I think, to +this question is, that in strict reasoning the teleological argument, in +its every shape, is inadequate to form a basis of Theism; or, in other +words, that the logical cogency of this argument is insufficient to justify +a wholly impartial mind in accepting the theory of Theism on so insecure a +foundation. Nevertheless, if the further question were directly put to me, +'After having heard the pleading both for and against the most refined +expression of the argument from teleology, with what degree of strictly +rational probability do you accredit it?'--I should reply as follows:--'The +question which you put I take to be a question which it is wholly +impossible to answer, and this for the simple reason that the degree of +even rational probability may here legitimately vary with the character of +the mind which contemplates it.' This statement, no doubt, sounds +paradoxical; but I think it is justified by the following considerations. +When we say that one proposition is more conceivable than another, we may +mean either of two very different things, and this quite apart from the +distinction previously drawn between symbolic conceptions and realisable +conceptions. For we may mean that one of the two propositions presents +terms which cannot possibly be rendered into thought at all in the relation +which the proposition alleges to subsist between them; or we may mean that +one of the two propositions presents terms in a relation which is more +congruous with the habitual tenor of our thoughts than does the other +proposition. Thus, as an example of the former usage, we may say, It is +more conceivable that two and two should make four than that two and two +should make five; and, as an example of the latter usage, we may say, It is +more conceivable that a man should be able to walk than that he should be +able to fly. Now, for the sake of distinction, I shall call the first of +these usages the test of _absolute_ inconceivability, and the second the +test of _relative_ inconceivability. Doubtless, when the word +"inconceivability" is used in the sense of relative inconceivability, it is +incorrectly used, unless it is qualified in some way; because, if used +without qualification, there is danger of its being confused with +inconceivability in its absolute sense. Nevertheless, if used with some +qualifying epithet, it becomes quite unexceptionable. For the process of +conception being in all cases the process of establishing relations in +thought, we may properly say, It is relatively more conceivable that a man +should walk than that a man should fly, since it is _more easy_ to +establish, the necessary relations in thought in the case of the former +than in the case of the latter proposition. The only difference, then, +between what I have called absolute inconceivability and what I have called +relative inconceivability consists in this--that while the latter admits of +_degrees_, the former does not.[33] + +With this distinction clearly understood, I may now proceed to observe that +in everyday life we constantly apply the test of relative inconceivability +as a test of truth. And in the vast majority of cases this test of relative +inconceivability is, for all practical purposes, as valid a test of truth +as is the test of absolute conceivability. For as every man is more or less +in harmony with his environment, his habits of thought with regard to his +environment are for the most part stereotyped correctly; so that the most +ready and the most trustworthy gauge of probability that he has is an +immediate appeal to consciousness as to whether he _feels_ the probability. +Thus every man learns for himself to endow his own sense of probability +with a certain undefined but massive weight of authority. Now it is this +test of relative conceivability which all men apply in varying degrees to +the question of Theism. For if, from education and organised habits of +thought, the probability in this matter appears to a man to incline in a +certain direction, when this probability is called in question, the whole +body of this organised system of thought rises in opposition to the +questioning, and being individually conscious of this strong feeling of +subjective opposition, the man declares the sceptical propositions to be +more inconceivable to him than are the counter-propositions. And in so +saying he is, of course, perfectly right. Hence I conceive that the +acceptance or the rejection of metaphysical teleology as probable will +depend entirely upon individual habits of thought. The test of absolute +inconceivability making equally for and against the doctrine of Theism, +disputants are compelled to fall back on the test of relative +inconceivability; and as the direction in which the more inconceivable +proposition will here seem to lie will be determined by previous habits of +thought, it follows that while to a theist metaphysical teleology will +appear a probable argument, to an atheist it will appear an improbable one. +Thus to a theist it will no doubt appear more conceivable that the Supreme +Mind should be such that in some of its attributes it resembles the human +mind, while in other of its attributes--among which he will place +omnipresence, omnipotence, and directive agency--it transcends the human +mind as greatly as the latter "transcends mechanical motion;" and therefore +that although it is true, as a matter of logical terminology, that we ought +to designate such an entity "Not mind" or "Blank," still, as a matter of +psychology, we may come nearer to the truth by assimilating in thought this +entity with the nearest analogies which experience supplies, than by +assimilating it in thought with any other entity--such as force or +matter--which are felt to be in all likelihood still more remote from it in +nature. On the other hand, to an atheist it will no doubt appear more +conceivable, because more simple, to accept the dogma of an eternal +self-existence of something which we call force and matter, and with this +dogma to accept the implication of a necessary self-evolution of cosmic +harmony, than to resort to the additional and no less inconceivable +supposition of a self-existing Agent which must be regarded both as Mind +and as Not-mind at the same time. But in both cases, in whatever degree +this test of relative inconceivability of a negative is held by the +disputants to be valid in solving the problem of Theism, in that degree is +each man entitled to his respective estimate of the probability in +question. And thus we arrive at the judgment that the rational probability +of Theism legitimately varies with the character of the mind which +contemplates it. For, as the test of absolute inconceivability is equally +annihilative in whichever direction it is applied, the test of relative +inconceivability is the only one that remains; and as the formal conditions +of a metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and +the formal conditions of a physical explanation of cosmic harmony are no +less undoubtedly present on the other hand, it follows that a theist and an +atheist have an equal right to employ this test of relative +inconceivability. And as there is no more ultimate court of appeal whereby +to decide the question than the universe as a whole, each man has here an +equal argumentative right to abide by the decision which that court awards +_to him individually_--to accept whatever probability the sum-total of +phenomena appears to present to his particular understanding. And it is +needless to say that experience shows, even among well-informed and +accurate reasoners, how large an allowance must thus be made for personal +equations. To some men the facts of external nature seem to proclaim a God +with clarion voice, while to other men the same facts bring no whisper of +such a message. All, therefore, that a logician can here do is to remark, +that the individuals in each class--provided they bear in mind the strictly +_relative_ character of their belief--have a similar right to be regarded +as holding a rational creed: the grounds of belief in this case logically +vary with the natural disposition and the subsequent training of different +minds.[34] + +It only remains to show that disputants on either side are apt to endow +this test of relative inconceivability with far more than its real logical +worth. Being accustomed to apply this test of truth in daily life, and +there finding it a trustworthy test, most men are apt to forget that its +value as a test must clearly diminish in proportion to the distance from +experience at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to be the case even +with the test of absolute inconceivability (see Chapter V.), but much more +must it be the case with this test of relative inconceivability. For, +without comment, it is manifest that our acquired sense of probability, as +distinguished from our innate sense of possibility, with regard to any +particular question of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparable +with its value in the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which our +sense of probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although, +therefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain a +belief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally entitled +to be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in whatever +degree either party considers their belief as of a higher validity than the +grounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in that degree must the +members of that party be deemed irrational. In other words, not only must a +man be careful not to confuse the test of relative inconceivability with +that of absolute conceivability--not to suppose that his sense of +probability in this matter is determined by an innate psychological +inability to conceive a proposition, when in reality it is only determined +by the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have long been habitually +associated;--but he must also be careful to remember that the test of +relative inconceivability in this matter is only valid as justifying a +belief of the most diffident possible kind. + +And from this the practical deduction is--tolerance. Let no man think that +he has any argumentative right to expect that the mere subjective habit or +tone of his own mind should exert any influence on that of his fellow; but +rather let him always remember that the only legitimate weapons of his +intellectual warfare are those the _material_ of which is derived from the +external world, and only the _form_ of which is due to the forging process +of his own mind. And if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted on +the hardened armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardened +armoury of confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must not +too confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of his +own weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need we +all stand of this caution:--Knowing how greatly the value of arguments is +affected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame of mind in +which we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not to +over-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is actually +superior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is surely +needless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us to bear +in mind this further caution:--Knowing with what great subjective +opposition arguments are met when they conflict with our established modes +of thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard the sanctuary of our +judgment from the polluting tyranny of habit. + + * * * * * + + +CHAPTER VII. + +GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. + +Sec. 48. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here suffice +to convey an epitomised recollection of the numerous facts and conclusions +which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first disposed of the +conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of things, or the mystery +of existence, admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any +further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the +argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a +subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to +prove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with regard +to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations point to +God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to observe that the +argument could only be admissible after the possibility of the operation of +natural causes had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed +intuitive necessity of individual thought was found to be untenable, first, +because, even if the supposed necessity were a real one, it would only +possess an individual applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, +it is extremely improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity +even for the individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that +it is not such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the +general consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts +and principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a +first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument +that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is +probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of +inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced worthless. + +Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in favour of +Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds are caused +by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our mind is caused +by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible for two reasons. +In the first place, "it does not account for mind (in the abstract) to +refer it to a prior mind for its origin;" and therefore, although the +hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of _known_ mind, it is +useless as an argument for the existence of the unknown mind, the +assumption of which forms the basis of that explanation. Again, in the next +place, if it be said that mind is so far an entity _sui generis_ that it +must be either self-existing or caused by another mind, there is no +assignable warrant for the assertion. And this is the second objection to +the above syllogism; for anything within the whole range of the possible +may, for aught that we can tell, be competent to produce a self-conscious +intelligence. Thus an objector to the above syllogism need not hold any +theory of things at all; but even as opposed to the definite theory of +materialism, the above syllogism has not so valid an argumentative basis to +stand upon. We know that what we call matter and force are to all +appearance eternal, while we have no corresponding evidence of a "mind that +is even apparently eternal." Further, within experience mind is invariably +associated with highly differentiated collocations of matter and +distributions of force, and many facts go to prove, and none to negative, +the conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or +at least is associated with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. +There is thus both a qualitative and a quantitative relation between +intelligence and cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and +motion cannot produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they +should, we have seen at some length that this is no conclusive +consideration as applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental +nature, and that in the present case it is particularly inconclusive, +because, as it is speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be +unknowable, it seems _a priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the +unknowable reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into +thought in that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which +is imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_ +conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is in +this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly, the +statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects can +contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by everyday +experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the will and +the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively by the +theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of utilitarianism. On +the whole, then, with regard to the argument from the existence of the +human mind, we were compelled to decide that it is destitute of any +assignable weight, there being nothing more to lead to the conclusion that +our mind has been caused by another mind, than to the conclusion that it +has been caused by anything else whatsoever. + +With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that Mill's +presentation of it is merely a resuscitation of the argument as presented +by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers. And indeed we saw that the first-named writer +treated this whole subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising +in him; for while he has failed to assign anything like due weight to the +inductive evidence of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a +supernatural explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed +signally in his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common +with all previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly +impossible for us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer +stands to the Designed,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme +Mind, even supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any +particular intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the +Design argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be +due to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that +this Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and +such cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise the +supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of the +existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after all, of +very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the _methods_ +of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that, _in some way +or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due to Intelligence +of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the first to endorse this +remark. It has always appeared to me one of the most unaccountable things +in the history of speculation that so many competent writers can have +insisted upon _Design_ as an argument for Theism, when they must all have +known perfectly well that they have no means of ascertaining the subjective +psychology of that Supreme Mind whose existence the argument is adduced to +demonstrate. The truth is, that the argument from teleology must, and can +only, rest upon the observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the +intellectual _processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been +accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this is +merely to change the teleological argument from its gross Paleyerian form, +into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws. And we saw +that this transformation is now a rational necessity. How far the great +principle of natural selection may have been instrumental in the evolution +of organic forms, is not here, as Mill erroneously imagined, the question; +the question is simply as to whether we are to accept the theory of special +creation or the theory of organic evolution. And forasmuch as no competent +judge at the present time can hesitate for one moment in answering this +question, the argument from a proximate teleology must be regarded as no +longer having any rational existence. + +How then does it fare with the last of the arguments--the argument from an +ultimate teleology? Doubtless at first sight this argument seems a very +powerful one, inasmuch as it is a generic argument, which embraces not only +biological phenomena, but all the phenomena of the universe. But +nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent power +dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if force and +matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have resulted by +way of necessary consequence. It will be remembered that I dwelt at +considerable length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only +because of its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but +also because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation. + +The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the conclusion that +was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless collapse of all the +possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully demonstrated that +there is no shadow of a positive argument in support of the theistic +theory, there arose the danger that some persons might erroneously conclude +that for this reason the theistic theory must be untrue. It therefore +became necessary to point out, that although, as far as we can see, nature +does not require an Intelligent Cause to account for any of her phenomena, +yet it is possible that, if we could see farther, we should see that nature +could not be what she is unless she had owed her existence to an +Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words, the probability there is that an +Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of nature, +is only equal to the probability there is that the doctrine of the +persistence of force is everywhere and eternally true. + +As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the +region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science, +and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the discussion +into the transcendental region of purely formal considerations. And here we +laid down the canon, "that the value of any probability, in its last +analysis, is determined by the number, the importance, and the definiteness +of the relations known, as compared with those of the relations unknown;" +and, consequently, that in cases where the unknown relations are more +numerous, more important, or more indefinite than are the known relations, +the value of our inference varies inversely as the difference in these +respects between the relations compared. From which canon it followed, that +as the problem of Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so +contains in its unknown relations all that is to man unknown and +unknowable, these relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all +relations that it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, +that although we have here the entire range of experience from which to +argue, we are unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. +The unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite, +both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the known +relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite probability +either for or against the being of a God. Therefore, although it is true +that, so far as human science can penetrate or human thought infer, we can +perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right on this account to +conclude that there is no God. The probability, therefore, that nature is +devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest kind if regarded +scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific demonstration,--is +nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically. Notwithstanding it is +as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of all experience +that, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a cause of the +universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that, if there had +never been a God, the universe could never have existed. + +Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter how +great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative sense, we +have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute sense. From +which position there emerged the possibility of another argument in favour +of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of the teleological +argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing that these formal +considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for or against Deity in +an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such reasoning in a relative +sense, if there yet remain any theistic deductions which may properly be +drawn from experience, these may now be adduced to balance the atheistic +deductions from the persistence of force. For although the latter +deductions have clearly shown the existence of Deity to be superfluous in a +scientific sense, the formal considerations in question have no less +clearly opened up beyond the sphere of science a possible _locus_ for the +existence of Deity; so that if there are any facts supplied by experience +for which the atheistic deductions appear insufficient to account, we are +still free to account for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of +Theism. And, it may be urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in +the correlation of general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It +signifies nothing, the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the +methods whereby the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor +does it signify that its operation must now be relegated to a +super-scientific province. What does signify is that, taking a general view +of nature, we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of +her harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation. +Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be +remembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to +distinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in +contradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction, it +will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms of +teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible reach of +science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific refutation, +the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis which is +clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be susceptible of +scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system of teleology does +rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it accepts the most +ultimate truths of which science can ever be cognisant--viz., the +persistence of force and the consequently necessary genesis of natural +law,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of regarding Mind as the +ultimate cause of things is not on this account removed; and, therefore, +that if science now requires the operation of a Supreme Mind to be posited +in a super-scientific sphere, then in a super-scientific sphere it ought to +be posited. No doubt this hypothesis at first sight seems gratuitous, +seeing that, so far as science can penetrate, there is no need of any such +hypothesis at all--cosmic harmony resulting as a physically necessary +consequence from the combined action of natural laws, which in turn result +as a physically necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the +primary qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that +metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered scientifically, +it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if considered +psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable that Mind should +be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the persistence of force +should be so, then it is not irrational to accept the more conceivable +hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable one, provided that the +choice is made with the diffidence which is required by the considerations +adduced in Chapter V. + +I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, +although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense +legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this +argument can rest--viz., the position that the fundamental postulate of +Atheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of +Theism--we have seen two important objections to lie. + +For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" is +here used is that of the impossibility of framing _realisable_ relations in +the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_ relations +in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is true that +the complexity of the human organisation and its functions is +inconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much less +weight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without waiting +again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative standing of +Materialism) how far even the genuine test of inconceivability ought to be +allowed to make against an inference which there is a body of scientific +evidence to substantiate, we went on to the second objection against this +fundamental position of metaphysical teleology. This objection, it will be +remembered, was, that it is as impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as +an effect of Mind, as it is to conceive of it as an effect of mindless +evolution. The argument from inconceivability, therefore, admits of being +turned with quite as terrible an effect on Theism, as it can possibly be +made to exert on Atheism. + +Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and +which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of Theism, +is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its metaphysical +character it has escaped the opposition of physical science, only to +encounter a new opposition in the region of pure psychology to which it +fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry, therefore, it devolved on us to +determine the relative magnitudes of these opposing forces. And in doing +this we first observed that, if the supporters of metaphysical teleology +objected _a priori_ to the method whereby the genesis of natural law was +deduced from the datum of the persistence of force, in that this method +involved an unrestricted use of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it +is no less open to an atheist to object _a priori_ to the method whereby a +directing Mind was inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this +method involved the population of an unknowable cause,--and this of a +character which the whole history of human thought has proved the human +mind to exhibit an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of +natural phenomena. On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as +their respective standing _a priori_ is concerned, both theories may be +regarded as about equally suspicious. And similar with regard to their +standing _a posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least +one infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely +inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the +two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a +question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of +absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a man +wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by what I +have designated relative inconceivability--_i.e._, in accordance with the +verdict given by his individual sense of probability as determined by his +previous habits of thought. And forasmuch as the test of relative +inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to vary with the +character of the mind which applies it, the strictly rational probability +of the question to which it is applied varies in like manner. Or, otherwise +presented, the only alternative for any man in this matter is either to +discipline himself into an attitude of pure scepticism, and thus to refuse +in thought to entertain either a probability or an improbability concerning +the existence of a God; or else to incline in thought towards an +affirmation or a negation of God, according as his previous habits of +thought have rendered such an inclination more facile in the one direction +than in the other. And although, under such circumstances, I should +consider that man the more rational who carefully suspended his judgment, I +conclude that if this course is departed from, neither the metaphysical +teleologist nor the scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over +the other in respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a +metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the +formal conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on +the other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein +the pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be +made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas. + +Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the abstract +nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which at the +present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the confusing +amount of good, bad, and indifferent literature on both sides of the +controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not think that +the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the score of its +lacking precision. At a time like the present, when traditional beliefs +respecting Theism are so generally accepted and so commonly concluded, as a +matter of course, to have a large and valid basis of induction whereon to +rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this short essay, by showing how +very concise the scientific _status_ of the subject really is, will do more +to settle the minds of most readers as to the exact standing at the present +time of all the probabilities of the question, than could a perusal of all +the rest of the literature upon this subject. And, looking to the present +condition of speculative philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost +importance to have clearly shown that the advance of science has now +entitled us to assert, without the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of +Mind in nature is as certainly superfluous to account for any of the +phenomena of nature, as the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force +and the indestructibility of matter is certainly true. + +On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical +aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite as +has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter which +does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of necessity be +left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears this +consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly complain of my +not having done my utmost in this case to define as sharply as possible the +character and the limits of this margin. + +Sec. 49. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any +antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is +unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with the +utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here +worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save the +strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society to +give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they may he worth. +Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the most profitable +for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual endeavour to attain +it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed and sincere, ought +without hesitation to be made the common property of all men, no matter in +what direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend. And so +far as the ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can have +a more lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency of +my work. So far as I am individually concerned, the result of this analysis +has been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower +plane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely +formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all +belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my +intellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest +scepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with those +who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable +substitute for the waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to +confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost +its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work +while it is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the +terribly intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no +man can work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the +appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was +mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such times +I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my +nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being +sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be +due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were +the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for +others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of +Hamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but +of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has become transformed into the +terrific oracle to Oedipus-- + + "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art." + + * * * * * + + +APPENDIX + +AND + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. + + * * * * * + + +APPENDIX. + + * * * * * + +A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF A FALLACY IN LOCKE'S USE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST +THE POSSIBILITY OF MATTER THINKING ON GROUNDS OF ITS BEING INCONCEIVABLE +THAT IT SHOULD. + +Lest it should be thought that I am doing injustice to the views of this +illustrious theist, I here quote his own words:--"We have the ideas of +matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any +mere material being thinks or no, it being impossible for us, by the +contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether +omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a power +to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a +thinking immaterial substance; it being, in respect of our notions, not +much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if He +pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that He should +superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know +not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substance the Almighty +has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, +but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I see no +contradiction in it that the first eternal thinking being should, if he +pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together +as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, +as I think, I have proved, lib. iv., ch. 10 and 14, &c., it is no less than +a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature +void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-thinking being. +What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such +as, _e.g._, pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, +after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be +in an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as +far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body; and +motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce +nothing but motion: so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, +or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond +our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For +since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way +conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He +could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive +capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of +matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way +lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality, &c.... It is a point which +seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge; and he who will +give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate +part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him +fixedly for or against the soul's materiality. Since on which side soever +he views it, either as an unextended substance or as a thinking extended +matter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in +his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which +some men take with themselves, who, because of the inconceivableness of +something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary +hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed +understanding." + +This passage, I do not hesitate to say, is one of the most remarkable in +the whole range of philosophical literature, in respect of showing how even +the strongest and most candid intellect may have its reasoning faculty +impaired by the force of a preformed conviction. Here we have a mind of +unsurpassed penetration and candour, which has left us side by side two +parallel trains of reasoning. In the one, the object is to show that the +author's preformed conviction as to the being of a God is justifiable on +grounds of reason; in the other, the object is to show that, granting the +existence of a God, and it is not impossible that he may have endowed +matter with the faculty of thinking. Now, in the former train of reasoning, +the whole proof rests entirely upon the fact that "it is impossible to +conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking +intelligent being." Clearly, if this proposition is true, it must destroy +one or other of the trains of reasoning; for it is common to them both, and +in one of them it is made the sole ground for concluding that matter cannot +think, while in the other it is made compatible with the supposition that +matter may think. This extraordinary inconsistency no doubt arose from the +fact that the author was antecedently persuaded of the existence of an +_Omnipotent_ Mind, and having been long accustomed in his intellectual +symbols to regard it presumptuous in him to impose any limitations on this +almighty power, when he asked himself whether it would be possible for this +almighty power, if it so willed, to endow matter with the faculty of +thinking, he argued that it might be possible, notwithstanding his being +unable to conceive the possibility. But when he banished from his mind the +idea of this personal and almighty power, and with that idea banished all +its associations, he then felt that he had a right to argue more freely, +and forthwith made his conceptive faculty a test of abstract possibility. +Yet _the sum total of abstract possibility, in relation to him, must have +been the same in the two cases_; so that in whichever of the two trains of +reasoning his argument was sound, in the other it must certainly have been +null. + +We may well feel amazed that so able a thinker can have fallen into so +obvious an error, and afterwards have persisted in it through pages and +pages of his work. It will be instructive, however, to those who rely upon +Locke's exposition of the argument from Inconceivability to see how +effectually he has himself destroyed it. For this purpose, therefore, I +shall make some further quotations from the same train of reasoning. The +statement of Locke's opinion that the Almighty could endow matter with the +faculty of thinking if He so willed, called down some remonstrances and +rebukes from the then Bishop of Worcester. Locke's reply was a very lengthy +one, and from it the following extracts are taken. I merely request the +reader throughout to substitute for the words God, Creator, Almighty, +Omipotency, &c., the words _Summum genus_ of Possibility. + +"But it is further urged that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I +grant it, but to argue from thence that God therefore cannot give to matter +a faculty of thinking is to say God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow +compass because man's understanding is so, and brings down God's infinite +power to the size of our capacities.... + +"If God can give no power to any parts of matter but what men can account +for from the essence of matter in general; if all such qualities and +properties must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties of +matter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be +the natural consequence of that essence; it is plain that the essence of +matter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of the +sensible parts of this our system. For it is visible that all the planets +have revolutions about certain remote centres, which I would have any one +explain or make conceivable by the bare essence, or natural powers +depending on the essence of matter in general, without something added to +that essence which we cannot conceive; for the moving of matter in a +crooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can be +said in the case; either of which it is above our reach to derive from the +essence of matter or body in general, though one of these two must +unavoidably be allowed to be superadded, in this instance, to the essence +of matter in general. The omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the +making of the world, and His ways are not the less excellent because they +are past finding out.... + +"In all such cases, the superinducement of greater perfections and nobler +qualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that were there +before, unless there can be showed a manifest repugnancy between them; but +all the proof offered for that is only that we cannot conceive how matter, +without such superadded perfections, can produce such effects; which is, in +truth, no more than to say matter in general, or every part of matter, as +matter, has them not, but is no reason to prove that God, if He pleases, +cannot superadd them to some parts of matter, unless it can be proved to be +a contradiction that God should give to some parts of matter qualities and +perfections which matter in general has not, though we cannot conceive how +matter is invested with them, or how it operates by virtue of those new +endowments; nor is it to be wondered that we cannot, whilst we limit all +its operations to those qualities it had before, and would explain them by +the known properties of matter in general, without any such induced +perfections. For if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing to +be because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be, I shall desire +them who use it to stick to this rule, and see what work it will make both +in divinity as well as philosophy, and whether they can advance anything +more in favour of scepticism. + +"For to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking and +self-motion bestowed by omnipotent power in some parts of matter: the +objection to this is, I cannot conceive how matter should think. What is +the consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this stand +for a good reason, and then proceed in other cases by the same. + +"You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance, much +less at the distance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it such a +power: you cannot conceive how matter should feel or move itself, or affect +any material being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it such +powers: which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution of the +planets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, without sense or +spontaneous motion; and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary motion. + +"Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an +extended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think: +can you conceive how your own soul or any substance thinks? You find, +indeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how the +action of thinking is performed: this, I confess, is beyond my conception; +and I would be glad any one who conceives it would explain it to me. + +"God, I find, has given me this faculty; and since I cannot but be +convinced of His power in this instance, which, though I every moment +experience in myself, yet I cannot conceive the manner of, what would it be +less than an insolent absurdity to deny His power in other like cases, only +for this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?... + +"That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at the +same time, I think with due reverence [diffidence?[35]] we may say; but +that a solid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers, +which have no natural or visibly necessary connection with solidity and +extension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing) +to be positive in. + +"If God cannot join things together by connections inconceivable to us, we +must deny even the consistency and being of matter itself; since every +particle of it having some bulk, has its parts connected by ways +inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raised against +the thinking of matter, from our ignorance or narrow conceptions, stand not +at all in the way of the power of God, if He pleases to ordain it so; nor +prove anything against His having actually endowed some parcels of matter, +so disposed as He thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can he +shown that it contains a contradiction to suppose it. + +"Though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general, in the +foregoing discourse I have spoke of sense in brutes as distinct from +thinking; because your lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in brutes. +But here I take liberty to observe, that if your lordship allows brutes to +have sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to some +parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking, or that all animals +have immaterial, and consequently, according to your lordship, immortal +souls, as well as men; and to say that fleas and mites, &c., have immortal +souls as well as men, will possibly be looked on as going a great way to +serve an hypothesis.... + +"It is true, I say, 'That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else,' and +so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their +operation. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's +incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power +in this point by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards +matter, by way unconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God +can, if He pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation above what +can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know +of matter, but also an unquestionable and everywhere visible instance that +He has done so. And therefore, in the next edition of my book, I will take +care to have that passage rectified.... + +"As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks, 'What is there like +self-consciousness in matter?' Nothing at all in matter as matter. But that +God cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and with +it self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking how is it possible to +apprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive? The +weakness of our apprehension I grant in the case: I confess as much as you +please, that we cannot conceive how an unsolid created substance thinks; +but this weakness of our apprehension reaches not the power of God, whose +weakness is stronger than anything in man." + +Lastly, Locke turns upon his opponent the power of the _odium theologicum_. + +"Let it be as hard a matter as it will to give an account what it is that +should keep the parts of a material soul together after it is separated +from the body, yet it will be always as easy to give an account of it as to +give an account what it is that shall keep together a material and +immaterial substance. And yet the difficulty that there is to give an +account of that, I hope, does not, with your lordship, weaken the +credibility of the inseparable union of soul and body to eternity; and I +persuade myself that the men of sense, to whom your lordship appeals in +this case, do not find their belief of this fundamental point much weakened +by that difficulty.... But you will say, you speak only of the soul; and +your words are, that it is no easy matter to give an account how the soul +should be capable of immortality unless it be a material substance. I grant +it, but crave leave to say, that there is not any one of these difficulties +that are or can be raised about the manner how a material soul can be +immortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body.... + +"But your lordship, as I guess from your following words, would argue that +a material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby I suppose you only +mean that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance should begin, +stop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, that when +you can make it conceivable how any created, finite, dependent substance +can move itself, I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow +this power on a solid than an unsolid created substance.... But though you +cannot see how any created substance, solid or not solid, can be a free +agent (pardon me, my lord, if I put in both, till your lordship please to +explain it of either, and show the manner how either of them can of itself +move itself or anything else), yet I do not think you will so far deny men +to be free agents, from the difficulty there is to see how they are free +agents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough for the day of +judgment." + +Let us now, for the sake of contrast, turn to some passages which occur in +the other train of reasoning. + +"If we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can never +begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or +without motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, perception, +and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and +knowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every +particle of it." There is a double fallacy here. In the first place, +conceivability is made the unconditional test of possibility; and, in the +next place, it is asserted that unless every particle of matter can think, +no collocation of such particles can possibly do so. This latter fallacy is +further insisted upon thus:--"If they will not allow matter as matter, that +is, every particle of matter, to be as well cogitative as extended, they +will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative +being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended +parts, if I may so speak.... Every particle of matter, as matter, is +capable of all the same figures and motions of any other, and I challenge +any one in his thoughts to add anything else to one above another." Now, as +we have seen, Locke himself has shown in his other trains of argument that +this challenge is thoroughly futile as a refutation of possibilities; but +the point to which I now wish to draw attention is this--It does not follow +because certain and highly complex collocations of material particles may +be supposed capable of thinking, that therefore every particle of matter +must be regarded as having this attribute. We have innumerable analogies in +nature of a certain collocation of matter and force producing certain +results which another somewhat similar collocation could not produce: in +such cases we do not assume that all the resulting attributes of the one +collocation must be presented also by the other--still less that these +resulting attributes must belong to the primary qualities of matter and +force. Hence, it is not fair to assume that thought must either be inherent +in every particle of matter, or else not producible by any possible +collocation of such particles, unless it has previously been shown that so +to produce it by any possible collocation is in the nature of things +impossible. But no one could refute this fallacy better than Locke himself +has done in some of the passages already quoted from his other train of +reasoning. + +But to continue the quotation:--"If, therefore, it be evident that +something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident that +that something must necessarily be a cogitative being; for it is as +impossible [_inconceivable_] that incogitative matter should produce a +cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should +produce a positive being or matter." Again,--"For unthinking particles of +matter, however put together, can have [_can be taught to have_] nothing +thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is +impossible [_inconceivable_] should give thought and knowledge to them." + +It is unnecessary to multiply these quotations, for, in effect, they would +all be merely repetitions of one another. It is enough to have seen that +this able author undertakes to demonstrate the existence of a God, and that +his whole demonstration resolves itself into the unwarrantable inference, +that as we are unable to conceive how thought can be a property of matter, +therefore a property of matter thought cannot be. That such an erroneous +inference should occur in any writings of so old a date as those of Locke +is not in itself surprising. What is surprising is the fact, that in the +same writings, and in the course of the same discussion, the fallacy of +this very inference is repeatedly pointed out and insisted upon in a great +variety of ways; and it has been chiefly for the sake of showing the +pernicious influence which preformed opinion may exert--viz., even to +blinding the eyes of one of the most clear-sighted and thoughtful men that +ever lived to a glaring contradiction repeated over and over again in the +course of a few pages,--it has been chiefly for this reason that I have +extended this Appendix to so great a length. I shall now conclude it by +quoting some sentences which occur on the very next page after that from +which the last quoted sentences were taken. Our author here again returns +to his defence of the omnipotency of God; and as he now again thus +personifies the sum total of possibility, his mind abruptly reverts to all +its other class of associations. In this case the transition is +particularly interesting, not only on account of its suddenness, but also +because the correlations contemplated happen to be exactly the same in the +two cases--viz., matter as the cause of mind, and mind as the cause of +matter. Remember that on the last page this great philosopher supposed he +had demonstrated the abstract impossibility of matter being the cause of +mind on the ground of a causal connection being inconceivable, let us now +observe what he says upon this page regarding the abstract possibility of +mind being the cause of matter. "Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate +ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would +reach to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some +dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to +exist by the power of that eternal first being.... But you will say, Is it +not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, since we +cannot possibly conceive it? I answer--No; because it is not reasonable to +deny the power of an infinite being [this phrase, in the absence of +hypothesis, _i.e._, in Locke's other train of reasoning, is of course +equivalent to the sum-total of possibility] because we cannot comprehend +its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we +cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive +how anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is not a +reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant +experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which +are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our minds, and are +not, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of the blind +matter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or +choice to alter it. For example, my right hand writes, whilst my left hand +is still: what causes rest in one and motion in the other? Nothing but my +will, a thought in my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests, +and the left hands moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: +explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to +understand creation."[36] + + * * * * * + + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. + + * * * * * + +I. + +COSMIC THEISM.[37] + +Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable is a doctrine of so much +speculative importance, that it behoves all students of philosophy to have +clear views respecting its character and implications. Mr. Spencer has +himself so fully explained the character of this doctrine, that no +attentive reader can fail to understand it; but concerning those of its +implications which may be termed theological--as distinguished from +religious--Mr. Spencer is silent. Within the last two or three years, +however, there has appeared a valuable work by an able exponent of the new +philosophy; and in this work the writer, adopting his master's teaching of +the Unknowable, proceeds to develop it into a definite system of what may +be termed scientific theology. And not only so, but he assures the world +that this system of scientific theology is the highest, the purest, and the +most ennobling form of religion that mankind has ever been privileged to +know in the past, or, from the nature of the case, can ever be destined to +know in the future. It is a system, we are told, wherein the most +fundamental truths of Theism are taught as necessary deductions from the +highest truths of Science; it is a system wherein no single doctrine +appeals for its acceptance to any principle of blind or credulous faith, +but wherein every doctrine can be fully justified by the searching light of +reason; it is a system wherein the noblest of our aspirations and the most +sublime of our emotions are able to find an object far more worthy and much +more glorious than has ever been supplied to them by any of the older forms +of Theism; and it is a system, therefore, in which, with a greatly enlarged +and intensified meaning, we may worship God, and all that is within us +bless His holy name. Assuredly a proclamation such as this, emanating from +the most authoritative expounders of modern thought, as the highest and the +greatest result to which a rigorous philosophic synthesis has led, is a +proclamation which cannot fail to arrest our most serious attention. Nay, +may it not do more than this? May it not appeal to hearts which long have +ceased to worship? May it not once more revive a hope--long banished, +perhaps, but still the dearest which our poor natures have +experienced--that somewhere, sometime, or in some way, it may yet be +possible to feel that God is not far from any one of us? For to those who +have known the anguish of a shattered faith, it will not seem so childish +that our hearts should beat the quicker when we once more hear a voice +announcing to a world of superstitious idolaters--"Whom ye ignorantly +worship, Him declare I unto you." But if, when we have listened to the glad +tidings of the new gospel, we find that the preacher, though apparently in +earnest, is not worthy to be heard again on this matter; and if, as we turn +away, our eyes grow dim with the memory of a vanished dream, surely we may +feel that the preacher is deserving of our blame for obtruding thus upon +the most sacred of our sorrows. + +Mr. John Fiske is, as is well known, an author who unites in himself the +qualities of a well-read student of philosophy, a clear and accurate +thinker, a thorough master of the principles which in his recent work he +undertakes to explain and to extend, and a writer gifted in a remarkable +degree with the power of lucid exposition. Such being the intellectual +calibre of the man who elaborates this new system of scientific theology, I +confess that, on first seeing his work, I experienced a faint hope that, in +the higher departments of the Philosophy of Evolution as conceived by Mr. +Spencer and elaborated by his disciple, there might be found some rational +justification for an attenuated form of Theism. But on examination I find +that the bread which these fathers have offered us turns out to be a stone; +and thinking that it is desirable to warn other of the children--whether of +the family Philosophical or Theological--against swallowing on trust a +morsel so injurious, I shall endeavour to point out what I conceive to be +the true nature of "Cosmic Theism." + +Starting from the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, Mr. Fiske, +following Mr. Spencer, proceeds to show how the doctrine implies that there +must be a mode of Being to which human knowledge is non-relative. Or, in +other words, he shows that the postulation of phenomena necessitates the +further postulation of noumena of which phenomena are the manifestations. +Now what may we affirm of noumena without departing from a scientific or +objective mode of philosophising? We may affirm at least this much of +noumena, that they constitute a mode of existence which need not +necessarily vanish were our consciousness to perish; and, therefore, that +they now stand out of necessary relation to our consciousness. Or, in other +words, so far as human consciousness is concerned, noumena must be regarded +as absolute. "But now, what do we mean by this affirmation of absolute +reality independent of the conditions of the process of knowing? Do we mean +to ... affirm, in language savouring strongly of scholasticism, that +beneath the phenomena which we call subjective there is an occult +substratum Mind, and beneath the phenomena which we call objective there is +an occult substratum Matter? Our conclusion cannot be stated in any such +form.... Our conclusion is simply this, that no theory of phenomena, +external or internal, can be framed without postulating an Absolute +Existence of which phenomena are the manifestations. And now let us +carefully note what follows. We cannot identify this Absolute Existence +with Mind, since what we know as Mind is a series of phenomenal +manifestations.... Nor can we identify this Absolute Existence with Matter, +since what we know as Matter is a series of phenomenal manifestations.... +Absolute Existence, therefore,--the Reality which persists independently of +us, and of which Mind and Matter are the phenomenal manifestations,--cannot +be identified either with Mind or with Matter. Thus is Materialism included +in the same condemnation with Idealism.... See then how far we have +travelled from the scholastic theory of occult substrata underlying each +group of phenomena. These substrata were but the ghosts of the phenomena +themselves; behind the tree or the mountain a sort of phantom tree or +mountain, which persists after the body of perception has gone away with +the departure of the percipient mind. Clearly this is no scientific +interpretation of the facts, but is rather a specimen of naive barbaric +thought surviving in metaphysics. The tree or mountain being groups of +phenomena, what we assert as persisting independently of the percipient +mind is a something which we are unable to condition either as tree or as +mountain. + +"And now we come down to the very bottom of the problem. Since we do +postulate Absolute Existence, and do not postulate a particular occult +substance underlying each group of phenomena, are we to be understood as +implying that there is a single Being of which all phenomena, internal and +external to consciousness, are manifestations? Such must seem to be the +inevitable conclusion, since we are able to carry on thinking at all only +under the relations of Difference and No-difference.... It may seem that, +since we cannot attribute to the Absolute Reality any relations of +Difference, we must positively ascribe to it No-difference. Or, what is the +same thing, in refusing to predicate multiplicity of it, do we not +virtually predicate of it unity? We do, simply because we cannot think +without so doing."[38] + +A single Absolute Reality being thus posited, our author proceeds, towards +the close of his work, to argue that as this Reality cannot be conceived as +limited either in space or time, it constitutes a Being which corresponds +with our essential conception of Deity. True it is devoid of certain +accessory attributes, such as personality, intelligence, and volition; but +for this very reason, it is insisted, the theistic ideal as thus presented +is a purer, and therefore a better, ideal than has ever been presented +before. Nay, it is the highest possible form of this ideal, as the +following considerations will show. In what has consisted that continuous +purification of Theism which the history of thought shows to have been +effected, from the grossest form of belief in supernatural agency as +exhibited in Fetichism, through its more refined form as exhibited in +Polytheism, to its still more refined form as exhibited in Monotheism? In +nothing but in a continuous process of what Mr. Fiske calls +"deanthropomorphisation." Consequently, must we not conclude that when we +carry this process yet one step further, and divest our conception of Deity +of all the yet lingering remnants of anthropomorphism which occur in the +current conceptions of Deity, we are but still further purifying that +conception? Assuredly, the attributes of personality, intelligence, and so +forth, are only known as attributes of Humanity, and therefore to ascribe +them to Deity is but to foster, in a more refined form, the anthropomorphic +teachings of previous religions. But if we carefully refuse to limit Deity +by the ascription of any human attributes whatever, and if the only +attributes which we do ascribe are such as on grounds of pure reason alone +we are compelled to ascribe, must we not conclude that the form of Theism +which results is the purest and the most refined form in which it is +possible for Theism to exist? "From the anthropomorphic point of view it +will quite naturally be urged in objection, that this apparently desirable +result is reached through the degradation of Deity from an 'intelligent +personality' to a 'blind force,' and is therefore in reality an undesirable +and perhaps quasi-atheistic result."[39] But the question which really +presents itself is, "theologically phrased, whether the creature is to be +taken as a measure of the Creator. Scientifically phrased, the question is +whether the highest form of Being as yet suggested to one petty race of +creatures by its ephemeral experience of what is going on in one tiny +corner of the universe, is necessarily to be taken as the equivalent of +that absolutely highest form of Being in which all the possibilities of +existence are alike comprehended."[40] Therefore, in conclusion, "whether +or not it is true that, within the bounds of the phenomenal universe the +highest type of existence is that which we know as humanity, the conclusion +is in every way forced upon us that, quite independently of limiting +conditions in space or time, there is a form of Being which can neither be +assimilated to humanity nor to any lower type of existence. We have no +alternative, therefore, but to regard it as higher than humanity, even 'as +the heavens are higher than the earth,' and except for the intellectual +arrogance which the arguments of theologians show lurking beneath their +expressions of humility, there is no reason why this admission should not +be made unreservedly, without the anthropomorphic qualifications by which +its effect is commonly nullified. The time is surely coming when the +slowness of men in accepting such a conclusion will be marvelled at, and +when the very inadequacy of human language to express Divinity will be +regarded as a reason for a deeper faith and more solemn adoration."[41] + +I have now sufficiently detailed the leading principles of Cosmic Theism to +render a clear and just conception of those fundamental parts of the system +which I am about to criticise; but it is needless to say that, for all +minor details of this system, I must refer those who may not already have +perused them to Mr. Fiske's somewhat elaborate essays. In now beginning my +criticisms, it may be well to state at the outset, that they are to be +restricted to the philosophical aspect of the subject. With matters of +sentiment I do not intend to deal,--partly because to do so would be unduly +to extend this essay, and partly also because I believe that, so far as the +acceptance or the rejection of Cosmic Theism is to be determined by +sentiment, much, if not all, will depend on individual habits of thought. +For whether or not Cosmic Theism is to be regarded as a religion adapted to +the needs of any individual man, will depend on what these needs are felt +to be by that man himself: we cannot assert magisterially that this +religion must be adapted to his needs because we have found it to be +adapted to our own. And if it is retorted that, human nature being +everywhere the same, a form of religion that is adapted to one man must on +this account be adapted to another, I reply that it is not so. For if a man +who is what Mr. Fiske calls an "Anthropomorphic Theist" finds from +experience that his system of religion--say Christianity--creates and +sustains a class of emotions and general habits of thought which he feels +to be the highest and the best of which he is capable, it is useless for a +"Cosmic Theist" to offer such a man another system of religion, in which +the conditions essential to the existence of these particular emotions and +habits of thought are manifestly absent. For such a man cannot but feel +that the proffered substitution would be tantamount, if accepted, to an +utter destruction of all that he regards as essentially religious. He will +tell us that he finds it perfectly easy to understand and to appreciate +those feelings of vague awe and "worship of the silent kind" which the +Cosmic Theist declares to be fostered by Cosmic Theism; but he will also +tell us that those feelings, which he has experienced with equal vividness +under his own system of Anthropomorphic Theism, are to him but as +non-religious dross compared with the unspeakable felicity of holding +definite commune with the Almighty and Most Merciful, or of rendering +worship that is a glad hosanna--a fearless shout of joy. On the other hand, +I believe that it is possible for philosophic habits of thought so to +discipline the mind that the feelings of vague awe and silent worship in +the presence of an appalling Mystery become more deep and steady than a +theist proper can well believe. It is therefore impossible that either +party can fully appreciate those sentiments of the other which they have +never fully experienced themselves; for even in those cases where an +anthropomorphic theist has been compelled to abandon his creed, as the +change must take place in mature life, his tone of mind has been determined +before it does take place; and therefore in sentiment, though not in faith, +he is more or less of a theist for the rest of his life: the only effect of +the change is to create a troubled interference between his desires and his +beliefs. + +However, I do not intend to develop this branch of the subject further than +thus to point out, in a general way, that religion-mongers as a class are +apt to show too little regard for the sentiments, as distinguished from the +beliefs, of those to whom they offer their wares. But although I do not +intend to constitute myself a champion of theology by pointing out the +defects of Cosmic Theism in the aspect which it presents to current modes +of thought, there is one such defect which I must here dwell upon, because +we shall afterwards have occasion to refer to it. A theologian may very +naturally make this objection to Cosmic Theism as presented by Mr. +Fiske--viz., that the argument on which this philosopher throughout relies +as a self-evident demonstration that the new system of Theism is a further +and a final improvement on all the previous systems of Theism, is a +fallacious argument. As we have already seen, this argument is, that as the +progress in the purification of Theism has throughout consisted in a +process of "deanthropomorphisation," therefore the terminal phase in this +process, which Cosmic Theism introduces, must be still in the direction of +that progress. But to this argument a theologian may not unreasonably +object, that this terminal phase differs from all the previous phases in +one all-important feature--viz., in effecting a _total abolition_ of the +anthropomorphic element. Before, therefore, it can be shown that this +terminal phase is a further development of _Theism_, it must he shown that +Theism still remains Theism after this hitherto characteristic element has +been removed. If it is true, as Mr. Fiske very properly insists, that all +the various forms of belief in God have thus far had this as a common +factor, that they ascribed to God the attributes of Man; it becomes a +question whether we may properly abstract this hitherto invariable factor +of a belief, and still call that belief by the same name. Or, to put the +matter in another light, as cosmists maintain that Theism, in all the +phases of its development, has been the product of a probably erroneous +theory of personal agency in nature, when this theory is expressly +discarded--as it is by the doctrine of the Unknowable--is it +philosophically legitimate for cosmists to render their theory of things in +terms which belong to the totally different theory which they discard? No +doubt it is true that the progressive refinement of Theism has throughout +consisted in a progressive discarding of anthropomorphic qualities; but +this fact does not touch the consideration that, when we proceed to strip +off the last remnants of these qualities, we are committing an act which +differs _toto coelo_ from all the previous acts which are cited as +precedents; for by this terminal act we are not, as heretofore, _refining_ +the theory of Theism--we are completely _transforming_ it by removing an +element which, both genetically and historically, would seem to constitute +the very essence of Theism. + +Or the case may be presented in yet another light. The only use of terms, +whether in daily talk or in philosophical disquisition, is that of +designating certain things or attributes to which by general custom we +agree to affix them; so that if anyone applies a term to some thing or +attribute which general custom does not warrant him in so applying, he is +merely laying himself open to the charge of abusing that term. Now apply +these elementary principles to the case before us. We have but to think of +the disgust with which the vast majority of living persons would regard the +sense in which Mr. Fiske uses the term "Theism," to perceive how intimate +is the association of that term with the idea of a Personal God. Such +persons will feel strongly that, by this final act of purification, Mr. +Fiske has simply purified the Deity altogether out of existence. And I +scarcely think it is here competent to reply that all previous acts of +purification were at first similarly regarded as destructive, because it is +evident that none of these previous acts affected, as this one does, the +central core of Theism. And, lastly, if it should be still further +objected, that by declaring the theory of Personal Agency the central core +of Theism, I am begging the question as to the appropriateness of Mr. +Fiske's use of the word "Theism,"--seeing he appears to regard the +essential meaning of this word to be that of a postulation of merely Causal +Agency,--I answer, More of this anon; but meanwhile let it be observed that +any charge of question-begging lies rather at the door of Mr. Fiske, in +that he assumes, without any expressed justification, that the essence of +Theism _does_ consist in such a postulation and in nothing more. And as he +unquestionably has against him the present world of theists no less than +the history of Theism in the past, I do not see how he is to meet this +charge except by confessing to an abuse of the term in question. + +I will now proceed to examine the structure of Cosmic Theism. We are all, I +suppose, at one in allowing that there are only three "verbally +intelligible" theories of the universe,--viz., that it is self-existent, or +that it is self-created, or that it has been created by some other and +external Being. It is usual to call the first of these theories Atheism, +the second Pantheism, and the third Theism. Now as there are here three +distinct nameable theories, it is necessary, if the term "Cosmic Theism" is +to be justified as an appropriate term, that the particular theory which it +designates should be shown to be in its essence theistic--_i.e._, that the +theory should present those distinguishing features in virtue of which +Theism differs from Atheism on the one hand, and from Pantheism on the +other. Now what are these features? The postulate of an Eternal +Self-existing Something is common to Theism and to Atheism. Here Atheism +ends. Theism, however, is generally said to assume Personality, +Intelligence, and Creative Power as attributes of the single self-existing +substance. Lastly, Pantheism assumes the Something now existing to have +been self-created. To which, then, of these distinct theories is Cosmic +Theism most nearly allied? For the purpose of answering this question, I +shall render that theory in terms of a formula which Mr. Fiske presents as +a full and complete statement of the theory:--"_There exists a_ POWER, _to +which no limit in space or time is conceivable, of which all phenomena, as +presented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can only know +through these manifestations._" But although the word "Power" is here so +strongly emphasised, we are elsewhere told that it is not to be regarded as +having more than a strictly relative or symbolic meaning; so that, in point +of fact, some more neutral word, such as "Something," "Being," or +"Substance," ought in strictness to be here substituted for the word +"Power." Well, if this is done, we have the postulation of a Being which is +self-existing, infinite, and eternal--relatively, at all events, to our +powers of conception. Thus far, therefore, it would seem that we are still +on the common standing-ground of Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism; for as it +is not, so far as I can see, incumbent on Pantheism to affirm that "thought +is a measure of things," the _apparent_ or _relative_ eternity which the +Primal Something must be supposed to present may not be _actual_ or +_absolute_ eternity. Nevertheless, as Mr. Fiske, by predicating Divinity of +the Primal Something, implicitly attributes to it the quality of an +_eternal_ self-existence, I infer that Cosmic Theism may be concluded at +this point to part company with Pantheism. There remain, then, Theism and +Atheism. + +Now undoubtedly, at first sight, Cosmic Theism appears to differ from +Atheism in one all-important particular. For we have seen that, by means of +a subtle though perfectly logical argument, Cosmic Philosophy has evolved +this conclusion--that all phenomena as presented in consciousness are +manifestations of a not improbable Single Self-existing Power, of whose +existence these manifestations alone can make us cognisant. From which it +apparently follows, that this hypothetical Power must be regarded as +existing out of necessary relation to the phenomenal universe; that it is, +therefore, beyond question "Absolute Being;" and that, as such, we are +entitled to call it Deity. But in the train of reasoning of which this is a +very condensed epitome, it is evident that the legitimacy of denominating +this Absolute Being Deity, must depend on the exact meaning which we attach +to the word "Absolute"--and this, be it observed, quite apart from the +question, before touched upon, as to whether Personality and Intelligence +are not to be considered as attributes essential to Deity. In what sense, +then, is the word "Absolute" used? It is used in this sense. As from the +relativity of knowledge we cannot know things in themselves, but only +symbolical representations of such things, therefore things in themselves +are absolute to consciousness: but analysis shows that we cannot +conceivably predicate Difference among things in themselves, so that we are +at liberty, with due diffidence, to predicate of them No-difference: hence +the noumena of the schoolmen admit of being collected into a _summum genus_ +of noumenal existence; and since, before their colligation noumena were +severally absolute, after their colligation they become collectively +absolute: therefore it is legitimate to designate this sum-total of +noumenal existence, "Absolute Being." Now there is clearly no exception to +be taken to the formal accuracy of this reasoning; the only question is as +to whether the "Absolute Being" which it evolves is absolute in the sense +required by Theism. I confess that to me this Being appears to be absolute +in a widely different sense from that in which Deity must be regarded as +absolute. For this Being is thus seen to be absolute in no other sense than +as holding--to quote from Mr. Fiske--"existence independent of the +conditions of the process of knowing." In other words, it is absolute only +as standing out of necessary relation to _human consciousness_. But Theism +requires, as an essential feature, that Deity should be absolute as +standing out of necessary relation to _all else_. Before, therefore, the +Absolute Being of Cosmism can be shown, by the reasoning adopted, to +deserve, even in part, the appellation of Deity, it must be shown that +there is no other mode of Being in existence save our own subjective +consciousness and the Absolute Reality which becomes objective to it +through the world of phenomena. But any attempt to establish this position +would involve a disregard of the doctrine that knowledge is relative; and +to do this, it is needless to say, would be to destroy the basis of the +argument whereby the Absolute Being of Cosmism was posited. + +Or, to state this part of the criticism in other words, as the first step +in justifying the predication of Deity, it must be shown that the Being of +which the predication is made is absolute, and this not merely as +independent of human consciousness, but as independent of the whole +noumenal universe--Deity itself alone excepted. That is, the Being of which +Deity is predicated must be Unconditioned. Hence it is incumbent on Cosmic +Theism to prove, either that the Causal Agent which it denominates Deity is +itself the whole noumenal universe, or that it created the rest of a +noumenal universe; else there is nothing to show that this Causal Agent was +not itself created--seeing that, even if we assume the existence of a God, +there is nothing to indicate that the Causal Agent of Cosmism is that God. + +It would appear therefore from this, that whatever else the Cosmist's +theory of things may be, it certainly is not Theism; and I think that +closer inspection will tend to confirm this judgment. To this then let us +proceed. + +Mr. Fiske is very hard on the atheists, and so will probably repudiate with +scorn any insinuations to the effect that his theory of things is +"quasi-atheistic." Nevertheless, it seems to me that he is very unjust to +the atheists, in that while he spares no pains to "purify" and "refine" the +theory of the theists, so as at last to leave nothing but what he regards +as the distilled essence of Theism behind; he habitually leaves the theory +of the atheists as he finds it, without making any attempt either to +"purify" it by removing its weak and unnecessary ingredients, or to +"refine" it by adding such sublimated ingredients as modern speculation has +supplied. Thus, while he despises the atheists of the eighteenth century +for their irrationality in believing in the self-existence of a +_phenomenal_ universe, and reviles them for their irreligion in denying +that "the religious sentiment needed satisfaction;" he does not wait to +inquire whether, in its essential substance, the theory of these men is not +the one that has proved itself best able to withstand the grinding action +of more recent thought. But let us in fairness ask, What was the essential +substance of that theory? Apparently it was the bare statement of the +unthinkable fact that Something Is. It therefore seems to me useless in Mr. +Fiske to lay so much stress on the fact that this Something was originally +identified by atheists with the phenomenal universe. It seems useless to do +this, because such identification is clearly no part of the _essence_ of +Atheism, which, as just stated, I take to consist in the single dogma of +self-existence as itself sufficient to constitute a theory of things. And, +if so, it is a matter of scarcely any moment, as regards that theory, +whether we are _immediately_ cognisant of that which is self-existent, or +only become so through the world of phenomena--the vital point of the +theory being, that Self-existence, _wherever posited_, is itself the only +admissible explanation of phenomena. Or, in other words, it does not seem +that there is anything in the atheistic theory, as such, which is +incompatible with the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge; so that +whatever cogency there may be in the train of reasoning whereby a single +Causal Agent is deduced from that doctrine, it would seem that an atheist +has as much right to the benefit of this reasoning as a theist; and there +is thus no more apparent reason why this single Causal Agent should be +appropriated as the God of Theism, than that it should be appropriated as +the Self-existing X of Atheism. Indeed, there seems to be less reason. For +an atheist of to-day may very properly argue:--'So far from beholding +anything divine in this Single Being absolute to human consciousness, it is +just precisely the form of Being which my theory postulates as the +Self-existing All. In order to constitute such a Being God, it must be +shown, as we have already seen, to be something more than a merely Causal +Agent which is absolute in the grotesquely restricted sense of being +independent of 'one petty race of creatures with an ephemeral experience of +what is going on in one tiny corner of the universe;' it must be shown to +be something more than absolute even in the wholly unrestricted sense of +being Unconditioned; it must be shown to possess such other attributes as +are distinctive of Deity. For I maintain that even Unconditioned Being, +_merely as such_, would only then have a right to the name of God when it +has been shown that the theory of Theism has a right to monopolise the +doctrine of Relativity.' + +In thus endeavouring to "purify" the theory of Atheism, by divesting it of +all superfluous accessories, and laying bare what I conceive to be its +essential substance; it may be well to state that, even apart from their +irreligious character, I have no sympathy with the atheists of the past +century. I mean, that these men do not seem to me to deserve any credit for +advanced powers of speculation merely because they adopted a theory of +things which in its essential features now promises to be the most +enduring. For it is evident that the strength of this theory now lies in +its _simplicity_,--in its undertaking to explain, so far as explanation is +possible, the sum-total of phenomena by the single postulate of +self-existence. But it seems to me that in the last century there were no +sufficient data for rendering such a theory of things a rational theory; +for so long as the quality of self-existence was supposed to reside in +phenomena themselves, the very simplicity of the theory, as expressed in +words, must have seemed to render it inapplicable as a reasonable theory of +things. The astounding variety, complexity, and harmony which are +everywhere so conspicuous in the world of phenomena must have seemed to +necessitate as an explanation some one integrating cause; and it is +impossible that in the eighteenth century any such integrating cause can +have been conceivable other than Intelligence. Therefore I think, with Mr. +Fiske, that the atheists of the eighteenth century were irrational in +applying their single postulate of self-existence as alone a sufficient +explanation of things. But of course the aspect of the case is now +completely changed, when we regard it in all the flood of light which has +been shed on it by recent science, physical and speculative. For the +demonstration of the fact that energy is indestructible, coupled with the +corollary that every so-called natural law is a physically necessary +consequence of that fact, clearly supply us with a completely novel datum +as the ultimate source of experience--and a datum, moreover, which is as +different as can well be imagined from the ever-changing, ever-fleeting, +world of phenomena. We have, therefore, but to apply the postulate of +self-existence to this single ultimate datum, and we have a theory of +things as rational as the Atheism of the last century was irrational. +Nevertheless, that this theory is more akin to the Atheism of the last +century than to any other theory of that time, is, I think, unquestionable; +for while we retain the central doctrine of self-existence as alone a +scientifically admissible, or non-gratuitous, explanation of things, we +only change the original theory by transferring the application of this +doctrine from the world of manifestations to that which causes the +manifestations: we do not resort to any of the _additional_ doctrines +whereby the other theories of the universe were distinguished from the +theory of Atheism in its original form. However, as by our recognition of +the relativity of knowledge we are precluded from dogmatically denying any +theory of the universe that may be proposed, it would clearly be erroneous +to identify the doctrine of the Unknowable with the theory of Atheism: all +we can say is, that, so far as speculative thought can soar, the permanent +self-existence of an inconceivable Something, which manifests itself to +consciousness as force and matter, constitutes the only datum that can be +shown to be required for the purposes of a rational ontology. + +To sum up. In the theory which Mr. Fiske calls Cosmic Theism, while I am +able to discern the elements which I think may properly be regarded as +common to Theism and to Atheism, I am not able to discern any single +element that is specifically distinctive of Theism. Still I am far from +concluding that the theory in question is the theory of Atheism. All I wish +to insist upon is this--that as the Absolute Being of Cosmism presents no +other qualities than such as are required by the renovated theory of +Atheism, its postulation supplies a basis, not for Theism, but for +Non-theism: a man with such a postulate ought in strictness to abstain from +either affirming or denying the existence of God. And this, I may observe, +appears to be the position which Mr. Spencer himself has adopted as the +only logical outcome of his doctrine of the Unknowable--a position which, +in my opinion, it is most undesirable to obscure by endeavouring to give it +a quasi-theistic interpretation. I may further observe, that we here seem +to have a philosophical justification of the theological sentiment +previously alluded to--the sentiment, namely, that by his attempt at a +final purification of Theism, Mr. Fiske has destroyed those essential +features of the theory in virtue of which alone it exists as Theism. For +seeing it is impossible, from the relativity of knowledge, that the +Absolute Being of Cosmism can ever be shown absolute in the sense required +by Theism, and, even if it could, that it would still be but the +Unconditioned Being of Atheism; it follows that if this Absolute Being is +to be shown even in part to deserve the appellation of Deity, it must be +shown to possess the only remaining attributes which are distinctive of +Deity--to wit, personality and intelligence. But forasmuch as the final act +of purifying the conception of Deity consists, according to Mr. Fiske, in +expressly removing these particular attributes from the object of that +conception, does it not follow that the conception which remains is, as I +have said, not theistic, but non-theistic? + +Here my criticism might properly have ended, were it not that Mr. Fiske, +after having divested the Deity of all his psychical attributes, forthwith +proceeds to show how it may be dimly possible to reinvest him with +attributes that are "quasi-psychical." Mr. Fiske is, of course, far too +subtle a thinker not to see that his previous argument from relativity +precludes him from assigning much weight to the ontological speculations in +which he here indulges, seeing that in whatever degree the relativity of +knowledge renders legitimate the non-ascription to Deity of known psychical +attributes, in some such degree at least must it render illegitimate the +ascription to Deity of unknown psychical attributes. But in the part of his +work in which he treats of the quasi-psychical attributes, Mr. Fiske is +merely engaged in showing that the speculative standing of the +"materialists" is inferior to that of the "spiritualists;" so that, as this +is a subject distinct from Theism, he is not open to the charge of +inconsistency. Well, feeble as these speculations undoubtedly are in the +support which they render to Theism, it nevertheless seems desirable to +consider them before closing this review. The speculations in question are +quoted from Mr. Spencer, and are as follows:-- + +"Mind, as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of +activities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another, +throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of which +they are the activities. But the same experiences which make him aware of +this coherent aggregate of mental activities, simultaneously make him aware +of activities that are not included in it--outlying activities which become +known by their effects on this aggregate, but which are experimentally +proved to be not coherent with it, and to be coherent with one another +(_First Principles_, Sec.Sec. 43, 44). As, by the definition of them, these +external activities cannot be brought within the aggregate of activities +distinguished as those of Mind, they must for ever remain to him nothing +more than the unknown correlatives of their effects on this aggregate; and +can be thought of only in terms furnished by this aggregate. Hence, if he +regards his conceptions of these activities lying beyond Mind as +constituting knowledge of them, he is deluding himself: he is but +representing these activities in terms of Mind, and can never do otherwise. +Eventually he is obliged to admit that his ideas of Matter and Motion, +merely symbolic of unknowable realities, are complex states of +consciousness built out of units of feeling. But if, after admitting this, +he persists in asking whether units of feeling are of the same nature as +the units of force distinguished as external, or whether the units of force +distinguished as external are of the same nature as units of feeling; then +the reply, still substantially the same, is that we may go further towards +conceiving units of external force to be identical with units of feeling, +than we can towards conceiving units of feeling to be identical with units +of external force. Clearly, if units of external force are regarded as +absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into +them is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And if +they are what they are supposed to be by those who identify them with their +symbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is +insurmountable: if Force as it objectively exists is absolutely alien in +nature from that which exists subjectively as Feeling, then the +transformation of Force into Feeling is unthinkable. Either way, therefore, +it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence. +But if, on the other hand, units of Force as they exist objectively are +essentially the same in nature with those manifested subjectively as units +of Feeling, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of +that aggregate of activities constituting a consciousness is known as +belonging to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond the +limits of this coherent aggregate of activities exist activities quite +independent of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine, +then, that by their exclusion from the circumscribed activities +constituting consciousness, these outer activities, though of the same +intrinsic nature, become antithetically opposed in aspect. Being +disconnected from consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are thereby +rendered foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, or +linked with these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it +were, run through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious--are +symbolised as having the nature called material, as opposed to that called +spiritual. While, however, it thus seems an imaginable possibility that +units of external Force may be identical in nature with units of the force +known as Feeling, yet we cannot by so representing them get any nearer to a +comprehension of external Force. For, as already shown, supposing all forms +of Mind to be composed of homogeneous units of feeling variously +aggregated, the resolution of them into such units leaves us as unable as +before to think of the substance of Mind as it exists in such units; and +thus, even could we really figure to ourselves all units of external Force +as being essentially like units of the force known as Feeling, and as so +constituting a universal sentiency, we should be as far as ever from +forming a conception of that which is universally sentient."[42] + +Now while I agree with Mr. Fiske that we have here "the most subtle +conclusion now within the ken of the scientific speculator, reached without +any disregard of the canons prescribed by the doctrine of relativity," I +would like to point out to minds less clear-sighted than his, that this +same "doctrine of relativity" effectually debars us from using this +"conclusion" as an argument of any assignable value in favour of Theism. +For the value of conceivability as a test of truth, on which this +conclusion is founded, is here vitiated by the consideration that, +_whatever_ the nature of Force-units may be, we can clearly perceive it to +be a subjective necessity of the case that they should admit of being more +easily conceived by us to be of the nature of Feeling-units than to be of +any other nature. For as units of Feeling are the only entities of which we +are, or can be, conscious, they are the entities into which units of Force +must be, so to speak, subjectively translated before we can cognise their +existence at all. Therefore, _whatever_ the real nature of Force-units may +be, ultimate analysis must show that it is more conceivable to identify +them in thought with the only units of which we are cognisant, than it is +to think of them as units of which we are not cognisant, and concerning +which, therefore, conception is necessarily impossible. Or thus, the only +alternative with respect to the classifying of Force-units lies between +refusing to classify them at all, or classifying them with the only +ultimate units with which we are acquainted. But this restriction, for +aught that can ever be shown to the contrary, arises only from the +subjective conditions of our own consciousness; there is nothing to +indicate that, in objective reality, units of Force are in any wise akin to +units of Feeling. Conceivability, therefore, as a test of truth, is in this +particular case of no assignable degree of value; for as the entities to +which it is applied are respectively the highest known abstractions of +subjective and objective existence, the test of conceivability is +neutralised by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that +subsists between subject and object. I think, therefore, it is evident that +these ontological speculations present no sufficient warrant for an +inference, even of the slenderest kind, that the Absolute Being of Cosmism +possesses attributes of a nature quasi-psychical; and, if so, it follows +that these speculations are incompetent to form the basis of a theory +which, even by the greatest stretch of courtesy, can in any legitimate +sense be termed quasi-theistic.[43] + +On the whole, then, I conclude that the term "Cosmic Theism" is not an +appropriate term whereby to denote the theory of things set forth in +"Cosmic Philosophy;" and that it would therefore be more judicious to leave +the doctrine of the Unknowable as Mr. Spencer has left it--that is, without +theological implications of any kind. But in now taking leave of this +subject, I should like it to be understood that the only reason why I have +ventured thus to take exception to a part of Mr. Fiske's work is because I +regret that a treatise which displays so much of literary excellence and +philosophic power should lend itself to promoting what I regard as mistaken +views concerning the ontological tendencies of recent thought, and this +with no other apparent motive than that of unworthily retaining in the new +philosophy a religious term the distinctive connotations of which are +considered by that philosophy to have become obsolete. + + * * * * * + + +II. + +SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IN REPLY TO A RECENT WORK ON THEISM.[44] + +On perusing my main essay several years after its completion, it occurred +to me that another very effectual way of demonstrating the immense +difference between the nature of all previous attacks upon the teleological +argument and the nature of the present attack, would be briefly to review +the reasonable objections to which all the previous attacks were open. Very +opportunely a work on Theism has just been published which states these +objections with great lucidity, and answers them with much ability. The +work to which I allude is by the Rev. Professor Flint, and as it is +characterised by temperate candour in tone and logical care in exposition, +I felt on reading it that the work was particularly well suited for +displaying the enormous change in the speculative standing of Theism which +the foregoing considerations must be rationally deemed to have effected. I +therefore determined on throwing my supplementary essay, which I had +previously intended to write, into the form of a criticism on Professor +Flint's treatise, and I adopted this course the more willingly because +there are several other points dwelt upon in that treatise which it seems +desirable for me to consider in the present one, although, for the sake of +conciseness, I abstained from discussing them in my previous essay. With +these two objects in view, therefore, I undertook the following +criticism.[45] + +In the first place, it is needful to protest against an argument which our +author adopts on the authority of Professor Clark Maxwell. The argument is +now a well-known one, and is thus stated by Professor Maxwell in his +presidential address before the British Association for the Advancement of +Science, 1870:--"None of the processes of nature, since the time when +nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of +any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of +the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any +of the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact quality +of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John +Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, +and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. Thus we have +been led along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which +science must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the external +mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from +investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing +back the history of matter, science is arrested when she assures herself, +on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that +it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural." + +Now it is obvious that we have here no real argument, since it is obvious +that science can never be in a position to assert that atoms, the very +existence of which is hypothetical, were never "made by any of the +processes we call natural." The mere fact that in the universe, as we now +know it, the evolution of material atoms is not observed to be taking place +"by any of the processes we call natural," cannot possibly be taken as +proof, or even as presumption, that there ever was a time when the material +atoms now in existence were created by a supernatural cause. The fact +cannot be taken to justify any such inference for the following reasons. In +the first place, assuming the atomic theory to be true, and there is +nothing in the argument to show that the now-existing atoms are not +self-existing atoms, endowed with their peculiar and severally distinctive +properties from all eternity. Doubtless the argument is, that as there +appear to be some sixty or more elementary atoms constituting the raw +material of the observable universe, it is incredible that they can all +have owed their correlated properties to any cause other than that of a +designing and manufacturing intelligence. But, in the next place--and here +comes the demolishing force of the criticism--science is not in a position +to assert that these sixty or more elementary atoms are in any real sense +of the term elementary. The mere fact that chemistry is as yet in too +undeveloped a condition to pronounce whether or not all the forms of matter +known to her are modifications of some smaller number of elements, or even +of a single element, cannot possibly be taken as a warrant for so huge an +inference as that there are really more than sixty elements all endowed +with absolutely distinctive properties by a supernatural cause. Now this +consideration, which arises immediately from the doctrine of the relativity +of knowledge, is alone amply sufficient to destroy the present argument. +But we must not on this account lose sight of the fact that, even to our +strictly relative science in its present embryonic condition, we are not +without decided indications, not only that the so-called elements are +probably for the most part compounds, but even that matter as a whole is +one substance, which is itself probably but some modification of energy. +Indeed, the whole tendency of recent scientific speculation is towards the +view that the universe consists of some one substance, which, whether +self-existing or created, is diverse only in its relation to ignorance. And +if this view is correct, how obvious is the inference which I have +elaborated in Sec. 32, that all the diverse forms of matter, as we know them, +were probably evolved by natural causes. So obvious, indeed, is this +inference, that to resort to any supernatural hypothesis to explain the +diverse properties of the various chemical elements appears to me a most +glaring violation of the law of parcimony--as much more glaring, for +instance, than the violation of this law by Paley, as the number and +variety of organic species are greater than the number and variety of +chemical species. And if it was illegitimate in Paley to use a mere absence +of knowledge as to how the transmutation of apparently fixed species of +animals was effected as equivalent to the possession of knowledge that such +transmutation had not been effected, how much more illegitimate must it be +to commit a similar sin against logic in the case of the chemical elements, +where our classification is confessedly beset with numberless difficulties, +and when we begin to discern that in all probability it is a classification +essentially artificial. Lastly, the mere fact that the transmutation of +chemical species and the evolution of chemical "atoms" are processes which +we do not now observe as occurring in nature, is surely a consideration of +a far more feeble kind than it is even in the case of biological species +and biological evolution; seeing that nature's laboratory must be now so +inconceivably different from what it was during the condensation of the +nebula. What an atrocious piece of arrogance, therefore, it is to assert +that "none of the processes of nature, _since the time when nature began_, +have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule!" +No one can entertain a higher respect for Professor Clark Maxwell than I +do; but a single sentence of such a kind as this cannot leave two opinions +in any impartial mind concerning his competency to deal with such subjects. + +I am therefore sorry to see this absurd argument approvingly incorporated +in Professor Flint's work. He says, "I believe that no reply to these words +of Professor Clark Maxwell is possible from any one who holds the ordinary +view of scientific men as to the ultimate constitution of matter. They must +suppose every atom, every molecule, to be of such a nature, to be so +related to others and to the universe generally, that things may be such as +we see them to be; but this their fitness to be built up into the structure +of the universe is a proof that they have been made fit, and since natural +forces could not have acted on them while not yet existent, a supernatural +power must have created them, and created them with a view to their +manifold uses." Here the inference so confidently drawn would have been a +weak one even were we not able to see that the doctrine of natural +evolution probably applies to inorganic nature no less than to organic. For +the inference is drawn from considerations of a character so transcendental +and so remote from science, that unless we wish to be deceived by a merely +verbal argument, we must feel that the possibilities of error in the +inference are so numerous and indefinite, that the inference itself is +well-nigh worthless as a basis of belief. But when we add that in Chapter +IV. of the foregoing essay it has been shown to be within the legitimate +scope of scientific reasoning to conclude that material atoms have been +progressively evolved _pari passu_ with the natural laws of chemical +combination, it is evident that any force which the present argument could +ever have had must now be pronounced as neutralised. Natural causes have +been shown, so far as scientific inference can extend, as not improbably +sufficient to produce the observed effects; and therefore we are no longer +free to invoke the hypothetical action of any supernatural cause. + +The same observations apply to Professor Flint's theistic argument drawn +from recent scientific speculations as to the vortex-ring construction of +matter. If these speculations are sound, their only influence on Theism +would be that of supplying a scientific demonstration of the substantial +identity of Force and Matter, and so of supplying a still more valid basis +for the theory as to the natural genesis of matter from a single primordial +substance, in the manner sketched out in Chapter IV. For the argument +adduced by Professor Flint, that as the manner in which the vorticial +motion of a ring is originated has not as yet been suggested, therefore its +origination must have been due to a "Divine impulse," is an argument which +again uses the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its possession. We are +in the presence of a very novel and highly abstruse theory, or rather +hypothesis, in physics, which was originally suggested by, and has hitherto +been mainly indebted to, empirical experiments as distinguished from +mathematical calculations; and from the mere fact that, in the case of such +a hypothesis, mathematicians have not as yet been able to determine the +physical conditions required to originate vorticial motion, we are expected +to infer that no such conditions can ever have existed, and therefore that +every such vortex system, if it exists, is a miracle! + +And substantially the same criticism applies to the argument which +Professor Flint adduces--the argument also on which Professors Balfour and +Tait lay so much stress in their work on the _Unseen Universe_--the +argument, namely, as to the non-eternal character of heat. The calculations +on which this argument depends would only be valid as sustaining this +argument if they were based upon a knowledge of the universe _as a whole_; +and therefore, as before, the absence of requisite knowledge must not be +used as equivalent to its possession. + +These, however, are the weakest parts of Professor Flint's work. I +therefore gladly turn to those parts which are exceedingly cogent as +written from his standpoint, but which, in view of the strictures on the +teleological argument that I have adduced in Chapters IV. and VI., I submit +to be now wholly valueless. + +"How could matter of itself produce order, even if it were self-existent +and eternal? It is far more unreasonable to believe that the atoms or +constituents of matter produced of themselves, without the action of a +Supreme Mind, this wonderful universe, than that the letters of the English +alphabet produced the plays of Shakespeare, without the slightest +assistance from the human mind known by that famous name. These atoms +might, perhaps, now and then, here and there, at great distances and long +intervals, produce by a chance contact some curious collocation or +compound; but never could they produce order or organisation on an +extensive scale, or of a durable character, unless ordered, arranged, and +adjusted in ways of which intelligence alone can be the ultimate +explanation. To believe that these fortuitous and indirected movements +could originate the universe, and all the harmonies and utilities and +beauties which abound in it, evinces a credulity far more extravagant than +has ever been displayed by the most superstitious of religionists. Yet no +consistent materialist can refuse to accept this colossal chance +hypothesis. All the explanations of the order of the universe which +materialists, from Democritus and Epicurus to Diderot and Lange, have +devised, rest on the assumption that the elements of matter, being eternal, +must pass through infinite combinations, and that one of these must be our +present world--a special collocation among the countless millions of +collocations, past and future. Throw the letters of the Greek alphabet, it +has been said, an infinite number of times, and you must produce the +'Iliad' and all the Greek books. The theory of probabilities, I need hardly +say, requires us to believe nothing so absurd.... But what is the 'Iliad' +to the hymn of creation and the drama of providence?" &c. + +Now this I conceive to have been a fully valid argument at the time it was +published, and indeed the most convincing of all the arguments in favour of +Theism. But, as already so frequently pointed out, the considerations +adduced in Chapter IV. of the present work are utterly destructive of this +argument. For this argument assumes, rightly enough, that the only +alternative we have in choosing our hypothesis concerning the final +explanation of things is either to regard that explanation as Intelligence +or as Fortuity. This, I say, was a legitimate argument a few months ago, +because up to that time no one had shown that strictly natural causes, as +distinguished from chances, could conceivably be able to produce a cosmos; +and although the several previous writers to whom Professor Flint +alludes--and he might have alluded to others in this +connection--entertained a dim anticipation of the fact that natural causes +might alone be sufficient to produce the observed universe, still these dim +anticipations were worthless as _arguments_ so long as it remained +impossible to suggest any natural _principle_ whereby such a result could +have been conceivably effected by such causes. But it is evident that +Professor Flint's time-honoured argument is now completely overthrown, +unless it can be proved that there is some radical error in the reasoning +whereby I have endeavoured to show that natural causes not only _may_, but +_must_, have produced existing order. The overthrow is complete, because +the very groundwork of the argument in question is knocked away; a third +possibility, of the nature of a necessity, is introduced, and therefore the +alternative is no longer between Intelligence and Fortuity, but between +Intelligence and Natural Causation. Whereas the overwhelming strength of +the argument from Order has hitherto consisted in the supposition of +Intelligence as the one and only conceivable cause of the integration of +things, my exposition in Chapter IV. has shown that such integration must +have been due, at all events in a relative or proximate sense, to a +strictly physical cause--the persistence of force and the consequent +self-evolution of natural law. And the question as to whether or not +Intelligence may not have been the absolute or ultimate cause is manifestly +a question altogether alien to the argument from Order; for if existing +order admits of being accounted for, in a relative or proximate sense, by +merely physical causes, the argument from a relative or proximate order is +not at liberty to infer or to assume the existence of any higher or more +ultimate cause. Although, therefore, in Chapter V., I have been careful to +point out that the fact of existing order having been due to proximate or +natural causes does not actually _disprove_ the possible existence of an +ultimate and supernatural cause, still it must be carefully observed that +this _negative_ fact cannot possibly justify any _positive_ inference to +the existence of such a cause. + +Thus, upon the whole, it may be said, without danger of reasonable dispute, +that as the argument from Order has hitherto derived its immense weight +entirely from the fact that Intelligence appeared to be the one and only +cause sufficient to produce the observed integration of the cosmos, this +immense weight has now been completely counterpoised by the demonstration +that other causes of a strictly physical kind must have been instrumental, +if not themselves alone sufficient, to produce this integration, So that, +just as in the case of Astronomy the demonstration of the one natural +principle of gravity was sufficient to classify under one physical +explanation several observed facts which many persons had previously +attributed to supernatural causes; and just as in the more complex science +of Geology the demonstration of the one principle of uniformitarianism was +sufficient to explain, without the aid of supernaturalism, a still greater +number of facts; and, lastly, just as in the case of the still more complex +science of Biology the demonstration of the one principle of natural +selection was sufficient to marshal under one scientific, or natural, +hypothesis an almost incalculable number of facts which were previously +explained by the metaphysical hypothesis of supernatural design; so in the +science which includes all other sciences, and which we may term the +science of Cosmology, I assert with confidence that in the one principle of +the persistence of force we have a demonstrably harmonising principle, +whereby all the facts within our experience admit of being collocated under +one natural explanation, without there being the smallest reason to +attribute these facts to any supernatural cause. + +But perhaps the immense change which these considerations must logically be +regarded as having produced in the speculative standing of the argument +from teleology will be better appreciated if I continue to quote from +Professor Flint's very forcible and thoroughly logical exposition of the +previous standing of this argument. He says:-- + +"To ascribe the origination of order to _law_ is a manifest evasion of the +real problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be explained. The +question is--Has law a reason, or is it without a reason? The unperverted +human mind cannot believe it to be without a reason." + +I do not know where a more terse and accurate statement of the case could +be found; and to my mind the question so lucidly put admits of the direct +answer--Law clearly has a reason of a purely physical kind. And therefore I +submit that the following quotation which Professor Flint makes from +Professor Jevons, logical as it was when written, must now be regarded as +embodying an argument which is obsolete. + +"As an unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in an +unlimited number of modes of distribution, there must, even granting matter +to have had all its laws from eternity, have been at some moment in time, +out of the unlimited choices and distributions possible, that one choice +and distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe that now +exists. Only out of rational choice can order have come." + +But clearly the alternative is now no longer one between chance and choice. +If natural laws arise by way of necessary consequence from the persistence +of a single self-existing substance, it becomes a matter of scientific +(though not of logical) demonstration that "the fair and orderly universe +that now exists" is the one and only universe that, in the nature of +things, _can_ exist. But to continue this interesting passage from Dr. +Flint's work--interesting not only because it sets forth the previous +standing of this subject with so much clearness, but also because the work +is of such very recent publication. + +"The most common mode, perhaps, of evading the problem which order presents +to reason is the indication of the process by which the order has been +realised. From Democritus to the latest Darwinian there have been men who +supposed they had completely explained away the evidences of design in +nature when they had described the physical antecedents of the arrangements +appealed to as evidences. Aristotle showed the absurdity of this +supposition more than 2200 years ago." + +Now this is a perfectly valid criticism on all such previous non-theistical +arguments as were drawn from an "indication of the process by which the +order has been realised;" for in all these previous arguments there was an +absence of any physical explanation of the _ultimate_ cause of the process +contemplated, and so long as this ultimate cause remained obscure, although +the evidence of design might by these arguments have been excluded from +particular processes, the evidence of design could not be similarly +excluded from the ultimate cause of these processes. Thus, for instance, it +is doubtless illogical, as Professor Flint points out, in any Darwinian to +argue that because his theory of natural selection supplies him with a +natural explanation of the process whereby organisms have been adapted to +their surroundings, therefore this process need not itself have been +designed. That is to say, in general terms, as insisted upon in the +foregoing essay, the discovery of a natural law or orderly process cannot +of itself justify the inference that this law or method of orderly +procedure is not itself a product of supernatural Intelligence; but, on the +contrary, the very existence of such orderly processes, considered only in +relation to their products, must properly be regarded as evidence of the +best possible kind in favour of supernatural Intelligence, _provided that +no natural cause can be suggested as adequate to explain the origin of +these processes_. But this is precisely what the persistence of force, +considered as a natural cause, must be pronounced as necessarily competent +to achieve; for we can clearly see that all these processes obviously must +and actually do derive their origin from this one causative principle. And +whether or not behind this one causative principle of natural law there +exists a still more ultimate cause in the form of a supernatural +Intelligence, this is a question altogether foreign to any argument from +teleology, seeing that teleology, in so far as it is _teleology_, can only +rest upon the observed facts of the cosmos; and if these facts admit of +being explained by the action of a single causative principle inherent in +the cosmos itself, teleology is not free to assume the action of any +causative principle of a more ultimate character. Still, as I have +repeatedly insisted, these considerations do not entitle us dogmatically to +deny the existence of some such more ultimate principle; all that these +considerations do is to remove any rational argument from teleological +sources that any such more ultimate principle exists. Therefore I am, of +course, quite at one with Professor Flint when he says Professor Huxley +"admits that the most thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume 'a +primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe +are the consequences,' and 'is thereby at the mercy of the theologist, who +can defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not +intended to involve the phenomena of the universe.' Granting this much, he +is logically bound to grant more. If the entire evolution of the universe +may have been intended, the several stages of its evolution may have been +intended, and they may have been intended for their own sakes as well as +for the sake of the collective evolution or its final result." Now that +such _may have been_ the case, I have been careful to insist in Chapter V.; +all I am now concerned with is to show that, in view of the considerations +adduced in Chapter IV., there is no longer any evidence to prove, or even +to indicate, that such _has been_ the case. And with reference to this +opportune quotation from Professor Huxley I may remark, that the +"thoroughgoing evolutionist" is now no longer "at the mercy of the +theologian" to any further extent than that of not being able to disprove a +purely metaphysical hypothesis, which is as certainly superfluous, in any +scientific sense, as the fundamental data of science are certainly true. + +It may seem almost unnecessary to extend this postscript by pursuing +further the criticism on Professor Flint's exposition in the light of "a +single new reason ... for the denial of design" which he challenges; but +there are nevertheless one or two other points which it seems desirable to +consider. Professor Flint writes:-- + +"M. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference from design, from the +order and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when he has +pointed out the physical conditions through which that order and stability +are secured, and the process by which they have been obtained.... Now the +assertion that the peculiarities which make the solar system stable and the +earth habitable have flowed naturally and necessarily from the simple +mutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter is one which greatly +requires proof, but which has never received it. In saying this, we do not +challenge the proof of the nebular theory itself. That theory may or may +not be true. We are quite willing to suppose it true--to grant that it has +been scientifically established. What we maintain is, that even if we admit +unreservedly that the earth and the whole system to which it belongs once +existed in a nebulous state, from which they were gradually evolved into +their present condition conformably to physical laws, we are in no degree +entitled to infer from the admission the conclusion which Comte and others +have drawn. The man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that the +law of gravitation, or any other physical law, has of itself determined the +course of cosmical evolution, so that there is no need for believing in the +existence and operation of a divine mind, proves merely that he is not +exempt from reasoning very illogically. The solar system could only have +been evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now presents if +the nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form, and constitution, if it +was neither too fluid nor too tenacious--if its atoms were all numbered, +its elements all weighed, its constituents all disposed in due relation to +one another; that is to say, only if the nebula was in reality as much a +system of order, which Intelligence alone could account for, as the worlds +which have been developed from it. The origin of the nebula thus presents +itself to reason as a problem which demands solution no less than the +origin of the planets. All the properties and laws of the nebula require to +be accounted for. What origin are we to give them? It must be either reason +or unreason. We may go back as far as we please, but, at every step and +stage of the regress we must find ourselves confronted with the same +question, the same alternative--intelligent purpose or colossal chance." + +Now, so far as Comte is here guilty of the fallacy I have already dwelt +upon of building a destructive argument upon a demonstration of mere +orderly processes in nature, as distinguished from a demonstration of the +natural cause of these processes, it is not for me to defend him. All we +can say with regard to him in this connection is, that, having a sort of +scientific presentiment that if the knowledge of his day were sufficiently +advanced it would prove destructive of supernaturalism in the higher and +more abstruse provinces of physical speculation, as it had previously +proved in the lower and less abstruse of these provinces, Comte allowed his +inferences to outrun their legitimate basis. Being necessarily ignorant of +the one generating cause of orderly processes in nature, he improperly +allowed himself to found conclusions on the basis of these processes alone, +which could only be properly founded on the basis of their cause. But +freely granting this much to Professor Flint, and the rest of his remarks +in this connection will be found, in view of the altered standing of this +subject, to be open to amendment. For, in the first place, no one need now +resort to the illogical supposition that "the law of gravitation or any +other physical law has of itself determined the course of cosmical +evolution." What we may argue, and what must be conceded to us, is, that +the common substratum of all physical laws was at one time sufficient to +produce the simplest physical laws, and that throughout the whole course of +evolution this common substratum has always been sufficient to produce the +more complex laws in the ascending series of their ever-increasing number +and variety. And hence it becomes obvious that the "origin of the nebula" +presents a difficulty neither greater nor less than "the origin of the +planets," since, "if we may go back as far as we please," we can entertain +no _scientific_ doubt that we should come to a time, prior even to the +nebula, when the substance of the solar system existed merely as +such--_i.e._, in an almost or in a wholly undifferentiated form, the +product, no doubt, of endless cycles of previous evolutions and +dissolutions of formal differentiations. Therefore, although it is +undoubtedly true that "the solar system could only have been evolved out of +its nebulous state into that which it now presents if the nebula possessed" +those particular attributes which were necessity to the evolution of such a +product, this consideration is clearly deprived of all its force from our +present point of view. For unless it can be shown that there is some +independent reason for believing these particular attributes--which must +have been of a more and more simple a character the further we recede in +time--to have been miraculously imposed, the analogy is overwhelming that +they all progressively arose _by way of natural law_. And if so, the +universe which has been thus produced is the only universe in this +particular point of space and time which could have been thus produced. +That it is an _orderly_ universe we have seen _ad nauseam_ to be no +argument in favour of its having been a _designed_ universe, so long as the +cause of its order--general laws--can be seen to admit of a natural +explanation. + +Thus there is clearly nothing to be gained on the side of teleology by +going back to the dim and dismal birth of the nebula; for no "thoroughgoing +evolutionist" would for one moment entertain the supposition that natural +law in the simplest phases of its development partook any more of a +miraculous character than it does in its more recent and vastly more +complex phases. The absence of knowledge must not be used as equivalent to +its presence; and if analogy can be held to justify any inference +whatsoever, surely we may conclude with confidence that if existing general +laws admit of being conceivably attributed to a natural genesis, the +primordial laws of a condensing nebula must have been the same. + +There is another passage in Professor Flint's work to which it seems +desirable to refer. It begins thus: "There is the law of heredity: like +produces like. But why is there such a law? Why does like produce like?... +Physical science cannot answer these questions; but that is no reason why +they should not both be asked and answered. I can conceive of no other +intelligent answer being given to them than that there is a God of wisdom, +who designed that the world should be for all ages the abode of life," &c. + +Now here we have in another form that same vicious tendency to take refuge +in the more obscure cases of physical causation as proofs of supernatural +design--the obscurity in this case arising from the _complexity_ of the +causes and work, as in the former case it arose from their _remoteness_ in +time. But in both cases the same answer is patent, viz., that although +"physical science cannot answer these questions" by pointing out the +precise sequence of causes and effects, physical science is nevertheless +quite as certain that this precise sequence arises in its last resort from +the persistence of force, as she would be were she able to trace the whole +process. And therefore, in view of the considerations set forth in Chapter +IV. of this work, it is no longer open to Professor Flint or to any other +writer logically to assert--"I can conceive of no other intelligent answer +being given to" such questions "than that there is a God of wisdom." + +The same answer awaits this author's further disquisition on other +biological laws, so it is needless to make any further quotations in this +connection. But there is one other principle embodied in some of these +passages which it seems undesirable to overlook. It is said, for instance, +"Natural selection might have had no materials, or altogether insufficient +materials, to work with, or the circumstances might have been such that the +lowest organisms were the best endowed for the struggle for life. If the +earth were covered with water, fish would survive and higher creatures +would perish." + +Now the principle here embodied--viz., that had the conditions of evolution +been other than they were, the results would have been different--is, of +course, true; but clearly, on the view that _all_ natural laws spring from +the persistence of force, no other conditions than those which actually +occurred, or are now occurring, could ever have occurred,--the whole course +of evolution must have been, in all its phases and in all its processes, an +unconditional necessity. But if it is said, How fortunate that the outcome, +being unconditionally necessary, has happened to be so good as it is; I +answer that the remark is legitimate enough if it is not intended to convey +an implication that the general quality of the outcome points to beneficent +design as to its cause. Such an implication would not be legitimate, +because, in the first place, we have no means of knowing in how many cases, +whether in planets, stars, or systems, the course of evolution has failed +to produce life and mind--the one known case of this earth, whether or not +it is the one success out of millions of abortions, being of necessity the +only known case. In how vastly greater a number of cases the course of +evolution may have been, so to speak, deflected by some even slight, though +strictly necessary, cause from producing self-conscious intelligence, it is +impossible to conjecture. But this consideration, be it observed, is not +here adduced in order to _disprove_ the assertion that telluric evolution +has been effected by Intelligence; it is merely adduced to prove that such +an assertion cannot rest on the single known result of telluric evolution, +so long as an infinite number of the results of evolution elsewhere remain +unknown. + +And now, lastly, it must be observed that even in the one case with which +we are acquainted, the net product of evolution is not such as can of +itself point us to _beneficent_ design. Professor Flint, indeed, in common +with theologians generally, argues that it does. I will therefore briefly +criticise his remarks on this subject, believing, as I do, that they form a +very admirable illustration of what I conceive to be a general +principle--viz., that minds which already believe in the existence of a +Deity are, as a rule, not in a position to view this question of +beneficence in nature in a perfectly impartial manner. For if the existence +of a Deity is presupposed, a mind with any particle of that most noble +quality--reverence--will naturally hesitate to draw conclusions that +partake of the nature of blasphemy; and therefore, unconsciously perhaps to +themselves, they endeavour in various ways to evade the evidence which, if +honestly and impartially considered, can scarcely fail to negative the +argument from beneficence in the universe. + +Professor Flint argues that the "law of over-production," and the +consequent struggle for existence, being "the reason why the world is so +wonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life," is "a means to an end +worthy of Divine Wisdom." "Although involving privation, pain, and +conflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections of +sentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion has +gained its strength, the deer its speed, and the dog its sagacity. The +inference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be attained +by it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of the +advantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering which the +conflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals for some +higher end than happiness--that he cares for animal perfection as well as +for animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying that the ends +which the conflict actually serves it was intended to serve." + +Now, whatever may be thought of such an argument as an attempted +justification of beneficent design already on independent ground believed +to exist, it is manifestly no argument at all as establishing any +presumption in favour of such design, unless it could be shown that the +Deity is so far limited in his power of adapting means to ends that the +particular method adopted in this case was the best, all things considered, +that he was able to adopt. For supposing the Deity to be, what Professor +Flint maintains that he is--viz., omnipotent--and there can be no inference +more transparent than that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends +designed, exhibits an incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the +divine character than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human +characters. For let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in +nature means. Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of +millions of animals must be supposed to have been sentient. Since that time +till the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations +of millions of millions of individuals. And throughout all this period of +incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms have +been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to the +outcome, we find that more than half of the species which have survived the +ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and insentient +forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find teeth and +talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for +torment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, and sickness, with oozing +blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence that +dimly close in deaths of brutal torture! Is it said that there are +compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the enjoyments I +plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the pains, and this +whether or not evolution is due to design. Therefore all I am concerned +with is to show, that if such a state of things is due to "omnipotent +design," the omnipotent designer must be concluded, so far as reason can +infer, to be non-beneficent. And this it is not difficult to show. When I +see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a spring-trap, I abhor the +devilish nature of the being who, with full powers of realising what pain +means, can deliberately employ his noble faculties of invention in +contriving a thing so hideously cruel. But if I could believe that there is +a being who, with yet higher faculties of thought and knowledge, and with +an unlimited choice of means to secure his ends, has contrived untold +thousands of mechanisms no less diabolical than a spring-trap; I should +call that being a fiend, were all the world besides to call him God. Am I +told that this is arrogance? It is nothing of the kind; it is plain +morality, and to say otherwise would be to hide our eyes from murder +because we dread the Murderer. Am I told that I am not competent to judge +the purposes of the Almighty? I answer that if these are _purposes_, I _am_ +able to judge of them so far as I can see; and if I am expected to judge of +his purposes when they appear to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged +also to judge of them when they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no +possible extenuation of the latter to point to the "final result" as "order +and beauty," so long as the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent_ Designer" +are known to have been so revolting. All that we could legitimately assert +in this case would be, that so far as observation can extend, "he cares for +animal perfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment," and even to +the _total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely +be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God. + +The dilemma, therefore, which Epicurus has stated with great lucidity, and +which Professor Flint quotes, appears to me so obvious as scarcely to +require statement. The dilemma is, that, looking to the facts of organic +nature, theists must abandon their belief, either in the divine +omnipotence, or in the divine beneficence. And yet, such is the warping +effect of preformed beliefs on the mind, that even so candid a writer as +Professor Flint can thus write of this most obvious truth:-- + +"The late Mr. John Stuart Mill, for no better reason than that nature +sometimes drowns men and burns them, and that childbirth is a painful +process, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall not +say what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed by such an +argument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the littleness +of man. The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it tries to +measure the attributes and limit the greatness of its Creator." + +But the argument--or rather the truism--in question is an attempt to do +neither the one nor the other; it simply asserts the patent fact that, if +God is omnipotent, and so had an unlimited choice of means whereby to +accomplish the ends of "animal perfection," "animal enjoyment," and the +rest; then the fact of his having chosen to adopt the means which he has +adopted is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his beneficence. And on +the other hand, if he is beneficent, the fact of his having adopted these +means in order that the sum of ultimate enjoyment might exceed the sum of +concomitant pain, is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his +omnipotence. To a man who already believes, on independent grounds, in an +omnipotent and beneficent Deity, it is no doubt possible to avoid facing +this dilemma, and to rest content with the assumption that, in a sense +beyond the reach of human reason, or even of human conception, the two +horns of this dilemma must be united in some transcendental reconciliation; +but if a man undertakes to reason on the subject at all, as he must and +ought when the question is as to the _existence_ of such a Deity, then +clearly he has no alternative but to allow that the dilemma is a hopeless +one. With inverted meaning, therefore, may we quote Professor Flint's words +against himself:--"The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it +tries to measure the attributes ... of its Creator;" for certainly, if +Professor Flint's usually candid mind has had a Creator, it nowhere +displays the "littleness" of prejudice in so marked a degree as it does +when "measuring his attributes." + +Thus in a subsequent chapter he deals at greater length with this +difficulty of the apparent failure of beneficence in nature, arguing, in +effect, that as pain and suffering "serve many good ends" in the way of +warning animals of danger to life, &c., therefore we ought to conclude +that, if we could see farther, we should see pain and suffering to be +unmitigated good, or nearly so. Now this argument, as I have previously +said, may possibly be admissible as between Christians or others who +_already_ believe in the existence and in the beneficence of God; but it is +only the blindest prejudice which can fail to perceive that the argument is +quite without relevancy when the question is as to the _evidences_ of such +existence and the _evidences_ of such character. For where the _fact_ of +such an existence and character is the question in dispute, it clearly can +be no argument to state its bare assumption by saying that if we knew more +of nature we should find the relative preponderance of good over evil to be +immeasurably greater than that which we now perceive. The platform of +argument on which the question of "Theism" must be discussed is that of the +observable Cosmos; and if, as Dr. Flint is constrained to admit, there is a +fearful spectacle of misery presented by this Cosmos, it becomes mere +question-begging to gloss over this aspect of the subject by any vague +assumption that the misery must have some unobservable ends of so +transcendentally beneficent a nature, that were they known they would +justify the means. Indeed, this kind of discussion seems to me worse than +useless for the purposes which the Professor has in view; for it only +serves by contrast to throw out into stronger relief the natural and the +unstrained character of the adverse interpretation of the facts. According +to this adverse interpretation, sentiency has been evolved by natural +selection to secure the benefits which are pointed out by Professor Flint; +and therefore the fact of this, its cause, having been a _mindless_ cause, +clearly implies that the _restriction_ of pain and suffering cannot be an +active principle, or a _vera causa_, as between species and species, though +it must be such within the limits of the same organism, and to a lesser +extent within the limits of the same species. And this is just what we find +to be the case. Therefore, without the need of resorting to wholly +arbitrary assumptions concerning transcendental reconciliations between +apparently needless suffering and a supposed almighty beneficence, the +non-theistic hypothesis is saved by merely opening our eyes to the +observable facts around us, and there seeing that pain and misery, alike in +the benefits which they bring and in the frightful excesses which they +manifest, play just that part in nature which this hypothesis would lead us +to expect. + +Therefore, to sum up these considerations on physical suffering, the case +between a theist and a sceptic as to the question of divine beneficence is +seen to be a case of extreme simplicity. The theist believes in such +beneficence by purposely concealing from his mind all adverse +evidence--feeling, on the one side, that to entertain the doubt to which +this evidence points would be to hold dalliance with blasphemy, and, on the +other side, that the subject is of so transcendental a nature that, in view +of so great a risk, it is better to avoid impartial reasoning upon it. A +sceptic, on the other hand, is under no such obligation to preconceived +ideas, and is therefore free to draw unbiassed inferences as to the +character of God, if he exists, to the extent which such character is +indicated by the sphere of observable nature. And, as I have said, when the +subject is so viewed, the inference is unavoidable that, so far as human +reason can penetrate, God, if he exists, must either be non-infinite in his +resources, or non-beneficent in his designs. Therefore it is evident that +when the _being_ of God, as distinguished from his _character_, is the +subject in dispute, Theism can gain nothing by an appeal to evidences of +_beneficent_ designs. If such evidences were unequivocal, then indeed the +argument which they would establish to an intelligent cause of nature would +be almost irresistible; for the fact of the external world being in harmony +with the moral nature of man would be unaccountable except on the +supposition of both having derived their origin from a common _moral_ +source; and morality implies intelligence. But as it is, all the so-called +evidence of divine beneficence in nature is, without any exception of a +kind that is worthless as proving _design_; for all the facts admit of +being explained equally well on the supposition of their having been due to +purely physical processes, acting through the various biological laws which +we are now only beginning to understand. And further than this, so far are +these facts from proving the existence of a moral cause, that, in view of +the alternative just stated, they even ground a positive argument to its +negation. For, as we have seen, all these facts are just of such a kind as +we should expect to be the facts, on the supposition of their having been +due to natural causes--_i.e._, causes which could have had no moral +solicitude for animal happiness as such. Let us now, in conclusion, dwell +on this antithesis at somewhat greater length. + +If natural selection has played any large share in the process of organic +evolution, it is evident that animal enjoyment, being an important factor +in this natural cause, must always have been furthered _to the extent in +which it was necessary for the adaptation of organisms to their +environment_ that it should. And such we invariably find to be the limits +within which animal enjoyments _are_ confined. On the other hand, so long +as the adaptations in question are not complete, so long must more or less +of suffering be entailed--the capacity for suffering, as for enjoyment, +being no doubt itself a product of natural selection. But as all specific +types are perpetually struggling together, it is manifest that the +competition must prevent any considerable number of types from becoming so +far adapted to their environment of other types as to become exempt from +suffering as a result of this competition. There being no one integrating +cause of an intelligent or moral nature to supply the conditions of +happiness to each organic type without the misery of this competition, such +happiness as animals have is derived from the heavy expenditure of pain +suffered by themselves and by their ancestry. + +Thus, whether we look to animal pleasures or to animal pains, the result is +alike just what we should expect to find on the supposition of these +pleasures and pains having been due to necessary and physical, as +distinguished from intelligent and moral, antecedents; for how different is +that which is from that which might have been! Not only might beneficent +selection have eliminated the countless species of parasites which now +destroy the health and happiness of all the higher organisms; not only +might survival of the fittest, in a moral sense, have determined that +rapacious and carnivorous animals should yield their places in the world to +harmless and gentle ones; not only might life have been without sickness +and death without pain;--but how might the exigences and the welfare of +species have been consulted by the structures and the habits of one +another! But no! Amid all the millions of mechanisms and habits in organic +nature, all of which are so beautifully adapted to the needs of the species +presenting them, there is _no single instance_ of any mechanism or habit +occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of another +species--although, as we should expect on the non-theistic theory, there +are some comparatively few cases of a mechanism or a habit which is of +benefit to its possessor being also utilised by other species. Yet, on the +beneficent-design theory, it is impossible to understand why, when all +mechanisms and habits in the same species are invariably correlated for the +benefit of that species, there should never be any such correlation between +mechanisms and habits of different species. For how magnificent, how +sublime a display of supreme beneficence would nature have afforded if all +her sentient animals had been so inter-related as to minister to each +other's happiness! Organic species might then have been likened to a +countless multitude of voices, all singing to their Creator in one +harmonious psalm of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such +correlation; every species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome +of the always and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life. + +So much, then, for the case of _physical_ evil; but Dr. Flint also treats +of the case of _moral_ evil. Let us see what this well-equipped writer can +make of this old problem in the present year of grace. He says--"But it +will be objected, could not God have made moral creatures who would be +certain always to choose what is right, always to acquiesce in His holy +will?... Well, far be it from me to deny that God could have originated a +sinless moral system.... But if questioned as to why He has not done +better, I feel no shame in confessing my ignorance. It seems to me that +when you have resolved the problem of the origin of moral evil into the +question, Why has God not originated a moral universe in which the lowest +moral being would be as excellent as the archangels are? you have at once +shown it to be _speculatively incapable of solution_ [italics mine], and +practically without importance[!]. The question is one which would +obviously give rise to another, Why has God not created only moral beings +as much superior to the archangels as they are superior to the lowest +Australian aborigines? But no complete answer can be given to a question +which may be followed by a series of similar questions to which there is no +end. We have, besides, neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such +questions."[46] + +Now I confess that this argument presents to my mind more of subtlety than +sense. I had previously imagined that the archangels were supposed to enjoy +a condition of moral existence which might fairly be thought to remove them +from any association with that of the Australian aborigines. But as this +question is one that belongs to Divinity, I am here quite prepared to bow +to Professor Flint's authority--hoping, however, that he is prepared to +take the responsibility should the archangels ever care to accuse me of +calumny. But, as a logician, I must be permitted to observe, that if I ask, +Why am I not better than I am? it is no answer to tell me, Because the +archangels are not better than they are. For aught that I know to the +contrary, the archangels may be morally _perfect_--as an authority in such +matters has told us that even "just men" may become,--and therefore, for +aught that I know to the contrary, Professor Flint's regress of moral +degrees _ad infinitum_, may be an ontological absurdity. But granting, for +the sake of argument, that archangels fall infinitely short of moral +perfection, and I should only be able to see in the fact a hopeless +aggravation of my previous difficulty. If it is hard to reconcile the +supreme goodness of God with the moral turpitude of man, much more would it +be hard to do so if his very angels are depraved. Therefore, if the +reasonable question which I originally put "may be followed by a series of +similar questions to which there is no end," the goodness of God must +simply be pronounced a delusion. For the question which I originally put +was no mere flimsy question of a stupidly unreal description. My own moral +depravity is a matter of painful certainty to me, and I want to know why, +if there is a God of infinite power and goodness, he should have made me +thus. And in answer I am told that my question is "practically without +importance," because there may be an endless series of beings who, in their +several degrees, are in a similar predicament to myself. Perhaps they are; +but if so, the moral evil with which I am directly acquainted is made all +the blacker by the fact that it is thus but a drop in an infinite ocean of +moral imperfection. When, therefore, Professor Flint goes on to say, "We +ought to be content if we can show that what God has done is wise and +right, and not perplex ourselves as to why He has not done an infinity of +other things," I answer, Most certainly; but _can_ we show that what God +has done is wise and right? Unquestionably not. That what he has done _may_ +be wise and right, could we see his whole scheme of things, no careful +thinker will deny; but to suppose it can be _shown_ that he has done this, +is an instance of purblind fanaticism which is most startling in a work on +_Theism_. "The best world, _we may be assured_, that our fancies can feign, +would in reality be far inferior to the world God has made, whatever +imperfections we may think we see in it." Are we leading a sermon on the +datum "God is love"? No; but a work on the questions, Is there a God? and, +if so, Is he a God of love? And yet the work is written by a man who +evidently tries to argue fairly. What shall we say of the despotism of +preformed beliefs? May we not say at least this much--that those who +endeavour to reconcile their theories of divine goodness with the facts of +human evil might well appropriate to themselves the words above quoted, "We +have neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such questions"? For the +"facts" indeed are absent, and the "faculties" of impartial thought must be +absent also, if this obvious truth cannot be seen--that "these questions" +only derive their "speculatively unanswerable" character from the rational +falsity of the manner by which it is sought to answer them. The "facts" of +our moral nature, so far as honest reason can perceive, belie the +hypothesis of Theism; and although the "faculties" of man may be forced by +prejudice into an acceptance of contradictory propositions, the truth is +obvious that only by the hypothesis of Evolution can that old-tied knot be +cut--the Origin of Evil. The form of Theism for which Dr. Flint is arguing +is the current form, viz., that there is a God who combines in himself the +attributes of _infinite_ power and _perfect_ goodness--a God at once +_omnipotent_ and _wholly_ moral. But, in view of the fact that moral evil +exists in man, the proposition that God is omnipotent and the proposition +that he is wholly moral become contradictory; and therefore the fact of +moral evil can only be met, either by abandoning one or other of these +propositions, or by altogether rejecting the hypothesis of Theism. + + * * * * * + + +III. + +THE SPECULATIVE STANDING OF MATERIALISM. + +As a continuation of my criticism on Mr. Fiske's views, I think it is +desirable to add a few words concerning the speculative annihilation with +which he supposes Mr. Spencer's doctrines to have visited Materialism. Of +course it is a self-evident truism that the doctrine of Relativity is +destructive of Materialism, if by Materialism we mean a theory which +ignores that doctrine. In other words, the doctrine of Relativity, if +accepted, clearly excludes the doctrine that Matter, _as known +phenomenally_, is at all likely to be a true representative of whatever +_thing-in-itself_ it may be that constitutes Mind. But this position is +fully established by the doctrine of Relativity alone, and is therefore not +in the least affected, either by way of confirmation or otherwise, by Mr. +Spencer's extended doctrine of the Unknowable--it being only because the +latter doctrine presupposes the doctrine of Relativity that it is exclusive +of Materialism in the sense which has just been stated. So far, therefore, +Mr. Spencer's writings cannot be held to have any special bearing on the +doctrine of Materialism. Such a special bearing is only exerted by these +writings when they proceed to show that "it seems an imaginable possibility +that units of external force may be identical in nature with the units of +the force known as feeling." Let us then ascertain how far it is true that +the argument already quoted, and which leads to this conclusion, is utterly +destructive of Materialism. + +In the first place, I may observe that this argument differs in several +instructive particulars from the anti-materialistic argument of Locke, +which we have already had occasion to consider. For while Locke erroneously +imagined that the test of inconceivability is of equivalent value +_wherever_ it is applied, save only where it conflicts with preconceived +ideas on the subject of Theism (see Appendix A.), Spencer, of course, is +much too careful a thinker to fall into so obvious a fallacy. But again, it +is curious to observe that in the anti-materialistic argument of Spencer +the test of inconceivability is used in a manner the precise opposite of +that in which it is used in the anti-materialistic argument of Locke. For +while the ground of Locke's argument is that Materialism must be untrue +because it is inconceivable that Matter (and Force) should be of a +psychical nature; the ground of Spencer's argument is that what we know as +Force (and Matter) may _not_ inconceivably be of a psychical nature. For my +own part, I think that Spencer's argument is, psychologically speaking, the +more valid of the two; but nevertheless I think that, logically speaking, +it is likewise invalid to a perceptibly great, and to a further indefinite, +degree. For the argument sets out with the reflection that we can only know +Matter and Force as symbols of consciousness, while we know consciousness +directly, and therefore that we can go further in conceivably translating +Matter and Force into terms of Mind than _vice versa_. And this is true, +but it does not therefore follow that the truth is more likely to lie in +the direction that thought can most easily travel. For although I am at one +with Mr. Spencer, whom Mr. Fiske follows, in regarding his test of +truth--viz., inconceivability of a negation--as the most _ultimate_ test +within our reach, I cannot agree with him that in this particular case it +is the most _trustworthy_ test within our reach. I cannot do so because the +reflection is forced upon me that, "as the terms which are contemplated in +this particular case are respectively the highest abstractions of objective +and of subjective existence, the test of truth in question is neutralised +by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that exists between +subject and object." Or, in other words, as before stated, "_whatever_ the +cause of Mind may be, we can clearly perceive it to be a subjective +necessity of the case that, in ultimate analysis, we should find it more +easy to conceive of this cause as resembling Mind--the only entity of which +we are directly conscious--than to conceive of it as any other entity of +which we are only indirectly conscious." When, therefore, Mr. Spencer +argues that "it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of +outer existence," while it is not so impossible to interpret outer +existence in terms of inner existence, the fact is merely what we should in +any case expect _a priori_ to be the fact, and therefore as a fact it is +not a very surprising discovery _a posteriori_. So that when Mr. Fiske +proceeds to make this fact the basis of his argument, that because we can +more conceivably regard objective existence as like in kind to subjective +existence than conversely, therefore we should conclude that there is a +corresponding probability in favour of the more conceivable proposition, I +demur to his argument. For, fully accepting the fact on which the argument +rests, and it seems to me, in view of what I have said, that the latter +assigns an altogether disproportionate value to the test of +inconceivability in this case. Far from endowing this test with so great an +authority in this case, I should regard it not only as perceptibly of very +small validity, but, as I have said, invalid to a degree which we have no +means of ascertaining. If it be asked, What other gauge of probability can +we have in this matter other than such a direct appeal to consciousness? I +answer, that this appeal being here _a priori_ invalid, we are left to fall +back upon the formal probability which is established by an application of +scientific canons to objective phenomena. (See footnote in Sec. 14.) For, be +it carefully observed, Mr. Spencer, and his disciple Mr. Fiske, are not +idealists. Were this the case, of course the test of an immediate appeal to +consciousness would be to them the only test available. But, on the +contrary, as all the world knows, Mr. Spencer asserts the existence of an +unknown Reality, of which all phenomena are the manifestations. +Consequently, what we call Force and Matter are, according to this +doctrine, phenomenal manifestations of this objective Reality. That is to +say, for aught that we can know, Force and Matter may be anything within +the whole range of the possible; and the only limitation that can be +assigned to them is, that they are modes of existence which are independent +of, or objective to, our individual consciousness, but which are uniformly +translated into consciousness as Force and Matter. Now it does not signify +one iota for the purposes of Materialism whether these our symbolical +representations of Force and Matter are accurate or inaccurate +representations of their corresponding realities,--unless, of course, some +_independent_ reason could be shown for supposing that in their reality +they resemble Mind. Call Force _x_ and Matter _y_, and so long as we are +agreed that _x_ and _y_ are _objective realities which are uniformly +translated into consciousness as Force and Matter_, the materialistic +deductions remain unaffected by this mere change in our terminology; these +essential facts are allowed to remain substantially as before, namely, that +there is an external something or external somethings--Matter and Force, or +_x_ and _y_--which themselves display no observable tokens of +consciousness, but which are invariably associated with consciousness in a +highly distinctive manner. + +I dwell at length upon this subject, because although Mr. Spencer himself +does not appear to attach much weight to his argument, Mr. Fiske, as we +have seen, elevates it into a basis for "Cosmic Theism." Yet so far is this +argument from "ruling out," as Mr. Fiske asserts, the essential doctrine of +Materialism--_i.e._, the doctrine that what we know as Mind is an effect of +certain collocations and distributions of _what we know_ as Matter and +Force--that the argument might be employed with almost the same degree of +effect, or absence of effect, to disprove any instance of recognised +causation. Thus, for example, the doctrine of Materialism is no more "ruled +out" by the reflection that what we cognise as cerebral matter is only +cognised relatively, than would the doctrine of chemical equivalents be +"ruled out" by the parallel reflection that what we cognise as chemical +elements are only cognised relatively. I say advisedly, "with _almost_ the +same degree of effect," because, to be strictly accurate, we ought not +altogether to ignore the indefinitely slender presumption which Mr. +Spencer's subjective test of inconceivability establishes on the side of +Spiritualism, as against the objective evidence of causation on the side of +Materialism. As this is an important subject, I will be a little more +explicit. We are agreed that Force and Matter are entities external to +consciousness, of which we can possess only symbolical knowledge. +Therefore, as we have said, Force and Matter may be anything within the +whole range of the possible. But we know that Mind is a possible entity, +while we have no certain knowledge of any other possible entity. Hence we +are justified in saying, It is possible that Force and Matter may be +identical with the only entity which we know as certainly possible; but +forasmuch as we do not know the sum of possible entities, we have no means +of calculating the chances there are that what we know as Force and Matter +are identical in nature with Mind. Still, that there is _a_ chance we +cannot dispute; all we can assert is, that we are unable to determine its +value, and that it would be a mistake to suppose we can do so, even in the +lowest degree, by Mr. Spencer's test of inconceivability. Nevertheless, the +fact that there is such a chance renders it in some indeterminate degree +more probable that what we know as Force and Matter are identical with what +we know as Mind, than that what we know as oxygen and hydrogen are +identical with what we know as water. So that to this extent the essential +doctrine of Materialism is "ruled out" in a further degree by the +philosophy of the Unknowable than is the chemical doctrine of equivalents. +But, of course, this indefinite possibility of what we know as Force and +Matter being identical with what we know as Mind does not neutralise, in +any determinable degree, the considerations whereby Materialism in its +present shape infers that what we know as Force and Matter are probably +distinct from what we know as Mind. + +But I see no reason why Materialism should be restricted to this "its +present shape." Even if we admit to the fullest extent the validity of Mr. +Spencer's argument, and conclude with Professor Clifford as a matter of +probability that "the universe consists entirely of Mind-stuff," I do not +see that the admission would affect Materialism in any essential respect. +For here again the admission would amount to little else, so far as +Materialism is directly concerned, than a change of terminology: instead of +calling objective existence "Matter," we call it "Mind-stuff." I say "to +_little_ else," because no doubt in one particular there is here some +change introduced in the speculative standing of the subject. So long as +Matter and Mind, _x_ and _y_, are held to be antithetically opposed in +substance, so long must Materialism suppose that a connection of +_causality_ subsists between the two, such that the former substance is +_produced_ in some unaccountable way by the latter. But when Matter and +Mind, _x_ and _y_, are supposed to be identical in substance, the need for +any additional supposition as to a causal connection is excluded. But +unless we hold, what seems to me an uncalled-for opinion, that the +essential feature of Materialism consists in a postulation of a causal +connection between _x_ and _y_, it would appear that the only effect of +supposing _x_ and _y_ to be really but one substance _z_, must be that of +_strengthening_ the essential doctrine of Materialism--the doctrine, +namely, that conscious intellectual existence is _necessarily_ associated +with that form of existence which we know phenomenally as Matter and +Motion. If it is true that a "a moving molecule of inorganic matter does +not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a small piece of +Mind-stuff," then assuredly the central position of Materialism is shown to +be impregnable. For while it remains as true as ever that mind and +consciousness can only emerge when what we know phenomenally as "Matter +takes the complex form of a living brain," we have abolished the necessity +for assuming even a causal connection between the substance of what we know +phenomenally as Matter and the substance of what we know phenomenally as +Mind: we have found that, in the last resort, the phenomenal connection +between what we know as Matter and what we know as Mind is actually even +more intimate than a connection of causality; we have found that it is a +substantial identity. + +To sum up this discussion. We have considered the bearing of modern +speculation on the doctrine of Materialism in three successive stages of +argument. First, we had to consider the bearing on Materialism of the +simple doctrine of Relativity. Here we saw that Materialism was only +affected to the extent of being compelled to allow that what we know as +Matter and Motion are not known as they are in themselves. But we also saw +that, as the inscrutable realities are uniformly translated into +consciousness as Matter and Motion, it still remains as true as ever that +_what we know_ as Matter and Motion may be the causes of what we know as +Mind. Even, therefore, if the supposition of causality is taken to be an +essential feature of Materialism, Materialism would be in no wise affected +by substituting for the words Matter and Motion the symbols _x_ and _y_. + +The second of the three stages consisted in showing that Mr. Spencer's +argument as to the possible identity of Force and Feeling is not in itself +sufficient to overthrow the doctrine that what we know as Matter and Motion +may be the cause of what we know as Mind. For the mere fact of its being +more _conceivable_ that units of Force should resemble units of Feeling +than conversely, is no warrant for concluding that in reality any +corresponding probability obtains. The test of conceivability, although the +most ultimate test that is available, is here rendered vague and valueless +by the _a priori_ consideration that _whatever_ the cause of Mind may be +(if it has a cause), we must find it more easy to conceive of this cause as +resembling Mind than to conceive of it as resembling any other entity of +which we are only conscious indirectly. + +Lastly, in the third place, we saw that even if Mr. Spencer's argument were +fully subscribed to, and Mind in its substantial essence were conceded to +be causeless, the central position of Materialism would still remain +unaffected. For Mr. Spencer does not suppose that his "units of Force" are +themselves endowed with consciousness, any more than Professor Clifford +supposes his "moving molecules of inorganic matter" to be thus endowed. So +that the only change which these possibilities, even if conceded to be +actualities, produce in the speculative standing of Materialism, is to show +that the raw material of consciousness, instead of requiring to be _caused_ +by other substances--Matter and Force, _x_ and _y_,--occurs ready made as +those substances. But the essential feature of Materialism remains +untouched--namely, that what we know as Mind is dependent (whether by way +of causality or not is immaterial) on highly complex forms of _what we +know_ as Matter, in association with highly peculiar distributions of _what +we know_ as Force. + + * * * * * + + +IV. + +THE FINAL MYSTERY OF THINGS. + +Some physicists are inclined to dispute the fundamental proposition in +which the whole of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy may be said to +rest--the proposition, namely, that the fact of the "persistence of force" +constitutes the ultimate basis of science. For my own part, I cannot but +believe that any disagreement on this matter only arises from some want of +mutual understanding; and, therefore, in order to anticipate any criticisms +to which the present work may be open on this score, I append this +explanatory note. + +I readily grant that the term "persistence of force" is not a happy one, +seeing that the word "force," as used by physicists, does not at the +present time convey the full meaning which Mr. Spencer desires it to +convey. But I think that any impartial physicist will be prepared to admit +that, in the present state of his science, we are entitled to conclude that +energy of position is merely the result of energy of motion; or, in other +words, that potential energy is merely an expression of the fact that the +universe, as a whole, is replete with actual energy, whose essential +characteristic is that it is indestructible. And this may be concluded +without committing ourselves to any particular theory as to the physical +explanation of gravity; all we need assert is, that in some way or other +gravity is the result of ubiquitous energy. And this, it seems to me, we +must assert, or else conclude that gravity can never admit of a physical +explanation. For all that we mean by a physical explanation is the proved +establishment of an equation between two quantities of energy; so that if +energy of position does not admit of being interpreted in terms of energy +of motion, we must conclude that it does not admit of being interpreted at +all--at least not in any physical sense. + +Throughout the foregoing essays, therefore, I have assumed that all forms +of energy are but relatively varying expressions of the same fact--the +fact, namely, which Mr. Spencer means to express when he says that force is +persistent. And it seems to me almost needless to show that this fact is +really the basis of all science. For unless this fact is assumed as a +postulate, not only would scientific inquiry become impossible, but all +experience would become chaotic. The physicist could not prosecute his +researches unless he presupposed that the forces which he measures are of a +permanent nature, any more than could the chemist prosecute his researches +unless he presupposed that the materials which he estimates by energy-units +are likewise of a permanent nature. And similarly with all the other +sciences, as well as with every judgment in our daily experience. If, +therefore, any one should be hypercritical enough to dispute the position +that the doctrine of the conservation of energy constitutes the "ultimate +datum" of science, I think it will be enough to observe that if this is +_not_ the "ultimate datum" of science, science can have no "ultimate datum" +at all. For any datum more ultimate than permanent existence is manifestly +impossible, while any such datum as non-permanent existence would clearly +render science impossible. Even, therefore, if such hypercriticism had a +valid basis of apparently adverse fact whereon to stand, I should feel +myself justified in neglecting it on _a priori_ grounds; but the only basis +on which such hypercriticism can rest is, not the knowledge of any adverse +facts, but the ignorance of certain facts which we must either conclude to +be facts or else conclude that science can have no ultimate datum whereon +to rest. In the foregoing essays, therefore, I have not scrupled to +maintain that the ultimate datum of science is destructive of teleology as +a scientific argument for Theism; because, unless we deny the possibility +of any such ultimate datum, and so land ourselves in hopeless scepticism, +we must conclude that there can be no datum more ultimate than +this--Permanent Existence; and this is just the datum which we have seen to +be destructive of teleology as a scientific argument for Theism. + +It may be well to point out that from this ultimate datum of science--or +rather, let us say, of experience--there follows a deductive explanation of +the law of causation. For this law, when stripped of all the metaphysical +corruptions with which it has been so cumbersomely clothed, simply means +that a given collocation of antecedents unconditionally produces a certain +consequent. But this fact, otherwise stated, amounts to nothing more than a +re-statement of the ultimate datum of experience--the fact that energy is +indestructible. For if this latter fact be granted, it is obvious that the +so-called law of causation follows as a deductive necessity--or rather, as +I have said, that this law becomes but another way of expressing the same +fact. This is obvious if we reflect that the only means we have of +ascertaining that energy is _not_ destructible, is by observing that +similar antecedents _do_ invariably determine similar consequents. It is as +a vast induction from all those particular cases of sequence-changes which +collectively we call causation that we conclude energy to be +indestructible. And, obversely, having concluded energy to be +indestructible, we can plainly see that in any particular cases of its +manifestation in sequence-phenomena, the unconditional resemblance between +effects due to similar causes which is formulated by the law of causation +is merely the direct expression of the fact which we had previously +concluded. It seems to me, therefore, that the old-standing question +concerning the nature of causation ought now properly to be considered as +obsolete. Doubtless there will long remain a sort of hereditary tendency in +metaphysical minds to look upon cause-connection as "a mysterious tie" +between antecedent and consequent; but henceforth there is no need for +scientific minds to regard this "tie" as "mysterious" in any other sense +than the existence of energy is "mysterious." To state the law of causation +is merely to state the fact that energy is indestructible. + +And from this there also arises at once the explanation and the +justification of our belief in the uniformity of nature. If energy is, in +its relation to us, ubiquitous and persistent, it clearly follows that in +all its manifestations which collectively we call nature, similar preceding +manifestations must always determine similar succeeding manifestations; for +otherwise the energy concerned would require on one or on both of the +occasions, either to have become augmented by creation, or dissipated by +annihilation. Thus our belief in the uniformity of nature, as in the +validity of the law of causation, is merely an expression of our belief in +the ubiquitous and indestructible character of energy. + +Such being the case, we may fairly conclude that all these old-standing +"mysteries" are now merged in the one mystery of existence. And deeper than +this it is manifestly impossible that they can be merged; for it is +manifestly impossible that Existence in the abstract can ever admit of what +we call explanation. Hence we can clearly see that, in a scientific sense, +there must always remain a final mystery of things. But although we can +thus see that, from the very meaning of what we call explanation, it +follows that at the base of all our explanations there must lie a great +Inexplicable, I think that the mystery of Existence in the abstract may be +rendered less appalling if we reflect that, as opposed to Existence, there +is only one logical alternative--Non-existence. Supposing, then, our +physical explanations to have reached their highest limits by resolving all +modes of Existence into one mode--force, matter, life, and mind, being +shown but different manifestations of the same Infinite Existence--the +final mystery of things would then become resolved into the simple +question, Why is there Existence?--Why is there not Nothing? + +Let us then first ask, What is "Nothing"? Is it a mere word, which presents +no meaning as corresponding to any objective reality, or has the word a +meaning notwithstanding its being an inconceivable one? Or, otherwise +phrased, is Nothing possible or impossible? Now, although in ordinary +conversation it is generally taken for granted that Nothing is possible, +there is certainly no more ground for this supposition than there is for +its converse--viz., that Nothing is merely a word which signifies the +negation of possibility. For analysis will show that the choice between +these two counter-suppositions can only be made in the presence of +knowledge which is necessarily absent--the knowledge whether the universe +of Existence is finite or infinite. If the universe as a whole is finite, +the word Nothing would stand as a symbol to denote an unthinkable blank of +which a finite universe is the content. And forasmuch as Something and +Nothing would then become actual, as distinguished from nominal +correlatives, we could have no guarantee that, in an absolute or +transcendental sense, it may not be possible, although it is inconceivable, +for Something to become Nothing or Nothing Something. Hence, if Existence +is finite, No-existence becomes possible; and the doctrine of the +indestructibility of Existence becomes, for aught that we can tell, of a +merely relative signification. But, on the other hand, if Existence is +infinite, No-existence becomes impossible; and the doctrine of the +indestructibility of Existence becomes, in a logical sense, of an absolute +signification. For it is manifest that if the universe of Existence is +without end in space and time, the possibility of No-existence is of +necessity excluded, and the word "Nothing" thus becomes a mere negation of +possibility.[47] + +Thus, if it be conceded that the universe as a whole is infinite both in +space and time, the concession amounts to an abolition of the final mystery +of things. For all that we mean by a mystery is something that requires an +explanation, and the whole of the final mystery of things is therefore +embodied in the question, "Why is there Existence?--Why is there not +Nothing?" But if the universe of Existence be conceded infinite, this +question is sufficiently met by the answer, "Because Existence is, and +Nothing is not." If it is retorted, But this is no real answer; I reply, It +is as real as the question. For to ask, Why is there Existence? is, upon +the supposition which has been conceded, equivalent to asking, Why is the +possible possible? And if such questions cannot be answered, it is scarcely +right to say that on this account they embody a mystery; because the +questions are really not rational questions, and therefore the fact of +their not admitting of any rational answer cannot be held to show that the +questions embody any rational mystery. That there _is_ a rational mystery, +in the sense of there being something which can never be _explained_, I do +not dispute; all I assert is, that this mystery is inexplicable, only +_because there is nothing to explain_; the mystery being ultimate, to ask +for an explanation of that which, being ultimate, requires no explanation, +is irrational. Or, to state the case in another way, if it is asked, Why is +there not Nothing? it is a sufficient answer, on supposition of the +universe being infinite, to say, Because Nothing is nothing; it is merely a +word which presents no meaning, and which, so far as anything can be +conceived to the contrary, never can present any meaning. + +The above discussion has proceeded on the supposition of Existence being +infinite; but practically the same result would follow on the +counter-supposition of Existence being finite. For although in this case, +as we have seen, Non-entity would still be included within the range of +possibility, it would still be no more conceivable as such than is Entity; +and hence the question, Why is there not Nothing? would still be +irrational, seeing that, even if the possibility which the question +supposes were realised, it would in no wise tend to explain the mystery of +Something. And even if it could, the final mystery would not be thus +excluded; it would merely be transferred from the mystery of Existence to +the mystery of Non-existence. Thus under every conceivable supposition we +arrive at the same termination--viz., that in the last resort there must be +a final mystery, which, as forming the basis of all possible explanations, +cannot itself receive any explanation, and which therefore is really not, +in any proper sense of the term, a mystery at all. It is merely a fact +which itself requires no explanation, because it is a fact than which none +can be more ultimate. So that even if we suppose this ultimate fact to be +an Intelligent Being, it is clearly impossible that he should be able to +_explain_ his own existence, since the possibility of any such explanation +would imply that his existence could not be ultimate. In the sense, +therefore, of not admitting of any explanation, his existence would require +to be a mystery to himself, rendering it impossible for him to state +anything further with regard to it than this--"I am that I am." + +I do not doubt that this way of looking at the subject will be deemed +unsatisfactory at first sight, because it seems to be, as it were, a merely +logical way of cheating our intelligence out of an intuitively felt +justification for its own curiosity in this matter. But the fault really +lies in this intuitive feeling of justification not being itself +justifiable. For this particular question, it will be observed, differs +from all other possible questions with which the mind has to deal. All +other questions being questions concerning manifestations of existence +presupposed as existing, it is perfectly legitimate to seek for an +explanation of one series of manifestations in another--_i.e._, to refer a +less known group to a group better known. But the case is manifestly quite +otherwise when, having merged one group of manifestations into another +group, and this into another for an indefinite number of stages, we +suddenly make a leap to the last possible stage and ask, "Into what group +are we to merge the basis of all our previous groups, and of all groups +which can possibly be formed in the future? How are we to classify that +which contains all possible classes? Where are we to look for an +explanation of Existence?" When thus clearly stated, the question, is, as I +have said, manifestly irrational; but the point with which I am now +concerned is this--When in plain reason the question is _seen_ to be +irrational, why in intuitive sentiment should it not be _felt_ to be so? +The answer, I think, is, that the interrogative faculty being usually +occupied with questions which admit of rational answers, we acquire a sort +of intellectual habit of presupposing every wherefore to have a therefore, +and thus, when eventually we arrive at the last of all possible wherefores, +which itself supplies the basis of all possible therefores, we fail at +first to recognise the exceptional character of our position. We fail at +first to perceive that, from the very nature of this particular case, our +wherefore is deprived of the rational meaning which it had in all the +previous cases, where the possibility of a corresponding therefore was +presupposed. And failing fully to perceive this truth, our organised habit +of expecting an answer to our question asserts itself, and we experience +the same sense of intellectual unrest in the presence of this wholly +meaningless and absurd question, as we experience in the presence of +questions significant and rational. + +THE END. + + * * * * * + + +Notes + +[1] The above was written before Mr. Mill's essay on Theism was published. +Lest, therefore, my refutation may be deemed too curt, I supplement it with +Mr. Mill's remarks upon the same subject. "It may still be maintained that +the feelings of morality make the existence of God eminently desirable. No +doubt they do, and that is the great reason why we find that good men and +women cling to the belief, and are pained by its being questioned. But, +surely, it is not legitimate to assume that, in the order of the universe, +whatever is desirable is true. Optimism, even when a God is already +believed in, is a thorny doctrine to maintain, and had to be taken by +Leibnitz in the limited sense, that the universe being made by a good +being, is the best universe possible, not the best absolutely: that the +Divine power, in short, was not equal to making it more free from +imperfections than it is. But optimism, prior to belief in a God, and as +the ground of that belief, seems one of the oddest of all speculative +delusions. Nothing, however, I believe, contributes more to keep up the +belief in the general mind of humanity than the feeling of its +desirableness, which, when clothed, as it very often is, in the form of an +argument, is a _naive_ expression of the tendency of the human mind to +believe whatever is agreeable to it. Positive value the argument of course +has none." For Mill's remarks on the version of the argument dealt with in +Sec. 5, see his "Three Essays," p. 204. + +[2] The words "or not conceivable," are here used in the sense of "not +relatively conceivable," as explained in Chap. vi. + +[3] For the full discussion from which the above is an extract, see _System +of Logic_, vol. i. pp. 409-426 (8th ed.). But, substituting "psychical" for +"volitional," see also, for some mitigation of the severity of the above +statement, the closing paragraphs of my supplementary essay on "Cosmic +Theism." + +[4] Essay on Understanding--Existence of God. + +[5] Locke, _loc. cit._ + +[6] See Appendix A. + +[7] Viz., the constant association within experience of mind with certain +highly peculiar material forms; the constant proportion which is found to +subsist between the quantity of cerebral matter and the degree of +intellectual capacity--a proportion which may be clearly traced throughout +the ascending series of vertebrated animals, and which is very generally +manifested in individuals of the human species; the effects of cerebral +anaemia, anaesthetics, stimulants, narcotic poisons, and lesions of cerebral +substance. There can, in short, be no question that the whole series of +observable facts bearing upon the subject are precisely such as they ought +to be upon supposition of the materialistic theory being true; while, +contrariwise, there is a total absence of any known facts tending to +negative that theory. At the same time it must be carefully noted, that the +observed facts (and any additional number of the like kind) do not +logically warrant us in concluding that mental states are necessarily +_dependent_ upon material changes. Nevertheless, it must also be noted, +that, in the absence of positive proof of causation, it is certainly in +accordance with scientific procedure, to yield our provisional assent to an +hypothesis which undoubtedly connects a large order of constant +_accompaniments_, rather than to an hypothesis which is confessedly framed +to meet but a single one of the facts. + +Professor Clifford, in a lecture on "Body and Mind" which he delivered at +St. George's Hall, and afterwards published in the _Fortnightly Review_, +argues against the existence of God on the ground that, as Mind is always +associated with Matter within experience, there arises a presumption +against Mind existing anywhere without being thus associated, so that +unless we can trace in the disposition of the heavenly bodies some +resemblance to the conformation of cerebral structure, we are to conclude +that there is a considerable balance of probability in favour of Atheism. +Now, as this argument--if we rid it of the grotesque allusion to the +heavenly bodies--is one that is frequently met with, it seems desirable in +this place briefly to analyse it. First of all, then, the validity of the +argument depends upon the probability there is that the constant associated +of Mind with Matter within experience is due to a _causal_ connection; for +if the association in question is merely an _association_ and nothing more, +the origin of known mind is as far from being explained as it would be were +Mind never known as associated with Matter. But, in the next place, +supposing the constant association in question to be due to a causal +connection, it by no means follows that because Mind is due to Matter +within experience, therefore Mind cannot exist in any other mode beyond +experience. + +Doubtless, from analogy, there is a presumption against the hypothesis that +the same entity should exist in more than one mode at the same time; but +clearly in this case we are quite unable to estimate the value of this +presumption. Consequently, even assuming a causal connection between Matter +and Human Mind, if there is any, the slightest, indications supplied by any +other facts of experience pointing to the existence of a Divine Mind, such +indications should be allowed as much argumentative weight as they would +have had in the absence of the presumption we are considering. Hence +Professor Clifford's conclusion cannot be regarded as valid until all the +other arguments in favour of Theism have been separately refuted. Doubtless +Professor Clifford will be the first to recognise the cogency of this +criticism--if indeed it has not already occurred to him; for as I know that +he is much too clear a thinker not to perceive the validity of these +considerations, I am willing to believe that the substance of them was +omitted from his essay merely for the sake of brevity; but, for the sake of +less thoughtful persons, I have deemed it desirable to state thus clearly +that the problem of Theism cannot be solved on grounds of Materialism +alone. [This note was written before I had the advantage of Professor +Clifford's acquaintance, but now I leave it, as I leave all other parts of +this essay--viz., as it was originally written.--1878.] + +[8] To avoid burdening the text, I have omitted another criticism which may +be made on Locke's argument. "Triangle" is a word by which we designate a +certain figure, one of the properties of which is that the sum of its +angles is equal to two right angles. In other words, any figure which does +not exhibit this property is not that figure which we designate a triangle. +Hence, when Locke says he cannot conceive of a triangle which does not +present this property, it may be answered that his inability arises merely +from the fact that any figure which fails to present this property is not a +figure to which the term "triangle" can apply. Thus viewed, however, the +illustration would obviously be absurd, for the same reason that the +question of the clown is absurd, "Can you think of a horse that is just +like a cow?" What Locke evidently means is, that we cannot conceive of any +geometrical figure which presents all the other properties of a triangle +without also presenting the property in question. Now, even admitting, with +Locke, that it is as inconceivable that the entity known to us as Matter +should possess the property of causing thought as it is that the figure +which we term a triangle should posses the property of containing more than +two right angles, still it remains, for the purposes of Locke's supposed +theistic demonstration, to prove that it is an inconceivable for the entity +which we call Mind _not_ to be due to another Mind, as it is for a triangle +_not_ to contain, other than two right angles. But, further, even if it +were possible to prove this, the demonstration would make as much against +Theism as in favour of it; for if, as the illustration of the triangle +implies, we restrict the meaning of the word "Mind" to an entity one of +whose essential qualities is that it should be caused by another Mind, the +words "Supreme and Uncaused Mind" involve a contradiction in terms, just as +much as would the words "A square triangle having four right angles." It +would, therefore, seem that if we adhere to Locke's argument, and pursue it +to its conclusion, the only logical outcome would be this:--Seeing that by +the word "Mind," I expressly connote the quality of derivation from a prior +Mind, as a quality belonging no less essentially to Mind than the quality +of presenting two right angles belongs to a triangle; therefore, whatever +other attributes I ascribe to the First Cause, I must clearly exclude the +attribute Mind; and hence, whatever else such a Cause may be, it follows +from my argument that it certainly is--Not Mind. + +[9] Hamilton. + +[10] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 25-31. + +[11] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 542. + +[12] _Loc. cit._, p. 543. + +[13] Appendix to Discussions, pp. 614, 165. + +[14] Mill, in the lengthy chapter which he devotes to the freedom of the +will in his Examination, does not notice this point. + +[15] If more evidence can be wanted, it is supplied in some suggestive +facts of Psychology. For example, "From our earliest childhood, the idea of +doing wrong (that is, of doing what is forbidden, or what is injurious to +others) and the idea of punishment are presented to the mind together, and +the intense character of the impressions causes the association between +them to attain the highest degree of closeness and intimacy. Is it strange, +or unlike the usual processes of the human mind, that in these +circumstances we should retain the feeling and forget the reason on which +it is grounded? But why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reason +has never, in our early education, been presented to the mind. The only +ideas presented have been those of wrong and punishment, and an inseparable +association has been created between these directly, without the help of +any intervening idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous feelings +of mankind regard punishment and a wrong-doer as naturally fitted to each +other--as a conjunction appropriate in itself, independently of any +consequences," &c.--Mill, Examination of Hamilton, p. 599. + +[16] Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107. + +[17] Throughout these considerations I have confined myself to the +_positive_ side of the subject. My argument being of the nature of a +criticism on the erroneous inferences which are drawn from the _good_ +qualities of our moral nature, I thought it desirable, for the sake of +clearness, not to burden that argument by the additional one as to the +source of the _evil_ qualities of that nature. This additional argument, +however, will be found briefly stated at the close of my supplementary +essay on Professor Flint's "Theism." On reading that additional argument, I +think that any candid and unbiassed mind must conclude that, alike in what +it is _not_ as well as in what it _is_, our moral nature points to a +natural genesis, as distinguished from a supernatural cause. + +[18] The illustration to which I refer is that of the watershed of a +country being precisely adapted to draining purposes. The rivers just fit +their own particular beds: the latter occupy the lowest grounds, and get +broader and deeper as they advance; pebbles, gravel, and sand all occupy +the best teleological situations, &c., &c. + +[19] "Order of Nature," by the Rev. Baden Powell, M.A., F.R.S., &c., 1859, +pp. 228-241. + +[20] I think it desirable to state that I perceived this great truth before +I was aware that it had been perceived also by Mr. Spencer. His statement +of it now occurs in the short chapter of _First Principles_ entitled +"Relations between Forces." So far as I an able to ascertain, no one has +hitherto considered this important doctrine in its immediate relation to +the question of Theism. + +In using the term "persistence of force," I am aware that I am using a term +which is not unopen to criticism. But as Mr. Spencer's writings have +brought this term into such general use among speculative thinkers, it +seemed to me undesirable to modify it. Questions of mere terminology are +without any importance in a discussion of this kind, provided that the +terms are universally understood to mean what they are intended to mean; +and I think that the signification which Mr. Spencer attaches to his term, +"persistence of force," is sufficiently precise. Therefore, adopting his +usage, whenever throughout the following pages I speak of force as +persisting, what I intend to be understood is, that there is a +something--call it force, or energy, or _x_--which, so far as experience or +imagination can extend, is, in its relation to us, ubiquitous and +illimitable; or, in other words, that it universally presents the property +of permanence. (See, for a more detailed explanation, supplementary essay, +"On the Final Mystery of Things.") + +[21] Hamilton may here be especially noticed, because he went so far as to +maintain that the phenomena of the external world, taken by themselves, +would ground a valid argument to the negation of God. Although I cannot but +think that this position was a conspicuously irrational one for any +competent thinker to occupy before the scientific doctrine of the +correlation of the forces had been enunciated, nevertheless I cannot lose +the opportunity of alluding to this remarkable feature in Sir William +Hamilton's philosophy, showing as it does that same prophetic forestalling +of the results which have since followed from the discovery of the +conservation of energy, as was shown by his no less remarkable theory of +causation. (See supplementary essay "On the Final Mystery of Things.") + +[22] Mr. N. Lockyer's work is now supplying important evidence on these +points.--1878. + +[23] It will of course be observed that if matter and force are identical, +the unification is complete. + +[24] Herbert Spencer. + +[25] It may here be observed that the above discussion would not be +affected by the view of Professor Clifford and others, that natural law is +to be regarded as having a subjective rather than an objective +signification--that what we call a natural law is merely an arbitrary +selection made by ourselves of certain among natural processes. The +discussion would not be affected by this view, because the argument is +really based upon the existence of a cosmos as distinguished from a chaos; +and therefore it would be rather an intensification of the argument than +otherwise to point out that, for the maintenance of a cosmos, natural laws, +as conceived by us, would be inadequate. And this seems a fitting place to +make the almost superfluous remark, that throughout this present essay I +have used the words "Natural Law," "Supreme Law-giver," &c., in an +apparently unguarded sense, merely in order to avoid needless obscurity. +Fully sensible as I am of the misleading nature of the analogy which these +words embody, I have yet adopted them for the sake of perspicuity--being +careful, however, never to allow the false analogy which they express to +enter into an argument on either side of the question. Thus, even where it +is said that the existence of Natural Law points to the existence of a +Supreme Law-maker, the argument might equally well be phrased: The +existence of an orderly cosmos points to the existence of a disposing mind. + +[26] First Principles, pp. 27-29. + +[27] It may be here observed that this quality of indefiniteness on the +part of such reasoning is merely a practical outcome of the theoretical +considerations adduced in Chapter V. For as we there saw that the ratio +between the known and the unknown is in this case wholly indefinite, it +follows that any symbols derived from the region of the known--even though +such symbols be the highest generalities which the latter region +affords--must be wholly indefinite when projected into the region of the +unknown. Or rather let us say, that as the region of the unknown is but a +progressive continuation of the region of the known, the determinate value +of symbols of thought varies inversely as the distance--or, not improbably, +as the square of the distance--from the sphere of the known at which they +are applied. + +[28] _i.e._, illegitimate in a _relative_ sense. The conclusion is +legitimate enough in a _formal_ sense, and as establishing a probability of +some _unassignable_ degree of value. But it would be illegitimate if this +quality of indefiniteness were disregarded, and the conclusion supposed to +possess the same character of actual probability as it has of formal +definition. + +[29] In order not to burden the text with details, I have presented these +reflections in their most general terms. Thus, if it be granted that cosmic +harmony results from the combined action of general laws, and that these +laws are the necessary result of the primary qualities of force and matter, +this the most general statement of the atheistic position includes all more +special considerations as a genus includes its species; and therefore it +would not signify, for the purposes of the atheistic argument, whether or +not any such more special considerations are possible. Nevertheless, for +the sake of completeness, I may here observe that we are not wholly without +indications in nature of the physical causation whereby the effect of +cosmic harmony is produced. The universal tendency of motion to become +rhythmical--itself, as Mr. Spencer was the first to show, a necessary +consequence of the persistence of force--is, so to speak, a conservative +tendency: it sets a premium against natural cataclysms. But a more +important consideration is this,--that during the evolution of natural law +in the way suggested in Chapter IV., as every newly evolved law came into +existence it must have been, as it were, grafted on the stock of all +pre-existing natural laws, and so would not enter the cosmic system as an +element of confusion, but rather as an element of further progress. For +instance, when, with the origin of organic nature, the law of natural +selection entered upon the cosmos, it was grafted upon the pre-existing +stock of other natural laws, and so combined within them in unity. And a +little thought will show that it was impossible that it should do +otherwise; for it was impossible that natural selection could ever produce +organisms which would ever be able by their existence to conflict with the +pre-existing system of astronomic or geologic laws; seeing that organisms, +being a product of later evolution than these laws, would either have to be +adapted to them or perish. And hence the new law of natural selection, +which consists in so adapting organisms to the pre-existing laws that they +must either conform to them or die. Now, I have chosen the case of natural +selection because, as alluded to in the text, it is the law of all others +which is the most conspicuously effective in producing the harmonious +complexity of nature. But the same kind of considerations may be seen to +apply to most of the other general laws with which we are acquainted, +particularly if we bear in mind that the general outcome of their united +action as we observe it--the cosmic harmony on which so much stress is +laid--is not _perfectly_ harmonious. Cataclysms--whether it be the capture +of an insect, or the ruin of a star--although events of comparatively rare +occurrence if at any given time we take into account the total number of +insects or the total number of stars, are events which nevertheless do +occasionally happen. And the fact that even cataclysms take place in +accordance with so-called natural law, serves but to emphasise the +consideration on which we are engaged--viz., that the total result of the +combined action of general laws is not such as to produce perfect order. +Lastly, if the answer is made that human ideas of perfect order may not +correspond with the highest ideal of such order, I observe that to make +such a answer is merely to abandon the subject of discussion; for if a +theist rests his argument on the basis of our human conception of order, he +is not free to maintain his argument and at the same time to abandon its +basis at whatever point the latter may be shown untenable. + +[30] Since the above was written, the first volume of Mr. Spencer's +"Sociology" has been published; and those who may not as yet have read the +first half of that work are here strongly recommended to do so; for Mr. +Spencer has there shown, in a more connected and conclusive manner than has +ever been shown before, how strictly natural is the growth of all +superstitions and religions--_i.e._, of all the theories of personal agency +in nature.--1878. + +[31] Herbert Spencer's Essays, vol. iii. pp. 246-249 (1874). + +[32] This is the truly inconceivable element in the physical theory. As I +have shown in the pleading on the side of Atheism, the supposed +inconceivability of cosmic harmony being due to mindless forces, is not of +such a kind as wholly refuses to be surmounted by symbolic conceptions of a +sufficiently abstract character. But it is impossible, by the aid of any +symbols, to gain a conception of an eternal existence. And I may here point +out, that if Mind is said to be the cause of evolution, not only does the +statement involve the inconceivable proposition that such a Mind must be +infinite in respect to its powers of supervision, direction, &c.; but the +statement also involves a necessary alternative between two additional +inconceivable propositions--viz., either that such a Mind must have been +eternal, or that it must have come into existence without a cause. In this +respect, therefore, it would seem that the theory of Atheism has the +advantage over that of Theism; for while the former theory is under the +necessity of embodying only a single inconceivable term, the latter theory +is under the necessity of embodying two such terms. + +[33] Mr. Herbert Spencer has treated of this subject in his memorable +controversy with Mill on the "Universal Postulate" (see _Psychology_, Sec. +427), and refuses to entertain the term "Inconceivable" as applicable to +any propositions other than those wherein "the terms cannot, by any effort, +be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition +asserts between them." That is to say, he limits the term "Inconceivable" +to that which is _absolutely_ inconceivable; and he then proceeds to affirm +that all propositions "which admit of being framed in thought, but which +are so much at variance with experience, in which its terms have habitually +been otherwise united, that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation +without effort," ought properly to be termed "_incredible_" propositions. +Now I cannot see that the class "Incredible propositions" is, as this +definition asserts, identical with the class which I have termed +"Relatively inconceivable" propositions. For example, it is a familiar +observation that, on looking at the setting sun, we experience an almost, +if not quite, insuperable difficulty in _conceiving_ the sun's apparent +motion as due to our own actual motion, and yet we experience no difficulty +in _believing_ it. Conversely, I entertain but little difficulty in +_conceiving_--_i.e._, imagining--a shark with a mammalian heart, and yet it +would require extremely strong evidence to make me _believe_ that such an +animal exists. The truth appears to be that our language is deficient in +terms whereby to distinguish between that which is wholly inconceivable +from that which is with difficulty conceivable. This, it seems to me, was +the principle reason of the dispute between Spencer and Mill above alluded +to,--the former writer having always used the word "Inconceivable" in the +sense of "Absolutely inconceivable," and the latter having apparently used +it--in his _Logic_ and elsewhere--in both senses. I have endeavoured to +remedy this defect in the language by introducing the qualifying words, +"Absolutely" and "Relatively," which, although not appropriate words, are +the best that I am able to supply. The conceptive faculty of the individual +having been determined by the experience of the race, that which is +inconceivable by the intelligence of the race may be said to be +inconceivable to the intelligence of the individual in an _absolute_ sense; +no effort on his part can enable him to surmount the organically imposed +conditions of his conceptive faculty. But that which is inconceivable +merely to one individual or generation, while it is not inconceivable to +the intelligence of the race, may properly be said to be inconceivable to +the intelligence of that individual or generation only in a _relative_ +sense; apart from the special condition to which the individual +intelligence has been subjected, there is nothing in the conditions of +human intelligence as such to prevent the thing from being conceived. +[While this work has been passing through the press, I have found that Mr. +G. H. Lewes has already employed the above terms in precisely the same +sense as that which is above explained.--1878.] + +[34] I should here like to have added some considerations on Sir W. +Hamilton's remarks concerning the effect of training upon the mind in this +connection; but, to avoid being tedious, I shall condense what I have to +say into a few sentences. What Hamilton maintains is very true, viz., that +the study of classics, moral and mental philosophy, &c., renders the mind +more capable of believing in a God than does the study of physical science. +The question, however, is, Which class of studies ought to be considered +the more authoritative in this matter? I certainly cannot see what title +classics, history, political economy, &c., have to be regarded at all; and +although the mental and moral sciences have doubtless a better claim, still +I think they must be largely subordinate to those sciences which deal with +the whole domain of nature besides. Further, I should say that there is no +very strong _affirmative_ influence created on the mind in this respect by +any class of studies; and that the only reason why we so generally find +Theism and classics, &c., united, is because we so seldom find classics, +&c., and physical science united; the _negative_ influence of the latter, +in the case of classical minds, being therefore generally absent. + +[35] The qualities named are only known in a relative sense, and therefore +the apparent contradiction may be destitute of meaning in an absolute +sense. + +[36] All the quotations in this Appendix have been taken from the chapter +on "Our knowledge of the existence of a God," and from the early part of +that on "The extent of human knowledge," together with the appended letter +to the Bishop of Worcester. + +[37] A criticism of Mr. John Fiske's proposed system of theology as +expounded in his work on "Cosmic Philosophy" (Macmillan & Co., 1874). + +[38] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 87-89. + +[39] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 429, 430. + +[40] Ibid., p. 441. + +[41] Ibid., pp. 450, 451. + +[42] Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pp. 159-161. + +[43] We thus see that the question whether there may not be "something +quasi-psychical in the constitution of things" is a question which does not +affect the position of Theism as it has been left by a negation of the +self-conscious personality of God. But as the speculations on which this +question has been reared are in themselves of much philosophical interest, +I may here observe that, in one form or another, they have been dimly +floating in men's minds for a long time past. Thus, excepting the degree of +certainty with which it is taught, we have in Mr. Spencer's words above +quoted a reversion to the doctrine of Buddha; for, as "force is +persistent," all that would happen on death, supposing the doctrine true, +would be an escape of the "circumscribed aggregate" of units forming the +individual consciousness into the unlimited abyss of similar units +constituting the "Absolute Being" of the Cosmists, or the "Divine Essence" +of the Buddhists. Again, the doctrine in a vague form pervades the +philosophy of Spinoza, and is next clearly enunciated by Wundt. Lastly, in +a recently published very remarkable essay "On the Nature of Things in +Themselves," Professor Clifford arrives at a similar doctrine by a +different route. The following is the conclusion to which he +arrives:--"That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplest +feeling is a complex, I shall call _Mind-stuff_. A moving molecule of +inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a +small piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to +form the film on the under side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff +which go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of +Sentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and +nervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff +are so combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say, +changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked +together that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other. +When matters take the complex form of a living human brain, the +corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having +intelligence and volition." (Mind, January, 1878.) + +[44] Theism, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the +University of Edinburgh, &c. + +[45] Such being the objects in view, I have not thought it necessary to +extend this criticism into anything resembling a review of Professor +Flint's work as a whole; but, on the contrary, I have aimed rather at +confining my observations to those parts of his treatise which embody the +current arguments from teleology alone. I may here observe, however, in +general terms, that I consider all his arguments to have been answered by +anticipation in the foregoing examination of Theism. I may also here +observe, that throughout the following essay I have used the word "design" +in the sense in which it is used by Professor Flint himself. This sense is +distinctly a different one from that which the word bears in the writings +of the Paley, Bell, and Chalmers school. For while in the latter writings, +as pointed out in Chapter III., the word bears its natural meaning of a +certain _process of thought_, in Professor Flint's work it is used rather +as expressive of a _product of intelligence_. In other words, "design," as +used by Professor Flint, is synonymous with _intention_, irrespective of +the particular psychological process by which the intention may have been +put into effect. + +[46] Op. cit., pp. 255-257. + +[47] Let it be observed that there is a distinction between what I may call +substantial and formal existence. Thus there is no doubt that flowers as +flowers perish, or become non-existent; but the substances of which they +were composed persist. And, in this connection, I may here point out that +if the universe is infinite in space and time, the universe as a whole +would present substantial existence as standing out of relation to space +and time, whereas innumerable portions of the universe present only formal +existences, because standing in relation both to space and time. Thus, for +instance, the solar system, as a solar system, must have an end in time as +it has a boundary in space; but as the substance of which it consists will +not become extinguished by the extinction of the system, it may not now +stand in any real relation to what we call space and time. I am inclined to +think that it is upon the idea of non-existence in this formal sense that +we construct a pseud-idea of non-existence in a substantial sense; but it +is evident that if the universe as a whole is absolute, this pseud-idea +must represent as impossibility. And from this it follows, that if +existence is infinite in space and time, every _quantum_ of it with which +our experience comes into relation must represent, as its essential +quality, that quality which we find to be presented by the substance of +things--the quality, that is, of persistence. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Candid Examination of Theism, by +George John Romanes + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM *** + +***** This file should be named 19003.txt or 19003.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/9/0/0/19003/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of +public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital +Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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